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POLITICAL LAW 2014

I. CONSTITUTION & AMENDMENTS
1. Constitution as a Social Contract
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUZ
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitation on the
exercise of the specific powers of the President, it maintains
intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
the executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. Having sword to defend and
uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation
under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in
mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of
power is also a social contract whereby the people have
surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for common
good. The State, through the Government, is not precluded
from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence
if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become
serious and direct.
2. Ways of Proposing Amendments
SANTIAGO VS COMELEC
Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a
Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of
elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then,
upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary
publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation,
and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners
and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec
1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for
prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.)
the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the
constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.)
RA 6735indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely,
initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local
legislation.
The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for
in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically
made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission
indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by
former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include
initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so whether
the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative
on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately
inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the
Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least there per centum of the
registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right This provision is
obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be
passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Con-Con stated without implementing legislation Section 2,
Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending
the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on
Congressional action.
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Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
constitution until Congress provides for its implementation.
The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally
guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide
for its implementation.
***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20,
2006 when ten justices of the
SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such
initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which
reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as
shown by their various opinions already given when the
Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735
is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a
peoples initiative.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite on their petition for an initiative to amend the
Constitution by adopting a unicameral-parliamentary form of
government and providing for transitory provisions. They
claimed that their petition was supported by at least 12% of
the registered voters, with each legislative district being
represented by at least 3% of its registered voter.
Held: Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements of the
Constitution for conducting an initiative. First, two essential
elements must be present. The people must sign the entire
proposal, and the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who
express their assent by signing such proposal in a petition. The
signature requirement would be meaningless if the person
supplying the signature has not first seen what he is signing.
Second the proposed changes mandate the interim parliament
to make further amendments or revisions of the Constitution.
Third, an initiative to change the Constitution applies only to
amendment and not revision. Revision broadly implies a
change that alters a basic principle in the Constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks and balance. The initiative of petitioners is a revision
and not merely an amendment. Fourth, RA 5735 provides that
the people must sign the petition. The 6.3 million signatories
did not sign the petition. Only petitioners and their counsel
signed the petition.
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN REVISION AND AMENDMENT
REVISION AMENDMENT
Broadly implies a change that
alters a basic principle in the
Constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of
powers or the system of
checks and balances.
Broadly refers to a change
that adds, reduces, deletes,
without altering the basic
principle involved.
If the change alters the
substantial entirety of the
Constitution.

Generally affects several
provisions of the
Constitution.
Generally affects only the
specific provision being
amended.

TW0-PART TEST must be satisfied by peoples initiative
1. Quantitative test- It asks whether the proposed change is
so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court examines
only the number of provisions affected and does not consider
the degree of the change; and
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2. Qualitative test- It inquires into the qualitative effects of
the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is
whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to
amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the
structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry
TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
Attempt of the Constitutional Convention to submit for
ratification one resolution (reducing the voting age from
21 to 18) in a plebiscite to coincide with the 1971 local
elections was declared unconstitutional.
When the Constitutional Convention is called for the
purpose of revising the Constitution, it may not submit for
ratification piecemeal amendments because the 1935
Constitution speaks of submission of the proposed
amendments in an election (singular) and also because to
allow the submission would deprive the people of a proper
frame of reference.
The use of the word election in the singular meant that
the entire Constitution must be submitted for ratification
at one plebiscite only; furthermore, the people have to be
given a proper frame of reference in arriving at their
decision; thus, the submission for ratification of piece-meal
amendments by the constitutional Convention ( which is
tasked to revise the Constitution) was disallowed since the
people had, at that time, no idea yet of what the rest of
revised Constitution would be.
DOCTRINE OF FAIR & PROPER SUBMISSION
Doctrine of proper submission because the Constitution itself
prescribes the time frame within which the plebiscite is to be
held, there can no longer be a question on whether the time
given to the people to determine the merits and demerits of
the proposed amendment is adequate.
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy if a law or contract
violates any norm of the Constitution, the law or contract,
whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons , is null and void and
without force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract (Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS).
BAUTISTA VS COMELEC
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS
II. IMMUNITY OF STATE FROM SUIT
3. Suability and Liability; Meaning
BASIS: There can be no legal right against the authority which
makes the law on which the right depends (Republic v. Villasor).
However, it may be sued if it gives consent, whether express or
implied. This doctrine is also known as the Royal Prerogative of
Dishonesty.
4. APPLICATION TO
(a) OTHER STATES
SANDERS VS VERIDIANO
Exceptions when the public officer may be sued without
the prior consent of the State:
1. To COMPEL him to do an act required by LAW;
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2. To RESTRAIN him from enforcing an act claimed to be
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
3. To COMPEL the PAYMENT OJF DAMAGES from an
already appropriated assurance fund or to REFUND
tax-overpayments from the fund already available for
the purpose;
4. To SECURE a judgment that the officer impleaded may
satisfy by himself WITHOUT THE STATE HAVING TO DO
A POSITIVE ACT to assist him
5. Where the GOVERNMENT itself VIOLATED its own
LAW, because the doctrine of state immunity cannot
be used to perpetrate an injustice.
USA VS RUIZ
Facts: US invited bids for the repairs of the military base in
Subic. Respondent, who submitted a bid, was asked to confirm
the price proposals and to submit the name of its bonding
company. Respondent complied with the request. Later on, the
projects were awarded to somebody else. Respondent sued
the US for specific performance on the ground that the request
was an acceptance pursuant to bidding practices of US
Held: US is immune from suit without its consent. While
immunity extends only to government acts and does not
extend to proprietary acts, no tacit consent to be sued can be
deemed to have given in this case. The contracts relate to the
exercise of the sovereign functions of the US. The projects
were integral part of the naval bases devoted to the defense of
US and Philippines.
*the contract for the repair of wharves was a contract in JUS
IMPERII, because the wharves were to be used in national
defense, a government function.
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear
and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary
implication
EQUALITY OF ALL NATIONS Par in parem non habet
imperium.
RECIPROCITY
(b) UNINCORPORATED AGENCIES AND INCORPORATED AGENCIES
If incorporated: suability is found in the charter.
If unincorporated: inquire into principal function of the
agency
If governmental: no waiver.
If proprietary: there is waiver.
SSS VS CA : GOCC, being incorporated has its own charter. If its
charter provides that it has the right to sue and be sued, it is an
express consent and it is suable. This includes a suit for tort.
MALONG VS PNR if its charter is silent, inquire into its
function based on the purpose for which it was created
Facts: Petitioner sued respondent for damages because their
son was killed when he fell from a train operated by
respondent. Respondent claimed that it is immune from suit.
Held: Respondent is not immune from suit. Under its charter, it
has all the powers of a corporation. Every corporation has the
power to sue and be sued. Besides, the State divested itself of
its sovereign capacity when it entered into a commercial
business by organizing respondent as a common carrier.
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(c) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
PROCESS OF SUGGESTION
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of
"suggestion," where the foreign state or the international
organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary
of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to
immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is
immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to
submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is
entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is
followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that
effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I
International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of
Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale
Law Journal 1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or
the international organization to first secure an executive
endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity.
But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement
to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the
respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed
diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino,
48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the
trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1
(1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the
Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City,
Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor
General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and
Memorandum as amicus curiae
(d) PUBLIC OFFICERS
REPUBLIC VS SANDOVAL
Facts: As a result of a clash between the group of
demonstrators and anti-riot squad, 12 demonstrators were
killed due to gunshots. Several others were wounded.
Petitioners filed an action for damages against the officers and
personnel involved in the incident. The latter invoke State
immunity from suit.
Held: Although military officers and personnel were
discharging their official functions when the incident occurred,
their functions ceased to be official when they exceeded their
authority. There was unnecessary firing in dispersing the
demonstrators. The military officers and personnel cannot
invoke the immunity of the state from suit to escape liability
TEST: whether the public officer is performing an official
function and within the limits of their authority as public
official
(e) LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS CA
Facts: Petitioner filed an expropriation case against
respondent. It opened a bank account and deposited the
advance payment for the property. Judgment was rendered
fixing the compensation for the property and ordering
petitioner to pay the just compensation minus the advance
payment. Upon finality of the decision, respondent asked the
issuance of writ of execution. As a result, the funds of
petitioner deposited in another account with the same bank
were garnished.
Held: The funds deposited in the second bank account were
public funds. Public funds are not subject to levy and
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garnishment. The remedy is to file a petition for mandamus to
compel the approval of an ordinance appropriating funds to
pay the money judgment.
CALOOCAN CITY VS ALLARDO
All government funds deposited with any official depository
bank of the Philippine government by any of its agencies and
instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit,
remain government funds and may not be subject to
garnishment or levy in the absence of a corresponding
appropriation as required by law. In this case the City of
Caloocan had already approved and passed ordinance 134
series 1992, allocating an amount for respondent Santiagos
back salaries plus interest. Thus, this case fell squarely within
the exception and the amount may therefore be garnished.
REMEDY: To file petition for mandamus to compel the
approval of ordinance appropriating funds.
III. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES & STATE POLICIES
5. DOCTRINE OF AUTOLIMITATIONS AND INCORPORATION
Doctrine of Auto-Limitation doctrine wherein the Philippines
adheres to the principle of international law as a limitation to the
exercise of its sovereignty. It means that any state may, by its
consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign
rights. A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise
of what is illimitable competence. There may thus be a curtailment
of what otherwise is a power plenary in character.
Doctrine of Incorporation generally accepted principles of
international law are automatically part of own laws.
TANADA VS ANGARA (Sovereignty is not a hermit type isolation
of a state)
Facts: The Philippines signed the agreement establishing the
WTO. Senate passed a resolution concurring in its ratification
by the President. Petitioners argued that the provision in the
agreement establishing the WTO requires members to ensure
that their law conform with their obligations in the annexed
agreement impairs Philippine sovereignty, since it prevents
Congress from enacting laws for the national interest or
general welfare if they will not conform with the agreement
establishing the WTO and derogates from the power to tax.
Held: The sovereignty of state cannot be absolute. It is subject
to limitations imposed by membership in the family of nations
and limitations imposed by treaties. The Constitution did not
envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of
the world. In section 2, Article 3, the Constitution adopts the
generally accepted principles.
ESPINA VS ZAMORA
The Court dismissed petitioners argument that Republic Act
No. 8762, known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 200,
violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos. The provisions of Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state
policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue
such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
Further, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
requires the development of a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipino
entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is
simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos
are given preference in all areas of development.
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6. FREE ACCESS TO PUBLIC SERVICE
PAMATONG VS COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for President.
COMELEC refused to give due course to his certificate
candidacy on the ground that he was a nuisance candidate,
since he could not wage a nationwide campaign and was
nominated or supported by a political party. Petitioner argued
that this violated his right to equal access to opportunities for
public service guaranteed under Section 26, Article 2 of the
Constitution.
Held: Section 26, Article 2 of the Constitution does not bestow
a right to seek the presidency nor elevate the privilege to the
level of an enforceable constitutional right and merely
specifies a guideline for legislative action. The provision is not
intended to compel the state to enact positive measures that
would accommodate as many as possible into public office.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public offices
may be subjected to limitation. One such valid limitation is the
provision of the Omnibus Election Code on nuisance
candidates.
7. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
PARAMETERS
Reinforced by:
a.) Freedom of Religious Clause
b.) Non-establishment of State religion clause;
c.) Religious sect cannot be registered as political party;
d.) No sectoral representative from religious sector
Exceptions:
1. Churches, parsonages, etc. actually, directly and
exclusively used for religious, charitable and
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation;
2. Optional religious instruction for public elementary
and high school students;
3. Prohibition against appropriation from sectarian
purposes except when priest, etc is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution or
government orphanage or leprosarium
4. Filipino ownership requirement for educational
institutions, except those established by religious
groups and mission board.
8. PARENS PATRIAE government as guardian of the rights of the
people
PEOPLE VS CASIPIT
9. TRANSPARENCY
LIMITATIONS
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the state
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest
VALMONTE VS BELMONTE
This case involves a request by petitioners from the General
Manager of the Government Service Insurance System to
furnish them a list of names of legislators who were able to
secure loans upon the guaranty of then First Lady Imelda
Marcos, as well as certified true copies of documents
evidencing the loans. In granting the petition for mandamus,
the Court said that the public nature of the loanable funds of
the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
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make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest
and concern. However, the right to access such records does
not accord them a right to compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in
their desire to acquire information or matters of public
concern.
10. RECOGNITION OF ROLE OF PRIVATE SECTOR
BOT
11. ROLE OF WOMEN AND YOUTH
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS
12. MEANING AND PURPOSE OF PRINCIPLE
Meaning: ordains that each of the 3 branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its
own constitutionally allocated sphere
Purpose: To prevent the concentration of authority in one person
or group of persons that might lead to irreparable error or abuse in
its exercise to the detriment of republican institutions.
13. BLENDING OF POWERS AND CHECKS & BALANCES
Principle of Blending of Powers: instances when powers are not
confined exclusively within one department but are assigned to or
shared by several departments
Checks and Balances: allows one department to resist
encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or
excesses committed by other departments
ARROYO VS DE VENECIA
ALBERTO VS CA (1/19/13)
No interference by judiciary of finding of probable cause by
DOJ; exception
14. POLITICAL QUESTIONS- those questions which under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislature or executive branches of government
V. DELEGATION OF POWERS
15. ETHICAL BASIS OF PRINCIPLE: delegated power constitutes not
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through
the instrumentality of his own judgment and not intervening mind
of another
REPUBLIC VS VILLASOR
16. PERMISSIBLE AREAS OF DELEGATION
(a) PRESIDENT
TARIFF & EMERGENCY POWERS
Tariff: The Congress may, by law, authorize and President to fix
within specified limits and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the government
Conditions on Emergency Power:
1. There must be war and other national emergency;
2. The delegation must be for a limited period;
3. The delegation must be subject to such restriction the
Congress prescribed;
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4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress
(b) LGUs
(c) ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES- power of subordinate legislation
GRANDE VS ANTONIO
Facts: Respondent [the father] filed a petition for judicial
approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with
the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the
minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document
acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his
children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of
parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration
of his childrens surname as Antonio.
Issue : Whether or not the respondent father could compel his
illegitimate children to use his surname,
Held: The Supreme Court ruled the father could not. ISC voided
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act
9255 insofar as the IRR makes it mandatory for the illegitimate
child to use the recognizing fathers surname, since this was
contrary to the express permissive wording of Republic Act
9255 amending Art 176 which states that illegitimate children
may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by the father.
(d) ABAKADA GURO VS PURISIMA
FACTS:Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and
contend that by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1)
transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection as it limits the scope of the law
to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the President the
power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and
(4) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by creating a
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the laws
implementing rules.
ISSUE:Is R.A. No. 9335 constitutional?
HELD:YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12
of the law which creates a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to review the laws IRR.
That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials
into bounty hunters and mercenaries is purely speculative as
the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on
officers and employees who are guilty of negligence, abuses,
malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause
violated since the law recognizes a valid classification as only
the BIR and BOC have the common distinct primary function of
revenue generation. There are sufficient policy and standards
to guide the President in fixing revenue targets as the revenue
targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection
expected of the BIR and the BOC.
SECRETARY OF FINANCE AS AGENT OF CONGRESS
(e) OSMENA VS ORBOS
Standard can be read from a law in pari materia with the law
Facts: On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956
creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as
the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed
to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and
imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate
adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of
crude oil.
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Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability
account," in virtue of E.O. 1024, and ordered released from the
National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.
Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive
Order No. 137 on February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds
for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost under
recovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic
prices of petroleum products, the amount of the under
recovery being left for determination by the Ministry of
Finance.
The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates
29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose
shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund was
created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any,
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . .
P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,'
not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special
tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated
therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only
for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another
government objective." Petitioner further points out that since
"a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the
taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State,
although the use thereof is limited to the special
purpose/objective for which it was created."
He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority"
to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article VI of the Constitution, viz.:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix,
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government;
and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the
power of taxation, "the limits, limitations and restrictions must
be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to
tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also
impose a specific limit on how much to tax.
Issue: Whether or Not the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1
(c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137,
for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power
to the Energy Regulatory Board.
Held: With regard to the alleged undue delegation of
legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring
the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on
petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which
the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general
policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing
and subsidizing domestic pump rates, 8(c) of P.D. 1956
expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to
augment the resources of the Fund.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite,
quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit on how much to
tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on
the premise that what is involved here is the power of
taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What is
here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police
power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose
additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power
of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding
consideration is to enable the delegate to act with expediency
in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced
by the police power of the State.
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The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors
involved in the determination of the price of oil and petroleum
products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment
or exhaust the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of
fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the
petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond
effectively so as to mitigate or avoid the undesirable
consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is
expressed suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the
delegated power, taking account of the circumstances under
which it is to be exercised.
(f) MAKALINTAL VS COMELEC
Facts: Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions
the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A.
9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following
grounds, among others: (a)That the provision that a Filipino
already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to
participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it
dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the
election; (b)That the provision allowing the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it
affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning
candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional
because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is
empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are
required to physically reside in the Philippines within the
period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as
understood in election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile
(insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the
place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an
immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to
return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the
Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee
voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the
affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the
intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the
proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and
presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing
and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential
elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way
transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
17. TESTS TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF DELEGATION OF POWERS
SUFFICIENT STANDARDS- map out the boundaries of delegates
authority by defining legislative policy and indicating
circumstances under which it is to be pursued
COMPLETENESS- law must be complete in all essential terms
and conditions so that there is nothing for the delegate to do
except to enforce it
PEOPLE VS DACUYCUY Incomplete
Facts: Respondent was charged with violation of Section 32 of
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Respondent
argued that the provision was unconstitutional, because it
stated that the penalty would be fine of P.100.00- P.1, 000.00
or imprisonment in the discretion of the court. Since the
provision did not prescribe the minimum and maximum
periods of the imprisonment, it constituted an undue
delegation of legislative power.
Page 12 of 119

Held: The provision in question provides for an indeterminate
period of imprisonment with neither a minimum nor a
maximum duration having been set by the legislature. The
courts are given wide latitude to fix the term of imprisonment
without any sufficient standard. It vests in the courts a power
which is essentially legislative in character. The penalty of
imprisonment is therefore unconstitutional.
YNOT VS CA Incomplete
Facts: EO 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and
carabeef from one province to another, directed the
confiscation of carabaos and carabeef transported in violation
of the executive order and ordered the distribution to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions of the
confiscated carabeef and of the distribution to deserving
farmers of the confiscated carabaos the government may see
fit. The carabaos of the petitioner were confiscated for
violation of the executive order while he was transporting
them to Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of the executive order.
Held: There is no standard that the officials must observe in
determining to whom to distribute the confiscated carabaos
and carabeef. There is thus an invalid delegation of legislative
powers.
DISINI, J. VS SEC OF JUSTICE (2/11/14) Constitutionality of
Cybercrime Prevention Act 2012
Doctrine: The strict scrutiny standard provides that a legislative
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.
The burden is on the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest
and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental
purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not
be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject
broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.
In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly
intruded into the zones of privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and if so, whether that expectation has been violated
by unreasonable government intrusion.
Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is
not accorded the same level of protection as that given to
other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection. Unsolicited advertisements
are legitimate forms of expression.
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, those
who pressed Like, Comment and Share are essentially knee-
jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly
of their response to the original posting. However, if the
Comment does not merely react to the original posting but
creates an altogether new defamatory story, then that should
be considered an original posting published on the internet.
Formulation of cyber security plan is consistent with policy to
prevent and combat cyber offenses by facilitating their
detection, investigation and prosecution at the domestic and
international levels. This policy is adopted in the interest of law
and order which is considered as sufficient standard.
Cybercrime law is complete when it directs the Cybercrime
Investigation & Coordinating Center to formulate and
implement a national cybercrime plan.
Cyber security refers to tools, policies, risk management
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and
Page 13 of 119

technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment &
organizations and users assets.
Definition as parameter for CICC to formulate the plan.
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
18. QUALIFICATIONS
BENGZON VS HRET
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this
case, in view of the constitutional requirement that no person
shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is
a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born
in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz
enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)]
section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in
the armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine
citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in
1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost
Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)].
He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd
District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of
the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in
the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63
enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who
lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship
will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
Page 14 of 119

citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place
where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as
the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
AQUINO VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati
City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered
political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec.
6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less
than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by
Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution.

