Korean Confucianism

OMNES : The Journal of Multicultural Society2014. Vol.5 No.1, pp. 1-21.
Special Issue
The Revival of Confucianism in an Age of
Globalization :
Towards a Critical Confucianism
Wu Yun & Daniel A. Bell
Abstract
Confucianism has been revived in many spheres of social life in mainland
China. In this age of globalization, Confucianism has to face several challenges,
including global issues that all states have to deal with together such as global
justice, global environmental issues, and global peace as well as domestic issues
such as economic development and social justice. A framework of Left-
Confucianism which may cope with these challenges in a more promising
way will be proposed in this paper. It tries to combine the core values of
the original Confucianism with the socialist values that have had a great
impact on Chinas development over the past century or so. This combination
of socialism and Confucianism does not merely take socialism as the standard
but also takes Confucianism equally seriously. In this paper, we show how
the core values of Left Confucianism can help us to think about domestic
and global challenges in innovative ways.
Key wordsCritical Confucianism, globalization, international responsibility,
distributive justice
Introduction
Is it not delightful to have friends come from afar?(Analects, 1:1)
1)

Confuciuss statement about the good life in the very beginning of the
Analects was echoed in the Birds Nest at the opening ceremony of the
2008 Beijing Olympics. The opening ceremony, which was vetted by
the Chinese government, offered Confucianism to the rest of the world,
2 OMNES : The Journal of Multicultural Society2014. Vol.5 No.1
yet Marx and Mao were entirely absent from the event, as though the
twentieth century was scratched from collective memory. This somewhat
unexpected phenomenon reminds us of the fact that Confucianism is now
being revived in mainland China.
The revival of Confucianism is not just government led; it can be
seen in many spheres of social life, such as the establishment of unofficial
Confucian academies that teach the Confucian classics and promote
Confucian values, the boom of Confucian websites which provide a plat-
form for the connection and communication of people who share the
same interests in Confucianism, and organized worship-ceremonies of
Confucius.
2)
What is notable about the current revival of Confucianism
is its special context, i.e., a global age. Confucianism, which is strongly
this-world-oriented,
3)
is always sensitive to its social background and can
respond to the challenges that globalization brings forth. These challenges
include the domestic issues that each state has to face and solve, such
as economic development, social justice, and social relationships as well
as the important global issues that all states have to deal with together,
such as global justice, global environmental issues, and global peace.
What can Confucianism say on these issues? Can it successfully cope
with key domestic challenges? Can it offer a distinct perspective for the
important global issues?
Confucianism is a rich and diverse tradition and nowadays many
forms of Confucianism are being revived, such as the de-politicized inter-
pretation of Confucianism by Yu Dan,
4)
the historical studies and inter-
pretations of key figures in the Confucian tradition that are not meant
to have direct bearing on contemporary society, and Liberal
Confucianism which is promoted largely by scholars outside of mainland
China. However, it is worth asking what kind of Confucianism ought
to be revived, especially when confronted with the challenges mentioned
above. In this paper, a framework of critical Confucianism will be
advocated. Critical Confucianism inherits this-worldly-spirit of the tradi-
tional Confucianism and concerns about the social and political problems
in the real world. Similar to Confucianism in the past, it is also willing
OMNES : The Journal of Multicultural Society2014. Vol.5 No.1 3
to learn from others;
5)
critical Confucianism tries to combine the core
values of the original Confucianism with the socialist values which
have had a great impact on Chinas development over the past century
or so. Hence, we term our interpretation Left-Confucianism, meaning
that it aims to maintain a critical spirit and to learn from aspects of
the socialist tradition; it is also meant to contrast with Conservative
Confucianism that is meant to justify the status quo. This combination
of socialism and Confucianism does not merely take socialism as the
standard but also takes Confucianism equally seriously. It aims to influ-
ence contemporary politics, but at the same time remains separate from
state power and orthodoxy, always ready to point to the gap between
the ideals and the social reality. Our paper focuses on what Left
Confucianism could and should say facing important domestic and global
challenges.
Global Challenges
Confucianism takes a global perspective and does not restrict the
application of its doctrines to certain states, regions, or ethnic groups.
Inheriting the global perspective, Left Confucianism has a natural concern
for global challenges and tries to resolve them in a Confucian way. As
Zhao Tingyang (2005) points out, in this global era, when China be-
comes an important part of the world, we must discuss Chinese cultures
implication for the world. China has the potential to become a power
that is responsible to the world.
