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Leonardo Felli
CLM.G.02
30 January 2014
Static Bayesian Games
This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria (U, L) and
(D, R) with payos respectively (1, 1) and (6, 6).
With probability
9
10
she thinks she is playing Game A:
1\2 L R
U
A
1, 1 0, 0
D
A
0, 0 6, 6
the rst element species the action player 1 will take if the
game is A: a
A
,
the second element species the action player 1 will take if the
game is B: a
B
.
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 5 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Player 1s Best Reply
1\2.A L R 1\2.B L R
U
A
1,1 0,0 U
B
1,0 0,10
D
A
0,0 6,6 D
B
0,0 6,6
2
(U
A
, U
B
; L) = 1
_
9
10
_
+ 0
_
1
10
_
=
9
10
2
(U
A
, U
B
; R) = 0
_
9
10
_
+ 10
_
1
10
_
= 1
The best reply is therefore R.
If player 2 expects player 1 to play D
A
or D
B
her expected payos
are:
2
(D
A
, D
B
, L) = 0
_
9
10
_
+ 0
_
1
10
_
= 0
2
(D
A
, D
B
, R) = 6
_
9
10
_
+ 6
_
1
10
_
= 6
The best reply is therefore R.
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 8 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Player 1s Best Reply
If player 2 expects player 1 to play U
A
or D
B
her expected payos
are:
2
(U
A
, D
B
; L) = 1
_
9
10
_
+ 0
_
1
10
_
=
9
10
2
(U
A
, D
B
, R) = 0
_
9
10
_
+ 6
_
1
10
_
=
6
10
The best reply is therefore L.
Finally if player 2 expects player 1 to play D
A
or U
B
her expected
payos are:
2
(D
A
, U
B
; L) = 0
_
9
10
_
+ 0
_
1
10
_
= 0
2
(D
A
, U
B
, R) = 6
_
9
10
_
+ 10
_
1
10
_
=
64
10
The best reply is therefore R.
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 9 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Recall that player 1s best reply is:
player 1 chooses D
A
if the game is A and D
B
if the game is B.
The equilibrium payos for the two players are:
1
A
(D
A
, D
B
, R) = 6,
1
B
(D
A
, D
B
, R) = 6,
2
(D
A
, D
B
, R) = 6.
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 10 / 43
Incomplete Information (Strategic Form)
An incomplete information game consists of:
A
i
player i s action set
T
i
player i s set of possible types
A prole of types t = (t
1
, ..., t
n
) is an element T =
j N
T
j
u
i
: A T R player i s utility function, u
i
(a|t)
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 11 / 43
Bayesian Game Example
Consider the Bayesian game we solved before:
T
i
denotes the type as a random variable
t
i
denotes the realization of the random variable T
i
T
i
= (T
1
, ..., T
i 1
, T
i +1
, ..., T
n
) denotes a prole of types for
all players other than i
Player i ignores T
i
, but knows
i
Player i has beliefs regarding the realization of the types of the
other players t
i
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 13 / 43
Beliefs about other Players Types [Take 1]
In this course we consider models in which types are independent:
(t) =
j N
j
(t
j
)
This implies that the type T
i
of player i is independent of T
i
Beliefs are a probability distribution over the types of the other
players
Any player forms beliefs about the types of the other players by
using Bayes Rule
Independence implies that conditional on observing T
i
= t
i
the
beliefs of player i are:
i
(t
i
|t
i
) =
j N\i
j
(t
j
) =
i
(t
i
)
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 14 / 43
Extra: Beliefs about other Players Types [Take 2]
Also in the general case with interdependence players form beliefs
about the types received by the others by using Bayes Rule
Conditional observing T
i
= t
i
the beliefs of player i are:
i
(t
i
|t
i
) = Pr(T
i
= t
i
|T
i
= t
i
) =
=
Pr(T
i
= t
i
T
i
= t
i
)
Pr(T
i
= t
i
)
=
=
Pr(T
i
= t
i
T
i
= t
i
)
i
T
i
Pr(T
i
=
i
T
i
= t
i
)
=
=
(t
i
, t
i
)
i
T
i
(
i
, t
i
)
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 15 / 43
Strategies
Strategy Proles:
Strategy s
i
