SIR HAROLD HARDING LECTURE

BY ARNOLD DIX


THE CHALLENGES OF SOUND
ENGINEERING FOR UNDERGROUND
CONSTRUCTION IN THE 21
ST

CENTURY


Introduction
On Thursday the 17
th
of April, 2008 the 7
th
Bi-
annual Sir Harold Harding Memorial Lecture was
presented by Professor Arnold Dix at the Institution
of Civil Engineers in London.
Attended by a large audience and watched over by
the names of great engineers such as Arkwright,
Cort, Watt, Bramah, Rumford, Murdock, Rennie,
Brunel, Myddelton, Dudley, Newton, Savery,
Newcomen, Darby, Brindley and Smeaton, in the
Thomas Telford Theatre, a lively address on
contemporary issues facing engineers in the
tunnelling sector proved to be both entertaining and
thought provoking. This is a transcript of that
lecture.

The Presentation
Good evening Ladies and Gentleman!
It is a tremendous honour to be here in this great
city. I apologise in advance for my very strange
accent and thank you for inviting me to present this
prestigious lecture.
For those of you who are wondering, it is true, I am
related to the famous soprano, Helena Dix who
performs here in London. I hope that somehow her
voice helps with my presentation.
Our century, this century the 21
st
century faces
challenges which are immediate and demand our
attention. Our civilisation has to address these
problems now, and we, as the people best able to
respond with respect to the underground
environment, must stand up and respond. Its just
that simple we the technically able are best
placed to provide the actual solutions to the
technical challenges of the 21
st
century.
I believe there are three key areas that we must
focus in on our response.
1. Truth. I know its a simple thing. Of
course, we all tell the truth? Well, in my
presentation, perhaps during a quiet
moment, Ill talk about some areas where
perhaps we dont. As masters of the factual
world we must be truthful.
2. Time. I dont think we, as technical people,
communicate our concepts and
understanding of time and what it means
well enough to other professionals.
Although we often share the same words, I
dont think we share the same mind space
when it comes to time.
3. Professional conduct. If we are to assume
our rightful place in leadership roles (the
rate we are required to take if our
civilisation is going to address the pressing
technical issues of this century) we must
behave as professionals and we must be seen
to behave as professionals.
Combining these three core areas will promote both
understanding and trust. These are essential for our
new leadership role.
The global crises of urbanisation, energy and
environmental degradation that were currently
facing arent unforeseen. These arent things that
have snuck up on us without us having any warning
about them. Weve known they were coming.
Urbanisation and population growth: Weve known
its an issue. Its upon us now.
Energy: The cost and availability of energy. We
knew this was coming as a major issue.
Environmental degradation: There is no surprise
about it. Old news for our professions.
Climate change: Interesting really, climate change.
We were trained on climate change. As soon as we
did quaternary studies; as soon as we looked at
alluvial deposits; as soon as we thought about
glaciations in this part of the world, we were
embracing climate change when it wasnt trendy to
do it. We know about it. We understand it. The
rates might be different but we are well placed to be
leaders in the engineering response to it.

Cost
Of course, the economic cost of infrastructure - its
getting more expensive and our communities are
asking, What is the value? In times of short
economic returns and meteoric politics the value of
major underground infrastructure is easily
miscalculated.

The Harding Context
Sir Harold Harding in his Presidential Address of
November 1963 said:
[The population explosion] may
produce a greater danger than
humanity might find itself being
choked by its own waste products
so in the future, the work to prevent
this may become our major task.
Now, in the 21
st
century, I will suggest to you that
some of the key major tasks that we face, some of
the main challenges that our society is going to look
to us for a response and as Harold Harding spoke
about all those years ago.
When you look at the tunnels here in London and
what the United Kingdom has done as a
community, the way it has allocated its resources,
the way its engineers have stepped up to the
challenge, it has a fire track record of responding to
these issues.
When I have a little look around the history, I see:

1863 - the Metropolitan line, Paddington Kings
Cross, the first underground service and the sewers
being constructed.

1890 - the deep level tube.

Then, when I went to Embankment Station and I
had a look below, I could see the big floodgates too,
of course to stop the flooding down there from the
Thames.
These are issues that have been addressed, by us as
engineers, on behalf of our community long before
they were trendy. Long before they became what
elections were being won or lost on. These are
normal engineering issues that we are trained to
deal with.
In terms of the truth, this is where we must stand
up. No amount of political promises no matter
how sweetly theyre said or with whatever vigour
changes the truth.
Legislative reform (God bless its little heart)
doesnt change the facts. Provisions in contracts
dont change the truth. Pronouncements in
standards dont change anything.
The universal laws of nature, including what
Mother Nature has dished up for us in terms of
ground conditions are the facts. The gravitational
constant will remain the same, no matter what is
said in the legislation or written in the contract.
Fluid dynamics will be the same. It doesnt matter
how eloquent or powerfully put the contrary
position is the facts are the facts. To suggest
otherwise is not the truth. Our job influences what
the politicians say, what the legislation says, what
the contracts say, what the standards say. We must
endeavour to keep these other important matters
grounded in truth.
Thats all very nice to say but lets have a closer
look at our culture and its impact on truth.
Here I am in the United Kingdom. A lovely place.
Dont we love to just talk down our success? Were
judged by the infrastructure. How late it was. How
much extra it cost. How we (in Australia we call it)
stuffed it up, and thats how were judged. Lets
give an example of that the new Terminal 5 at
Heathrow, T5 and our culture.
T5 clearly shows that an operational failure
undermines absolutely undermines - community
confidence in the piece of exceptional engineering
that T5 is. Its fantastic engineering! Could the
change of ownership have had something to do with
that? Could the people, who are there now, be
different to the people who were there for the main
substantive part of the project? I think they are
different. I understand, from reading the tabloids, a
couple of key senior people have gone now. No
one is saying publically what a great piece of
engineering it is.
The whole world is celebrating T5s failure as
everyones bags zip on down to Italy! (T5 luggage
was sent to Italy to be sorted following handling
difficulties.) Yet, when I went to T5, I thought it
was gorgeous. Almost as gorgeous as an
underground place. I really enjoyed all these sorts
of things. I could only imagine the castings for the
structural elements.