6)
To be more concrete, Chinese scholars
such as Kang Xiaoguang (2007) emphasizes that Chinas soft power
should be built on Confucianism.
7)
Left Confucianism agrees that China
should be responsible to the world and that Confucianism, which has
been the core of Chinese social and political thought, should take the
lead by offering its distinctive perspective. Generally speaking, regarding
global issues, Left Confucianism is inspired by the Confucian concept
of tianxia and tries to draw implications from it.
Tianxia, literally, means the entire world under Heaven (or Sky).
The Confucian ideal of tianxia is a normative moral and political order
of the whole world, rather than the actually existing world order.
Politically, tianxia is the superior unit in the Confucian political system
and has superior political authority. Morally, it is based on the Confucian
belief that all human beings share the common human nature of ren
(humanity and compassion), and is the ultimate stage for the realization
of the principle of ren which is considered to be universally applicable
for Confucianism. In the ideal state of tianxia, which is specifically
termed as Da Tong (Great Harmony) in Liji (Book of Rituals), all people
are freed from the state of being disadvantaged and live in a harmony
with each other. The Confucian tianxia is an ideal ruled by a humane
ruler who realizes and extends Confucian moral principles through politi-
cal authority.
Tianxia is distinctive in certain aspects and has several key im-
plications for the global challenges of the day. Today, the state is regarded
as the core and superior political unit in the contemporary international
political system. But an important feature of tianxia is that it is not
state-centric. This is not to deny that the state may have a legitimate
place in the Confucian political system, either because the state is the
best means currently available for realizing Confucian values or as a
way of institutionalizing the Confucian idea that love diminishes in in-
tensity as it extends beyond the family. However, the Confucian per-
spective aims far beyond state-centricness because of the broader view
of tianxia. For example, Confucius himself was quite proud of his moth-
er-states culture (Luguo),
8)
but he did not restrict his mission to the
empowerment of Lu. Instead, he traveled to many states so that he could
serve as a political advisor and thus help to apply and extend the principle
of ren (humanity and compassion) to the whole world. Based on the
perspective of tianxia, contemporary Confucians question the idea of state
sovereignty. For instance, Jiang Qing (2009) criticizes the idea of state
sovereignty and insists that sovereignty lies with heaven (Tian) rather
than the state.
9)
Hence, Confucianism takes account of the interests of the whole
worlds people in controversies regarding global justice. The consid-
eration of the most disadvantaged, for example, does not end in the do-
mestic sphere and should not be understood in the sense of a closed
community. Instead, it should be understood in the context of the entire
world. In line with this Confucian outlook, the global economic system
is the source of morally problematic outcomes that need to be remedied.
For example, as Thomas Pogge (2002) has argued, the current rules which
govern international trade and international aid often operate to the ad-
vantage of the interests of developed and powerful countries and to the
detriment of the poorest within poor countries.
10)
Those rich countries
may do well in coping with domestic justice issues, but fail to take poor
people outside of their own boundaries into account and thus fail to meet
the standards of global justice. To overcome this failure, for Left
Confucianism, the Confucian perspective of tianxia should be interpreted
in ways that support a just global economic system, prescribing global
norms regulating international economic relationships, and securing a de-
cent life for the most disadvantaged people worldwide, regardless of their
nationality.
The Confucian tianxia does not only take foreigners interests into
account, it also considers the interests of different generations. It is a
comprehensive political order comprised of people of all generations, in-
cluding ancestors, the current generation, and future generations. To a
great extent, Tianxia is regarded as a common estate which is built up
together through numerous generations efforts. The ancestral heritage
ought to be highly respected, cherished, and promoted by the current
generation, and then transmitted to future generations.
11)
Such an ideal
may help overcome the short-sightedness of the current generation that
often pursues its own interests and ignores the interests of ancestors and
future generations. Left Confucianism takes this perspective of tianxia
to be especially relevant to global environmental issues. If the current
generation regards the eco-environment of the world as a heritage the
ancestors handed down and as an estate that should be bestowed to the
future generation without diminishment, then the assignment of many
important global environmental protocols would not be as difficult as
it is now.
