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E s c a l a n t e

HEIRS OF MAXIMO LABANON, represented by ALICIA LABANON CAEDO and the PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF COTABATO, petitioners,
vs. HEIRS OF CONSTANCIO LABANON, represented by ALBERTO MAKILANG, respondents.
G.R. No. 160711. August 14, 2007.

Constancio Labanon with the help of his more educated brother, cultivated and acquired a property though a homestead patent prior the WW-II. Since
Constancio do not know the formalities necessary in the application of a homestead patent and subsequently a certificate of title, he asked the
assistance of his brother Maximo. In return, he offered to give half of the property to Maximo.

Upon the acquisition of the homestead patent in 1941 and subsequently the OCT, Maximo executed a document transferring his rights over the eastern
property to his brother. Upon Constancios death, the eastern portion was sold to Alberto Magkilang, his son-in-law. The heirs of Maximo however
intervened in the said sale by causing the cancellation of the said sale. No reasons were given for refusal. Heirs of C Labanon demanded the surrender
the OCT. But heirs of M. Labanon refused to honor the prior agreement of brothers Constancio and Maximo.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Original Certificate of Title No. 41320 issued on April 10, 1975 in the name of MAXIMO LABANON be now considered
indefeasible and conclusive; and
2. Whether or not the Trust Agreement allegedly made by Constancio Labanon and Maximo Labanon prescribed

Ruling:

First Issue:
Respondents are not precluded from challenging the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. P-41320

The principle of indefeasibility of a TCT is embodied in Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, amending the Land Registration Act, which
provides:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence,
minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right
of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of
title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year
from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for
value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase
occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person
aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons
responsible for the fraud.

Contrary to petitioners' interpretation, the aforequoted legal provision does not totally deprive a party of any remedy to recover the
property fraudulently registered in the name of another. Section 32 of PD 1529 merely precludes the reopening of the registration
proceedings for titles covered by the Torrens System, but does not foreclose other remedies for the reconveyance of the property to
its rightful owner.

While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive
an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real
owners.

The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property
described therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included. It is evident from the records
that the petitioner owns the portion in question and therefore the area should be conveyed to her. The remedy of the land owner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree,
but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

Undeniably, respondents are not precluded from recovering the eastern portion of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14320, with an area subject
of the "Assignment of Rights and Ownership" previously owned by their father, Constancio
Labanon. The action for Recovery of Ownership before the RTC is indeed the appropriate remedy.

Second Issue:
The trust agreement between Maximo Labanon and Constancio Labanon may still be enforced.

In the instant case, such intention to institute an express trust between Maximo Labanon as trustee and Constancio Labanon as trustor was contained in
not just one but two written documents, the Assignment of Rights and Ownership as well as Maximo Labanon's April 25, 1962 Sworn Statement. In both
documents, Maximo Labanon recognized Constancio Labanon's ownership and possession over the eastern portion of the property covered by OCT No.
P-14320, even as he recognized himself as the applicant for the Homestead Patent over the land. Thus, Maximo Labanon maintained the title over the
property while acknowledging the true ownership of Constancio Labanon over the eastern portion of the land. The existence of an express trust cannot
be doubted nor disputed.

In relation to the issue of prescription, unrepudiated express trusts do not prescribe. In the case at bar, Maximo Labanon never repudiated the express
trust instituted between him and Constancio Labanon. And after Maximo Labanon's death, the trust could no longer be renounced; thus, respondents'
right to enforce the trust agreement can no longer be restricted nor prejudiced by prescription.

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Lastly, the heirs of Maximo Labanon are bound to the stipulations embodied in the Assignment of Rights and Ownership pursuant to Article 1371 of the
Civil Code that contracts take effect between the parties, assigns, and heirs. Petitioners as heirs of Maximo cannot disarrow the commitment made by
their father with respect to the subject property since they merely subrogated to the rights and obligations of their predecessor-in-interest.

JUAN AGUILA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, et al.respondents
G.R. No. L-48335. April 15, 1988.

Parties to this case are successors-in-interest of Juliana Matienzo. Juliana Matienza contracted two marriages during her lifetime. Herein petitioner is the
only surviving child in her second marriage whereas respondents are children of his only offspring during the first marriage. Dispute among parties
started when grandchildren from the first marriage claimed property possessed by Aguila stating that there was no property acquired during the second
marriage and thus such property belongs to the estate of the first marriage.

