converting Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the house of Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. The house bill was then duly referred to the House COmiittee on Local Government and the House Committee on Appropriations. On January 1994, said bill was transmitted to the Senate. Senate Bill 1243, a counterpart of HB 8817, entitled as An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago was subsequently filed in the Senate. After approval of subsequent amendments made thereto, said bill was approved by the Senate. The enrolled bill following presidents approval was ratified by the people. Petitioners then raised among others that said conversion could not be validated as the said city does not meet the requirement in connection with the annual income requirement following the exclusion of the IRA in the total. Issue: WON IRA is included in the annual income of a local government.
2. Pimentel Jr. v. Aguire Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed on connection with the enactment of AO. No. 372, otherwise known as Adoption of Economy Measure in Government for FY 1998. The said order required local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent to their authorized regular appropriations for non- personal services and which stipulated that a portion of their Internal Revenue Allotments will be withheld pending the assessment and evaluation by the Department of Budget and Management, on a quarterly basis using the attached format. Petitioner contends that the President in issuing said order was in effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. He further contends that the Constitution only grants the President general supervision over LGUs consistent with the principle of autonomy. Petitioner further argues that the directive to withhold the IRA is in contravention of the LGC and the Constitution which mandates the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national revenue. Respondent, speaking through the SG, claims that the said order was issued to alleviate the economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation and constituted merely an exercise of the Presidents power of supervision over LGUs. He adds that said order does not violate fiscal autonomy and that the withholding of a portion of the IRA was only temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation of DCC of the emerging fiscal situation. Issue: WON the president acted beyond the mandate of the constitution when he enacted AO 372 providing for the
3. Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals vs. Commission on Audit Facts: Petitioner composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists was incorporated as a juridical entity on 1905 by the Philippine Commision. The objects petitioner was generally about enforcing laws relating to animal cruelty and perform all things to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare. Its creation preceded the Corporation Law and Security and Exchange Commission. Subsequently CA 148 recalled its power to retain some of its collected fines and to make arrest. On December 2003, an audit team from respondent visited the office of the petitioner to conduct an audit survey pursuant to its mandate. Petitioner demurred on the ground that it was a private entity and not under the jurisdiction of COA. Respondents on the other hand asserts that since petitioner is a body politic created by virtue of a special legislation and endowed with a governmental purpose the former can thus audit the financial activities of the respondent. Despite several correspondences between petitioner and respondent, the latter was not able to conduct the audit survey due to the refusal of the petitioner because the petitioner maintained that it was a private corporation. Issue: WON petitioner is a public corporation thus under the jurisdiction of COAs auditing mandate. Held: No.
4. Atienza v. Villarosa Petitioner Atienza and Respondent Villarosa were Vice-Governor and Governor respectively of the Occindental Mindoro. Initially petitioner received a letter from respondent informing him that purchase orders shall be approved by him in his capacity as the local chief executive of the province. A subsequent letter followed ordering petitioner to submit a list of employees entered by him and to have them terminated and granted them to appoint replacements subject to respondents approval. Petitioner in response iterated that approval of Purchase Orders is under his prerogative and that the appointment of casual/job order employees is exercised under his appointing authority. Respondent asserts the validity of his orders. Issue: WON said orders issued by Governor are valid.
5. Liban v. Gordon Facts: Petitioner filed a petition to declare Richard Gordon as Having forfeited His Seat in the Senate as he was accordingly appointed as the Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors during his incumbency as a member of the Senate. Petitioner asserts that respondent has ceased to be a member of the Sentate as provided in the Constitution Art. VI Sec. 13 No Senator may hold any other office or employment in the Government including GOCC or their subsidiaries . Petitioners cited a case which held that the PNRC is a GOCC. Respondent replied that PNRC is not a GOCC thus prohibition stated in the Constitution does not apply to him. Issue: WON PNRC is a GOCC thus subsequent appointment of Gordon as its chairman during his incumbency in the Senate constitutes a violation in the constitutional prohibition against incompatible offices. Held: No. PNRC is not a GOCC. It is a private organization performing Public Functions. As stated in its charter PNRC is a non-profit, donor- funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.