weakly dominates s
i
if for any a
i
and t T:
u
i
(s
i
(t
i
), a
i
|t) u
i
(s
i
(t
i
), a
i
|t) with > for some a
i
Strategy s
i
is dominant if it dominates any other strategy s
Strategy s
i
is undominated if no strategy dominates it
Denitions (Dominant Strategy Equilibrium DSE)
A Dominant Strategy equilibrium of an incomplete information
game is a strategy prole s that for any i N, t T and
a
i
A
i
satises:
u
i
(s
i
(t
i
), a
i
|t) u
i
(s
i
(t
i
), a
i
|t) for any s
i
: T
i
A
i
I.e. s
i
is optimal independently of what others know and do
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 18 / 43
Interim Expected Utility
The interim stage occurs just after a player knows his type
T
i
= t
i
T
i
u
i
(s(t)|t)(t
i
|t
i
) : T
i
R
T
i
u
i
(a
i
, s
i
(t
i
)|t)(t
i
|t
i
)
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 19 / 43
Best Reply
T
i
u
i
(s(t)|t)
i
(t
i
|t
i
)
T
i
u
i
(a
i
, s
i
(t
i
)|t)
i
(t
i
|t
i
) s
i
U
i
(s|t
i
) U
i
(a
i
, s
i
|t
i
) s
i
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 24 / 43
DSE Example: Exchange
A buyer and a seller want to trade an object:
This game for any Bs beliefs 0 < < 1 has a DSE in which:
S
(L) = sale,
S
(H) = no sale,
B
= 1
where
i
(t
i
) is player i s strategy if the type is t
i
.
with probability
1
2
the cost is high c
H
,
with probability
1
2
the cost is low c
L
.
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 28 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Cournot Duopoly (contd)
The inverse demand function faced by both rms is:
P(q
1
+q
2
) = a (q
1
+q
2
)
where c
H
< a.
Notice that rm 1 will choose a unique quantity.
Notice that rm 2 will choose a dierent quantity depending on
whether its cost is high or low.
We label these quantities: q
H
2
or q
L
2
.
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 29 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Cournot Duopoly (contd)
Depending on the value of the cost rm 2s prot functions are:
H
2
(q
1
, q
H
2
) = q
H
2
_
a (q
1
+q
H
2
) c
H
_
or
L
2
(q
1
, q
L
2
) = q
L
2
_
a (q
1
+q
L
2
) c
L
_
while rm 1s expected prot function is:
1
(q
1
, q
H
2
, q
L
2
) =
1
2
q
1
_
a (q
1
+q
H
2
) c
_
+
+
1
2
q
1
_
a (q
1
+q
L
2
) c
_
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 30 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Cournot Duopoly (contd)
For any given quantity chosen by rm 1, q
1
, rm 2s best reply is,
depending on the value of the cost:
max
q
H
2
R
+
q
H
2
_
a (q
1
+q
H
2
) c
H
_
or
q
H
2
=
1
2
(a q
1
c
H
) ,
and
max
q
L
2
R
+
q
L
2
_
a (q
1
+q
L
2
) c
L
_
or
q
L
2
=
1
2
(a q
1
c
L
) .
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 31 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Cournot Duopoly (contd)
For any given quantity chosen by the two types of rm 2 q
H
2
and
q
L
2
, rm 1s best reply is:
max
q
1
R
+
1
2
q
1
_
a (q
1
+q
H
2
) c
_
+
1
2
q
1
_
a (q
1
+q
L
2
) c
_
or
q
1
=
1
2
_
1
2
_
a q
H
2
c
_
+
1
2
_
a q
L
2
c
_
_
.
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 32 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Cournot Duopoly (contd)
In other words the best reply of the two types of rm 2 and of rm
1 are:
q
H
2
=
1
2
(a q
1
c
H
) ,
q
L
2
=
1
2
(a q
1
c
L
) ,
q
1
=
1
2
_
1
2
_
a q
H
2
c
_
+
1
2
_
a q
L
2
c
_
_
.
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 33 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Cournot Duopoly (contd)
The solution to this system of equations is:
q
1
=
(a 2c +
1
2
c
H
+
1
2
c
L
)
3
and
q
H
2
=
(a 2c
H
+c)
3
+
1
12
(c
H
c
L
)
and
q
L
2
=
(a 2c
L
+c)
3
1
12
(c
H
c
L
)
where q
L
2
> q
H
2
.
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 34 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Cournot Duopoly (contd)
This is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this Cournot game
with asymmetric information.
