G.R. No.

126379 June 26, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR
HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision
promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals.
1
Said judgment dismissed the People's
petition for certiorari to invalidate (i) the Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February
9, 1996.
2
as well (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the People's motion for reconsideration.
3
Those orders were handed down in
Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of explosives, after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial
Court at Quezon City on December 15, 1995,
4

2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court within five (5) days "to be released
thereafter in favor of the lawful owner considering that said amount was not mentioned in the Search Warrant."
The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of
Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail
Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at
Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four
(4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist
watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00
and P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of
$5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon order of the court on respondents' motion or request.
Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1)
fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search warrant are; (a) three (3) Ingram machine
pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f)
assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a return was made without mentioning the
personal belongings, papers and effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There was no
showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.
4. On January 22, 1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged; **" and
on the same date, submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence
Obtained Inadmissible)," dated January 15, 1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated comment on petition forcertiorari **):
On January 29, 1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted by respondent Judge and the
following facts had been established as contained in the order dated January 30.1996 ** to wit:
1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigail's
Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as "1207" found in the building as it is correspondingly called
only as "Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;"
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigail's Variety Store to Apartment
No. 1;
5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own respective doors used for
ingress and egress.
There being no objection on the said observation of the Court, let the same be reduced on the
records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order duly granting the motion to quash search warrant**;
5

7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant motion to dismiss** ;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a motion for reconsideration and
supplemental motion on the order quashing the search warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondents filed opposition/comment and supplemental
opposition/comment on the motion for reconsideration** ;
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order denying the motion for reconsideration**; (and on)
June 11, 1996, private respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred to, the Solicitor General forthwith commenced
a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth
Division of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:
6

1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place described in the search warrant. This fact
was ascertained by the Trial Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not objected to by the
People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The place searched, in which the accused (herein
petitioners) were then residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and separate from, and in no way
connected with, albeit adjacent to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutor's claim that the sketch submitted to Judge Bacalla relative to the application for a
search warrant, actually depicted the particular place to be searched was effectively confuted by Judge
Casanova who pointed out that said "SKETCH was not dated, not signed by the person who made it and not even
mentioned in the Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who) instead**directed them to search Abigail
Variety Store Apartment 1207** in the Order **dated December 15, 1995" this, too, being the address given "in
the Application for Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the
Team Leader." The untenability of the claim is made more patent by the People's admission, during the hearing of
its petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that said sketch was in truth "not attached to the application for
search warrant **(but) merely attached to the motion for reconsideration."
7

Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations of Judge Casanova contained in his
Order of May 28, 1996, viz.:
8

d) ** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different from the place mentioned in the Search
Warrant, that is the reason why even P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella and
SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of being
RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to OPEN THEIR MOUTH
to say TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who issued the Search Warrant the words "KATABI", or
"KADIKIT" or "KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang papasukin namin" or if they happen to
be an ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN, they were not able to open their mouth even to WHISPER
the ENGLISH WORDS "RESIDE" or "ADJACENT" or "BEHIND" or "NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE,
the place they are going to raid."**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of the place (herein private
respondents) or any member of the family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the living room at
the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law.
9

4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the warrant itself; "(i)n fact the
return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
10

