CASE SYNTHESIS: (MARIA CAROLINA V. BENIGNO AQUINO, ET. AL., GRECO BELGICA, ET. AL. V.

HON. EXEC. SEC. PAQUITO OCHOA, ET. AL., PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ, LAMP V.
SEC. OF DBM, ET. AL., ABAKADA PARTY LIST V. PURISIMA)

The five (5) cases involved the assailing of CONSTITUTIONALITY of legislations of
appropriations (GAAs), tax reform, pork barrels (Congressional and Presidential),
Development funds and all other issuances in connection to the implementation of the same
and the constitutionality of the exercise of Presidential Veto of the Special provisions in the
appropriations of certain items in the General Appropriation Act (1994), and the conditions
imposed and attached to the exercise of the veto power by the President. Among the
constitutional provisions and mandates that were allegedly assailed by the petitioners in their
respected cases and issues (Procedural and Substantive) tackled and held by the Court
were:

Mandatory Requisites for the Exercise of Judicial review (Existence of
Actual Controversy - including the ripeness of the cases- the locus standi
(legal standing) of the petitioners)
Principle of Separation of Powers
Undue Delegation of Power/Non-Delegability of Legislative Power
Principle of Checks and Balances
Equal Protection Clause
Accountability
Local Autonomy

As held by the Court, in the case of Belgica v. Executive Secretary (G.R. Nos.208566,
208493 and 209251, 2013), the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they had violated the principles
of/constitutional provisions on: (1) Separation of Powers; (2) non-delegability of legislative
power; (3) checks and balances; (4) accountability; and (5) local autonomy. It then laid
down the guidelines, to wit: 1.)At is core, legislators had been consistently accorded post-
enactment authority (a) to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations; (b) and in the areas of fund release and realignment.
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various
operational aspects of budgeting, violating the separation of powers principle; 2.) The 2013
PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed
to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa case, is
lodged in Congress; 3.) Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only
appears as a collective allocation limit. Legislators make intermediate appropriations of the
PDAF only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside the law. Thus, actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General appropriations Bill and are thus
put into effect without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents
power of item veto; 4.)To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities which they themselves participated. Also, this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall not intervene in
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to
act on account of his office. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office
which is a palpable contravention of the principle of accountability; 5.)The Court, however,
finds inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of making
equal the unequal. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the
fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the
district the legislators represent. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural
province which would be relatively underdeveloped compared to the former. To add,
what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel as well.

As the Court palpably reiterated in the cases of Belgica and ABAKADA case, there are
two (2) fundamental tests that determine the validity of the delegation of the legislative
power: (1) the Completeness Test and (2) the Sufficient Standard Test.

As to the validity of the Presidential Pork Barrel, in accordance with the principle of a
valid delegation of power, the Court ruled that the phrases and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President and to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects, respectively contained in the provisions of Malampaya Fund and
Presidential Social Fund, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used and the law does
not supply a definition of priority infrastructure development projects and hence, leaving
the President without any guideline to construe the same.

While in the ABAKADA Case, the Court held that the assailed RA 9335 adequately
states the policy and standards to guide the President in the fixing revenue and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.

In the case of ABAKADA Guro Party list V. Purisima (G.R. No. 166715), Supreme Court,
held that from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers the Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. As thereby ruled in the same case the congressional committee is invalid
and unconstitutional. As again enunciated by the Court, to strengthen the adherence to the
principle of separation of powers, it ruled that: [A]ny post-enactment congressional measure
such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional
oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power
of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of the Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and (2) investigation
and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of the Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step that will undermine the separation
of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J.
Puno, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to
monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity
with the congressional perception of public interest.

However, in the case of LAMP VS. SEC OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, ET. AL.,
Supreme Court ruled in the negative. In determining whether or not a statue is
unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to
statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there
must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of
doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on baseless supposition is an affront to the
wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing
that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually
spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support
that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request for
rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.

While it is held in the PHILCONSA case, that the Court upheld the authority of individual
members of Congress to propose and identify priority projects because this was merely
recommendatory in nature, the said ruling was thereby abandoned for while it can be said
that the aforesaid authority is merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law.

