Rural Bank of Anda Inc. vs.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen, Dagupan

G.R No. 155051; May 29, 2007
Ponente: Carpio, J.

FACTS: The lot in dispute, Lot 736 is located in Binmaley, Pangasinan. The disputed lot
together with Lot 737, which is also known as Imeldas Park and Lot 739, which is a
waiting shed for commuters form part of Lot 3. The disputed land is titled in the name of
respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop. An annotation on Transfer Certificate Title
states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both respondent and the
Municipality of Binmaley. The Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the
fence separating Lot 736 from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking
because the smell of horse manure was already bothering the priests living in the
seminary. The Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan passed Resolution Nos.
104 and 105 which converted Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot and
authorized the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the
Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 respectively. The Municipal Mayor of
Binmaley came to the seminary to discuss the situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr.
Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the Rural Bank of Anda should
be stopped. Later on, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the construction of
the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to discuss
with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736. Respondent filed a
complaint in the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in favor of the respondent stating
that Lot 736 is property of public dominion. Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan exceeded its
authority when it adopted the two Resolutions. The Court of Appeals affirmed its
decision. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed land is a property of public dominion

HELD: The property must be held as property of public domain because there was no
evidence that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands. For it is well
settled "that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the government." It is indispensable then that there be a
showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all
lands and waters of the public domain. Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to
themselves public or government lands without prior grant from the government. Since
Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its
authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105
are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley
and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.




















Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
G.R No. 135385; December 6, 2000
Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS: Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) on the ground that the law amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA recognizes the
existence of the Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) as
a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and
possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of
these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership
under customary law which traces its origin to native title. Cruz et al contend that, by
providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the ancestral domains and ancestral land are lands of public domain
2. Whether or not IPRA is unconstitutional for violating the Regalian Doctrine

HELD: Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous
peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain. The IPRA grants to
ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The
private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further
strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned
ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public agricultural land
which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that ancestral land
is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for
registration purposes. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP
wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his
ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of 18% or over, from private
to public agricultural land for proper disposition. The option to register land under the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a limited period. This
option must be exercised within 20 years from October 29, 1997, the date of approval of
the IPRA.

Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined
in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/lPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership,
but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a). The non-inclusion
of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with
the Regalian doctrine. Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/lPs the right to
"manage and conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs
"priority rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving
preference. Having priority rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean
ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that
owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the
resources to whosoever itself chooses. Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian
doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural resources found
within the ancestral domains belong to the State.








Republic vs. Naguiat
GR. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
Ponente: Garcia, J.

FACTS: Private respondent Celestina Nuguiat applied for registration of title of 4 parcels of
land located at Botolan, Zambales. She alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of
land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired
the same from Demetria Calderon et al. and their predecessorin-interest who have been in
possession thereof for more than 30 years. The Republic filed an opposition to the
application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands
in question since June12, 1945 or prior thereto. The Republic further claims that the
monuments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for, and that the parcels of
land applied for are part of the public domain belonging which is not subject to private
appropriation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or
other inalienable lands of the public domain

HELD: Applicants registration of title for said parcels of land will not prosper because the
said land is a public forest lands. Forest lands unless declassified and released by positive
act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable and agricultural lands of
the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation. Forests, in the context of both
Public Land act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks do not necessarily refer to a large tract of
woodland or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. Here,
respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency
or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. For
unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation thereof in the concept
of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.

Carino vs. Insular Government of the Philippines
212 US 449; February 23, 1909
Ponente: Justice Holmes, J.

FACTS: Mateo Carino, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 30 years before the
treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors had held the land for years. The local community
recognizes them as the owners of the said land. His grandfather lived upon it and
maintained fences around the property. His father raised cattle on the property and he
had inherited the land according to Igorot custom although no title was issued to them
from the Spanish Crown. He tried twice to have it registered during the Spanish
occupation but to no avail. He filed a petition alleging ownership of the land but he was
only granted a possessory title.

ISSUE: Whether or not Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration

HELD: In the present case, the Land was not registered. Therefore, it became a public
land. The grant to the petitioner was a result of the principle of prescription which states
that, "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be
sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For
cultivated land, 20 years of uninterrupted possession is enough. On the other hand, 30
years is required for uncultivated land. Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no
attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was made. Every native
who does not have a paper title is not a trespasser. There must be a presumption
against the government when a private individual claims property as his or her own.
The Court held that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.






