Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61652 June 22, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO IBASAN, SR., alias "Loring"; ALEJANDRO IBASAN, JR., alias "Intsik";
ALEJANDRO IBASAN II, alias "Boy"; and ALEJANDRO IBASAN III alias "Tito", defendants-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. E. M. Fallarme for defendants-appellants.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:
Before Us, on appeal is a Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Dagupan City, Third Judicial
District, convicting Alejandro Ibasan, Sr., alias "Loring"; Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. alias "Intsik"; Alejandro
Ibasan II alias "Boy" and Alejandro Ibasan III alias "Tito" of the crime of murder. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds all the four (4) accused, namely: Alejandro
Ibasan, Sr., alias "Loring", Alejandro Ibasan, Jr., alias "Intsik", Alejandro Ibasan 11,
alias " Boy", and Alejandro Ibasan III, alias "Tito", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder, and pursuant to law, hereby sentences each of them to suffer
the medium penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment), to indemnify the heirs
of the victim, Leoncio Balolong in the amount of P12,000.00, plus P12,000.00 as
moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
Let this case be archived as against accused Juan Ibasan, alias 'John', who is
presently confined in the National Mental Hospital, without prejudice to its
reinstatement as against said accused, upon motion of the prosecution and return to
sanity of said accused.
The original information dated June 8, 1978 charged the appellants with the crime of homicide,
together with two others, Juan Ibasan, alias "John" and Demetrio Ibasan alias "Etring". However,
upon a finding that accused Juan Ibasan alias "John" was mentally unfit to stand trial, proceedings
as against him were suspended pending the recovery of his sanity, hence, his non-inclusion in these
proceedings. On the other hand, Demetrio Ibasan alias "Etring" died prior to final judgment in the
lower court and the case against him was accordingly dismissed.
After the information was filed but before the accused could be arraigned, a motion to amend the
charges to murder and for the presentation of additional evidence convinced the Fiscal to conduct a
reinvestigation. A notice of reinvestigation was issued by the District State Prosecutor, upon proper
authority of the Dagupan City Fiscal, with the advice that he "will conduct a reinvestigation of the
above-entitled case on Wednesday, August 9, 1978, ..."
On July 27, 1978, pending reinvestigation of the case, accused Alejandro Ibasan, Jr., alias "Intsik"
filed a motion to be arraigned ahead of his co-accused to enable him to leave for employment
abroad as seaman for a period of ten (10) months. He assured the court that his departure was not
intended to avoid the case and that he needed employment badly as the only source of livelihood to
sustain his family. The following day, July 28, 1978, he filed a written manifestation and waiver to wit:
COMES NOW the accused Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. in the above-entitled case through
counsel and to this Honorable Court most respectfully manifests:
1. That he filed a motion dated July 27,1978 for an early arraignment as to him alone,
ahead of his other co-accused based upon the grounds stated in said motion;
2. That he is aware of the move of the Fiscal to reinvestigate this case to determine
whether there is basis to amend the charge from HOMICIDE to MURDER;
3. That in case his motion is granted and is arraigned ahead of his co-accused, he is
willing to withdraw his plea on the charge of HOMICIDE and will enter a plea of NOT
GUILTY to the charge of MURDER in case the Fiscal finally decide to amend the
charge;
4. That he is expressly waiving the defense of double jeopardy which otherwise will
be available to him in case the charge is amended from HOMICIDE to MURDER in
view of his early arraignment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that this
manifestation be favorably acted upon.
The same was filed through counsel Benigno M. Gubatan. The motion was granted and accused
Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. alias "Intsik" was accordingly arraigned on July 28, 1978 with a plea of NOT
GUILTY to homicide. Subsequently, he left for abroad after waiving his right to be present during the
proceedings.
On the basis of the fiscal's reinvestigation, an amended information dated August 30, 1978 was filed
charging all accused with the crime of murder as follows:
That on or about May 31, 1978 at Bonuan Gueset, Dagupan City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation, and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, maul and hit Leoncio Balolong at the back
of his head and other vital parts of his body with a piece of bamboo, stones, empty
bottles of beer, pepsi cola, coke, dagger, hollow block and wooden bench, which
caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the sum of P12,000.00.
The crime was committed by a band.
The remaining accused were arraigned under the above information and all entered their plea of "not
guilty" to the charge of MURDER.
Upon his return and with the aid of a new counsel, Atty. Salvador Avedania, Alejandro Ibasan, Jr.,
filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the filing of the amended information
constituted double jeopardy, as he had already been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty under the
original information for HOMICIDE, and the same had been dismissed without his consent when the
new information was filed for the graver offense of MURDER. He further maintained that his earlier
waiver of the defense of double jeopardy was of no moment, the same having been done prior to
arraignment. He stated that it was not possible then for him to waive jeopardy which had not yet
attached.
Denying said motion, the court reasoned that by his own acts the accused was estopped to
interpose the defense of double jeopardy and that his manifestation was express consent on his part
to the amendment of the original information. The court stated that the defense of double jeopardy
was never intended to be a tool for the benefit of one who had intentionally misled and confused the
court for his own escape to go abroad. Furthermore, there being no plea under the amended
information, double jeopardy had not yet attached. Accused's motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Subsequently, accused Juan Ibasan alias "John", through his own counsel, also
filed a motion to quash the amended information on the ground of accused's insanity. The motion
was denied and, as earlier stated, accused Juan Ibasan was committed to the National Mental
Hospital for observation and treatment. The trial as against him was suspended until such time as he
is certified mentally fit to stand trial.
Trial proceeded against the rest of the accused except Demetrio Ibasan alias "Etring" the case
against him having been dismissed after his death.
The prosecution evidence tended to prove that:
... On May 31, 1978, at about 6:00 P.M., while Leoncio Balolong was walking (with
his cousin Alberto Balolong) along the road towards Balolong Street, at Bonuan
Gueset, Dagupan City Juan Ibasan, alias "John", who was armed with a baseball bat
1 meter long), hit Leoncio Balolong (who was then unarmed) suddenly with said bat
once on top of his head, holding the bat with both hands. Upon being hit by the
baseball bat, Leoncio ran away, but he was pursued by Alejandro Ibasan III, alias
"Tito", who then struck Leoncio with a baseball bat (1 meter long) hitting him on the
left leg, causing Leoncio to fall to the ground. Upon seeing his cousin Leoncio fall to
the ground, Alberto Balolong ran away.
After Leoncio fell to the ground after being hit on the leg by accused Alejandro
Ibasan III, alias "Tito", accused Alejandro Ibasan II, alias "Boy", who was armed with
the dagger (Exh. J).lwphl@it which is double bladed, sharp pointed and about 8" long with 4"
handle and a leather scabbard, stabbed Leoncio several times with said dagger on
the breast, causing him (Leoncio) to grasp for breath and disabling him. All the six (6)
accused threw stones (bigger than the size of a fist) at Leoncio, then accused
Alejandro Ibasan, alias "Boy" and Juan Ibasan, alias "John", held the hands of
Leoncio and dragged him inside their (Ibasan's) yard, passing through the steel gate
fronting the Ibasan's residence, adjacent to their sari-sari store (Exh. E). Inside the
yard, all the six (6) accused again hit Leoncio several times with bottles of beer, coke
and with a wooden leg of a bench hitting him on the head, breast and abdomen (57
tsn., Sept. 8, 1981). A few minutes later, Dagupan City policemen arrived at the
place and they brought Leoncio to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital. At the time of
the arrival of said policemen, all the six (6) accused were no longer at the crime
scene as they have already fled.
The prosecution relied on the testimony of two eyewitnesses, Domingo Paras and Agustina
Redoban, both of whom positively Identified all the accused. Domingo Paras testified that while all
the six (6) accused were mauling Leoncio Balolong, they shouted "Vulva of your mother, we are
going to kill you" and that accused Alejandro Ibasan, Sr., alias "Loring" addressed accused Juan
Ibasan, alias "John", Alejandro Ibasan II alias "Boy", Alejandro Ibasan III alias "Tito" and shouted
"You finish him" while the accused continued mauling Leoncio.
Prosecution witness Agustina Redoban corroborated the testimony of Domingo Paras in all its
material points and furthermore, declared that upon seeing Leoncio Balolong already prostrate on
the ground, she told the six (6) accused to stop beating him but they refused to heed her plea. She
also heard Alejandro Ibasan, Jr., alias "Intsik" state that "Whoever will testify in this case should be
killed."
For its part, the defense introduced evidence to prove the following: On May 31, 1978, at about 5:00
p.m., Leoncio Balolong and his counsel, Alberto Balolong, came looking for accused Alejandro
Ibasan, Sr., alias "Loring" at the latter's store. Leoncio was asking Loring to come out in a loud voice.
Leoncio was carrying with him a balisong tucked on his right waist. Accused Demetrio Ibasan, alias
"Etring" told Leoncio that his father was asleep. This made Leoncio angry. Leoncio then told
Demetrio "Vulva of your mother", "let your father come out." Demetrio then picked up a stone and
thereupon, Leoncio drew his balisong (Exh. J). Demetrio Ibasan, sensing the presence of an
imminent danger, immediately got hold of an empty bottle and with it hit Leoncio again, this time
hitting the latter on the center forehead, as a result of which blood oozed from his head (tsn., March
15, 1982, p. 175).
During the altercation between Demetrio Ibasan and Leoncio Balolong, Alberto Balolong fled and he
did so at the moment Leoncio Balolong fell down. Felisa Ibasan, wife of accused Alejandro Ibasan,
Sr., and Linda Ibasan, his daughter, scurried upstairs to the house where they cried, and woke up
Loring Ibasan (tsn., March 15, 1982, pp. 178-179). Soon Loring Ibasan came out of the house and
told his son, Demetrio Ibasan to kill Leoncio Balolong probably because the latter might kill them all if
he survives. Loring Ibasan, in order to insure the death of Leoncio Balolong, himself got a 2 feet long
and 2 inches thick piece of wood and with it, hit said Leoncio Balolong who was already lying flat,
several times (tsn., March 15, 1982, pp. 100-101). At that moment when Alejandro Ibasan began to
hit Leoncio several times, the latter was not moving anymore and it was difficult to say whether he
was already dead according to their eyewitness Angel Paras (tsn., March 15, 1982, pp. 181-182).
This same eyewitness stated that he left the place after Alejandro Ibasan, alias "Loring" hit Leoncio
Balolong with a piece of wood (tsn., March 15, 1982, p. 182). He then went to the other side of the
road and that he did not bother to report the incident to the police for fear that he might get involved
(tsn., March 15, 1982, p. 183).