HELD: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must
prove that he has established not just residence but domicile
of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections,
indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the
same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At
that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered
voter of the same district. His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What
stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile
of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent
certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion,
Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati
City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of
petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of ones original domicile.
Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from
Tarlac to Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly supported
by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear
and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
19. BILLS; TITLE
TOBIAS VS ABALOS
Facts: Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district
until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City
to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in
question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by
invoking their right as tax payers and residents of
Mandaluyong.
Page 15 of 119

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of
Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of Mandaluyong
to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in
effect.
Issues: WON RA 7675 is in:
1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution
regarding 'one subject one bill rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number
of members of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating the
legislative districts.
Held:Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court
dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art
VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with
such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and
all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided
by law" was enforced justifying the act of the legislature to
increase the number of the members of the congress.\Article
VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself
which drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district.
20. DOCTRINE OF ORIGINATION
ALVAREZ VS GUINGONA
Facts: In April 1993, HB 8817 (An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City
to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the HOR. In
May 1993, a Senate bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content
with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate. In January
1994, the HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February
1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In
March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government
rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it
was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817
became a law (RA 7720). Now Alvarez et al are assailing the
constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill
creating the law did not originate from the lower house and
that the Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at
least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the
computation of the reported average income of
P20,974,581.97 included the IRA which should not be.

ISSUES:
1.Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally
from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the
computation of an LGUs income.

HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill
as the record shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any
hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1
st
, 2
nd
and 3
rd

reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1
st
hearing
on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the
Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an
LGUs average annual income as was done in the case at bar.
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the
gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The
IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the local
government unit. They thus constitute income which the local
government can invariably rely upon as the source of much
needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is
there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or
transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all
its own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers
referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from
Page 16 of 119

the national government, its instrumentalities and
government-owned-or-controlled corporations.

BILLS THAT SHOULD ORIGINATE FROM THE LOWER HOUSE;
MEANING (A-P-R-I-L)
BILLS THAT BECOME LAWS WITHOUT SIGNATURE OF THE
PRESIDENT
21. INHIBITIONS
LIBAN VS GORDON
FACTS: In 1947, President Roxas signed R.A. 95, otherwise
known as the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Charter.
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva
Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization
for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Red Cross
Convention.

The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary,
humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely,
effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the
most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race,
religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC
provides 6 major services: Blood Services, Disaster
Management, Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing,
Social Services and Voluntary Service.
Liban et al. are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon
City Red Cross Chapter. In 2006, during Gordons incumbency
as a member of the Senate, he was elected Chairman of the
PNRC Board of Governors.

Liban et al.s position: In Camporedondo v. NLRC, it was held
that the PNRC is a GOCC. In accepting and holding the position
of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, Gordon has
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. Incumbent
national legislators lose their elective posts upon their
appointment to another government office.

Gordons position:
(1) He has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past
40 years. He was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having
been elected Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005.
2) PNRC is not a GOCC
(3) The prohibition under Art. 6, 13 of the Constitution does
not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the
PNRC is neither an office nor an employment

ISSUE: Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a
government office or an office in a GOCC.

HELD: NO. PNRC IS A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION PERFORMING PUBLIC
FUNCTIONS.
22. HRET & SET
Composition:
a.) 3 Supreme Court Justices designated by the Chief Justice; and
b.) 6 members of the Chamber concerned (Senate or HR) chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from political
parties and parties registered under the party-list system.
Senior Justice shall act as Chairman.
Members of the Electoral Tribunals are appointed by the house
concerned. Under Section 17, Article 4 of the Constitution, each
chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose within
constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would
occupy the limits, who among their members would occupy the
allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal
Page 17 of 119

Nature: Non-partisan court. It must be independent of Congress
and devoid of partisan influence and consideration. Disloyalty to
the party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for
expulsion of a member.
Security of Tenure of Members: Membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause,
such as the expiration of the members congressional term of
office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the
political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with
another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member
may not be expelled by the HR for party disloyalty short of proof
that he has formally affiliated with another political group.
Jurisdiction and Power of Electoral Tribunals:
1. Sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualification of their respective members

Once a winning candidate has been (i) proclaimed, (ii) taken his
oath; (ii) assumed office as a member of HOR, COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to election, returns
and qualifications ends and HRETs own jurisdiction begins.

Electoral Tribunal have no jurisdiction over pre-proclamation
controversies which come under the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC.

When there has been proclamation and a defeated candidate
claims to be a winner, Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.

Mere filing of a motion to withdraw protest, without any
action on the part of tribunal, did not divest it of jurisdiction.
An election protest is impressed with public interest in the
sense that the public is interested in knowing what happened
in the elections. For this reason, private interest must yield to
the common good.

HRET decides whether a party-list representative is qualified.
But the COMELEC can decide a party-list organization is
qualified to join the party-list system.

The decisions of the electoral tribunal may be reviewed by SC
only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion in a petition for
certiorari filed under Rule 65, ROC.

2. Rule-making power
PET SET Congress and
COMELEC
Jurisdiction The sole judge of
all contests
relating to the
election returns
and
qualifications of
the President
and Vice
President
The sole judge of
all contests
relating to the
election returns
and
qualifications of
members of
Senate
Congress and
COMELEC en
banc shall
determine only
the authenticity
and due
execution of the
certificate of
canvass
Exercise of
Jurisdiction
Can only be
invoked once the
winning
presidential/ vice
presidential
candidates have
been proclaimed
Can only be
invoked once the
winning
senatorial
candidates have
been proclaimed
Congress and
COMELEC en
banc shall
exercise its
power before
the proclamation
of the winning
presidential, vice
presidential and
senatorial
candidates

Page 18 of 119

23. POWER ON TREATIES
PIMENTEL VS SEC OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ET AL
FACTS: On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute was opened for
signature at its headquarter in New York. On December 28,
2000, three days before its deadline for signing, the Philippines
through its Charge d Affairs, Enrique A. Manalo signed the
Statute. By its provision, however, it is requiring that it be
ratified by the accepting states.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, file this petition to compel the Hon.
Alberto Romulo (Executive Secretary) and Hon. Blas Ople
(Department of Foreign Affairs) respondents in this case to
transmit the signed document to the Senate for ratification.
Hon. Alberto Romulo and Hon. Blas Ople, on the other hand,
argue that they as representative of the Executive Department
have no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for
concurrence.
ISSUE: Who has the power to ratify the Rome Statute?
HELD: The President, being the head of state, is regarded as
the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
countys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys
mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the
President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign
states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.
The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
President to submit to Senate a treaty for concurrence is a
political question
VINUYA VS ROMULO
FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the
Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-
stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC,
established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of
rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the
Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the
Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG,
requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of
the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials
of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners,
and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by
Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a)
declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war
crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the
respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its
nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San
Page 19 of 119

Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the
Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for
former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were
implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse
of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING: Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law
Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners
claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of
foreign relations. It is well-established that the conduct of the
foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislativethe political
departments of the government, and the propriety of what
may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex,
and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should
be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people
whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political
questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to
construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to
the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of
knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and
especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of
diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up
petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign
policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region.
For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by
a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a
general principle, where such an extraordinary length of time
has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our
consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion
to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim
against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the
petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis
if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary.
Page 20 of 119

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means
available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is able
to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals
behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may
exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to
whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State
is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf
it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately
protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they
can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a
view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these
questions remain within the province of municipal law and do
not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes
obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not
shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace
was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of
international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has
attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in
international law has been used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the community of states as
a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the
obligations of a State towards the international community as
a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to
norms that command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory,
do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority
NICOLAS VS ROMULO (VFA a mere implementation of a
previous treaty, the Mutual Defense Treaty; no need for
Senates concurrence.)
FACTS: Herein respondent, Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, is a
member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged
with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, Suzette S.
Nicolas.
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States, the United
States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith
pending the proceedings.
During the trial, the US Government faithfully complied with its
undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every
time his presence was required.
Eventually, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision,
finding defendant Smith guilty. He shall serve his sentence in
the facilities that shall be agreed upon by appropriate
Philippine and United States pursuant to the VFA. Pending
agreement on such facilities, accused is hereby temporarily
committed to the Makati City Jail.
However, defendant was taken out of the Makati jail by a
contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, and brought
to a facility for detention under the control of the United
Page 21 of 119

States government, provided for under new agreements
between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as
the Romulo-Kenney Agreement. This agreement provides that
in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed,
Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to United
States military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of
Smith because if they would allow such transfer of custody of
an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule
of procedure for that accused. The equal protection clause of
the Constitution is also violated.
ISSUE: Whether or Not there is a violation of the equal
protection clause.
HELD: The equal protection clause is not violated, because
there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a
member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter
our territory and all other accused.
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces
allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local
jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of
Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the
world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation
of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But
the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise
jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the
extent agreed upon by the parties.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the
power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or
violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered
around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of
one State do not extend or apply except to the extent agreed
upon to subjects of another State due to the recognition of
extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting
foreign armed forces.
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that
there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as
against custody.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference
between custody during the trial and detention after
conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement
to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states
not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities
agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the
detention shall be "by Philippine authorities." Therefore, the
Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006,
which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the
United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself
because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities."
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and
negotiate with representatives of the United States towards an
agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities
as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.
The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of
the Philippines and the United States, is UPHELD as
constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements are
DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.
24. POWER TO INVESTIGATE
BENGZON VS BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
Petitioners sought to enjoin the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee from requiring them to testify on the alleged
sale of Kokoy Romualdez of his equity to Lopa Group of
Companies. Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech
discussing the alleged takeover of Lopa of SOLOIl Inc.,
Page 22 of 119

which is the flagship of First manila Management of
Companies. He accused Lopa of violating the anti-graft law
for having been intervened in the transaction with the
government despite the fact that he is relative of the
president.
SC ruled that the inquiry must be in aid of legislation. Since
the speech of Enrile contained suggestion of contemplated
legislation. He merely called upon the Senate to look into
the possible violation by Lopa of the anti-graft law.
SC also ruled that inasmuch there is already a pending case
before the SB which involves the petitioners and the issues
therein are intimately related to subject of the proposed
inquiry, the continuance of the inquiry of the Committee
will be encroachment on the judiciary.
ROMERO VS ESTRADA ET AL
The sub judice rule is embodied in the broad language of Rule
71, Section 3(d) of the Rules of Court. That section provides
that *a+ny improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice is
punishable as indirect contempt. As stated in the case of
Romero, et al. v. Estrada, et al. (G.R. No. 174105, 2 April 2009),
the rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing
the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. This
rule applies not only to the parties to the case, but also to the
public in general, including the media
Note: There is inconsistency between the two cases.
NERI AND GARCILLANO CASES
Neri Case
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong
Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate passed
various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other
hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he
was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that
Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange
for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that
he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking executive privilege.
In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused
to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the
SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and
Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC
to be answered falls under executive privilege.
Page 23 of 119

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-
delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into
an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of
the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of
the President. Under the operational proximity test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
of President Arroyos cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority
Garcillano Case
FACTS:More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing
a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President
of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. On October 26, 2007, Maj.
Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the
resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and
testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R.
No. 179275.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein
through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the
intended legislation which underpins the investigation.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
had been published in newspapers of general circulation only
in 1995 and in 2006. However, with respect to the present
Senate of the 14th Congress, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules
have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they
are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.
ISSUE:Whether or not the absence of any amendment to the
rules dispenses the requirement of due publication of the rules
of procedure in a legislative inquiry.
RULING:No. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with
the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement under Section 21, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the
Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with
duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or
tradition followed by the Senate.
Page 24 of 119

Furthermore, the invocation by the respondents of the
provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. The
law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their
being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium
for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Protection of rights of persons / witnesses
Rules to be published
25. POWER TO DISCIPLINE- Each House may punish its members for
disorderly behavior, and with concurrence of 2/3 of all its
members, suspend for not more than 60 days or expel a member
JALOSJOS CASE
PAREDES VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Ceferino
Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province),
Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto
Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to
falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript
of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no
arraignment notice had ever been issued against him in a
criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a
certification from the judge handling the case himself that the
criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage
because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his
part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment
but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that
Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment.
Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended
that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public
Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by
the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress,
may be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of
suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan,
despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on
the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution which deals with the power of each House
of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-
thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the
penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed
sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct
from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019,
which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed
on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives.

ALEJANDRO VS OMBUDSMAN (4/13/13)
POWER OF OMBUDSMAN TO SUSPEND- Ombudsman act vests
the Office of ombudsman with disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the government, except
officials who may be removed only by impeachment, Members
of Congress and the Judiciary
Different from that of Congress
Punitive
OSMENA VS PENDATUM
FACTS:Congressman Osmea took the floor on the one-hour
privilege to deliver a speech, entitled A Message to Garcia
Page 25 of 119

wherein said speech contained serious imputations of bribery
against the President. Being unable to produce evidence
thereof, Osmea was then found to be guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour by the House of Representatives.
Osmea argues that the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the
House, he ought not to be questioned.
ISSUE:Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in
violation of Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution.

RULING:Said disciplinary action is not in violation of the
Constitution. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution provides
that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or
Members of the House of Representative shall not be
questioned in any other place. Although exempt from
prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress,
the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in
Congress itself. Observe that they shall not be questioned in
any other place in Congress.
26. APPROPRIATION IN RELATION TO PRESIDENTS POWER TO VETO
BENGZON VS DRILON
ULTRA VIRES VETO
27. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
POBRE VS SANTIAGO
FACTS: In his privilege speech in the Senate, said Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago:
I am not angry. I am not angry. I am irate. I am irate. I am
foaming in the mouth. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be
living my middle years in a country of this nature. And I am not
only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in
a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I am nauseated. I spit
on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots.
Iniinvoke naman ng aking paboritong senador ang kanyang
constitutional rights bilang isang miyembro ng Kongreso
(parliamentary immunity). Iniinvoke also my favorite senator
his constitutional rights as a member of Congress
(parliamentary immunity). May mga nakatala (tulad ni Pobre)
na ang pahayag na ito ng senadorang may kaunting tililing ay
bunga ng hindi pag-a-appoint sa kanya bilang Chief Justice.
There are recorded (like Pobre) that this statement has little
senadorang tililing is the result of not-a-appoint him as Chief
Justice.
ISSUE: Kung si Miriam Baliw ba ay administratively liable dahil
sa pahayag niyang ito, at kung abuso ba ito ng kanyang mga
karapatan bilang isang senador. Issue: If you touched Miriam
administratively liable for his statement, and if it ever abuse his
rights as a senator.
Held: Baliw si Miriam at talagang baliw siya; Held: MAD Miriam
and actually touched him; bitter na bitter rin siya nang hindi
siya naging Chief Justice. bitter bitter to him as he became
Chief Justice. Lol. Lol.
Eto seryoso na. Speaking seriously.Isinaad ng Korte Suprema
na ang Senadora ay indeed, may constitutional rights na
Page 26 of 119

makikita sa Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which
provides: A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. Supreme Court stated that the
Senator is indeed, have constitutional rights found in Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, Which provides: "A Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six months imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof . Ika ng Korte Suprema, isa ang free
speech sa mga pundasyon ng demokrasya. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech
or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
"Bottom of the Supreme Court, one of the free speech on the
foundation of democracy.
Ngunit kahit may parliamentary rights siya na naka-mandate sa
Konstitusyon, pinagalitan pa rin ng Korte Suprema ang
senadora. But even with parliamentary rights he turned to the
Constitutional mandate, still scolded the Supreme Court
senator.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the
language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her
speech and its effect on the administration of justice. The
Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language
Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and
its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the
lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency
and good professional conduct. To the Court, the lady senator
has undoubtedly crossed the limits of Decency and good
professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her
statements in question were intemperate and highly improper
in substance. It is at once apparent that her statements in
question were intemperate and highly improper in substance.
Ayon na rin sa Korte Suprema, nasa Senado na ang opisyal na
hatol kay Miriam Baliw, dahil Rules of the House ang kanyang
nilabag. As well as the Supreme Court, in the Senate that the
official verdict Miriam touched, because the Rules of the
House his violated.
PURPOSE IS FOR PERPETUATING INVIOLATE THE FUNCTIONS
OF CONGRESS
Polite deliberative body if without parliamentary immunity.
Ineffective deliberative body if without parliamentary
immunity.
28. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PDAF
BELGICA ET AL VS OCHOA ET AL (11/19/13)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
Appropriation of government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely and primarily to bring money to
the representatives district.
Legitimate control of local appropriation.
Reasons for unconstitutionality:
1. Violation of principle of separation of powers.
2. Violation of non-delegability of legislative powers.
3. Denied the President the power to veto items.
4. Impaired public accountability.
5. Subverted genuine local autonomy.
Note:HRET & COA
FERNANDEZ VS HRET
Page 27 of 119