5. Judge Casanova "correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash search warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal
tenets laid down in Nolasco vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous ruling of the Supreme Court
in Templo vs. de la Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been
issued by one court or branch thereof and a criminal case is initiated in another court or branch thereof as a result
of the search of the warrant, that search warrant is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than the search warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in
the criminal case has the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained (Nolasco
& Sans cases).
6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge, in light of "Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the special civil action ofcertiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning "the lower Court's precipitate act of disregarding the proceedings before the issuing Court and
overturning the latter's determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be searched;"
2) sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion that the sketch was not attached to the application for warrant
despite the clear evidence** to the contrary;"
3) ignoring "the very issues raised in the petition before it;"
4) "holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be diminished by the tardiness by which the return
is made;"
5) hastily applying "the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a substitute for appeal although the
circumstances attending the case at bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule;" and
6) depriving petitioner of "the opportunity to present evidence to prove the validity of the warrant when the
petition before it was abruptly resolved without informing petitioner thereof."
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in
which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been
specifically described in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had direct, personal
knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to
surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind the
Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had
personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects
should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but
unfortunately, the place they had in mind the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety
Store" was not what the Judge who issued warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search
warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the premises to be searched. For in their
application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what
the Judge reproduced in the search warrant: "premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207. Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue,
Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the search was made more particular and more restrictive by
the Judge's admonition in the warrant that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described."
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct places in the area involved: the store
known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4) separate and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single
structure and are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through which a person could pass from the
interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may be entered only through its
individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only one of the residential
units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the store and the apartments behind the
store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after
having received the warrant which directs that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described," "Abigail Variety
Store Apt 1207" thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the store they did not ask the Judge to correct said
description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own definite idea of the place to be searched clearly indicated,
according to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application was sufficient
particularization of the general identification of the place in the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP,
11
allegedly to the effect that the
executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the
warrant as to the place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal, immediately disclosed an obvious
typographical error. The application in said case was for seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at "No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City," and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2)
warrants issued No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-83 [b]). Objection was made to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C &
D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" because both search warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This was error, of course but, as this
Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants for
the search of only one place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants specified two (2) distinct addresses,
and that in fact the address, "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" appeared in the opening paragraph of
Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that evidently, this was the address the Judge intended to be searched when he issued the
second warrant (No. 20-82[b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the "obviously typographical error," the officer executing
the warrant could consult the records in the official court file.
12

The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error" involving ambiguous descriptions of
the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the
search warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in
question. In the instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the
absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the
same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the
executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a
place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the
warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their
thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory, in
the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a
search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the
premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or
things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that
delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the
place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the
police officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge Bacalla's finding of probable cause, "as if he were
an appellate court." A perusal of the record however shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies
between Judge Bacalla's Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as regards the identities of the police officers examined
by Judge Bacalla.
13
In Judge Casanova's view, said inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of
the determination of the facts on which the search warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a
search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant which, of
course, is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof was not that which the police officers who applied for
the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than
that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigail's Variety Store,
there was none for Apartment No. 1 the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in
which the private respondents were then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that:
14

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the things to be seized.
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally determined by
the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is
essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched,
15
the manifest intention being that the search be
confined strictly to the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search warrant particularly describe the
place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence
obtained in violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
16

In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought to be made by the Office of the Solicitor
General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the building housing the store and the residential apartment units the place to be
searched being plainly marked was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had been
conducted in the presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant
was diminished by the tardiness by which the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive
"evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to present before the trial court;" or (5) the remedy of the
special civil action ofcertiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues would not
affect the correctness of the conclusion that the search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search
warrant is different from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their argument that anyway the premises
searched were precisely what they had described to the Judge, and originally and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General's Office opines that where a search warrant has been "issued by a
court other than the one trying the main criminal case," the "proper recourse" of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it
before the issuing court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the subject of the warrant is afterwards filed.
17
In
support, it cites the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down by this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals
18
concerning
"possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court
and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said
criminal case." Said second guideline reads:
19

2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the main criminal case) issues the search
warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any
proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All
grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings
for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results
of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things
thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing Court
or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance
of the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the
rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly applies to the case at
bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party
may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property
seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different
participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence
are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent
or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in
the appropriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the
return was made to said court. On the other hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was
filed in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the search warrant, or for the return of
the personal property seized (not otherwise contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was
ever filed. It was only after the criminal action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress
evidence was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which the latter
court must be deemed to have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of September 11, 1996 which dismissed the
Peoples petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and
May 28, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.