6. Boy Scout of the Philippines v. NLRC Facts: Petitioner, in a letter, addressed to the five private respondents informing them that they were to be transferred to another branch. These orders were opposed by the private respondents and appealed the matter. Despite assurance of the BSP regarding added benefits, private respondents were not persuaded to abandon their opposition to the transfer order. Their persistent refusal later resulted to their termination of employment with BSP which In turn caused them to amend their complaint from illegal transfer to one including charges of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner BSP. Initially the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint but was later reversed by the NLRC. In the complaint, private respondents stated that BSP is by mandate of law a Public Corporation. The court later required the parties to file a comment on the question whether or nor BSP is in fact a GOCC. BSP asserts that it does not receive monetary subsidy from the government. It further asserts that it is a purely private organization directed and controlled by its National Executive Board the members of which are voluntary scouters including seven Cabinet Secretaries. Issue: WON BSP is a GOCC. Held: Yes. The public function of BSPs functions and activities must be conceded, for they pertain to the educational, civic, and social development of the youth which constitutes a very substantial and important part of the nation. Second, the fact that the appointment of members of the Board are subject to the ratification by the Chief Scout, the president suggest that there is substantial governmental participation or intervention in the choice of the majority of members. Considering the character of its purpose and its functions, the statutory designation of the BSP as a public corporation and the substantial participation of the Government in the selection of members of the National Executive Board of the BSP, as presently constituted under its charter, is a government-controlled corporation within the meaning of the Constitution.
7. Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes Facts: Respondent as the Secretary of National Defense, issued the assailed order directing petitioner for the briefing and for documents on personnel, ongoing projects and petitioners financial condition. Respondent also informed petitioner that it would be paying a visit for an update on VFPs different affiliates and the financial statement of the federation. Petitioner initially denied the order on the ground that the timeframe set by respondent had been set for the activity. Later petitioner asserts that it is not a public nor a governmental entity but a private organization, and advances this claim to prove that the order issued by respondent is an invalid exercise of respondent secretarys control and supervision. VFP asserts that it does not possess the elements which would qualify them as a public office, particularly the designation of a portion of sovereign power of the government; and that the funds are not public it being sourced out from membership dues and not from government funds; and that although its personality emanates from a statutory charter, VFP retains its essential character as private. Issue: WON VFP is a GOCC. Held: yes
8. Feliciano v. Gison Facts: Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) filed a petition to Department of Finance requesting that a certain water supply equipment and a vehicle given by the Japanese Government for the rehabilitation of its typhoon- damaged water supply system for tax exemption. Initially the water supply equipment was granted tax exemption but the vehicle was not included. Upon filing for reconsideration by LMWD, respondent as undersecretary of DOF, denied the request to include the vehicle for tax exemption. Accordingly, privileges of tax exemption of GOCCs had already been withdrawn. After elevating the case to the CTA, the same denied their request for the same reason iterated by DOF. LMWD then filed in CA and requested among others to determine whether LMWD is a GOCC or not. Issue: WON LMWD is a GOCC. Held: YES. LWDs are not private corporations as they are not created under the Corporation Code. Nor are they registered with the SEC. Sec. 14 of the Corp. Code states that all corporations organized under this code shall file with the SEC articles of incorporation. LWDs have no articles of incorporation, nor incorporators, nor stockholders and members. PD 198 created LWDs thus their powers to exercise powers given to a private corporation emanates from said decree, a special charter rather than a general law.
9. Chavez v. Public Estate Authority Facts: President Marcos through a presidential decr ee created PEA, which was tasked with the development, improvement, a nd acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project.
Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the r eclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public bidding.
Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA.
Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the conveyance or sale of the re claimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
10. Limbona v. Mangelin Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.