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GARCIA v RECIO

DOCTRINE:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to
our law on evidence.

FACTS:
March 1, 1987 Recio, Filipino married Editha Samson, an Australian national in Malabn
Rizal.
May 18, 1989 - a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
Recio became a Australian citizen
Jan 12, 1994 Garcia, Filipina and Recio were married in Cabanatuan City. In the marriage
application, Recio declared as single and Filipino
March 3, 1998 Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
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in the RTC
Cabanatuan on the ground of bigamy (Garcia only found out the Recio was previously [and
still subsisting] married only in 1997).
o Recio contends that his first marriage has been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
in Australia in 1989 hence, he is legally capacitated to marry Garcia

RTC: dissolved the marriage and declared the parties to be capacitate to remarry. The divorce
issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. The decision is based on the
divorce decree and NOT on bigamy

ISSUES:
1. WON the divorce decree ipso facto terminated Recios first marriage? NO
2. WON Recio was legally capacitated to marry Garcia? CASE IS REMANDED

HELD:

One of the Petitioners contention is that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the
place where the marriage was performed.

Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

There is no showing in the case
at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

It is possible that even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."


This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did NOT absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

In addition, petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According
to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law
of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A
duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on
the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.


As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to
marry petitioner.

We cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's
contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was
really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we
believe that the most judicious course is to REMAND this case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing
in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines.

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
respondents.

DOCTRINE: (In addition, please see notes below)

A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or
more states is said to contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is
inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined
to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.

The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply
consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or
that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In
other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.


FACTS:

Morada isa Flight Attendant of Saudi Arabian Airlines (herein Saudia). During a lay-over in
Jakarta, Indonesia, together with 2 male crew members, Thamer and Allah (both Saudi
nationals), the 3 went to a disco dance. They went home almost morning and agreed to have
breakfast together at Thamers room. Thereafter, Allah went out on some pretext, and this is
where Thamer attempted to rape Morada. Fortunately, the roomboy and security personnel hear
Moradas cry and rescued her. The 2 men were arrested by police (Allah as an accomplice).

Morada returned to Jeddah and Saudia official interrogated her about the incident. Saudia
requested Morada to return to Jakarta to help arrange the release of the 2 men. The negotiation
of Saudia with the police failed due to Moradas refusal to cooperate. She reasoned out that she
was afraid that she might be tricked because of her inability to understand the local language.
She also refused to sign a blank document. She was the allowed by Saudia to return to Jeddah
but barred her from Jakarta flights.

Morada learned that after 2 week of detention, the men were released and were put in service
again by the airline. Meanwhile, Morada was transferred to Manila. 2 years after (1992), she
was requested to go back to Jeddah and see Mr. Ali Meniewy, the legal officer of Saudia. She
was pressured to drop the case against the 2 men and her passport was not given to her until
she did so. In 1993 she then was asked to see Mr. Ali Meniew. A certain Khalid brought her to
Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. She was told that the
document was necessary for the dropping of the case against the men however, it turned out
that it was a notice to her to appear before the court. She went to a series of investigation which
she was told that it will not be prejudicial on her part.

When she came back to the court, she was surprised that a decision was rendered and read to
her in English. She was convicted, together with Thamer and Allah of adultery, going to a disco,
dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and socializing with the male
crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. She was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and
286 laches. No help was given by Saudia to reverse her conviction. Prince of Makkah
dismissed her case and was allowed to return to Manila. Shortly after, Saudia terminated her
without informing her of the cause.

Morada filed a complaint of damages against Saudia in RTC Quezon City. Denying Saudias
Motion to Dismiss, it filed and MR alleging that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try
the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Respondent Judge denied its MR.

CA: ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended
Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly
within the jurisdiction of respondent Court

Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset. It
maintains that private respondent's claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the
application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi
rule.
Morada contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law.

ISSUES:

WON Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and try the civil case filed by Morada? Yes
WON this case involves conflict of laws? YES

HELD:

We agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a "conflicts" case.

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a
resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also,
by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events
did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from
Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation
to arise.

We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise.
conflicts problem presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction
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confronts the court a
quo.

It is important to note that Moradas Amended Aomplaint is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code. Thus, we agree with private respondent's assertion that violations of Articles 19 and
21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.

Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on
jurisdiction we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. In addition, both parties have submitted
jurisdiction over their person by filing several motions.

Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor
of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant.
Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and
obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient
forum, "vex", "harass", or "oppress" the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense
or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice
of forum should rarely be disturbed.

The court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take
cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial
action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial
connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor"
or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus
occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could
be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is
because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here.

NOTES:
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal
system regulate the situation.

Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should
ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both
notions of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the
problem of deciding which of these two important values should be stressed.

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain
set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of
qualification". It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question
specified in a conflicts rule."
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The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select
the proper law.

Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or
operative fact.
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An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting
factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such
as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of
the res, the place of celebratio, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the
determination of the applicable law.
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These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting
factors" could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his
origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In
particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a
contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The
lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance
of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex
fori the law of the forum is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier,
matters of "procedure" not going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by
it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable
foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under
one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships
of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships
particularly contracts of affreightment.
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(Emphasis ours.)

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