ABAYON VS HRET (2//11/10)
FACTS: Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party
list representatives of AAngat Tayoand Bantay respectively. A
quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the
jusridiction of HRET over the Party list., and its
representatives.. HRET dismissed the proceeding but upheld
the jurisdiction over the nominated representatives who now
seeks certiorari before the SC
Issue:W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
qualifications of petitioners.
.HELD: Affirmative. The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the
disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay . Since petitioners
Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were
chosen by their respective organizations under their internal
r ul es , t he HRET has no j ur i s di c t i on t o i nqui r e
i nt o and adj udi c at e t hei r qual i f i c at i ons as
nominees. Although it is the party-list organization that is
voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as
and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the
members of that House are representatives of districts and
party list. Once elected, both the district representatives and
the party-list representativesare treated in like manner.
The Party-List System Act itself recogni zes party-list
nominees as members of the House of
Representatives, a party-list representative is in
every sense an elected member of the House of
Representatives. Although the vote cast in a party-list election
is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for
its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in
the House of Representatives. Both the Constitution and the
Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds
for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A.
7941, echoing the Constitution. It is for the HRET to interpret
the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe
need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a
representative of his party-list organizationin the context
of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and
Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo andBantay ,
respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented
interests that they presumably embody. By analogy with the
cases of district representatives, once the party or organization
of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken hi s oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET di d not gravely
abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions
for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and
Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of
the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
GONZALES VS GUINGONA
FACTS: On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. in
his behalf and in behalf of LAKAS-NUCD filed a petitionto prohibit
Senator Neptali Gonzales, ex-officio Chairman of Commission on
Appointments from recognizing themembership of Senators
Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tanada. The resulting composition
of proportionalrepresentatives is as follows:
POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP PROP.
REPRESENTATIVES
LDP 15 7.5 members
NPC 5 2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members

Page 28 of 119

To resolve the impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a
compromise to the effect that the Senate elect 12members to the
Commission on Appointments, 8 from LDP, 2 from NPC, 9 from
liberal party. This proposal was approved despite the objections of
Senators Guingona and Osmena. Senator Romulo occupied the 8
th

membership of the LDP while Senator Tanada for LD-PDP-LABAN.
ISSUE: WON the election of Senators Romulo and Tanada as
members of Commission on Appointments is in accordance with
Art. 6, Section 18 of the Constitution.
HELD: No, Art.6 Sec. 18 assures representation in the COA of any
political party who succeeds in electing members to the Senate,
provided that the number of Senators so elected enables it to put a
representative in the COA. Drawing from the ruling in the case of
Coseteng v Mitra, Jr. a political party must have at least 2 senators
in the senate to be able to have a representative in the COA, so
that any member less than 2 will not entitle such a party a
membership in the COA. In the light of the foregoing and on the
basis of the applicable rules and jurisprudence on the matter
before this court, we declare the election of Senator Alberto
Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tanada as members of the COA as
null and void for being in violation of the rule on proportional
representation under Art VI, Sec 18 of the Philippine Constitution.
Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said
respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Tanada to desist from
assuming, occupying and discharging the functions of members of
the COA; and ordering the respondent Senate President Neptali
Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio chairman of the COA, to
desist from recognizing the membership of the respondent
Senators and from allowing and permitting them from sitting and
participating as members of said commission.
VII. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
29. POWER OF CONTROL AND DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL
AGENCY
Control- power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter
Supervision- overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties and if the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may take such action
or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or Alter Ego Principle- acts of
the Securities of Executive departments when performed and
promulgated in the regular course pf business or unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief executive, are
presumptively the acts of the chief Executive
LGU supervision only
Can suspend but cannot remove; only court can order removal.
PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL CASE
No need for approval by President of ordinance
The requirement of prior approval by the president applies
only to departments, bureaus, offices and GOCC under the
Executive branch.
PICHAY VS OFFICE OF THE DEP SEC FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS
(7/24/12)
Continuing authority to reorganize offices under the Office of
the President.
30. POWER OF APPOINTMENT
FUNA VS AGRA (2/19/13; No designation of Sol. Gen. as acting
Sec. of Justice, Probably includes designation, Not ex officio)
Page 29 of 119

GR: No holding of multiple positions
E:
a.) Those provided for under the Constitution; (e.g. VP can
be a cabinet member)
b.) Posts occupied by executive officials specified in
Section 13, article 7 without additional compensation
in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the officials
offices
CAN ONE CABINET MEMBER ASSUME CONCURRENTLY AS DOJ
SECRETARY AND SOLICITOR GENERAL? May one be validly
appointed and assume as DOJ Secretary and concurrently as
Solicitor General? Does it matter if either or both
appointments are merely temporary or in acting capacity? The
answers to both are in the negative. Pursuant to Sec. 13,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. To claim
exception from this prohibition on double or multiple holding
of offices involving the executive officials mentioned, one
needs to establish that the concurrent designations and
assumptions are expressly allowed by the Constitution itself.
The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices
are: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as
Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become
a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive
officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the officials offices.
However, none of these exceptions as embodied in the
Constitution apply to justify the concurrent assumption of one
as DOJ Secretary (DOJ) and Solicitor General (OSG). The
appointment to the post of Solicitor General cannot not merely
be by virtue of ones office (ex-officio) as DOJ Secretary, and
vice versa. Similarly, the concurrent designations cannot be
justified by arguing that the powers and functions of the OSG
are required by the primary functions or included by the
powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. By law and by the nature of
their powers and functions, these two offices are independent
and distinct from each other. The OSG, while attached to the
DOJ, is not a constituent unit of the latter, as, in fact, the
Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is
independent and autonomous. With the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9417, the Solicitor General is now vested with
a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits
and privileges as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals. The prohibition on double or multiple appointments
applies regardless of whether either or both the appointments
are merely temporary or in acting capacity. This is so because
the constitution does not make a distinction as to the nature of
appointment. Secondly, the purpose of the prohibition is to
prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants. To construe differently is to open the veritable
floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional
disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and of
limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the
guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge
of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-
owned or controlled corporations.
VALENZUELA VS BALLARTA CASE (No midnight appointment)
FACTS:On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments
of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges
of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These
appointments were deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly
prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Page 30 of 119

Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar
Council to discuss the constitutionality of appointments to the
Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998
Presidential elections. Senior Associate Justice Florenz
Regalado, Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was in the position that election
ban had no application to the CA based on the Commissions
records. This hypothesis was then submitted to the President
for consideration together with the Councils nominations for 8
vacancies in the CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official
communication from the Executive Secretary transmitting the
appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on
March 11, 1998 (day immediately before the commencement
of the ban on appointments), which implies that the
Presidents Office did not agree with the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998
the transmission of the list of final nominees for the vacancy
in view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution (from Feb
13, date present vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ
sent the reply on May 6 that no session has been scheduled
after the May elections for the reason that they apparently did
not share the same view (hypothesis) proposed by the JBC
shown by the uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments.
However, it appeared that the Justice Secretary and the other
members of the Council took action without waiting for the CJ
reply. This prompted CJ to call for a meeting on May 7. On
this day, CJ received a letter from the President in reply of the
May 6 letter where the President expressed his view that
Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive appointments, the
whole article being entitled EXECUTIVE DEPT. He posited
that appointments in the Judiciary have special and specific
provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
Article 8 Sec 9
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from the list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacaang, the appointments of
the 2 Judges of the RTC mentioned. Considering the pending
proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the Court
resolved by refraining the appointees from taking their oaths.
However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming
he did so without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It
should be noted that the originals of the appointments for
both judges had been sent to and received by the CJ on May 12
and is still in the latters office and had not been transmitted
yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the
May 7 Malacaang copy of his appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential
elections, Art. 8 shall apply where vacancies in SC shall be filled
within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art. 7 must be
considered where the President shall not make any
appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the reason for
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prohibition is in order not to tie the hands of the incoming Pres
through midnight appointments.
ISSUE: whether, during the period of the ban on appointments
imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the, Constitution, the
President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the
judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII; whether
he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period
of the ban in the interest of public service.
HELD: The provisions of the Constitution material to the
inquiry at bar read as follows:
Sec. 15, Article VII:
Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII :
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Sec. 9, Article VIII :
The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for, every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of the
list.
During the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the
Constitution (t)wo months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end his term the
President is neither required to make appointments to the
courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of
Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided
therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is not
noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into
effect only once every six years.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election and are similar to those which are
declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. (1) Any person who gives,
offer or promises money or anything of value gives or promises
any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private,
or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or
indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person,
association, corporation, entity, or community in order to
induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against
any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote
for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a
candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a
political party.
xxx xxx xxx
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(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position,
promotion, or giving salary increases. During the period of
forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before
a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1)
any head, official or appointing officer of a government office,
agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints
or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or
casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior
authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant
the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to
be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or
agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a
manner that may influence the election.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15,
Article VII consist of the so-called midnight appointments.
There may well be appointments to important positions which
have to be made even after the proclamations of a new
President. Such appointments, so long as they are few and so
spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointees qualifications, can be made by the outgoing
President.
Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate
not only midnight appointments those made obviously for
partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of
their making but also appointments of the Presidential
election.
The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only
the making of temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts
the appointing power of the President during the period of the
ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for
filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the
Presidents power of appointments, it is the Supreme Courts
view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the
former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of
vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding
delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some
cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban
which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist
only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the
lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But
prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in
their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, their making is
considered an election offense.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need
for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in
the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the
case should the membership of the Court be so reduced that it
will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly
important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly
divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither Section 15
of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.
PIMENTEL VS ERMITA (10/13/05)
Designation of acting secretary
Stop-gap until a regular appointment is made
OFFICERS WHO MUST BE CONFIRMED BY CA
a.) Heads of executive department;
b.) Ambassadors and other public ministers;
c.) Officers of the AFP from rank of colonel or naval
captain;
d.) Officers whose appointments are vested in him by
Constitution
Page 33 of 119

31. PARDON, ETC.
GAUZON VS DRILON
Commutation can be in any form
32. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF POWER (CALLING OUT)
To call out the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion
SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Grounds for suspension: invasion or rebellion, when public
safety requires it
Effects of suspension of writ:
a.) Proclamation does not affect the right to bail;
b.) Suspension applies only to persons facing charges of
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion;
c.) Persons arrested must be charged within 3 days; if not,
they must be released;
d.) Proclamation does not supersede civilian authority
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW
Grounds for Declaration: invasion or rebellion, when public
safety requires
The following cannot be done:
a.) Suspend the operation of Constitution;
b.) Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and legislative
assemblies;
c.) Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and agencies over
civilians, where civil courts are able to function
Open court doctrine- civilian cannot be tried by military
courts if the civil courts are open and functioning
d.) Automatically suspend the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus
Constitutional limitations on the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law:
Duration: Not more than 60 days, following which it shall
be lifted, unless extended by Congress
Duty of President to report to Congress within 48 hours
personally or in writing
Authority of Congress to revoke or extend the effectivity of
proclamation: By majority vote of all of its members voting
jointly
Authority of the SC: To inquire into the sufficiency of the
factual basis for such action, at the instance of any citizen.
Decision must be promulgated 30 days within its filing
Note; The constitutional validity of the Presidents
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of
the Congress before it becomes justiciable in the hands of
the court.
Ways to lift proclamation or suspension
a.) Lifting by the President;
b.) Revocation of Congress;
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c.) Nullification by SC; and
d.) By operation of law after 60 days
DAVID VS ARROYO- A distinction must be drawn between the
Presidents authority to declare a state of national
emergency and to exercise emergency powers. The exercise
of emergency powers such as the taking of privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest
SANLAKAS & SJS VS ERMINTA
FACTS: They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-
powered ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred
junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere
apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of 27 July 2003.
Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded,
among other things, the resignation of the President, the
Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP). In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the
President issued later in the day Proclamation 427 and General
Order 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out
the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. By the evening of
27 July 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-
long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks.
The President, however, did not immediately lift the
declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on 1 August
2003, through Proclamation 435. In the interim, several
petitions were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the
validity of Proclamation 427 and General Order 4.
ISSUE: Whether the petitions have been rendered moot by the
lifting of the declaration.
HELD: NO. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the
issuance of Proclamation 435, declaring that the state of
rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a
rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being
limited to the determination of actual controversies.
Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if
it is capable of repetition yet evading review. The present
case is one such case. Once before, the President on 1 May
2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and
the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation 38 and
General Order 1. On that occasion, an angry and violent mob
armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs,
stones and other deadly weapons assaulted and attempted to
break into Malacaang. Petitions were filed before the
Supreme Court assailing the validity of the Presidents
declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the
President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in
Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases precluded the Court
from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration. To
prevent similar questions from reemerging, the Supreme Court
seized the opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the
declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the
Presidents calling out power, the mootness of the petitions
notwithstanding.
Calling out
AMPATUAN VS PUNO (7/7/11)
FACTS:On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome
massacre of 57 men and women, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the
Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP
and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed
by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in the named places. Under AO
273, she also delegated to the DILG the supervision of the
ARMM.The petitioners claimed that the Presidents issuances
encroached the ARMMs autonomy, that it constitutes an
invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the President
had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency,
Page 35 of 119

especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They
want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared unconstitutional.
The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to
deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and
order in subject places. It is pursuant to her calling out power
as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to
exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.
The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over
the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any
way. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the
investigation of the mass killings
ISSUE:WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency
powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent
and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
HELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national
emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted
by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.
ISSUE (2): WON there is factual basis on the calling out of the
Armed Forces.
HELD: Yes. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in
her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is
true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the
Presidents exercise of the above power, unless it is shown that
such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion,
the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.
KULAYAN VS TAN (7/3/12) Sulu
Only the President can call out the AFP; emergency powers.
Ultra vires act of Governor
33. FOREIGN RELATIONS
VINUYA VS ROMULO (4/28/10)
FACTS:This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of
the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-
stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC,
established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of
rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the
Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the
Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG,
requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of
the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials
of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners,
and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by
Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a)
declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
Page 36 of 119

espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war
crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the
respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its
nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the
Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for
former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were
implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
ISSUE:WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse
of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective,
the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against
Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of
foreign relations. It is well-established that the conduct of the
foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislativethe political
departments of the government, and the propriety of what
may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex,
and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should
be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people
whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political
questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to
construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to
the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of
knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and
especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of
diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up
petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign
policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region.
For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by
a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a
general principle, where such an extraordinary length of time
Page 37 of 119

has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our
consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion
to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim
against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the
petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis
if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means
available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is able
to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals
behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may
exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to
whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State
is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf
it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately
protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they
can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a
view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these
questions remain within the province of municipal law and do
not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes
obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not
shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace
was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of
international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has
attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in
international law has been used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the community of states as
a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the
obligations of a State towards the international community as
a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to
norms that command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory,
do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
State does not need to pursue the cause of the comfort
women anymore because of the waiver in the Treaty of Peace.
34. DAP CONSTITUTIONALITY
BELGICA ET AL VS OCHOA (11/19/13)
Unconstitutional
NAZARETH VS VILLAR (1/29/13)
FACTS:
1) On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to
address the policy of the State to provide a program for
human resources development in science and technology
in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of
talent and manpower that would sustain the drive for total
science and technology mastery.3 Section 7 of R.A. No.
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8439 grants the following additional allowances and
benefits (Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials
and employees of the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST). Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the
payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be
appropriated by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of
the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.
2) The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City
released the Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials
and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the
absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in the
GAA. Subsequently, following the post-audit conducted by
COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas on April 23, 1999,
October 28, 1999, June 20, 2000, February 27, 2001, June
27, 2001, October 10, 2001 and October 17, 2001, several
NDs (Notice of Disallowance) were issued disapproving the
payment of the Magna Carta benefits. The provision for
the use of savings in the General Appropriations Act (GAA)
was vetoed by the President; hence, there was no basis for
the payment of the aforesaid allowances or benefits
according to the State Auditor.
3) DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the
Office of the President (OP) through his Memorandum
dated April 3, 2000 (Request for Authority to Use Savings
for the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in
R.A. 8439) for the authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to
pay the Magna Carta benefits.6 The salient portions of the
Memorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. explained the
request in the following manner: x x x. However, the
amount necessary for its full implementation had not been
provided in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since
the Acts effectivity, the Department had paid the 1998 MC
benefits out of its current years savings as provided for in
the Budget Issuances of the Department of Budget and
Management while the 1999 MC benefits were likewise
sourced from the years savings as authorized in the 1999
GAA. The 2000 GAA has no provision for the use of savings.
The Department, therefore, cannot continue the payment
of the Magna Carta benefits from its 2000 savings. x x x.
The DOST personnel are looking forward to His Excellencys
favorable consideration for the payment of said MC
benefits, being part of the administrations 10-point action
program to quote I will order immediate implementation
of RA 8439 (the Magna Carta for Science and Technology
Personnel in Government) as published in the Manila
Bulletin dated May 20, 1998.
4) Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of
the President, approved the request of Secretary Uriarte,
Jr., With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03,
2000 requesting authority to use savings from the
appropriations of that Department and its agencies for the
payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A.
8439, please be informed that the said request is hereby
approved.
5) On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the
DOST Regional Director in Region IX, lodged an appeal with
COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the
lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for
the period covering CY 1998 to CY 2001 amounting to
P4,363,997.47. She anchored her appeal on the April 12,
2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora, and
cited the provision in the GAA of 1998.
ISSUE: Is the act of the Executive Secretary falls under Article
VI, Section 25 (5) which provides (5) No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
Page 39 of 119