Not long after, two policemen arrived. The two policemen went inside the yard of the Ibasans, and
thereafter brought the bleeding body of Leoncio Balolong and put him down immediately in front of
the steel gate while the said policemen waited for a ride (tsn., March 16, 1982, p. 171). After about
five minutes, the policemen were able to get a ride, a passenger jeepney, on which they loaded the
body of Leoncio Balolong and left (tsn., March 16, 1982, p. 172) for the Pangasinan Provincial
Hospital (tsn., October 12, 1981, p. 75; tsn., October 23, 1981, p. 87). After bringing the body of
Leoncio Balolong to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, the two policemen hurriedly went back to
the scene of the crime to make their investigation. Later, Demetrio Ibasan, who is actually one of the
accused, (but whose case had been previously dismissed because of his death), voluntarily and
willingly went along with the police and submitted himself for their investigation (tsn.,November 9,
1981, p. 107). In fact, at the police sub-station, he admitted to Patrolman Rolando Coquia in the
presence of Patrolman Rolando Valdez, that he was the one who killed Leoncio Balolong and that
no one else was responsible for it (tsn., November 9, 1981, p. 108).
Thus, the defense tried to show that the aggressor was Leoncio Balolong and that, in self-defense,
Demetrio Ibasan, alias "Etring", now deceased, had to hit Leoncio with a stone and an empty bottle.
Likewise, Alejandro Ibasan, Sr., alias "Loring" had to hit Leoncio with a piece of wood, but Leoncio
was, by then dead from Etring's blows.
The other accused- appellants interposed the defense of alibi. Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. alias "Intsik"
alleged that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was attending the Perpetual Help Novena
and mass, it being a Wednesday, with his wife. His alibi was reiterated by two of his friends who
testified in his behalf. Alejandro Ibasan II, alias "Boy" and Alejandro Ibasan III alias "Tito" alleged that
at the time of the incident, they were at the house of their uncle, Juan Ibasan alias "John" feeding
and watching his poultry and that they had attended to their duties therein without leaving said
premises.
After the trial, the court found the four appellants guilty as charged. Hence, this appeal.
The accused-appellants interposed the following assignments of errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE AS AGAINST THE ACCUSED
ALEJANDRO IBASAN, JR., ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN AND/OR CONDUCTING THE
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES AS THOUGH IT WERE THE PROSECUTION; AND IN
DEPRIVING THE DEFENSE FROM PRESENTING OTHER MATERIAL WITNESSES BY GIVING
HOPE AND IMPRESSIONS WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE FALSE AFTER ALL.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS AS PRESENTED, AND
IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AS ADDUCED.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE AS AGAINST ALL THE
ACCUSED AFTER THE PROSECUTION HAD RESTED ITS CASE AND UPON MOTION TO
DISMISS FILED BY DEFENSE BASED ON THREE VALID GROUNDS.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE FOUR REMAINING ACCUSED
AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE PROSECUTION
UTTERLY FAILED TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE FOUR CONVICTED ACCUSED OF THEIR
RIGHT TO BAIL, THEIR RIGHT TO HAVE THEIR CASE TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER SALA OR
OTHER COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION, AND THEIR RIGHT TO BE DETAINED IN THE
LOCAL JAIL PENDING THEIR APPEAL INSTEAD OF IN THE NATIONAL PENITENTIARY AT
MUNTINGLUPA.
Pending appeal, notice was received by this Court about the death of accused Alejandro Ibasan, Sr.,
alias "Loring" while confined in the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinglupa. The case against him was
dismissed insofar as his criminal liability was concerned.
At the outset, it is important to note the very peculiar factor which had given rise to the first issue.
First of all, we find quite unusual that the accused Alejandro Ibasan, Jr., alias "Intsik" was allowed to
leave the country while standing charged with the serious crime of homicide. His claim of innocence
did not preclude the possibility of his jumping bail while abroad and not returning to answer the
charges against him. The accused was allowed to be arraigned earlier than his co-accused even as
the circumstances of murder were being reinvestigated.
Second, it was error for the court to allow the advance arraignment of Intsik for homicide when the
prosecution was still reinvestigating the case to determine the possibility of amending the information
to murder. Intsik should have been arraigned for murder and afterwards could have been convicted
either of homicide or murder as may be proven, the former being an offense necessarily included in
the crime charged.
We cannot sanction the conduct of the fiscal and the court. They should be more prudent and
cautious in the performance of their duties.
Appellant Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. would have us dismiss the case against him for murder on the
ground of double jeopardy.
The prosecution, sustained by the court a quo, contended that the requisite of double jeopardy to
wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the defendant had been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
is not present under the circumstances of the case. It argued that since the accused had earlier filed
a written manifestation and waiver of his right to be present as well as his right to the defense of
double jeopardy, the first information had been amended with the accused's express consent.
The appellant maintains otherwise. He states that the element of time plays an important role in
considering when such "express consent" should be given, He submits that the express consent
must be given after the accused had already entered a plea and not before. Was there double
jeopardy?
At the time that the accused executed his waiver, the right to the defense of double jeopardy for
murder did not yet exist. For jeopardy to attach, it is necessary that the defendant has been
arraigned and has pleaded to the charge because it is from that moment that the issues for trial are
deemed joined. Before that, the accused is not in danger of being validly convicted, hence he is not
yet in jeopardy (People v. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001). If the accused has not yet been arraigned for either
homicide or murder, a motion to quash and a waiver of the right to the defense of double jeopardy
would be premature. Jeopardy attaches (a) upon valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment and (d) after plea (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).lwphl@it The defendant, not having
been arraigned and not having pleaded to either charge when the waiver of his right to the defense
of double jeopardy was made, the same produces no legal effect. There could have been no valid
waiver for there was nothing to waive. There is no double jeopardy in this case.
Appellant Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. was arraigned and he pleaded "NOT GUILTY" under the original
information for homicide. He was never arraigned for Murder. Hence, the proceedings below, while
for the charge of murder insofar as the other accused were concerned, were only for homicide as
regards Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. The treachery which qualified the crime to murder was, for him, an
aggravating circumstance. No mitigating circumstance was proved during trial.
Coming now to the appellants' second assignment of error, we find the same to be without merit. It is
not denied that the court had at certain points conducted its own questioning during the proceedings.
The records, however, show that the court's questions did not amount to interference as to make the
case for the prosecution and deprive the accused of their defense. The questions of the judge
addressed to the witnesses and the accused were merely to clarify certain points and confirm certain
statements. The number of times that a judge intervenes is not necessarily an indication of bias. It
cannot be taken against a judge if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain
truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
As held in the case of Ventura v. Yatco (105 Phil. 287) "Judges are not mere referees like those of a
boxing bout, only to watch and decide the results of a game; they should have as much interest as
counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, calling attention of counsel to points
at issue that are overlooked, directing them to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues
involved, clarifying ambiguous remarks by witnesses, etc."
A judge may properly intervene in the trial of a case to promote expedition and avoid unnecessary
waste of time or to clear up some obscurity (People v. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196; Par. 14 Canons of
Judicial Ethics; Administrative Order No. 162 dated August 1, 1946, 42 O.G. 1803). In this respect,
the record shows no irregularity in the conduct of the trial judge.
As to the alleged deprivation of the appellants' right to present other material witnesses, we find the
same without basis. The appellants alleged that they had intended to present two witnesses,
namely: Atty. Gubatan and Atty. Esteves. However, the judge had expressed displeasure against the
appearance of the two witnesses when the defense requested that they be subpoenaed, to wit:
COURT
You know, Esteves is a persona non grata in this
court. He filed a case against me in Lingayen. I don't
like to see his face. Never, forever, never in my whole
life. Gubatan, Ancheta, Esteves, as far as I am
concerned, they are already buried a long time. (con't.
of order) subpoena the following; Erlinda Relosemon,
Bonuan Gueset, Dr. Dominador Gutierrez, c/o GSIS,
Dagupan City. (tsn., March 16, 1982, p. 196).
The emotional outburst of the presiding judge is rather unfortunate. Even if a judge sincerely
believes that a counsel is deliberately exasperating or inciting him through the introduction of
witnesses publicly known to be personally anathema to the judge and not because their testimony
may prove or disprove matters in issue, the judge should avoid any unseemly display of shortness of
temper or other unbecoming behaviour. A judge should not allow himself to be led by counsel or
witnesses into showing that he can be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
performance of his official functions (Austria v. Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247). It is precisely during such
trying moments that a judge should be studiously careful about his conduct and in the measures he
takes to uphold the court's authority and dignity. However, the actuations of the trial judge showing
some impatience against the appellants did not preclude them from adequately presenting their
case, We have examined the records carefully and we find that the appealed decision was not
based on any matters improperly elicited by the trial Judge during his examination of the witnesses
nor has it been affected by the quoted remarks. Appellants were given all the opportunity to present
their evidence.
Neither did the initial refusal of the trial judge to subpoena the two supposed witnesses prevent their
being presented in court if they were really willing to testify for the defense. There are remedies
available to parties for such situations. In fact, the records show that, later, the trial judge was
amenable to their being present in court as witnesses and it was the defense which found no more
need for the testimony:
ATTY. FALLARME
We are intending to present another witnesses
especially Atty. Gubatan and Atty. Esteves, but I think
there is no need, so we are closing our evidence and
may we be given a chance to close tomorrow, your
Honor. (Tsn., April 19, 1982, p. 269)
The appellants state that they did not take certain steps they should have taken because the
presiding judge had impressed upon the accused and counsel "that the case of the prosecution was