G.R. No. 136292 January 15, 2002
RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision
1
of respondent Court of Appeals dated September 15, 1998 which affirmed the
judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, and the resolution
2
dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
In an Information
3
dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft committed as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or elsewhere in the Province of Laguna,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00, belonging to
and to the damage and prejudice of said owner National Power Corp., in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay
Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was
driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires
weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45. Noceja asked appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered
that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and the
vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the
appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan,
Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a
NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his identification card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of
June 28, 1989, while he was driving a passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to
transport in his jeepney conductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had finished his last
trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and
informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed with
the loading of the wires and that the former would act as back-up and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in
Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own vehicle, its tires were old so the
cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered with kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5)
masked men. He was promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his case, he
was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the cables, he told the police officers that the
cables were loaded in his jeep by the owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to
police headquarters where he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead locked him up in jail for
a week."
4

On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment
5
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of property worthP55,244.45, the
Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from TWO (2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant National Power
Corporation in the amount of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award for damages on the ground that the
stolen materials were recovered and modified the penalty imposed, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant RUDY CABALLES is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft, defined and penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised
Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years,
Nine (9) months and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No civil indemnity and no costs."
6

Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police officers searched his vehicle and
seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and when samples of the wires and references to them were
admitted in evidence as basis for his conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was engaged in an entrapment
operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in rejecting said defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt and
thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner to presumption of innocence."
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the warrantless search and seizure made by the police
officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search and validity of his arrest on the
ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court cannot again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho
[Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, it has been held that 'considering that before a warrant can be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which
borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on grounds of practicability.'
The doctrine is not of recent vintage. In the case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on
Motion for Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that 'automobiles because of their mobility may be searched
without a warrant upon facts not justifying warrantless search of a resident or office. x x x To hold that no criminal can, in
any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society,
to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their
escape in many instances' (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court
held that a search may be made even without a warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under the circumstances,
the police officers are not only authorized but are also under obligation to arrest the accused even without a warrant."
7

Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it
might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that,
contrary to the findings of the trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express or implied, to the
search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure shall be
deemed inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable
searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof, which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such
right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely:
(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;
8
(2) seizure of evidence in plain view;
9
(3) search of moving vehicles;
10
(4) consented warrantless search;
11
(5) customs
search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);
12
and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
13

In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied
with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of
the articles procured.
14

It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at bar was not authorized by a search
warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without said
evidence, the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.1wphi1.nt
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity.
15
Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is
the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things
and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another
with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.
16
Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of
the State.
17

The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate
searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
18
Still and all, the
important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
19
The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is
not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
20

One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police checkpoints which has
been declared to be not illegal per se,
21
for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order
22
and conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists.
23
A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally
permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds;
24
(2) simply looks into a vehicle;
25
(3) flashes a light therein without opening the
car's doors;
26
(4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
27
(5) where the inspection of the vehicles is
limited to a visual search or visual inspection;
28
and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
29

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or
visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks
before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre,
30
the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part of the body of an agent into the vehicle
goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment, to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a physical intrusion into the
vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did not conduct a search when he physically intruded part of
his body into a space in which the suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion
allowed him to see and to smell things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . . In doing so, his inspection went
beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent
police officers, and into the area protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his head inside the
open window of a home."
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the
search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle
to be searched.
31

This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in
situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command
("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of
marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that
a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents
confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the
same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana;
32
(5) the accused who were riding a jeepney
were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large
quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and
clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to
which the accused belonged - that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.
33

In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became
suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you were performing your duty?
A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting patrol in the said place when we spotted
a suspicious jeepney so we stopped the jeepney and searched the load of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these
conductor wires.
Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became suspicious, why did you become
suspicious?
A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.
Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what did you do next, if any?
A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir."
34

The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:
"ATTY SANTOS
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since
such vehicle should not be covered by those and I flagged him, sir."
35

We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati
leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,
36
we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the accused was different in appearance from the
usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he
attempted to flee from the police authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of probable cause - persistent
reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the
usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines x x x, CHUA's
suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA
can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine
laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package
emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by
informers of courier of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious
demeanor or behavior, and suspicious bulge in the waist - accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest
exists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing
prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact
that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark
him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. x x x." (emphasis supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was
carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with
cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
37
Unfortunately,
none exists in this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was
inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer
could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
38

It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks
39
and
covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as
to what was hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his
vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles
without further search.
40

III. Consented search
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle "with the consent of the accused" is too
vague to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He claims that there is no specific statement as to how the consent was
asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there was only an
implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The
consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific,
and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
41
Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must
be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
42
The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
43
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or
secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on;
44
(4) the education and intelligence of the
defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found;
45
(7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.
46
It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.
47