I thought it was a very impressive place.

So what does it tell us? It tells us in our profession,
as experts in the underground space, we are going
to be judged on how our systems perform. Thats
why tonight Im not just talking about boring our
tunnels, Im not just going to limit it to the code
Im going to talk about the operation as well.

Messages
What are my messages going to be? Ill tell you in
advance so if you go to sleep, you wont have
missed anything.
Generally, we must assume our role as leaders in
developing and operating subterranean
infrastructure. That is our place! We have the best
information. We have the best knowledge and
judgment. We have to stand up and take that place.
Do not assume that others understand, or can
understand some of the complex technical scientific
and philosophical concepts that underlie our
profession. Even if they mimic our words, they
dont share the concepts, and Ill explore that
shortly.
Dont think that because somebody says to you,
Oh, I can put that in the contract. I understand
that whatever it might be. Something about
ground conditions, something about a 1 in 50 year
event, something about a standard. Dont assume
that they know what youre talking about. Even if
they use the words back at you.
We have a different mindset. We think about things
differently. Engage with these other professionals,
tease out their ideas, talk to them. Dont be afraid
to help them understand our concepts. Theyre
clever people. Other professionals are clever. We
have to help them understand and we have to help
them appreciate what they dont yet understand.
We should not compromise our intellectual integrity
to pander to bureaucrats. This is actually really
serious. The UK is the home of bureaucracy. God
bless you! It started here. It spread around the
world. Coming from another colony, Im kind of
sensitive to this sort of thing.
Did I mention risk assessments? Ill come to them.
Dont let simplistic risk assessments compromise
our intellectual integrity to do so brings us all into
discredit.
Consider the operational implications of everything
that we do. I know that its easier, for example,
when building a tunnel through say, soft ground
going into hard ground -
Lets go in steep because its easier and
then we shorten the distance were in the
difficult ground and then well go along the
nice ground and well pop up steep at the
other end.
Something as simple as that, although wonderful in
terms of the immediate construction risk profile,
may damn that piece of infrastructure for the next
100 or 200 years in terms of operational
performance.
If for example over that 100 or 200 years - the
buoyancy of poisonous gases, for example,
becomes an issue. The grade on the steep section
will haunt the users for ever and to protect them
will require advanced systems of ventilation and
other technologies which perhaps havent even been
invented yet. The other option was to perhaps be
more sensitive about grade. Its just a simple
example.
Dont be slaves to standards. Truth is a much
better master.
For want of nothing better to do, I sit on a number
of Standards Bodies. For those of you who dont,
youve got to try it. Its a special kind of thing. Its
like a form of therapy. You go along to a meeting.
Work out the politics. Eat food thats yucky.
Pretend that people you dont like, you do. Try and
understand all the various personality disorders and
then in the very end, establish a minimum standard
that everyone can agree on and then celebrate it as
if the world has changed. These minimum
standards are dangerous things for us.
The EU Directive, for example, on the Trans
European Road Network for Safety, is a minimum
standard. Just a minimum standard. Yet, its
interpreted to be something special. Its not. So
dont be slaves to it. Truth is a better master.
Develop innovative ways of conducting knowledge
transfer and group problem solving. Endorse new
ways of doing peer review in your intellectual
endeavours. There arent enough of us anymore to
be insular in the way we work. The world is
screaming for the infrastructure we deliver there
arent enough experienced people to do it. We have
to become more clever in the way we share our
expertise and remember, the root cause (as best I
can tell from my analysis of many failures) of
tunnels collapses is administrative, not technical.
Usually administrative errors cause the vast
majority of technical collapses not technical
issues.
I know of only a handful of cases where the
collapses have been what I would call a technical
surprise for technical people. Usually if you
actually had the time or the expertise or even just a
quiet moment, the fact that the whole thing is
bending, for example, no matter what clever way
we describe it, should give you an idea that
something is not quite right. So just remembering
the bureaucracy, the way things are structured, the
way engineers are resourced is really important.
Weve actually got the technology really, really,
highly developed now technically there are very
few constraints in 21
st
century tunnelling.



Construction and Risk - Tunnels
Risk taking is part of the process in underground
construction. We are explorers of the unknown.
There is not going to be a, without risk
underground construction project unless, like
Superman, we develop special eyes to see through
the rock itself. Its not going to happen in the
foreseeable future.
Calculated risk taking is to be endorsed by us
because thats what we do. We are risk takers.
Engineers do it all the time. We have numbers that
describe it, we know the things that we build will
break. We understand the people who use them
will die. Thats what happens. Thats what we do.
Were practical people. Weve just got to get on
with it and do the job. The Joint Code of Practice
1
,
we should and I think YOU should, particularly,
celebrate that as an achievement. It is a significant
step, in my opinion, forward for the world in
managing the technically complex underground
projects.

Operations
In terms of operations, we should carefully consider
the human factors and Ill touch upon this. Its the
people that were building this for. Not
hypothetical people real people. Think about how
real people behave.
We must also consider the long term energy
consumption of our infrastructure. The
environmental implications of this infrastructure
that we build and in the contracts, dont be too
bogged down by what people do elsewhere get a
contract that suits your culture. Suits your project.
Often the administration of the contract is much
more important than the words. Of course, the
words are important but its like a marriage. It
doesnt really matter what the vows say if you hate
each other. Its the culture and Ill explore that.