HELD:NO. Simply put, it means that only the President has the
power to augment savings from one item to another in the
budget of administrative agencies under his control and
supervision. This is the very reason why the President vetoed
the Special Provisions in the 1998 GAA that would authorize
the department heads to use savings to augment other items
of appropriations within the Executive Branch. Such power
could well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos
under the doctrine of qualified political agency enunciated
by the Supreme Court in the case of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188
SCRA 154, where it was pronounced that the official acts of a
Department Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless
disapproved or reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant
case, the authority granted to the DOST by the Executive
Secretary, being one of the alter egos of the President, was
legal and valid but in so far as the use of agencys savings for
the year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in
2001, the authority granted on the use of savings did not
necessarily extend to the succeeding year.
Power of augmentation: authority to transfer funds
Who are authorize to augment: President, Senate President,
Speaker of the HOR, CJ of SC and heads of Constitutional
commission
When to augment:
Two essential elements:
a.) There must be savings from the authorized appropriation
of the agency; and
b.) There must be an existing item, project, activity, purpose
or object of expenditure with appropriation which the
savings would be transferred for augmentation purpose
only
VIII. JUDICIARY
35. INDEPENDENCE; PARAMETERS
Safeguards that guarantee Independence of Judiciary
a.) SC is a Constitutional body; may not be abolished by law;
b.) Members are only removable by impeachment;
c.) SC may not be deprived of minimum and appellate jurisdiction;
appellate jurisdiction may not be increased without the advice
or concurrence;
d.) SC has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and
personnel;
e.) SC has exclusive power to discipline judges/ justices of inferior
courts;
f.) Members of judiciary enjoy security of tenure;
g.) Members of judiciary may not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions;
h.) Salaries of judges may not be reduced; judiciary enjoys fiscal
autonomy;
i.) SC alone may initiate Rules of Court;
j.) SC alone may order temporary detail of judges; and
k.) SC can appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary
MAKALINTAL VS. PET ( SC and PET are two independent
bodies)
FACTS: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of
the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
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The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the formers petition
and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as
constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground
that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the
creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the
Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET
is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the
Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for
the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of
the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not PET is constitutional.
2) Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
1) Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the
Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically
declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4,
Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they
constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power
granted to the Supreme Court by the same
Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction
bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-
presidential elections contests includes the means
necessary to carry it into effect.
2) No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which
provides that the power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. The set up embodied in the
Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution
of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial
power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally
speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are,
nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which
involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of
the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2),
Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for
the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.
GSIS VS. HEIRS OF CABALLERO (Fiscal Autonomy of Courts)
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal
Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010, the Court ruled
that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from all taxes,
assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds, cannot
operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was
because,unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which
empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from
Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole
authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts. In said case, the Court ruled
that
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The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches
of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other
branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or
issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this
perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from
the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291
necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS
from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another
equally important institutional safeguard of the Courts
independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes
the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect
fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141
have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF).
The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly
declare the identical purpose of these funds to guarantee the
independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution
and public policy. Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a
vital source of the Courts financial resources but also comprise
an essential element of the Courts fiscal independence. Any
exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress
to government-owned or controlled corporations and local
government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF.
Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it
impairs the Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its
independence (emphasis supplied). In Re: Petition for
Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees. (GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F.
CABALLERO, G.R. Nos. 158090, October 4, 2010, PERALTA, J.).
36. JUDICIAL POWER; CONCEPT
-includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government
Requisites for its exercise
a.) Actual controversy
b.) Locus standi
c.) Raised at the earliest opportune time
d.) Determination of constitutionality must be necessary to a
final determination of the case
BIRAOGO VS. PTC
FACTS:Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body.
But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations.
It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is
a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information
in our courts of law.
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Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and
to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued
that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the
power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power
to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto
inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes
when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the
DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is
their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of
petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress
because the Presidents executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and
that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and
settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the
functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-
finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do
not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection
clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions
and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of
powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman
and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:The power of judicial review is subject to limitations,
to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
Page 43 of 119

raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of
the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To
the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or
is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury
attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the
real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party
in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.
Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of
the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in
the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as
a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition
covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws
are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not
limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to
this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad
hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain
facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or
allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the
Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for
the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the
PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations
so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode
their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of
the commission will complement those of the two offices. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with
the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
Page 44 of 119

President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of
the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III
(Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members
of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the
equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a
class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The
PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance
with which all private rights determined and all public
authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No.
1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
ANGARA VS. ELECTORALCOMMISSION
Judicial review is the power of courts to test the validity of
executive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with
the Constitution. This is not assertion of superiority by the
courts over the other departments, but merely an expression
of the supremacy of the Constitution.
The judicial review is inherent in Judicial department, by virtue
of doctrine of separation of powers.
When the judiciary allocates constitutional boundaries, it
neither asserts superiority nor nullifies an act of the
Legislature. It only asserts the solemn and scared obligation
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assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in actual controversy the rights which the
instrument secures and guarantees them.( Doctrine of Judicial
supremacy)
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION CASE
Power of judicial review cannot be exercised in
______________
Functions and power of judicial review
BELGICA VS.OCHOA
37. JBC
Functions : recommend appointees to the Judiciary; may
exercise such other functions as may be assigned by the SC
CHAVEZ VS. JBC
FACTS: The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC
in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBCs action of
allowing more than one member of the congress to represent
the JBC to be unconstitutional Respondent contends that the
phrase a representative of congress refers that both houses
of congress should have one representative each, and that
these two houses are permanent and mandatory components
of congress as part of the bicameral system of legislature.
Both houses have their respective powers in performance of
their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one
representative from congress.
ISSUE: W/N the JBCs practice of having members from the
Senate and the House of Representatives to be
unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution.
HELD: The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the
phrase a representative of congress should be construed as
to having only one representative that would come from either
house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only
intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative. The motion was denied.
COMPOSITION:
Ex Officio Chairman: Chief Justice
Ex Officio members: Secretary of Justice and Representative of
Congress
Regular Members; Representative of the IBP; Professor of Law;
Retired member of SC; Representative of Private Sector; and
Clerk of SC
38. POWERS OF SC
Rule-making power
Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution grants the Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules concerning (1) the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights (2)
pleading (3) practice (4) admission to the practice of law (5)
the integrated bar (6) procedure in all courts, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged.
GSIS VS. CABALLERO
Exemption of GSIS& LGU from payment of legal fees. Fiscal
Autonomy
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Transfer venue of trial cases
Paragraph 4, Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides
that the Court may order a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid miscarriage of justice.
The purpose of provision is to ferret out the truth from the
opposing claims of the parties in a controversy by means of a
fair and impartial inquiry. Consequently, where there are
serious and weighty reasons present that would prevent the
court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and
impartial trial, this Court has been mandated to order a change
of venue so as to prevent miscarriage of justice. Among the
reasons sufficient to justify a change of venue is the reluctance
of witnesses to testify out of fear for their personal security.
Corollarily, a hostile sentiment against the accused at the place
of the trial, giving rise to the possibility that his life could be
placed in danger, is sufficient and justifiable cause to order a
change of venue of the trial.
BELGICA VS. OCHOA
Ruling on academic cases
G.R.: Courts will not decide moot and academic issues.
E:
a.) There is grave violation of Constitution;
b.) There is exceptional character of the situation and
paramount interest is involved;
c.) The constitutional issues raised require formulation of
controlling principle to guide the bench, the bar and
public; and
d.) The case is capable of repetition yet evasive.
IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
39. INDEPENDENCE
Safeguards that guarantee the Independence of the Commissions:
a.) They are constitutionally created; may not be abolished by
statute;
b.) Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot
be reduced by statute;
c.) Each expressly described as independent;
d.) Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by
impeachment;
e.) Chairmen and members may not be re-appointed or appointed
in acting capacity;
f.) Salaries of Chairmen and members are relatively high and may
not be decreased during the continuance in office;
g.) Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy;
h.) Each Commission may promulgate its own procedural rules;
i.) Chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualifications
calculated to strengthen their integrity; and
j.) Commissions may appoint their own officials and employees in
accordance with Civil Service Law
BRILLANTES VS. YORAC
FACTS: In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting
the president to create a fact finding commission which would
be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his
chairmanship over the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Haydee Yorac, an associate commissioner in the COMELEC,
was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a
temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed in an acting
capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such
appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in
no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting chairman
should not come from the President for such is an internal
matter that should be resolved by the members themselves
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and that the intrusion of the president violates the
independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president
violates the constitutional independence of the COMELEC.
HELD: Yes. Yoracs designation as acting chairman
is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that although all
constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature,
they are not under the control of the president in the
discharge of their functions. The designation made by the
president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded
on the quote administrative expediency to present the
functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it
found no basis on existing rules on statutes. It is the members
of the COMELEC who should choose whom to sit temporarily
as acting chairman in the absence of Davide (they normally do
that by choosing the most senior member).
But even though the presidents appointment of Yorac as
acting president is void, the members of COMELEC can choose
to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman the point here is
that, it is the members who should elect their acting chairman
pursuant to the principle that constitutional commissions are
independent bodies
FUNA VS. VILLAR
Re-appointment
FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the
appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the COA.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and
during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar
was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4,
2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar
was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly
thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment
papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as
COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this
recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his
hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA
Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to
lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such
chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from
February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter
dated February 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S.
Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon
the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar
vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III
named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman.
This development has rendered this petition and the main
issue tendered therein moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of
Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider the
instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a
moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four
exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs
Macapagal Arroyo namely:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is
of paramount public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the
public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Page 48 of 119

The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether
or not the following requisites for the exercise of judicial
review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz:

a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy
before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.
ISSUES:
a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to
court
b. WON Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in
that body and after having served for four (4) years of his
seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of
the term limitations imposed under, and the circumscribing
concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
HELD:Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of
transcendental importance, since it obviously has far-reaching
implications, and there is a need to promulgate rules that will
guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases.
We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to
institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare
minimum norm before the so-called non-traditional suitors
may be extended standing to sue, thusly:
a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement
of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in
the validity of the election law in question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
On the substantive issue:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman
shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five
years, and the other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of
the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind
within the commission, the point being that a second
appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to
another position of commissioner) or upgraded position
(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment
and is a nullity ab initio.
The Court finds petitioners position bereft of merit. The flaw
lies in regarding the word reappointment as, in context,
embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that
if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.
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The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman
shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven years,
and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be
reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same
vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven
years who likewise served the full term is barred from being
reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner
shall have served the full term of seven years, then he can no
longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or
Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent
the president from dominating the Commission by allowing
him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit
a promotional appointment from commissioner to chairman as
long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven
years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2),
Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of
Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the
staggering of terms in the commission membership such that
the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said
position and the term to which he will be appointed to the
position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to
disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that
explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from
Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the
aforestated circumstances or conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that
his promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave him a
completely fresh 7- year termfrom February 2008 to
February 2015given his four (4)-year tenure as COA
commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by
this Court. While there had been divergence of opinion as to
the import of the word reappointment, there has been
unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA
member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both
positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A
contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-
year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive
as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system
of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have
had, under any circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA
Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution
decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year
aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year
term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to
comply with said rule would also be invalid as the
corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear
purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so
appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed
term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner
like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven
(7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position
became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term
of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term
is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed
to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional
ban.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D)
of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three
constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven
terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always
be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a
lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing
authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years
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in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the
distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the
Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes
(death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but
such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion
as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down
under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC,
who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who
served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to
any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first
appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also
covered by the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission
for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the
position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of
the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by
the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period
of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired
period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7)
years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of
Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or
removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to
Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand,
an appointment involving a movement to a different position
or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new
appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a
reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
40. POWERS OF COMELEC
1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating
to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections, including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for
the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to
this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
1. Financial contributions from foreign governments and their
agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or
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candidates related to elections, constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the
Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.
2. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
3. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize
election spending, including limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and
penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices,
and nuisance candidacies.
4. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or
employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
5. Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive
report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, or recall.
ARROYO VS. COMELEC; ABALOS VS. DE LIMA
Joint Panel to investigate electoral fraud; new concurrent
power
41. POWER TO REGISTER & DETERMINATION OF LEADERSHIP
ALCANTARA VS. COMELEC
KALAW VS. COMELEC
LP VS. COMELEC
Coalition must register as such
42. RIGHTS OF CSC EMPLOYEES
MPSTA VS. LAGUIO
FACTS: The series of events that touched off these cases
started with the so-called "mass action" undertaken by some
800 public school teachers, among them members of the
petitioning associations in both cases, on September 17, 1990
to "dramatize and highlight" 1 the teachers' plight resulting
from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's
attention.
ISSUE: Are employees in the public service prohibited from
forming unions and holding strikes?
HELD: these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a
strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized
stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers
duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic
reasons, should not principally resolve the present case, as
the underlying facts are allegedly not identical.
JACINTO VS. CA
FACTS: Petitioners are public school teachers from various
schools in Metropolitan Manila. Between the period
September 17 to 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized
absences in connection with the mass actions then staged; and
on September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cario
immediately issued a return-to-work order. They were
administratively charged with gross misconduct; gross neglect
of duty, etc. for joining unauthorized mass actions; ignoring
report-to-work directives; unjustified abandonment of
teaching posts; non-observance of Civil Service law, rules and
regulations; non-compliance with reasonable office rules and
regulations; and incurring unauthorized absences without
leave, etc.
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ISSUE: Were the public school teachers penalized for the
exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition
the government for redress of grievances?
HELD: Improper Exercise of the Right to Peaceful Assembly and
to Petition for a Redress of Grievances. There is no question as
to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition the
government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to
organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law,
as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. Although
the Constitution vests in them the right to organize, to
assemble peaceably and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances, there is no like express provision
granting them the right to strike. Rather, the constitutional
grant of the right to strike is restrained by the proviso that its
exercise shall be done in accordance with law.
It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by
the petitioners resulted in the non-holding of classes in several
public schools during the corresponding period.
43. ELECTED LOCAL OFFICIAL
No appointment to CSC
FLORES V. DRILON
FACTS: Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at
Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the
President to appoint a professional manager as administrator
of the SBMAprovided that for the 1st year of its operations,
the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be
appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic
Authority.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription
against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the
position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted
circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an
elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-
B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to
another post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the
appointing authority of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems,
allowances and other emoluments which he may have
received pursuant to his appointment.
HELD:
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation
in any capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to
appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to
other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is
precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a
situation where a local elective official will work for his
appointment in an executive position in government, and thus
neglect his constitutents.
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(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts
as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without
need of appointment. The phrase shall be appointed
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of
Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the
subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an
elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may
receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if
specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the
power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no
choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power
of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment
involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence,
when Congress clothes the President with the power to
appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice
of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to
choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of
appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely
sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of
operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo
City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to
prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can
qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for
appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his
incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post
to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before
he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as
long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains
ineligible for appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA;
hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He
however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with
jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits
Re: Gordon
44. GROUNDS FOR DELISTING PARTY-LIST
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD VS. COMELEC
Failure to participate in 2 election
Failure to obtain 2% in 2 elections
Facts: The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a
petition for review and a motion for reconsideration to nullify
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679
dated October 13,2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the
Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions delisted
PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as
Party-List System Act,COMELEC ,upon verified complaint of any
interested party, may remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to participate in
the last two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered. For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC
en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list
groups or organizations from the list of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among
the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted
because it failed to get 2% of thevotes cast in 2004 and it did
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not participate in the 2007 elections. PGBI filed its opposition
to Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for accreditation
as a party-list organization. One of the arguments cited is that
the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 MINERO
(Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC
cannot apply in the instant controversy. One of the reasons is
because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from
PGBI's. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been
relaxed by the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 179271 - BANAT
(Barangay Association for Advancement and National
Transparency) vs COMELEC.COMELEC denied the motion and
in response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in
point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did
not participate at all in the 2004 elections.
Issue: Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in
delisting PGBI.
Held: According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an
erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it
cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system. First the law is clear in
that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other
things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus,
the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides
for two separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is
diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8)
of RA 7941 and therefore, simply cannot stand. Its basic defect
lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-
list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner
the 2% threshold party-list vote. What MINERO effectively
holds is that a party list organization that does not participate
in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the
party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of
the law, given the law's clear and categorical language and the
legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A
delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different
and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained
application of the law - in jurisdictional terms, it is an
interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of
the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the
law.
Instead, what should be taken into account is the ruling in
BANAT vs COMELEC where the 2% party-list vote requirement
provided in RA 7941 is partly invalidated. The Court rules that,
in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b)of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional; it finds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats
when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of
the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House
of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. To
reiterate, Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate
grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or
combined to support delisting; and the disqualification for
failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections
should now be understood, in light of the BANAT ruling, to
mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This is
how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied
under the authority of the Supreme Court to state what the
law is and as an exception to the application of the principle of
stare decisis (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
things which are established).The most compelling reason to
abandon MINERO and strike it out from ruling case law is that
it was clearly an erroneous application of the law - an
application that the principle of stability or predictability
of decisions alone cannot sustain. MINERO did unnecessary
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violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature and to the rule of law in general. Therefore, the
Supreme Court grants PGBIs petition and accordingly, annul
COMELEC Resolution No.8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar
as the petitioner PGBI is concerned and the Resolution dated
December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI's motion for
reconsideration. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-
list group or organization in the May 2010 elections.
X. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
45. IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS AND GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT
Impeachable Officers:
a.) President;
b.) Vice- president;
c.) Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;
d.) Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commission; and
e.) Ombudsman; and
Grounds:
a.) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
b.) Treason, bribery and graft and corruption;
c.) Other high Crimes; and
d.) Betrayal of Public Trust