Ching vs. CA
G.R. No. 59731; January 11, 1990|||
Ponente: Paras, J.

FACTS: A decree was issued to spouses Nofuente in covering a parcel of land situated
in the Province of Rizal. 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to
Francisco et al. and a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in their favor. By
virtue of a sale to Ching Leng, a new TCT was issued and the previous one was
cancelled. Four years later, Ching Leng died. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed a
petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng. Such petition was
granted. Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced by
private respondent Pedro Asedillo for reconveyance of the said property and
cancellation of TCT in his favor based on possession. An amended complaint was filed
by private respondent alleging that on account of the fact that the defendant has been
residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive
or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other processes only by
publication. Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by
the trial court. A judgment by default was rendered in favor of Asedillo. Petitioner
Alfredo Ching learned of the decision and filed a verified petition on to set it aside as
null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the court. Petitioner avers that
an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam and the court a quo
never acquired jurisdiction over the deceased Ching Leng and/or his estate by means of
service of summons by publication. On the other hand, private respondent argues that
an action for cancellation of title is quasi in rem, for while the judgment that may be
rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in rem, it fixes and settles the title to the
property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature of the judgment in rem,
hence, service of summons by publication may be allowed unto Ching Leng who on the
face of the complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines. However, the original
decision was reinstated by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this present recourse

ISSUE: Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property and cancellation
of title is in personam, and if so, would a dead man or his estate be bound by
service of summons and decision by publication

HELD: An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not
an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding
or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein
is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former
are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are
directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with
respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a
real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only
although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Private respondent's action for
reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in question is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching
Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen years after the latter's death. As ruled
by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc., the decision of the lower court
insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He
was not, and he could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more
civil personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations,
was lost through death.









Castillo vs Escutin
G.R. No. 171056; March 13, 2009
Ponente: Chico-Nazario J.

FACTS: Petitioner Dinah C. Castillo is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K.
Moratilla. In the course of her search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor,
petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw, and sister Perla K.
Moratilla, co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters,
situated in Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449. After
verifying the ownership of said lot, petitioner proceeded to levy on the subject property.
Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that
the parcel of land was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision
owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation. Castillo immediately met
with the Corporation Vice President Orense. However, she claimed that Orense did not
show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty. Castillo
added that Orense even threatened her that the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste
family, was too influential for petitioner to tangle with. The public auction sale pushed
through and petitioner Castillo bought Raquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in the disputed
parcel of land. Petitioner had her acquisition recorded in the Register of Deeds of Lipa
City. The City Assessor declared petitioner Castillo as the owner of 5,000 square
meters of Lot 13713, while Urbana and Perla as the owners of the other 10,000 square
meters. When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes her share in Lot 13713, she
was shocked to find out that, without giving her notice, her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A
was cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and overlapping with the
105,648 square meter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B in the name of Francisco
Catigbac. The reverse side of transfer certificate of title bore three entries, reflecting the
supposed sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty. Subsequently, the title in the name of
Catigbac was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the corporation
herein. Petitioner filed a Complaint Affidavit before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon charging Atty. Antonio M. Escutin, the Register of Deeds of Lipa
City, and other public officers in conspiring with Lauro S. Leviste II and Benedicto L.
Orense, Executive Vice-President and Vice-President, respectively, of Summit Realty in
transferring the subject property to the latter corporations name. After several exchange
of pleadings, the case was submitted for resolution. The Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon gave more credence to respondent Escutins defenses, as
opposed to petitioners charges against him. According to the Deputy Ombudsman,
respondent Escutin convincingly explained that he allowed the registration of the
allegedly defective Deed of Sale because as Register of Deeds, has no power to look
into the intrinsic validity of the contract presented to him for registration, owing to the
ministerial character of his function. Moreover, as sufficiently explained by said
respondent, all the documents required for the registration of the Deed of Sale were
submitted by the applicant [Summit Realty]. The Deputy Ombudsman neither found any
probable cause to criminally charge private individuals Leviste and Orense. As to
whether petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her 5,000 square meter property, it was
ruled that such matter was not within its jurisdiction and should be raised in a civil action
before the courts of justice. The petitioner, in bringing the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA), was deemed to fail. The CA denied Castillos petition and affirmed the Joint
Resolution issued by the Deputy Ombudsman. Hence, petitioner sought recourse to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the cancellation of the tax
declaration of petitioner, thus violating Section 109 of Presidential Decree 1529
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that petition at bar is without merit. Petitioners
reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is totally misplaced. The
said provision provides for the requirements for the issuance of a lost duplicate
certificate of title. It cannot, in any way, be related to the cancellation of petitioners tax
declaration. The cancellation of petitioners tax declaration was not because of the
issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but of the fact that Lot 1-B, which
encompassed the 5,000 square meters petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by
TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an absolute and
indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. All persons must
take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. Thus, the Office of the
City Assessor must recognize the ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his
name a tax declaration for the said property. And since Lot 1-B is already covered by a
tax declaration in the name of Catigbac, accordingly, any other tax declaration for the
same property or portion thereof in the name of another person, not supported by any
certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City
Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax from different persons on one and the
same property. Comparing Catigbacs title with Castillos title evidenced only by a tax
declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other
certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbacs
ownership of Lot 1-B. As to the administrative liabilities alleged by the filing of a
complaint by petitioner Castillo, the Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals that respondents
did not commit gross misconduct. Respondents were able to convincingly explain that
they had only acted in accordance therewith in their dealings with petitioner and/or her
documents. Respondents also enjoy in their favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official duty. The burden of proving otherwise by substantial
evidence falls on petitioner, who failed to discharge the same.













Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of Paranaque
G.R. No. 133240, November 15, 2000
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name
from Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by
Securities and Exchange Commission. As a consequence of its change of name,
petitioner sought the amendment of the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) over real
properties owned by them, all of which were under the old name. For this purpose,
petitioner instituted a petition for amendment of titles with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Paraaque City. The petitioner impleaded the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City
as respondent because the titles sought to be amended all state that they were issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and alleged that the lands covered by the
subject titles are located in Pasay City. The court a quo dismissed the petition motu
proprio on the ground of improper venue. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the
subject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City. Hence,
petitioner moved for leave of court to amend its petition. In the Amended Petition,
petitioner impleaded instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City,
and alleged that its lands are located in Paraaque City. However, in view of the
dismissal of the petition, the lower court denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Petition. Hence, this petition for review

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case involving
amendment of a certificate of title

HELD: Petitioner correctly invoked the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in seeking
the amendment of its certificates of title. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
over matters involving the registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens
system is conferred by Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property
Registration Decree. More specifically, jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of
certificates of title, such as the one brought below, is provided for by Section 108 of P.D.
1529. Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interest therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration
of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions More specifically, jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of certificates of
title, such as the one brought below, is provided for by Section 108 of P.D. 1529 which
states that No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration
book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the
attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except upon order of the proper Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). In the case at bar, the lands are located in
Paraaque City, as stated on the faces of the titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed
the petition in the place where the lands are situated



















Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro vs. Court of Appeals
G.R No. 103727; October 2, 1915
Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr., J.

FACTS: The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been
laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the government itself, a total
land area of approximately 173,000 hectares of 314,047 quiniones on the basis of a
Spanish Title entitled Titulo de Propiedad Numero 4136 dated April 25, 1894. The
claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of
Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as
Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting
in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and
the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south. In the
complaint, it was alleged that the private respondents Aurelia Ocampo and Teresa dela
Cruz were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to a portion of
the claimed estate. The Court ruled in favor of the private respondents on the ground
that the Torrens titles of the defendants cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title,
Titulo Propriedad no. 4316.

ISSUE: Whether or not Spanish Titles are still considered as indubitable evidence of
land ownership

HELD: It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on
February 16, 1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was
abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered
thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act within six (6) months from the
date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976. Otherwise, non-
compliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their lands. Spanish titles can no
longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. Caution and care
must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles taking into account
the numerous fake titles that have been discovered after their supposed reconstitution
subsequent to World War II. Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not
evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Proof of
compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.
The alleged Spanish title had become bereft of any probative value as evidence of land
ownership by virtue of P.D. 892. Therefore, the Titulo in the present case cannot be
relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of ownership.

