Another important feature of the Confucian ideal of tianxia is that
rulers seek to govern by means of morally justified policies, not simply
realpolitik. A political power that rules by hegemony or tyranny may
be a great power politically, but it lacks moral legitimacy because it
aims to grab resources and expand its power, often by means of coercion
and violence. However, a world order ruled by humane authorities ulti-
mately aims to realize the virtues of ren in the whole world and this
aim determines its peace-oriented orientation. Confucius said that for the
morally qualified rulers, If distant populations are still not won over,
they persuade them to join them through the cultivation of their refine-
ment and excellence.
12)
So, the establishment of moral authority is not
another means for grabbing population and resources. Instead, people who
voluntarily join the community from outside should be well treated.
[O]nce they have joined them, [the qualified rulers] make them feel
secure. They are obliged to be provided with the sustenance of life and
also a sense of belonging and security.
The difference between the Confucian tianxia and imperialism is
obvious. Imperialism is the hegemony-ruled order, which uses coercion
and force to dominate and colonize. In the imperial system, people from
the subdued countries and regions are exploited and not treated as genuine
members of the system, but merely as means for producing wealth.
Because of Confucianisms impact, historically in the Sino-centric world
order, a tributary system was adopted to manage the central kingdoms
relations with other countries. To an important extent, this system was
basically based on voluntary participation and it evolved primarily as
a response to deal with foreigners who wished to have trading or diplo-
matic relations with China (Chan, 2008).
13)
Left Confucianism regards
the moral legitimacy and peace orientation of tianxia to be important
for China today. Given Chinas rising power, as Yan Xuetong points
out, it is important to think about what kind of a power China ought
to be. Based on such values as tianxia, he implies that China should
not become a power that manipulates the world without sufficient moral
considerations, which might draw the world into conflicts and even wars.
Instead, China should try to become a power built upon moral legitimacy,
which would bring forth a more stable and secure world order (Yan,
2009).
14)
Under the Confucian system of tianxia, the relationship between
states is regulated by a set of rituals prescribed by authoritative sage
rulers past or present, and is thus not determined by their respective
powers. For example, Confucius condemned the powerful Jishi states
invasion of its vulnerable neighbor on the grounds that it violated the
rituals prescribed by the former sage kings.
15)
Recognizing and respecting
the authority of rituals, the international order is not a product of pure
power relations, but subject to moral assessment. However, for
Confucianism, rituals regulating the international relationship are not ega-
litarian in the modern sense, instead, they are hierarchical. Xunzi fa-
mously argued for the desirability of the hierarchical rituals in regulating
international relationships because he believed that they can better curb
violence among states.
16)

But this should not be understood as substituting moral standards
with realpolitik. The differentiation in the rituals is in terms of different
states international responsibilities. Big powers ought to shoulder more
responsibilities and obligations, while the weaker ones take on less. Left
Confucianism appreciates this differentiation in terms of responsibilities.
Yan Xuetong draws implication from Xunzis interpretation of the hier-
archical rituals between different states and points out, The differ-
entiation in the international norms should be determined by states inter-
national positions. For the big powers that are in the center of the world,
there should be stricter norms. While for the marginalized states that
are far from the center, there should be looser norms (Yan, 2009, p.
156).
17)
Yan argues that this is unequal but fair, and gives an example
in international economic cooperation; the cooperation between China
and ASEAN requires that China, prior to other countries, implement
zero-tariff on agricultural products, which effectively promotes
cooperation. In contrast, the cooperation between Japan and ASEAN has
stagnated because Japan insists on equal tariffs (Yan, 2009).
18)
The hier-
archical rituals also have implications for the international political order.
For example, the United Nations assesses member states contributions
to its regular budget. Due to its great economic growth, China has shown
its willingness to shoulder greater responsibilities and pay more
contributions.
19)
On the issue of world security, as Yan argues, different
states should take varied responsibilities. For instance, in the nuclear
non-proliferation mechanism, nuclear countries ought to strictly obey the
pact and meanwhile guarantee nuclear security for countries without nu-
clear power.
Domestic Challenges
The section above analyses what Confucianism can contribute with
respect to dealing with some key global challenges. However, the realiza-
tion of the ideal of tianxiaa world without any territorial boundariesis
an ultimate goal that cannot all be achieved in one step. For now and
the foreseeable future, the state may be a necessary second best system
for realizing key Confucian values. To the extent possible, Confucian
moral principles would still inform policy, but they would be done in
the context of modern-day states. For example, the right to immigrate
to a state with a Confucian moral foundation would be determined more
by cultural factorssuch as affinity to Confucian valuesthan blood or
ethnicity. Let us focus on more details on issues of state governance
such as social justice and social solidarity considered from a Left
Confucian perspective (Bell, 2010).