Effects of Impeachment (Conviction)
Removal from the office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines. But the party convicted
shall be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment
according to law
46. GUTIERREZ VS. HOR : An impeachment complaint need not alleged
only one impeachable offense; In fact, multiple complaints may be
considered as they would all be simultaneously referred or
endorsed to the proper community
2 impeachment rule
Meaning of initiate : impeachment is deemed initiated when
the complaint ( with accompanying resolution of endorsement)
has been filed with the HoR and referred to appropriate
Committeee
The initial action of indorsing to Committee for Investigation
1 year bar ______ : No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of 1 year.
47. OMBUDSMAN
ALEJANDRO VS. FACT FINDING COMMITTEE OF OMBUDSMAN
Power to suspend includes elected officials except
impeachable ones
Prior suspension during investigation, not merely
recommendatory but mandatory (FAJARDO VS. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN)
FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Fajardo, an employee of Bureau of
Customs (BOC) designated as a Special Collecting Officer at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Customs House,
Collection Division, failed to remit the total amount of
P53,214,258.00 unremitted collection from sales of
accountable forms with money value and stamp. This findings
were result of the audit made by the Commission on Audit
State Auditor. Customs Commissioner Antonio M. Bernardo
requested respondent National Bureau of Investigation-
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National Capital Region (NBI-NCR) to conduct an investigation
on the reported misappropriation of public funds committed
by petitioner. A case of plunder was filed against the
petitioner. When the petitioner failed to return the said money
and duly account for the same, an administrative investigation
commenced. The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a
Decision finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct, ordering the dismissal of the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
subsequently denied. When petitioner elevated the case to the
CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
1) Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
failing to consider and appreciate that there was no direct
evidence to prove that petitioner malversed and/or amassed
government funds.
2) Whether the Ombudsman can directly dismiss petitioner
from government service.
RULING:There is substantial evidence to support the finding
that petitioner is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
The result of the audit was not the sole basis for his dismissal.
Affidavits and testimonies of witnesses taken during the ball
hearing in the criminal case were also submitted as evidence.
The discrepancy between the "audit sales' and the actual
amount remitted by petitioner is sufficient evidence of
dishonesty and grave misconduct warranting his dismissal from
public service.
As a last ditch effort to save himself, petitioner now puts in
issue the power of the Ombudsman to order his dismissal from
service. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman in dismissing
him from service disregarded Section 13, subparagraph 3,
Article XI of the Constitution as well as Section 15(3) of RA No.
6770.which only vests in the Ombudsman the power to
recommend the removal of a public official or employee.
Petitioner's contention has no leg to stand on.
It is already well-settled that "the power of the Ombudsman to
determine and impose administrative liability is not merely
recommendatory but actually mandatory." As we have
explained in Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, the fact "[t]hat
the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with
[the] order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or
employee is a ground for discipilinary action [under Section
15(3) of RA No. 6770]; is a strong indication that the
Ombudsman's 'recommendation' is not merely advisory in
nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law."
The petition was hereby DENIED. the Decision of CA hereby
AFFIRMED.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. APOLONIO
Facts:Dr. Apolonio (respondent) served as the Executive Officer
of the National Book Development Board (NBDB) from 1996 to
August 26, 2002. In December 2000, NBDBs Governing Board
approved the conduct of a two-day Team Building Seminar
Workshop for its officers and employees. Based on the
Department of Budget Management (DBM) Circular No. 442
dated March 29, 1995 prescribing a P900 limit for each
participant per day in similar activities, NBDB disbursed the
amount of P108,000.00 to cover the P1,800 allowance of the
60 employees.
Prior to the conduct of the workshop, some of the
employees/participants approached respondent to ask
whether a part of their allowance, instead of spending the
entire amount on the seminar, could be given to them as cash.
After the consultation with the Rogelio Montealto, the Finance
and Administrative Chief of NBDB about the proposal and the
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possible legal repercussions of the proposal, respondent
concluded it to be legally sound and in the spirit of the yuletide
season and approved the request. Thus, after the end of the
workshop, SM gift cheques were distributed to the participants
in lieu of a portion of their approved allowance.
On August 24, 2001, Nicasio I. Marte, an NBDB Consultant,
filed a complaint against Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto
before the Ombudsman. The complaint alleged that Dr.
Apolonio and Mr. Montealto committed grave misconduct,
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service for the unauthorized purchase and disbursement of the
gift cheques.
Investigation by Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Plaridel Oscar
J. Bohol found Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto to be liable
only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and
recommended the imposition of suspension for six (6) months
and one (1) day without pay. However, this recommendation
was not acted favorably by then Acting Ombudsman Margarito
Gervacio, Jr.. Instead, he adopted the recommendation of GIO
Julita M. Calderon which found Dr. Apolonio and Mr.
Montealto guilty of gross misconduct and dishonestly, in
addition to the charge of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Consequently, GIO Calderon
recommended that Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto be
dismissed from the service. GIO Calderon described Dr.
Apolonios act as a criminal act of technical malversation.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), it ruled that the
Ombudsman does not possess the power to directly impose
the penalty of removal against a public official but only a
recommendatory one. It also ruled that respondent was only
liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
the conclusion reached and recommended by GIO Bohol. The
CA imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6) months, but
due to her retirement from the service, the amount
corresponding to her salary for six months was deducted from
her retirement benefits.
Issue/s:
1) Whether the Ombudsman has power to directly impose
the penalty of removal from office against public officials.
2) Whether Dr. Apolonios act constitute grave misconduct.
Ruling:
A. Power of Ombudsman to directly impose the penalty of
removal from office against public officials.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman
Act of 1989 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not
only to act promptly on complaints but also to enforce the
administrative, civil and criminal liability of government
officers and employees in every case where the evidence
warrants to promote efficient service by the Government to
the people. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution states that the Ombudsman has the power,
function and duty to direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
Section 15 of RA 6770, which is substantially the same as the
above provision in the constitution, added that the
Ombudsman shall enforce its disciplinary authority as provided
in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any
officer without just cause to comply with an order of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
The provision is a strong indication that the Ombudsmans
recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is
actually mandatory within the bounds of law. It is likewise
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apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to
provide the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to
ensure that it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector
of the people against inept and corrupt government officers
and employees.
In the case of Gemma P. Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-
Region VII, the court ruled that the provisions in R.A. No. 6770
taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to
bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut
of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to,
inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold
hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon
witnesses and require the production of documents, place
under preventive suspension public officers and employees
pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty
imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted
by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty.
Thus, it is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman can
directly impose administrative sanctions.
B. Grave Misconduct
Contrary to the Ombudsmans submissions, however, Dr.
Apolonio is guilty of simple misconduct, not grave misconduct
or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer. It becomes grave if it involves
any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence (Civil Service Commission
v. Ledesma). Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.
In Monico K. Imperial, Jr. v. Government Service Insurance
System, the court ruled that to be categorized as grave
misconduct substantial evidence should be adduced to prove
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law
or flagrant disregard of established rule. In this case, Dr.
Apolonios use of the funds to purchase the gift cheques
cannot be said to be grave misconduct for the following
reasons:
a. Dr. Apolonios actions were not attended by a willful
intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. The
circumstances prove this conclusion, viz: Dr. Apolonio merely
responded to the employees request and even consulted the
Finance and Administrative Chief on the possible legal
repercussions of the proposal.
b. The court ruled in Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, et al., that
in the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the public
fund allegedly technically malversed for another public
purpose, an accused did not commit technical malversation as
set out in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Similarly in
this case, there is no law allocating the funds for the workshop
since the DBM circular is not a law. Even if it were a law, it
merely prescribed the amounts to be used for the workshop
and did not appropriate the specific amounts to be used.
The court, however, do not agree with the CAs ruling that the
respondent is merely guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service. In Lacson v. Tuazon, the court considers it
as misconduct such as when it affects his performance of his
duties as an officer. From the definition of misconduct as state
previously and in the ruling in Lacson v. Tuason, it is clear in
this case that the act of the respondent is done within his
functions. Therefore, the respondent is only guilty of simple
misconduct. Although her actions do not amount to technical
malversation, she did violate Section 89 of PD 1445 when she
approved the cash advance that was not authorized by the
NBDBs Governing Board.
The petition was PARTIALLY GRANTED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals MODIFIED. The court only found respondent
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GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT. In the absence of any
showing that this is her second offense, the penalty of
SUSPENSION for SIX MONTHS was imposed, but due to her
retirement from the service, the amount corresponding to her
six-month salary was to be deducted from her retirement
benefits.
XI. BILL OF RIGHTS
48. DUE PROCESS--
PROCEDURALaspect of due process which serves as a
restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of
the government; a guarantee of procedural fairness.
Two (2) Aspects of Procedural Due Process:
1) PDC in judicial proceedings; and
2) PDC in administrative proceedings.
SUBSTANTIVEaspect of due process which serves as a
restriction on the governments law and rule-making power.
REQUISITES
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
For JUDICIAL proceedings: CODE: C J N O H
1) A court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it.
2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person
of the defendant or over the property which is the
subject of the proceedings.
3) The defendant must be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
4) Judgment must be rendered upon a lawful hearing.
For ADMINISTRATIVE proceedings: CODE: H E D S H I P
1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present ones case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3) The decision must have something to support itself.
4) Evidence supporting the conclusion must be
substantial.
5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented
at the hearing or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its
or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7) The board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved and the reasons for the decision
rendered.
Note:
1) What is required is not actual hearing, but a real
opportunity to be heard.
2) The requirement of due process can be satisfied by
subsequent due hearing.
3) Violation of due process: when same person reviews
his own decision on appeal.
4) Notice and hearing are required in judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings, but not in the promulgation of
general rule.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Requisites of SUBSTANTIVE due process: CODE: I M
1) The INTERESTS of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, requires the
interference by the government and
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2) The MEANS employed are necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
PHIL. ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS DRILON
reasonable means.
JMM PROMOTIONS CASE protection
The questioned DOLE Department Order requiring training,
testing and certification of performing artist before their
deployment abroad, was held by the court to have been issued
pursuant to a valid exercise of police power. These measures
were adopted to ensure that those individuals who met set
standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing
artists would be deployed, because a significant number of
performing artists ended up as prostitutes.
The Constitution mandates the government to extend
protection to overseas workers. While calling is a property
right, it is subject to the valid exercise of police power.
OLAGUER VS MILITARY COMMISSION
It has been held in a long line of cases that Military
Commissions/Tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for
alleged offenses when Civil Courts are open andfunctioning.
Such being the case here, the respondent Military
Commissions actions oftrying the Petitioners and rendering
sentence is null and void.
And assuming that the same does have jurisdiction, the fact
that the trial(s) wereconducted hastily i.e., the Petitioners
were never actually given a chance to defendthemselves or
even present their own evidences dueprocess was actually
denied tothe Petitioners; hence, their sentence should be
treated as unconstitutional.
No jurisdiction.
No double jeopardy.
49. EQUAL PROTECTION
BIRAOGO VS PTC singled-out Arroyos Administration
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members
of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the
equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
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Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a
class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS. PURISIMA (8/16/08)
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They
principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its
great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the
purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335, which
provides for a system of rewards and sanctions to BIR and BOC
officials and employees if they exceed their revenue targets,
fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
No violation of EPC; give rewards to BIR and BOC to
maximize efforts of collection.
CRUZ VS COA (10/23/01)
RA 6758 Amelioration benefits.
Any distinction among employees must be based on
substantial differences, that is, level or rank, degree of
difficulty and amount of work. To discriminate against
some employees on the basis solely of date of hiring is to
run against the progressive and social policy of the law.
R. A. No. 6758 and CCC No. 10 do not make any distinction
between those hired before and after October 31, 1989.
Neither did the 1st Indorsement of the Office of the
President make any such distinction. The legal maxim that
when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
court apply in this case.
NICOLAS VS ROMULO (2/11/09) difference between AFP
members and members of foreign army.
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a
substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a
foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory
and all other accused.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the
power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or
violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered
around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of
one State do not extend or apply except to the extent agreed
upon to subjects of another State due to the recognition of
extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting
foreign armed forces.
QUINTO VS COMELEC difference between elected and
appointed.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso
facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs,
but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates
against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial
distinction between those who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4)
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
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(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds
that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive
offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not
germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent
the use of a governmental position to promote ones
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence
on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting
the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would
be motivated by political considerations rather than the
welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral
arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency
in the performance of duty because they would be attending
to their campaign rather than to their office work.
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS CENTRAL BANK
no distinctions.
Relative Constitutionality
Under the concept of relative constitutionality, the ponente,
Justice Puno, explained that a statute that was valid at one
time could become void at another time because of altered
circumstances or changed conditions.
The proviso in question was subjected to a two-tiered scrutiny
to determine its constitutionality: the rational basis test and
the strict scrutiny test.
The majority conceded that RA 7653 had started as a valid
measure. Its classification between the rank-and-file and the
officers of the BSP was found reasonable due to substantial
distinctions or real differences between the two classes.
Particularly, the exemption of officers (SG-20 and above) from
the SSL was intended to address the BSPs lack of
competitiveness interms of attracting competent officers and
executives, not to discriminate against the rank-and-file. Thus,
the provision passed the rational basis test.
Nonetheless, the petitioners contended that the enactment of
subsequent laws exempting from the SSL all rank-and-file
employees of the seven GFIs constituted a significant change in
circumstance that considerably altered the reasonableness of
the continued operation of the proviso in question. Scrutinized
this time was the constitutionality of the classification of the
rank-and-file employees of the BSP and that of the seven other
GFIs, who all belonged to the same class. Between persons
who were similarly situated, the proviso could not unjustly
distinguish or grossly discriminate in its operation.
Against the standard of strict scrutiny, the disparity in the
treatment of the rank-and-file file employees of the BSP and
those of the other GFIs could not stand judicial scrutiny. It was
held that there were no characteristics peculiar only to the
rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs that would justify
the exemption that was denied to those of the BSP. Moreover,
the challenged provision operated on the basis of the salary
grade or officer-employee status, a distinction akin to that
based on economic class and status. That classification was
suspect, as shown by a number of international conventions,
as well as foreign and international jurisprudence.
DE JESUS VS DRILON RA 9262 (Valid Classification)
Three (3) levels of tests to be applied in equal protection cases,
depending on the subject matter involved:
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1. Rational Basis Scrutiny the traditional test, which requires
"only that government must not impose differences in
treatment except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly
related to the object of regulation." Simply put, it merely
demands that the classification in the statute reasonably
relates to the legislative purpose.25
2. Intermediate Scrutiny requires that the classification
(means) must serve an important governmental objective
(ends) and is substantially related to the achievement of such
objective. A classification based on sex is the best-established
example of an intermediate level of review.26
3. Strict Scrutiny requires that the classification serve a
compelling state interest and is necessary to achieve such
interest. This level is used when suspect classifications or
fundamental rights are involved.
The enactment of Republic Act No. 9262 was in response to
the undeniable numerous cases involving violence committed
against women in the Philippines.The law takes into account
the pervasive vulnerability of women and children, and the
seriousness and urgency of the situation, which, in the
language of the law result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
50. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
STOP & FRISK
POSADAS VS CA Yes.
When petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee,
there was a probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag. It was the right and duty of
the police officer to inspect the bag. To require a search
warrant would be useless and too late. The search and
seizure may be justified as akin to stop-and-frisk
situation.
RP VS MENGOTE No.
A person may not be stopped and frisked in broad daylight
on a busy street on mere unexplained suspicion.
TERRY SEARCH A protective search for weapons in the
absence of probable cause to arrest (is valid) because it is
unreasonable to deny a police officer the right to
neutralize the threat of physical harm when he possesses
an articulate suspicion that an individual is armed and
dangerous.
INCIDENT OF LAWFUL ARREST
PEOPLE VS DEL CASTILLO (6/30/12, Peralta) search within
immediate control; if 20 meters away, NO.
PLAIN VIEW
No further search.
PEOPLE VS MUSA
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the
one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who
has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not
justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature
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of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the
object.
KEN VS CALIFORNIA
AIRPORT SEARCH
RP VS LEILA JOHNSON The packs of methamphetamine
hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid
warrantless search (frisked at the airport departure area),
they are admissible in evidence against the accused-
appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest,
although likewise without warrant, was justified since it
was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu
in her person in flagrante delicto.
INSPECTION
RP VS MALINSTEAD -- NARCOM operation was conducted
with a probable cause for a warrantless search upon
information that prohibited drugs are in the possession of
the accused and he failed to immediately present his
passport.
ANIAG VS COMELEC (passive conformity) Outlawed a
search based on an implied acquiescence, because such
acquiescence was not consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty, but was merely passive conformity
to the search given under intimidating and coercive
circumstances.
PEOPLE VS EXALA (over apprehensiveness) -- An incident to
or an offshoot of a lawful stop-and-search at a military or
police checkpoint. The checkpoint in the instant case was
established in line with Operational Bakal, the main
object of which was to search for unlicensed firearms and
other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized
persons passing through it. When the jeep carrying the
contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged
down and the occupants were asked routine questions. In
the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather bag
the sides of which were bulging. He asked what the
contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered.
At that moment, the demeanor of the accused changed;
they became suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were
concealing something from Pfc. Galang. The accused
clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered.
Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction
of the accused, which did not appear normal, provided the
probable cause justifying a more extensive search that led
to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the
prohibited stuff.
GENERAL WARRANT
STONEHILL VS DIOKNO -- Search warrants issued were
violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or
being general warrants. There is no probable cause and
warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized.
The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers.
VALLEJO VS CA (4/14/04; search warrant for 3 offenses;
No, warrant must be for specific offense) -- A warrant must
be issued upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense. To uphold the validity of the warrant in
question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it
would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims, caprice, or passion of peace officers. This is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above-quoted to outlaw the so-
called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what
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would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the
party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.
51. PRIVACY
SJS VS DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD (11/30/06)
Random drug testing not a violation of privacy
Application to school children
Application to employees
DISINI, JR. VS SEC. OF JUSTICE (2/11/14)
2 Constitutional Guarantees on Privacy
Against search and seizure
Communication and correspondence
OCA Cir. No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely
regulates by providing guidelines to be complied with
before judges and court personnel can go on leave to
travel abroad.
Requires submission of certification from the statistics
division, court management office OCA the condition of his
docket that he has resolved all cases within 3 months from
date of submission.
Request for Copy of 2008 SALN, of Personnel Data of SC
Justices, Offices Employees of the Judiciary, AM No. 09-9-
6-SC, 6/13/12.
There is no duty on the part of members of the
government to disclose their SALN to public in the manner
provided by law.
While public offices having custody of public records have
discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be
inspected, they have no discretion to regulate the manner
in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by
interested persons; such discretion does not carry with it
the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination or
copying of records. After all, public office is a public trust.
52. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
MPSTA VS LAGUIO (No right to go on strike) --
Except JACINTO VS CA
When on leave, etc.
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSN. VS CA A reading of the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission shows that in recognizing the
right of the government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to information of
unions and associations only, without including the right to
strike.
53. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL
MARCOS VS MANLAPUS No right to return to ones own
country.
YAP VS CA one with case has limited liberty of abode.
VILLAVICENCIO VS LUCBAN -- The supreme court said that the
mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice
was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could
force filipino women to change their domicile from manila to
another place. The women, said the court, although in a sense
"lepers of society" were still Filipino citizens and such they
were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other Filipino
citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a
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fundamental right that its suppression could be considered
tantamount to slavery. The supreme court upheld the right of
Filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode.
Ours is a government of laws and not of men.
OFFICE OF ADMIN SERVICES-OCA VS JUDGE MACARINE
(7/18/12) Restrictions on right to travel of judges;
requirements of reasons.
54. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Four (4) Aspects of Freedom:
a) Freedom from prior restraint
b) Freedom to circulate
c) Freedom from liability
d) Freedom of access t information (Chavez vs Gonzales,
2/15/08)
MANUEL VS PANO No penalty if a private individual reports
illegal acts.
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER CASE Right of people to know
qualifications of candidates.
TESTS ON RESTRAINT
1) CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST
NAVARRO VS VILLEGAS The right to freedom of
speech and peaceful assembly, though granted by the
Constitution, is not absolute for it may be regulated in
order that it may not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right of
community and society, This power may be exercised
under the police power of the state, which is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, and good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. While the privilege of
the citizen to use streets and parks for communication
may be regulated in the interest of all, said privilege is
not absolute. It must be exercised in subordination to
the general comfort and convenience and in
consonance with peace and good order.
REYES VS BAGATSING -- The invocation of the right to
freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the
implication that the right to free speech has likewise
been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public
places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is
freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who
is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual
or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the
existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place
where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial
Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.
With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing
that there was violation and even if it could be shown
that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that
respondent could legally act the way he did. The
validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be
challenged.
A summary of the application for permit for rally: The
applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public
place where and the time when it will take place. If it
were a private place, only the consent of the owner or
the one entitled to its legal possession is required.
Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of
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the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It
is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given
to applicants for the denial.
IBP VS ATIENZA It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If
he is of such a view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must
be heard on the matter.
SORIANO VS LAGUARDIA Under the circumstances
obtaining in this case, and considering the adverse
effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers
fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear
violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB
properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating
Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be
properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an
undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as
a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside
from the reasons given above (re the paramount of
viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a
broadcasters role and the power of the State to
regulate broadcast media), a requirement that
indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on
the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that
cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language.
2) BALANCING OF INTEREST
PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS CASE
FACTS: Petitioners herein alleged that they informed
the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills of their
decision to have a mass demonstration at Malacaang,
in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police.
The company respondent pleaded to exclude the
employees in the first shift to join the mass
demonstration, however the petitioners still included
them. As a result, the company respondent filed a case
thru the city prosecutor and charged the
demonstrating employees of violation of the CBA. Trial
court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent
company, and the petitioners failed to file a timely
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the case dismissal as a consequence of a
procedural fault violates due process.
HELD: Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the
petition based on technicality (being 2 days late) was
rendered null and void. (The constitutional rights have
dominance over procedural rules.) And, the company
was directed to reinstate the eight officers with full
backpay from date of separation minus the one day's
pay and whatever earnings they might have realized
from other sources during their separation from
service. (The removal from employment of the officers
were deemed too harsh a punishment for their
actions).
3) DOCTRINE OF FAIR COMMENT
BORJAL VS CA (1/14/99) Fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are privileged and constitute
a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed
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innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every
false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation is directed against a
public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation
to a public official may be actionable, it must either be
a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of
opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken,
as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts.
4) OBRIEN TEST Intermediate Approach
A government regulation is justified if:
(a) It is within the constitutional power of the
government;
(b) It furthers an important or substantial government
interest;
(c) The government interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression;
(d) The incident restriction on alleged freedom of speech
and expression is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK INC. VS
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (10/5/10) A statute or act suffers
from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: 1) it violates
due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and 2) it
leaves law enforces unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscles. (People vs. Nazario, 1998). The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
(Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Comelec, 2010)
A distinguished from vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth
doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a
statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected. (SHENI et al vs.
Anti-Terrorism Council).
DISINI, JR. VS SEC. OF JUSTICE (2/11/14)
RA 10175 THE CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012
APPLICATION OF OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE AND FACIAL
CHALLENGE
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper
governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to
state regulation, may not be achieved by means that
unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby
invading the area of protected freedoms.
In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited
a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether
that expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion.
Commercial speech is a separate category of speech
which is not accorded the same level of protection as
that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms
of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.
The State cannot rob him of this right without violating
the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
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Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
Except for the original author of the assailed
statement, those who pressed Like, Comment and
Share are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers
who may think little or haphazardly of their response
to the original posting. However, if the Comment
does not merely react to the original posting but
creates an altogether new defamatory story then that
should be considered an original posting published on
the internet.
55. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
ASPECTS:
1. The separation of Church and State
2. The freedom of religious profession and worship
i. Freedom to believe in a religion
ii. Freedom to act in accordance with such belief
VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY closed shop
agreement
EBRALINAG VS SUPT. OF SCHOOLS
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and
the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious
profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on ones belief. The first is absolute
as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The
only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave
and present danger to public safety, morals, health and
interests where State has right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external
acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who
believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for
the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior,
there is no warrant for their expulsion.
CONTRA: GERONA VS SEC. OF EDUCATION
The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious
veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and
national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony
but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of
loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by
authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was
duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series
of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag
ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No.
8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom
of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the
non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and
school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is
a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for
failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony,
petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the
public school they were attending.
ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR state should show state interest.
State Interest Test (3 Step Process):
1. Has the statute create a burden on the free exercise of
religion?
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2. Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify
the infringement of religious freedom?
3. Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the
least intrusive means possible?
56. NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT
BF HOMEOWNERS ASSOC. VS BF conflict between LGUs
ordinance and prohibition on title.
CHILD LEARNING CENTER INC. VS AYALA ALABANG
HOMEOWNERS ASSOC. same; power to classify LGU
properties.
57. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
MIRANDA WARNINGS -- The Philippine version of the Miranda
Doctrine basically provides that:
a) A person in custody must be informed at the outset in
clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to
remain silent; and that anything he says can and will be
used against him in a court of law;
b) He has the right to an attorney and if he cant secure one,
a lawyer shall be appointed to represent him. His right to
counsel is available at any stage of the interrogation even
if he initially consents to giving any information without
the assistance of counsel.
If the above is not observed, it renders all evidence obtained
therefrom to be inadmissible in court, being the fruit of a
poisonous tree. It is therefore imperative that these rights are
read to the person in custody prior to being subjected to
questioning.
Now it is an established rule that the Miranda Doctrine does
not have to be read out in every arrest being made by police
officers. It is however a must that if the person is already taken
into police custody and the police carries out a process of
interrogation upon the person arrested in custody and he is
already being asked incriminating questions, his Miranda
Rights must be read him.
PP VS VIDUYA (Fiscal) -- Waiver of the right to remain silent,
and to counsel and to be informed of such rights, must not
only be voluntary, but must also be made knowingly and
intelligently. The answer of the accused (Nandiyan naman po
si Fiscal kaya hindi ko na kailangan ng abogado) is a palpable
indication that she did not fully understand her in-custody
rights, hence it cannot be said that she knowingly and
intelligently waived those rights.
PP VS OLIVARES (Mere invitation) Where a person went to
the police station upon invitation, and later police officers
investigated him for allegedly committing a crime, the court
declared that such invitation is equivalent to arrest. It is
covered by the proscription on a warrantless arrest because it
is intended for no other reason than to conduct an
investigation.
PP VS ANDAN (Spontaneous statements) The confession of
the accused is admissible. His confession was not made in
response to any interrogation by the mayor. In fact the mayor
did not question him. It was the accused himself who
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting.
PP VS JESLAVA (Spontaneous statements) Custodial
investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. This presupposes that he is suspected of
having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to
elicit information or a confession from him. The rule begins to
operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed
upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and
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to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions
which tend to elicit incriminating statements. The assailed
statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner and
were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established
that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona,
personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the
statement
PEOPLE VS LAUGA (3/15/10; Confession to Bantay Bayan)
Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch
groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by
the local government unit to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function
and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of
the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is
concerned.
LUZ VS PEOPLE (2/29/12; Roadside questioning of motorist
pursuant to routine traffic stop; not custodial investigation)
58. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
CONCEPT: A punishment is authorized by statute is not cruel or
degrading unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive or
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. It takes
more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.
LIM VS PEOPLE (9/27/02; BP 22 not cruel and unusual) While
PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa
committed under At. 315, par. 2(d) without increasing the
amounts corresponding to the new penalties, it does not
violate the constitutional injunction against excessive
punishment. The fact that the decree did not increase the
amounts only proves that the amount is immaterial. What the
law sought to aver was the proliferation of estafa cases
committed by means of bouncing checks.
PEOPLE VS TAN; PEOPLE VS MERCADO; PEOPLE VS ECHAGARAY
(Death penalty is not cruel and unusual; form and character of
punishment, not severity, determines whether punishment is
cruel and unusual).
59. RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
KINDS OF IMMUNITY STATUTES
GALMAN VS PAMARAN
a) USE AND FRUIT IMMUNITY prohibits the use of the
witness compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner
in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.
b) TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY that which may be granted
by the Commission on Human Rights to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth
in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority,
which makes the criminal immune from criminal
prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates.
COMELEC VS ESPANOL
PP VS TRANCA (Mechanical act of bearing ultra violet
radiationNo.) Accused was made to undergo ultra-violet
ray examination to determine the presence of fluorescent
powder dusted on the money used in a buy-bust operation.
VILLAFLOR VS SUMMERS (Writingcovered)
PP VS AGUSTIN (DNANo.)
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60. BAIL
WHEN IS IT A MATTER OF RIGHT when the offense charged is
NOT punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
WHEN IS IT A MATTER OF DISCRETION when upon conviction
by the RTC of an offense NOT punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.
Bail is OUTRIGHTLY DENIED when accused is charged with a
capital offense, or an offencs punishable by reclusion perpetua
or higher, AND evidence of guilt is strong or when an accused
is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is
convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such
penalty.
YAP VS CA (P5M bailNo; excessive) -- The right to change
abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by
petitioner, are not absolute rights. It can be regulated by lawful
order. The order of the CA releasing petitioner on bail
constitutes such lawful order contemplated by Section 6. The
condition imposed by the CA is simply consistent with the
nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that
petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence.
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMIN REGION VS OLALIA (Extradition;
Right to bail; Human rights treaties)
FACTS: Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the
Hongkong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
accepting an advantage as an agent, conspiracy to defraud,
was penalized by a common law of Hongkong. A warrant of
arrest was issued and if convicted, he may face jail terms.
On September 23, 1999, He was arrested and detained.
On November 22, 1999, Hongkong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for his
extradition.
Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which Judge
Felixberto Olalia granted.
Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a petition to vacate
such order, but it was denied by the same judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to
post bail when there is nothing in the Constitution or Statutory
law providing a potential extradite a right to bail.
HELD: The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person (Sec. 2 Art II 1987 Constitution) have the obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be
viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail
to an extradite, however, there is no provision prohibiting him
or her from filing a motion for bail, aright to due process under
the Constitution.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands
that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition
Treaty it entered into with the Hongkong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations
is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of
extradition.
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61. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
REQUISITES
1) Valid complaint or information;
2) Filed before competent court;
3) To which defendant has pleaded; and
4) Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted or
the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his expres consent.
PP VS BALISACAN Existence of a plea is an essential
requisite in order that the accused may be in jeopardy. In
this case, he first entered a plea of guilty and
subsequently, he was led to testify on the mitigating
circumstances and he said he acted in self defense: this
had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty; court should
have required a new plea.
PP VS IVLER (Imprudence resulting in damage to property;
physical injuries; homicide) The Supreme Court sufficiently
explained that the doctrine that reckless imprudence under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution
for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting
acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence
on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365
JACOB VS SB (Only one justice issued order of dismissalNo;
Void dismissal; No DJ)
62. EX POST FACTO LAW Ex Post Facto literally means "After the
fact". Putting it simply, it is a law passed after someone has
committed some legal act until said law was passed, making it
illegal. An ex post facto law is a law that retroactively punishes an
act that would not have been punished before the enactment of a
law. So basically, let's say that someone commits an act that is
perfectly legal, then the legislature passes a law making the act
illegal. One can not be retroactively prosecuted for the act that
was committed while it was legal. Prohibition is a good example.
Say a restraunteur was serving alcoholic beverages at his/her
establishment. Then the legislature passes a law that outlaws
alcohol. The restraunteur can not be punished for the sale of
alcohol before the law was enacted, only for the sale of alcohol
after the law was enacted.
AND
63. BILL OF ATTAINDER Bill of Attainder means that you are
prosecuted without a trial. Furthermore, there are three
requirements for a "Bill of Attainder", there must be: (1)
specification of the affected person(s); (2) punishment; and (3) lack
of a judicial trial. 16B Am. Jur. 2D Constitutional Law 716 (2009).
In other words, the legislature can not pass a law which punishes
something without a trial. The Bill of Attainder clause in the
Constitution protects citizens against the legislature carrying out
functions of the judicial branch. It protects you from being found
guilty by legislative act as opposed to a court or jury of your peers.
WRIGHT VS CA (Treaty not ex post facto)
Forfeiture proclaimed under RA 1397retroactive
Ex post facto; even if civil, there is penalty; forfeiture of
property
PP VS SB (increase in prescriptive period of offenses;
retroactiveex post facto; prejudicial to accused)
PP VS TEVES (RA 1700No)
DISINI, JR VS SEC OF JUSTICE (2/11/14; Sec. 20Non-
complianceof CyberCrime LawNot bill of attainder.
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64. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
ZAFRA VS PEOPLE (4/25/12)
Violation of Dangerous Drugs Law
Chain of custody to be followed
Establish that it be the same substance exhibited
Establish with the same unwavering exactitude as required
to find guilt of accused
Chain of custody will ensure unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence
CHAIN
1) Arresting officer
2) Inventory
3) Laboratory
4) Court
65. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
PHILCOMSAT HOLDING CORP. VS SENATE (6/19/12)
Investigation in aid of legislation
Witness is not entitled to counsel as it attaches only if a person
is under investigation for a crime.
Merely invited as resource person
66. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
BABANTO VS ZOSA The complaint filed alleged that the
accused abused his position as policeman by having carnal
knowledge of a13 year old girl. However, there is no allegation
that the complainant was a virgin. Though it is true that
virginity is presumed if the girl is over 12 but under 18,
unmarried and of good reputation, virginity is still an essential
element of the crime of qualified seduction and must be
alleged in the complaint. A conviction of the crime of qualified
seduction without the allegation of virginity would violate the
petitioners right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Petitioner is guilty of rape, consider the
victims age, mental abnormality and deficiency. There was
also sufficient intimidation with the accused wearing his
uniform
PEOPLE VS CRISOLOGO The conviction of the accused who
was a deaf-mute was reversed by the Supreme Court because
no one who knew how to communicate with the accused ws
utilized by the trial court during the entire proceedings.
PEOPLE VS PARAZO The judgment of conviction rendered by
the trial court was vacated where there was no showing that
the accused, a deaf-mute, was aided by a competent sign
language expert able to fully understand and interpret the
actions and muterins of the appellant.
PEOPLE VS AGUSTIN The extrajudicial admission of the
appellant, contained in twenty-two pages appear to be signed
by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the
records, the transcript of the notes which consists of twelve
pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the court cannot
even read or decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be
expected that appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only
the fourth grade, to read or decipher its contents. The
appellant, therefore was deprived of his rights under Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and
properly informed of his rights. The appellant was not explicitly
told of his right to have a competent and independent counsel
of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such
counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services,
and, if he could not, whether he would agree to be assisted by
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one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed
that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel
and that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of
his counsel. He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by
agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such
right appears in the transcript and no other independent
evidence was offered to prove its existence. In short, after the
appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the
City fiscal, through suggestive language, immediately informed
him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him. Moreso said
counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the
private prosecutor.
PEOPLE VS ONG the requirement that the Information should
be read in a language or dialect known to the accused is
mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is intended to
protect the constitutional right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to
observe the rules necessarily nullifies the arraignment.
PESIGAN VS AZURA
XII. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN power of the state, asa sovereign,
to take or expropriate property for public use upon payment of
just compensation
67. WHO EXERCISES & BASIS OR FOUNDATION OF POWER; NATURE
Entity who may exercise: generally, the legislature but also:
- President;
- Law-making bodies of LGU;
- Public corporations
- Quasi-public corporations; and
- Even Private enterprises performing public
services
*pursuant to validly delegated authority
Basis: necessity of the property for public use
Nature: highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the
government that may be acquired for some public purpose through a
method in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State
GENUINE NECESSITY must be of public character
If exercised by Congress: political question
If exercised by delegate: justiciable question
BEYOND JUDICIAL REVIEW EXCEPT IF THERE IS
ARBITRARINESS
KNECHT VS BAUTISTA
FACTS:
The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be
ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project,
originally called for the expropriation of properties along
Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the
Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed
extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the
Commission on Human Settlements recommended the
reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the
new route which save the government P2 million. The
government filed expropriation proceedings against the
owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, among
whom was petitioner.
ISSUE:Whether or not there is a genuine need to
expropriate the properties owned by De Knecht and others
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similarly situated on the ground that the choice of
properties to be expropriated seemed arbitrarily made by
the DPWH.
HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets is
arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The
Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost
factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a
choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality
strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and
Del Pan Streets, while the factor of social and economic
impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta
Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a
choice between people, on one hand, and progress and
development, on the other, it is to be remembered that
progress and development are carried out for the benefit
of the people
FACTORS
KNECHT V. CA
SUPERVENING EVENT
Republic v. De Knecht182 SCRA 142 (1990)
FACTS:De Knecht was one of the owners of several
properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets
which the Government sought to expropriate to give
way to the extension of EDSA and the construction of
drainage facilities. De Knecht filed a case to restrain
the Government from proceeding with the
expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the lower
court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed the lower
court decision and granted the relief asked for by De
Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. The
case was remanded to the lower court. No further
action was taken despite the SC decision until two
years later, in 1983, when the Government moved for
the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
Legislature has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the
same properties for the same purpose. The lower
court denied the motion. Appeal.
ISSUE:Is the final judgment of the court on the subject
becomes the law of the case between the parties?
RULING:While it is true that said final judgment of this
Curt on the subject becomes the law of the case
between the parties, it is equally true that the right of
petitioner to take private properties for public use
upon payment of just compensation is so provided in
the Constitution and the laws.Such expropriation
proceeding may be undertaken by the petitioner not
only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but
also by taking appropriate court action or by
legislation. When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it
was based on supervening events that occurred after
the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was
rendered. The social impact factor which persuaded
the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had
disappeared. Moreover, the said decision is no
obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in
thereafter making its own independent assessment of
the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety
of undertaking the expropriation of properties in
question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding
legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the
wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the
anterior decision of the Court must yield to the
subsequent legislative fiat.
68. REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE
TAKING it normally results in the taking or appropriation of
title to and possession of the expropriated property; but may
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be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of
condemned property without loss of title and possession
Meaning:
a.) The owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his
property;
b.) There is a practical destruction or material impairment of
the value of his property;
c.) When the owner is deprived of the ordinary use of his
property;
d.) When the owner is deprived of jurisdiction, supervision
and control of his property
Requisites of taking
a.) Expropriator must enter a private property;
b.) Entry must not be for a momentary period only;
c.) Entry must be under a warrant or color of authority;
d.) Property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
e.) Utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of the beneficial enjoyment of
the property
VDA VS.DE CASTELO
PUBLIC USE
Traditional concept: any use directly available to general public
as a matter of right and not merely of forbearance or
accommodation
Idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by
the public has been discarded (Manosca case)
Expansive concept: include any use that is of usefulness utility
or advantage or what is productive of general benefit of the
public.
As long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or
many members of public, a public advantage or public benefit
accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.
MANOSCA VS.CA
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution
No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis
that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose
and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application
of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the
provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: The expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born,
valid and constitutional?
Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There
was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of
streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is
not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public,
then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any
doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation
of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of
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this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW- requires that the property owner must
be given an opportunity to be heard in the determination of
FMV of the property
NPC VS ZABALA
COMPENSATION; MEASURES NOT TAKERS GAIN; OWNERS
LOSS
LBP VS DAR ADJUDICATION BOARD
Immediate withdrawal of the deposited amount is proper but
without prejudice to final determination of compensation
BARANGAY SINDALAN V. CA
PRIVATE USE; NO
Facts: Barangay Sindalan, pursuant to its resolution, filed a
complaint for eminent domain against the Sindayan spouses who
were the registered owners of the parcel of land subject of the
expropriation. The barangay sought to convert a portion of
spouses Sindayans land into Barangay Sindalans feeder road. The
spouses argued that the expropriation of their property was
improper because it was sought for a private use. They alleged that
the expropriation of their property, which was adjacent to Davsan
II Subdivision, would benefit only the homeowners of said
subdivision. The RTC ruled that the barangay had the lawful right
to take the property of the Sindayan spouses. The Court of Appeals
reversed.
Issue: Whether the proposed exercise of the power of eminent
domain would be for a public purpose
No, the contemplated road to be constructed by the barangay
would benefit only the residents of a subdivision.
Held: In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic
that the taking of private property must be for a public purpose. In
this jurisdiction, "public use" is defined as "whatever is beneficially
employed for the community." The intended feeder road sought to
serve the residents of the subdivision only. It
69. PROPERTY TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE CAN BE TAKEN FOR ANOTHER
PUBLIC USE; WHEN
CHINESE COMMUNITY VS CITY OF MANILA-
Grant of special authority for special purpose, in which
case the question of genuine necessity is still political
question
grant of general authority, in which case it is JUSTICIABLE
question that can be resolved by the Courts
70. EFFECT IF USE IS ABANDONED
In case of abandonment of intended use, the expropriator should
file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then
incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same.
Otherwise, the judgment of the expropriation suffers an intrinsic
flaw for lack of public purpose.
The former owner, if he so desires may seek reversion, subject of
course to the return at the very least of the compensation received
MCIAA VS. LOZADA
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OWNER CAN BUY BACK
WHAT TO PAY
71. RA 8874 ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES
CASE:REPUBLIC VS FAR EAST ENTERPRISE
PURPOSE:TO FACILITATE SITE OR LOCATION OF NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE
PAY 100% OF ZONAL VALUE
According to Republic vs Far East Enterprise case, the
requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation
proceedings involving real property are:
a.) The filing of complaint for expropriation sufficient in
substance and form;
b.) Due notice to the defendant;
c.) Payment of amount equivalent to 100% of the value of
property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of
BIR including the payment of the value of the
improvements and/ or structures if any, or if no such
valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the
payment of the proffered value of the property seized; and
d.) Presentation to the court of the certificate of availability of
funds from the proper officials.
Upon compliance with the requirements, a complainant in an
expropriation case is entitled to a writ of possession as a
matter of right, and it becomes ministerial duty of the trial
court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No hearing is
required, and the court exercises neither its discretion nor
judgment in determining the amount of the provisional value
of the properties expropriated, as the legislature has fixed the
amount under the law.
XIII. POLICE POWER
72. BASIS: public necessity and right of State and public to self-
protection
73. PURPOSES: promoting public welfare by restraining the use of
liberty and property
CARLOS SUPER DRUG VS DSWD
PROMOTION OF THE WELFARE OF SENIOR CITIZENS
Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors
operating drugstores in the Philippines. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known
as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Section 4(a) of
RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for
the Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private
property.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional
Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of
police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
has general welfare for its object.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
to all the great public needs. It is the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
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the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined
by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.