Legarda vs. Saleeby,
G.R. No. 8936, October 2, 1915
Ponente: Johnson, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Legarda and the respondent Saleeby own and occupy adjoining lots
in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila. A stone wall between the said lots has
existed for a number of years. Said wall is located on the lot of the petitioner. The
petitioner presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of
their lot, which decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to
them the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. Said registration and
certificate included the wall. Later, the predecessor of the respondent presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by
him. The court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate
provided for under the Torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of
the respondent also included said wall. The petitioner discovered that the wall which
had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the respondent. They immediately presented a petition in the Court
of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by
including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court
however, without notice to the respondent, denied said petition upon the theory that,
during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the respondents land, they
failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name
of the respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the owner of the same land which is registered
in the name of the respondent

HELD: Petitioner obtained a decree of registration of a parcel of land on the October 25,
1906 while respondent, obtained a certificate of registration for his land which joined the
land theretofore registered by petitioner on March 25, 1912. The certificate of title
issued to respondent included a narrow strip of the land theretofore registered in the
name of the petitioner. In a case where two certificates of title include or cover the same
land, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties, whether the land
comprised in the latter certificate be wholly or only in part comprised in the earlier
certificate. In successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued in
respect of a particular interest in land, the person holding under the prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against the person who obtained the second certificate. The real
purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted, at the
time of registrations in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner
might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in
the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. The decree of
registration is conclusive upon and against all persons. The registration under the
Torrens System and the issuance of a certificate of title do not give the owner any better
title than he had. He secures his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple
title. If he obtains a certificate of title, by mistake, to more land than he really and in fact
owns, the certificate should be corrected. If he does not already have a perfect title, he
cannot secure his certificate. Having a fee simple title, and presenting sufficient proof of
that fact, he is entitled to a certificate of registration. The certificate of registration simply
accumulates, in one document, a precise and correct statement of the exact status of
the fee simple title, which the owner, in fact, has. The certificate, once issued, is the
evidence of the title which the owner has.









Talusan vs. Tayag
G.R. No. 133698; April 4, 2001
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Talusan spouses bought the subject property covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651, from its former owner, Elias Imperial, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent Juan D. Hernandez, City Treasurer
of Baguio City, wrote a letter to the former owner Elias Imperial informing him that the
property would be sold at public auction on to satisfy the delinquent real estate taxes,
penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the sum of P4,039.80,
representing total taxes due and penalties thereon. Elias Imperial and his entire family
immigrated to Australia in 1974. Respondent Hernandez sold the property to
respondent Tayag without any notice to the former owner thereof, or to petitioners, and
without compliance with the provisions of PD No. 464, as evidenced by the Certificate of
Sale. A final bill of sale was later issued in favor of the Tayag. Petitioners have been in
actual possession of the Unit in question, since they bought the same from its former
owners, and their possession is open, public, continuous, adverse and in the concept of
owners, while Tayag has never been in possession of the said property. Petitioners filed
a complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. They cited irregularities in the
proceedings and noncompliance with statutory requirements. The trial court dismissed
their complaint. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling and ratiocination.
Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not lack of personal notice of the sale for public auction of the
subject property to its owner which nullifies the said proceeding.

HELD: In this regard, we note that unlike land registration proceedings which are in
rem, cases involving an auction sale of land for the collection of delinquent taxes are in
personam. Thus, notice by publication, though sufficient in proceedings in rem, does not
as a rule satisfy the requirement of proceedings in personam. As such, mere publication
of the notice of delinquency would not suffice, considering that the procedure in tax
sales is in personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city treasurer to send
the notice of tax delinquency directly to the taxpayer in order to protect the interests of
the latter. In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by registered mail to
the permanent address of the registered owner in Manila. In that notice, the city
treasurer of Baguio City directed him to settle the charges immediately and to protect
his interest in the property. Under the circumstances, we hold that the notice sent by
registered mail adequately protected the rights of the taxpayer, who was the registered
owner of the condominium unit. For purposes of the real property tax, the registered
owner of the property is deemed the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is
entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and other proceedings relative to the tax sale. Not
being registered owners of the property, petitioners cannot claim to have been deprived
of such notice. In fact, they were not entitled to it. Although petitioners have been in
possession of the subject premises by virtue of an unregistered deed of sale, such
transaction has no binding effect with respect to third persons who have no knowledge
of it. The importance of registration and its binding effect is stated in Section 51 of the
Property Registration Decree or PD 1529, which provides that, The act of registration
shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies." Thus,
insofar as third persons are concerned, it is the registration of the deed of sale that can
validly transfer or convey a persons interest in a property. In the absence of
registration, the registered owner whose name appears on the certificate of title is
deemed the taxpayer to whom the notice of auction sale should be sent. Petitioners,
therefore, cannot claim to be taxpayers. For this reason, the annulment of the auction
sale may not be invoked successfully. As correctly pointed out by respondents,
equitable considerations will not find application, if the statutes or rules of procedure
explicitly provide for the requisites and standards by which the matters at bench can be
resolved. It is a well-settled principle that between two purchasers, the one who has
registered the sale in ones favor has a preferred right over the other whose title has not
been registered, even if the latter is in actual possession of the subject property.
Likewise, we cannot help but point out the fact that petitioners brought this misfortune
upon themselves. They neither registered the Deed of Sale after its execution nor
moved for the consolidation of ownership of title to the property in their name. Worse,
they failed to pay the real property taxes due. Although they had been in possession of
the property since 1981, they did not take the necessary steps to protect and legitimize
their interest.


