20)
As noted above, Confucianism has a broad concern for the well-be-
ing of the most disadvantaged in the world. However, this broad concern
and care is deeply rooted in the relatively intense love of ones family
and community and as a natural extension of it. In this sense, for
Confucians the realization of the domestic justice is an even stronger
obligation.
But the Confucian approach to domestic justice may differ from
social democratic rights-based approaches. Socialists and Confucians seek
to reduce the gap between rich and poor. In Western countries, socialists
also tend to favor social equality, that is, a society where people treat
each other as equals regardless of status. To the extent possible, the eld-
erly and the young as well as bosses and assistants should disregard social
status when they engage in everyday social behavior; for example, they
should address each other on a first name basis. There may be several
reasons why social and economic equality are thought to go together.
One reason is that an ideal society would do away with all power relation-
ships, whether based on social status or class (modern liberal ideas, such
as John Rawlss original position and Jurgen Habermass ideal speech
situation, are meant to express the ideal of equal power). Another is
that social equality is more likely to contribute to economic equality;
the more likely people treat each other as social equals, the more likely
they are to support measures that reduce the gap between rich and poor.
In China, it is widely acknowledged that the first priority should
be to address the huge domestic gap between rich and poor and to secure
the interests of the disadvantaged. However, for Confucianism the way
to reduce the gap between rich and poor is not necessarily egalitarian.
Confucians are realists in the sense that they take for granted that power
relationships will exist in large-scale societies and the question is how
to make those power relationships work for the interests of the powerless.
And here is another Confucian characteristic: Confucians worry less about
social hierarchies, particularly hierarchies based on age and achievement.
If a choice must be made between social and economic equality, then
Confucians would choose economic equality and social inequalities
should be made to work for economic equality.
How might that work? Xunzi proposed the idea of social rituals
that include people of different social status. By participating in common
rituals, those with more status come to develop feelings of care for the
others and thus become more willing to do things in their economic
interest. For example, a boss in Confucian-influenced Japan or South
Korea might enjoy singing karaoke with a worker. The ritual is hier-
archicalthe boss sings first and perhaps for a longer period, but after
a period of singing and drinking affective bonds are strengthened and
the boss is less likely to dismiss the worker in difficult economic times.
Such rituals help to explain the practice of lifelong employment in large
Japanese and Korean corporations. More generally, such inclusive rituals
help to explain why Japan and Koreaperhaps the most socially hier-
archical societies in East Asiaalso have relatively equal distributions
of wealth and do not suffer from huge unemployment problems in times
of economic hardship.
There may be a few small societies such as Norway that are rela-
tively homogenous and endowed with substantial natural resources that
can afford equality all the way through, but the Confucian recognizes
that the choice for most societies is between a socially egalitarian society
like the United States where the way to express power typically takes
the form of wealth and societies governed by informal rituals that express
differences in social status and where the powerful do not need to rely
on material wealth to show their superiority to the same extent. For
the Confucian, the latter society is preferable and the key is to promote
rituals involving the powerful and the powerless so that the rich are made
to feel a sense of community with the powerless and thus are less likely
to seek other forms of domination such as material wealth.
Another difference between Western socialists and Confucians is that
the former are more likely to favor political and civil rights in cases
of conflicts with economic rights meant to secure material equality. The
US Constitution expresses the basic liberal preference for civil and politi-
cal rights. Even left liberals like John Rawls stipulate without much argu-
ment that civil and political rights have precedence over principles of
economic justice in cases of conflict. Rawls does allow for very poor
societies on the verge of starvation to prioritize the right to food, but
that is about as far as most left-liberal in the West are prepared to go
in terms of sacrificing civil and political rights in the interests of econom-
ic rights.
In East Asia, it is not just the Chinese Communist Party that says
the right to food comes first. The idea that the state has an obligation
to deal with material deprivation goes back more than two thousand years
Mencius famously defended the well-field system that provides for a
relatively equal distribution of land at the local community level on the
grounds that most people need the basic means of subsistence in order
to develop their moral natures. In Western political history, by contrast,
poverty was considered a problem for political stability or a matter for
charity until the eighteenth century or so. Hence, it should not be surpris-
ing that the obligation to secure peoples means of subsistence is widely
held to be a value that trumps other political values in cases of conflict.