weak and that it was not airtight nor foolproof, and that eventually he was going to acquit the
accused. The following statement of the trial court:
COURT
I would suggest to counsel that since this case have
been pending for the past 7 to 8 years and its record
is about 4 to 6 inches thick, that trial of this case will
continue Mondays and Tuesdays every week so that
the innocent will be set free and that the guilty will be
put to jail. ... Why prolong this agony? ... (tsn., March
16, 1982, p. 195) (Emphasis supplied).
is no indication that the accused would eventually be acquitted. The statement shows no bias nor
intention to give false hopes to either party. The judge merely expressed the need for a speedy trial.
The statement should not be relied upon as a suggestion that the case for the defendants was
stronger than the case for the prosecution. Notwithstanding any remarks of any judge, a lawyer
should continue giving his client entire devotion to the latter's interest, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of the lawyer's utmost learning and ability appropriate for
the circumstances.
Notwithstanding any impressions that counsel may have about the predispositions of a judge, the
client is entitled to the benefit of any remedy and defense that is authorized by law. The lawyer
should assert every such remedy or defense (Canon 15, Canons of Professional Ethics; Javier v.
Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 (1936); In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 (1922); In re Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 (1958);
Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932); Toguib v. Tomol, Jr. GR. Adm. Case No. 554, Jan. 3, 1969;
People v. Macellones, GR. No. 33639, Feb. 28, 1975; Tan Kui v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 36808,
Nov. 29, 1973, See Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1980, pp. 147-186.)
The second assignment of error has no merit but nonetheless we take this opportunity to remind
members of the bench that judges' undue interference, impatience, or participation in the
examination of witnesses or a severe attitude on the court's part towards the witnesses, especially
those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial may tend to prevent the
proper presentation of the cause or ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto. (People v.
Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196). Thus, a judge should exercise more care and patience in conducting a
case, his right to intervene to be used sparingly, if at all. He must bear in mind that witnesses may
be easily intimidated by an overly inquisitive judge considering the unusual circumstances which
they find themselves in, especially when testifying in criminal cases.
We find no merit in the appellants' third and fifth assignments of errors. The lower court correctly
appreciated the facts of the case and the testimonies of the witnesses. The appellants' point out
alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies vis-a-vis their sworn statements.
They also seek to discredit the prosecution witnesses Domingo Paras because of his relationship
with Gregorio Balolong, the deceased's father. The appellants state that the prosecution witnesses'
statements are conflicting, exaggerated, perjured, prejudiced, evasive, and apparently dubious.
Furthermore, the defense relies on the alleged counter-affidavit of Agustina Redoban, an eyewitness
for the prosecution, recanting her earlier statements to the police.
An examination of the records shows no compelling reason to disbelieve the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. The inconsistencies to which the appellants advert are but minor
discrepancies which do not affect the weight of the witnesses' testimonies where they all coincide in
the matter of Identity of the accused and in the narration of all material facts. Minor discrepancies do
not render testimony incredible and cannot destroy the probative value of the consistent testimony of
the witnesses on how the six (6) perpetrators has assaulted and mauled the victim to death. (People
v. Pajenado, 69 SCRA 172; People v. Lopez, 80 SCRA 18; People v. Llanto, 88 SCRA 8; People v.
dela Cruz, 91 SCRA 525; People v. Yutila, 102 SCRA 264; People v. Hinlo, 102 SCRA 472; People
v. Garcia, 105 SCRA 325; People v. Canizares, 107 SCRA 296; People v. Munoz, 107 SCRA 313;
People v. Demate, 113 SCRA 353; People v. Millora, 119 SCRA 417; People v. Barros, 122 SCRA
34; People v. dela Rosa, 102 SCRA 147). It is settled that some minor inconsistencies become
themselves indices of truth, a sign of veracity of the statements of unlearned and untutored
eyewitnesses. (People v. Paculba, 124 SCRA 383; People v. Cardinas, 118 SCRA 458).lwphl@it According
to the trial court, the prosecution witnesses testified in a clear, positive, straightforward, truthful and
convincing manner. The witnesses remained consistent on cross-examination. We see no reason to
doubt the lower court's finding that they are more credible. Having been eyewitnesses to a frightful
event as the killing of a fellow human, minor inaccurate expressions or honest mistakes in
observation are not fatal. Differences in some details from nervous, rattled, and scared
eyewitnesses cannot be avoided. It cannot be expected that these witnesses under such strain and
pressure could pay particular attention and remember each and every detail no matter how trivial.
Thus, whether the weapon used is referred to as a bat or a club is a matter of semantics. The fact
remains that the deceased was hit by a one meter long wooden truncheon and mauled to death.
Also, whether or not the beating of the victim had first occurred inside or outside the fence of the
Ibasans is immaterial, the fact is the former was beaten both inside and outside of the premises of
the Ibasans' yard. The fact is clear that the deceased was mauled and beaten with pieces of wood,
bottles and a dagger or balisong, the weapons used being properly established by the evidence on
record. Also, the fact remains that the victim died at the hands of the accused all of whom were
positively Identified.
Anent the alleged relationship of a prosecution eyewitness to the deceased's father, we reiterate the
oft-repeated rule that relationship of witnesses does not necessarily affect credibility. (People v.
Ruiz, 93 SCRA 739; People v. Puesce, 87 SCRA 130). Relationship to the victim by itself, does not
prove that a witness is prejudiced and biased when, as in this case, said testimony is not only clear
and natural, but is corroborated substantially by the other findings of the trial court. There is
moreover the absence of an improper motive actuating the witness to testify falsely against the
accused. (People v. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503; People v. Veloso, 92 SCRA 515). And as to
eyewitness Agustina Redoban, her friendship with the victim standing alone is not proof of prejudice
(People v. Campana, 24 SCRA 271), the same not being a sufficient motive for witnesses to testify
falsely against an accused (People v. Salcedo, 122 SCRA 54). As we stated in one case, the fact
that two of the prosecution's witnesses were sheltered and fed by the deceased father's victim does
not prove that said witnesses perjured in recounting what they saw. It is well-known that witnesses to
killings usually do not want to undergo the trouble and inconvenience of going to court and being
exposed to reprisal. (People v. Medrana, 110 SCRA 130).
The alleged inconsistencies between witness Redoban's testimony in open court and her statements
in pre-trial affidavits, are not marks of untrustworthiness or wilfull falsehood (People v. Bermoy 105
SCRA 106). It is a matter of judicial notice and experience that, not infrequently, affidavits are
prepared in haste and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate (People v. Gonzales. 99 SCRA
697). Greater weight is accorded the statements given on the witness stand where both prosecution
and defense counsel could more thoroughly question the witness.
The appellants would have us dismiss the case or acquit accused Juan Ibasan alias "John" on the
ground of insanity. They argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion to quash. Section 2 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides among the grounds for a motion to quash: "That the
defendant is insane." When after an examination into the mental condition of the accused, it appears
that the defendant is insane at the time of the trial, the court is under a legal duty to suspend the
proceedings and to order the commitment of the accused to an asylum. The fundamental reason
behind this may be taken from the very fact that if the accused were insane, he would never have a
fair trial; the assistance that the law provides would be an empty ceremony (US v. Guendia, 37 Phil.
337). The trial court acted fully in accordance with the law.
Appellants, however, maintain that at the hearing on the motion to quash, the evidence presented
tended to show that accused Juan Ibasan was insane before, during, and after the commission of
the crime, as well as at the time of trial, and should be exempt from criminal liability. This is properly
a matter to be considered as a matter of defense during a fullblown trial to determine the guilt of the
accused. For the same to be properly passed upon in the motion to quash defendants should have
invoked Subsection g, Section 2 Rule 117, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification;
xxx xxx xxx
They did not do so,
The fourth assignment of error has no merit.
Defendants' sixth assignment of error that the lower court erred in denying (1) bail to the accused
on appeal, (2) their right to have their case transferred to another sala or court of competent
jurisdiction, and (3) their right to be detained in the local jail pending their appeal instead of the
National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa, cannot be sustained.
Section 4, Rule 114 provides:
After conviction by the Court of First Instance defendant may, upon application, be
bailed at the discretion of the court.
This discretion will not be disturbed absent any showing of abuse or arbitrariness on the part of the
trial court. (Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 83 Phil. 658) There is no such showing in the case at bar.
As for their detention at the National Penitentiary rather than the local jail, the appellants are national
prisoners and are correctly detained at the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinglupa, Rizal, pending the
resolution of their appeal.
The transfer of the case, after judgment in the lower court, cannot be sanctioned. No law or rule
permits the same. Appeal is an adequate remedy to correct whatever errors may have been
committed by the lower court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED insofar
as appellants Alejandro Ibasan II, alias "Boy" and Alejandro Ibasan III alias "Tito" are concerned,
with the modification that the indemnity for the heirs of the victim, Leoncio Balolong, is raised from
Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) to Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos in accordance with the
ruling laid down by this Court in People v. de la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518. The judgment of the court a
quo as to them is AFFIRMED in all other respects. Insofar as appellant Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. alias
"Intsik" is concerned, we find him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and
hereby sentence him to an indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and order him to indemnify the heirs of the victim jointly and
solidarily with the other accused-appellants. The resolutions dismissing the cases against Demetrio
Ibasan, Sr., alias "Loring" are reiterated. The late Alejandro Ibasan, Sr., remains civilly liable, his
death having occurred pending appeal. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Leoncio
Balolong together with the other accused-appellants.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. MTJ-90-388. June 19, 1990.]

THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE VIRGILIO S. LANSANG,
MTC, Clark Field, Angeles City, Respondent.


R E S O L U T I O N


PER CURIAM:


An administrative complaint, dated February 26, 1990, was filed against Judge Virgilio S. Lansang,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Clark Field, Angeles City, based on the following findings of the Judiciary Planning
Development and Implementation Office and the Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez in the
course of an investigation conducted in his court, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Cases deemed submitted for decision, some of which had been submitted since 1979 and 1982 had
remained undecided as of January 3, 1990, contrary to his monthly certification that he has no pending civil
and criminal cases under submission for decision or determination beyond the 90-day period.

"2. Cases calendared for hearing during the month of June 1989 to December 1989, show that for the
month of October 1989, only one (1) hearing was conducted; for November, only one (1) hearing also; for
December, also one (1) hearing; for the month of January 1990, only two (2) days have been set for trial
hearing; for the month of February 1990, only one (1) and for the month of August 1989, it appears that no
case has been disposed of.

"3. While it has been verified from reports and records in his office that he has been solemnizing several
marriages between Filipino citizens and Americans or foreigners on an average of about three (3) marriages
a day aside from notarizing public documents for a fee, his monthly reports for 1989 to the Statistic Division
of this Court do not show any marriage solemnized or document notarized by him.

"4. The accumulated caseload of 182 cases has remained invariably a back log which has not been reduced
over the year despite the few cases that are filed averaging from 4 to 6 cases a month only." (Complaint,
pp. 1-2).

Earlier however, on January 26, 1990, in view of the special visit of Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Leonor Ines Luciano to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Clark Field, prompted by various complaints against
Judge Lansang and the latter being aware of the seriousness of the charges, respondent Judge submitted his
irrevocable resignation to take effect January 31, 1990.

In his Comment dated April 4, 1990, respondent Judge summed up his reasons in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . my failure to decide, to settle cases load was the non-apprehension or arrest of the accused, the
existence of rift between me and the Clerk of Court, became almost irreconcilable, as manifested in the
inconsistent monthly report, which was full of intrigue and inaccuracy, which lead me to say I could no
longer stay, and happy working with them. That even before this controversy, I have nursed the idea of
resigning." (p. 3, Comment)