The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power
where just compensation is not warranted. It does not
purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in
the operation or conduct of the business of private
establishments for the use or benefit of the public or senior
citizen for the matter but merely regulates the pricing of
goods and services to and the amount of profits or
income/gross sales that such private establishments may
derive from senior citizen.
SJS VS ATIENZA
CLASSIFICATION AND RECLASSIFICATION OF LGUS
PROPERTY
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate
exercise of police power
As with the State, local governments may be considered as
having properly exercised their police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In
short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and
a lawful method.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure
because there is a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful
method. It was enacted for the purpose of promoting
sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and
general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian
was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of
Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist
attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective,
the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the
ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not
just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or
wrongly, as a representation of western interests which
means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such
a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe.
It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals
to dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is vested on the
legislative authority to determine not only what the
interests of the public require but also what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests. Clearly, the
Sanggunian was in the best position to determine the
needs of its constituents.
MMDA VS. VIRON TRANS
CANT IMPLEMENT A PROJECT OF GREATER MANILA
TRANS. SYSTEM
Facts: PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the
establishment of a Mass Transport System for Greater
Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila Council of
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the MMDA cited the need to remove the bus terminals
located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Respondents, provincial bus operators who had bus
terminals that were threatened to be removed, alleges
that EO should be declared unconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory rights of owners and
operators of public land transportation units over their
respective terminals
Issue: Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of police
power
Held: Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has
no police power, let alone legislative power. In light of the
administrative nature of its powers and functions, the
MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as
envisioned by the EO; hence it could not have been validly
designated by the President to undertake the Project. It
follows that the MMDA cannot validly order theelimination
of the respondents terminals.
Police power rests primarily with the legislature, such
power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being
delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may
be exercised by the President and administrative boards as
well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations
or local government under an express delegation by the
LGC of 1991.
Measures calculated to promote the safety and
convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the
regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for
the exercise of police power.
On Constitutional Law, The true role of Constitutional Law
is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so
that rights are exercised within the framework of the law
and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
LUQUE VS. VILLEGAS
POWER OF LGU TO REGULATE THE USE OF STREETS
Petitioners (who are passengers from Cavite and Batangas
who ride on buses to and from their province and Manila)
and some public service operators of buses and jeeps assail
the validity of Ordinance 4986and Administrative Order 1.
Ordinance 4986 states that PUB and PUJs shall be allowed
to enter Manila only from 6:30am to 8:30pm every day
except Sundays and holidays.
Petitioners contend that since they possess a valid CPC,
they have already acquired a vested right to operate.
Administrative Order 1 issued by Commissioner of Public
Service states that all jeeps authorized to operate from
Manila to any point in Luzon, beyond the perimeter of
Greater Manila, shall carry the words "For Provincial
Operation".
Issue:
1. Whether or not the said regulations are valid.
2. Whether or not Ordinance 4986 destroys vested rights
to operate in Manila.
Held:
1. YES! Using the doctrine in Lagman vs. City of Manila,
Petitioner's Certificate of Public Convenience was issued
subject to the condition that operators shall observe and
comply with all the rules and regulations of the PSC
relative to PUB service.
The purpose of the ban is to minimize the problem in
Manila and the traffic congestion, delays and accidents
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resulting from the free entry into the streets of Manila and
the operation around said streets.
Both Ordinance 4986 and AO 1 fit into the concept of
promotion and regulation of general welfare.
2. NO! A vested right is some right or interest in the
property which has become fixed and established and is no
longer open to doubt or controversy. As far as the State is
concerned, a CPC constitutes neither a franchise nor a
contract, confers no property right, and is a mere license
or privilege.
The holder does not acquire a property right in the route
covered, nor does it confer upon the holder any
proprietary right/interest/franchise in the public highways.
Neither do bus passengers have a vested right to be
transported directly to Manila. The alleged right is
dependent upon the manner public services are allowed to
operate within a given area. It is no argument that the
passengers enjoyed the privilege of having been
continuously transported even before outbreak of war.
Times have changed and vehicles have increased. Traffic
congestion has moved from worse to critical. Hence, there
is a need to regulate the operation of public services.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL CASE
ORDINANCE DECLARINGINSEPARABLE-VOID
USE GRAND TERMINAL-VOID
Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which
provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and out-of-
town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering
the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the
common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their
passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of
Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the
effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all
jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central
terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city
ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter
alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police
power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation
of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite
of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject and
lawful means.

