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A.C. No.

4103 September 7, 1995


VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR.
SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.

DAVIDE JR., J .:
In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of
the respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice,
neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual
investigation of this complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of
Merit wherein they specifically allege:
1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court
of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which
to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition
[sic]. A close perusal of the case reveals the serious
misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado
Fojas tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the
performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in
the aforesaid case. That the said attorney without
informing us the reason why and riding high on the
trust and confidence we repose on him either
abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously
neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in
the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-
91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in
default.
2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us
that everything was in order. That he had already
answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant
demand for him to give us a copy he continued to deny
same to us. Only to disclose later that he never
answered it after all because according to him he was
a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals
decision dated August 17, 1993.
3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and
malpractice of law we lost the Judge Capulong case
and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is
only proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and
disbarred in the practice of his profession.
In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file
the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges
that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which
was unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No.
3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants because it was
based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern
University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful
in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable
judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake
but rather imputable to the merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the
Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainants herein) illegally
removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. .
. ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass
him because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor
case he had handled for them. The respondent then prays for the
dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to
file the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument
that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law profession.
The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.
Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us
whether they were willing to submit this case for decision on the basis
of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance, both
manifested in the affirmative.
The facts in this case are not disputed.
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro
Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President,
Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly
expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint
(NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the
union.
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin
declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all its
officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members with
all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was
affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against
the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss
the said case on grounds of (1) res judicataby virtue of the final
decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of
jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-union issue
cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the
motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion
for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal,
reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein to file their
answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion having been
denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein
as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration
were both denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants'
answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's
motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was
authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default
and to stop the ex-parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of
Court, but to no avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the
complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador the
amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as
attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision
to this Court, but his services as counsel for the complainants and for
the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant
Veronica Santiago.
The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent
committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action,
in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-
V-91 for which reason the latter were declared in default and
judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's
evidence, which was received ex-parte.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has
the right to decline employment,
1
subject, however, to Canon 14 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up
the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
2
He
must serve the client with competence and diligence,
3
and champion
the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion.
4
Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end
that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of
law, legally applied.
5
This simply means that his client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by
the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense.
6
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar,
and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect
of the community to the legal profession.
7

The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his failure to do so in this wise:
[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order
of the trial court,
8
[he] instead, thru honest mistake and
excusable neglect, filed a PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 100983. . . .
And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983
was referred, dismissed the petition, he again "inadvertently"
failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because
of his overzealousness as stated earlier. . . . "
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer
was not an honest mistake but was "deliberate, malicious and
calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their damage
and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his motion to set aside the
order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and pressure
of legal work."
9
In short, the complainants want to impress upon this
Court that the respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his
failure to file an answer.
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of
the default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the
required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a
large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this
case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to
his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and
pressure of legal work" on the other are two distinct and separate
causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and
continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which,
nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had
committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an
order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's
complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The
second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other
commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the
respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case
No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his
erroneous belief that the trial court committed such error or grave
abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer
even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in
the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that he further
assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of
overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it
shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the
complainants had a meritorious defense.
10
And, in his appeal from
the judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of
the trial court either the impropriety of the order of default or the
court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that
order.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the
respondent's inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of
his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his
full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients,
the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule
18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants
since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision
of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling
Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought
which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so
convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have
seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15
of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides:
A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid
and honest opinion on the merits and probable results
of the client's case, neither overstating nor
understanding the prospects of the case.
Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are
unable to understand why he took all the trouble of filing a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of
jurisdiction and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon
initially with this Court and then with the Court of Appeals,
unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply delay the
disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were not
entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They could
prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all the damages
sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask for a
reduction of the amounts thereof.
We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free
from any blame for the sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for
inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED
and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the
performance of his duty to his clients.
SO ORDERED.























































G.R. No. 77439 August 24, 1989
DONALD DEE petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMELITO MUTUC, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta & Tanjuatco for petitioner.
Amelito R. Mutuc for and in his own behalf

REGALADO, J .:
Petitioner assails the resolution of respondent court, dated February
12,1987, reinstating its decision promulgated on May 9, 1986 in AC-
G.R. CV No. 04242 wherein it affirmed the decision of the that court
holding that the services rendered by private respondent was on a
professional, and not on a gratis et amore basis and ordering
petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 as the
balance of the latter's legal fee therefor.
The records show that sometime in January, 1981, petitioner and his
father went to the residence of private respondent, accompanied by
the latter's cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the
alleged indebtedness of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar's
Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A.
Petitioner's father was apprehensive over the safety of his son,
Dewey, having heard of a link between the mafia and Caesar's Palace
and the possibility that his son may be harmed at the instance of the
latter.
1

Private respondent assured petitioner and his father that he would
inquire into the matter, after which his services were reportedly
contracted for P100,000. 00. From his residence, private respondent
called up Caesar's Palace and, thereafter, several long distance
telephone calls and two trips to Las Vegas by him elicited the
information that Dewey Dee's outstanding account was around
$1,000,000.00. Further investigations, however, revealed that said
account had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey Dee
merely signing for the chits. Private respondent communicated said
information to petitioner's a father and also assured him that Caesar's
Palace was not in any way linked to the mafia.
2

In June, 1981, private respondent personally talked with the president
of Caesar's Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised the president
that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better to
make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president told him
that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation,
Dewey Dee would be exculpated from liability for the account. Upon
private respondent's return to Manila, he conferred with Ramon Sy
and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. In
August, 1981, private respondent brought to Caesar's Palace the
letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking for a discount.
Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino
never bothered him.
3

Having thus settled the account of petitioner's brother, private
respondent sent several demand letters to petitioner demanding the
balance of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Petitioner, however, ignored
said letters. On October 4, 1982, private respondent filed a complaint
against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
CXXXVI, for the collection of attorney's fees and refund of transport
fare and other expenses.
4

Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged his
services for a fee of P100,000.00 and that the services he rendered
were professional services which a lawyer renders to a client.
Petitioner, however, denied the existence of any professional
relationship of attorney and client between him and private
respondent. He admits that he and his father visited private
respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey Dee's gambling
account. However, he insists that such visit was merely an informal
one and that private respondent had not been specifically contracted
to handle the problem. On the contrary, respondent Mutuc had
allegedly volunteered his services "as a friend of defendant's family"
to see what he could do about the situation. As for the P50,000.00
inceptively given to private respondent, petitioner claims that it was
not in the nature of attomey's fees but merely "pocket money" solicited
by the former for his trips to Las Vegas and the said amount of
P50,000.00 was already sufficient remuneration for his strictly
voluntary services.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering herein
petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 with
interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint on
October 4, 1982 and to pay the costs. All other claims therein of
private respondent and the counterclaim of petitioner were
dismissed.
5
On appeal, said judgment was affirmed by the then
Intermediate Appellate Court on May 9, 1986.
6

Petitioner, in due time, filed a motion for reconsideration contending
that the Appellate Court overlooked two important and decisive
factors, to wit: (1) At the time private respondent was ostensibly
rendering services to petitioner and his father, he was actually
working "in the interest" and "to the advantage" of Caesar's Palace of
which he was an agent and a consultant, hence the interests of the
casino and private respondent were united in their objective to collect
from the debtor; and (2) Private respondent is not justified in claiming
that he rendered legal services to petitioner and his father in view of
the conflicting interests involved.
In its resolution of July 31, 1986, respondent court reconsidered its
decision and held that the sum of P50,000.00 already paid by
petitioner to private respondent was commensurate to the services he
rendered, considering that at the time he was acting as counsel for
petitioner he was also acting as the collecting agent and consultant of,
and receiving compensation from, Caesar's Palace.
7
However, upon
a motion for reconsideration thereafter filed by private respondent, the
present respondent Court of Appeals issued another resolution, dated
February 12, 1987, reinstating the aforesaid decision of May 9, 1986.
8

Petitioner is now before us seeking a writ of certiorari to overturn the
latter resolution.
It is necessary, however, to first clear the air of the questions arising
from the change of stand of the First Civil Cases Division of the former
Intermediate Appellate Court when, acting on the representations in
petitioner's undated motion for reconsideration supposedly filed on
May 28,1986, it promulgated its July 31, 1986 resolution reconsidering
the decision it had rendered in AC-G.R. CV No. 04242. Said
resolution was, as earlier noted, set aside by the Twelfth Division of
the reorganized Court of Appeals which, at the same time, reinstated
the aforesaid decision.
Because of its clarificatory relevance to some issues belatedly raised
by petitioner, which issues should have been disregarded
9
but were
nevertheless auspiciously discussed therein, at the risk of seeming
prolixity we quote hereunder the salient portions of the assailed
resolution which demonstrate that it was not conceived in error.
The reason for then IAC's action is that it deemed the
P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee had previously received
from defendant-appellant as adequate compensation
for the services rendered by am for defendant-
appellant, considering that at the time plaintiff-appellee
was acting as counsel for defendant-appellant, he was
also acting as the collecting agent and consultant of,
and receiving compensation from Caesar's Palace in
Las Vegas, Nevada, the entity with whom defendant-
appellant was having a problem and for which he had
engaged the services of plaintiff-appellee. The crux of
the matter, therefore, is whether or not the evidence on
record justifies this finding of the IAC.
Plaintiff-appellee maintains that his professional
services to defendant-appellant were rendered
between the months of July and September of 1981,
while his employment as collection agent and
consultant of Caesar's Palace covered the period from
December 1981 to October 1982. This positive
testimony of plaintiff-appellee, however, was
disregarded by the IAC for the following reasons:
1. In August l983, plaintiff-appellee testified that he was
a representative of Caesar's Palace in the Philippines
'about two or three years ago.' From this the IAC
concluded that the period covers the time plaintiff-
appellee rendered professional services to defendant-
appellant.
We do not think that IAC's conclusion is necessarily
correct. When plaintiff-appellee gave the period 'about
two or three years ago,' he was merely stating an
approximation. Considering that plaintiff-appellee was
testifying in August 1983, and his employment with
Caesar's Palace began in December 1981, the stated
difference of two years is relatively correct. . . .
2. The plaintiff appellee had testified that he was
working for the sake,' 'in the interest,' and 'to the
advantage' of Caesar's Palace. x x x "We detect
nothing from the above which would support IAC's
conclusion that plaintiff-appellee was then in the
employ of Caesar's Palace. What is gathered is that
plaintiff-appellee was simply fulfilling a condition which
plaintiff-appellee had proposed to, and was accepted
by, Caesar's Palace, for the release of Dewey Dee
from his obligation to Caesar's Palace.
3. Caesar's Palace would not have listened to, and
acted upon, the advice of plaintiff-appellee if he were
no longer its consultant and alter ego.
Why not? We are witnesses to many successful
negotiations between contending parties whose
representing lawyers were not and were never in the
employ of the opposite party. The art of negotiation is
precisely one of the essential tools of a good
practitioner, and mastery of the art takes into account
the circumstance that one may be negotiating, among
others, with a person who may not only be a complete
stranger but antagonistic as well. The fact that plaintiff-
appellee was able to secure a favorable concession
from Caesar's Palace for defendant-appellant does not
justify the conclusion that it could have been secured
only because of plaintiff-appellee's professional
relationship with Caesar's Palace. It could have been
attributable more to plaintiff-appellee's stature as a
former ambassador of the Philippines to the United
States, his personality, and his negotiating technique.
Assuming, however, that plaintiff-appellee was
employed by Caesar's Palace during the time that he
was rendering professional services for defendant-
appellant, this would not automatically mean the denial
of additional attorney's fees to plaintiff appellee. The
main reason why the IAC denied plaintiff-appellee
additional compensation was because the latter was
allegedly receiving compensation from Caesar's
Palace, and, therefore, the amount of P50,000.00
plaintiff-appellee had previously received from
defendant-appellant is 'reasonable and commensurate.
This conclusion, however, can only be justified if the
fact and amount of remuneration had been established.
These were not proven at all. No proof was presented
as to the nature of plaintiff-appellee's remuneration,
and the mode or manner in which it was paid.. . .
10

Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their findings
that there was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and
private respondent Mutuc. We find no reason to interfere with this
factual finding. There may be instances when there is doubt as to
whether an attorney-client relationship has been created. The issue
may be raised in the trial court, but once the trial court and the Court
of Appeals have found that there was such a relationship the
Supreme Court cannot disturb such finding of fact,
11
absent cogent
reasons therefor.
The puerile claim is advanced that there was no attorney-client
relationship between petitioner and private respondent for lack of a
written contract to that effect. The absence of a written contract will
not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship
which merits attorney's fees for professional services rendered.
Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied.
To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance
of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the
attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a
request from the latter.
12

There is no question that professional services were actually rendered
by private respondent to petitioner and his family. Through his efforts,
the account of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, with Caesar's Palace
was assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further
freed from the apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even
killed by the so-called mafia. For such services, respondent Mutuc is
indubitably entitled to receive a reasonable compensation and this
right cannot be concluded by petitioner's pretension that at the time
private respondent rendered such services to petitioner and his family,
the former was also the Philippine consultant of Caesar's Palace.
On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the services of
respondent Mutuc were engaged by the petitioner for the purposes
hereinbefore discussed. The previous partial payments totalling
P50,000.00 made by petitioner to respondent Mutuc and the tenor of
the demand letters sent by said private respondent to petitioner, the
receipt thereof being acknowledged by petitioner, ineluctably prove
three facts, viz: that petitioner hired the services of private respondent
Mutuc; that there was a prior agreement as to the amount of
attorney's fees to be given to the latter; and there was still a balance
due and payable on said fees. The duplicate original copy of the initial
receipt issued and signed in this connection by private respondent
reads:
RECEIVED from Mr. Donald Dee, for professional
services rendered, the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00) as partial payment, leaving a
balance of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P70,000.00), payable on demand.
Makati, Metro Manila, July 25,1981.
13

Thereafter, several demand letters for payment of his fees, dated
August 6, 1981, December 2, 1981, January 29, 1982, March 7, 1982,
and September 7, 1982 were sent by private respondent to
petitioner,
14
all to no avail.
On the second objection, aside from the facts stated in the
aforequoted resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, it is also not
completely accurate to judge private respondent's position by
petitioner's assumption that the interests of Caesar's Palace were
adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the casino was a creditor but
that fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey Dee, since the
latter, as verifications revealed, was not the debtor. Hence, private
respondent's representations in behalf of petitioner were not in
resistance to the casino's claim but were actually geared toward
proving that fact by establishing the liability of the true debtor, Ramon
Sy, from whom payment was ultimately and correctly exacted.
15

Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained, private
respondent's role therein was not ethically or legally indefensible.
Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with
contending positions. However, at a certain stage of the controversy
before it reaches the court, a lawyer may represent conflicting
interests with the consent of the parties.
16
A common representation
may work to the advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with
honest motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties' disparate
positions, may well be better situated to work out an acceptable
settlement of their differences, being free of partisan inclinations and
acting with the cooperation and confidence of said parties.
Here, even indulging petitioner in his theory that private respondent
was during the period in question an agent of Caesar's Palace,
petitioner was not unaware thereof, hence he actually consented to
and cannot now decry the dual representation that he postulates. This
knowledge he admits, thus:
It is a fair question to ask why, of all the lawyers in the
land, it was the private respondent who was singled out
by the petitioner's father for consultation in regard to an
apparent problem, then pending in Caesar's Palace.
The testimony of Arthur Alejandrino, cousin to private
respondent, and the admission of the private
respondent himself supply the answer. Alejandrino
testified that private respondent was the representative
of Caesar's Palace in the Philippines (p. 23, t.s.n., Nov.
29, 1983).lwph1.t Private respondent testified that
he was such representative tasked by the casino to
collect the gambling losses incurred by Filipinos in Las
Vegas. (p. 5, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1983).
17

A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable
compensation for services rendered at the special instance and
request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good faith
trying to serve and represent the interests of his client, the latter is
bound to pay his just fees.
18

WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated
February 12,1987, reinstating its original decision of May 9, 1986 is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against l petitioner.
SO ORDERED.