Standards
So lets get to the question about being a
professional. As professional engineers, turn
your expert mind, your profession to the task at
hand. Thats what you have to do. So if you just
follow a standard, its not going to be good enough.
There are a whole range of things that can happen if
you say to someone, Just follow the standard. As
I said, if youve been on a standard body, you know
how perilous that might be.
So lets have a think about tonight in terms of the
presentation professional conduct in construction,
operation, standards and contracts. In the end, we
have to be trusted and in the end, we have to be
trustworthy.

1
A Code of Practice for Risk Management of Tunnel Works;
December 2005; Prepared by the International Tunneling
Insurance Group

Trusted and Trustworthy
So what are our challenges on being trusted and
trustworthy?
Firstly, there is a lack of experienced practitioners
globally.
Secondly, and I think very importantly, there is a
huge brain drain of competence to other
professions.
How many sitcoms have you ever seen on the sex
life of engineers? Hands up the answer is none,
and I dont know if its our brown cardigans, or
what it is, but the world does not portray us as cool,
sexy kind of guys as I know we all are!
We can be a bit functional sometimes, but thats
okay. But this is actually a very serious issue
because there was a time when the best minds -
without question - would become engineers. That
time has past and its past at a time in the history of
the world where we need them now. I dont want
the cleverest MBA business manager in the world
by my side when things are going technically
wrong. How helpful are they? I would have
preferred it if there was someone useful out there to
help me. We are useful people. Thats what were
trained to be. Our time has come again to be useful.
Okay, we may have to get a bit sexier, but our time
has come again.


Money
Money! Ive called it reward in the presentation.
We are worth more than were paid. That situation
will change rapidly, I think, here and in other
countries as well, as the world recognises if they
want functional projects built and they want them
built on time and on budget, it would help if they
paid decent people to do the job and it would help if
they attracted decent people to the profession by
paying them something reasonable to come. This
really upsets me because why should an MBA earn
more than an engineer when the engineers are the
ones who can deliver the infrastructure and the
MBA can sit back and get drunk at lunch time and
tell you what a bad job youve done because your
KPIs are stuffed!!!
We are the rightful masters. The engineers and the
scientists are the custodians of the fundamental
unalterable truth about the real world. Digging
holes through the ground and keeping people safe in
them is as real a problem as it gets. It demands our
special attention. As Sir Harold Harding said:
The only bore hole that can be relied upon
to describe the ground conditions precisely
would be one the length of the tunnel and
several feet larger in diameter.
Im thinking, Pretty astute kind of guy.

Information Sharing

Were going to have to develop innovative ways to
cooperatively deliver outcomes, share our
experience and expertise. Of course we still have to
respect the commercial business models. Our
masters still have to win or lose elections. Our
masters still have to make more money for the
investments than they make. They dont like losing
money. We have to respect those commercial
models but in order to create trust in us; we need to
communicate better the special knowledge that we
have about these risks. As I mentioned, we need
better ways of communicating with each other.

Tunnelling Essentials
So, now to the tunnel essentials. Im going to
quickly go through geology, design and
construction, use, normal, utility use, energy
consumption, pollution and emergencies.

Clichs
Ground Conditions
Now, lets go to the clichs.
Ground conditions are variable.
Well done!
How many people do you talk to who arent
engineers, who arent lawyers (oh, maybe they are
lawyers), but how many people do you talk to who
arent technically trained in what that means, who
nod, Yes, ground conditions are variable. But
what they mean is I put tomatoes in the garden.
There was a clay layer down below. Very variable
or I didnt use the pitchfork, I didnt get down deep
enough. They dont get it! They dont understand
how serious that clich is nor can they.
The contracts should recognise ground condition
uncertainties. The challenge for our colleagues in
the legal area is how to translate what we know to
be a truth and a fact into something which is
workable legally. This is an enormous problem for
them. The risk is that we leave it to them to sort out
without giving it our attention to help them work
out a practical solution.
Fundamental questions require our assistance.
When are there enough boreholes? When is enough
geo-technical data enough? How do you translate
that into the sort of formality and certainty in a
contract thats demanded? Those are real questions
and we have to help them answer them. We have to
become their partners in this problem. We have the
expertise to do so.

Risks
My favourite clich, Risks should be born by the
party best able to manage them oh, get out of it!
Our projects cost so much, why would anyone of us
want to bear the risk of it, even though we are best
placed to manage the risks? Weve only got modest
houses and wealth accumulating at an hourly labour
rate - a billion pounds is quite a lot of exposure.
This is just a clich. Its mouthing. Its part of what
I spoke to you about.

Understanding
Dont believe that people understand what youre
saying just because they use your words. They
dont understand. They havent been trained in the
concepts. They havent got the experience that we
have to deal with these matters, they cant
understand without our help.
Just a quick ground conditions re-visit in the
context of truth of will illustrate this!

Time
Mother Nature has had about 4.5 billion years to
fiddle with the ground conditions.
London has been here around about 2,000 years. So
we, as human beings, have had about 2,000 years to
put a tunnel over some soil in the ground a bit of
iron, a few sleepers or something.
The operational life of the infrastructure may be
200 years. It might be a bit more; it might be a bit
less. In the scheme of the world, it is barely a
blip. Nothing surer than it wont exist in a billion
years, or so, no matter what the contract says!
Years in Millions to :
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
G
r
o
u
n
d

C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s

B
u
i
l
d

L
o
n
d
o
n

C
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t

a

T
u
n
n
e
l

T
a
k
e

a

j
o
u
r
n
e
y

H
a
v
e

a
n

e
m
e
r
g
e
n
c
y


The design and construct period may be 10 years
(just to pick a number).
A journey might take (Ill use a transit example)
10 minutes and an emergency might take 5 minutes.
Ladies and Gentlemen, this breadth of time
highlights why our conceptual models of the world
and risk are fundamentally different to other
professions.
Most people have never thought about 4.5 billion
years and what it means for ground conditions.
Even now when I think about that, Im not sure I
exactly understand what it means other than a very
long time. Ground variability needs this
geological time perspective.
What better to illustrate this than a cross section of
the earth. How funny is this cross section?