Herein petitioner filed on June 8, 1977, a complaint for reconveyance of the properties acquired by the defendants in the earlier action for partition in
CFI Batanggas. Respondents in their response said that petitioner is barred for res judicata. This was taken by the Court and thus case was dismissed.
Upon its plea in the SC, it stated that the requisites for res judicata are not present. At the same time, it alleged that he must not be prejudiced by the
negligence committed by his counsel in relation to the judicial partition.

Ruling:
The reason in relation to his counsels negligence cannot be taken. He was aware of this yet he tolerated it. He should have sought the assistance of
other counsels instead. His tardiness with regards his act cannot serve as an excuse. Allowing such will lead to an ad infinitum which the court wishes to
prevent.

At that, it is not even exactly true, as the petitioner claims, that his evidence was not considered by the trial court in Civil Case No. 1552. The record
shows that when the defendants filed their second motion for reconsideration and/or to allow them to present their evidence, which was attached, it
was examined by the court "in fairness to the defendants" but found to be "so vague and not appearing to be indubitable as to warrant reopening of the
case."

Such conclusion was reached after a careful and lengthy analysis of evidence, dwelling on each of the disputed properties, their antecedents,
description, and the basis of the defendants' claims therefor. A mere reading of such discussion, which covered two single-spaced typewritten pages,
will show that, although the judge could have simply denied the second motion for reconsideration, he nonetheless took the ti me and exerted
painstaking efforts to study the proffered evidence. The meticulous consideration of such evidence commends the trial judge's thoroughness and sense
of justice and clearly belies the petitioner's complaint that he had been denied due process. Perhaps it is for this reason that the petitioner does not
strongly attack the decision, preferring to train his sights on his own former counsel. As he says in his petition, he "does not seek the nullity of the
judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 1552 which has already become final due to legal technicality. 10 What he does ask for is a reconveyance of the
subject properties which he says were unjustly taken from him as a result of his lawyer's mistakes. Such blunders, he contends, are correctible in an
action for reconveyance which the Court should allow in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.

The law on reconveyance is clear, and jurisprudence thereon is well-settled. This remedy is available in cases where, as a result of
mistake or fraud, property is registered in the name of a person not its owner. Clerical error in designating the real owner is a valid ground for
reconveyance after the decree shall have become final following the lapse of one year therefrom. Reconveyance may also be sought where it is
established that a person not entitled to the property succeeded in registering it in his name to the prejudice of the real owner. However, it cannot be
employed to negate the effects of a valid decision of a court of justice determining the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties in an appropriate
proceeding, as in Civil Case No. 1552.

The decision in that case was a valid resolution of the question of ownership over the disputed properties and cannot be reversed now
through the remedy of reconveyance.

JESSIE GASATAYA, petitioner, vs. EDITHA MABASA, respondent
G.R. No. 148147. February 16, 2007.

Herein respondent is the daughter of the original owner of the property subject to action for reconveyance in this case. Lots 279, 272 and 972 were
mortgaged in relation to a loan acquired by Buenaventura Mabasa in DBP. Failure to pay indebtedness led to the foreclosure of the property which DBP
later on acquired through the public auction conducted. Upon the death of B Mabasa, its daughter Editha, representing her siblings entered into an
agreement with the DPB to repurchase property through a deed of conditional sale for P25,875.

A subsequent agreement was entered by the Mabasas with the father of herein petitioner. They sold the property with right to repurchase to Sabas
Gasataya upon assumption on respondents debt to DBP. Agreement was to possess the land for 20 years and to develop a fishpond. S Gabataya
agreed and a Deed of Sale of Fishpond Lands with Right to Repurchase was executed upon S Gabutayas representation that the 25, 000 debt with the
DBP was already settled (in addition to the 10,000 received by the Mabasas). However, eight years after the execution of said deed, DBP cancelled the
right to repurchase of the Mabasas for failure of S Gasataya to pay the loan. DBP foreclosed the loan which was then acquired by herein petitioner as
highest bidder during the public auction.