A.C. No. 3745 October 2, 1995
CYNTHIA B. ROSACIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

FRANCISCO, J .:
Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a
duly registered corporation, filed a complaint for disbarment dated
October 25, 1991, against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B.
Bulalacao. Acting on the complaint, the Court in a resolution dated
February 24, 1992, resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, the IBP investigating
commissioner, found that respondent breached his oath of office and
accordingly recommended respondent's suspension from the practice
of law for three (3) months.
1
In a resolution dated July 30, 1994, the
IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
commissioner's report and recommendation.
2

As found by the IBP, the undisputed facts are as follows:
On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement
(Exh. "3-a"), respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao
was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the
name of Tacma Phils., Inc.
On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship
between the respondent and Tacma Phils., Inc. was
severed as shown by another agreement of even date
(Exh. "3-b").
On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the
date respondent's retainer agreement with Tacma,
Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the
corporation consulted the respondent for the purpose
of filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he
agreed to handle the case for the said employees as
against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint before
the National Labor Relations Commission, and
appearing in their behalf.
3

The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent
breached his oath of office for representing the employees of his
former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their
attorney-client relationship. We agree with the findings of the IBP that
respondent breached his oath of office. Respondent does not now
dispute this. In fact, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent
admitted that he "did commit an act bordering on grave misconduct, if
not outright violation of his attorney's oath".
4
However, respondent is
pleading for the Court's compassion and leniency to reduce the IBP
recommended three months suspension to either fine or admonition
with the following proffered grounds: that he is relatively new in the
profession having been admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10,
1990 at the age of 46 when the complained conduct was committed
on August 1991; that he is of humble beginnings and his suspension
will deprive his family of its only source of livelihood he being the sole
bread winner in the family; that he has fully realized his mistake and
the gravity of his offense for which he is fully repentant; that he has
severed his attorney-client relationship with the employees of Tacma,
Phils., Inc. by inhibiting himself and withdrawing his appearance as
counsel in the labor case against Tacma, Phils., Inc.; and that he
pledges not to commit the same mistake and to henceforth strictly
adhere to the professional standards set forth by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only
in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation
of attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice to
permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against
his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and
independent of the former case.
5
It behooves respondent not only to
keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.
6
The relation of
attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in the highest
degree.
7
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought
to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
8
An attorney
not only becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's
cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of
the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of
the secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of
attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by
the loss of the confidence of the people.
9

Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that
respondent is new in the profession as he was just admitted to the
Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the breach of his oath of office
occurred more than a year after. Having just hurdled the bar
examinations which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the
precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility to keep inviolate
the client's trust and confidence even after the attorney-client relation
is terminated
10
must have been still fresh in his mind. A lawyer
starting to establish his stature in the legal profession must start right
and dutifully abide by the norms of conduct of the profession. This will
ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the legal
profession as well.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three months. Let this resolution be attached to
respondent's record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
thereof furnished to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.



























A.C. No. 2597 March 12, 1998
GLORITO V. MATURAN, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. CONRADO S. GONZALES, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

ROMERO, J .:
A complaint for disbarment was filed with this Court on October 25,
1983, by Glorito V. Maturan against his counsel, Atty. Conrado S.
Gonzales, charging him with immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts.
The respondent filed his comment thereto on February 6, 1984. On
November 11, 1997, or after thirteen (13) years, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines submitted their
report and recommendation on the instant case.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Spouses Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in-law,
Glorito V. Maturan (herein petitioner), as their attorney-in-fact, through
a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated November 6, 1981. Said
SPA authorized Maturan to file ejectment cases against squatters
occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50375, located in General Santos City, as
well as criminal cases against the latter for violation of P.D. 772, again
in connection with said lot. Respondent, Atty. Conrado Gonzales,
prepared and notarized said Special Power of Attorney.
Subsequently, Glorito Maturan engaged the services of respondent in
ejecting several squatters occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50735. While
said lot was registered in the name of Celestino Yokingco, Antonio
Casquejo had, however, instituted a case for reconveyance of
property and declaration of nullity against the former, docketed as
Civil Case No. 2067.
As a consequence of his engagement by petitioner, respondent
Gonzales filed Civil Case No. 1783-11 for Forcible Entry and
Damages against several individuals. On February 18, 1983, a
judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner. Petitioner, through
respondent, filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution on March
10, 1983.
In the interim, the parties to Civil Case No. 2067 entered into a
compromise agreement, which was judicially approved in a judgment
dated March 28, 1983.
On June 22, 1983, while the motion for issuance of a writ of execution
was pending, and without withdrawing as counsel for petitioner,
respondent filed, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., Civil Case
No. 2746, an action to annul the judgment rendered in Civil Case No.
2067. The action was predicated on the lack of authority on the part of
petitioner to represent Antonio and Gloria Casquejo, as no such
authorization was shown to be on record in Civil Case No. 2067. On
August 24, 1983, respondent, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al.,
also filed Special Civil Case No. 161 for injunction with a prayer for
preliminary injunction, with damages, against petitioner.
Aggrieved by respondent's acceptance of professional employment
from their adversary in Civil Case No. 2067, and alleging that
privileged matters relating to the land in question had been
transmitted by petitioner to respondent in Civil Case 1783-11,
petitioner filed an administrative complaint against the former for
immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for his disbarment.
Respondent, in a comment dated January 25, 1984, denied having
committed any malicious, unethical, unbecoming, immoral, or
anomalous act against his client. Respondent declared that he was of
the belief that filing a motion for issuance of a writ of execution was
the last and final act in the lawyer-client relationship between himself
and petitioner, and that his formal withdrawal as counsel for the
Casquejos was unnecessary in order to sever the lawyer-client
relationship between them. Furthermore, he alleged that his
acceptance of employment from Yokingco was for him, an opportunity
to honestly earn a little more for his children's sustenance.
The investigating commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, in his report dated August 21, 1997, found respondent
guilty of representing conflicting interests and recommended that he
be suspended for three (3) years. The Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
investigating commissioner but recommended that the suspension be
reduced from three (3) years to one (1) year.
This Court adopts the findings of the investigating commissioner
finding respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is
improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against the
adverse party who is his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is
prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging
inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with
that of his present or former client.
1
That the representation of
conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the
part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and
client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A
lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's
case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as
the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and
guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take
advantage of the client's secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest
confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the
profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
2

This Court finds respondent's actuations violative of Canon 6 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which provide in part:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it
is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose.
Moreover, respondent's justification for his actions reveal a patent
ignorance of the fiduciary obligations which a lawyer owes to his
client. A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the filing of a
motion for a writ of execution. His acceptance of a case implies that
he will prosecute the case to its conclusion. He may not be permitted
to unilaterally terminate the same to the prejudice of his client.
As to the recommendation that the term of suspension be reduced
from three years to one year, we find the same to be unwarranted. In
similar cases decided by the Supreme Court, the penalty of two or
three years suspension has been imposed where respondent was
found guilty of representing conflicting interests. In Vda. De Alisbo
vs.Jalandoon, Sr.,
3
the respondent, who appeared for complainant in
a case for revival of judgment, even though he had been the counsel
of the adverse party in the case sought to be revived, was suspended
for a period of two years. In Bautista vs.Barrios,
4
a suspension of two
years was imposed on respondent Barrios, who had drafted a deed of
partition for petitioner, but who appeared for the other party therein,
when the same was sought to be enforced by petitioner. In PNB
vs. Cedo,
5
the Court even suspended the respondent therein for three
years, but only because respondent not only represented conflicting
interests, but also deliberately intended to attract clients with interests
adverse to his former employer. Finally, in Natan
vs.Capule,
6
respondent was suspended for two years after he
accepted professional employment in the very case in which his
former client was the adverse party.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to MODIFY the IBP
recommendation to suspend respondent for one year and modifies it
to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS,
effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.














A.C. No. 4346 April 3, 2002
ERLINDA ABRAGAN, MILA GINA JAVIER, REYNALDO
MERCADO, PATERNO TORRES, BENIGNA ANTIBO, ELEISER
SALVADOR, EDNA SAPON, JULIANA CUENCA, ESPERANZA
BUENAFE, VICENTE BARNAGA, MARTHA SAPON, JOSEFINA
OPEA, PUREZA WABE, RONULFO LOPEZ, DOMINADOR
HERNANDEZ, FELIPA EMBATE, ROQUE CATIIL, JERRY SAPON,
CONCEPCION MATANOG, and PABLO SALOMON,complainants,
vs.
ATTY. MAXIMO G. RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Lawyers violate their oath of office when they represent conflicting
interests. They taint not only their own professional practice, but the
entire legal profession itself.1wphi1.nt
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Petition
1
praying for the disbarment of Atty.
Maximo G. Rodriguez because of alleged illegal and unethical acts.
The Petition relevantly reads as follows:
"2. That sometime in 1986, the petitioners hired the services of
the respondent and the latter, represented the former in the
case entitled PABLO SALOMON et al vs. RICARDO
DACALUZ et al., before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3 docketed as Civil Case No.
11204, for Forcible Entry with Petition for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Damages, [and] a Certified True and Correct
Copy of the COMPLAINT by Clerk of Court III Gerardo B. Ucat
of the said Court, is herewith attached to the original of this
PETITION, while photocopies of the same are also attached to
the duplicate copies of this same Petition and marked as
Annex 'A' hereof;
"3. That after the Case No. 11204 was finally won, and a Writ
of Execution was issued by the Honorable Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3, the same
respondent lawyer represented the petitioners herein;
"4. That when respondent counsel disturbed the association
(Cagayan de Oro Landless Residents Association, Inc.), to
which all the complainants belong, by surreptitiously selling
some rights to other persons without the consent of the
petitioners herein, they decided to sever their client-lawyer
relationship;
"5. That in fact, the National Bureau of Investigation of
Cagayan de Oro City, is presently undertaking an investigation
on the illegal activities of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez pertaining to
his express involvement in the illegal and unauthorized
apportionment, assignment and sale of parcels of land subject
to the Case No. 11204, where he represented the poor
landless claimants of Cagayan de Oro City, which include your
petitioners in this case;
"6. That petitioners herein later filed an indirect contempt
charge under Civil Case No. 11204 against Sheriff Fernando
Loncion et al., on August 2, 1991 engaging the services of
Atty. LORETO O. SALVA, SR., an alleged former student of
law of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, [and a] certified true and
correct copy of the complaint thereat consisting of four (4)
pages is herewith attached and photocopies of which are also
attached to the duplicates hereof, and correspondingly marked
as their Annex 'B';
"7. That respondent lawyer, Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, (in the
Indirect Contempt Case under the same Civil Case No.
11204,) REPRESENTED and actively took up the defense of
FERNANDO LONCION et al. much to the dismay, damage
and prejudice of the herein petitioners, [and] a copy of Atty.
Rodriguez's Answer, which is also certified true and correct by
Clerk of Court III Gerardo Ucat of Branch 3 of MTCC
Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of three (3) pages, is
attached to the original of this Petition, while photocopies of
the same are attached to the other copies hereof and
accordingly marked as Annex 'C';
"8. That the records will bear the petitioners out that their
counsel, Atty. SALVA SR. later on withdrew the case of
Indirect Contempt upon the suggestion of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez; and instead, filed the Motion for the Issuance of an
Alias Writ of Execution;
"9. That on January 12, 1993, the herein respondent, without
consulting the herein Petitioners who are all poor and ignorant
of court procedures and the law, filed in behalf of the plaintiffs
(which include the herein Petitioners) in Civil Case No. 11204,
a Motion to Withdraw Plaintiffs' Exhibits, [and] a certified true
and correct copy of said Motion by Mr. Gerardo Ucat of MTCC
Branch 3, Cagayan de Oro City is herewith attached to the
original of this Petition, while photocopies of the same are also
attached to the rest of the copies of this same Petition, and are
correspondingly marked as their Annex 'D'.
"10. That the illegal and unethical actions of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez are most obnoxious, condemnable, and highly
immoral, to say the least, more so if we consider his social
standing and ascendancy in the community of Cagayan de
Oro City;
"11. That the records of Civil Case No. 11204 which are
voluminous will bear the petitioners' allegations against the
herein respondent, who, after representing them initially, then
transferring allegiance and services to the adverse parties
(Lonchion, Palacio and NHA Manager), came back to
represent the herein petitioners without any regard [for] the
rules of law and the Canons of Professional Ethics, which is
highly contemptible and a clear violation of his oath as a
lawyer and an officer of the courts of law;
"12. That these acts are only those that records will bear,
because outside of the court records, respondent, without
regard [for] delicadeza, fair play and the rule of law, has
assigned, apportioned and sold parcels of land[,] subject
matter in Civil Case No. 11204 which legally have been
pronounced and decided to be in the possession of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11204, who are partly the petitioners
herein. Thus, they cannot yet enjoy the fruits of the tedious
and protracted legal battle because of respondent's illegal
acts, which have instilled fear among the plaintiffs and the
petitioners herein;
"13. That respondent lawyer even represented ERLINDA
ABRAGAN, one of the herein petitioners, in a later
proceedings in Civil Case No. 11204 wherein the
apportionment of parcels of land was erroneously,
unprocedurally and illegally submitted to a commissioner, and
that ERLINDA ABRAGAN, after winning in the said Civil Case
was later on dispossessed of her rights by respondent
counsel's maneuver, after the decision (in Civil Case No.
11208) became final executory;
"14. That to make matters worse, respondent Atty. Rodriguez
eventually fenced an area consisting of about 10, 200 square
meters within Lot No. 1982[,] the subject matter in Civil Case
No. 11204 without the consent of the herein petitioners. He
even openly and publicly proclaimed his possession and
ownership thereof, which fact is again and also under NBI
investigation;
"15. That all the foregoing acts of respondent lawyer plus his
continuing and ongoing illegal and unethical maneuvers have
deprived the herein petitioners of their vested rights to possess
and eventually own the land they have for decades
possessed, and declared as such by final judgment in Civil
Case No. 11204."
In his Comment,
2
respondent flatly denied the accusations of
petitioners. He explained that the withdrawal of the exhibits, having
been approved by the trial court, was not "illegal, obnoxious,
undesirable and highly immoral." He added that he took over the
8,000 square meters of land only after it had been given to him as
attorney's fees. In his words:
"14. Respondent ADMITS that he fenced an area of about
8,000 sq. [m]. after the association had awarded the same as
attorney's fees in Civil Case Number 11204, the dismissal of
the appeal by the NHA, the successful handling of three (3)
cases in the SUPREME COURT, the pending case of
QUIETING OF TITLE filed by the NHA, and for the pending
reconveyance case, Civil Case No. 93-573, supra. These area
of 8,000 sq. [m]., was awarded as attorney's fees, which [were]
supposed to be ten percent of the 22 hectares, Lot No. 1982,
the subject matter of Civil Case No. 11204, but the association
and its members were able to take actual possession by
judgment of the courts only o[f] the twelve (12) hectares. [This]
area consisting of 8,000 sq. [m]., and consisting of two (2) lots
[was] fenced by the respondent to prevent squatters from
entering the area. The rights of possession and ownership o[f]
this area by the respondent depends upon the outcome of Civil
Case No. 93-573, supra, for reconveyance of title by the
association and its members versus the NHA, et. al. If it is true
that this is under investigation by the NBI, then why, not wait
and submit the investigation of the NHA, instead of filing this
unwarranted, false and fabricated charge based on
preposterous and ridiculous charges without any proof
whatsoever, except the vile [language] of an irresponsible
lawyer."
3

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Reply
4
in which they reiterated their
allegations against respondent and added that the latter likewise
violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and/or decision.
5

Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In her Report and Recommendation dated January 23, 2001,
Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months
for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Her report reads in part as follows:
"From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent
represented conflicting interest considering that the
complainants were the same plaintiffs in both cases and were
duly specified in the pleadings particularly in the caption of the
cases. Under the said predicament even if complainants were
excluded as members of the Association represented by the
respondent; the latter should have first secured complainants'
written consent before representing defendants in the Indirect
Contempt case particularly Macario Palacio, president of the
Association, or inhibited himself.
"It is very unfortunate that in his desire to render service to his
client, respondent overlooked the fact that he already violated
Rule 15.03 of [C]anon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
'Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.'
"We have no alternative but to abide by the rules."
6

IBP Board of Governors' Resolution
Upholding the above-quoted Report, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended via its May 26, 2001
Resolution that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) months for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors, but hold that the penalty should be six-month
suspension as recommended by the investigating commissioner.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
At the outset, we agree with Commissioner Navarro's conclusion that
apart from their allegations in their various pleadings, petitioners did
not proffer any proof tending to show that respondent had sold to
other persons several rights over the land in question; and that he had
induced the former counsel for petitioners, Atty. Salva Jr., to withdraw
the indirect contempt case that they had filed. Neither did the IBP find
anything wrong as regards the 8,000 square meters awarded to
respondent as payment for his legal services. Petitioners' bare
assertions, without any proof to back them up, would not justify the
imposition of a penalty on respondent.
Having said that, we find, however, that respondent falls short of the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers. They are
expected to uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times. The
trust and confidence clients repose in them require a high standard
and appreciation of the latter's duty to the former, the legal profession,
the courts and the public. Indeed, the bar must maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealings.
To this end, lawyers should refrain from doing anything that might
tend to lessen the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of their profession.
7