Considering all the allegations, issues and arguments raised in the complaint and in the Comment and the
resignation letter of respondent Judge dated January 26, 1990, the Court finds Judge Virgilio S. Lansang
GUILTY of the charges complained of. His actuations, practices and conduct are unbecoming of a judicial
officer; his acts of commission and omission having been committed through admitted negligence on his
part, failure to report to the Supreme Court or to the Court Administrator, his grievances against his own
Clerk of Court against whom he never filed any formal complaints regarding the latters alleged
irregularities; his apparent acceptance of the accuracy of the reports submitted by his Clerk of Court; and
unmitigated failure to ask for administrative remedies from the Supreme Court and Court Administrator and
the existence up to now of 182 pending cases which according to the Court Administrator had been
submitted for decision, and not merely pending trial. The Court likewise Resolved not to accept such
resignation (acceptance of resignations from the judiciary being a prerogative of the President of the
Philippines), but instead to consider him RETIRED, with all benefits and gratuities forfeited.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J. and Cortes, J., are on leave.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 704-RTJ June 14, 1990
FELDMERTO M. LONGBOAN, complainant,
vs.
HON. EMILIO L. POLIG, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
A letter-complaint was addressed to the Court Administrator on July 18, 1986 charging the
respondent judge with gross negligence of duty or abuse of authority for his failure to apprise
complainant of the status of Civil Case No. 641 despite the former's registered letters requesting the
status.
Civil Case No. 641 involved a dispute for collection of a sum of money between the complainant as
plaintiff and one Arsenic Cunaden as defendant. The complainant obtained a favorable judgment
from Municipal Circuit Judge Flora M. Tel-equen of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bauko-
Sibangan, Mountain Province on October 26, 1981. It was on appeal when the matter subject of the
letter-complaint came about.
It appears that on February 20, 1984, the complainant was informed by Regional Trial Court Judge
Nicasio A. Baguilat that respondent judge, his predecessor, was in possession of the records of Civil
Case No. 641 considering that the appeal thereto had been perfected prior to respondent judge's
transfer to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 at Lagawe, Ifugao. On August 8, 1984, Judge
Baguilat's Clerk of Court certified, among others, that Civil Case No. 641 was among the cases
retained by respondent judge and that as of the said date no decision therein had been received
from the said judge.
Meanwhile, the complainant had sent five registered letters inquiring about the status of Civil Case
No. 641. Due to respondent Judge's failure to make any reply as requested, the Office of the Court
Administrator sent respondent judge three tracers dated August 12, 1985, April 15, 1986 and June
23, 1986, respectively in relation to the records of Civil Case No. 641. Still, the respondent judge
made no reply.
In our resolution dated September 9, 1986, we ordered the respondent judge to: (a) show cause why
no disciplinary or administrative action should be taken against him, and (b) comply with the inquiry
within ten (10) days from notice thereof with a warning that failure still to do so would be dealt with
accordingly.
In our resolution dated July 31, 1987, we suspended the respondent judge "immediately and
continuing until further orders" for his willful disobedience and disregard of our previous resolution.
The respondent judge was further ordered to show cause and comply with complainant's inquiry with
a warning that failure to do so would be dealt with more severely.
On May 30, 1989, we resolved to dispatch an audit team headed by Deputy Court Administrator
Juanito A. Bernad to conduct a physical inventory of the cases pending in the respondent judge's
sala on the basis of the communication from Judge Baguilat informing the Office of the Court
Administrator that Civil Case No. 641 had already been decided by him and that he could not decide
the other cases pending before the respondent judge's former sala because the records thereof
could not be located and the respondent judge could not be contacted.
On June 1, 1989, a manifestation from the respondent judge with prayer for the lifting of his
suspension and reinstatement to his office was received by us stating that the respondent judge was
unable to submit his comment within the time allotted because the record of Civil Case No. 641 was
somehow mislaid on account of his transfer to Lagawe, Ifugao; that while in the process of locating
the said record, we suspended respondent judge; that eventually the said record was found
inadvertently mixed up with the disposed and archived cases and upon discovery, respondent judge
immediately transmitted the same to Judge Baguilat's sala for disposition since he was under
suspension; that Civil Case No. 641 had already been decided by the Regional Trial Court of
Bontoc, Mountain Province; that respondent judge failed to ask for extension of time to make and
submit his comment to our show-cause resolution due to "awful shock and anxiety at the thought
that the record of the said case may have been lost beyond recovery"; that it took respondent judge
a long time to plead for the lifting of his suspension due to "self-reproach and disgust of himself for
his omission"; and that upon realizing that he still has to support two boys in high school and two
boys in college and considering the present high cost of living, respondent judge deemed his two-
year suspension as enough punishment for his omission, thus, resumption of his judicial functions
should be ordered.
On June 27, 1989, Deputy Court Administrator Juanita A. Bernad conducted the physical inventory
of the cases pending before respondent judge's sala. In a memorandum dated July 4, 1989, Deputy
Court Administrator Bernad reported that all the cases inventoried were accounted for except four
(4) criminal cases where the accused are not under detention and four (4) civil cases which
remained missing as of June 29, 1989.
On July 6, 1989, we resolved to refer the instant case for investigation and recommendation to
Associate Justice Jesus Elbinias of the Court of Appeals.
After hearing, the investigating officer recommended the lifting of respondent judge's suspension and
the resumption of his official duties. A fine equivalent to two month's pay to be paid through equitable
salary deductions was further recommended. As to the missing cases, the investigating officer stated
that:
With regard to the missing four (4) criminal cases without prisoners and four (4) civil
cases referred to by Deputy Court Administrator Bernad in his memorandum for the
Chief Justice, it is my view that this is a matter entirely outside the scope of the
administrative complaint under inquiry. While the instant case is privately initiated in
the sense that a member of the public instituted it, in the matter of the missing cases
without the parties involved in them having as yet initiated any action, I believe the
decision of whether or not to require respondent Judge to account for them lies with
the Honorable Supreme Court or Office of the Court Administrator.
After a careful perusal of the records of the instant administrative case coupled with painstaking
deliberations, we are convinced that the respondent judge's continued silence as to the status of
Civil Case No. 641 despite repeated written queries from one of the parties, his failure to reply to the
tracers of the Office of the Court Administrator, and his willful disobedience and disregard to our
show-cause resolutions constituted grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and the
worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office. Once again, we hold with great emphasis
that:
...The Judge is the visible representation of the law of justice. From him, the people
draw their will and awareness to obey the law ..." (see Call A. Impao., et al. v. Judge
Jacosalem D. Makilala, A.M. No. MTJ 88-184, October 13, 1989; Atty. David G.
Ompoc, Jr. v. Judge Norito E. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ 86-11, September 27, 1989)
How can the respondent judge expect others to respect the law when he himself cannot obey orders
as simple as the show cause resolution?
Moreover, it is not enough that the complaining litigant was eventually appeased by the turn of
circumstances. What is more important is whether or not in the course of the judicial process, judicial
norms have been maintained. It is with this end in view that we stress diligence and efficiency
attendant to the discharge of a judge's function in the present Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3,
Rule 3.08, of the said Code provides that:
A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain
professional competence in court management and facilitate the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
In the instant case, respondent judge even impeded the speedy disposition of cases by his
successor on account of missing records of cases. This fact reflects an inefficient and disorderly
system in the recording of cases assigned to his sala. Although blame can also be conveniently laid
on the court personnel's mismanagement of the records of cases, proper and efficient court
management is as much the judge's responsibility for the Court personnel are not the guardians of a
Judge's responsibilities. (See. of Justice v. Legaspi, 107 SCRA 233 [1981])
With respect to the inventoried four (4) criminal cases without prisoners and four (4) civil cases
missing, we find no justification for the failure to present them to the Deputy Court Administrator
when required and their absence from the place where court records are stored. A judge is expected
to ensure that the records of cases assigned to his sala are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight records is indicative of gross
misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge. For true professionalism in the
bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards of a judicial office and whose
acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisites attached to said
office must be weeded out.
Lastly, the report on the physical inventory of the records of the cases in RTC, Branch 14, Lagawe,
Ifugao, which was respondent judge's last assignment before his suspension revealed that a total of
35 cases submitted for decision have remained unresolved beyond the 90-day reglementary period.
We have consistently held that failure to decide a case within the required period is not excusable
and constitutes gross inefficiency. (Ubarra v. Tecson, 134 SCRA 4 [1985]; De Leon v. Castro, 104
SCRA 241 [1981]; and In re: Judge Jose F. Madara, 104 SCP A, 245 [1981]).
In sum, the Court finds respondent judge guilty of inexcusable negligence, gross inefficiency and
grave and serious misconduct in the discharge of his functions.
ACCORDINGLY, the COURT RESOLVED to DISMISS RESPONDENT JUDGE from the service
with forfeiture of all his accrued retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including
government owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO QUIJANO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII),
MARIO ABONG, ALFREDO DE LEON, ERIWADWIN MONTEBON, ROMEO DE GUZMAN, &
EDUARDO MABUHAY, respondents.
Basilio E. Duaban for accused.

CRUZ, J .:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before
he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution.
1
As a result of the
reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded
not guilty.
2
Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first
information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and
ordering his release; and so he escaped.
3
The respondent judge, learning later of the trickery,
cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest.
4
But he was gone. Nonetheless, the
prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision
authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances.
5
The respondent judge denied the motion,
however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused.
6
The order of the trial court
is now before us on certiorari and mandamus.
7