Held: The local government may be considered as having
properly exercised its police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the
objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of
Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the
interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper
exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for
determination the issue of whether the means employed
by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its
professed objective were reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances
assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go
beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the
terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users
thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is
unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate
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court. What should have been done was to determine
exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right
there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an
equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights
are exercised within the framework of the law and the
laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its
reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its
constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were
measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws
may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.
LBP VS. REPUBLIC
FOREST LAND RECOVERED BY THE STATE
NO IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT
FOREST IS IMPORTANT TO DEVELOPMENT
Facts:Angelito C. Bugayong was able to illegally acquire a
title over a forest land located in Bocana,Kabacan, Davao
City on September 26, 1969 which during that time was
still not declared 1) alienable and disposable 2) the land
was marshy and covered by sea water during high tide;
and (3) Bugayong was never in actual possession of the
land.Subsequently, Bugayong subdivided the land and sold
it to different persons/entity and one of them is Lourdes
Farm,Inc., who in turned mortgaged to the said Petitioner,
Land Bank of the Philippines. It was find out later on that
the titles issued to private parties by the Bureau of Lands
are void ab initio as forest land is part of a public domain
and therefore, should be reverted to PUBLIC DOMAIN and
the original title No. O.C.T. P-2823 and its subsequent titles
be declared null and void.

Issue:Whether or not the CA erred in declaring the OCT P-
2823 and its subsequent titles void ab initio.

Held:FOREST lands are outside the commerce of man and
unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the cross-claim of petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines
against Lourdes Farms, Inc. is REMANDED to the RTC for
further proceedings.
ESPINA VS ZAMORA
NATURE OF STATES POWER TO REGULATE AND CONTROL
TRADE; POLICE POWER FOR
The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the
public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power
of the State; To the extent that Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the
restraint on the foreigners right to property or to engage
in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the
law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos right to property
and to due process of law.The control and regulation of
trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an
exercise of the police power of the State. A persons right
to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign
national, cannot be taken from him without due process of
law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act or R.A. 1180 that restricts the retail
business to Filipino citizens. In denying the petition
assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the
foreigners right to substantive due process of law, the
Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid
exercise of police power. The State had an interest in
preventing alien control of the retail trade and R.A. 1180
was reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not
arbitrary. Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail
Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the
foreigners right to property or to engage in an ordinarily
lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a
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denial of the Filipinos right to property and to due process
of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the
kinds of retail business to which the law in question has
permitted the entry of foreign investors.

It is not within the province of the Court to inquire into
the wisdom of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8762 save when it
blatantly violates the Constitution.It is not within the
province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A.
8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But
as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has
contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not
convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would
eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business.
Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong
argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided
strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business.
XIV. TAXATION
74. BASIS: power emanating from necessity
75. PROPERTIES EXEMPT
Churches, parsonages, etc ADE
Non-stock, non-profit educational institution
Educational purposes
LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES
ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY USED
FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established
by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from real
property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax
Declarations for the land and the hospital building.
Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable
institution. The request was denied, and a petition
hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the
resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner alleged that
as a charitable institution, is exempted from real
property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the
Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and the
decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
CBAA.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution
within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987
Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.

2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real
property taxes.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a
charitable institution within the context of the 1973
and 1987 Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner
is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which,
subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be
administered by the Office of the President with the
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human
Settlements. The purpose for which it was created was
to render medical services to the public in general
including those who are poor and also the rich, and
become a subject of charity. Under PD 1823, petitioner
is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or
donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the
government.

Page 85 of 119

2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not
enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real
properties as well as the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of
the Constitution of the property taxes only. This
provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA
7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the
exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that:
it is a charitable institution and; its real properties are
actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the
hospital used for its patients are exempt from real
property taxes while those leased to private entities
are not exempt from such taxes.
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS HERNANDO
INCIDENTAL
Facts: The provincial assessor made a tax assessment on
the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued.
The bishop claims tax exemption from real estate tax,
through an action for declaratory relief. A summary
judgment was made granting the exemption without
hearing the side of the Province of Abra.
Issue: Whether the properties of the Bishop of Bangued
are tax-exempt.
Held: The 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions differ in
language as to the exemption of religious property from
taxes as tehy should not only be exclusively but also
actually and directly used for religious purposes.
Herein, the judge accepted at its face the allegation of the
Bishop instead of demonstrating that there is compliance
with the constitutional provision that allows an exemption.
There was an allegation of lack of jurisdiction and of lack of
cause of action, which should have compelled the judge to
accord a hearing to the province rather than deciding the
case immediately in favor of the Bishop. Exemption from
taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if
granted, it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer.
There must be proof of the actual and direct use of the
lands, buildings, and improvements for religious (or
charitable) purposes to be exempted from taxation.
DUMAGUETE CREDIT COOPERATIVE VS CIR
EXEMPTION OF COOPERATIVES AND MEMBERS; REASONS
Facts:DCCCo is a credit cooperative registered and
regulated by Cooperative Development Authority. In 2001,
BIR Deputy Commissioner authorized BIR officers to
inspect the books of DCCCo. In 2002, DCCCo received 2
Pre-assessment Notices, in two instances, for taxable years
1999 and 2001 covering payments of the honorariums of
its Board of Directors, security and janitorial services, legal
and professional fees, and interest in savings and time
deposits of its members. Subsequently, petitioner availed
to the Voluntary Assessment and Abatement Program of
the BIR and paid the amounts corresponding to the
withholding taxes on payment for the compensation,
honorarium of the BOD, security and janitorial services,
and legal and professional services for the years 1999 and
2001 respectively. However in 2003, DCCCo received an
increased assessment which it protested with the
commissioner. After the lapse of 180 days without action
from the commissioner, petitioners filed a petition for
review with the CTA. The 1st division of CTA ruled to cancel
the assessment for deficiency withholding taxes on the
honorarium and per diems of petitioners BOD, security
and janitorial services, commissions and legal and
professional fees but retain the assessment for deficiency
withholding taxes on interests. Reconsideration denied,
DCCCo filed a petition for review with CTA en banc who
likewise denied the petition.

Page 86 of 119

Issue: Whether or not DCCCo is liable to pay the deficiency
withholding taxes on interest from savings and time
deposits of its members for 1999 and 2000

Held:DCCCo is correct invoking BIR Ruling No. 551-888 and
BIR Ruling DA 591-2006wherein the BIR ruled that
cooperatives are not required to withhold the
corresponding tax on the interest from savings and time
deposits of their members.SC ruled that interpretations of
administrative agencies in charge of enforcing a law
areentitled to great weight and consideration by the
courts, unless such interpretations are ina sharp conflict
with the governing statute or the Constitution and other
laws.Members of cooperatives deserve a preferential tax
treatment pursuant to RA 6938 or the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines, and as retained in RA 9520.SC further held
that cooperatives, including their members, deserve a
preferential tax treatment because of the vital role they
play in the attainment of economic development and
social justice. Thus, although taxes are the lifeblood of the
government, the State's power to tax must give way to
foster the creation and growth of cooperatives. To borrow
the words of Justice Isagani A. Cruz: "The power of
taxation, while indispensable, is not absolute and may be
subordinated to the demands of social justice.
XV. CITIZENSHIP
76. NATURAL BORN
BENGZON VS. HRET
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship
will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC
FACTS:Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the
province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The
League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for
the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.

Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American
citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during
the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section
1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited
American citizenship under the laws of the United States of
America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was
between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his
American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No.
63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.
77. WAYS OF ACQUIRING
JUS SANGUINIS
JUS SOLI
Page 87 of 119

NATURALIZATION
78. DERIVATIVE CITIZENSHIP- the unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age, of those who re-
acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectitivity of said RA shall be
deemed citizens of the Philippines
MOY ZA LIM YAO ( effects of naturalization on the wife- it vests
citizenship on the wife who might herself be lawfully
naturalized; she need not to prove her qualifications but only
that she is not disqualified)
FACTS:Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien visiting the Philippines, whose
authorized stay in the Philippines was to expire, claims herself
to be lawfully naturalized upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen. Solicitor General opposes the ground that the marriage
of the alien to a Filipino citizen does not automatically confer
on the latter Philippine citizenship. Plaintiff-appellant does not
possess all the qualifications required for applicant for
naturalization (CA 473), even she has proven that she
possesses none of the disqualifications in said law.

ISSUE:Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a
Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

RULING:Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto, provided that
she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in
CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)
79. DUAL CITIZENSHIP- allows natural-born Filipinos to enjoy the rights
they used to enjoy before they acquired a new citizenship abroad;
also available to natural born Filipinos who are naturalized after
the effectivity of the law in 2003 and are allowed to retain their
Philippine citizenship
LEWIS VS COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225, sought registration and certification as
overseas absentee voters however they were advised by the
Philippine Embassy in the US that as per a COMELEC letter to
DFA dated September 23, 2003, they have no right yet to vote
in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence
requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art. IV of the Constitution.

When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on said requirement,
the COMELEC replied its position that the OAVL was not
enacted for the petitioners and that they are considered
regular voters who have to meet the requirements of
residency under the Constitution.

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May
2004 elections because of COMELEC's refusal to include them
in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioners filed on
April 1, 2004 a petition for certiorari and mandamus.

On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day),
COMELEC filed a Comment praying for the denial of the
petition. Consequently, petitioners were not able to register let
alone vote in said elections.

On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of
Comment) stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos,
including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of
suffrage, may do so, observing, however, that the conclusion
of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and
academic.

Issue: Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition
considering that under the circumstances the same has already
been rendered moot and academic?

Held: The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered
the petition moot and academic, but only insofar as
petitioners participation in such political exercise is
Page 88 of 119

concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered in
the petition is the propriety of allowing dual citizens to
participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections,
which however, remains unresolved.

The issues are thus reduced to the question of whether or not
petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained
and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225
may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

[Ruling on the main issue: Considering the unison intent of the
Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of
that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible
conclusion is that dual citizens may now exercise the right of
suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas
absentee voters.

The Court granted the instant petition and held that those who
retain or re acquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225
may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee
voting in R.A. No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003.]
MAQUILING VS. COMELEC
USE OF AMERICAN PASSPORT DUAL CITIZENSHIP
IF HE RENOUNCES OTHER CITIZENSHIP AND USES FOREIGN
PASSPORT, IT IS A RECANTATION OR REPUDIATION
REPOSSESSES OTHER CITIZENSHIP
CITIZENSHIP NOT A COMMODITY
ACT OF USING AMERICAN PASSPORT DID NOT DIVEST HIM
OF FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP; FATAL TO HIS BID FOR PUBLIC
OFFICE
GORDON VS COMELEC
80. REPATRIATION
RA 8171
Repatriation shall be effected by the taking of necessary oath
of allegiance to the Republic of Philippines and registration in
the proper Civil Registry and Bureau of Immigration. Bureau of
Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of
identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
COVERAGE:
a.) Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by marriage to aliens; and
b.) Natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity
TABASA VS. CA
FACTS: In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his
father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the
United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived
from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by
virtue of naturalization), petitioner also acquired American
citizenship. Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated
under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino,
and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative
naturalization when he was still a minor.

ISSUE: Is Jeovanie Tabasa a natural-born Filipino who had lost
his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic
necessity under RA 8171?

Page 89 of 119

HELD: He does not. The only persons entitled to repatriation
under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b.
Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost
their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of
repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-
born Filipinos. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege
of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-
born Filipinos. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children
who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition
for repatriation.
81. NATURALIZATION- process by which a foreigner acquires,
voluntarily or by operation law, the citizenship of another State;
legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the rights that
belong to a natural born citizen
GO VS. RAMOS
Facts:These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit
for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration)
against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien. He submitted as proof,

Jimmys birth certificate indicating that the latters citizenship
is Chinese. The birth certificates of Jimmys siblings also
indicate that they are Chinese. Jimmy, as a defense, explained
that he is

Filipino since his father is also a Filipino, having elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1,
paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act
No. 625, while his mother is Filipina.

Issue:Does the principle of res judicata apply to decisions on
citizenship?