In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts."
The Court explained in Buted v. Hernando:
8

"[A] lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose.
"The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity
and not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the
subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from
others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client
with respect to which confidence has been reposed."
9
(Italics
in the original)
In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the
indirect contempt case and in the Complaint for forcible entry in Civil
Case No. 11204.
10
Respondent should have evaluated the situation
first before agreeing to be counsel for the defendants in the indirect
contempt proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their
clients, and should at all times weigh their actions, especially in their
dealings with the latter and the public at large. They must conduct
themselves beyond reproach at all times.
The Court will not tolerate any departure from the "straight and
narrow" path demanded by the ethics of the legal
profession.1wphi1.nt
In Hilado v. David,
11
which we quote below, the Court advised lawyers
to be like Caesar's wife to be pure and to appear to be so.
"This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well as to protect
the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good
taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether
the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's
wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also
to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only
thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice."
Because of his divided allegiance, respondent has eroded, rather than
enhanced, the public perception of the legal profession. His divided
loyalty constitutes malpractice for which he may be suspended,
following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of Attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. Any member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
x x x."
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. We find however that
suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law, as
recommended by Commissioner Navarro, is sufficient to discipline
respondent.
A survey of cases involving conflicting interests on the part of counsel
reveals that the Court has imposed on erring attorneys
12
either a
reprimand, or a suspension from the practice of law from five (5)
months
13
to as high as two (2) years.
14

WHEREFORE, Maximo G. Rodriguez is found guilty of violating Rule
15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.1wphi1.nt
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as
attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator
who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.









































































A.C. No. 4354 April 22, 2002
LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO, respondent.
PUNO, J .:
For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics,
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
in its Resolution of May 2, 2000 recommended the suspension from
the practice of law of respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for the
period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that repetition of the
same act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent allegedly
represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
1

By way of a Motion for Reconsideration,
2
respondent now comes
before this Court to challenge the basis of the IBP's resolution, and
prays for its reversal.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or about 3:00
in the early morning of December 24, 1992, Allan Echavia had a
vehicular accident at Caduman St., corner H. Abellana St., Mandaue
City. At the time of the accident, Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar
car owned by a Japanese national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was
registered in the name of his brother-in-law, Jun Anthony Villapez.
The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita
Artezuela.
3

The destruction of the complainant's carinderia caused the cessation
of the operation of her small business, resulting to her financial
dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives and due to financial
constraints, stopped sending her two children to college.
4

Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a
damage suit against Echavia, Villapez and one Bernardo
Sia.
5
Docketed as Civil Case No. 13666, the case was assigned to
Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. An Amended
Complaint was thereafter filed, impleading Echavia, Kiyami and
Villapez, and dropping Sia as a party-defendant.
6
For his services,
complainant paid the respondent the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as attorney's fees and Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) as filing fee.
7
However, the case was dismissed on March
22, 1994, allegedly upon the instance of the complainant and her
husband.
8

Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant filed a
civil case for damages against the respondent. It was docketed as
CEB-18552 and assigned to Branch 57, Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City. The case was dismissed on June 12, 2001.
9

On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified
complaint for disbarment against the respondent. She alleged that
respondent grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer and failed to
represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her,
when Civil Case No. 13666 was scheduled for pre-trial conference on
August 20, 1993, respondent asked for its postponement although all
the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant's persistent
and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the
case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainant's
consent.
10

Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities
inimical to her interests. While acting as her counsel, respondent
prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said
document was even printed in respondent's office. Complainant
further averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of the
case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was
with her consent.
11

Respondent denied the complainant's allegations and averred that he
conscientiously did his part as the complainant's lawyer in Civil Case
No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel because the complainant was
uncooperative and refused to confer with him. He also gave several
notices to the complainant and made known his intention before he
filed his Manifestation to withdraw as counsel. Because of the severed
relationship, the lower court, after holding a conference, decided to
grant respondent's manifestation and advised the complainant to
secure the services of a new lawyer. Complainant, however, refused
and instead, sought the dismissal of the case.
12

Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial
Conference scheduled on August 20, 1993 so that he could file the
Amended Complaint. He admitted that Echavia's Answer to the
Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having
prepared the document and having acted as counsel of Echavia. He
claimed that complainant requested him to prepare Echavia's Answer
but he declined. Echavia, however, went back to his office and asked
respondent's secretary to print the document. Respondent intimated
that the complainant and Echavia have fabricated the accusations
against him to compel him to pay the amount of P500,000.00.
13

This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). The IBP-Visayas Regional Committee on Bar
Discipline formed an Investigating Committee to hear the disbarment
complaint.
On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a Report
finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, in
violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Ethics. He recommended that the respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
14
Commissioner Ingles did
not rule on the other issues.
As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines upheld the findings of the Committee with modification
only as to the penalty.
Seeking reconsideration of the IBP's resolution, respondent contends
that the Investigating Committee did not conduct trial; hence, he was
not able to confront and examine the witnesses against him. He
argues that the Investigating Committee's finding that he represented
Echavia is contrary to court records and the complainant's own
testimony in CEB-18552. He also casts doubt on the credibility of the
Investigating Committee to render just and fair recommendations
considering that the Investigating Commissioner and the respondent
are counsel-adversaries in another case, Civil Case No. R-33277.
Finally, he questions the imposition of a six-month suspension, which
he claims to be harsh considering that his private practice is his only
source of income.
15

After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable laws
and jurisprudence on the matter, this Court is inclined to uphold the
IBP's resolution.1wphi1.nt
In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does
not connote full adversarial proceedings, as "actual adversarial
proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is
a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague
testimonies."
16
Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support
of their arguments.
17

In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought
the postponement of the hearings, prompting the Investigating
Commissioner to receive complainant's evidence ex parte and to set
the case for resolution after the parties have submitted their
respective memorandum. Hence:
"The records show that this is already the third postponement
filed by respondent namely December 12, 1996(sic), January
3, 1996 and April 1, 1996.
The Commission for the last time, will cancel today's hearing
and can no longer tolerate any further postponement. Notify
respondent by telegram for the hearing for (sic) April 22, 1996
at 2:00 P.M. Said hearing is intransferable in character.
In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and
likewise her witness, Allan Echavia, also affirmed the contents
of his affidavit and further stated that he had executed the
same and understood the contents thereof."
18

It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to have
waived his right to cross-examine the complainant and her witness.
He cannot belatedly ask this Court to grant new trial after he has
squandered his opportunity to exercise his right.
Respondent's contention that the finding of the Investigating
Committee was contrary to the records and the complainant's own
admission in CEB-18552 is without merit. It is true that Atty. Aviola
was Echavia's counsel-of-record in Civil Case No. 13666 as
evidenced by the certification from the clerk of court,
19
and as
admitted by the complainant in CEB-18552, viz:
"ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness- ON CROSS)
Q: Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in
this case was the counsel of Allan Echavia as early as August
20, 1993, wherein you learned for the first time of this fact
when you say he is counsel of Allan Echavia. (sic) You mean
he is the counsel of record of Allan Echavia in the Civil Case
before Judge Dacudao? Is that what you mean?
A: What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of
Allan Echavia in the case before Judge Dacudao but I heard
Atty. Maderazo telling Allan Echavia not to admit that Atty.
Maderazo is appearing for me because he will be the one to
coordinate with Allan's case.
Q: So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the
counsel of record of Allan Echavia. It was Atty. Alviola stated
by you now?
A: Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavia's counsel but it
was Atty. Alviola who was the counsel of record of Allan
Echavia."
20

Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the respondent
also acted as the counsel-of-record of Echavia. Rather, it is whether
or not he had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavia's Answer to
the Amended Complaint.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record
of one party need not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party.
He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the
adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse party's
conflicting interests of record--- although these circumstances are the
most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that
the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading
of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that
of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of
the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit
and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose
to the client the circumstances of his relations to the parties
and any interest in or in connection with the controversy, which
might influence the client in the selection of the counsel.
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except
by express consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when in behalf of
one of the clients, it is his duty to contend for that which
duty to another client requires him to oppose." (emphasis
supplied)
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the
highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship, sound public
policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing
conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not,
without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former
client. Indeed, good faith and honest intention on the part of the erring
lawyer does not make this rule inoperative.
21
The lawyer is an officer
of the court and his actions are governed by the uncompromising
rules of professional ethics. Thus:
"The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of
public policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily
one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney
has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ceasar's wife, not
only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice."
22

The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided
attention and zeal for his client's cause is likewise demanded in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Inherently disadvantageous to
his client's cause, representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests
requires disclosure of all facts and consent of all the parties involved.
Thus:
"CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
xxx
Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts."
While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we find no
reason to reverse the same. In disciplinary proceedings against
members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required
to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by
complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more
convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.
23

A perusal of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint shows that
it indeed conflicts with the complainant's claims. It reads:
"1. The allegations (sic) in Paragraph One (1) of the Complaint
is admitted in so far as it pertains to the personal circumstance
and residence of the answering defendant. The rest of the
allegations in Paragraph One (1), and all the allegations in
Paragraph Two (2) , THREE (3), FOUR (4), FIVE (5), SIX (6),
ELEVEN (11), TWELVE (12), and FOURTEEN (14), of the
Complaint are DENIED for lack of knowledge sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of such allegations."
24

By way of prayer, Echavia states:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing,
judgment be rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint."
25

Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document quoted
above, the Investigating Committee found the testimonies of the
complainant and Echavia credible as opposed to respondent's bare
denial. As pointed out by Echavia, he was approached by Atty.
Maderazo, introduced himself as his lawyer and after some sessions
in the latter's office, asked him to return and sign a document which
he later identified as the Answer to the Amended Complaint.
The Investigating Committee found respondent's defense weak.
Respondent did not bother to present his secretary as witness, nor
obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations. Instead, he offered a
convenient excuse--- that he cannot anymore locate his secretary.
Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to
prepare Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint, after reaching
an agreement whereby Echavia would testify in favor of the
complainant. After he declined the request, he claimed that it was the
complainant who prepared the document and asked his secretary to
print the same. But as shown, Echavia's Answer to the Amended
Complaint was in no way favorable to the complainant.
With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off
the hook. We cannot find any reason why Echavia would commit
perjury and entangle himself, once again, with the law. He does not
stand to profit at all by accusing the respondent falsely.
Furthermore, considering complainant's stature and lack of legal
education, we can not see how she could have prepared Echavia's
Answer to the Amended Complaint and device a legal maneuver as
complicated as the present case.
Respondent's attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner
Ingles to render an impartial decision, having been an adversary in
Civil Case No. R-33277, does not convince us to grant new trial. This
is the first time that respondent questions the membership of
Commissioner Ingles in the Investigating Committee. If respondent
really believed in good faith that Commissioner Ingles would be
biased and prejudiced, he should have asked for the latter's inhibition
at the first instance. Moreover, we could not find any hint of
irregularity, bias or prejudice in the conduct of the investigation that
would lead us to set it aside.
Finally, we remind the respondent that the practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, and as such, must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
26
The suspension of the respondent's
privilege to practice law may result to financial woes. But as the
guardian of the legal profession, we are constrained to balance this
concern with the injury he caused to the very same profession he
vowed to uphold with honesty and fairness.1wphi1.nt
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the respondent
guilty of violating Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and
Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
is affirmed. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months with a stern warning that a similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.




































































A.C. No. 5948 January 22, 2003
(Formerly A.M. No. CBD-354)
GAMALIEL ABAQUETA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BERNARDITO A. FLORIDO, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
This is an administrative complaint 1 against Atty. Bernardito A.
Florido filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline, praying that appropriate sanctions be
imposed on respondent for representing conflicting interests.
Complainant is a Filipino by birth who had acquired American
citizenship. He resides at 15856 N. 15th Way, Phoenix, Arizona
85022, U.S.A. Respondent is a practicing lawyer based in Cebu City.
On November 28, 1983, complainant engaged the professional
services of respondent trough his attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Charito Y.
Baclig, to represent him in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, entitled,
"In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Bonifacia
Abaqueta,
2
Susana Uy Trazo, petitioner" before the Regional Trial
court of Cebu.
3

Accordingly, respondent entered his appearance in Special
Proceedings No. 3971-R as counsel for herein
complainant.
4
Subsequently, he filed complainant's "Objections and
Comments to Inventory and Accounting," registering complainant's
objection
. . . to the inclusion of the properties under Items 1 to 5
contained in the inventory of the administratrix dated
November 9, 1983. These properties are the sole and
exclusive properties of the oppositor per the latest tax
declarations already marked as Exhibits "2", "3", "4", "5" and
"6" in the Formal Offer of Exhibits by oppositor in writing dated
August 17, 1983 x x x .
5

Several years later, Milagros Yap Abaqueta filed an action for sum of
money against complainant, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11453
and entitled, "Milagros Yap Abaqueta vs. Gamaliel Abaqueta and
Casiano Gerona."
6
Respondent signed the Complaint as counsel for
plaintiff Milagros Yap Abaqueta, averring, inter alia, that:
Plaintiff and defendant Gamaliel Abaqueta are the conjugal
owners of those certain parcels of land, more particularly as
follows . . .
The "parcels of land" referred to as conjugal property of complainant
and Milagros Yap-Abaqueta are the very same parcels of land in
Special Proceedings No. 3971-R which respondent, as lawyer of
complainant, alleged as the "sole and exclusive properties" of
complainant. In short, respondent lawyer made allegations in Civil
Case No. CEB-11453 which were contrary to and in direct conflict with
his averments as counsel for complainant in Special Proceedings No.
3971-R.
Complainant further averred that respondent admitted he was never
authorized by the former to appear as counsel for complainant's ex-
wife in Civil Case No. CEB-11453; that respondent failed to indicate in
the Complaint the true and correct address of herein complainant,
which respondent knew as far back as August 2, 1990, when he wrote
a letter to the complainant at the said address.
7
Consequently,
complainant failed to receive summons and was declared in default in
Civil Case No. CEB-11453. While the order of default was eventually
set aside, complainant incurred expenses to travel to the Philippines,
which were conservatively estimated at $10,000.00. He argues that
respondent's conduct constitute professional misconduct and
malpractice as well as trifling with court processes.
In his defense, respondent claims in his Answer
8
that he always acted
in good faith in his professional relationship with complainant in spite
of the fact that they have not personally met. He based the matters he
wrote in the Complaint on information and documents supplied by
Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig, complainant's sister-in-law and attorney-in-fact,
indicating that he was sole and exclusive owner of the properties. This
was sometime in November 1983. No affidavit of adjudication was
ever furnished respondent by complainant and this was apparently
suppressed because it would show that the properties formed part of
the estate.
Eight years later, in November 1991, long after Special Proceedings
No. 3971-R was settled and the attorney-client relationship between
complainant and respondent was terminated, Mrs. Milagros Abaqueta
through Mrs. Baclig, engaged his services to file Civil Case No. CEB-
11453. Mrs. Baclig presented to him a deed of absolute sale dated
July 7, 1975,
9
showing that the properties subject hereof were not
complainant's exclusive property but his conjugal property with his
wife, the same having been acquired during the subsistence of their
marriage. Thus, in all good faith, respondent alleged in the complaint
that said properties were conjugal assets of the spouses.
Respondent further pointed out that his law firm handles on the
average eighty new court cases annually and personally interviews
four or five clients, prospective clients and/or witnesses daily except
Saturdays and Sundays. It regularly closes to the public at 7:00 p.m.,
but work continues sometimes until 8:30 p.m. This has been going on
for the last twenty-five years out of respondent's thirty-three years of
private practice. The absence of personal contact with complainant
and the lapse of eight years resulted in the oversight of the
respondent's memory that complainant was a former client.
Furthermore, the caption of the Special Proceeding was not in the
name of complainant but was entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Bonifacia Payahay Abaqueta."
Respondent expressed regret over the oversight and averred that
immediately after discovering that the formerly represented
complainant in Special Proceeding No. 3971-R, he filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel for plaintiff, which was granted by the trial
court.
10
He denied any malice in his acts and alleged that it is not in
his character to do malice or falsehood particularly in the exercise of
his profession.
In his Comments/Observations on Respondent's
Answer,
11
complainant averred that respondent's conduct was geared
towards insuring a court victory for Milagros Yap in Civil Case No.
CEB-11453, wherein he deliberately stated that complainant's
address was 9203 Riverside Lodge Drive, Houston, Texas 77083,
U.S.A., when he knew fully well that complainant's true and correct
address was c/o V.A. Hospital, 7th Street & Italian School Road,
Phoenix, Arizona, 85013, U.S.A. By falsely stating and concealing his
true and correct address, respondent eventually succeeded in
obtaining a default judgment in favor of his client.
During the pendency of these proceedings before the IBP, it appeared
that respondent's son got married to the daughter of IBP National
President Arthur D. Lim. Thus, Atty. Lim inhibited himself from
participating in the resolution of the case.
12
Subsequently, a
Resolution was issued requiring the IBP to elevate the entire records
of the case within thirty (30) days from notice.
13