In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was conducted in this wise:
"WITNESS
Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?
A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident on said date and time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is that incident?
A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw Rudy Caballes driving a vehicle and the vehicle
contained aluminum wires, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since
such vehicle should not be covered by those and I flagged him, sir.
Q Did the vehicle stop?
A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle and by so doing, I saw the aluminum
wires.
Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?
A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.
Q What was the answer of Caballes?
A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I told him I will look at the contents of
his vehicle and he answered in the positive.
Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did you do?
A I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from the Cavinti area, sir."
48

This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the
police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for
doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the request
demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such request.
49

In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,
50
the apprehending officers sought the permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the
latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his consent to said search. In People vs. Lacerna,
51
the appellants who were
riding in a taxi were stopped by two policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In
upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech"
expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People vs.
Cuizon,
52
the accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating that they freely consented to the search of their
luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,
53
it was held that the accused
spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which
acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. In People vs. Omaweng,
54
the police officers asked the accused if
they could see the contents of his bag to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." Then the
policemen asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court said there was a valid consented
search.1wphi1.nt
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
55

In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The
manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to
be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents
of his vehicle and he answered in the positive."We are hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the police officers were
asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they
were informing, nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld
the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of
the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein
petitioner, the statements of the police officers were not asking for his consent; they were declaring to him that they will look
inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted because when Sgt. Noceja was
asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of
the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner
he will inspect the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked twice in his
direct examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle. He
never testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the search.
56

Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. InPeople vs.
Barros,
57
appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box, boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen
inspected the carton and found marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and failed
to object to the search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and held that the accused is not to be
presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted simply because he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People
vs. Burgos,
58
to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizens
in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain petitioner's conviction. His
guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes is herebyACQUITTED of the crime
charged. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
























G.R. No. 136860 January 20, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated November 19, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City, finding
appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
1
For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and
to pay a fine of two million pesos.
Appellant and her co-accused were charged under the following Information:
"That on or about October 20, 1996 at around 1:00 oclock dawn, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
helping with one another, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
delivery/transport with intent to sell marijuana leaves wrapped in a transparent plastic weighing approximately eight (8)
kilos, which is in violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
2

During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned
from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a
month in big bulks.
On October 19, 1996, at about 10 oclock in the evening, Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in
connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night.
An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon
Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint.
At about 1:00 oclock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two
female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga.
3
In
front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and
content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center No.2 located at the same barangay. They brought with them the black bag.
Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the
meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay
captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found
inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana.
To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two. Rosita Nunga stated that it was owned by the
appellant. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation receipt without the
assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have one. During the course of the investigation, not even
close relatives of theirs were present.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on October 23, 1996. Forensic
Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the articles were marijuana leaves weighing
eight kilos.
4

For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them. Rosita Nunga testified that in the evening of October 19,1996, she
went to buy medicine for her ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. The child was suffering from diarrhea,
occasioned by abdominal pain. To return to their house, she boarded a tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where she resides. Along
the way, the tricycle she was riding was flagged down by a policeman at a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan. She was taken aback
when the officer invited her to the Kabayan Center. It was there that she was confronted with the black bag allegedly containing
eight bricks of marijuana leaves. She disputed owning the bag and knowing its contents. She also denied sitting beside the appellant
in the passengers seat inside the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a male passenger behind the driver.
Remarkably, appellant did not appear in court and was only represented by her lawyer. The latter marked and submitted in evidence
an affidavit executed by one Efren Gannod, a security guard of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac. The sworn statement
declared that at about 0220H on October 20, 1996, SPO2 Antonio arrived at their terminal and arrested a certain woman who
boarded their Bus No. 983. The incident was recorded in the companys logbook. Gannod, however, was not presented in court to
attest that the woman referred in his affidavit was the appellant.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga, thus:
"WHEREFORE, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA
6425 in relation to RA 7659, they are hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
two million pesos.
SO ORDERED."
5