China is probably beyond the Rawlsian minimum, meaning that
few Chinese are starving or malnourished, and yet the idea that electoral
democracy should wait until the economy is more developed is not nearly
as controversial as it might be in left-liberal circles in the West. For
example, the influential New Leftist scholar Wang Shaoguang argues that
the Hu-Wen administration has been aggressively tackling the problem
of economic inequality and promoting social welfare reforms the last
few years (Wang, 2008a).
21)
The increased focus on the publics prior-
ities, according to Wang, is partly explained by increased opportunities
for citizens to influence the process of policy formation by such means
as the internet and the mass media (Wang, 2008b).
22)
Perhaps economic
rights might be even more secure under a fully elected government, but
there is plenty of empirical evidence that democratization at low levels
of wealth may hinder economic growth (Peerenboom, 2007).
23)
The his-
tory of other modernizing East Asian countries suggests that strong bu-
reaucratic states in non-democratic contexts can successfully promote rel-
atively egalitarian forms of economic development. At some point, that
same history shows that the regimes will need to allow for political partic-
ipation that gives more voice to the disadvantaged, but political change
need not come all at once, particularly in these turbulent times. And
China, so large and diverse, is a unique case. The most likely optimistic
scenario is experimentation with mixtures of different forms of political
participation at sub-national levels of government, taking what works,
and then adaptation at the national level. That is how economic reforms
proceeded over the last three decades, and such a pragmatic spirit may
inspire political reforms over the next three.
Other than general concern for basic material well-being, socialists
and Left Confucians both have strong concern for the disadvantaged.
They can agree that the governments first obligation is to provide for
the disadvantaged in society. To a certain extent, they can also agree
about what it means to be disadvantaged; it means being deprived of
material goods that underpin any decent conception of the good life. But
the Confucian would add that being disadvantaged is not just about lack-
ing money. An equally serious harm is being deprived of family members
and friends that make up the good life. Hence, when Mencius says the
government should give first consideration to old men without wives,
old women without husbands, old people without children, and young
children without fathers, he does not just mean that people are materially
poor. For Mencius, they are disadvantaged (partly, if not mainly) because
they are deprived of key human relations. Such views help to explain
why East Asian states with a Confucian heritage often rely on the family
to provide welfare services, with the state stepping in to help those with-
out family members. For example, health care insurance in Singapore
is family rather than individual basedwith family members responsible
for each others insurance, including the obligation of adult children to
take out insurance for elderly parents. The state takes responsibility for
elderly parents without relatives. Such insurance schemes might seem
peculiar in Western countries, but they are not nearly as controversial
in East Asian countries with a Confucian heritage.
Both socialists and Confucians would also agree that justice in the
distribution of economic goods is a foundation for a healthy society.
However, it does not guarantee social solidarity, which is also central
to the both traditions. In the West, socialists have argued for realizing
solidarity by different means. For French revolutionaries, the task was
to change the political system as well as hierarchical social practices,
such as banning the use of the formal personal pronoun vous in favor
of the informal tu. For Marxists, the path to solidarity lies in violent
class revolution that would abolish private ownership of the means of
production. Social democrats argue for realizing the value of solidarity
by means of a state enforced system of equal rights for all citizens.
The Confucian way to solidarity is different in both means and ends.
The idea is expressed in the famous opening passage of the Great
Learning:
The extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things.
When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when knowl-
edge is extended, the will is sincere; when the will is sincere, the
mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life is culti-
vated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regu-
lated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and
when the state is in order, there is peace throughout the world (Tian
Xia).
The idea is that ties should be extended to others, starting from
the family to the state and ultimately to the whole world. But the end
is not a universal solidarity where all treat each other as equals. Rather,
ties are extended with diminishing intensity, so that strangers will be
treated well but without the same degree of love shared among family
members.
And how is this ideal of graded love to be realized? Confucians
have emphasized two mechanisms. The first is to learn care and compas-
sion within the family and then extend care to others by applying fam-
ily-like labels and norms to non-family members. In Chinese, for exam-
ple, good friends and alumni will refer to each other as younger or older
siblings, graduate supervisors will refer to his or her students as younger
siblings, and (in the best cases) employers and employees will use fam-
ily-like language to refer to each other. The extension of such terms
of family endearment to non-family members is far more widespread
than in most Western languages and contributes to a sense of solidarity
in East Asian societies.
Confucian solidarity is also realized by means of rituals that civilize
and elevate, particularly in the context of competitive relationships that
would otherwise degenerate into hostility and antagonism, if not warfare.