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not
respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The investigating Commissioner found that respondent
clearly violated the prohibition against representing conflicting
interests and recommended that he be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) months.
We find the recommendation well-taken.
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly
provides that
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.
There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.
14
In short, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues
for the other client.
15

There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.
16

As pointed out by the investigating commissioner, respondent does
not deny that he represented complainant in Special Proceedings No.
3971-R. He also does not deny that he is the lawyer of Milagros Yap
Abaqueta in Civil Case No. CEB-11453, filed against complainant and
involving the same properties which were litigated in Special
Proceedings No. 3971-R. Respondent also admitted that he did not
secure the consent of complainant before he agreed to act as
Milagros Yap Abaqueta's lawyer in Civil Case No. CEB-11453.
The reasons proffered by respondent are hardly persuasive to excuse
his clear representation of conflicting interests in this case. First, the
investigating commissioner observed that the name "Gamaliel
Abaqueta" is not a common name. Once heard, it will surely ring a bell
in one's mind if he came across the name again.
In this case, respondent actively prosecuted the cause of complainant
in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, such that it would be impossible
for respondent not to have recalled his name.
Second, assuming arguendo that respondent's memory was indeed
faulty, still it is incredible that he could not recall that complainant was
his client, considering that Mrs. Charito Baclig, who was complainant's
attorney-in-fact and the go-between of complainant and respondent in
Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, was the same person who brought
Milagros Yap Abaqueta to him. Even a person of average intelligence
would have made the connection between Mrs. Baclig and
complainant under such circumstances.
Lastly, the fact that the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-11453
and Special Proceedings No. 3971-R are thesame properties could
not have escaped the attention of respondent. With such an
abundance of circumstances to aid respondent's memory, it simply
strains credulity for him to have conveniently forgotten his past
engagement as complainant's lawyer. What rather appears, given the
prevailing facts of this case, is that he chose to ignore them on the
assumption that the long period of time spanning his past and present
engagement would effectively blur the memories of the parties to such
a discrepancy.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has
the right to decline such employment,
17
subject, however, to Canon 14
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
18
Once he agrees to take
up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.
19
He must serve the client with competence and diligence
20
and
champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and
devotion.
21

A lawyer May not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act
as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his former
client
22
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of
attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree.
23
Indeed, as we stated in Sibulo v. Cabrera,
24
"The relation of
attorney and client is based on trust, so that double dealing, which
could sometimes lead to treachery, should be avoided."
25

Credence cannot, however, be given to the charge that respondent
fraudulently and maliciously falsified the true and correct address of
the complainant notwithstanding respondent's knowledge thereof.
Lawyers normally do not have knowledge of the personal
circumstances of a party in a case and usually rely on the information
supplied by their clients. The fact that respondent sent a letter to
complainant at the latter's correct address
26
sixteen months before the
filing of Civil Case No. CEB-11453 does not by itself prove malice on
the part of respondent. A new address was furnished by Milagros Yap
Abaqueta days before the complaint was filed. Respondent had no
reason to doubt the correctness of the address of the complainant
given to him by Milagros Yap Abaqueta considering that she was
complainant's wife.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Bernardito A. Florido is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for Three (3) months. He is further ADMONISHED to
exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties
towards his clients and the court. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.









A.C. No. 5128 March 31, 2005
ELESIO
1
C. PORMENTO, SR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALIAS A. PONTEVEDRA, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
In a verified Complaint
2
dated August 7, 1999, Elesio C. Pormento, Sr.
charged Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct,
praying that on the basis of the facts alleged therein, respondent be
disbarred.
Complainant alleges that between 1964 and 1994, respondent is his
family's legal counsel having represented him and members of his
family in all legal proceedings in which they are involved. Complainant
also claims that his family's relationship with respondent extends
beyond mere lawyer-client relations as they gave respondent moral,
spiritual, physical and financial support in his different endeavors.
3

Based on the allegations in the complaint, the rift between
complainant and respondent began when complainant's counterclaim
in Civil Case No. 1648 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod
City was dismissed. Complainant claims that respondent, who was his
lawyer in the said case, deliberately failed to inform him of the
dismissal of his counterclaim despite receipt of the order of dismissal
by the trial court, as a result of which, complainant was deprived of his
right to appeal said order. Complainant asserts that he only came to
know of the existence of the trial court's order when the adverse party
in the said case extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage executed over
the parcel of land which is the subject matter of the suit. In order to
recover his ownership over the said parcel of land, complainant was
constrained to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to
institute an action for the recovery of the subject property.
4

Complainant also claims that in order to further protect his rights and
interests over the said parcel of land, he was forced to initiate a
criminal case for qualified theft against the relatives of the alleged new
owner of the said land. Respondent is the counsel of the accused in
said case. Complainant claims that as part of his defense in said
criminal case, respondent utilized pieces of confidential information he
obtained from complainant while the latter is still his client.
5

In a separate incident, complainant claims that in 1967, he bought a
parcel of land located at Escalante, Negros Occidental. The Deed of
Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and
notarized by respondent. Since there was another person who claims
ownership of the property, complainant alleges that he heeded
respondent's advice to build a small house on the property and to
allow his (complainant's) nephew and his family to occupy the house
in order for complainant to establish his possession of the said
property. Subsequently, complainant's nephew refused to vacate the
property prompting the former to file an ejectment case with the
Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros Occidental, docketed as
Civil Case No. 528. Respondent acted as the counsel of
complainant's nephew.
6

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of malpractice and
misconduct by representing clients with conflicting interests and
should be disbarred by reason thereof.
7

In his Comment,
8
respondent contends that he was never a direct
recipient of any monetary support coming from the complainant.
Respondent denies complainant's allegation that he (respondent) did
not inform complainant of the trial court's order dismissing the latter's
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648. Respondent claims that within
two days upon his receipt of the trial court's order of dismissal, he
delivered to complainant a copy of the said order, apprising him of its
contents. As to his representation of the persons against whom
complainant filed criminal cases for theft,
9
respondent argues that he
honestly believes that there exists no conflict between his present and
former clients' interests as the cases he handled for these clients are
separate and distinct from each other. He further contends that he
took up the cause of the accused in the criminal cases filed by
complainant for humanitarian considerations since said accused are
poor and needy and because there is a dearth of lawyers in their
community. With respect to the case for ejectment filed by
complainant against his nephew, respondent admits that it was he
who notarized the deed of sale of the parcel of land sold to
complainant. However, he contends that what is being contested in
the said case is not the ownership of the subject land but the
ownership of the house built on the said land.
10

On December 21, 1999, complainant filed a Reply to respondent's
Comment.
11

On January 19, 2000, the Court referred the instant case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
12

On February 18, 2002, respondent filed a Rejoinder to complainant's
Reply adding that the instant complaint was orchestrated by
complainant's son who wanted political vengeance because he lost
the vice-mayoralty post to respondent during the 1988 local
elections.
13

On February 20, 2002, complainant filed a Sur-Rejoinder to
respondent's Rejoinder.
14

Thereafter, the parties filed their respective Position Papers,
15
after
which the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
In his Report and Recommendation dated February 20, 2004,
Investigating Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga found respondent
guilty of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He recommended that respondent be meted the
penalty of suspension for one month.
In a minute Resolution passed on July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to annul and set aside the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and instead approved the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-387
Adm. Case No. 5128
Elesio C. Pormento, Sr., vs. Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDED [sic], as it is hereby
ANNULED and SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commission, and to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit of
the complaint.
We do not agree with the dismissal of the complaint.
At the outset, we reiterate the settled rule that in complaints for
disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which
may not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling
reasons.
16
Formal investigations entail notice and hearing. However,
the requirements of notice and hearing in administrative cases do not
necessarily connote full adversarial proceedings, as actual adversarial
proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is
a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague
testimonies.
17
Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support
of their arguments.
18

From the records extant in the present case, it appears that the
Investigating Commissioner conducted a hearing on January 16, 2002
where it was agreed that the complainant and the respondent shall file
their respective position papers, after which the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution.
19
No further hearings were conducted.
It is also disturbing to note that the abovementioned Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors, annulling and setting aside the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, is bereft of any
findings of facts or explanation as to how and why it resolved to set
aside the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
instead dismissed the complaint against respondent.
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be
reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
record and evidence transmitted to it by the
Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board
upon such review shall be in writing and shall
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated
within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the
next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the
Investigator's report. (Emphasis supplied)
In Cruz vs. Cabrera,
20
we reiterated the importance of the requirement
that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors must state the facts
and the reasons on which such decision is based, which is akin to
what is required of the decisions of courts of record. We held therein
that:
[A]side from informing the parties the reason for the decision
to enable them to point out to the appellate court the findings
with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them
decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the
judge, or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his
judgment through the process of legal reasoning.
Noncompliance with this requirement would normally result in the
remand of the case.
21

Moreover, while we may consider the act of the IBP Board of
Governors in simply adopting the report of the Investigating
Commissioner as substantial compliance with said Rule, in this case,
we cannot countenance the act of the IBP Board of Governors in
merely stating that it is annulling the Commissioner's recommendation
and then dismiss the complaint without stating the facts and the
reasons for said dismissal.
However, considering that the present controversy has been pending
resolution for quite some time, that no further factual determination is
required, and the issues being raised may be determined on the basis
of the numerous pleadings filed together with the annexes attached
thereto, we resolve to proceed and decide the case on the basis of
the extensive pleadings on record, in the interest of justice and
speedy disposition of the case.
22

Coming to the main issue in the present case, respondent is being
accused of malpractice and misconduct on three grounds: first, for
representing interests which conflict with those of his former client,
herein complainant; second, for taking advantage of the information
and knowledge that he obtained from complainant; and, third, for not
notifying complainant of the dismissal of his counterclaim in Civil Case
No. 1648.
We shall concurrently discuss the first and second grounds as they
are interrelated.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
"A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts."
Corollary to this, Canon 21 of the same Code enjoins a lawyer to
preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated. Rule 21.02, Canon 21
specifically requires that:
A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he
use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.
In addition, Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to
the client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties
and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which
might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it
is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity
and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the
subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from
others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client
with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney
to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter
in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in
his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection.
23
Another test to determine if there is a
representation of conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty
of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
24

A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a
former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is
related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous
litigation in which he appeared for the former client.
25
Conversely, he
may properly act as counsel for a new client, with full disclosure to the
latter, against a former client in a matter wholly unrelated to that of the
previous employment, there being in that instance no conflict of
interests.
26
Where, however, the subject matter of the present suit
between the lawyer's new client and his former client is in some way
connected with that of the former client's action, the lawyer may have
to contend for his new client that which he previously opposed as
counsel for the former client or to use against the latter information
confided to him as his counsel.
27
As we have held in Maturan vs.
Gonzales:
28

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of
attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the
weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.
No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the
client's secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of
his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will
suffer by the loss thereof.
29

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the
same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse
interest may be.
30
In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is
to maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from doing
anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he
previously represented him.
31

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent
represented herein complainant's nephew and other members of his
family in the ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 528, and in
the criminal complaint, denominated as I.S. Case No. 99-188, filed by
herein complainant against them. The only established participation
respondent had with respect to the parcel of land purchased by
complainant, is that he was the one who notarized the deed of sale of
the said land. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that
respondent obtained any information from herein complainant that can
be used to the detriment of the latter in the ejectment case he filed.
While complainant alleges that it was respondent who advised him to
allow his nephew to temporarily occupy the property in order to
establish complainant's possession of said property as against
another claimant, no corroborating evidence was presented to prove
this allegation. Defendant, in his answer to the complaint for
ejectment, raised the issue as to the right of the vendor to sell the said
land in favor of complainant.
32
However, we find this immaterial
because what is actually in issue in the ejectment case is not the
ownership of the subject lot but the ownership of the house built on
the said lot. Furthermore, the subject matter of I.S. Case No. 99-188
filed by complainant against his nephew and other members of his
family involves several parts of trucks owned by herein
complainant.
33
This case is not in any way connected with the
controversy involving said parcel of land. In fine, with respect to Civil
Case No. 528 and I.S. Case No. 99-188, complainant failed to present
substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for violating the
prohibition against representation of conflicting interests.
However, we find conflict of interests in respondent's representation of
herein complainant in Civil Case No. 1648 and his subsequent
employment as counsel of the accused in Criminal Case No. 3159.
The subject matter in Civil Case No. 1648 is Lot 609 located at
Escalante, Negros Occidental, the same parcel of land involved in
Criminal Case No. 3159 filed by herein complainant against several
persons, accusing them of theft for allegedly cutting and stealing
coconut trees within the premises of the said lot. Complainant
contends that it is in this criminal case that respondent used
confidential information which the latter obtained from the former in
Civil Case No. 1648.
To prove his contention, complainant submitted in evidence portions
of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during his cross-
examination in Criminal Case No. 3159. However, after a reading of
the said transcript, we find no direct evidence to prove that
respondent took advantage of any information that he may have been
acquired from complainant and used the same in the defense of his
clients in Criminal Case No. 3159. The matter discussed by
respondent when he cross-examined complainant is the ownership of
Lot 609 in its entirety, only a portion of which was purportedly sold to
complainant. Part of the defense raised by his clients is that herein
complainant does not have the personality to file the criminal
complaint as he is not the owner of the lot where the supposed theft
occurred. It is possible that the information as to the ownership of the
disputed lot used by respondent in bringing up this issue may have
been obtained while he still acted as counsel for complainant. It is
also probable that such information may have been taken from other
sources, like the Registry of Deeds, the Land Registration Authority or
the respondent's clients themselves.
Nonetheless, be that as it may, it cannot be denied that when
respondent was the counsel of complainant in Civil Case No. 1648, he
became privy to the documents and information that complainant
possessed with respect to the said parcel of land. Hence, whatever
may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against
complainant any information given to him in a professional capacity,
the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him
from appearing as counsel for the opposing side. As we have
previously held:
The relations of attorney and client is [are] founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste. The question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether
the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's
wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also
to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only
thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
34

Moreover, we have held in Hilado vs. David
35
that:
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of
entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts.
In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings
between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial,
of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant's cause.
36

Thus, respondent should have declined employment in Criminal Case
No. 3159 so as to avoid suspicion that he used in the criminal action
any information he may have acquired in Civil Case No. 1648.
Moreover, nothing on record would show that respondent fully
apprised complainant and his new clients and secured or at least tried
to secure their consent when he took the defense of the accused in
Criminal Case No. 3159.
Respondent contends that he handled the defense of the accused in
the subject criminal case for humanitarian reasons and with the
honest belief that there exists no conflict of interests. However, the
rule is settled that the prohibition against representation of conflicting
interests applies although the attorney's intentions and motives were
honest and he acted in good faith.
37
Moreover, the fact that the conflict
of interests is remote or merely probable does not make the
prohibition inoperative.
38

Respondent also asserts that when he accepted employment in
Criminal Case No. 3159, the attorney-client relations between him and
complainant in Civil Case No. 1648 had already been terminated. This
defense does not hold water because the termination of the relation of
attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent
an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.
39

Thus, we find respondent guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests.
As to the third ground, we find that complainant failed to present
substantial evidence to prove that respondent did not inform him of
the dismissal of his counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648. On the
contrary, we find sufficient evidence to prove that complainant has
been properly notified of the trial court's order of dismissal. The only
proof presented by complainant to support his claim is the affidavit of
his daughter confirming complainant's contention that respondent
indeed failed to inform him of the dismissal of his
counterclaim.
40
However, in the same affidavit, complainant's
daughter admits that it was on December 4, 1989 that respondent
received the order of the trial court dismissing complainant's
counterclaim. Respondent, presented a "certification" dated
December 11, 1989, or one week after his receipt of the trial court's
order, where complainant's daughter acknowledged receipt of the
entire records of Civil Case No. 1648 from complainant.
41
The same
"certification" relieved respondent of his obligation as counsel of
complainant. From the foregoing, it can be inferred that respondent
duly notified complainant of the dismissal of his counterclaim.
Otherwise, complainant could not have ordered his daughter to
withdraw the records of his case from respondent at the same time
relieving the latter of responsibility arising from his obligation as
complainant's counsel in that particular case.
As to the penalty to be imposed, considering respondent's honest
belief that there is no conflict of interests in handling Civil Case No.
1648 and Criminal Case No. 3159, and it appearing that this is
respondent's first infraction of this nature, we find the penalty of
suspension to be disproportionate to the offense
committed.
42
Moreover, we take into account respondent's undisputed
claim that there are only three lawyers who are actually engaged in
private practice in Escalante, Negros Occidental, where both
complainant and respondent reside. One of the lawyers is already
handling complainant's case, while the other lawyer is believed by
respondent's clients to be a relative of complainant. Hence,
respondent's clients believed that they had no choice but go to him for
help. We do not find this situation as an excuse for respondent to
accept employment because he could have referred his clients to the
resident lawyer of the Public Attorney's Office or to other lawyers in
the neighboring towns. Nonetheless, in view of respondent's belief
that he simply adhered to his sworn duty to defend the poor and the
needy, we consider such situation as a circumstance that mitigates
his liability. Considering the foregoing facts and circumstances, we
find it proper to impose a fine on respondent. In Sibulo vs.
Cabrera,
43
the respondent is fined for having been found guilty of
unethical conduct in representing two conflicting interests.
Respondent is further reminded to be more cautious in accepting
professional employments, to refrain from all appearances and acts of
impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests,
and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting
a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and
loyalty in all transactions with his clients.
44

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra is found GUILTY
of representing conflicting interests and is hereby FINED in the
amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
DIRECTED to be heedful of the requirements provided for in Section
12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court as discussed in the text of
herein decision.
SO ORDERED.
