In the case of Carolina P. Araullo vs. Benigno Aquino, as to the determination of the
constitutionality and validity of the assailed DAP and all other executive issuances relating to
the implementation of the DAP, the Court laid down the requisites that must be made upon
for the transfer of appropriated funds to be valid under Section 25 (5) of the Constitution,
namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their
respective offices; and
(3) The purpose I of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices.

Further, in the same case, the Court ruled that the Cross-border
transfers/augmentations from savings were prohibited by the Constitution.

As exemplified in the PHILCONSA case, the Court said under the special provision
applicable to Congress, the members of the Congress are given the power to determine the
necessity or re-alignment of the savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They
are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are
savings, or deficiencies in appropriation. However, only the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the re-alignment. Further, two (2) conditions
must be met: (1) the funds to be re-aligned are actually savings, and (2) the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer is to be made.

As regards to the Presidential Veto, as exercised by the President himself, the veto
power, is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as
Amicus Curiae, pp 3-7). There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of
validity of the veto. In tracking the conditions set by the President in the exercised of his veto
power, the following are regarded: (1) the veto is valid provided that was is avoided in the
double funding and redundancy in relation to the One Fund Policy (2) provided that the
vetoing of the item is to protect the non-impairment or breach of contractual obligations;
(3)any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring
legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive
bill; (4)the provisions must be in accord to Sec. 29 (1) of Art. VI of the Constitution, which
provides that: No Money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law; (5)condition prescribed is consistent with the Constitutional
injunction prescribed under Sec. 8, Art. IX-B of the Constitution which states that no elective
officer or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect
compensation unless specifically authorized by law.

In all the cases, as to the determination of the existence of actual controversy, the
Court consistently reiterated the mandatory requirements for the determination of exercise
judicial review, to wit: (1) there must be an actual controversy; (2) the person challenging
the act must be the proper party or have the legal standing to question the validity of the
subject of the case; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of the constitutionality is the very litis mota of the case. For the
existence of an actual controversy, there must be a contratriety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.

In the case of CarolinaP. Araullo vs. Benigno Aquino, the Supreme Court ruled that an
actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The incompatibility of
the perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances
satisfy the requirement for conflict between legal rights. The issues being raised herein meet
the requisite ripeness considering that the challenged executive acts were already being
implemented by the DBM, and there are averments by the petitioners that such
implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the
implementation of the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public
funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, therefore, to an actual controversy
that is ripe for adjudication by the Court. The Court cannot agree that the termination of the
DAP as a program was a supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated
cases. Verily, the Curt had in past exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases
being rendered moot and academic by supervising events, like(1) when there was a grave
violation of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional character
and was of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4)
when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. Assuming that the petitioners
several submissions against the DAP were ultimately sustained by the Court here, these cases
would definitely come under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from
exercising its power of judicial review. Except for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No. 209164,
the petitioners have invoked their capacities as taxpayers who, by averring that the issuance
and observance and implementation of the DAP and its relevant issuances involved the
illegal disbursements of the public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R.
No. 29442 (Belgica) also assert their right as citizens to sue for the enforcement and
observance of the constitutional limitations on the political branches of the Government. On
its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its legal standing to
bring cases upon constitutional issues. 48 Luna, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites his
additional capacity as a lawyer. The IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by its
avowed duty to work for the rule of law and paramount importance of the question in this
action, not to mention its civic duty as the official association of all lawyers in this country.
Under the petitioners respective circumstances, the Court ruled that each of the petitioners
has established sufficient interest in the on outcome of the controversy as to confer locus
standi on each of them. In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the
power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether appropriated
by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of transcendental importance to the
entire nation, the petitioners included. As such, the determination of such important issues
call for the Courts exercise of it broad and wise discretion to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions
raised.

The Locus Standi, being a procedural technicality may be brushed aside, when the
petition poses issues involved impressed with paramount public interest, when there is far
reaching implications and the unconstitutional spending of public funds involved warrants
the assumption of the Courts jurisdiction over the petition raised.

In the case of PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez GR No.113105, the Supreme Court ruled that a
member of the Senate, and the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal
standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in
an appropriation bill. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of that
institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307
[1973].

In relation to the Equal Protection clause as per invoked by the Petitioners in the cases
Araullo, et. al. v. Aquino and ABAKADA, the Court said that the denial of equal protection of
any law should be an issue must be raised only by parties, who supposedly suffer it, and the
Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution allows valid classification, that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.