F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel. inj. to prohibit the military and police officers represented by public respondents from conducting "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" in MM. The 41 petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide residents of MM and Taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities. Accdg. to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. Petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. Respondents stress 2 points. First, the resps. have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And, second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights, are total lies. Resps. cite Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Const.:"The Pres. shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed." They also cite sec. 18.:"The Pres. shall be the Commander-in-chief of all AFP and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. xxx
HELD: The Court believes it is highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents"to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification." However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstration if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes necesary as long as the rights of the people are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontation where search warrants and warrants of arrest against specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices bec. all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited. The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a TP''s suit. Where not one victim complains, and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for the SC. It is basically one for the executive departments and for the trial courts. Under the circumstances of this TP''s suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners'' charges and a hard look by admin. officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted. In the meantime, and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably committed and could be committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily restrain the alleged baning on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of half- naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters
Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff G.R. L-64261. December 26, 1984
Escolin, J.
Doctrine: A machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
Facts: Armed with a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, law enforcement officers searched the offices of the We forum and Metropolitan Mail newspapers. During the course of the search, the law enforcement officers seized office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia and several other materials used in the distribution of newspapers. Petitioner avers, among others, that the seizure of the properties mentioned above amounts to seizure of real properties, which cannot be validly conducted under the strength of a search warrant. It must be noted that real properties are not susceptible of confiscation under a search warrant. Hence this appeal which assails the validity of the search and the seizure of the properties of the petitioner.
Issue: Whether there is merit in the petitioners assertion that real property were invalidly seized under the disputed warrants.
Held: No. The petitioners assertion does not hold water. Under Article 415(5) of the civil code, machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works are considered immovable property. In another case decided by the Court, in which the abovementioned legal provision was invoked, it was ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remains movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
Malaloan v. CA, 232 SCRA 249 (1994)
FACTS: The crime alleged is a violation of PD 1866. The officers applied for a search warrant in Kalookan City. However, the place to be searched was in Quezon City. The officers executed the search and seized several firearms. After the search and seizure was conducted, the accused are now assailing the validity of the search warrant since they claim that it was void for lack of jurisdiction. The accused buttresses their claim arguing that the criminal case was filed in the Quezon City RTC, not in Kalookan City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid.
HELD: Yes, the search warrant was valid. A warrant merely constitutes criminal process. It is not a criminal action. The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action. Moreover, no law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest.
NOTE: Policy guidelines: 1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original are subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression of as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress shall likewise by subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different information or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on the applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.
PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 (1999)
FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to the described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash and a Motion to SuppressEvidence. On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid
HELD:
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.
Particularity of the Place to be searched: The belief to value privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need and then only under stringent procedural safeguards. The aforementioned premises, did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place and that is Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound. However; it was made of 200 offices / building, 15 plants, 84 staffs houses, airstrip, 3 piers / wharves, and 23 warehouses.
Jurisprudence: People vs CA What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the Court issuing the warrant. - It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if not delineated in the warrant - The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed.2d 527 (1983) The police received an anonymous letter saying that the Gates' were traveling between Illinois and Florida transporting drugs. The police found out that Mr. Gates had indeed bought a plane ticket to Florida. They followed him and saw him meet with someone and then drive back to Illinois. o Gates' behavior was mostly similar to what was described in the letter. Based on the letter and their surveillance, the police swore out an affidavit for a search warrant. The warrant was granted, the police searched Gates' car and found a large quantity of drugs. He was arrested. The Trial Court found that there was no probable cause and so the warrant was insufficient and therefore the drug evidence was inadmissible. The prosecutor appealed. o Gates argued that the police did not have sufficient probable cause for the warrant, and therefore the search was a violation of the 4 th Amendment. The Appellate Court affirmed. The prosecutor appealed. o The Appellate Court looked to Spinelli v. United States (393 U.S. 410 (1969)), which had a two-pronged test that basically said that a warrant can't be based on an informer's information unless the affidavit for the warrant also explained why the informer was reliable, and what the underlying circumstances of the informer's information were. Known as the Aguilar-Spinelli Doctrine. o The letter provided nothing that would let a magistrate conclude that the author is honest or that his information is reliable. It also gave no indication of how the author came upon the information. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The prosecutor appealed. The US Supreme Court reversed and found that there was sufficient probable cause. o The US Supreme Court reversed their decision is Spinelli, finding that the courts should look at the totality of the circumstances when deciding if there is probable cause. "The task of the magistrate: make a practical common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular places." o The Court found that while the veracity and basis of knowledge of an anonymous tipster cannot be measured, when corroborated by the actions of the Gates, it satisfies the requirement to establish probable cause. "We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and 'basis of knowledge' are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We do not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. They should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense, practical question whether there is probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place." o The Court noted that if the only thing that the police had was the anonymous letter, that alone would not be sufficient to establish probable cause. However, the letter combined with their other police work was enough. Basically, in this case, the Court was saying that the requirement for probable causeis not as high as for admissibility at a formal trial. It is enough for the magistrate to decide that there is a fair probability that the informer is telling the truth. In this case, the corroboration of much of the letter's contents by the police investigation should be sufficient to establish that the letter writer was reliable and had a good basis for their information. At the end of the day, this ruling wasn't much different than Spinelli. It just makes the analysis less formalistic and somewhat combines the two prongs. o The main differences between the Aguillar-Spinelli Doctrine and the Totality of the Circumstances Test are that under the Totality of the Circumstances Test, a deficiency in one prong can be made up for by a strong showing in the other prong, and there is no bright line rule about how much is required, it is an open-ended standard. If one prong is completely missing, then there is not enough to give probable cause. PEOPLE VS ESTRADA