We cant even figure out whats a few 100 metres
below the surface here is a cross section right
down to the middle of the earth! So, Im always
staggered by this. I think the good news is that
whatever is going on down in there does cause our
continents to run around and bang into one another,
which is handy (although I wouldnt suggest
waiting for it to happen).
I was reminded of this flying here passing by the
Himalayas and I was saying to someone, You
know, their mountains are actually going up really
quickly (he just had another red wine or something
and went to sleep). Its in there that the magnetic
fields are created which cause the ionosphere which
protects life on earth. I find that just truly
remarkable. It gives us our poles. For me, having
originally trained as a geologist, this is for me, like
my mummy picture. This is mother earth but it is a
special place and it is different, and our conceptual
understanding of it is different to everybody elses.
Oldest rocks - 4.4 billion years old thats a long
time, as Ive mentioned. Thats what they look like.

The three people you see arent rocks; although
they are some of the people who wear cardigans and
dont feature in sitcoms. They love 4.5 billion years
of rocks.


Any other profession driving past those rocks would
say, Some rocks. For us, theyre the oldest rocks
on earth. Theyre in Western Australia in part of
the crater there. That is remarkable and of course,
thats why geology is so remarkable - 4.5 billion
years gives you a lot of time to have some
volcanisms, squash some things, have a few
glaciations, run some rivers through it, do some
other things we dont understand, induce concepts
of uniformitarians principles. Do all sorts of things
that are so big I still dont fully understand them,
but thats why its hard to figure out whats going to
happen when you dig a hole.
So, if I was to draw another graph of years to form
ground conditions and that was a bar chart. Thats a
bar chart showing everything in perspective. You
will see building London, and everything else
doesnt even show. There is a pie chart just to
confirm it (for the MBAs amongst you).


Years to form the ground conditions
0
000000000
000000000
000000000
000000000
000000000
Form Ground
Conditions
BuildLondon Construct
Tunnel
Make Journey Respond to
Emergency
Years

Ground
London
construction
Journey
Emergency

So if we now put years to build London, and I have
arbitrarily chosen 2,000 years, strangely enough
constructing the tunnel journey, times and
emergency responses dont show. The time scales
are too different.

This is just giving you an idea of the history of
London, 60 years AD60 the first London
Bridge.
This is simply providing an insight into our 2,000
years of history here in London.

Tunnel Construction
Now were down to 10 years. Normal operations
and emergencies dont show. There is a pie chart
just to show you that it doesnt show.
History of London
construction
Journey
Emergency

0
2
4
6
8
10
construction Journey Emergency
Years

Im doing this just to highlight for your amusement
this time exposure. If you werent professionally
trained, it wouldnt be funny. It would be like, Oh,
thats very interesting mmm. [Laughs].
Tunnel Operations - were now down to .00002 of
a year having started at 4.5 billion and we can see
there is a bit of a difference between journeys and
emergencies. On the pie chart, you can see that. So
thats handy, that must be true!
0
0.000005
0.00001
0.000015
0.00002
Journey Emergency
Years

So what does all that mean? We are the masters of
tunnel time. We actually understand the concepts.
This is uncommon. Most people dont think about
time in this way. You might say, No one else
thinks about time in this way Arnold. Can you
please leave. You are clearly on some substance.
We must communicate the implications of time
more successfully. It is our duty to do so. We
under-sell the intellectual tools that we have for
understanding the world around us and by under-
selling it and poorly communicating it, it doesnt
help our projects or anybody else. It doesnt help
the lawyers. It doesnt help the politicians. It
doesnt help anyone. We fail them because we
dont communicate time correctly.
Risk
Ive got to dim the lights [And the lights are in
fact then dimmed.]
I dont know how to tell you this because you are
all my best friends now, I thought Id just dim the
lights so no one actually can see anyone when I say
this but [whispering] effectively managing risk is
not a function of the number of workshops or the
length of the risk register. [Laughter] I had to dim
the lights because I didnt want anyone to actually
see the MBAs saying, Isnt it? [Laughter]
Scheduling a two hour risk workshop isnt going to
do it Ladies and Gentlemen. We have professional
duties to discharge. The technical term we use in
Australia, in learned circles, for this silliness is
bullshit. The reason we use that term, or I use
that term is because risk as we understand it
demands expert judgment assisted by the various
risk management tools that are available. Available
to us because weve been trained in them.
Available to us because we have the intellectual
models and capability to deal with them.
Take a Bayesian approach to risk. [I am keeping
the lights down because I dont really know how to
pronounce it. I certainly cant spell it.] I have
written it but I am not claiming to be an expert on it.
Ive tried to be, but failed dismally but it provides a
systematic way of combining expert judgment with
empirical evidence. What does it tell us? It tells us
when we use a Bayesian mathematical approach,
minor changes in one parameter can dramatically
change the overall result.