Confucians take for granted that human desires can undermine social
cooperation, but the task is to civilize those desires rather than suppress
them. And it is particularly important for the winnersthose with pow-
er and social statusto act in civilized ways, to show modesty and cour-
tesy during the course of rituals designed to civilize human desires. These
rituals are particularly evident in sporting activities, past and present.
Confuciuss account of the gentleman Confuciuss account of the gentle-
man-archerExemplary persons are not competitive, but they must still
compete in archery. Greeting and making way for each other, the archers
ascend the hall, and returning they drink a salute. Even during competi-
tion, they are exemplary persons
24)
echoes the rituals of sumo
wrestlers. Such rituals also inform sports that developed in Western coun-
triesthe ritual of helping opponents up after a fall and exchanging
sweat-soaked shirts at the end of football games comes to mind but
they are more central to sporting traditions that developed in
Confucian-influenced East Asian societies. Contrary to the fears of some
Western analysts that the 2008 Beijing Olympics would showcase ex-
treme forms of Chinese nationalism, the gold medal winners from China
often seemed humble and kind to opponents, perhaps due (at least partly)
to the civility campaigns prior to the games. In the same vein, the Chinese
fans were generally respectful of other teams and athletes.
However, social solidarity and harmony should not come at the ex-
pense of social diversity. That is to say, for Confucianism, independent
social and political criticism still has its place. The relation between har-
mony and diversity was outlined in the Analectsthat exemplary persons
should pursue harmony but not conformity--and has clear political
implications. The contrast between harmony and conformity owes its ori-
gin to the Zuo Zhuan, where it clearly referred to the idea that the ruler
should be open to different political views among his advisers. In imperial
Chinese history, the ideal of the independent social critic was in-
stitutionalized in the form of the Censorate, consisting of scholar-officials
who had the mandate to criticize the governments mistaken policies.
Independent Confucian academies, often located far from the countrys
capital so as not to be subject to political control, trained scholars in
the art of criticism. Confucian-inspired social critics such as Yang Jisheng
and Huang Zongxi penned more radical political criticisms outside of
formal channels. Today, social critics have drawn on the contrast between
harmony and conformity to urge the government to be tolerant of differ-
ences and not simply enforce one dominant state ideology on the whole
population.
But a Confucian twist, so to speak, is that criticism is best carried
out on the basis of social harmony and trust. If two enemies criticize
each other, they will question each others motives and the result may
be more bad blood. Criticism may be most effectivein the sense that
it leads to improvementif it is founded on affective ties. Whether in
the family or in the political realm, criticisms should be seen as being
motivated by affection rather than hostility. In practice, it means that
criticisms should be expressed in gentle and humble ways, so as to main-
tain harmonious relationships. Today, the language of not losing face
is used to express this ideal. The strident and self-righteous criticisms
of some Western politicians and Western-based human rights organ-
izations often fall on deaf ears in China because they are viewed as rude
and disrespectful even by those who might agree with the substance of
the criticisms. Conversely, the cooperative and long-term minded ap-
proach of such organizations as the Danish Institute of Human Rights
are often more effective (Lindsnaes et al., 2007).
25)
Today, of course, the media is often regarded as an important vehicle
for public criticism, with investigative journalists aiming to expose offi-
cial wrongdoing and social injustices. In China, the media has been open-
ing up, but far too slowly. Left-Confucians favor more space for an in-
dependent media with the power to tell the truth about social problems
and blame the government when it is at fault. However, from a Confucian
perspective there is also cause to worry about the kind of media model
that focuses almost exclusively on bad news. It is fine to encourage pri-
vate media to report on news as they see fit (so long as they avoid extreme
violence and pornography), but an important task of the media would
also be to promote social harmony. Such media reporting might involve
the portrayal of moral exemplars, appeals to peoples better nature, and
sympathy for the disadvantaged.
More concretely, a Confucian-inspired model of media regulation
might mean space for private media but also funding for public media
that seeks to promote social harmony rather than loyalty to the party.
Perhaps politicians should be praised when they set a good moral example
for others, so long as leaders that do bad are also subject to criticism.
Beyond China?
Early Confucian thinkers assumed that their ideals were universally
valid; they were meant to be applicable to all human beings. An ideal
world would be composed of people who endorse (and live by) those
ideals. A world where different people live in accordance with different
values in different parts of the world would have been considered second
best. In that sense, Confucianism is put forward as a philosophy with
universal validity, similar to liberalism and Christianity. It is inaccurate
to say that liberalism is universal whereas Confucianism is particularistic;
they are both meant to be universal in scope.