A.C. No. 8243 July 24, 2009
ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
This case stems from an administrative complaint
1
filed by Rolando
Pacana, Jr. against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter
with flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
2
Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts
constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and
failure to render an accounting of all the money and properties
received by her from complainant.
On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for
Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate
company of Multitel International Holdings Corporation (Multitel).
Sometime in July 2002, MCC changed its name to Precedent
Communications Corporation (Precedent).
3

According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by
demand letters from its members and investors because of the failure
of its investment schemes. He alleges that he earned the ire of
Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the
shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a
fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at
Real Bank.
Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also
happened to be a member of the Couples for Christ, a religious
organization where complainant and his wife were also active
members. From then on, complainant and respondent constantly
communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and
interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel.
Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even helped him
prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, complainant avers
that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him and
respondent although no formal document was executed by them at
that time. A Retainer Agreement
4
dated January 15, 2003 was
proposed by respondent. Complainant, however, did not sign the said
agreement because respondent verbally asked for One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as acceptance fee and a 15%
contingency fee upon collection of the overpayment made by Multitel
to Benefon,
5
a telecommunications company based in Finland.
Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not within
his means.
6
Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.
7

After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand
letter from respondent
8
asking for the return and immediate settlement
of the funds invested by respondents clients in Multitel. When
complainant confronted respondent about the demand letter, the latter
explained that she had to send it so that her clients defrauded
investors of Multitel would know that she was doing something for
them and assured complainant that there was nothing to worry about.
9

Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information
regarding the persistent demands made by Multitel investors against
complainant. On these occasions, respondent impressed upon
complainant that she can closely work with officials of the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportations (BID),
10
and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC)
11
to resolve complainants problems. Respondent also
convinced complainant that in order to be absolved from any liability
with respect to the investment scam, he must be able to show to the
DOJ that he was willing to divest any and all of his interests in
Precedent including the funds assigned to him by Multitel.
12

Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for
safekeeping to be used only for his case whenever necessary.
Complainant agreed and gave her an initial amount of P900,000.00
which was received by respondent herself.
13
Sometime thereafter,
complainant again gave respondent P1,000,000.00.
14
Said amounts
were all part of Precedents collections and sales proceeds which
complainant held as assignee of the companys properties.
15

When complainant went to the United States (US), he received
several messages from respondent sent through electronic mail (e-
mail) and short messaging system (SMS, or text messages) warning
him not to return to the Philippines because Rosario Baladjay,
president of Multitel, was arrested and that complainant may later on
be implicated in Multitels failed investment system. Respondent even
said that ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold departure order had been
issued against him. Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail
messages from respondent updating him of the status of the case
against Multitel and promised that she will settle the matter discreetly
with government officials she can closely work with in order to clear
complainants name.
16
In two separate e-mail messages,
17
respondent
again asked money from complainant, P200,000 of which was handed
by complainants wife while respondent was confined in Saint Lukes
Hospital after giving birth,
18
and anotherP700,000 allegedly to be
given to the NBI.
19

Through respondents persistent promises to settle all complainants
legal problems, respondent was able to convince complainant who
was still in the US to execute a deed of assignment in favor of
respondent allowing the latter to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular
phones and accessories stored in complainants house and inside a
warehouse.
20
He also signed a blank deed of sale authorizing
respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper.
21

Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to
handle his legal problems, complainant was advised by his family to
hire another lawyer. When respondent knew about this, she wrote to
complainant via e-mail, as follows:
Dear Butchie,
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to
do it as your friend and lawyer. The charges are all non-bailable but
all the same as the SEC report I told you before. The findings are the
same, i.e. your company was the front for the fraud of Multitel and that
funds were provided you.
I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is
willing to return the Crosswind, laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny
Cancio really helped. Anthony na lang. Then, I will need the
accounting of all the funds you received from the sale of the phones,
every employees and directors[] quitclaim (including yours), the funds
transmitted to the clients through me, the funds you utilized, and
whatelse (sic) is still unremitted, every centavo must be accounted for
as DOJ and NBI can have the account opened.
I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the
trust given [to] you. So we can inform them [that] it was not touched
by you.
I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco
Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I
have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work
differently kasi. In this cases (sic), you cannot be highprofile (sic)
because it is the clients who will be sacrificed at the expense of the
fame of the lawyer. I have to work quietly and discreetly. No funfare.
Just like what I did for your guys in the SEC. I have to work with
people I am comfortable with. Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer
although I will do all the work. He can help with all his connections.
Vals friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized crime
who is the entity (sic) who has your warrant. My law partner was the
state prosecutor for financial fraud. Basically we have it covered in all
aspects and all departments. I am just trying to liquidate the phones I
have allotted for you s ana (sic) for your trooper kasi whether we like it
or not, we have to give this agencies (sic) to make our work easier
according to Val. The funds with Mickey are already accounted in the
quit claims (sic) as attorneys (sic) fees. I hope he will be able to send
it so we have funds to work with.
As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the
children who (sic) the irate clients and government officials harass
and kidnap to make the individuals they want to come out from hiding
(sic). I do not want that to happen. Things will be really easier on my
side.
Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if
you hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case.
Please trust me. I have never let you down, have I? I told you this will
happen but we are ready and prepared. The clients who received the
phones will stand by you and make you the hero in this scandal. I will
stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! That is all.
You have an angel on your side. Always pray though to the best legal
mind up there. You will be ok!
Candy
22

On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondents advice, complainant
returned to the country. On the eve of his departure from the United
States, respondent called up complainant and conveniently informed
him that he has been cleared by the NBI and the BID.
23

About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with
complainant and his wife and told them that she has already
accumulated P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to
give P2,000,000.00 to complainant in appreciation for his help.
Respondent allegedly told complainant that without his help, she
would not have earned such amount. Overwhelmed and relieved,
complainant accepted respondents offer but respondent, later on,
changed her mind and told complainant that she would instead invest
the P2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business venture. Complainant
declined and explained to respondent that he and his family needed
the money instead to cover their daily expenses as he was no longer
employed. Respondent allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her
promise.
24

Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization
that she was able to help settle the ten (10) warrants of arrest and
hold departure order issued against complainant and narrated how
she was able to defend complainant in the said cases.
25

By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was
evading him. Respondent would either refuse to return complainants
call or would abruptly terminate their telephone conversation, citing
several reasons. This went on for several months.
26
In one instance,
when complainant asked respondent for an update on the collection of
Benefons obligation to Precedent which respondent had previously
taken charge of, respondent arrogantly answered that she was very
busy and that she would read Benefons letter only when she found
time to do so.
On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondents
arrogance and evasiveness, complainant wrote respondent a letter
formally asking for a full accounting of all the money, documents and
properties given to the latter.
27
Respondent rendered an accounting
through a letter dated December 20, 2004.
28
When complainant found
respondents explanation to be inadequate, he wrote a latter
expressing his confusion about the accounting.
29
Complainant
repeated his request for an audited financial report of all the
properties turned over to her; otherwise, he will be constrained to file
the appropriate case against respondent.
30
Respondent
replied,
31
explaining that all the properties and cash turned over to her
by complainant had been returned to her clients who had money
claims against Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was
able to secure quitclaim documents clearing complainant from any
liability.
32
Still unsatisfied, complainant decided to file an affidavit-
complaint
33
against respondent before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the
disbarment of respondent.
In her Answer-Affidavit,
34
respondent vehemently denied being the
lawyer for Precedent. She maintained that no formal engagement was
executed between her and complainant. She claimed that she merely
helped complainant by providing him with legal advice and assistance
because she personally knew him, since they both belonged to the
same religious organization.
35
lavvph!1
Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of
Multitel and that she merely mediated in the settlement of the claims
her clients had against the complainant. She also averred that the
results of the settlement between both parties were fully documented
and accounted for.
36
Respondent believes that her act in helping
complainant resolve his legal problem did not violate any ethical
standard and was, in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
37

To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent
noted that a complaint for estafa was also filed against her by
complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City
citing the same grounds. The complaint was, however, dismissed by
Assistant City Prosecutor Josephus Joannes H. Asis for insufficiency
of evidence.
38
Respondent argued that on this basis alone, the
administrative case must also be dismissed.
In her Position Paper,
39
respondent also questioned the admissibility
of the electronic evidence submitted by complainant to the IBPs
Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent maintained that the e-mail
and the text messages allegedly sent by respondent to complainant
were of doubtful authenticity and should be excluded as evidence for
failure to conform to the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-
01-SC).
After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez
issued a Report and Recommendation
40
finding that a lawyer-client
relationship was established between respondent and complainant
despite the absence of a written contract. The Investigating
Commissioner also declared that respondent violated her duty to be
candid, fair and loyal to her client when she allowed herself to
represent conflicting interests and failed to render a full accounting of
all the cash and properties entrusted to her. Based on these grounds,
the Investigating Commissioner recommended her disbarment.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,
41
but the IBP Board of
Governors issued a Recommendation
42
denying the motion and
adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.
The case now comes before this Court for final action.
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility
provides:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the
facts.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good
taste
43
and, more importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected
with the clients case, including its weak and strong points. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No
opportunity must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if
the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss
thereof.
44
It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of
justice.
45
It is for these reasons that we have described the attorney-
client relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree.
46

Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively
communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered
with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the
establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot
shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by
simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was
only in the form of "friendly accommodations,"
47
precisely because at
the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already
privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to
her by the SEC.
48

Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship
by arguing that no written contract for the engagement of her services
was ever forged between her and complainant.
49
This argument all the
more reveals respondents patent ignorance of fundamental laws on
contracts and of basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of
justice. The IBP was correct when it said:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that
there was a professional relationship between the parties.
Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied.
To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance
of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession.
50
(Emphasis supplied.)1awphi1
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which
respondent should have done was either to advise complainant to
engage the services of another lawyer since she was already
representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as
representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for
complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would
amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of
interest.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,
51
we explained the concept of conflict of
interest, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not
in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is
conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require
the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double dealing in the performance thereof.
52

Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless
situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting
money and properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed
upon complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping
him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him
from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same
thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel,
that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with
Multitel. Respondent herself admitted to complainant that without the
latters help, she would not have been able to earn as much and that,
as a token of her appreciation, she was willing to share some of her
earnings with complainant.
53
Clearly, respondents act is shocking, as
it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,
54
but also toyed with decency and good taste.
Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had
ever complained of respondents unethical behavior.
55
This remark
indubitably displays respondents gross ignorance of disciplinary
procedure in the Bar. As a member of the Bar, she is expected to
know that proceedings for disciplinary actions against any lawyer may
be initiated and prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors, motu
proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board of Officers of an
IBP Chapter
56
even if no private individual files any administrative
complaint.
Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, as adopted
by the IBP Board of Governors, on the admissibility of the electronic
evidence submitted by complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same
in toto.
Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors to disbar her on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and
other gross misconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyers Oath,
has been rendered moot and academic by voluntary termination of
her IBP membership, allegedly after she had been placed under the
Department of Justices Witness Protection Program.
57
Convenient as
it may be for respondent to sever her membership in the integrated
bar, this Court cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this
administrative case against her.
The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is
necessary in order to determine the degree of her culpability and
liability to complainant. The case may not be dismissed or rendered
moot and academic by respondents act of voluntarily terminating her
membership in the Bar regardless of the reason for doing so. This is
because membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.
58
The conduct of a lawyer may make him or her civilly, if
not criminally, liable to his client or to third parties, and such liability
may be conveniently avoided if this Court were to allow voluntary
termination of membership. Hence, to terminate ones membership in
the Bar voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first prove that the
voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to further prejudice
the public or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the present
case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby
DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging in
unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a
member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.


A.C. No. 9094 August 15, 2012
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., represented
by GABRIEL H. ABAD, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
ABAD, J .:
This is a disbarment case against a lawyer who sued a former client in
representation of a new one.
The Facts and the Case
Complainant Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. (Hocorma
Foundation) filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Richard Funk. It alleged that Atty. Funk used to work as corporate
secretary, counsel, chief executive officer, and trustee of the
foundation from 1983 to 1985.
1
He also served as its counsel in
several criminal and civil cases.
Hocorma Foundation further alleged that on November 25, 2006 Atty.
Funk filed an action for quieting of title and damages against Hocorma
Foundation on behalf of Mabalacat Institute, Inc. (Mabalacat Institute).
Atty. Funk did so, according to the foundation, using information that
he acquired while serving as its counsel in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and in breach of attorney-client
relationship.
2

In his answer, Atty. Funk averred that Don Teodoro V. Santos
(Santos) organized Mabalacat Institute in 1950 and Hocorma
Foundation in 1979. Santos hired him in January 1982 to assist
Santos and the organizations he established, including the Mabalacat
Institute, in its legal problems. In 1983 the Mabalacat Institute made
Atty. Funk serve as a director and legal counsel.
3

Subsequently, according to Atty. Funk, when Santos got involved in
various litigations, he sold or donated substantial portions of his real
and personal properties to the Hocorma Foundation. Santos hired
Atty. Funk for this purpose. The latter emphasized that, in all these,
the attorney-client relationship was always between Santos and him.
He was more of Santos' personal lawyer than the lawyer of Hocorma
Foundation.
4

Atty. Funk claimed that before Santos left for America in August 1983
for medical treatment, he entered into a retainer agreement with him.
They agreed that Atty. Funk would be paid for his legal services out of
the properties that he donated or sold to the Hocorma Foundation.
The foundation approved that compensation agreement on December
13, 1983. But it reneged and would not pay Atty. Funk's legal fees.
5

Atty. Funk also claimed that Santos executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) in his favor on August 13, 1983. The SPA authorized
him to advise Hocorma Foundation and follow up with it Santos' sale
or donation of a 5-hectare land in Pampanga to Mabalacat Institute,
covered by TCT 19989-R. Out of these, two hectares already
comprised its school site. The remaining three hectares were for
campus expansion.
Atty. Funk was to collect all expenses for the property transfer from
Hocorma Foundation out of funds that Santos provided. It was Santos'
intention since 1950 to give the land to Mabalacat Institute free of rent
and expenses. The SPA also authorized Atty. Funk to register the 5-
hectare land in the name of Mabalacat Institute so a new title could be
issued to it, separate from the properties of Hocorma
Foundation.
6
When Santos issued the SPA, Atty. Funk was Mabalacat
Institute's director and counsel. He was not yet Hocorma Foundation's
counsel.
7
When Santos executed the deeds of conveyances, Atty.
Funk's clients were only Santos and Mabalacat Institute.
8

According to Atty. Funk, on August 15, 1983 Santos suggested to
Hocorma Foundation's Board of Trustees the inclusion of Atty. Funk in
that board, a suggestion that the foundation followed.
9
After Santos
died on September 14, 1983, Atty. Funk was elected President of
Mabalacat Institute, a position he had since held.
10

Atty. Funk claims that in 1985 when Hocorma Foundation refused to
pay his attorney's fees, he severed his professional relationship with
it. On November 9, 1989, four years later, he filed a complaint against
the foundation for collection of his attorney's fees. The trial court, the
Court of Appeals (CA), and the Supreme Court decided the claim in
his favor.
11

After hearing, the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty.
Funk to have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03
12
of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) with the aggravating circumstance
of a pattern of misconduct consisting of four court appearances
against his former client, the Hocorma Foundation. The CBD
recommended Atty. Funk's suspension from the practice of law for
one year.
13
On April 16, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the CBD's report and recommendation.
14
Atty. Funk
moved for reconsideration but the IBP Board of Governors denied it
on June 26, 2011.
The Issue Presented
The issue here is whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and
confidence of a former client in violation of the CPR when he filed
several actions against such client on behalf of a new one.
The Court's Ruling
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is
undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma
Foundation. Years after terminating his relationship with the
foundation, he filed a complaint against it on behalf of another client,
the Mabalacat Institute, without the foundation's written consent.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the
highly fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound public policy
dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or
discharging inconsistent duties.1wphi1An attorney may not, without
being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This
rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the erring
lawyer's part does not make it inoperative.
15

The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former
client's doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily
not have acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his
client placed on him in the light of their relationship. It would simply be
impossible for the lawyer to identify and erase such entrusted
knowledge with faultless precision or lock the same into an iron box
when suing the former client on behalf of a new one.
Here, the evidence shows that Hocorma Foundation availed itself of
the legal services of Atty. Funk in connection with, among others, the
transfer of one of the properties subject of the several suits that the
lawyer subsequently filed against the foundation. Indeed, Atty. Funk
collected attorney's fees from the foundation for such services. Thus,
he had an obligation not to use any knowledge he acquired during
that relationship, including the fact that the property under litigation
existed at all, when he sued the foundation.
The Court finds it fitting ti adopt the CBD's recommendation as well as
the IBP Board of Governor's resolution respecting the case.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolution of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated April 16,
2010 and June 26, 2011 and SUSPENDS Atty. Richard Funk from the
practice of law for one year effective immediately. Serve copies of this
decision upon the Office of the Court Administration for dissemination,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant so the latter may attach its copy to his record.
SO ORDERED.