Risk Assessments
Risk assessments have become popular but are our
special underground risks understood? We are
trained in tunnel special risk which is essential in
this type of risk analysis. But what is a risk
assessment? Lets use an example?
This is my favourite scam. Lets give several
factors a grade! Lets arbitrarily call them between
1 and 10 and then average them and conclude
whatever the risk is. It is just wrong.
One of the three axioms of probability says that, If
events are independent, their probability is a
product of the probabilities we all know that but
everyday we go out and do these little Mickey
Mouse risk assessment things because the
bureaucrats are there saying, Well cant you risk
assess that? and then secretly we go, Well, what
answer do we want?, Oh yeah, okay. Yeah, we
can risk assess that. No worries.
What about lack of data? You either have to have
data or expert opinion. If there is not enough data,
dont demand a number. Its probably going to be
wrong and misleading. We know that. Were
trained in that yet we let the bureaucrats say, I
want a number. Well give them a number. They
wont understand it. We can give it a number. It
means nothing!
Variance: Variance normally isnt spoken about on
calculated probabilities. Without variance the fat in
the answer is hidden by the numerical answer.
Again, extremely misleading.
Ignoring statistical dependencies: Subject matter
experts us understand the inter-dependencies of
risk factors in tunnels. Junior inexperienced risk
analysts dont. They just dont.
Understanding the relationships between factors is
essential for real results.
Risk matrix tables (I love these the best): How can
you multiply two numbers, that dont usually have
the same units, and then compare the results? Its
just wrong. Its our intellectual secret, but its
dangerous because we actually build a matrix and
we calculate a number, a meaningless number, yet
many commonly do it and use these numbers as the
basis for decisions well no one here does it!
(Laughter) I think they do it in other countries.
Wed never do it here? We know that thats not a
correct way of dealing with risk. We know the
answer is not true but we do it. I mean, they do it!
If we are to be leaders, if were to be trusted, we
must reject the Mickey Mouse approach to risk
assessments, hence, substitute sound expert decision
making. Risk assessments are techniques, they are
tools to assist us make expert decisions. They are
not a substitute for expert decisions. If were going
to be trusted, if were going to be professional, we
must stand up and remind the bureaucrats of that.
We cant just abuse the tools that help us make
decisions for bureaucratic purposes.
(Ill have the lights back up now).
I dont know what I just said. Ive completely
forgotten that section on risk analysis. I do
remember something about it only being foreigners
that did it and because Im not from the EU I think I
can say that. If I was from the EU, I think Id go to
jail.


Construction
This picture is of a tunnel in Japan. Its in Tokyo.
Its gorgeous.
In fact, if I wasnt already married, Id kind of like
getting married in it, but then thats why I wear
brown cardigans too.
Construction relies on complex machines and
expert judgment. There are always tight
construction timelines and budget restraints
everywhere in the world but things go wrong:
Munich, (of course, somewhere near here), Daegu
Metro (South Korea), Shanghai Metro.

Munich Metro 1994

Daegu Metro 2000


Heathrow Express 1994

Shanghai Metro 2003

Shanghai was interesting. They were going through
soft ground and the freeze system on the front of the
TBM wasnt freezing so much and they went
basically Oh, its only 30cm to go. Those
engineers went straight to jail. China is direct. Oh,
we can be a bit more relaxed here, we dont get
executed anymore.

Collapses
Collapses do not respect the boundaries of
countries. A short summary from Munich Re
insurance produced an interesting summary.





These collapses respect no country whether its
Germany, Denmark, Taiwan, US, Italy, Turkey,
Korea, France, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland,
Australia, Taiwan. Why could that be? Because
its the universal laws of nature. Were dealing
with the unknown and were dealing with the
problems, the very real, the very practical problems
of digging through something that in the end, is
likely to have a few surprises within it and if we
dont have our wits about us, it can happen on other
projects.

So, what about some new trends in construction risk
and project management?

Well, the Joint Code of Practice, (which is based on
the BTS Code), is a great step forward, as I have
mentioned. Im sure you all know the key features
of it so Ill be very quick, but management of risks,
not elimination of them are in my opinion the
essential elements of such a response like:

having a dynamic risk register,
articulating responsibilities for the risks,
insurance not being used as a contingent
single mitigation measure in major
infrastructure works.

Client expertise is mandated by the Code, and the
bit I really loved is including named individuals and
confirmation of availability!
How many of you have had your names on a tender
thats been successful, never to hear again from the
successful tenderer? The insurers are onto it, they
understand this issue thats good for us. Its good
for the experts. Its good for the people who
actually want to do the job properly because the
insurers are saying We think that the people who
are most competent make a difference to the
outcome should be employed. Today, I learnt that
perhaps the banks are doing the same in relation to
credit ratings on projects.
Factors such as:
sufficient time and budget,
ground reference conditions,
data exchange,
change management,
sharing all available subsurface
information,
a coordinated insurance program, and
adequate resources for ground
investigations;
form part of the Codes requirements.
All of these things make the Code and what the
BTS has done, a significant step forward for the
world in terms of project management from a risk
perspective for major underground infrastructure
projects.
I think as you say here, Well done!, Jolly good
show and all those sorts of things. Now, I say, As
you were and well all be right. But it really is a
great step forward for the world because even if
people dont follow the Code, even if people say,
Were not going to exactly do it youve got the
world thinking about the sorts of issues which
youve identified as important and youve got them
thinking about how they might manage the A job
problems of delay, cost overruns, killing people and
destroying infrastructure. All the normal problems.
Examples
I said before that a collapse today is probably going
to be bureaucratic driven and not technical. Let me
give you an example:

Singapore, March 2004
The first picture shows how the area was shortly
before. Thats what it looked like shortly
afterwards.

Whats particularly interesting is that I was at a
conference before 2004 and heard a paper given on
the concerns that a geotechnical person had on
Singapores reliance on the cheapest bid and
Singapores reliance on construction methods that
caused great big cracks on the surface. This person
was saying, Im a bit worried something bad is
going to happen in Singapore, and no one wanted
to listen. This person was an expert who was trying
to tell those who didnt want to listen, what was
going to happen, inevitably.
And this is how that disaster unfolded:
225 days out before the collapse:
. 150 metres long settlement cracks, deflection
movements were anticipated about 190mm,
actual movements nearly three times as much.
The models werent the same as reality.
(225 days before the people died.)
209 days out:
. In an email from the design engineer:
It seems that the design is being
stretched to the limit. Many
instruments have breached design
allowable values. The situation is
beginning to look precarious.
Singapore March 2004