So which values are truly universal? At the level of principle, a
small set of crucial human rights are valued by all governments, religions,
and traditions. The most obvious are the prohibitions against slavery,
genocide, and systematic racial discrimination. Of course, many human
rights violations occur off the record, but the task is to expose the gap
between public allegiance to basic human rights and the sad reality of
ongoing abuse. Such work is practical, not philosophical. At the level
of principle, Western liberals and Left Confucians also share thicker
values, such as commitments to gender equality in education and the
need to criticize bad governments. However, beyond that there will be
clear areas of divergence; for example, Left Confucianism will place more
emphasis upon hierarchy in international relations, meritocracy in politics,
paternalism in government-funded media, and ritual as a mechanism for
securing the interests of the disadvantaged.
Different political theories should allow for the possibility of mutual
enrichment. In its best moments, Confucianism has shown openness to
learning from other traditions like legalism, Buddhism, liberalism, and
socialism. In its encounter with Western political theories, however,
Confucianism has been the student rather than teacher and it is worth
asking under what conditions it might be seen as compelling by Western
liberals. One condition is that Western societies undergo prolonged crises
of confidence. It is a sad truth, perhaps, that people are more inclined
to learn from others when their own ways prove to be problematic.
Chinese intellectuals only looked to the West when traditional ways of
social and political life broke down, and it may take a similar crisis
of confidence in the West before large numbers of Western intellectuals
turn to Confucianism for hope and inspiration. Meanwhile, it is important
for the West to tolerate, if not respect, areas of morally justifiable
difference.
But perhaps the key obstacle to universalizing Confucianism is the
gap between the theory and the practice. If it is just talk, nobody will
listen. Confucianism will not be taken seriously abroad unless it is prac-
ticed seriously at home. In this sense, it is even more vital for
Confucianism to prove its desirability and feasibility domestically. At
the moment, there is a long way to go. Once the Chinese state acts mo-
rally in accordance with Confucian ideas, then it can articulate and pro-
mote its soft power to the rest of the world.
1) Analects 1:1 (Authors' translation).
2) For more detailed empirical investigation of the revival of Confucianism see Kang
Xiaoguang, Zhongguo guilai [The Return of China] (Singapore: Shijie keji chubanshe,
2008) and the articles co-authored by Sebastien Billioud and Joel Thoravel in China
Perspectives.
3) This-word-oriented basically means a lack of concern with the after-life, because no
matter how rich and diverse the Confucian tradition, it has hardly anything to say about
the after-life.
4) See Daniel A. Bell, Chinas New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing
Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), appendix 2.
5) In its encounter with other cultures and traditions, Confucianism has often learned from
them and incorporated the new elements into its own distinctiveness. For example,
Neo-Confucianism in the Song dynasty was developed under the challenges of Buddhism
and Daoism. It successfully absorbed many Buddhist and Daoist elements into its own
system, which allowed for a great revival of Confucianism in China and its promotion
abroad to Korea and elsewhere. Similarly, today under the challenges of other cultures
developed in Western societies, our interpretation of a humane and progressive
Confucianism does not deny that such Western values as social democracy, solidarity,
human rights, and the rule of law need to be adopted in China. But it insists that they
need to be adapted in China, in combination with Confucian values, enriched and some-
times constrained by them.
6) Zhao Tingyang, Tianxia tixishijie zhidu zhexue daolun [The System of Tianxia: An
Introduction to the Philosophy of the World Institution] (Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chu-
banshe, 2005), p. 2.
7) Kang Xiaoguang, Zhongguo ruan liliang jianshe yu Rujia wenhua fuxing de guanxi
[Chinas Soft Power and Its Relation to the Revival of Confucian Culture], November
2007, <http://www.nporuc.org/html/section/papers/20071119/13_2.html> (31 October 20
09).
8) See Analects 6:24.
9) See Jiang Qing, paper presented in Qufu, April 2009.
10) See Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities
and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity Press 2002).