A.C. No. 2040 March 4, 1998
IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.

PUNO, J .:
The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES
dates back to the '50s during their school days in De La Salle and the
Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to their families and
respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant
of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer
residence in Moran Street, Baguio City.
1
For lack of funds, he
requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They
agreed that respondent would keep the property in trust for the
Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement,
respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank (in the amounts of
P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate
the property. Title was then issued in respondent's name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When
Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal
counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA NAKPIL.
On March 9, 1976, respondent's law firm, Carlos J. Valdes &
Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Jose's
estate. Complainant was appointed as administratrix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate
proceedings. It appears that respondent excluded the Moran property
from the inventory of Jose's estate. On February 13, 1978, respondent
transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval
Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran
property by filing with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio
City an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent
and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute
ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over
it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed
this administrative case to disbar the respondent. She charged that
respondent violated professional ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property
(Pulong Maulap) which belonged to the estate he was
settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the "inventory of
real estate properties" he prepared for a client-estate
and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to
purchase the said excluded property as a liability of the
estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to the
said property to his family corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against
the estate that retained him as its counsel and auditor.
2

On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted
respondent's offer to serve as lawyer and auditor to settle her
husband's estate. Respondent's law firm then filed a petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include the
Moran property in the estate's inventory. Instead, respondent
transferred the property to his corporation, Caval Realty Corporation,
and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of
maliciously appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not
belong to him. She claimed that respondent has expressly
acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his
correspondences
3
with the Baguio City Treasurer and the
complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondent's auditing
firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the
inventory of her husband's estate, yet included in the claims against
the estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which
respondent represented as her husband's loans applied "probably for
the purchase of a house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City."
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondent's law firm
(Carlos J. Valdes and Associates) filed the petition for the settlement
of her husband's estate in court, while respondent's auditing firm (C.J.
Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the estate and two
of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting
interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of
creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her husband's estate
which was represented by respondent's law firm. Complainant averred
that there is no distinction between respondent's law and auditing
firms as respondent is the senior and controlling partner of both firms
which are housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In his
ANSWER,
4
respondent initially asserted that the resolution of the first
and second charges against him depended on the result of the
pending action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue
of ownership of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in
the reconveyance case that he did not hold the Moran property in trust
for the Nakpils as he is its absolute owner. Respondent explained that
the Nakpils never bought back the Moran property from him, hence,
the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the
inventory of Nakpil's estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of
claims against the estate which included his loans of P65,000.00 and
P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of the Moran property. In
charging his loans against the estate, he stressed that the list drawn
up by his accounting firm merely stated that the loans in respondent's
name were applied "probably for the purchase of the house and lot in
Moran Street, Baguio City." Respondent insisted that this was not an
admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase
"probably for the purchase" did not imply a consummated transaction
but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of
a letter (Exhibit "H") of his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer
remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran property on behalf of the
Nakpils. He contended that the letter could be a mere error or
oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that
they did not own the Moran property for: (1) complainant's February
1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities did not include the said
property, and; (2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance
Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law
and accounting firms in the settlement of her husband's
estate.
5
However, he pointed out that he has resigned from his law
and accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty.
Percival Cendaa (from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who
filed the intestate proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of
interest when his law firm represented the estate in the intestate
proceedings while his accounting firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs)
served as accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of
creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He
proffered the following reasons for his thesis: First, the two claimants
were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a
family corporation of the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the
President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil who,
upon the latter's death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These
two claimants had been clients of his law and accounting firms even
during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation
of conflicting interests was with the knowledge and consent of
complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of interests
between the estate and the claimants for they had forged a modus
vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied only after full
payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as
administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. Complainant has started paying off the claims of Angel
Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks' claims.
Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the
estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J. Valdes & Co. as common auditor
redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm prepared a true and
accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law
and accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974.
6
He rejoined his
accounting firm several years later. He submitted as proof the SEC's
certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an Amended Articles
of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaa, from
the firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate
proceedings in court. On the other hand, the claimants were
represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth,
respondent alleged that in the remote possibility that he committed a
breach of professional ethics, he committed such "misconduct" not as
a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common auditor of the
estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in
another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY.
7
She
maintained that the pendency of the reconveyance case is not
prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment complaint against
respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran
property but the ethics and morality of respondent's conduct as a
CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondent's Annexes to his Reply (such as
the Statement of Assets & Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance
Sheet of the Estate) which showed that complainant did not claim
ownership of the Moran property were all prepared by C.J. Valdes &
Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the
intestate court by C.J. Valdes & Associates as counsel for the estate.
She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that respondent
owned the Moran property but were part of respondent's scheme to
remove the property from the estate and transfer it to his family
corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the documents
because of the professional counsel of respondent and his firm that
her signature thereon was required. Complainant charged respondent
with greed for coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects in
the documents he himself prepared..
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable
documents (the list of claims against the estate and the letter
regarding Nakpil's payment of realty tax on the Moran property) which
were prepared by his law and accounting firms and invoke other
documents prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him.
She averred that respondent must accept responsibility not just for
some, but for all the representations and communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondent's claim that he resigned from his
firms from March 9, 1976 to "several years later." She alleged
that none of the documents submitted as evidence referred to his
resignation from his law firm. The documents merely substantiated his
resignation from his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,
8
respondent insisted that complainant cannot
hold him liable for representing the interests of both the estate and the
claimants without showing that his action prejudiced the estate. He
urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondent's accounting
firm to act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated
that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not
as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and its claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims
of the creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not
defended by his accounting or law firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He
averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims as they were
legitimate and not because they were prepared by his accounting firm.
He emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims were
fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of respondent's law firm to
object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,
9
we deferred further action on the
disbarment case until after resolution of the action for reconveyance
between the parties involving the issue of ownership by the then CFI
of Baguio. Complainant moved for reconsideration on the ground that
the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her
complaint which involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical
acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted her motion and
referred the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation.
10

In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance.
The trial court ruled that respondent held the Moran property in trust
for the Nakpils but found that complainant waived her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The
appellate court held that respondent was the absolute owner of the
Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainant's appeal
to this Court, the OSG submitted its Report
11
on the disbarment
complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the decision of the Court of
Appeals then pending review by this Court. The OSG found that
respondent was not put on notice of complainant's claim over the
property. It opined that there was no trust agreement created over the
property and that respondent was the absolute owner thereof. Thus, it
upheld respondent's right to transfer title to his family corporation. It
also found no conflict of interests as the claimants were related to the
late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as
it involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his
accounting profession and law practice in connection with the property
of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the
business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and
good faith.
12
The measure of good faith which an attorney is required
to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard
than is required in business dealings where the parties trade at "arms
length."
13
Business transactions between an attorney and his client
are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence,
courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage
is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public
policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to
take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no
presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is
considered in an attorney's favor.
14

In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in
its Report. These findings were based mainly on the decision of the
Court
of Appeals in the action for reconveyance which was reversed by this
Court in 1993.
15

As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this
Court in the aforementioned reconveyance case.
16
It is well-
established that respondent offered to the complainant the services of
his law and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship
dating as far back as the '50s. She reposed her complete trust in
respondent who was the lawyer, accountant and business consultant
of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed that the
former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the
latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute
ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to
complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property
beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent
later transferred it to his corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially
acknowledged and respected the trust nature of the Moran property.
Respondent's bad faith in transferring the property to his family
corporation is well discussed in this Court's Decision,
17
thus:
. . . Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the
trust during the lifetime of the late Jose Nakpil. On the
contrary, he expressly recognized it. . . . (H)e
repudiated the trust when (he) excluded Pulong
Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose
Nakpil submitted to the intestate court in 1973. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership
intended by the parties . . . can be bolstered by Exh. "I-
2," an annex to the claim filed against the estate
proceedings of the late Jose Nakpil by his brother,
Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes
& Co., the accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit
"I-2," which is a list of the application of the proceeds of
various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973
by the late Jose Nakpil, . . . contains the two (2) loans
contracted in the name of respondent. If ownership
of Pulong Maulap was already transferred or ceded to
Valdes, these loans should not have been included in
the list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed
to under the arrangement outlined in Exh. "J" was that
respondent Valdes would . . . "take over the total loan
of P140,000.00 and pay all of the interests due on the
notes" while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would
continue to live in the disputed property for five (5)
years without remuneration save for regular
maintenance expenses. This does not mean, however,
that if at the end of the five-year period petitioner
(Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, . .
. Valdes could already automatically assume ownership
of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents
Carlos J. Valdes and Caval Realty Corporation was to
proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil
and/or the property itself." (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainant's
documentary evidence (Exhibits "H", "J" and "L"), which she also
adduced in this administrative case, should estop respondent from
claiming that he bought the Moran property for himself, and not
merely in trust for Jose Nakpil.
18

It ought to follow that respondent's act of excluding the Moran
property from the estate which his law firm was representing evinces
a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent truly believed
that the said property belonged to him, he should have at least
informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on
its ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim in
the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the property to his
own corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge in
the estate proceedings. Respondent's misuse of his legal expertise to
deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm,
charged the two loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the
estate, after said loans were obtained by respondent for the purchase
and renovation of the property which he claimed for himself.
Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by
disclaiming knowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of the
estate's liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans must
have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear
that the information as to how these two loans should be treated could
have only come from respondent himself as the said loans were in his
name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in charging
respondent's loans against the estate could not have been committed
without respondent's participation. Respondent wanted to "have his
cake and eat it too" and subordinated the interest of his client to his
own pecuniary gain. Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity
to his client's cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interests. It is generally the rule, based on
sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent adverse
interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an
issue.
19
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to
the same general matter
20
and is applicable however slight such
adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorney's intentions
and motives were honest and he acted in good faith.
21
However,
representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the
parties consent to the representation, after full disclosure of facts.
Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed
consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients
the nature and extent of the conflict and the possible adverse effect
must be thoroughly understood by his clients.
22

In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate
and that of its creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's
accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate
and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the
estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate
which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are
creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondent's law firm
questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented
complainant in the intestate proceedings. He points out that it was one
Atty. Percival Cendaa, from his law firm Carlos J. Valdes &
Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However, the fact
that he did not personally file the case and appear in court is beside
the point. As established in the records of this case and in the
reconveyance case,
23
respondent acted as counsel and accountant
of complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondent's defense
that he resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974
(or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is unworthy of
merit. Respondent's claim of resignation from his law firm is not
supported by any documentary proof. The documents on
record
24
only show respondent's resignation from his accounting firm
in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent
returned to his accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the
intestate proceedings for the settlement of Jose's estate had not yet
been terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent
transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February 13,
1978, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the
succession of events shows that respondent could not have been
totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J.
Valdes & Associates was the legal counsel of the estate
25
and his
accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the auditor of both the
estate and the two claimants against it.
26
The fact, however, that
complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be
taken against her as there is nothing in the records to show that
respondent or his law firm explained the legal situation and its
consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the
arrangement does not amount to an acquiescence based on
an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil
does not negate the conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim
against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to the estate. As
correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a claim against her
husband's estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the
intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his
law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client could be doubted.
In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondent's law firm was to
contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims were
prepared by respondent's accounting firm. Even if the claims were
valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable.
The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the
representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was
respondent's duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to
avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of
interest, he could not be charged before this Court as his alleged
"misconduct" pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively
practicing both professions. He is the senior partner of his law and
accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at bar,
complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being
the common accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is
charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of
the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the
estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented. The act
is a breach of professional ethics and undesirable as it placed
respondent's and his law firm's loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even
granting that respondent's misconduct refers to his accountancy
practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a
member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
27
Possession of good
moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but
also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a
lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the
relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in
nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
28
In the case at
bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his
clients.
29

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J.
VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year effective from receipt of this Decision,
with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more
severely in the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.




A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

BIDIN, J .:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant
Philippine National Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo,
former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of
complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with
complainant bank in which respondent during his employment with
aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he
participated in arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as
Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He
even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr.
Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of
the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil
action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and
complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
146, respondent who had since left the employ of complainant bank,
appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an
administrative case filed by complainant bank against his former
subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and dishonesty,
respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later
disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of
complainants Asset Management Group, he intervened in the
handling of the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia
Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the
couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and
the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were
represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of
which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he
appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the
execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did
not participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court. With
respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that
he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the
law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as
counsel of record, the case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro
Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a general
partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named
therein. They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law
firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one
office as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them
handles their own cases independently and individually receives the
revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for
investigation, report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that
respondent was previously fined by this Court in the amount of
P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong
Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where
respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy
"through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent
were fully substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm
handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership
deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation of
complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the
hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same
with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his
appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say
and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the
application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent
impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made
of record that respondent was working in the same office as Atty.
Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm
is true, it is in itself a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the clients secrets and confidential
records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff
members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of
respondent to devise ways and means to attract as clients former
borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to
see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor
for the said clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the IBP
saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration
of the money he expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for 3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had,
on October 4, 1994, submitted to this Court its Report and
recommendation in this case, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation
contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On
December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set
Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration.
In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration the aforesaid
pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion
appropriate to emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the
representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case of Pasay
Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where
a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who
participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor
Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the
same anti-graft case, this Court, citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26
SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no
reason to disagree with him, that even if respondent did
not use against his client any information or evidence
acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he
did become privy to information regarding the
ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated
in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the
land that triggered the mauling incident which gave rise
to the criminal action for physical injuries. This Court's
remarks inHilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a
great number of litigations, a complicated affair,
consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret
and well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said
in the course of dealings between an attorney and
client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the
revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that
might only further prejudice the complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent
utilized against his former client information given to
him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their
previous relationship should have precluded him from
appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible
entry case. In the case ofHilado vs. David, supra, this
Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare
relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for
testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to
protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on principles
of public policy, of good taste. As has been said in
another case, the question is not necessarily one of the
rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's
wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged
to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal
force and effect to respondent in the case at bar. Having been an
executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as
counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer
involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an
employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to
wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests,
except by express conflicting consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting
interest when, in behalf on one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires
him to oppose.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY.
TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3)
YEARS, effective immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.
















