The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He mistakenly allowed himself to be
tethered by the literal reading of the rule when he should have viewed it from the broader
perspective of its intendment.
The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in
full as follows:
Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustified.
The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the
past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's
escape. The old case ofPeople v. Avancea
8
required his presence at certain stages of the trial
which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not re-appeared or remained
at large. As his right to be present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape,
such escape thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as
the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been recaptured.
The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in
absentia, Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and
possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly
notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.
The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that trial in
absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified under Section 19.
He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has
escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape
can never be a legal justification. In the past, his escape "rewarded" him by postponing all further
proceedings against him and in effect ultimately absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under
the present rule, his escape will, legally speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by preventing him
from attending his trial, which will continue even in his absence and most likely result in his
conviction.
The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the
prosecution intends to present witnesses who will Identify the accused.
9
Under Section 19, the
defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him
of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to
have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified
because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.
Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v. Mendoza
10
because it was held notwithstanding that the
accused had not been previously arraigned. His subsequent conviction was properly set aside. But
in the instant case, since all the requisites are present, there is absolutely no reason why the
respondent judge should refuse to try the accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he
was released on the illegal bail bond. Abong should be prepared to bear the consequences of his
escape, including forfeiture of the right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the right
to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a
possible or even probable conviction.
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its
purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that
killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we
must look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by our own
lights, the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its
ends, we need and must use not only learning but also vision.
The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from
the city court of Cebu on the basis of the withdrawn information for homicide and to report to us the
result of his investigation within sixty days.
WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated December 22, 1983, denying the motion for the
trial in absentia of the accused is set aside. The respondent judge is directed to continue hearing the
case against the respondent Mario Abong in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it is
terminated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1966 March 21, 2006
IMELDA S. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANACLETO L. CAMINADE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, CJ :
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
laws. In all good faith, they must know the laws and apply them properly. Judicial competence
requires no less. Where the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic and elementary, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a verified Complaint
1
filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) by Imelda S. Enriquez. In that case, Judge Anacleto Caminade was charged
with gross misconduct, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and gross ignorance of the law. The
material averments of the Complaint and respondents Comment are summarized by the OCA as
follows:
"x x x [Complainant] Imelda S. Enriquez charges [Respondent] Judge Anacleto Caminade with
Gross Misconduct, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment and Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Procedure relative [to] Criminal Case No. CBU-066703, entitled People of the Philippines versus
Sherwin Que @ Bungol, Anthony John Apura, for Murder. As mother of the victim in the criminal
case, [complainant] alleges that respondent issued an order dated 31 March 2004, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby denies the motion for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against
the accused-movants; sets aside the assailed Resolution of the City Prosecutor on the basis of
which the latest amended information was filed; quashes the latest amended information; and
remands this case to the City Prosecutor for completion of the preliminary investigation.
"Respondent so ruled because there was no preliminary investigation completed on accused Alvin
Taggart Pimentel Alvez and Alvin John Apura [as] they were denied the opportunity to file a motion
for reconsideration or a petition for review before the information was filed in court.
"Complainant claims that respondent was grossly mistaken when he ruled, in effect, that the
investigating prosecutor cannot file a criminal information before the expiration of the 15-day period
within which the accused are allowed by the Revised Rules of Court to move for reconsideration or
petition for review of an adverse Resolution. Respondent cited Sales versus Sandiganbayan (G.R.
[No.] 143802, 16 November 2001) that the filing of motion for reconsideration is an integral part of
the preliminary investigation proper and that an [i]nformation filed without first affording x x x
accused his right to file motion for reconsideration is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a
preliminary investigation.
"Complainant contends that Sales is not applicable to the criminal case because of significant factual
and procedural distinctions between the two cases: (1) the Sales case proceeded under the Rules of
Procedure of the Ombudsman, while subject criminal case was conducted under the Rules of Court;
(2) there was no completed preliminary investigation in the Sales case but there was a completed
full-blown panel preliminary investigation on the accused in the subject criminal case; and (3) it is
only under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman that the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed and terminated upon the lapse of the period to file a motion for reconsideration from the
resolution of the Ombudsman while there is nothing in the Rules of Court which states that a person
investigated has the right to file a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation before the
[i]nformation can be filed in court.
"In his COMMENT, respondent explains that the panel of prosecutors conducting preliminary
investigation filed in court their amended information without furnishing accused Apura and Alvez
their copy of the resolution. He stresses that his challenged order is in accordance with law and
jurisprudence, citing among others, the case of Sales. He claims his order was an honest response
to the pending matters before him and [he] merely granted reliefs consistent with those granted by
the Supreme Court in the Sales case.
"[Respondent judge asserts that] while the facts of Sales and the criminal case are different, the
legal principle involved in the former case that a preliminary investigation is part of due process and
a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Prosecutor finding probably cause for the filing
of information is part of a preliminary investigation and respondent who is not given the opportunity
to file the same is in effect deprived of his right without due process of law cannot be overlooked.
Respondent points out that complainant, who was represented by two attorneys, should have
resorted to judicial recourse such as an appeal of the order in question via a petition for certiorari to
the Court of Appeals."
2

Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Report,
3
the OCA finds respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Thus, it recommends
that respondent be penalized with the maximum imposable fine of P40,000, considering that he was
earlier penalized with six months suspension for another serious though unrelated offense.
According to the OCA, the issue raised by complainant does not pertain to an error of judgment or to
one pertaining to the exercise of sound judicial discretion by respondent. Rather, the issue is
whether respondent complied with procedural rules so elementary that to digress from them
amounts to either ignorance or negligence. Since the procedure for the institution of criminal actions
is basic and clearly expressed in the Rules of Court, respondents Order is deemed to have been
attended by gross ignorance of the law.
The Courts Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA but reduces the penalty.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
This Court has consistently held that lack of conversance with legal principles sufficiently basic and
elementary constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
4
As an advocate of justice and a visible
representation of the law, a judge is expected to be proficient in the interpretation of our laws.
5

A perusal of the Order issued by respondent on March 31, 2004, shows that he remanded Criminal
Case No. CBU-066703 to the city prosecutor for the completion of the preliminary investigation
based on this Courts ruling in Sales v. Sandiganbayan.
6
Clearly, respondent failed to read the case
in its entirety, or he grossly misapprehended the doctrine it had laid down.
A careful study of Sales reveals that it applies specifically to preliminary investigations conducted
before the Ombudsman. That case was decided in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, granting the accused fifteen days to move for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of
an adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation.
7
Obviously, the criminal case filed before
respondents court was not covered by the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman but by the Rules
of Court, which had no corresponding provision. Thus, Sales was not in point.
Diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of judges
and, of course, members of the bar. Comprehending the Courts decisions is a different matter,
however, for it is in this area where ones competence may be tested and proven.
8

As aptly pointed out by the OCA, the termination of a preliminary investigation upon the filing of an
information in court is a well-established procedural rule under the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Respondent clearly strayed from the well-trodden path when he grossly misapplied the ruling of the
Court in Sales. Since a preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. CBU-066703 was held, that
stage of the legal process was already completed.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to be embodiments of
judicial competence and diligence.
9
Those who accept this exalted position owe the public and this
Court the ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at all
times.
10
Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. This exalted position entails a lot of
responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the law. One cannot seek refuge in a mere
cursory knowledge of statutes and procedural rules.
11

Respondent judge fell short of these standards when he failed in his duties to follow elementary law
and to keep abreast with prevailing jurisprudence.
12
Service in the judiciary involves continuous
study and research from beginning to end.
13

Exacting as these standards may be, judges are expected to be personifications of justice and the
rule of law and, as such, to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules.
14
Essential to every one of them is faithfulness to the laws and maintenance of
professional competence.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors "men forgive and time forgets."
15
For when
they display an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, they erode the confidence of the public in the
competence of our courts.
16
Such lack is gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic
legal commands and rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, of which no one is excused, and
surely not a judge.
17

Respondent contends that instead of filing the instant Administrative Complaint, complainant should
have resorted to judicial recourse, like an appeal of the Order in question. It should be reiterated that
the courts power of appellate review is distinct from an administrative matter, which involves the
exercise of the courts power to discipline judges. An administrative matter is undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare; that is, to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in
the government.
18

In sum, we reiterate our ruling in Abbariao v. Beltran,
19
as follows:
"We emphasize that ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. For this reason, we always
remind the members of the bench of their duty to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional
competence. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules. Basic rules must be at the palms of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to
observe the basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable. Where the law involved --
as in this case -- is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross
ignorance of the law."
20

As to the charges of grave misconduct and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, we agree with
the findings of the OCA that there is no allegation or evidence on record to support these claims.
Regarding the penalty to be imposed on respondent, although gross ignorance of the law is
classified as a serious charge, it has been sanctioned with a wide range of penalties.
21
The Court
has to balance the recommended penalty. The OCA suggests the maximum fine of P40,000,
because respondent was penalized earlier with six months suspension for another serious though
unrelated offense. Without minimizing the seriousness of the previous misconduct, the Court notes
that the acts presently complained of are completely unrelated to and dissimilar from those in the
prior case. The acts under consideration cannot be considered a repetition of the same or similar
acts for which respondent was previously suspended. Neither is there any showing that he acted
with malice or bad faith in issuing his Order in the present case. Under the present circumstances,
this Court deems a fine of P20,000 to be appropriate.
Unrelated or not, both cases reflect poorly on respondent as a public officer. The Constitution
expects judges to be embodiments of competence, integrity, probity and independence.
22
Indeed,
magistrates should personify four Ins;namely, integrity, independence, industry and intelligence.
23

WHEREFORE, Judge Anacleto L. Caminade is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, for which
he is FINED in the amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000). He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[A.M. No. MTJ-94-1004. August 21, 1996]
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF BATAC, ILOCOS NORTE, complainant,
vs. JUDGE EFREN F. ALBANO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Before us is Resolution No. 56 s. 1994 issued by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Batac, Ilocos Norte calling for the immediate investigation of Judge Efren F.
Albano, of the Municipal Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos
Norte. The Sanggunian alleged that:
(1) the stay of Judge Albano in the Municipality of Batac as the Presiding Judge of
its Municipal Trial Court has been marred by controversial decisions coupled with
habitual absence from office which hampered speedy resolution of cases to the
prejudice of (their) constituents, and
(2) there have been reported cases and complaints from (their) constituents that due
to the indiscretion, inefficiency and incompetence of the incumbent Presiding Judge,
it has clogged the dockets of the court, caused misery to litigants which resulted to the
filing of certiorari cases against the Presiding Judge.
[1]

On November 3, 1994, we referred the Sanggunians resolution to Judge
Alejandrino C. Cabebe of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte for
investigation, report and recommendation.
[2]

Judge Cabebe summoned Mr. Da Vinci Crisostomo, Presiding Officer of
the Sanggunian, to a conference to substantiate their charges against the
respondent judge. Mr. Crisostomo pointed out several irregularities in the way
respondent judge conducts preliminary investigations. Judge Cabebe then
examined the criminal dockets of the Municipal Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos
Norte as well as the records of preliminary investigations conducted in said
court.
[3]