Useful question is what is the dierence with the Cournot model
with perfect information.
Consider the same model in which everything is the same except
that rm 1 knows the costs of rm 2.
In this case rm 1 will choose two dierent quantities depending
on whether it is competing with the high cost rm 2, q
H
1
, or the
low cost rm 2, q
L
1
.
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 35 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Cournot Duopoly (contd)
These quantities are the solution to the following two problems:
max
q
H
1
R
+
q
H
1
_
a ( q
H
1
+ q
H
2
) c
_
with best reply:
q
H
1
=
1
2
_
a q
H
2
c
_
,
and
max
q
L
1
R
+
q
L
1
_
a ( q
L
1
+ q
L
2
) c
L
_
or
q
L
1
=
1
2
_
a q
L
2
c
_
.
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 36 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Cournot Duopoly (contd)
Firm 2s best reply are instead:
q
H
2
=
_
a q
H
1
c
H
_
2
, q
L
2
=
_
a q
L
1
c
L
_
2
.
The Nash equilibria of this two Perfect Information Cournot games
are then:
q
H
1
=
(a 2c +c
H
)
3
q
H
2
=
(a 2c
H
+c)
3
and
q
L
1
=
(a 2c +c
L
)
3
q
L
2
=
(a 2c
L
+c)
3
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 37 / 43
Static Bayesian Games: Cournot Duopoly (contd)
Compare now the quantities chosen by rm 2 in the presence of
complete vs. asymmetric information:
q
H
2
=
(a 2c
H
+c)
3
+
1
12
(c
H
c
L
) > q
H
2
and
q
L
2
=
(a 2c
L
+c)
3
1
12
(c
H
c
L
) < q
L
2
while for rm 1:
q
1
=
1
2
q
H
1
+
1
2
q
L
1
or
q
H
1
> q
1
> q
L
1
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 38 / 43
Mixed Strategies in Bayesian Games
Strategy Proles:
In particular
i
(a
i
|t
i
) denotes the probability that i chooses a
i
if his type is t
i
As usual
i
(T
i
) denotes the prole of strategies of all
players, but i
T
i
aA
u
i
(a|t)
j N
j
(a
j
|t
j
)(t
i
|t
i
)
U
i
(a
i
,
i
|t
i
) =
T
i
a
i
A
i
u
i
(a|t)
j =i
j
(a
j
|t
j
)(t
i
|t
i
)
Denitions (Bayes Nash Equilibrium BNE)
A Bayes Nash equilibrium of a game is a strategy prole such
that for any i N and t
i
T
i
satises:
U
i
(|t
i
) U
i
(a
i
,
i
|t
i
) for any a
i
A
i
Interim optimality: do your best given what you know.
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 40 / 43
Computing Bayes Nash Equilibria
Testing for BNE behavior:
1
(T) = 1/2 and
2
(X|L) =
2
(W|R)
Such games satisfy all BNE conditions since:
U
1
(T,
2
) = (1/2)
2
(X|L) + (1/2)(1
2
(W|R)) =
= (1/2)(1
2
(X|L)) + (1/2)
2
(W|R) = U
1
(D,
2
)
u
2
(X,
1
|L) =
1
(T) = 1
1
(T) = u
2
(Y,
1
|L)
u
2
(W,
1
|R) = (1
1
(T)) =
1
(T) = u
2
(Z,
1
|R)
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 42 / 43
Example II
Consider the following example for
1
(L) = q 2/3:
1\2.L X Y 1\2.R W Z
T 0,0 0,2 T 2,2 0,1
D 2,0 1,1 D 0,0 3,2
All BNEs for this game satisfy
1
(T) = 2/3 and:
2
(X|L) = 0 (dominance) and
2
(W|R) =
3 2q
5 5q
Such games satisfy all BNE conditions since:
U
1
(T,
2
) = 2(1 q)
2
(W|R) =
= q + 3(1 q)(1
2
(W|R)) = U
1
(D,
2
)
u
2
(X,
1
|L) = 0 < 2
1
(T) + (1
1
(T)) = u
2
(Y,
1
|L)
u
2
(W,
1
|R) = 2
1
(T) =
1
(T) + 2(1
1
(T)) = u
2
(Z,
1
|R)
Leonardo Felli (LSE) EC202 Microeconomic Principles II 30 January 2014 43 / 43