Respondent filed a complaint in the RTC for reconveyance of titles of lands with damages against petitioner and Sabas Gasataya (Gasatayas). She
claimed that the latter deliberately reneged on his commitment to pay DBP to: (1) revoke her right to repurchase the lots under the deed of conditional
sale and (2) subject the properties to another public auction where petitioner could bid.

Petitioner and his father denied the allegations saying that the deed of conditional sale assumed by the latter from respondent was rendered ineffective
by DBP's refusal to accept payments thereon. Reply was not accepted by the court stating that they were not able to prove that they have not defraude
the Mabasas and that the DBP refused such payments. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals stating that the Gasatayas committed a breach of
trust amounting to fraud which would warrant an action for reconveyance. The Supreme Court agrees.

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Ruling:
Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the person with a better right than the person under whose name said
property was erroneously registered. While respondent is not the legal owner of the disputed lots, she has a better right than petitioner to the contested
lots on the following grounds:
1. the deed of conditional sale executed by DBP vested on her the right to repurchase the lots
2. her right to repurchase them would have subsisted had they (the Gasatayas) not defrauded her.

Petitioner insists that respondent had no right to the disputed lots since the conditional sale agreement where such right was based had long been
cancelled by DBP. This is without merit. Petitioner cannot discredit the deed of conditional sale just so he can to keep his titles to the lots. Petitioner
should be reminded that DBP revoked respondent's right to repurchase the lots under said deed because of the deceitful maneuverings that he and his
father employed.

Fraud overthrows the presumption that the public sale was attended with regularity. The public sale did not vest petitioner with any valid title to the
properties since it was but the consequence of his and his father's fraudulent schemes. The registration of the properties in petitioner's name did not
obliterate the fact that fraud preceded and facilitated such registration. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception
practiced by means of misrepresentation of material facts, which in this case was the conscious representation by petitioner's father
(Sabas Gasataya) that respondent's obligation to DBP had already been settled. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which
benefit is obtained, to the prejudice of another. Consequently, fraud is a ground for reconveyance.

Moreover, the law only protects an innocent purchaser for value and not one who has knowledge of and participation in the employment of fraud. An
innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that same
property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person's claim. Obviously, petitioner
was not an innocent purchaser for value.

As a final point, the Court takes significant note of the fact that respondent's father originally acquired the subject lots through homestead grant.
Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act) aims to confine and preserve to the homesteader and his kin the homestead lots. We, therefore, agree with
the CA's disquisition that courts should "lend a stout shoulder to help keep a homestead in the homesteader's family" for the stern reality cannot be
belied that "homesteaders and their families are generally in the lower stratum of life" and most likely, when they alienate the homestead, it is "out of
dire necessity."

DATU KIRAM SAMPACO, substituted by HADJI SORAYA S. MACABANDO, petitioner,
vs. HADJI SERAD MINGCA LANTUD, respondent
G.R. No. 163551. July 18, 2011.

Herein respondent filed an action to quiet title with damages against Datu Kiram Sampaco (deceased and substituted by his heirs). In his complaint,
Lantud alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land in Marinaut, Marawi City. He said that on August 25, 1984, that Datu Kiram
Sampaco, through his daughter Soraya Sampaco-Macabando with several armed men, forcibly and unlawfully entered his property and destroyed the
nursery buildings, cabbage seedlings and other improvements therein worth P10,000.00. On August 30, 1984, Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato
and his councilmen prepared and issued a decision in writing stating that Kiram Sampaco is the owner of the subject parcel of land.

Lantud in order to remove the cloud that is cast upon his title by the acts of petitioner and the said decision of the Barangay Captain instituted an action
against Sampaco. Respondent stated that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public and exclusive possession of the subject
property. He prayed that the acts of petitioner and the decision of Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen be declared invalid, and
that petitioner be ordered to pay respondent damages.

Sampaco denied allegations and asserted that he and his predecessors-in-interest are the ones who had been in open, public, continuous, and exclusive
possession of the property in dispute. Petitioner alleged that OCT No. P-658, possessed by Lantud was secured in violation of laws and through fraud,
deception and misrepresentation, considering that the subject parcel of land is a residential lot and the title issued is a free patent. Moreover, Lantud
and his predecessors-in interest had never taken actual possession or occupied the land under litigation. On the contrary, Sampaco has all the evidence
of actual possession and ownership of permanent improvements and other plants on the land in dispute.