Singapore 30 April 2004

(Weve still got 209 days until the fatal
collapse).
198 days from collapse:
. The expertise of the engineer was questioned:
He does not possess the requisite
qualifications. Its difficult to expect that he
will be able to fulfil the very onerous
professional duties to supervise the very
difficult works.
(Were still 198 days out from the collapse).
178 days from collapse:
. A member of the Independent Expert Panel (the
special engineering advisory panel), advises that
the technique being used to design the works is
underestimating the forces on the walls.
Well done! The actual observations are 300%
of what was anticipated by the models.
160 days from collapse:
. The project team is not prepared to reassess the
design.
. Another independent expert endorses the first
expert stating:
The walls are potentially severely under
designed throughout. The work design has
no justifiable technical basis. In my opinion
it would be irresponsible to continue with
any excavation that has been designed on
what we now know is an incorrect and very
unsafe basis.
97 days from collapse:
. More wall deflections.
81 days from collapse:
. More wall deflections.
. Trigger levels reach surges.
80 days from collapse:
. The design manager borrows a copy of an
engineering program.
Why? Because the design manager doesnt
have budget for one for themselves, but cant
complete the analysis due to lack of full time
engineering resources. He has to return the
software without completing his analysis. They
really did have to borrow the software!
. A third independent expert is retained by the
government agency he conducts a
geotechnical analysis which demonstrates wall
failure in each of the three instances modelled.
Well done!
You could be cynical and say the reason for the
indecision was that these matters dealt with
temporary works. If these temporary works had
held, the final works completed quickly, money and
time would have been saved.
Some might say that whats going on here is a
stalling tactic while the construction continues. The
engineering is straight forward. There was no
technical doubt the temporary works would fail.
60 days out from failure:
. Another expert expresses concern about
fundamentally unsound excavations. There
could be the potential for a major failure.
59 days from collapse:
. The government writes to the engineers saying
We think there is a problem with the
predictions. This is of paramount importance
as the excavation is carried out adjacent to a
major thoroughfare, several buildings and
critical utilities.
. More deflections
. More deflections
19 days from collapse:
. The design engineer resigns. Good timing! No
new engineers apply for his job.
7 days out from failure:
. The first independent expert meets with
representatives from the joint venture. The
independent expert says The people using the
model should come to his advanced course so
that they can understand the limitations of the
model that they're using. Of course, he says if
the excavation goes further, it may fail.
5 days out from failure:
. The government says There should be a design
review. Well done!
The last few days:
. No one does much at all.
The final day:
. It collapses. Luckily, only four people were
killed. The collapse was during a labour break
and the damages extensive.
\
The day of the collapse.

Consequently legal proceedings were launched
between everyone. Well done!
Lessons?
It was the bureaucracy, not the technology that
caused the failure. It was not a lack of expertise,
knowledge of the natural worlds, knowledge of
engineering, knowledge of science. Nothing
untoward it was the bureaucracy that caused the
failure. The way we organised ourselves. The way
it was resourced. The way in which right back at
the tender stage, the lowest bid was selected.
Question: What was the differentiating factor?
Answer: The temporary works.
Question: What failed? Answer: The temporary
works.
If the differentiating factor is the cost of the
temporary works, is it any wonder that they didnt
want to stop these works when thats the whole
basis on which that bid team won?
Contracts
Contracts are the fundamental mechanism for
financial and delivery of risk management in every
country in the world.
New approaches: Well, there are new approaches
and they recognise the inevitability of high risk
nature of underground construction. Tailoring an
approach for local conditions is, I think, absolutely
fundamental.
Dont accept that you should do business here how
someone else does it somewhere else just because
they did it somewhere else well. Whatever you do
the method has to suit here. Our own little social
quirks. The way we deal with one another. The
special way that our professionals deal with one
another. Our labour market. All those sorts of
things mean that you have to tailor the response for
where you are.
There are lots of ways you can contract. The
following picture depicts just some of the vast array
of possible standard form contracts. I find if I look
at the picture I understand them best. I find they're
all different, different approaches, different
contractors different projects, different places.

At the International Tunnelling Association (UN
Affiliate) (where I chair the Contractual Practices
Group), weve been looking at contractual matters
and from around 52 member nations ITA have
produced many propositions for consideration in
contracts but so long as I am the chairman of that
group, I will not and have refused, and despite a lot
of pressure, will not produce a model contract.
Frankly, I think that is a waste of time. There is no
such thing as the perfect contract. There is a
contract which is best suited to your task but I cant
produce one and I resist ITA trying to produce one.
Why? Every country is different. There is no
perfect fit contract.
I'm just going to take you to Japan because what I
found in Japan was really interesting.
The quality of the infrastructure in Japan is quite
exceptional. The construction industrys based
upon mutual trust and respect in the contract. (It
sounds a bit British doesnt it. Remember then?
Mutual trust and respect!)
There are some downsides. Some corruption, some
bribery and a lot of secret deals but the
infrastructure is good. Now, this raised some very
interesting questions for me because having been
trained in the Westminster system, Id always
thought that transparency was good. Everything
being open. Lets get all the dirty washing and
bring it out and pop it in the tabloids. I thought all
that was good. But you know, maybe there is a
place for corruption, bribes and secret deals if it
delivers good infrastructure. Maybe there is a price
to pay for getting the job done, and, at this stage, of
course, I get thrown out of the country.
Ill give you an example. The basic spirit of
standard Japanese contracts stipulates a whole lot of
things about the bills of quantities and the works
program but unless otherwise specified, the bill of
quantities and the works program are not binding on
the owner or the contractor.
There are no contractually binding elements except
the achieved result of the contract sum and the
completion period. There is no requirement to
show the process. The parties involved in
construction make the contract based on equal
footing and implement their own duties faithfully
and honestly (well, except for the bribery and
corruption part!).
Thats an extract from Construction Business Law,
clause 18 in Japan.
The basis of a construction contract in Japan is
faithfully conduct and honesty. So, thats a
fundamental difference to how we approach it. The
principle in our contracts is mutual distrust and the
principles in Japan are of mutual confidence. The
infrastructure looks something like this.