In the course of his investigation, Judge Cabebe uncovered around forty
(40) criminal cases dismissed after preliminary investigation.
[4]
In all these
cases, respondent judge failed to transmit the resolution and records to the
provincial prosecutor upon conclusion of the proceedings. Respondent judge
also archived two (2) cases when the police failed to arrest the suspects
therein, in violation of Section 5 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. In
addition, Judge Cabebe discovered that respondent judge issued warrants of
arrest without examining the complainant and his witnesses in writing and
under oath, in violation of Section 6 (b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Court and Section 21, Article III of the Constitution. Judge Cabebe
recommended the dismissal of respondent judge from the service with
forfeiture of benefits.
[5]
The Office of the Court Administrator made a similar
recommendation in a Memorandum dated May 23, 1996.
[6]

It is the stance of respondent judge that the cases cited by Judge Cabebe
were all dismissed at the preliminary examination stage and did not reach the
preliminary investigation proper. Respondent judge averred that before going
to the preliminary investigation proper, he first conducted a preliminary
examination to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant
of arrest. In the cases cited by Judge Cabebe, respondent judge found no
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, hence he did not proceed to the
preliminary investigation proper. He argued that since there were no
preliminary investigations conducted and concluded, there were no records to
be forwarded to the provincial prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding
information.
[7]
Respondent judge further argued that (he) may not be held
liable for improper disposition of cases under preliminary investigation
because the acts imputed against him pertains (sic) to his judicial capacity
that are not subject to disciplinary power.
[8]

Respondent judges stance clearly demonstrates his gross ignorance of
the proper procedure in conducting a preliminary investigation.
Under the old rules, the preliminary investigation conducted by a municipal
judge had two stages: (1) the preliminary examination stage during which the
investigating judge determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe
that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for
trial; and (2) the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or
information is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the
substance of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to
present evidence in his favor if he so desires.
[9]
Presidential Decree
911,
[10]
upon which the present rule is based, removed the preliminary
examination stage and integrated it into the preliminary investigation
proper. Now, the proceedings consist only of one stage.
[11]

Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court outlines the
procedure for conducting a preliminary investigation:
Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed
without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following
manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be
accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other
supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents plus two (2)
copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or
unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he has personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and
other supporting documents. Within ten (10) days from receipt thereof the respondent
shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. He shall have the
right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent
shall also be sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies
thereof shall be furnished by him to the complainant.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed does not submit counter-
affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base his
resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set
a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during
which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right
to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to
the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses
concerned.
(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating
officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus
adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient
ground to hold the respondent for trial.
Section 5 of the same rule specifies the duty of the investigating judge upon
conclusion of the preliminary investigation:
Sec. 5. Duty of investigating judge. Within ten (10) days after the conclusion of
the preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit to the provincial
or city fiscal, for appropriate action, the resolution of the case, stating briefly the
findings of facts and the law supporting his action, together with the entire records of
the case, which shall include: (a) the warrant, if the arrest is by virtue of a warrant;
(b) the affidavits and other supporting evidence of the parties; (c) the undertaking or
bail of the accused; (d) the order of release of the accused and cancellation of his bail
bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of the complaint.
Should the provincial or city fiscal disagree with the findings of the investigating
judge on the existence of probable cause, the fiscals ruling shall prevail, but he must
explain his action in writing furnishing the parties with copies of his resolution, not
later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the records from the judge. If the accused is
detained, the fiscal shall order his release.
Respondent judges failure to transmit the resolution and records of the
cases disregards the clear mandate of Section 5 of Rule 112. Under this
provision, it is mandatory for the investigating judge to transmit to the
provincial or city prosecutor his resolution dismissing or admitting the
complaint, together with the entire records of the case.
A preliminary investigation is conducted to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
[12]
It is an executive, not a
judicial function. It falls under the authority of the prosecutor who is given by
law the power to direct and control all criminal actions. However, since there
are not enough fiscals and prosecutors to investigate the crimes committed in
all the municipalities all over the country, the government was constrained to
assign this function to judges of Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
[13]
Thus, when a municipal judge conducts preliminary
investigation, he performs a non-judicial function as an exception to his usual
duties. His findings, therefore, are subject to review by the provincial or city
prosecutor whose findings, in turn, may be reviewed by the Secretary of
Justice in appropriate cases. Hence, the investigating judge, after conducting
a preliminary investigation, must perform his ministerial duty to transmit within
ten (10) days the resolution of the case together with the entire records to the
provincial or city prosecutor.
[14]

It is true that the determination of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is a judicial function which is beyond the
reviewing power of the prosecutor. However, distinction should be made
between a preliminary inquiry for the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and a preliminary investigation to ascertain
whether or not a person should be held for trial. The first is a judicial function
while the second is an executive function.
[15]
Even if the investigating judge
finds no sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest, he is still duty-bound to
transmit the records to the provincial or city prosecutor. The prosecutors
reviewing power shall affect only his conclusion as to whether or not a criminal
complaint or information should be filed against the respondent, but not his
conclusion as to the propriety of issuing a warrant of arrest.
We now come to the warrants of arrest issued by the respondent judge.
The issuance of a warrant of arrest is addressed to the sound discretion of a
judge. Provided there is no grave abuse of discretion or malice, a mistake on
his part in the determination of probable cause will not subject him to
disciplinary action. He is nevertheless expected to follow strictly the
procedure laid down in the rules regarding its issuance. Failure to comply
with such procedure will make him administratively liable.
[16]
In the case at bar,
respondent judge issued several warrants of arrest without examining
the complainant and his witnesses in writing and under oath, in violation
of Section 6 of Rule 112 which provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. x x x
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial judge conducting the
preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of
the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that
a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant
of arrest.
The records show that respondent judge has violated the rules on
preliminary investigation and issuance of a warrant of arrest since the start of
his term as municipal judge in Batac, Ilocos Norte in September 1991. The
gross ignorance of respondent judge has immensely prejudiced the
administration of justice. Parties adversely affected by his rulings dismissing
their complaints after preliminary investigation have been denied their
statutory right of review that should have been conducted by the provincial
prosecutor. His practice of issuing warrants of arrest without examining the
complainants and their witnesses is improvident and could have unnecessarily
deprived the accused of their liberty however momentary it may be. Our
Constitution requires that all members of the judiciary must be of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence.
[17]
Respondent judges
stubborn adherence to improper procedures and his constant violation of the
constitutional provision requiring him to personally examine the complainant
and the witness in writing and under oath before issuing a warrant of arrest
makes him unfit to discharge the functions of a judge.
[18]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Judge Efren F. Albano
is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave credits and
retirement benefits and with disqualification for reemployment in the national
and local governments, as well as in any governmental instrumentality or
agency, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This decision is immediately executory and the respondent judge is further
ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his office upon
receipt of this Decision. Let a copy be entered in the personal records of the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. R-192-RTJ January 9, 1987
ATTY. ARTURO A. ROMERO, complainant,
vs.
HON. JUDGE GABRIEL O. VALLE, JR., respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint dated November 28, 1984, Atty. Arturo A. Romero charged Judge Gabriel O.
Valle, Jr;. of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch XII with grave misconduct and
oppression. In the words of complainant himself, the acts complained of consisted in:
5. That instead of directing complainant to proceed with the marking of exhibits and
to continue the direct examination, respondent continued to utter embarrassing
remarks which hurt complainant and, therefore, the latter tried to make further
explanations on said exhibits and to defend his integrity in a controlled and respectful
manner, but his honor, the respondent judge suddenly banged his gavel producing
such a deafening noise that several persons from the adjoining branches of the Court
came: that without declaring a recess, said respondent judge unceremoniously
REMOVED his coat and told, angrily, herein complainant: "You step out and we will
finish the matter"; immediately thereafter, respondent judge stepped down from the
rostrum and left;
6. That, shaken and stunned by such sudden aggressive behaviour of respondent,
complainant then stood by his seat, and as some people in the Courtroom rushed out
of the Courtroom, complainant looked around and then saw respondent judge
outside the courtroom holding a gun with his right hand, in front of him, facing
towards complainant, in an angry and menacing manner, and waited for complainant
to go outside; confronted by such alarming and threatening stance of respondent,
complainant could not move for a moment, as complainant was totally unarmed,
surprised and shocked; and when complainant saw respondent Judge briskly walked
to and fro still holding a gun, complainant then asked the Court stenographer:
"Please put in the record that the Judge is holding a gun"; that luckily thereafter, Atty.
Isidro Madamba, member of the Sangunian Panlalawigan, succeeded in pacifying
respondent judge and shortly, said respondent returned to the Court; that after some
remarks by respondent judge, complainant moved that the Honorable respondent
voluntarily inhibit himself from further trying the case in the light of the antecedents,
but denied it and ordered the resetting of the case;
1