Malabanan vs. Republic
G.R No. 79987; April 29, 2009
Ponente: Tinga, J.

FACTS: Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite,
consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for
more than thirty years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had
four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban. Upon Linos death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco
sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including the lot, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo
Velazco to Malabanan. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated June 11, 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR),
which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land. The RTC approved the application for registration. The Republic
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the
application of Malabanan.

ISSUE: Whether or not a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be
deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code

HELD: Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not,
are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when
no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State". It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may
be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After
all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to
the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of
the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth". Accordingly, there must be an express declaration
by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420
(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. Such declaration shall be in the
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where
the President is duly authorized by law. While the subject property was declared as
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that it is no longer
intended for public use, public service or for the development of the national wealth for it
to conform with Article 422 of the Civil Code.





Republic represented by Mindanao Medical Center vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-40912; September 30, 1976
MARTIN, J.

FACTS: Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with
the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron,
Municipality of Davao. The property applied for was a portion of what was then known
as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre. After two biddings, the Director of Lands issued to
Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award. The Bureau of Lands conducted a survey
because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de
Jesus filed his Sales Application. The plan was approved and the land awarded to
Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B.
The Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio
stating that a portion of the land covered by Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus is
needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes. The said application is
amended so as to exclude therefrom Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in question, consisting
of 12.8081 hectares. President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85
withdrawing the disputed portion from sale and settlement and reserving the same for
military purposes. Eugenio paid for the land exclusive of the military camp site.
Thereafter, the Director of Lands ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus,
pursuant to his Sales Application for a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares.
On the same date, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources granted a Sales
Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for a tract of agricultural public land, containing an area of
20 hectares. Later, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and
declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the
Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters. President Magsaysay also revoked this
Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site
purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital. Petitioner Mindanao
Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2
with the Court of First Instance of Davao. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and
successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration oil
the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had acquired a vested right on the subject
lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the Director of Lands. The Court of
First Instance ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, the Court of Appeals reversed its
decision. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over
the land by virtue of an executive proclamation

HELD: Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole
contested area. Proclamation No. 350 of President Magsaysay legally effected a land
grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of
Health, of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land
Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in
favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which
governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that
"Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the
Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of the Land
Registration Act and shall become registered lands." It would be completely absurd to
rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has registerable title
on the portion occupied by it and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the
proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot to the Center. Respondent Appellate
Court erroneously ruled that Alejandro's father, Eugenio de Jesus, had acquired
ownership over the whole area because the Sales Award was only for 22 hectares
which is later found to be 20,6400 hectares upon actual survey and not for 33 hectares.
The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for
the conclusion that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the applied
area of 33 hectares. Such general description of "whole tract" cannot prevail over the
specific description delineating the area in quantity and in boundaries. Besides, patents
and land grants are construed favorably to the Government, and most strongly against
the grantee. Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant, or the intention of the
Government, is to be resolved in its favor. In general, the quantity of the land granted
must be ascertained from the description in the patent is exclusive evidence of the land
conveyed. And courts do not usually go beyond a description of a tract in a patent and
determine the tract and quantity of land apart from the patent itself. Eugenio de Jesus'
alleged occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land did not vest in
him a right of preference or pre-emptive right in the acquisition of the land. The privilege
of occupying public lands a view to preemption confers no contractual or vested right in
the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or
acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the
government of title thereof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a
settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement
on them can be acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on occupied, and
improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered
worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized
by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands and warning all persons to depart
therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by a person who
was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase.














Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority
G.R. No. 133250; July 9, 2002
Ponent: Carpio, J.

FACTS: The Government through the Commissioner of Public Highways and the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) signed a contract
to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. PD 1084 was issued,
creating Public Estates Authority (PEA) and PD 1085, transferring the reclaimed lands
to PEA. PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands, and the JVA was approved by President
Ramos. However, PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without
public bidding. A Legal Task Force was created to look into the issue. The said
taskforce upheld the legality of the JVA. Petitioner Frank Chavez, as tax payer filed a
petition to compel PEA to disclose all facts on its negotiations with AMARI, invoking the
constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern. He assails
the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of the
constitutional prohibiting in the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations. Despite the ongoing court petitions, PEA and AMARI signed an Amended
Joint Venture Agreement (Amended JVA) in 1999, and such was approved by President
Estrada. The Amended JVA seeks to convey to AMARI the ownership of 77.34 hectares
of the Freedom Islands.

ISSUE: Whether AMARI has the capacity to acquire the lands held by PEA.

HELD: The Amended Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA was null and
void. Under the 1987 Constitution, private corporations such as AMARI cannot acquire
alienable land of the public domain. Reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
which are covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands
to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987Constitution and
existing laws. The constitutional intent is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of
alienable land of public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is
safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of
the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of
alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more
alienable public lands.
























Republic vs. Doldol
G.R. No. 132963; September 10, 1998
Ponente: Romero, J.

FACTS: Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pantacan, Municipality of
Opol, Misamis Oriental. He filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said area
with the Bureau of Forest Development, but it was rejected. However, the Provincial
Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving a lot which included the area
occupied by Doldol as a school site. Accordingly, the Opol High School, now called as
Opol National Secondary Technical School, transferred to the said area. President
Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the said area for the said
school. The school, then, made several demands to Doldol to vacate the portion
occupied by him but he refused to do so. As a consequence, an accion possessoria
was filed by the school against him, and the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
ruled in the school's favor and ordered him to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the court a quo. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in dispute?

HELD: The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied
with the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of title/certificate of tile being issued. The
evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable in
accordance with the District Foresters Certification. Therefore, Doldol meets the first
requirement. Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the
disputed land since his occupation of the same started only in 1955, much later than
June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set forth by law, Doldol cannot
be said to have acquired a right to the land or a right to assert a right superior to the
school given that then Pres. Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School. The
privilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting confers no contractual or
vested right in the land occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such
lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to
divesting by the government of title thereof stands even though this may defeat the
imperfect right of settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no
lawful settlement on them can be acquired. In sum, Opol National School has the better
right of possession over the land in dispute.























Republic vs. Alconaba
G.R No. 155012; April 14, 2004
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.

FACTS: Respondents filed an application for registration of title over 5 parcels of land
located in Laguna. They stated that they are the sole heirs of Melendez spouses and that
their parents had been in possession of the property since 1949. After the death of their
parents, they respectively partitioned the lot and subdivided it into 5 lots. Since then they
have been in actual possession of the property in the concept of owners and in a public and
peaceful manner. The republic opposed on the grounds that they are not in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the property, tax declaration and tax receipts do not
constitute bona fide right over the land, ownership based on Spanish title can no longer be
availed and that the said land is part of the public domain. Trial court ruled in favor of the
respondents. It ruled that the land is alienable and not deemed as reserve or forest land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed land is considered alienable

HELD: Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942 provides that
citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore, under the
Land Registration Act. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following:
(a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since
time immemorial or since 12 June 1945. Indeed the lot is deemed as alienable and
disposable. However there was no sufficient proof that the respondents are in actual,
continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land. No evidence on record shows that
Spouses Mauricio and Luz Melendez cultivated, had control over, or used the whole or even
a greater portion of the tract of land for agricultural purpose.

Angeles University Foundation
School of Law
Angeles City





LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
(CASE DIGESTS)



Submitted by:
Navarro, Camille S.
JD-2


Submitted to:
Judge Kevin Narce B. Vivero
Professor

October 7, 2014