Aggrieved by the verdict, appellant interposed the present appeal. In her brief, she assigned the following errors:
"1. The Honorable Regional Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the right of accused against
illegal and unwarranted arrest and search was violated by the police officers who arrested both accused.
2. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the right of the accused to custodial
investigation was deliberately violated by the peace officers who apprehended and investigated the accused.
3. The Honorable Court miserably failed to evaluate the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecutions
witnesses which inconsistencies cast doubt and make incredible the contention and version of the prosecution.
4. The Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion when it appreciated and considered the documentary and object
evidence of the prosecution not formally offered amounting to ignorance of the law."
6

We are not persuaded by these contentions; hence, the appeal must be dismissed.
In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her arrest. She contends that at the
time she was apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle. In the same
manner, she impugns the search made on her belongings as illegal as it was done without a valid warrant or under circumstances
when warrantless search is permissible. Consequently, any evidence obtained therein is inadmissible against her.
These arguments fail to impress. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a
search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."
7

The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable"
searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and police
must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of
arrest.
8

Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not
absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles.
9
Warrantless search
and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
10
Peace officers in such
cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection.
11
When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable
cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle
contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.
12

In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana
emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused;
13
(b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed
to be acting suspiciously;
14
(c) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had
earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a quantity of marijuana;
15
(d) where Narcom agents had
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport
and other identification papers when requested to do so;
16
(f) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of
intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy -- one who participated in the drug smuggling
activities of the syndicate to which the accused belong -- that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country;
17
(g)
where the arresting officers had received a confidential information that the accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was
established in a previous test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably carrying shabu with him;
18
(h) where
police officers received an information that the accused, who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport
marijuana in a bag to Manila;
19
and (i) where the appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he was carrying fitted the
description given by a civilian asset.
20

The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been
conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a month,
appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip
that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle
and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and
what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of appellants bag was
not illegal.
It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or
transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a
police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in
flagrante delicto, thus:
"Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
x x x."
21
(emphasis supplied)
Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police officers interrogated her. She claimed that
she was not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to have competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues that the
confession or admission obtained therein should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her.
These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any confession during her custodial investigation. In determining
the guilt of the appellant and her co-accused, the trial court based its decision on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and on
the existence of the confiscated marijuana. We quote the relevant portion of its decision:
"Earlier in the course of the proceedings, the court then presided by Judge Angel Parazo, granted bail to accused Agpanga
Libnao, ruling that the confiscation receipt signed by both accused (Exhibit "C") is inadmissible because they were not
assisted by a counsel. Confronted with this same issue, this court finds the postulate to rest on good authority and will
therefore reiterate its inadmissibility.
Since the prosecution had not presented any extrajudicial confession extracted from both accused as evidence of their guilt,
the court finds it needless to discuss any answer given by both accused as a result of the police interrogation while in their
custody. By force of necessity, therefore, the only issue to be resolved by the court is whether or not, based on the
prosecutions evidence, both accused can be convicted."
22
(emphasis supplied)
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and documentary evidence of the
prosecution despite the latters failure to formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she argues that they again must be deemed
inadmissible.
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly
identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.
23
All the documentary
and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of
marijuana.
24
Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses properly
identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded.
25
Furthermore, appellants counsel had cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses who testified on the exhibits.
26

Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. She first cites the inconsistency between the
testimony of SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, who said that it was SPO2 Antonio who opened the black bag containing the marijuana; and
that of SPO2 Antonio, who declared that the bag was already open when he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then focuses on the
police officers failure to remember the family name of the driver of the tricycle where she allegedly rode, claiming that this is
improbable and contrary to human experience.
Again, appellants arguments lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she mentions refer only to minor details and not to material
points regarding the basic elements of the crime. They are inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility of the witnesses
nor detract from the established fact that appellant and her co-accused were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need
only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.
27
The identity of the person who
opened the bag is clearly immaterial to the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it is to be expected that the testimony of witnesses
regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different persons may have different recollections of the
same incident.
28

Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to note and remember the name of the tricycle driver for
the reason that it was unnecessary for them to do so. It was not shown that the driver was in complicity with the appellant and her
co-accused in the commission of the crime.
To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police
officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold this presumption.
29
In this case, no
evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting the appellant.
Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The
defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
30
It has to be substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence.
31
The sole proof presented in the lower court by the appellant to support her claim of denial and alibi
was a sworn statement, which was not even affirmed on the witness stand by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to an imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.