FACTS: A petition for review was filed seeking the reversal of respondent Judge Estrada's order that granted private respondent's motion to quash search warrant 958 as well as the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts of the present case are as follows: > Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of BFAD filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza (private respondent) of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City for violation of Article 40(k) of RA 7934 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines). However, the application ended with a statement that the warrant is to search the premises of another person at a different address (Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu - who happened to be the subject on whom another search was applied for by the same applicant) >Respondent Judge issued search warrant 958 on June 27, 1995 which was served the next day. The present petition stated that, during the search, the team discovered that said address (516 xx) was actually a 5,000-meter compound containing at least 15 structures. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent Lanuza at Lot 41 of said address. Failure to find any drug products prompted the policemen to proceed to search a nearby warehouse at Lot 38 which yielded 52 cartons of assorted drug products. > On August 22, 1995, private respondent Lanuza filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the ground that the search warrant is illegal and null and void. Respondent judge granted Lanyzas motion to quash the search warrant and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in granting Lanuzas motion to quash Search Warrant 958.
Held: There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant. Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was notconvinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to presentdocumentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs. We hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must show "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence or the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and personalities. In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily procured such certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different person. This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. 28 In the present case, it must be noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch 29 of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2- storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement.
Chimel v. California 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed.2d 685 (1969) The police suspected Chimel of robbing a rare coin store. They came to his house to arrest him for burglary. His wife let them in. When Chimel arrived home, they arrested him at the front door. The police asked Chimel for consent to search the house, which Chimel refused. The police made a search of his house anyway. They found the rare coins hidden in a bedroom dresser. He was arrested and charged with burglary. o The police did not have a search warrant, they only had an arrest warrant. The Trial Court found Chimel guilty of burglary. He appealed. o Chimel argued that the evidence was inadmissible because it was an unconstitutional search and seizure under the 4th Amendment, because the police did not have a warrant. o The prosecution argued that the arrest warrant gave the police the authority to search the entire house. A search incident to a lawful arrest (SILA). The Appellate Court upheld the conviction. Chimel appealed. The US Supreme Court reversed and overturned the conviction. o The US Supreme Court found that when the police are acting under an arrest warrant, an arresting officer may search only the area "within the immediate control" of the person arrested, meaning the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. If the police want to search further, they need a search warrant. In a dissent, it was argued that it would have been impractical for the police to drive all the way to Chimel's house, take him back to the police station, apply for a search warrant, and then drive all the way back to execute the search. o Especially since it was possible that Chimel's wife, left alone in the house, would chose to get rid of the evidence. The basic rule is that if the police are acting on an arrest warrant, they are limited to searching the suspect to make sure that he doesn't have a weapon or that he doesn't have evidence on him that he can destroy. Anything beyond that requires asearch warrant. o If this rule wasn't in effect, then there would be the risk that the police would arrange to arrest a suspect in their home (as opposed to elsewhere) and use that arrest as an excuse to search the home without probable cause or a search warrant. o In this case, Chimel was sitting by the front door in handcuffs. There was no way he could have destroyed evidence in a bedroom dresser. o Prior to this decision, the courts had generally allowed a search to assume that the area within the immediate control was the entire house. But those cases involved smaller houses. Here, the Court decided to change the rule to limit it. See Rabinowitz (339 U.S. 50 (1950)) (a one-room office) See Harris (331 U.S. 145 (1947)) (a 4 room apartment) o If the police arrest someone in their home, there is another exception allowing them to do a protective sweep so they can look into adjoining areas for places where a person might be lurking and preparing to attack them. There is no need for reasonable suspicion to perform a protective sweep. If there is reasonable suspicion (like they hear a noise) that there is a threat in a non- adjoining area, the police can check it out. But they can only look in places large enough for a person to be hiding
Alvarez vs. CFI 64 Phil. 33 (1937)
Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latters motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void. Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable. Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicants knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts
Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938)
F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the resp. judge, & the restoration of certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usury Board. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a SW, commanding any officer of the law "to search the person, house or store of the petitioner for certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents & other papers relating to her activities as userer." On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the PC, went to the office of the petitioner, and after showing the SW to the petitioner''s bookeeper, Salas, & w/o the presence of the petitioner, who was ill and confined at that time, proceeded w/ the execution thereof. Two packages of records & a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt thereof issued by him to Salas. Separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner. Petitioner demanded the return of the documents seized. Bu motion, pet. challenged the legality of the SW and the devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution, the resp. judge of CFI denied the petitioner''s motion for the reason that though the SW was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner. The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order of 1/3/38 are sought, together w/ the SW, to be nullified in these proceedings.
HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a SW to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or another; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; & (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. In the instant case, the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the prop. to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed w/in the meaning of the law, the prop. seized were not delivered to the court w/c issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued, there was no case pending against the petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not w/o basis. IS THERE A WAIVER? No express waiver. IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None.
Caballes vs Court of Appeals (January 15, 2002) Ponente: Puno Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: While on a routine patrol in Brgy Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, Sgt. Victorino Nocejo and Pat. Alex deCastro spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered withkakawati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded withsmuggled goods, the two officers flagged down the vehicle. Being the driver of the jeep, Caballes was asked by theofficers as to what was loaded in the jeep, to which he did not respond, appearing pale and nervous. The officerschecked the cargo and discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National PowerCorporation. Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station, wherehe was imprisoned for 7 days. The trial court found Caballes guilty of the crime of Theft of property. Upon appeal, the Court fo Aooeaksmaffirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction. Issue: WON the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against Caballes Held: No; the evidence are not admissible in evidence. Ratio: The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute, but admits of certainexceptions. The situation in the case at bar does not fall under any of the accepted exceptions. 1.Search of a moving vehicle ( ito yung sense ng case talaga) The rules governing searches and seizures of moving vehicles have been liberalized for the purposes of practicality. Obtaining a warrant for a moving vehicle is particularly difficult for want of a specific descriptionof the place, things, and persons to be searches. Also, it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Still, however, theremust be probable cause to conduct such warrantless search.One form of search of moving vehicles is the stop-and-search without warrant at checkpoints, which hasbeen declared as not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conductedin a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve anextensive search.Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. Thecircumstances in this case, however, do not constitute a routine inspection. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers have probable cause to believe that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In this case, theofficers flagged down the jeep because they became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle wascovered with kakawati leaves, which, to them, was unusual and uncommon. The Court believes that the factthat the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered in kakawati leavesdoes not constitute probable cause to justify a search without a warrant. In addition, there was no tip orconfidential information that could have backed up their search, as jurisprudence is replete with cases wheretipped information has become sufficient to constitute probable cause. 2.Plain view doctrine It is clear from the records that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks andcovered with leaves. They had no clue as to what was underneath the leaves. Object was not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure without further search. 3.Consented search At most, there was only implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no consent at all within thepurview of the constitutional guarantee. Evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his rightagainst unreasonable searches.
Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997
Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a refund for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico. Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants. Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence Held: Yes. Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
MHP GARMENTS, INC v CA September 2, 1994 FACTS: MHP Garments was granted by the Boy Scouts of the Phils. an exclusive franchise to sell and distributeofficial boy Scout uniforms, supplies, badges and insignias. It was also given authority to undertake theprosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies. Accordingly, MHP tasked its employee, Larry de Guzman to undertake surveillance and report to thePC of the activities of the respondents who were reported to selling Scout uniforms and paraphernaliawithout authority. De Guzman and 3 constabulary men went to the stores of respondents and seized Scout uniformswithout warrant, causing commotion and embarassment to respondents. Subsequently, a criminal complaint for unfair competition was filed against respondents. Fiscaldismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seized articles. Thereafter, the respondents filed a civil case against petitioners for sums of money and damages. TCordered petitioners to pay. CA affirmed. ISSUE: WON petitioners should be held liable HELD: Yes SC held that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of respondents goods: 1.progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores shows therewas sufficient time to apply for a judicial warrant.2.no probable cause for the seizure The members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of therespondents constitutional rights. Still, the omission will not exculpate MHP Garments and De Guzman. TC was correct in granting damages to respondents. MHP Garments and De Guzman were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of respondents against unreasonable searches and seizures.1.Raid was conducted with the active participation of employee De Guzman. He did not lift a finger tostop the seizure of the boy and girl scout items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto,he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves.2.So with the MHP Garments which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized bythe PC raiding team and De Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite thedismissal of its complaint against respondents. 3.If petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a 3rd party complaint against theraiding team for contribution or any other relief. They did not.