A.M. No. 632 June 27, 1940
In re Attorney MELCHOR E. RUSTE, respondent,
The respondent in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
LAUREL, J .:
By virtue of an administrative complaint filed by Mateo San Juan
against Melchor E. Ruste on February 27, 1934, to which the
respondent made answer on March 15, 1934, this Court, by resolution
of December 1, 1934, referred the case to the Solicitor-General for
report. The reference brought forth the following formal complaint filed
by the Solicitor-General against the respondent on March 26, 1935:
Comes now the undersigned Solicitor-General of the
Philippine Islands in the above entitled administrative case,
and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 5 of the rules
concerning disbarment or suspension of attorneys-at-law, to
this Honorable Supreme Court, respectively alleges:
1. That in cadastral case No. 6, G. L. R. O. Record No. 483 of
the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, the respondent,
Melchor E. Ruste, appeared for and represented, as counsel,
Severa Ventura and her husband, Mateo San Juan, the herein
complainant, who claimed lot No. 3765; and as a result of said
cadastral proceedings, an undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20)
share of said lot was adjudicated by said court to said
claimants;
2. That there was no agreement the respondent and his said
clients as to the amount of his fees; but that they paid to him
upon demand on different occasions the sums of (30 and P25
as attorney's fees;
3. That after said payments, the respondent again demanded
of the complainant and his wife as additional fees the sum of
P25, but they had no money to pay, him, and so he asked
them to execute in his favor a contract of lease, and a contract
of sale, of their share in said lot No. 3764 in order that he may
be able to borrow or raise said sum of P25;
4. That in accordance with said respondent's request, the
complainant and his wife executed on September 22, 1930, a
contract of lease, whereby in consideration of P100, they
leased to him their coconut and banana plantation in said lot
No. 3764 for a term of five years, and also a deed of sale,
whereby in consideration of P1,000, they sold and transferred
to him their undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20) share in said lot
No . 3764, although, ,in fact and in truth, neither of the
consideration mentioned in said contracts of lease and sale
were ever receive by them;
5. That on March 21, 1931, the respondent executed a deed of
sale, whereby in consideration of P370 he sold and transferred
to Ong Chua said undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20) share in
lot No. 3764 excluding the house and its lot, occupied by the
complainant and his wife; and on March 28, 1931, the
respondent executed another deed of sale, whereby in
consideration of the same amount of P370 paid to him by the
same Ong Chua, he sold and transferred to the latter the same
undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20") share in lot No. 3764, but
already including said houses and its lot;
6. That by virtue of the sale to him, Ong Chua has taken
possession of said eleven-twentieth share in lot No. 3764;
7. That notwithstanding said second deed of sale, the
respondent obtained from Ong Chua to allow the complaint
and his wife to continue living house for a period of two years
without paying any rent;
8. That on October 10, 1933, however, the respondent notified
the complainant and his wife in writing that the said house still
belonged to the respondent, and requires said spouses to pay,
the sum of P40.50, representing ten months' rental in arrears,
and thereafter a monthly rental of P1.50; and
9. That the respondent did not turn over to the complainant
and his wife the amount of P370 paid by Ong Chua nor any
part thereof.
Wherefore, the undersigned prays that disciplinary action be
taken against the respondent.
To the foregoing complaint, the respondent, on April 23, 1935,
interposed the following answer:
Comprarece el infrascrito, en su propiarepresentacion y a la
Honorable Corte Suprema, alega:
Niega, general y especificamente sus alegaciones en dicha
demanda, sobretodo en cuanto al pago de cantidades
monetarias alli especificadas, y como defensa especial, alega:
Que el denunciante Mateo San Juan, y sus testigos Esperato
Bucoy y Severa Ventura han infringido la Ley del Perjurio;
ademasd el Fiscal Provincial Jose Evangelista es una parte
interesada en el resultado de este asunto;
Por todo lo expuesto, al Honorable Tribunal pide:
(a) Que para la substanciacion de esta causa que actue de
Fiscal, el Honorable Enrique Braganza, Fiscal de Jolo, Sulu;
(b) Que dicho Honorable Fiscal Enrique Braganza, sea
requerido a investigar a los testigos, Esperato Bucoy y
Severa, Ventura, y la Ley del Perjirio tal como esta
enmendada.
Sometido respetuosamente.
By resolution of this court of April 24, 1935, the said formal complaint
and answer were referred to the judge of First Instance of Zamboanga
for investigation, report, and recommendation. After various and
postponements, transpiring between August 3, 1935 and October 18,
1939, the Honorable Catalino Buenaventura, then presiding over the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, elevated the record of the case
of this court. On October 31, 1939, the case was included in the
January, 1940 calendar, and at the hearing thereof on February 1,
1940, the respondent submitted the case without oral argument, and
the memorandum presented by the Solicitor-General, recommending
the dismissal of the complaint filed against respondent, was ordered
attached to the record.
From a perusal of the entire record, particularly of the formal
complaint filed by the Solicitor-General against the respondent
attorney, we gather the following material charges formulated against
the latter, to wit, (1) that he engineered the execution in his favor, by
the spouses Mateo San Juan and Severa Ventura, of the contract of
lease, Exhibit A, and of the deed of sale, Exhibit B, covering the
property in question; (2) that he did turn over the considerations
therefor to the said spouses; (3) that he likewise deeded the same
property to one Ong Chua, for P370, without paying the spouses the
said purchase price, and (4) that he required the spouses to pay
(40.50 for ten months' rental in arrears, and thereafter a monthly
rental of P1.50 for the house occupied by the said spouses.
Sometime in July, 1930, the respondent acted as counsel for the
complainant and his wife when the latter laid claim of ownership upon
lot No. 3764 in case No. 6, G. L. R. O., Cadastral Record 483 of the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, eleven-twentieth of said lot
having been eventually adjudicated to the wife, Severa Ventura, on
December 20, 1933. On September 22, 1930, that is, during
pendency of said cadastral case, the spouses purportedly leased a
part of said lot to the respondent for P100, which lease was cancelled
and superseded by a deed of sale executed on the same date,
whereby the said spouses, in consideration of P1,000, conveyed
eleven-twentieth of the same land in favor of the respondent. This is
also the finding of the Solicitor-General in his report submitted in this
case:
. . . convinieron cancelar el arrendamiento y otorgar en
sustitucion un contrato de compraventa absoluta a favor del
recurrido, como en efecto se hizo y es el Exhibito B (pp. 37-
38, Rollo 1), por cuyo documento Severa Ventura con el
consentimiento marital correspondiente vendio definitivamente
al recurrido su participacion pro indivisa da 11/20 partes en el
rferido lote, y estando aun el mismo pendiente de vista u
decision el Expediente Catastral No. 6, Record No. 483, del
Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Zamboanga. (Pp. 19-20.)
The property being thus in suit, which the respondent was waging on
behalf of his clients, his acquisition thereof by the deed of sale, Exhibit
B, constitutes malpractice. (Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil.,
775; In re Calderon, 7 Phil. 427.) Whether the deed of sale in question
was executed at the instance of the spouses driven by financial
necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the latter's behest,
as contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In either case as
attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his
terms to a harassed client, in breach of the "rule so amply protective
of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between
attorney and client, and of the rights of both."
(Hernandez vs. Villanueva, supra.)
There is evidence to show that the respondent has failed to account to
the aggrieved spouses for the various amounts received by him on
account of the transactions effected by him pertaining to the portion of
lot No. 3764. However, as the evidence is conflicting and the
statements of the parties are contradictory on this point, it is believed
that the determination of the exact amount due them by the
respondent should better elucidated and determined in an appropriate
action which the complaint and his spouse may institute against the
respondent for this purpose.
For having improperly acquired the property referred to in Exhibits A
and B, under the above circumstances, which property was then
subject matter of a judicial proceedings, in which he was counsel, the
respondent is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended for
a period of one year, reserving to the complainant and his spouse
such action as may by proper for the recovery of such amount or
amounts as may be due from the respondent. So ordered.























































A.M. No. 2144 April 10, 1989
CELEDONIO QUILBAN, ROMUALDO DALAGAN, FORTUNATO
RAMIREZ AMADOR ALARCON and LUIS AGAWAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, respondent.
A.M. No. 2180 April 10, 1989
ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. A. R. MONTEMAYOR, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N


PER CURIAM:
Subjected to frustrations were the dreams of thirty-two (32) squatter
families to own the land of approximately 50 square meters each on
which their respective homes were built. To vindicate their rights they
have aired their plight before this Court. Thwarted, too, was the
benevolence shown by the original owner of the land which parted
with its property at a giveaway price thinking that it was
accommodating the landless squatters.
The antecedent facts follow:
The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit corporation, (Colegio, for short)
used to own a parcel of land at the Seminary Road, Barrio Bathala,
Quezon City. Through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, it
sold said land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the
Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square
meters as a possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in
the area since 1965 or 1966.
Sometime in 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave
permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved
site a house for his residence and a training center for the Christian
Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters,
Congressman Taruc broached to Father Escaler the Idea of donating
or selling the land cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then
advised the squatters to form an organization and choose a leader
authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the
squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala"
(Samahan, for brevity), with Bernabe Martin as President (Exhibit
"24", Robinol), who was entrusted with the task of negotiating on their
behalf for the sale of the land to them.
But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to
one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the
sale to the exclusion of the other Samahan members. On 28 March
1971, the land was ultimately sold to Rivera at P 15 per square meter
or a total consideration of P 41,961.65. The prevailing price of the
land in the vicinity then was P 100 to P 120 per square meter. It was
evident that Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera
represented the squatters on the property. On the same date, 28
March 1971, Rivera obtained TCT No. 175662 to the property in his
name alone.
In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed Civil Case
No. Q-16433, Branch IV, Quezon City, entitled "Celedonio Quilban, et
al., Plaintiffs, vs. Maximo Rivera, et al., Defendants." with the principal
prayer that said defendants be ordered to execute a deed of
conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs after reimbursement by the latter
of the corresponding amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio. The Court
of First Instance of Quezon City, however, dismissed the case.
To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan
members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which
the latter was paid P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees on 8 October 1975
(Exhibit "I"). Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part
of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would
pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the
land sharing was confirmed in writing on 10 March 1979 (Exhibit "2").
On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI
Decision by:
(1) ordering defendant Maximo Rivera
and all his co-defendants to execute a
deed of conveyance of the land in
question in favor of herein plaintiffs after
the payment of the corresponding
amount paid by the defendants to the
Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and in case
of refusal or failure on their part to do so,
ordering the Clerk of Court to execute
the same in favor of plaintiffs and
declaring TCT No. 175662 (Annex E)
null and void and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel said
certificate and issue a new one in lieu
thereof in the name of plaintiffs-
appellants, upon presentation of the
deed of conveyance to be executed in
favor of appellants and (2) ordering
appellees jointly and severally to pay
appellants the sum of P 2,000.00 as
attomey's fees, plus costs." (p. 30,
Report and Recommendation)
To raise the amount of P 41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of
Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying
the property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of title etc., the five
officers of the Samahan collected, little by little, P 2,500.00 from each
head of family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper
receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol. On 18 May 1979, the sum of P
68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May
1979 the amounts of P l,030.00 and P 2,500.00 respectively; and on 2
June 1979, the sum of P 2,500.00, or a total of P 75,000.00.
After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had
been made to Rivera. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there
was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution
had not yet been issued by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had already
been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the
latter gave other excuses, which the officers discovered to have no
basis at all.
On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first consensus"
to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol (Exhibit "3"). The officers of the
Samahan thereafter approached Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, who
agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown the document of 6
March 1980 containing the consensus of the Samahan members to
change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's
advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter dated 17 March 1980
informing the latter of their decision to terminate his services and
demanding the return of the P 75,000.00 deposited with him (Exhibit
"5"). Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent
letter of the same tenor, dated 31 March 1980 (Exhibit "6"), was
similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol.
On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his
appearance in Civil Case No. Q-16433 as counsel for the plaintiffs
(Exhibit "8"), vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of the authority dated
18 March 1980 given him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the
five officers (Exhibit "9"). Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20 March
1980 a Motion for Execution praying that the defendants and/or the
Clerk of Court be directed to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of
the plaintiffs (Exhibit "10"). At the hearing of the Motion for Execution
on 5 June 1980, Atty. Robinol manifested that he had no objection to
the appearance of and his substitution by Atty. Montemayor (Exhibits
"11" & "11-A").
Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus
dated 6 March 1980, another document labelled the "second
consensus" (Exhibit "E") was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting
held for the purpose on 24 November 1980 to the effect that they had
decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had
delayed paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in their favor.
Administrative Case No. 2144
On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative
Complaint before this Court requesting the invention of Atty. Robinol
for refusal to return the P 75,000.00 and praying that the Court
exercise its power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to
practice law. The details of their Complaint were embodied in their
Joint Affidavit executed on 14 April 1980 describing what had
transpired between them and Atty. Robinol.
In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by
Complainants to appeal their case to the Court of appeals after they
had lost in the lower Court; that their agreement as to attomey's fees
was on a contingent basis if he obtains a reversal of the lower Court
Decision, they wig give him a portion of the property subject matter of
the litigation equal to the portion that will pertain to each of the 32
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433; that he did not receive P
70,000.00 from Complainants on 18 May 1979 but only P 56,470.00;
that he prepared and signed the receipt dated 18 May 1979 showing
that he received P 70,000.00 only to save complainants from
embarrassment and shame should their co-plaintiff ask for proof that
they (Complainants) have paid their shares, which they have not; that
the correct amount in his possession is only P 62,470.00-it would
really be P 75,000.00 had the five Complainants paid their shares in
the amount of P 12,500.00 at P 2,500.00 each and one Fortunate
Ramirez paid his balance of P 30.00; that he had the right to hold the
money in his possession as guarantee for the payment of his
attomey's fees of get a portion of the property that win pertain to each
of the plaintiffs, he wants his portion converted to cash, and the cash
equivalent of his portion is P 50,000.00 (2,743 square meters divided
by 32 plaintiffs equals 85 square meters for each plaintiff, multiplied
by P 500.00 up per square meter); that considering that P 50,000.00
is even less than one-half (1/ 2) per cent of the total value of the
property, which is more than a million pesos, such amount is not
unreasonable; that he is ready to give back the amount of P
12,470.00, representing the difference between P 50,000.00 and the
amount of P 62,470.00 in his possession; that complainants cannot
make this Court a collection agency and that while this Court has the
exclusive disciplinary power over members of the Bar, it is equally
true that the Court cannot pass judgment on Complainants' plea that
the amount deposited by respondent be returned to them as this
prayer should be ventilated in an ordinary action; that he does not
have the slightest intention to appropriate the money in his
possession (P 62,470.00) for himself, but he is holding it until his
attomey's fees are satisfied there being no guarantee for its
satisfaction because of Complainants' adamant refusal to pay him;
that there was no previous notice to him of his discharge; and that
Atty. Montemayor accepted the case without his Robinols formal
withdrawal and conformity.
Administrative Case No. 2180
Pursuing that tack on 29 July 1980, Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for
Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross
unethical conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor
readily accepted the case without his Robinols formal withdrawal and
conformity and knowing fully well that there was no consensus of all
the plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel.
For his part, Atty. Montemayor denied that the attomey's fees agreed
upon by plaintiffs and Atty. Robinol were purely on a contingent basis,
the truth being that the attomey's fees were payable on a cash basis
of P 2,000.00 retainer fee, as evidenced by the receipt signed by Atty.
Robinol (Annex "I"), plus whatever amount is adjudicated as attomey's
fees by the Court of Appeals; that the contingent fee referred to by
Atty. Robinol was the result of his insistent demand after the Court of
Appeals Decision in Civil Case No. Q-16433 was already final, as
shown by the date of the agreement (Annex "2"); that twenty [20] out
of thirty-two [32] members of the Samahan signed the agreement to
discharge Atty. Robinol and hire a substitute counsel as shown by
Annex "3", which is a majority of the membership and, therefore, a
valid consensus; that he agreed to act as counsel if only to arrest the
growing belief of the Samahan that most members of the Philippine
Bar are unprincipled; that although there was no formal Motion for
substitution, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 26, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, as shown by the formal entry of appearance in
Civil Case No. Q-1 6433 (Annex "8"), the written consent of the clients
(Annex "9"), notice to Atty. Robinol of his discharge and substitution
(Annexes "10' and "11"), non-objection by Robinol of his appearance
as counsel (Annex "l 2"), and implied consent of the Court to the
substitution as shown by its Order of 29 May 1980 (Annex "l 3"); that
his professional and personal actuations as counsel for the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. Q-16433, CFI-Quezon City, do not cause dishonor
either to himself or to the Philippine Bar; and that the Complaint
against him should be dismissed.
On 1 September 1980 and on 17 December 1980, the Court referred
Adm. Case No. 2144 and Adm. Case No. 2180, respectively, to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On 15 December 1988, the Solicitor General
submitted his compliance and recommended:
1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be
suspended for three months for refusing
to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his
possession, with the warning that a
more severe penalty will be imposed for
a repetition of the same or similar act,
and that he be ordered to return to the
plaintiffs, through the complainants in
Adm. Case No. 2134, the sum of P
75,000.00.
2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto
R. Montemayor, Adm. Case No. 2180,
be dismissed, since he has not
committed any misconduct imputed to
him by Atty. Robinol. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)
Except for the disciplinary sanction suggested for Atty. Robinol, we
concur with the recommendations.
Re: Atty. Santiago R. Robinol
Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave
misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of the
profession. After the Court of Appeals had rendered a Decision
favorable to his clients and he had received the latter's funds,
suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the
payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of
the plaintiffs to P 50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary
value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally
appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a
written agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was
highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters
who could barely eke out an existence They had painstakingly raised
their respective quotas of P 2,500.00 per family with which to pay for
the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having
seen the color of money, heart lessly took advantage of them.
Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly
dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the money in
his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge
as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously
engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he
was duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid
ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds
intended for a specific purpose the purchase of land. He stands
obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners.
The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed
without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he would
be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he
has earned. In this case, however, there was an express contract and
a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit
onquantum meruit therefore, is inapplicable.
But Atty. Robinol seeks to impress upon the Court that he had
received only the sum of P 62,470.00 and not P 75,000.00 claiming
that five (5) officers of the Samahan had not yet paid their shares to P
12,500.00.
We agree with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on
this score is the more credible and that he had, in fact, received the
total sum of P 75,000.00 inclusive of the share of P 12,500.00 of the
five (5) officers of the Somalian For, in the pleadings filed by Atty.
Robinol himself in the civil case below, namely, the Motion for
Execution on 5 June 1979; the Motion for Postponement on 31
August 1979; and the Motion to Set Hearing of Motion for Execution
on 10 March 1980, he made mention of seven (7) persons, who, as of
that time, had not yet submitted their corresponding shares which list,
however, did not include any of the five (5) officers of the Samahan.
Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered
himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He has not only
violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the
profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith
and reliance for the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a
homelot they could call their own.
Re: Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor
In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the
findings of the Solicitor General that he has not exposed himself to
any plausible charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his
profession when he agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. Q-16433.
Of the thirty-two (32) plaintiffs in said civil case, twenty-one (21) had
signed the first consensus of 6 March 1980 expressing their resolve to
change their lawyer. In as much as Atty. Robinol sought to exclude
seven (7) of the plaintiffs (out of 32) for non-payment of their shares,
only twenty five (25) of them should be considered in determining the
majority. Consequently, twenty-one (21) out of twenty-five (25) is
sufficient to make the said consensus binding. It is more than a simple
majority.
Moreover, the following developments estop Atty. Robinol from
questioning his discharge as counsel: On 17 March 1980 he was
informed in writing by plaintiffs of the termination of his services
(Exhibit "5"). That was followed by another letter of 31 March 1980 of
the same tenor (Exhibit "6"). In his Memorandum of 12 December
1985 and during the proceedings before the lower Court on 5 June
1980 he had stated that he had no objection to Atty. Montemayor's
appearance in Civil Case Q-16433. When the latter did enter his
appearance, therefore, on 20 March 1980 it was only after assuring
himself that Atty. Robinol's services had been formally terminated. He
had in no way encroached upon the professional employment of a
colleague.
There is no gainsaying that clients are free to change their counsel in
a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and
thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance.
In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their
lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was
well within their prerogative.
In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against
Atty. Montemayor is concerned, therefore, we find the same
absolutely without merit.
ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty. Santiago
R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's
oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between
lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the
practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby
declared to have forfeited his rights to attomey's fees and is ordered
to return the amount of P 75,000.00 to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
Q-16433 through the complainant in the aforementioned
Administrative Case.
2) Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R.
Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the respective personal
records of Attys. Santiago R. Robinol and Anacleto R. Montemayor.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
































