Stare decisis et non quieta movere

Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.


J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 177127 October 11, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner, a PEZA Corporation, filed applications for tax credit/refund of unutilized input VAT on
its zero-rated sales for the taxable quarters of 2000. The claim for credit/refund, however, remained
unacted by the respondent. Hence, petitioner was constrained to file a petition before the CTA. The CTA
eventually denied the petition for lack of the word zero-rated on the invoices/receipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to print the word zero-rated on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a
claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales
Held:
Yes. The absence of the word zero rated on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for
credit/refund of input VAT. This has been squarely resolved in Panasonic Communications Imaging
Corporation of the Philippines (formerly Matsushita Business Machine Corporation of the Philippines) v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No. 178090, 612 SCRA 28, February 8, 2010). In that case, the
claim for tax credit/refund was denied for non-compliance with Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations
No. 7-95, which requires the word zero rated to be printed on the invoices/receipts covering zero-
rated sales.
From the abovementioned decision, the Court ruled that the appearance of the word zero-
rated on the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers from falsely claiming input VAT
from their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If, absent such word, a successful claim for input
VAT is made, the government would be refunding money it did not collect.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case has
been decided one way, courts have no choice but to resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue
in the same manner.




Ubi jus, ibi remedium
Where there is a right, there is a remedy.


LEONARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 125329. September 10, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner Ann Brigit Leonardo was born in Manila to common-law spouses Eddie Fernandez and
Gloria Leonardo. In her Birth Certificate Leonardo was her surname.
Wanting to change her surname to that of her father, they sent a letter to the Local Civil
Registrar on August 1, 1994. The Local Civil Registrar denied their request citing FC 176 which states that
petitioner, being illegitimate, should carry the surname of the mother.

Issue:
Whether or not Ann Brigit Leonardo could use her fathers surname.
Held:
No. The Family Code has repealed NCC 366 which allows natural children to use the surname of
the father if the child is recognized by BOTH parents. Now, in the Family Code, an illegitimate child
should use the surname of the mother even if the father acknowledges him/her. Hence, Ann Brigit has
NO right to use the surname of the father. Ubi jus, ibi remedium. When there is a right, there is a
remedy. Conversely, if there is no right, there is no remedy as every remedial right is based on a
substantive right.








Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus
Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish


GUEVARA vs. INOCENTES
G. R. No. L-25577, 16 SCRA 379, March 15, 1966

Facts:
The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of
Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965. Took his oath of office on November 25th same
year. The incumbent Executive issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated January 23, 1966 declaring
that all ad interim appointments made by the former Executive lapsed with the adjournment of the
special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966. The respondent, Raoul Inocentes was
extended an ad interim appointment for the same position by the incumbent Executive on January 23,
1966. Guevara filed before the court an instant petition for Quo Warranto seeking to be declared person
legally entitled to the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor under Art. VII Sec. 10 (4) of the 1935
Constitution. which states that:
The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress.
Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the special session which
commenced on January 17, 1966, the respondent contended that the petitioners ad interim
appointment as well as other made under similar conditions must have lapsed when the Congress
adjourned its last special session. But the petitioner stated that (1) the specific provision in the
Constitution which states that: until the next adjournment of Congress means adjournment of a
regular session of Congress and not by a special session and (2) only the Senate adjourned sine die at
midnight of January 22, 1966 and the House of the Representative merely suspended its session and to
be resumed on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has
been in continuous session without interruption since January 17.

Issues:
1. Whether or not, the petitioners contention regarding the next adjournment of Congress specifically
provides for regular session only.
2. Whether or not, the petitioners contention that Congress is still in continuous session?
HELD:
1. NO. The phrase until the next adjournment of Congress does not make any reference to specific
session of Congress, whether regular or special. But a well-know Latin maxim is statutory construction
stated that when the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus. It is safe to conclude that the authors of the 1935 Constitution used the word
adjournment had in mind either regular or special and not simply the regular one as the petitioner
contended.

2. NO. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966, the House of
the Representative is only a part of the Congress and not the Congress itself. So logically, the
adjournment of one of its Houses is considered adjournment of the Congress as a whole. And the
petitioners ad interim appointment must have been lapsed on January 22, 1966 upon adjournment of
the Senate.


















Utile per Inutile non vitiatur
The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful.


PEOPLE vs. MARTIN
G.R. No. L-33487; May 31, 1971


Facts:
Respondents were charged with violating Sec. 46 of C.A. No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration
Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union, specifically in the act of bringing in and landing. The Court
dismissed the charges on the ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in
Bulacan against other Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese Immigrants
who were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with
concealing and harboring.
Held:
No. They are two separate offenses. C.A. No. 613 clearly provides that the four acts are in fact
four separate acts. Each act possesses its own distinctive, different, and disparate meaning. The word
OR in C.A. No. 613 cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separation of one act from
the other. The words in the information suggesting conspiracy are considered a mere surplusage. A
well-know Latin maxim is statutory construction stated that The useful is not vitiated by the non-
useful. Utile per inutile non vitiatur.









Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
The construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its very word.


PEOPLE vs. MANTALABA
G.R. No. 186227


Facts:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a
report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao
District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized. Around 7 o'clock in the evening the team,
armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the
buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was said to be in the act of selling
shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant
handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the
appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has
been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he
was leaving the place. The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay
officials, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the
barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground.
The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of R.A. 9165. The
appellant pleaded not guilty and states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in
convicting him of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of R.A. 9165.
Held:
Yes. This Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. It is often utilized by law enforcers
for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities.
Further, What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is
proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have
been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous
drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also
clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted. Interpretatio fienda est ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have
efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which
impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
























Verba Accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam
A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used.


R (ON THE APPLICATION OF ST (ERITREA)) (FC) vs. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Facts:
The appellant is of Eritrean nationality. But she has never lived in Eritrea. She was born on 2 July
1981 and was formerly resident in Ethiopia. She came to the United Kingdom on 3 July 1998.
Immediately on her arrival in this country she claimed protection as a refugee. Her reason was that she
feared persecution in both Eritrea and Ethiopia. Her claim was registered, and she was granted
temporary admission into the United Kingdom under paragraph 21 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act
1971.
The appellants status has not changed since the date of her arrival more than 13 years ago. Her
temporary admission has been extended from time to time, and she remains liable to detention. The
latest notification of temporary admission was issued to her on 17 October 2011. She was told that she
must reside at the address given on the notification form and she was to report to an immigration
official on 22 December 2011 and then on the fourth Thursday every two months. She was also told that
she was not allowed to work or engage in any business unless she had been explicitly granted
permission to do so.
Issue:
Whether the appellant is entitled to the protection of article 32 of the Convention, which
precludes the contracting states from expelling a refugee who is lawfully in their territory save on
grounds of national security or public order.
Held:
For these reasons, I am not persuaded that there are sound grounds for departing from my
provisional view that the word lawfully in article 32(1) must be taken to refer to what is to be treated
as lawful according to the domestic laws of the contracting state. I think, in agreement with the Court of
Appeal and with Lord Dyson, that this is what the framers of the Convention intended by the use of this
word in this context. I would dismiss the appeal.
Mr Drabble did not seek to rely on Lord Browns observations in Szoma v Secretary of State for
Work and Pensions [2006] 1 AC 564, para 24, that in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex
p Bugdacay [1987] AC 514 Lord Bridge has decided the case of In re Musisi rightly but for the wrong
reasons, and that the term refugee in article 32(1) of the Refugee Convention must be taken to mean
someone who has been determined to have satisfied the article 1 definition of that term. I think that he
was right not to do so. The ancient maxim verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam (words
are to be understood according to the subject-matter with which they deal) provides the best guide to
the meaning that should be given to what Lord Brown said in this paragraph.
























Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire
Words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words.


LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINE REPRESENTATIVE BY LCP NATIONAL PRESIDENT JERRY P. TRENAS,
ET AL.
GR. No. 176951 GR. No. 177499 GR. No. 178056


Facts:
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of
Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Trenas, assailing the constitutionality
of the sixteen laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city and seeking
to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. The supreme court en
banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc,
again by a majority vote, denied the respondents first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the
Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents second motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the subject 16 Cityhood Laws is a violation of the Constitution.
Held:
Yes! Its final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. We should not ever lose sight of the fact
that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed
prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations
that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to
the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of
Congress, the SC said. The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government
units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher
income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities. The Court reiterated that while RA
9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of
several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took
effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent
to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the
House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain
Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic
Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House
readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded
the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of
respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all
unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously
approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately
incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to
exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and,
by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being
embodied in the exemption clauses. The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of
P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. While the Constitution mandates that the
creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be
justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such
amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote
autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth. In fact,
any interpretation that runs counter with the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid. Verba
intentioni, non e contra debent inservire. Words ought to be more subservient to the intent than intent
to the words.

















Verba legis
Plain-meaning rule.


REPUBLIC v. LACAP
G.R. No. 158253; March 2, 2007

Facts:
Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed,with
modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance anddamages filed by
Lacap against RP
Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and twoother
contractors were pre-qualified
Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, andthereafter
undertook the works and purchased materials and labor in connection with
On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fountit 100%
completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds dueto Lacaps
license as contractor having expired
Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that theContractors
License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by acontractor after expiry of
license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract
DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994recommending
that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no paymentwas issued
On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damagesagainst
petitioner before the RTC.14
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed aMotion to
Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of actionand that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did notappeal to the COA the decision of
the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
Following the submission of respondents Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, the RTC issued an Order
dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but
it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State
Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for the
contract of the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%
Issue:
Whether or not a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects
Held:
A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate
him from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to
submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory
capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage
in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of
another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate
or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed
guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five
hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The
wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered
into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for
payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed.
Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.









Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt
The laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.


ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,
G.R. No. 130876; December 5, 2003

Facts:
The Supreme Court rendered a decision declaring that neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son
Francisco M. Alonso or the latters heirs are the lawful owners of the lot in dispute. Neither has the
respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc. been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate. The
reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form
and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership
of the land or estate covered thereby.
It declared that the subject lot legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines. Wherefore,
the petition for review was denied.
Petitioners and respondent filed separate motions for reconsideration, each assailing a different
aspect of the decision.
Issue:
Petitioners, in their MR vigorously argue that:
The majority decision unduly deprives petitioners of their property without due process of law
and in a manner shocking to good conscience; in invalidating the sale to the late Tomas Alonso, the
ponencia unfairly deviated from established doctrine, using as basis factual findings either unsupported
by the evidence or contradicted by the appellate courts findings of fact; the core issues of fraud and
want of jurisdiction afflicting the reconstitution of respondent Cebu Country Clubs title were not
squarely and frontally met, to the prejudice and damage of the petitioners; and the dissenting opinion
deserves a second hard look as it presents a more balanced, sober, factually accurate, and juridically
precise approach to the critical issues of this case, including prescription and laches.Respondents, in
their MR staunchly assails the decision insofar as it declared that that the subject land legally belongs to
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Moreover: The Torrens Certificate of Title of
respondent, covering subject lot cannot be collaterally attacked and nullified in this case at bar.
Held:
IN VIEW THEREOF, we DENY with finality the separate motions for reconsideration of the
petitioners and respondent.
Tomas Alonso had caused the reconstitution of his title on a Lot which is adjacent to the
disputed property, and yet petitioners failed to show that Tomas Alonso exerted the same effort to
reconstitute his alleged title to the subject property. As successors-in-interest, petitioners merely
stepped into the shoes of Tomas Alonso. They cannot claim a right greater than that of their
predecessor.
Moreover, it cannot be over-accentuated that Tomas Alonso, petitioners predecessor-in-
interest, never asserted any claim of ownership over the disputed property during his lifetime. When he
was alive, Tomas Alonso did not exert any effort to have the title of the disputed property reconstituted
in his name or seek recovery thereof from the respondent which was in possession since 1931
On the part of respondent, it failed to shed light on how its predecessor in interest, United
Services Country Club, Inc., acquired its title. Surprisingly, there is not even one evidence to show when
and how its predecessor in interest, United Services Country Club, Inc., acquired the property from
anybody.
Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine or resolve
the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The reconstitution of a title is simply
the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not
determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted
title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered
thereby.
Furthermore, the declaration in the Courts judgment that the subject property belongs to the
Government is not an offshoot of a collateral attack on respondents title. The validity of the
reconstitution of title to the land in question was directly in dispute, and the proceedings before the trial
court was in the nature of a direct attack on the legality of respondents title.
Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it is an iron-
clad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. Since respondent failed to present
the paper trail of the propertys conversion to private property, the lengthy possession and occupation
of the disputed land by respondent cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar
land, remained part of the patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of patrimonial property
of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, cannot ipso facto ripen into ownership.
Their claims can hardly evoke judicial compassion. Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. "If
eternal vigilance is the price of safety, one cannot sleep on ones right for more than a tenth of a century
and expect it to be preserved in its pristine purity"




Verba legis non est recedendum
From the words of the statute there should be no departure.


VICTORIA vs. COMELEC AND JESUS JAMES CALISIN
G.R. 109005;January 10, 1994

Facts:
Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor
Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post
as vice-governor. Under the law, Azanas position as vice-governor should be occupied by the highest
ranking Sangguniang member, a post being contested by petitioner and private respondent.
In answer to private respondents petition for his declaration as senior Sanggunian member for
the Province of Albay, the COMELEC issued a resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying him as first in
the order of ranking, garnering 21.78% out of the total registered voters while petitioner herein as
second ranking member with 21.19%. The COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes
obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered voters in the district.
However the petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be
based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on
the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein.

Issue:
The issue at bar is the ranking of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province
of Albay for purposes of succession.

Held:
The Local Government provides:
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.
The law is clear. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words.
Petitioners contention is therefore untenable considering the clear mandate of the law, which
leaves no room for other interpretation but it must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and
not to this Court which has no power to change the law.

Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statue is clear, plain and free from ambiguity,
it must be given it literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule
or verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on
the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent
or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisely, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure
No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the Resolution dated
January 22, 1999 was committed. The petition is DISMISSED.