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Guazon v.

De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 (1990)



F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel. inj. to prohibit the military and police officers represented by public
respondents from conducting "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" in MM. The 41 petitioners state that
they are all of legal age, bona fide residents of MM and Taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities.
Accdg. to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the
military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. Petitioners claim that the saturation drives
follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. Respondents stress 2 points. First, the resps. have legal
authority to conduct saturation drives. And, second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a
deliberate disregard for human rights, are total lies. Resps. cite Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Const.:"The Pres. shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed." They also cite sec. 18.:"The Pres. shall be the Commander-in-chief of all AFP and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. xxx

HELD: The Court believes it is highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so inspite
of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents"to submit themselves voluntarily for
character and personal verification." However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the
essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled
areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstration if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A
show of force is sometimes necesary as long as the rights of the people are protected and not violated.
A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one
confrontation where search warrants and warrants of arrest against specific individuals are easily procured.
Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices bec. all concerted drives
where a show of force is present are totally prohibited. The remedy is not an original action for prohibition
brought through a TP''s suit. Where not one victim complains, and not one violator is properly charged, the
problem is not initially for the SC. It is basically one for the executive departments and for the trial courts.
Under the circumstances of this TP''s suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be
given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners'' charges and a hard look by admin. officials at the
policy implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted. In the meantime, and in the face of
a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably committed and could be committed during future police
actions, we have to temporarily restrain the alleged baning on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of half-
naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences even if these are
humble shanties of squatters





















Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. L-64261. December 26, 1984

Escolin, J.

Doctrine: A machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

Facts: Armed with a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, law enforcement officers
searched the offices of the We forum and Metropolitan Mail newspapers. During the course of the search,
the law enforcement officers seized office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia and several other
materials used in the distribution of newspapers. Petitioner avers, among others, that the seizure of the
properties mentioned above amounts to seizure of real properties, which cannot be validly conducted under
the strength of a search warrant. It must be noted that real properties are not susceptible of confiscation under
a search warrant. Hence this appeal which assails the validity of the search and the seizure of the properties of
the petitioner.

Issue: Whether there is merit in the petitioners assertion that real property were invalidly seized under the
disputed warrants.

Held: No. The petitioners assertion does not hold water. Under Article 415(5) of the civil code, machinery,
receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which
may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works are considered immovable property. In another case decided by the Court, in which the
abovementioned legal provision was invoked, it was ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
owner. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground
remains movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

























Malaloan v. CA, 232 SCRA 249 (1994)

FACTS: The crime alleged is a violation of PD 1866. The officers applied for a search warrant in Kalookan City.
However, the place to be searched was in Quezon City. The officers executed the search and seized several
firearms. After the search and seizure was conducted, the accused are now assailing the validity of the search
warrant since they claim that it was void for lack of jurisdiction. The accused buttresses their claim arguing that
the criminal case was filed in the Quezon City RTC, not in Kalookan City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid.

HELD: Yes, the search warrant was valid. A warrant merely constitutes criminal process. It is not a criminal
action. The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different
from those for the institution of a criminal action. Moreover, no law or rule imposes such a limitation on search
warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest.

NOTE: Policy guidelines: 1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search
warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another
court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court
which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing
the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.

2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by
said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the
resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original
are subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may
move in court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression of as evidence of the personal property seized under
the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are
involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not
cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress shall likewise by subject to any proper
remedy in the appropriate higher court.

4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented
from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the
court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.

5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different information or
complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of
which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to
act on the applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.


















PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 (1999)

FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC
of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject
of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in
the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession
and bring to the described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion
issued the contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP
compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search
unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a
Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash and a Motion to SuppressEvidence. On March 23, 1995, the RTC
issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second
contested Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid

HELD:

The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined
personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally
examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on
facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to
examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during
the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not
licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.

Particularity of the Place to be searched:
The belief to value privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional protection against the long reach
of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case
of overriding social need and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.
The aforementioned premises, did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place and that is
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound. However; it was made of 200
offices / building, 15 plants, 84 staffs houses, airstrip, 3 piers / wharves, and 23 warehouses.

Jurisprudence: People vs CA
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the
applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the Court issuing the
warrant.
- It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if not delineated
in the warrant
- The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done by the Judge, and
only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.