Hadji Lantud is in possession of the land for more than 30 years and was subsequently granted an OCT No P-658. He paid corresponding taxes and
introduced improvements to the said property. On the other hand, petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco testified that the land under litigation is only a
portion of the 1,800 square meters of land that he inherited in 1952 from his father, Datu Sampaco Gubat. Since then, he had been in adverse
possession and ownership of the subject lot, cultivating and planting trees and plants through his caretaker Hadji Mustapha Macawadib. In 1962, he
mortgaged the land (1,800 square meters) with the Development Bank of the Philippines, Ozamis branch. He declared the land (1,800 square meters)
for taxation purposes and paid real estate taxes, and adduced in evidence the latest Tax Receipt No. 1756386 dated September 15, 19[9]3. 15
Petitioner presented four corroborating witnesses as regards his possession of the subject property.

The Regional trial Court ruled in favor of herein petitioner in line with the evidences and the testimonies they presented. This however was reversed by
the Court of Appeals relying on the certificate of title possessed by herein respondents.

The Court of Appeals held that petitioner's counterclaim filed on October 15, 1984 for cancellation of respondent's original certificate of title issued on
May 22, 1981 was filed beyond the statutory one-year period; hence, petitioner's title had become indefeasible, and cannot be affected by the decision
made by Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen. Moreover, the appellate court held that petitioner's prayer for the cancellation of
respondent's title, OCT No. P-658, through a counterclaim included in his Answer is a collateral attack, which the law does not allow.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the validity of OCT No. P-658 and confirming respondent as owner of the property in
dispute

Ruling:
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The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein, and other matters which can be litigated and
decided in land registration proceedings. Tax declarations and tax receipts cannot prevail over a certificate of title which is an incontrovertible proof of
ownership. An original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding is as indefeasible as a certificate of title
issued under judicial proceedings. However, the Court has ruled that indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation

The trial court erred in concluding that there was fraud in the issuance of respondent's free patent title on the ground that it covered residential land
based only on the Complaint which stated that the property was residential land when it was not shown that it was the President who classified the
disputed property as residential, and OCT No. P-658 itself stated that the free patent title covered agricultural land. It has been stated that at present,
not only agricultural lands, but also residential lands, have been made available by recent legislation for acquisition by free patent by any natural born
Filipino citizen. Nevertheless, the fact is that in this case, the free patent title was granted over agricultural land as stated in OCT No. P-658.

The Court holds that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove that fraud was committed in the issuance of respondent's Torrens title. Hence,
respondent's Torrens title is a valid evidence of his ownership of the land in dispute.

Right to Reconveyance:
Article 434 of the Civil Code governs an action for reconveyance, thus:
In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim. Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who
claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.

In this case, petitioner claims that the property in dispute is part of his larger property. However, petitioner failed to identify his larger property by
providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so that the same may be compared with the technical description contained in the title of
respondent, which would have shown whether the disputed property really formed part of petitioner's larger property; thus, there is no sufficient
evidence on record to support petitioner's claim that the disputed property is part of his larger property.

In regard to the second requisite of title to property, both petitioner and respondent separately claim that they are entitled to ownership of the property
by virtue of open, public, continuous and exclusive possession of the same in the concept of owner. Petitioner claims that he inherited the subject
property from his father in 1952, while respondent claims that he acquired the property from his grandmother Intumo Pagsidan, a portion thereof from
his grandmother's helper Totop Malacop pursuant to a court decision after litigating with him. Respondent has OCT No. P- 658 to prove his title to the
subject property, while petitioner merely claims that the property is already his private land by virtue of his open, public, continuous possession of the
same in the concept of owner.

The Court holds that petitioner failed to prove the requisites of reconveyance as he failed to prove the identity of his larger property in relation to the
disputed property, and his claim of title by virtue of open, public and continuous possession of the disputed property in the concept of owner is
nebulous in the light of a similar claim by respondent who holds a free patent title over the subject property.

In relation to prescription the court ruled that the one-year prescriptive period, however, does not apply when the person seeking
annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot. This is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title which is
imprescriptible.

Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be
altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. An action is an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title, and
thus challenge the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action is to annul or set
aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. . . . A counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the title.

Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that petitioner's counterclaim for cancellation of respondent's title is not a collateral attack, but a direct attack
on the Torrens title of petitioner. However, the counterclaim seeking for the cancellation of title and reconveyance of the subject property has
prescribed as petitioner has riot proven actual possession and ownership of the property due to his failure to prove the identity of his larger property
that would show that the disputed property is a part thereof, and his claim of title to the subject property by virtue of open, public and continuous
possession in the concept of owner is nebulous in the light of a similar claim by respondent who holds a Torrens title to the subject property.

Respondent's original certificate of title was issued on May 22, 1981, while the counterclaim was filed by petitioner on October 15, 1984, which is clearly
beyond the one-year prescriptive period.


QUANTUM OF PROOF


CONRADO O. LASQUITE and TEODORA I. ANDRADE, petitioners, vs. VICTORY HILLS, INC., respondent .
G.R. No. 175375. June 23, 2009.

Various individuals claim ownership over a parcel of land, all possessing a certificate of title!

On May 4, 1971, Jose Manahan executed a Deed of Quitclaim/Assignment of Rights over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3050 at Barrio Ampid,
San Mateo, Rizal in favor of Conrado O. Lasquite. Lasquite applied for a free patent over
the lot, and pending approval of the application, sold half of the land to Juanito L. Andrade on January 11, 1981. Upon the grant of the patent
application, OCT Nos. NP-197 and NP-198 were issued in the names of Andrade and Lasquite, respectively, on June 18, 1981.

Thereafter, on August 22, 1983 8 and October 22, 1983, the Prescillas filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands to question the grant of free patent in
favor of petitioners. They claimed to have been in possession since 1940 planting and reaping its fruits since then. On March 8, 1989, the Prescillas also
5 | L e z l e e A m o r R . E s c a l a n t e

instituted a case for reconveyance and damages against petitioners alleging that Lasquite forged the signature of Jose M. Manahan in the Deed of
Quitclaim/Assignment of Rights since the latter has died on April 11, 1968.

A second complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages was also filed by Manahans against petitioners on June 1, 1990. The Manahans
asserted title over Lot No. 3050 as successors of Jose S. Manahan whom they claimed to have died on October 12, 1947. Cases were later on
consolidated. Respondent Victory Hills also intervened in the case claiming ownership of the lot. Victory Hills traced its title to Lot No. 3050 to OCT No.
380 which was allegedly registered on January 4, 1937 to Jose H. Manahan by virtue of Homestead Patent No. H-19562 15 dated December 14, 1936.
According to Victory Hills, Jose H. Manahan sold Lot No. 3050 to Rufino Hieras on May 17, 1944 to whom Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 46219
16 was issued. Hieras then conveyed the lot to spouses Serafin and Veronica Angeles, and Catalina Cayetano who obtained TCT No. 85082 17 in their
names. Later, the lot was transferred to Victory Hills on September 6, 1961 under TCT No. 90816. Victory Hills acquired a title with the

RTC sustained the title possessed by Lastique and Andrade. An appeal was made by the losing party in the Court of Appeals. CA ruled in favor of
Victory Hills title.

Issue: Whether respondent Victory Hills is entitled to reconveyance of Lot No. 3050.

Ruling:

On the other hand, respondent relies on OCT No. 380 as evidence of the earlier registration of Lot No. 3050 in the name of its predecessor, Jose H.
Manahan. Such recording, respondent asserts, has rendered OCT No. 380 indefeasible one year following its issuance on January 4, 1937 and has
effectively segregated Lot No. 3050 from the domain of public lands. Respondent further justifies that the notation "sgd" in OCT No. 380 was sufficient
indication that the original copy of Homestead Patent No. H-19562 had been signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce Eulogio Rodriguez.
In any case, respondent invokes the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by the Register of Deeds in issuing OCT No. 380. It finally
argues against the issue of prescription since petitioners raised the same only for the first time on appeal.