Required to comment on the complaint, respondent judge denied the charges and branded the same
as "exaggerated, sensationalized, fabricated and inherently improbable and contrary to human
experience and one-sided.
2
Respondent judge likewise explained that he has been issued by the
provincial commander the necessary permit to carry his licensed pistol outside his residence on account
of a threat on his life from the New People's Army. By way of prayer, he asked that complainant be
suspended from the practice of law for a certain period of time.
3

On January 31, 1985, the Court en banc resolved to refer the case to Associate Justice of the then
Intermediate Appeallate Court, Abdulwahid Bidin, for investigation, report and recommendation.
From the evidence adduced at the hearings, Associate Justice Bidin made the following findings of
facts and conclusions:
Complainant is one of the two counsels for plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6821 entitled
"Iglesia Filipina Independiente versus Rafael Albano, et. al.," for "Quieting of Title
with Preliminary Injunction," pending before the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte-
Laoag City, branch XII, presided by Respondent Judge.
During the trial of said case on November 19, 1984, complainant requested that an
inventory book of plaintiff be marked as Exhibit F. Respondent Judge interrupted the
complainant with a remark that the said inventory book should be marked Exh. G
since there is already an Exh. F of the plaintiff which was marked during the last
hearing of the case when complainant was absent. The fact that there was already
an Exh. F for the plaintiff was confirmed by the manifestation of Atty. Rafael Ruiz,
counsel for the defendant after verifying his notes as requested by respondent judge.
Nevertheless, the complainant in a loud voice insisted that his proposed marking of
the Exhibit is the correct one as the Exhibit F referred to by respondent judge and
Atty. Ruiz was not initialed by the Clerk of Court. This remark of complainant irritated
the respondent judge who retorted that complainant is not prepared for trial and
admonished the latter to be prepared with his trial brief before coming to court so that
he will not bangle (sic) the marking of his exhibit. As the complainant continued
insisting in a loud voice that his proposed marking of the inventory book as Exhibit F
is correct, despite the fact that respondent judge had admonished him [complainant]
not to bring his "passion" to the court and if complainant does not respect the Judge,
he should respect the court, the respondent banged his gavel left the rostrum and
went to his chamber. According to the complainant and his witness, [Atty. Andres
Tunac, co-counsel of complainant in the case], the respondent, before leaving the
rostrum made this remark to complainant "You step out. We finish the matter."
Respondent denied having made the challenge to complainant and alleged that what
he said or declared before leaving the rostrum was "five minutes recess." This call for
a recess by respondent is confirmed and/or corroborated by Atty. Rafael Ruiz,
defendant's counsel in the case on trial and respondent's witness in this
investigation. From his chamber, respondent judge went to the stairs passing the
corridor holding his coat with his left hand while on his right hand he was holding a
hand gun [revolver] which was inside its holster. As respondent walked on the
corridor towards the stairs, he looked at the courtroom where the lawyers were. Upon
reaching the stairs, respondent was informed by his clerk that there are still cases in
the calendar ready for trial. Respondent returned to his chamber and placed his gun
inside his table. Later, respondent came out to resume his court session.
At the resumption of the trial, the complainant stood up and asked the respondent to
inhibit himself from hearing the case. The respondent required the complainant to put
his request in writing and dictated an order resetting the case to another date. The
case [Civil Case No. 6821], is now transferred to another judge who presides over
Branch XIII.
Respondent claims that he is authorized to carry his licensed pistol outside of his
residence as evidenced by the Certification issued by the Provincial Commander of
Ilocos Norte [Exh. 7] and that he had been carrying the said gun from his house to
office and back ever since he received a letter threat dated March 22, 1984 [Exh. 1 ]
from the NPA.
According to Atty. Leandro Rafales [complainant's own witness] and who appears
with [sic] the most impartial among the witnesses, the respondent stood up, bang
[sic] his gavel and left the rostrum because the complainant did not stop making
remarks and insisted in a loud voice in marking the inventory book as Exhibit F
despite the fact that it has been established that there was already an Exhibit F of the
plaintiff and that before banging the gavel respondent judge told the complainant not
to bring his passion to court and if complainant does not respect the Judge, he
should respect the court. Atty. Rafales also testified that respondent judge did not
remove his coat when he left the rostrum and while respondent was holding his gun
which was inside its holster with his right hand when he came out of his chamber on
his way towards the stairs, the gun was not pointed at anyone, although the
respondent turned his face towards the people inside the courtroom as he walked
towards the stairs.
As regards the charge that respondent challenged the complainant to step out and
we settle the matter the evidence is inconclusive. While the complainant and his co-
counsel, Atty. Tunac testified that the respondent Judge uttered those statements,
the latter and Atty. Rafael Ruiz [defendant's counsel and witness for respondent]
denied that such statement was made by respondent. Both respondent and Atty.
Ruiz allege that what respondent said or declared before leaving the rostrum was
"five minute recess." On the other hand, Atty. Rafales testified that what he heard
from respondent-judge was "step out" only. The transcript of the proceedings that
took place before respondent judge on that fateful day had not been presented as
evidenced [sic] by the parties at this investigation. In view of this conflicting testimony
of the witnesses, the undersigned cannot conclude that respondent judge challenged
the complainant as alleged in the complaint.
4

It is evident from the foregoing that complainant and respondent judge are equally to blame for the
incident under consideration. We have enunciated in the case of Lugue vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165,
that:
It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the high esteem
and regard for courts. Any act on the part of one or the other that tends to undermine
the people's respect for, and confidence in, the administration of justice is to be
avoided. And this, even if both may have to restrain pride from taking the better part
of their system. To be expected then of petitioner and respondent is a sense of
shared responsibility, a crucial factor in the administration of justice. ...
The relations between counsel and judge should be based on-mutual respect and on a deep
appreciation by one of the duties of the other.
5
Thus, counsel is expected to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial of officers.
6
Although allowed some latitude of
remarks or comment in the furtherance of causes he upholds,
7
his arguments, written or oral, should
be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed
by one gentleman to another.
8
Certainly, and most especially in our culture, raising one's voice is a
sign of disrespect, improper to one whose "investiture into the legal profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior
towards the courts."
9

Complainant is an active law practitioner in the province of Ilocos Norte. He was director of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Ilocos Norte-Laoag City Chapter in 1982, Chairman of the Legal
Aid Committee of said chapter, president of PHILCONSA, Ilocos Norte-Laoag City Chapter from
1981-83 and president of the Ilocos Norte Lions Club in 1983. 10 As a recognized community leader,
complainant should provide an example in proper court decorum to his brothers in the profession,
and not to foment discord in the courtroom. Considering complainant's obvious high standing in the
legal profession and the community, he should have observed humility to accept mistakes graciously
and to treat the same as the proverbial learning experience.
On the other hand, respondent judge exhibited shortness of temper and impatience, contrary to the
duties and restrictions imposed upon him by reason of his office. 11 In Calalang vs. Fernandez, Adm.
Case No. 175-J, June 10, 1971, We stated that a judge should show no shortness of temper for it
merely detracts from the equanimity and judiciousness that should be the constant marks of a
dispenser of justice. In the case at bar, respondent judge, in losing his temper and engaging
complainant in a heated discussion, not only failed to observe the proper decorum expected of
judicial officers, but as a consequence thereof likewise failed to preserve and enforce order in his
court. Precisely, judicial officers are given contempt powers in order that without being arbitrary,
unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to
the court. Respondent judge could very well have cited complainant in contempt of court instead of
indulging in tantrums by banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and unceremoniously walking
out of the courtroom.
Respondent judge appears to have a valid explanation for gun, but such explanation cannot be
taken as carrying a satisfactory. for his having chosen to carry the same in plain view of the
complainant and other lawyers inside the courtroom when he came out of his chambers on his way
to the stairs. Taken in the light of what had just transpired, the actuation of respondent judge was not
an innocent gesture, but one calculated to instill fear in or intimidate complainant. We cannot let this
pass unnoticed. Respondent judge's behavior constitutes grave misconduct. It is a serious violation
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which require that a "judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his every day life, should be beyond
reproach." 12 Moreover, it reveals an attitude diametrically opposed to our pronouncement in De la
Paz v. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540. that "the judge is the visible representation of law, and more
importantly, of justice." Certainly, one who lives by the uncivilized precept of "might is right," is
unworthy of an office entrusted with the duty to uphold the rule of law.
WHEREFORE, Judge Gabriel O. Valle, Jr. is found guilty of grave misconduct and is hereby ordered
DISMISSED from the service, without forfeiture of retirement benefits but with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.
Complainant Atty. Arturo A. Romero is required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court, within fifteen (15) days from
notice.
The decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, CJ., Feria, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras
and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., is on leave.