Illinois v. Gates
462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed.2d 527 (1983)
The police received an anonymous letter saying that the Gates' were traveling between Illinois and
Florida transporting drugs.
The police found out that Mr. Gates had indeed bought a plane ticket to Florida. They followed him and
saw him meet with someone and then drive back to Illinois.
o Gates' behavior was mostly similar to what was described in the letter.
Based on the letter and their surveillance, the police swore out an affidavit for a search warrant. The
warrant was granted, the police searched Gates' car and found a large quantity of drugs. He was
arrested.
The Trial Court found that there was no probable cause and so the warrant was insufficient and
therefore the drug evidence was inadmissible. The prosecutor appealed.
o Gates argued that the police did not have sufficient probable cause for the warrant, and
therefore the search was a violation of the 4
th
Amendment.
The Appellate Court affirmed. The prosecutor appealed.
o The Appellate Court looked to Spinelli v. United States (393 U.S. 410 (1969)), which had a
two-pronged test that basically said that a warrant can't be based on an informer's information
unless the affidavit for the warrant also explained why the informer was reliable, and what the
underlying circumstances of the informer's information were.
Known as the Aguilar-Spinelli Doctrine.
o The letter provided nothing that would let a magistrate conclude that the author is honest or that
his information is reliable. It also gave no indication of how the author came upon the
information.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The prosecutor appealed.
The US Supreme Court reversed and found that there was sufficient probable cause.
o The US Supreme Court reversed their decision is Spinelli, finding that the courts should look at
the totality of the circumstances when deciding if there is probable cause.
"The task of the magistrate: make a practical common-sense decision whether, given all
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis
of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular places."
o The Court found that while the veracity and basis of knowledge of an anonymous tipster cannot
be measured, when corroborated by the actions of the Gates, it satisfies the requirement to
establish probable cause.
"We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and
'basis of knowledge' are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We do
not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and
independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. They should be
understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common
sense, practical question whether there is probable cause to believe that contraband or
evidence is located in a particular place."
o The Court noted that if the only thing that the police had was the anonymous letter, that alone
would not be sufficient to establish probable cause. However, the letter combined with their
other police work was enough.
Basically, in this case, the Court was saying that the requirement for probable causeis not as high as
for admissibility at a formal trial. It is enough for the magistrate to decide that there is a fair probability
that the informer is telling the truth. In this case, the corroboration of much of the letter's contents by the
police investigation should be sufficient to establish that the letter writer was reliable and had a good
basis for their information.
At the end of the day, this ruling wasn't much different than Spinelli. It just makes the analysis less
formalistic and somewhat combines the two prongs.
o The main differences between the Aguillar-Spinelli Doctrine and the Totality of the
Circumstances Test are that under the Totality of the Circumstances Test, a deficiency in one
prong can be made up for by a strong showing in the other prong, and there is no bright line rule
about how much is required, it is an open-ended standard.
If one prong is completely missing, then there is not enough to give probable cause.
PEOPLE VS ESTRADA

FACTS:
A petition for review was filed seeking the reversal of respondent Judge Estrada's order that granted private respondent's motion to
quash search warrant 958 as well as the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts of the present case are
as follows:
> Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of BFAD filed an application for the issuance of a
search warrant against Aiden Lanuza (private respondent) of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City for violation of
Article 40(k) of RA 7934 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines). However, the application ended with a statement that the warrant is
to search the premises of another person at a different address (Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu - who
happened to be the subject on whom another search was applied for by the same applicant)
>Respondent Judge issued search warrant 958 on June 27, 1995 which was served the next day. The present petition stated that,
during the search, the team discovered that said address (516 xx) was actually a 5,000-meter compound containing at least 15
structures. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent Lanuza at Lot 41 of said address. Failure to find
any drug products prompted the policemen to proceed to search a nearby warehouse at Lot 38 which yielded 52 cartons of assorted
drug products.
> On August 22, 1995, private respondent Lanuza filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the ground that the search warrant
is illegal and null and void.
Respondent judge granted Lanyzas motion to quash the search warrant and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in granting Lanuzas motion to quash Search Warrant 958.

Held: There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was notconvinced that there was probable
cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to presentdocumentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza had no license to sell drugs.
We hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must
show "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the
circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence or the negative
ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such
evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence
could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the
judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the
constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and personalities.
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no
license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily
procured such certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. No justifiable reason
was introduced why such certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private
respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant.
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the questioned search warrant,
considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The
said warehouse is owned by a different person.
This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized,
wherever and whenever it is feasible. 28 In the present case, it must be noted that the application for search warrant was
accompanied by a sketch 29 of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-
storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of
other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe
the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures
inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house
of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has
characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement.