11) See Zhongyong [The Doctrine of the Mean] chapters 17 and 18. In these chapters,
it is considered to be the Son of Heavens great merit making Tianxia a continual
estate established by generations. For example, it praises the sage-king Shun, How
greatly filial was Shun! ......He offered his sacrifices in his ancestral temple, and his
descendants preserved the sacrifices to himself. Similarly, it praises King Wu on the
grounds thatIt is only king Wen of whom it can be said that he had no cause for
grief! His father was king Ji, and his son was king Wu. His father laid the foundations
of his dignity, and his son transmitted it. The translations are based on James Legge
translation. See James Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol.1 (London: Trubner&Co.,
57&59, Ludgate Hill, 1875), 294-95.
12) Analects, 16:1.
13) Joseph Chan, Territorial Boundaries and Confucianism, in Confucian Political Ethics,
ed. Daniel A. Bell (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), 77.
14) Yan Xuetong, Wangba tianxia sixiang ji qiji [Thoughts of World Leadership and
Implications] (Beijing: Shijiezhishi chubanshe, 2009), 152. Yans work on the im-
plications of pre-Qin foreign policy for contemporary China has been translated into
English and will be published in 2011 by Princeton University Press.
15) Analects 16:1.
16) Xunzi 18:14.
17) Yan, 156.
18) Ibid.
19) See Lianheguo huifei fentan, zhongfang yuan chengdan 3.1% bili [China is willing
to contribute 3.1% of the UN budget], October 2009, <http://www.stnn.cc/chi-
na/200910/t20091006_1138095.html> (31 October 2009).
20) This section draws on Daniel A. Bell, Reconciling Socialism and Confucianism:
Reviving Tradition in China, Dissent, Winter 2010, pp. 91-102 and from his book
Chinas New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
21) Wang Shaoguang, The Great Transformation, Boundary 35, no.2 (2008): 15-47.
22) Wang, Changing Models of Chinas Policy Agenda Setting, Modern China 34, no.1
(2008): 56-87.
23) See Randall Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threats to the West or Model for the
Rest? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
24) Analects 3:7.
25) See Birgit Lindsnaes, Hans-Otto Sano, and Hatla Thelle, Human Rights in Action:
Supporting Human Rights Work in Authoritarian Countries, in Ethics in Action: The
Ethical Challenges of International Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. 6.
References
Analects 1:1, 3:7, 6:24, 16:1
Xunzi 18:14
Zhongyong [The Doctrine of the Mean] chapters 17 and 18
Bell, D. A. (2008). Chinas new Confucianism: Politics and everyday life
in a changing society. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
______. (2010). Reconciling socialism and Confucianism: Reviving tradition
in China. Dissent, 57, 91-102.
Chan, J. (2008). Territorial boundaries and Confucianism. In D. A. Bell (Ed.),
Confucian Political Ethics (pp. 61-84). New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.
Kang, X. (2007). Zhongguo ruan liliang jianshe yu Rujia wenhua fuxing
de guanxi [Chinas soft power and its relation to the revival of
Confucian culture] Retrieved from http://www.nporuc.org/html/sec-
tion/papers/20071119/13_2.html
Lindsnaes, B., Sano, H-O., & Thelle, H. (2007). Human rights in action:
Supporting human rights work in authoritarian countries. In D. A.
Bell & J-M. Coicaud (Eds.), Ethics in action: The ethical challenges
of international human rights nongovernmental organizations (pp.
117-132). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Peerenboom, R. (2007). Chinamodernizes: Threats to the West or model for
the rest? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pogge, T. (2002). World poverty and human rights: Cosmopolitan re-
sponsibilities and reforms. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Wang, S. (2008a). The great transformation. Boundary, 35, 15-47.
______. (2008b). Changing models of Chinas policy agenda setting. Modern
China, 34, 56-87.
Yan, Xuetong. (2009). Wangba tianxias ixiang ji qidi [Thoughts of world
leadership and implications]. Beijing : Shijiezhishi chubanshe.
Zhao, Tingyang. (2005). Tianxia tixishijie zhidu zhexue daolun [The system
of tianxia: An introduction to the philosophy of the world in-
stitution]. Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe.
Biographical Note
Wu Yun received her Doctoral degree from Tsinghua University and is now a
post-doc at Shanghai Jiao Tong University.
Daniel A. Bell is professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at Tsinghua University
(Beijing). His latest book is Chinas New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life
in a Changing Society (Princeton University Press, new edition 2010).
Date of the submission of the article: March 10, 2014
Date of the peer-review: June 9, 2014
Date of the confirmation of the publication: June 9, 2014

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OMNES : The Journal of Multicultural Society2014. Vol.5 No.1, pp. 1-21.

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