A.C. No. 2614 May 21, 1991
MAXIMO DUMADAG, petitioner,
vs.
ERNESTO L. LUMAYA, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURLAM:p
Respondent Atty. Ernesto L. Lumaya of Banganga, Davao Oriental is
administratively charged with unethical practices, conflict of interest
and disloyalty to client by Maximo Dumadag in a sworn letter-
complaint dated 22 December 1983. Respondent was complainant's
counsel in Civil Case No. 148 before the RTC of Banganga, Davao
Oriental, filed against spouses Jose and Jesusa Avellanosa, involving
the sale of a parcel of land. Civil Case No. 148 was terminated via a
compromise agreement which provided, inter alia, that not later than 1
October 1979, the Avellanosas would pay Dumadag the amount of
P4,644.00 and in turn Dumadag would execute in favor of the
Avellanosas a deed of reconveyance of the land. However, in case of
failure of the Avellanosas to make full payment of the P4,644.00
within the stipulated period, Dumadag would be entitled to obtain
possession of the land. The compromise agreement, prepared by
respondent, was approved by the trial court. The Avellanosas failed to
comply with their undertaking under the compromise agreement to
pay complainant the amount of P4,644.00 not later than 1 October
1979, which necessitated the filing by Dumadag of a motion for
execution.
According to complainant, he asked his then counsel, herein
respondent, to prepare and file the appropriate motion for execution;
however, the latter failed to do so. It was through the assistance of the
court stenographer, Mr. Eleuterio Catubig, that complainant himself
signed and filed the motion and later obtained the writ of execution.
When the writ of execution was issued, Deputy Sheriff Rogelio
Dongiapon, according to the complainant, instead of serving the same
on the Avellanosas, connived with respondent attorney by selling a
one (1) hectare portion of the land subject of Civil Case No. 148 to
one Eleonora Astudillo to satisfy complainant's claim out of the
proceeds of the sale, without however Dumadag's knowledge and
consent. The Deed of Sale between the Avellanosas and Astudillo,
dated 14 September 1981, was notarized by respondent attorney and
stated that the "parcel of land, together with all the improvements
found and existing thereon, (is) free from liens and encumbrances,
whatsoever. "It expressly stated on its face "That this Deed of Sale is
executed also to satisfy finally the claim of Maximo Dumadag in Civil
Case No. 148 of the CFI of Banganga, Davao Oriental."
After the sale to Astudillo, or on 16 June 1983, Deputy Sheriff Rogelio
Dongiapon made a Sheriff's Return of Service which stated:
Respectfully returned to MR. JAIME B. TOROBA,
Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court, this
Court, the original copy of the Writ of Execution in Civil
Case No. 148, with the information that said Writ of
execution was partially satisfied the defendants Jose
R. Avellanosa and Jesusa N. Avellanosa having paid
the amount of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
FORTY FOUR (P4,344. 00) Philippine Currency to
Atty. Ernesto L. Lumaya, plaintiff's counsel in the above
entitled case in November, 1981, with the balance of
P300.00 which the defendants Jose R. Avellanosa and
Jesusa N.Avellanosa have not paid up to this moment.
(Emphasis ours)
The said amount of P4,344.00, according to complainant, was not
delivered to him by respondent attorney, even after the former made a
demand on the latter.
After respondent's comment and complainant's reply had been filed,
the case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Actual investigation and
hearings were conducted by Provincial Fiscal Arnulfo M. Agleron of
Mati, Davao Oriental, who submitted a report to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). Based on said report, the OSG prepared and
submitted its own report, including therewith a complaint for
disbarment against respondent attorney, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 139
of the Rules of Court.
While respondent later filed an answer to the OSG prepared
complaint against him, he however, did not appear at the earlier
investigation despite due notice. We will nonetheless consider his
answer as well as comment prior to the referral of the case to the
OSG.
Respondent claims that it was the presiding judge in Civil Case No.
148 who played an active role in the settlement proceedings between
Dumadag and the Avellanosas, and that it is unfortunate, according to
respondent, that there are no written records to prove this fact, but
that it was agreed that Jose Avellanosa would pay Dumadag the
amount of P4,644.00 in installments, which he did, and that
complainant Dumadag claimed and received the money each time
payment was made by Jose Avellanosa; thru herein respondent. His
(respondent's) mistake according to him, was that he merely noted at
the back of his own copy of the judgment by compromise the sums
paid, all in the total amount of P3,000.00, and all taken by
complainant Dumadag, without any receipts. All his (respondent's)
records of the case, according to respondent, were also taken by
Dumadag from his office when he became a provincial board
member.
Respondent also denies having been asked by Dumadag to file a
motion for execution in Civil Case No. 148 or having received from
him a cow or P700.00; however he was promised one cow since he
paid the expenses in Civil Case No. 148.
Anent the sale by the Avellanosas to Eleonora Astudillo, the same,
according to respondent, was a private sale, Dumadag was not a
party thereto. Respondent also claims that he was not aware that a
motion for execution had been filed in Civil Case No. 148 by
Dumadag when the Deed of Sale between the Avellanosas and
Astudillo was presented to him for notarization, and that he did not
see any cash change hands as he was informed that it was just a
ratification of an earlier verbal sale. He notarized the deed of sale
without intention to cause any damage. Respondent however admits
that in a later case, Civil Case No. 283 (where the validity of the sale
from the Avellanosas to Astudillo was assailed by Dumadag), it was
disclosed that from the P7,000.00 actually realized from the sale of
the land to Astudillo, the sheriff deducted P1,605.00 for his expenses,
with the balance being given to the vendors (Avellanosas), because
Dumadag had already been paid by the Avellanosas thru their lawyer,
herein respondent.
In the Court's resolution of 16 April 1990, respondent was required to
answer the OSG complaint. Respondent's answer merely reiterates
his earlier explanation and further states:
The truth of the matter was that the DEED OF SALE
WAS ALREADY Prepared when SHERIFF Dongiapon,
the spouses Avellanosa and Maxima Astudillo came to
my Office for the Notarization of that DEED OF SALE.
What respondent did was only to ask whether the
signatures are their and that the consideration was paid
but did not go over the contents. All of the parties
affirmed their signature and informed respondent that
the consideration was paid in installments. At that time
respondent never was informed that the proceeds was
for the final satisfaction of Mr. Dumadag's claim.
Respondent knew it only when Mr. Dumadag came to
claim the money of course I have to tell the truth and I
told him, Maximo Dumadag, that I have never received
any money from Sheriff ROGELIO DONGIAPON and I
did not even know that there was a petition for the
issuance of a writ of execution that he filed because I
was never asked by him. Mr. Maximo Dumadag told
me that he will file a case against me if I will not give
the money . . .
For the reasons that respondent's acts constitute lack of fidelity,
loyalty and devotion to his client's cause, unethical practice and a
violation of his lawyer's oath, the OSG recommends respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for not less than five (5) years.
In the case of Licuanan vs. Melo (Adm. Case No. 2361 February 9,
1989) a lawyer was disbarred for retaining for his personal benefit for
over a one (1) year period, the amount of P5,220.00 received by him
in behalf of his client, thereby compelling the latter to file a groundless
collection suit which exposed said client to a damage countersuit.
While not exactly identical with the Licuanan case, herein complainant
Dumadag had to file a separate civil case (No. 283 for annulment
of sale, damages and attorney's fees) to recover the amount of
P4,344.00 from his previous counsel, herein respondent, Atty.
Lumaya.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 16
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each
client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy
his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a
lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for
in the Rules of Court.
Both parties failed to apprise this Court of the final disposition of Civil
Case No. 283, even as the Court took note of the RTC decision in
said case where a finding was made that the land earlier sold by the
Avellanosas to Dumadag is separate and distinct from the one (1)
hectare portion sold by the Avellanosas to Astudillo. However, the
RTC in its decision also ordered co-defendant (herein respondent)
Atty. Lumaya to pay the plaintiff (herein complainant) the sum of
P4,344.00 he (Atty. Lumaya) had received from Deputy Sheriff
Rogelio Dongiapon for herein complainant.
Therefore, even a respondent consistently denied liability to
Dumadag, his former client, the records abundantly point to his receipt
of and failure to deliver the amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the
herein complainant, a clear breach of the canons of professional
responsibility.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Ernesto Lumaya
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law effective from date of his
receipt of this resolution.
Let this resolution be served personally on the respondent at his given
address of record and entered in his record as attorney. Let the IBP
and the Court Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution
for their information and guidance as well as for circularization to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.


































A.M. No. 3216 March 16, 1992
DOMINGA VELASCO ORDONIO, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. JOSEPHINE PALOGAN EDUARTE, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Josephine
Palogan-Eduarte originally filed with this Court on April 18, 1988. On
August 10, 1989, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, to which the case was referred for
investigation, submitted a report confirming in substance the charge of
violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code and part of the Oath of Office of
a lawyer and recommending the suspension of herein respondent.
The evidence discloses that on July 18, 1983, Antonia Ulibari filed
with the RTC, Branch XXII, Cabagan, Isabela, Civil Case No. 391 for
annulment of a document (known as Affidavit of Adjudication of the
Estate of Felicisimo Velasco and Quitclaim Thereof) against her
children. The case was handled by Atty. Henedino Eduarte, herein
respondent's husband, until his appointment as RTC judge on
October 26, 1984. His wife, Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte, took
over. On August 22, 1985, decision in Civil Case No. 391 was
rendered in favor of Antonia Ulibari. Except for Dominga Velasco-
Ordonio, one of the children of Antonia Ulibari and complainant in the
instant case, the rest of the defendants did not appeal. On June 13,
1987, while Civil Case No. 391 was pending appeal in the Court of
Appeals, Antonia Ulibari conveyed some parcels of her land to her
children in the form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared and notarized
by herein respondent. Significantly, on the same day, Antonia Ulibari
also conveyed 20 hectares of land to herein respondent and her
husband as their Attorney's fees for legal services rendered. All the
titles of the lands subject of the deeds of absolute sale and the deed
of conveyance however remained in the name of Antonia Ulibari.
On April 4, 1988, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed this complaint for
disbarment against herein respondent on the basis of an affidavit
executed by her mother Antonia Ulibari on March 2, 1988 stating that
affiant never conveyed the subject parcel of land to respondent as her
attorney's fees and that the deeds of absolute sale executed in favor
of her children were not known to her (and that she received no
consideration therefor).
On August 10, 1989, the Investigation Commissioner submitted a
report finding the charges to be true and recommending a one-year
suspension of the respondent from the practice of law.
The first issue to be resolved is whether Antonia Ulibari was
defrauded into signing the Deed of Conveyance transferring to her
lawyer (herein respondent) the subject parcel of land containing
298,420 square meters as the latter's attorney's fees. It is clear from
Antonia Ulibari's affidavit and deposition that she never conveyed the
said land to her lawyer as attorney's fees.
Even granting for the sake argument that Antonia Ulibari knowingly
and voluntarily conveyed the subject property in favor of the
respondent and her husband, the respondent, in causing the
execution of the Deed of Conveyance during the pendency of the
appeal of the case involving the said property, has violated Art. 1491
of the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers from "acquiring by
assignment property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession."
In the case at bar, the property (which includes the more than 20
hectares of land allegedly conveyed to the respondent) was already in
actual litigation first in the lower court and then in the Court of
Appeals. Whether the deed of conveyance was executed at the
instance of the client driven by financial necessity or of the lawyers is
of no moment (In re: Atty. Melchor E. Ruste, 70 Phil. 243). "In either
case, an attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate
his terms to a harrased client, in breach of the rule so amply
protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist
between attorney and client, and of the rights of both." The act
constitutes malpractice, even if the lawyer had purchased the property
in litigation. (Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775; In re: Calderon, 7
Phil. 427). We agree with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion
that the prohibition applies when the lawyer has not paid money for it
and the property was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal
services rendered at a time when the property is still the subject of a
pending case.
For having improperly acquired the subject property, under the
foregoing circumstances, respondent has violated not only Art. 1491
of the Civil Code but also Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which provides that "the lawyer should not purchase any
interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting."
The last issue to be resolved is whether respondent violated any law
in preparing and notarizing the deeds of absolute sale in making it
appear that there were considerations therefor, when in truth there
were none so received by the seller. In her answer, respondent
admitted that Antonia Ulibari did not actually sell the parcels of land to
her children for the considerations stated in the deeds of sale and that
she (respondent) "utilized the form of deed of sale as the most
convenient and appropriate document to effect the transfer of the
parcels of land to Antonia Ulibari's children in accordance with her
wish that said parcels of land be given to them.
In so doing, respondent has manifestly violated that part of her oath
as a lawyer that she shall not do any falsehood. Not only that. In
preparing the documents which do not reflect the true transaction,
respondent has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall be
mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.
ACCORDINGLY, for having violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code,
respondent is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months, and, for having stated falsehoods in the
four (4) deeds of absolute sale she prepared and notarized, in
violation of the lawyer's oath and Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent is also ordered suspended
from the practice or law for a period of another six (6) months,
resulting in a total period on one year, effective from the date this
judgment becomes final.
SUSPENSION ORDERED.

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