This is heading into the new Shinjuku project in
Tokyo. (I was there just a few weeks ago back to
my gorgeous tunnel that makes me feel very nice).

This is looking along the roadway shaft and
following ventilation chamber.

You could eat your rice and noodles off the floor!
It is just gorgeous.


Let me compare it with a European example, which
shall remain nameless, with all the transparency that
you would maybe expect, that I visited in February.
Here is an example of some of the interesting civil
works in an emergency escape shaft. The high
voltage cables touch my head as I go up the stairs.


In truth, the ten year project in Europe was
completed very quickly, in two years. The
politicians were re-elected. Some of the worst civil
works I have ever seen constructed. And I mean
that absolutely, no joke intended. Critical safety
systems not operational and the public are happy.
They are so happy they got their infrastructure early
and they go it within budget and they all celebrate
by drinking lots of wine and smoking and having
coffees (and there is a clue as to where it might be
laughs). Well done Europe! Well done
transparency.
Lets now go to the contracts - so what advice do I
bring because there are two very different ways of
delivering infrastructure: one quite unpalatable
because of the outcome; and one quite unpalatable
because of the way you get the outcome.
Well, we know there are weaknesses in geology.
We know there are going to be issues in dispute
management. We know there are going to be issues
in bureaucracy. We know there are going to be
issues with delays. We know there are issues with
funding and there is always going to be politics.
Always, everywhere!
We can look elsewhere for inspiration. Look at
standard contracts and traditional ones and modern
ones and emerging ones. Different models.
Develop your UK approach: You have a range of
UK products here and Id be saying dont shy away
from using them because they are a product of your
society. They are a product of the way business is
conducted here.
Check what you plan to do against what we say or
suggest in the ITA. So check how you deal with
ground conditions, dispute resolution, approvals,
insurance, risk management, project management,
etc. Dont be afraid to tailor the approach. Dont
be afraid to tailor the approach when you learn
mistakes and learn from your successes as well.

Operations
Finally Operations -the bit that really matters!
Our tunnels are confined spaces. They are
deceptively more dangerous than they appear. We,
as technical people know it but we dont tell anyone
because maybe they wont like the places we create
for them. We know that in some of the systems
perhaps not so far from here, one of the great risks
may just be asphyxiation because of ventilation
issues. We know that there are risks when, for
example, the terrorist attacks occurred here in
London. I was here assisting with that in some
way. We know that these underground places
behave in very different ways when events occur
that cause issues in confined spaces.
So we have to be careful when we design them. We
have to expect, when were operating them, the
extraordinary to occur. We have to remember that
the safety for our citizens, and the people who use
them in these systems (I'm talking, of course, of
transit systems at the moment) are prone to failure
because of their dependence on the engineering, on
the evacuation and the choices people make in
evacuation and the way in which the systems weve
created are controlled in an emergency.
Some of the civil works choices we make, as I
mentioned right at the beginning, are so critical: the
slope, the obstructions, the natural ventilation, the
bends, the emergency egress points.

Substandard Engineering
You dont have to go any further than Paris and the
well publicised crash that occurred there with
Princess Diana to get a topical example of tunnel
safety issues.. You look at that tunnel and you say
Its just a bad design. You shouldnt have pillars
running down the middle of a tunnel with cars
driving down it. Its just such a simple thing to
have a barrier there. A New Jersey barrier or some
other barrier of appropriate engineering design
would fundamentally alter the risk profile for the
hundreds of thousands of people per day that use
that facility. Its just that simple.
Tunnel beneath the Place de lAlma, Paris -
Pillars rather than a continuous crash barrier.
Such pillars should be avoided. Princess Dianas
car crashed into one of the pillars in 1997. (This
tunnel is only 100m long)

Apart from the inherent safety, there are the control
aspects. So emergency control with the engineered
systems is essential if were to change the future.
The problem is when something occurs the
consequences can be very severe and they can be
very severe quickly.



This is a picture of a tunnel fire from obviously here
in Europe and you will see the fire actually moves
hundreds of metres beyond the initial combustion
area.




This is in a metro system in South Korea. I
investigated this matter.


These are trains that dont burn. Most cities have
got trains that dont burn.
Here is a train that doesnt burn in another city.
Here is a train burning that doesnt burn and these
people all died shortly after this photograph was
taken because they chose not to use the emergency
exits that wed put in there as engineers because,
they chose not to evacuate. The passengers just sat
there and sent pictures off their mobile phones to
their friends about the train thats not to burn, while
they sat in the tunnel thats not meant to burn either
and died.
Question: So what does all that mean? Answer:
Youve got to expect the unexpected.