Chimel v. California
395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed.2d 685 (1969)
The police suspected Chimel of robbing a rare coin store. They came to his house to arrest him for
burglary. His wife let them in. When Chimel arrived home, they arrested him at the front door.
The police asked Chimel for consent to search the house, which Chimel refused. The police made a
search of his house anyway. They found the rare coins hidden in a bedroom dresser. He was arrested
and charged with burglary.
o The police did not have a search warrant, they only had an arrest warrant.
The Trial Court found Chimel guilty of burglary. He appealed.
o Chimel argued that the evidence was inadmissible because it was an unconstitutional search
and seizure under the 4th Amendment, because the police did not have a warrant.
o The prosecution argued that the arrest warrant gave the police the authority to search the entire
house.
A search incident to a lawful arrest (SILA).
The Appellate Court upheld the conviction. Chimel appealed.
The US Supreme Court reversed and overturned the conviction.
o The US Supreme Court found that when the police are acting under an arrest warrant, an
arresting officer may search only the area "within the immediate control" of the person arrested,
meaning the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
If the police want to search further, they need a search warrant.
In a dissent, it was argued that it would have been impractical for the police to drive all the way to
Chimel's house, take him back to the police station, apply for a search warrant, and then drive all the
way back to execute the search.
o Especially since it was possible that Chimel's wife, left alone in the house, would chose to get
rid of the evidence.
The basic rule is that if the police are acting on an arrest warrant, they are limited to searching the
suspect to make sure that he doesn't have a weapon or that he doesn't have evidence on him that he
can destroy. Anything beyond that requires asearch warrant.
o If this rule wasn't in effect, then there would be the risk that the police would arrange to arrest a
suspect in their home (as opposed to elsewhere) and use that arrest as an excuse to search the
home without probable cause or a search warrant.
o In this case, Chimel was sitting by the front door in handcuffs. There was no way he could have
destroyed evidence in a bedroom dresser.
o Prior to this decision, the courts had generally allowed a search to assume that the area within
the immediate control was the entire house. But those cases involved smaller houses. Here, the
Court decided to change the rule to limit it.
See Rabinowitz (339 U.S. 50 (1950)) (a one-room office)
See Harris (331 U.S. 145 (1947)) (a 4 room apartment)
o If the police arrest someone in their home, there is another exception allowing them to do
a protective sweep so they can look into adjoining areas for places where a person might be
lurking and preparing to attack them.
There is no need for reasonable suspicion to perform a protective sweep.
If there is reasonable suspicion (like they hear a noise) that there is a threat in a non-
adjoining area, the police can check it out. But they can only look in places large enough
for a person to be hiding











Alvarez vs. CFI
64 Phil. 33 (1937)

Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a
certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer
charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt say that the information
was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the
judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject
place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit
receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who
issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all
articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury
Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the
judge sustained the latters motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant
as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.
Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in
whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for
the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person
whom he considered reliable.
Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require
that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must
be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its
broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in
conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given
by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to
God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held
liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the
search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is
the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It
is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made
by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution
does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented
by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the
presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of
probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense
with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of
the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more
witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search
warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and
direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicants
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of
the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of
the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts








Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938)

F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search warrant (SW) & 2 orders of
the resp. judge, & the restoration of certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an agent of the
Anti-Usury Board. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac,
Tarlac, a SW, commanding any officer of the law "to search the person, house or store of the petitioner for
certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents & other papers relating to her activities as userer." On the same
date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the PC, went to the office of the petitioner, and after showing the
SW to the petitioner''s bookeeper, Salas, & w/o the presence of the petitioner, who was ill and confined at that
time, proceeded w/ the execution thereof. Two packages of records & a locked filing cabinet containing several
papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt thereof issued by him to Salas. Separate criminal
cases were filed against petitioner. Petitioner demanded the return of the documents seized. Bu motion, pet.
challenged the legality of the SW and the devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution, the resp.
judge of CFI denied the petitioner''s motion for the reason that though the SW was illegal, there was a waiver
on the part of the petitioner. The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order of 1/3/38 are sought, together w/ the SW, to
be nullified in these proceedings.

HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a SW to be
valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or another; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; & (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
In the instant case, the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the
applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. It does not appear
that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the prop. to be
seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed w/in the meaning of
the law, the prop. seized were not delivered to the court w/c issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead,
they were turned over to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against petitioner.
Considering that at the time the warrant was issued, there was no case pending against the petitioner, the
averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not w/o basis. IS THERE A
WAIVER? No express waiver. IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None.


