The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals upheld OCT No. 380 as the origin of TCT No. 90816 in the name of respondent Victory Hills. The appellate
court ruled that the homestead patent which was awarded to respondent's predecessor, Jose H. Manahan, in 1936 cannot simply be defeated by the
subsequent grant of free patent to petitioners 45 years later. It accepted the transcript of Homestead Patent No. H- 19562 in OCT No. 380 as a faithful
reproduction of the original. Also, the Court of Appeals recognized the notation "sgd" in OCT No. 380 as customary to signify that the original copy of
the patent had been signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. After carefully poring over all the evidence submitted in this case, we find
the petition to be impressed with merit.


PRESCRIPTION


LIWALUG AMEROL, MACATANTO AMEROL, TAIB AMEROL, DIBARATUN AMEROL, DIBARATUN MATABALAO, MINDANAO DIBARATUN,
DIPUNDUGUN MORO, and MANUCAO MORO, petitioners, vs. MOLOK BAGUMBARAN, respondent
G.R. No. L-33261. September 30, 1987.

Herein respondent seeks to recover property alleging that petitioner forcibly entered the property. Said property was covered under two separate free
patent applications. One was that of Datumanong (Amerol) filed on September 1953 and that of Bagumbaran filed on December 27, 1954. It was
however, Bagumbarans patent certificate which bore fruit to an OCT (P-466).

Liwalug Datomanong had never known of plaintiff's free patent application on the land in question nor was he ever notified or participated in the
administrative proceedings relative to plaintiff's free patent application. In the meantime, since the date he purchased the land from Mandal Tando, said
defendant has been and up to the present in continuous occupation and cultivation of the same. He did not take appropriate action to annul the patent
and title of the plaintiff within one year from issuance thereof and that the first step taken by him to contest said patent and title was a formal protest
dated April 24, 1964, filed before the Bureau of Lands after the lapse of Nine (9) long years from the issuance of patent in favor of the plaintiff. The
second step he took was his counterclaim contained in his answer to the complaint in the above entitled case, which answer was filed with this court on
December 4, 1964. In said counterclaim, defendant reiterated his stand that plaintiff secured patent on the land by means of deceit and fraud,
wherefore, defendant prayed that said title be annulled, or, alternatively, plaintiff be ordered to reconvey the said land to the said defendant Liwalug
Datomanong.

Proofs are sufficient to support defendant's contention that plaintiff is guilty of fraud and misrepresentation. In the first place, proofs are abundant
tending to show that since 1952 when Mandal Tando transferred the land to said defendant,
the latter occupied, took possession thereof and cultivated the same continuously, publicly, adversely against any claimant and in the concept of owner
up to the present; that said defendant had introduced considerable improvements such as coconut and coffee plantations and other fruit trees besides
his farm house, a mosque, cassava plantation and clearing and full cultivation of the entire area. The fact of possession on the part of said defendant
has been attested to by competent and creditable witnesses.

At the same time, Bagumbaran knew that the land in question which was covered by his free patent application was then actually occupied and
cultivated by defendant Liwalug Datomanong if not by Mandal Tando, the original occupant. Be it remembered that Mandal Tando had transferred to
defendant Liwalug Datomanong Twenty Four (24) hectares, more than eleven hectares of which is (sic) outside the military reservation and designated
as Lot No. 524, Pls-126 and the rest which is in the southern portion lies within the military reservation. Now, immediately adjacent thereto on the south
is the land claimed and occupied by the herein plaintiff also consisting of Twenty Four (24) hectares but wholly within the military reservation. It
appears that plaintiff declared this Twenty four hectares for the first time on October 24, 1950 for taxation purposes (Tax Declaration No. 1529, Record)
and stated in said tax declaration regarding the boundaries that the adjacent owner on the north is Mandal Tando. In other words, plaintiff had
expressly recognized the fact that Mandal Tando is an adjacent land owner north of plaintiff's property. On February 19, 1951 herein plaintiff revised the
abovestated tax declaration and secured another and still plaintiff stated therein that his boundary land owner on the north is Hadji Abdul Gani.

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Despite the foregoing facts, the trial court denied the counterclaim of Liwalug of the affirmative relief of reconveyance.
Issue: What is the prescriptive period for the action to reconvey the title to real property arising from an implied oor constructive trust, corollary, its
point of reference.

Ruling:
10 years. The ten-year prescription to bring action commences to run from the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the real property as stated
in the new civil code. The 4 year prescription period was under the old civil code