This graph (from Ingerson 2003) shows that really
large fires in road tunnels can occur in around five
minutes. Maybe five to ten minutes, but Id say
around five minutes quick! So what do we do?
We have really sophisticated systems that we, as
engineers, designed. We have powerful ventilation
systems in some of our tunnels, not all of them. We
even have suppression systems in some parts of the
world, such as Madrid Metro, Japan and Australia.
The truth is that the standards dont define what
should be done in these tunnels. Fire suppression
systems have effectively been outlawed in our
tunnels up until, actually, only early 2008. So if its
true that we have to rapidly respond, if its true that
we have to rapidly identify the exact location of an
incident and then we have to correctly use the
ventilation suppression and all these other systems,
then its not just about the engineering, its about
what are the engineering options that we have
considered? What have we actually got available?
And if the tunnel standards say Dont do it, does
that mean we shouldnt do it?
Now let me show you a movie of a bus fire in a
tunnel. This is what a bus fire looks like. This is a
tunnel in Norway. I hope you are all tunnel
travellers. Thats what a bus looks like when its
catching on fire. Whats so important about that?
Well, this next bit of video is of some tests from the
Netherlands and they actually show what happens
in a confined space when something like a bus or a
car is burning.
What I want to remind you of (and this is actually
quite a large bore tunnel with very small or slight
longitudinal airflow and its a road configuration,
not a rail), watch the smoke come down the tunnel
and see it extinguish the lights. That is what those
who survive tunnel incidents talk about. They talk
about the fact that all of a sudden everything went
black and most people who die who havent been
killed in the initial collisions die in that smoke.
They dont get cooked by the fire. Its because of
the neuro toxins; its because of the other toxins in
that smoke and the fact that they cannot self rescue
that they die.
In 1983, PIARC, probably the peak body for roads,
were recommending against sprinklers because of a
range of adverse consequences of their use.
In the 1987 standard, they counselled against using
sprinklers.
In the 1995 standard they again counselled against
using sprinklers.
But in 2005 the standard changed and sprinklers
were more positively raised for fire life safety and
asset protection. My point is that standards are
slow to respond to innovation and change in
learning.
So when I'm talking about standards, I'm on this
saying, Guys, hello, there is some truthful things
weve got to talk about, Oh no, we dont want to
hear about that. But the truth gets there in the end.
So who uses these systems? There is Australia. All
of Australian tunnels. All of the big Japanese
tunnels. A few in the Netherlands and a handful in
the US.
In 2008, released by PIARC in Paris was the new
standard actually acknowledging that fixed fire
suppression systems may have a place.
In America, NFPA-502 (I also sit on this one),
again, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2004 No. We dont
want to put them in unless there is hazardous
cargo. Then, in 2004, in the later parts said Well,
if you do put them in, youd better look after them
then now they're on the table. Now the truth of it is
on the table. Its not saying If you put them in its
safe, but its saying Come on, its on the table, its
in your toolbox, its an option.
The point, when were going through this, dont be
driven by the standards, use your technical skill,
your intellectual power to ask yourself what it is
you are trying to achieve and set your mind at it. So
its an option.
So dont just follow the standard. The standard
says Its an option. What are we trying to
achieve? If were going to use these technologies,
make sure the support technologies work. The
computer control systems work. The location
system works. The characterisation of the incident
all works. Why? Because this infrared camera
showing what happens in an experiment because
if people cant see, even if they're not killed, the
emergency exit that this person is now walking past,
wont be found. Thats why! Its a functional
problem again.
Why is water suppression suddenly on the agenda?
I have a theory on this. Back in Paris in the A86,
its just been installed. So now because in Paris it
has been installed, now I think its okay to talk about
it publicly.

Innovation
Innovation! This is something from Australia.


Its an innovation. Its not in any standard. In fact,
the person who came up with the idea is actually in
the audience, Bob Allen, from the Sydney Harbour
Tunnel who operates it, thought of it. I think, while
at a rock concert, Wouldnt it be good if we could
have a virtual stop sign on a tunnel like a light show
in a rock concert.. Its not in any standard. Its not
anywhere that I know of. So he commissioned a
company to build one and in the last twelve months,
this image being projected onto a screen of water to
create a virtual stop sign has been used 40 times
successfully. There is a picture of one of the
examples with a large truck trying to get into the
tunnel in the day light.
Innovation! Not in a standard. Whats the
problem? Stopping people in the tunnel. Does it
work? Yes it does.

Innovation from Japan. Air quality: an issue in
Japan. This is around Tokyo.

This is in Tokyo. This is air cleaning technology
for a road tunnel.
They're achieving to 90% to high 90% efficiencies
removing particles and NO
2
. They are actually
doing it at the moment, despite all the controversy
about it. This is coming. Its innovation. What
does it mean? Just put it on the table. Ive been
there, touched it. It appears to be working.
The vehicles we use whether they are cars or trains
are changing in their energy supply, like hydrogen,
fuel cells. The composite materials and the plastics,
they will behave differently. Whatever we build
today, however we design it today, wont respond,
wont be built for the things that we put in it in 100
years time. Just look at the steam engines we used
to have in the underground here.

Conclusions
Remember these?
Assume our role as leaders and developing
and operating subterranean infrastructure.
Dont assume that others understand or can
understand the complex technical scientific
and philosophical concepts that underlie
our professional judgment, even if they use
our words.
Dont compromise our intellectual
integrity to pander to bureaucrats. To do
so, brings us all into disrepute.
I did mention risk assessments.
Consider the operational implications of
everything we do.
Dont be slave to standards. Truth is a
better master.
Develop innovative ways of conducting
knowledge transfer and group problem
solving.
Endorse new innovations in the peer
review process
Remember the root causes of most tunnel
construction failures are administrative, not
technical.
In construction, risk is part of the process.
Its just part of what we do. Just embrace
it in an intellectual way.
The Joint Code of Practice. Pat yourselves
on the back, you did well.
Operationally: Carefully consider human
beings for both the control and the human
response to the threats of harm in the
systems we build.
Energy consumption is an emerging issue.
Dont forget it. Our infrastructure lasts a
long time.
The consequences on the environment of
our infrastructure are important. New
materials do create new challenges.
Contracts: Use the contractual framework
that best fits your culture. The cultural
aspects of contract administration are often
more important than the words alone. The
attitude you bring to your contracts.
We are the experts of the subterranean
infrastructure world. We must embrace excellence
and truth. That has to be our mantra if we are to
assume our rightful place; our rightful place as the
leaders in tunnel project design, construction and
operation.
As Sir Harold Harding said:
The best engineers are those who treat
the forces of nature with humility until
they are sufficiently sure how they can
outwit them and convert them
unsuspectingly to the use and
convenience of man.

That remains our challenge in the 21
st
Century.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you!