Caballes vs Court of Appeals
(January 15, 2002)
Ponente:
Puno
Nature:
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
While on a routine patrol in Brgy Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, Sgt. Victorino Nocejo and Pat. Alex
deCastro spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered withkakawati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was
loaded withsmuggled goods, the two officers flagged down the vehicle. Being the driver of the jeep, Caballes
was asked by theofficers as to what was loaded in the jeep, to which he did not respond, appearing pale and
nervous. The officerschecked the cargo and discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively
owned by National PowerCorporation. Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the
Pagsanjan Police Station, wherehe was imprisoned for 7 days. The trial court found Caballes guilty of the
crime of Theft of property. Upon appeal, the Court fo Aooeaksmaffirmed the trial courts judgment of
conviction.
Issue:
WON the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against Caballes
Held:
No; the evidence are not admissible in evidence.
Ratio:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute, but admits of
certainexceptions. The situation in the case at bar does not fall under any of the accepted exceptions.
1.Search of a moving vehicle
( ito yung sense ng case talaga)
The rules governing searches and seizures of moving vehicles have been liberalized for the purposes
of practicality. Obtaining a warrant for a moving vehicle is particularly difficult for want of a specific
descriptionof the place, things, and persons to be searches. Also, it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Still,
however, theremust be probable cause to conduct such warrantless search.One form of search of moving
vehicles is the stop-and-search without warrant at checkpoints, which hasbeen declared as not illegal per se,
for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conductedin a way least intrusive to
motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve anextensive search.Routine
inspections are not regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search.
Thecircumstances in this case, however, do not constitute a routine inspection. They had to reach inside
the vehicle, lift the leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a search would be constitutionally permissible
only if the officers have probable cause to believe that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In this case, theofficers flagged
down the jeep because they became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle wascovered with
kakawati leaves, which, to them, was unusual and uncommon. The Court believes that the factthat the vehicle
looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered in kakawati leavesdoes not
constitute probable cause to justify a search without a warrant. In addition, there was no tip orconfidential
information that could have backed up their search, as jurisprudence is replete with cases wheretipped
information has become sufficient to constitute probable cause.
2.Plain view doctrine It is clear from the records that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they
were placed in sacks andcovered with leaves. They had no clue as to what was underneath the leaves. Object
was not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure without further search.
3.Consented search At most, there was only implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no
consent at all within thepurview of the constitutional guarantee. Evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally
surrendered his rightagainst unreasonable searches.




Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC
G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.
Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is
P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico
as a refund for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of
Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by
virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by government
and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence
Held: Yes.
Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite
this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment
Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
































MHP GARMENTS, INC v CA
September 2, 1994
FACTS:
MHP Garments was granted by the Boy Scouts of the Phils. an exclusive franchise to sell and distributeofficial
boy Scout uniforms, supplies, badges and insignias. It was also given authority to undertake theprosecution in
court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies.
Accordingly, MHP tasked its employee, Larry de Guzman to undertake surveillance and report to thePC of the
activities of the respondents who were reported to selling Scout uniforms and paraphernaliawithout authority.
De Guzman and 3 constabulary men went to the stores of respondents and seized Scout uniformswithout
warrant, causing commotion and embarassment to respondents.
Subsequently, a criminal complaint for unfair competition was filed against respondents. Fiscaldismissed the
complaint and ordered the return of the seized articles.
Thereafter, the respondents filed a civil case against petitioners for sums of money and damages. TCordered
petitioners to pay. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners should be held liable
HELD:
Yes
SC held that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of respondents goods:
1.progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores shows therewas
sufficient time to apply for a judicial warrant.2.no probable cause for the seizure
The members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of
therespondents constitutional rights. Still, the omission will not exculpate MHP Garments and De Guzman.
TC was correct in granting damages to respondents. MHP Garments and De Guzman were
indirectly involved in transgressing the right of respondents against unreasonable searches and
seizures.1.Raid was conducted with the active participation of employee De Guzman. He did not lift a finger
tostop the seizure of the boy and girl scout items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto,he was
liable to the same extent as the officers themselves.2.So with the MHP Garments which even received for
safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized bythe PC raiding team and De Guzman, and refused to surrender
them for quite a time despite thedismissal of its complaint against respondents.
3.If petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a 3rd party complaint against theraiding
team for contribution or any other relief. They did not.

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