Ruling:Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its
own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as
a matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said
that every time the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as
the occasion may demand. Res judicata may be applied in
cases of citizenship only if the following concur:

1. A persons citizenship must be raised as a material issue in
a controversy where said person is a party;
2. 2. The Solicitor General or his authorized representative
took active part in the resolution thereof; and3. The
finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court
In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or
his deportation sought, the same has to be ascertained once
again as the decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall
have no preclusive effect upon his citizenship. As neither injury
nor benefit will redound upon Carlos, he cannot be said to be
an indispensable party in this case.
REPUBLIC VS. ONG
LUCRATIVE TITLE
FACTS:The trial court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, among others
for having failed to state all his former place of residence in
Page 90 of 119

violation of C.A. No. 473, 7 and to support his petition
with the appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner
admits that he failed to mention said address in his
petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of
Residence containing it had been fully published, with the
petition and the other annexes, such publication
constitutes substantial compliance with 7.

ISSUE:Whether or not the documents annexed by the State
to its appellants brief without having been presented and
formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence justified the reversal of the
Trial Courts decision.

HELD:YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Petition was denied.

RATIO:It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government
and against the applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of
the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioners
argument of substantial compliance with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law.

[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of
evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford
the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived
of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State.
REPUBLIC VS. LI CHUNG
1 YEAR TO FILE INTENTION TO FILE PETITION
CANT BE FILED BEFORE LAPSE OF 1 YEAR
82. ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP
IN RE CHING
Facts: Appellant, the legitimate son of Chinese father and
Filipino mother was born on April 11, 1964. He was allowed to
take bar examination on the condition that he must submit
proof of his Filipino citizenship. He passed the examination. On
July 15, 1999, he executed an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship. He also stated that he was always registered in his
school records and all official documents as a Filipino, he is a
CPA, he participated in several elections and he was elected as
councilor.
Held: The opinion of the Secretary of Justice interpreted the
reasonable time for the election Philippine citizenship as 3
years from reaching the age of majority. The election by
applicant of Philippine citizenship made more than 14 years
after had reached the age of majority was beyond the
allowable period. His continuous stay in the Philippines and his
being a CPA, registered voter and a former elected public
official cannot vest him Phlippine citizenship.
3 YEARS FROM ATTAINMENT OF AGE OF MAJORITY
83. RA 9139 NATURALIZATION OF ALIEN
COVERAGE: aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be
granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings
subject to certain requirements dictated by national security
and interest
Qualifications:
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing
therein since birth;

(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of
age, at the time of filing of his/her petition;
Page 91 of 119


(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes
in the underlying principles of the Constitution, and must have
conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during his/her entire period of residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted
government as well as with the community in which he/she is
living;

(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and
secondary education in any public school or private
educational institution dully recognized by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the
school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any
race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor
children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in
similar schools;

(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business,
profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she derives
income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married
and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided,
however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are
college degree holders but are unable to practice their
profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of
their citizenship;

(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino
or any of the dialects of the Philippines; and

(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.

Disqualifications
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with
any association of group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;

(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of
violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or
predominance of their ideas;

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases;

(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the
Philippines, have not mingled socially with Filipinos, or who
have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;

(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war,
during the period of such war; and

(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not
grant Filipinos the right to be naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.
SO VS. REPUBLIC
APPLIES TO NATURAL BORN ALIENS
Facts: Petitioner, a Chinese citizen, applied for
Naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law. He
failed to prove that his character witnesses were
competent to vouch for his good moral character and that
they possessed good moral character. Petitioner argued
Page 92 of 119

that the qualifications prescribed in RA 9139, which
facilitated naturalization, should be applied to him.
Held: Applying the qualifications prescribed in RA 9139 for
judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention o
legislature. RA 9139 applies only to aliens who were born
in the Philippines and have been residing here.
XVI. ELECTION LAWS
84. QUALIFICATIONS
NATIONAL CANDIDATES
PRESIDENT & VICE
PRESIDENT
SENATOR
CITIZENSHIP Natural-born Natural-born
VOTER
REGISTRATION
Registered voter Registered voter
LITERACY Able to read and write Able to read and write
AGE At least 40 years old on
the day of election
At least 35 years old on
the day of election
RESIDENCY At least 10 years
immediately preceding
the day of the election
At least 2 years
immediately preceding
the day of the election

LOCAL ELECTIONS
DISTRICT
REPRESENTATIVES
GOVE / V-GOV /
MAYOR / V-MAYOR /
PUNONG BARANGAY /
SANGUNIAN MEMBERS
CITIZENSHIP Natural-born Citizen only
VOTER
REGISTRATION
Registered voter in the
district which he shall
be elected
In the barangay,
municipality, city or
province, or, in the
case of a member of
the sanguniang
panlungsod or bayan,
the district where he
intends to be elected
RESIDENCY Resident of the same
district for a period not
less than 1 year
immediately preceding
the day of election
Resident therein for a
period not less than 1
year immediately
preceding the day of
election
LITERACY Able to read and write Able to read and write
Filipino or any other
language or dialect
AGE At least 25 years old on
the day of election
On election day, age
must be at least:
a. 23 gov / v-gov,
member of
sanguniang
panlalawigan,
mayor, v-mayor
or member of
sangguniang
panlungsod of
HUC;
b. 21 mayor or v-
mayor of ICC, CC,
or municipalities;
c. 18 member of
sangguniang
panlungsod or
bayan, or punong
barangay or
member of the
sangguniang
barangay;
d. 15 but not more
than 21 SK.
DISQUALIFICATIONS:
1. Declared by competent authority to be insane or
incompetent, or
Page 93 of 119

2. Has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than 18 months or
3. Sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude.
4. Any person who is permanent resident of or immigrant to
a foreign country; and
5. One who has violated provision on:
a) Campaign period;
b) Removal, destruction of lawful election
propaganda;
c) Prohibited forms of propaganda;
d) Regulation of propaganda through mass media;
and
e) Election offenses.
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall
be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from
his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again
becomes disqualified.
UNDER THE LGC, SEC. 40
The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of
allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here
or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
VILLABER VS COMELEC (Convicted of BP 22No.)
REYES VS COMELEC (Convicted in administrative caseNo.)
CAYAT VS COMELEC (Convicted of crime involving moral
turpitude; Only one candidate; No second placer)
FACTS: Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only
mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in Buguias
Benguet.

Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on
the ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat
misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that he is
eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is
serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts
of lasciviousness.

Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a
motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because
Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it was declared
final and executory.

Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner
and Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation.
Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and
Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor.

Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because
of the doctrine of rejection of second placer.

ISSUE: WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is
applicable.
Page 94 of 119


HELD: The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the
disqualification of Cayat became final and executory before the
elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes
cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only
candidate and the duly elected mayor.

The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his
intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1)
the decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending on
election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two
mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections;
and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final
only after the elections.
FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICENO.
85. COC- CANDIDATE CAN FILE ONLY ONE COC
RAMIREZ VS. COMELEC (Repudiation of LPs nomination)
VIVERO VS COMELEC (Intercalation-effect)
VILLANUEVA VS COMELEC (Withdrawal under oath; WON will
of the people is supreme law against technical rule)
86. SUBSTITUTION
GAMBOA VS AGUIRRE
ABAYA VS COMELEC (Void COC; Cant be substituted)
PLANAS VS COMELEC
DEFENSOR SUBSTITUTED
ELECTED
87. PROTESTS
JURISDICTION
88. QUO WARRANTO; ELECTION PROTEST
GREGO VS. COMELEC
SECOND PLACER
KNOWLEDGE; DEGREE OF NOTORIETY
OCAMPO VS HRET
WREATH OF VICTORY CANT BE _______ TO THE
REPUDIATED CANDIDATE
89. NUISANCE CANDIDATE
PAMATONG VS COMELEC
MOCKERY OF ELECTORAL PROCLAMATION
NOTE: MAQUILING VS COMELEC
-THE VOTES OF A DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
COUNTED THAT LEFT MAQUILING THE ONLY CANDIDATE, SUCCESSION
XVII. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
90. CREATION
AQUINO VS COMELEC
250,000 POPULATION APPLIES ONLY CREATION OF
URBANIZED CITIES
Page 95 of 119

NOT TO REDISTRICTING
Issue: This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse
Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of
Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From
Such Reapportionment.

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No.
4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect
on 31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative
district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4)
legislative districts. Following the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence,
the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined
with the second district municipalities of Milaor and
Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment
introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue:w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province?

Held: We deny the petition.

Ruling:There is no specific provision in the Constitution
that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to
separate the phrase each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or
each province point to no other conclusion than that
the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a
city, but not for a province.26

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local
Government Code on the creation of a province which,
by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a
legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local
Government Code states:

Page 96 of 119

Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an
indispensable requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income
requirement.
MARIANO VS. COMELEC
MAKATI
FACTS:Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with
residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and
52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati). Another petition which contends the
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H.
Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land
areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and
450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and
bounds with technical descriptions
2.Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with
Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new
corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend
his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the
Constitution
3. Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati
is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by
a special law

HELD/RULING:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall
be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the
City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall
comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in
Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction
bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the
City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the
southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the
southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig;
and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.

Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute.
Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be
noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant
merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end
in itself.

Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the
territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and
Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of
becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of
government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to
the courts to decide.
1.Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Page 97 of 119

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent
elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as
the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their
powers and functions until such time that a new election is
held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified
and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a
new corporate existence. The appointive officials and
employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their
functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed
by the city government of the City of Makati.

Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
provide the following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the
premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent
events. Considering that these events may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to
ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only
Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are
not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.
1. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides
that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two
hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As
thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment of the law.
NAVARRO VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
LAND AREAS INCLUDES WATER BECAUSE OF A
DISCREPANCY IN THE LAW; IT ALLOWS CREATION OF CITIES
AND MUNICIPALITIES EVEN IF NOT COMPACT; APPLIES TO
PROVINCES
2 REQUISITES OF LAND AREA- CONTIGIOUS, SUFFICIENT TO
PROVIDE BASIC SERVICES AND FACILITIES TO MEET THE
REQUIRED POPULATION
Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL,
and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands
and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.

The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1)
or more islands, is declared VALID.

According to the SC, with respect to the creation of
barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability.
However, with respect to the creation of municipalities,
component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e.,
income, population, and land area, are provided for.
Page 98 of 119


But it must be pointed out that when the local
government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more
islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as
expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the
LGC if the local government unit to be created is a
municipality or a component city, respectively. This
exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites
for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the
LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR.

xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this
exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but
not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical
configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a
greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would
form part of the land area of a newly-created province
than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical
to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section
450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but
fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in
Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the
inclusion was intended to correct the congressional
oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the
true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the
Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

xxxConsistent with the declared policy to provide local
government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for
prospective local government units should be liberally
construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict
interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision
could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright
absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended
province that consists of several municipalities and
component cities which, in themselves, also consist of
islands. The component cities and municipalities which
consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area
requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442,
respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made
to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000
square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands.
fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that Congress has
opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a
province with contiguous land area over one composed of
islands and negate the greater imperative of
development of self-reliant communities, rural progress,
and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This
preferential option would prove more difficult and
burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a
province is scattered because the islands are separated by
bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous
land mass.

xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as an
indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a
province, taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of its
creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents
has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than
looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10,
2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which
cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a
province, they must be seen from the perspective that
Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.
Page 99 of 119

91. POWERS
POLICE POWER
TAXATION
Fundamental Principles in Taxing and Revenue-raising
powers of LGU:
a.) uniform in each LGU;
b.) taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall
be
(i) equitable
(ii) based on the taxpayers ability to pay
(ii)levied and collected only for public
purposes;
(iv) not unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory; and
(v) not contrary to policy, national economic
policy or in restraint of trade
c.) collection of local taxes, fees, etc.,shall in no case
be let to any private persons;
d.) revenue collected shall inure solely to benefit of
and be subject to disposition by LGU, unless
specifically provided in LGC; and
e.) each LGU shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation

EMINENT DOMAIN
Additional Limitations for exercise of LGU:
a.) exercise by local chief executive pursuant to an
ordinance;
b.) for public purpose, use or welfare for the
benefit of poor and landless; and
c.) only after valid and definite offer had been
made to, and not accepted by owner
92. QUALIFICATIONS
CITIZENSHIP
CASES
RESIDENCE
CASES
93. DOCTRINE OF FORGIVENESS
Doctrine of condonation. Admin. Law. [The doctrine that a] public
official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases
pending against petitioner. [Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768,
773 (1992)]. Also called Doctrine of forgiveness
AGUINALDO VS. SANTOS-NO
Facts:Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the
province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup dtat
was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram &
Page 100 of 119

letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to show cause
why he should not be suspended or removed from office
for disloyalty to the Republic. A sworn complaint was also
filed by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against
Aguinaldo for acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo
denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he
was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.

The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days
from notice, pending the outcome of the formal
investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision
finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal
from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was installed as
Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.

Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining
order with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent
Secretary of Local Government. Petitioner argued that: (1)
that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or
remove local government official under Section 60,
Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987
Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer
has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former
could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor;
and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by
petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence,
because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code.

While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of
Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed
against him on the ground that he had been removed from
office.

The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed
on the ground that the decision of the Secretary has not
yet attained finality and is still pending review with the
Court. As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the
elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual
proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.

Issues:
1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of
Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case
moot and academic

2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove
local government officials as alter ego of the President

3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before
petitioner could be removed from office.

Held:
1. Yes. Aguinaldos re-election to the position of Governor
of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending
moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of
votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes
among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province.
The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term,
since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of
the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule,
however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against petitioner for acts he may have committed during
the failed coup.

2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local
government officials is anchored on both the Constitution
and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The
constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4)
of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the
Page 101 of 119

power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices and the power of general supervision over local
governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of
the department head are presumptively the acts of the
President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it
cannot be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity
of the present Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987
Constitution grants to the legislature the power and
authority to enact a local government code, which
provides for the manner of removal of local government
officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al.,
this court had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337
remained in force despite the effectivity of the present
Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local
Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of the
DILG secretary to remove local elective government
officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.

3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but
administratively where the quantum of proof required is
only substantial evidence
SALUMBIDES VS OMBUDSMAN
APPOINTED-NO
SC: Doctrine of Condonation Does Not Extend to
Appointive Officials
By Gleo Sp. Guerra

The Court declined to extend the settled doctrine of
condonation to cover appointive officials who were
administratively charged along with the reelected
official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly
committed during their preceding term.

In a 15-page decision penned by Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales, the Court En Banc affirmed the
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, finding petitioners Atty.
Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr. and Glenda Araa, Municipal
Legal Officer Administrator and Municipal Budget
Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon, guilty of
simple neglect of duty. The Court, however, modified
their penalty from suspension from office from six to
three months only.

First applied in the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, the doctrine of
condonation prohibits the disciplining of elective
officials for a wrongful act committed during their
immediately preceding term of office on the theory
that reelection to office operates as a condonation of
the previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove them therefor.

The Court ruled that the doctrine of condonation
cannot to be extended to reappointed coterminous
employees like petitioners as in their case, there is
neither subversion of the sovereign will nor
disenfranchisement of the electorate. Moreover, the
unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would
set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents
posit, provide civil servants, particularly local
government, with blanket immunity from
administrative liability that would spawn and breed
abuse of the bureaucracy, added the Court.

GARCIA VS MOJICA
Facts: On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City
mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of
asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001,
which was to commence on September 1998 upon F.E.
Zuelligs first delivery. Sometime in March 1999, news reports
Page 102 of 119

came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt
by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This
prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct
an inquiry into the matter.
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution
officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to
conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After
investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be
upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against
petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent
Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas,
approved this recommendation

Issues:
1. Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable.
2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by
virtue of the Local Government Code.

Held:
1. No. As previously held, a reelected local official may not
be held administratively accountable for misconduct
committed during his prior term of office. The rationale is that
when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed
that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character,
including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge,
it still reelects him, then such is considered a condonation of
his past misdeeds.
However, in the present case, respondents point out that the
contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed
just 4 days before the date of the elections. It was not made an
issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be
said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this
particular aspect of his life and character.
Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an
act done during his previous term. The agreement between
petitioner and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the
contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that
moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the
contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to
the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have
in signing the contract already became extant on the day the
contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under
the contract are supposed to have been made months later.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable
for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, this should not
prejudice the filing of any case, other than administrative,
against petitioner. The ruling does not mean the total
exoneration of petitioners wrongdoing, if any, that might have
been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling is
now limited to the question of his administrative liability
therefore, and it is our considered view that he may not.

2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the
specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone
irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike
down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month
suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The power to preventively suspend
is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy
Ombudsman.
94. TERM OF OFFICE
3 TERM LIMIT
RATIONALE: PREVENT POLITICAL DYNASTIES, ENHANCE
FREEDOM OF CHOICE BY THE PEOPLE
BORJA VS. COMELEC
Action:
Determination of the scope of constitutional provision
barring elective officials, with the exception of barangay
officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms.
Page 103 of 119


Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected
vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became
mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding
elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as
Mayor.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a
certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the
May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr.,
who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos
disqualification on the theory that the latter would have
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by
June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve
for another term after that.

The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled
in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent
Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of
Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority
overturned the original decision.

Issue:
1. w/n Capco has served for three consecutive terms as
Mayor
2. w/n Capco can run again for Mayor in the next election

Held:
1. No. Capco was not elected to the office of mayor in the
first term but simply found himself thrust into it by
operation of law. Neither had he served the full term
because he only continued the service, interrupted by the
death, of the deceased mayor. A textual analysis supports
the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, Sec. 8 contemplates
service by local officials for three consecutive full terms as
a result of election. It is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local officials,
he must also have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply.
2. Yes. Although he has already first served as mayor by
succession, he has not actually served three full terms in all
for the purpose of applying the three-term limit. The
three-term limit shall apply when these 2 conditions
concur: (1) the local official concerned has been elected
three consecutive times; and (2) he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
LATAZA VS. COMELEC
CREATION OF CITY
abolition of an elective office due to the conversion of
a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to
interrupt the incumbent officials continuity of service.
LONZANIDA VS.COMELEC
ABANDONED OFFICE AFTER DECLARATION OF FAILURE OF
ELECTION
when a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective
position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when
he losess in an election protest and is ousted from office.
An interruption for any length of time, provided the cause
is involuntary is sufficient to break the continuity of
service.
ALDOVINO VS COMELEC
SUSPENDED: NO INTERRUPTION
NO LOSS OF TITLE TO OFFICE; BARRED MERELY FROM
EXUCUTIVE FUNCTIONS
Page 104 of 119

preventive suspension is not a term interrupting event as
the elective officers continued stay and entitlement to the
office remain unaffected during the period of suspension,
although he is barred from exercising the functions of the
office during this period.
ABUND Abundo ran for the position of Municipal Mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes in the years 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010. He
was proclaimed winner of the 2001 and 2007 elections. In the
2004 election, however, Jose Torres was proclaimed the
winner of the electoral race and Mayor of Viga, performing the
functions of the office. Abundo protested Torres election and
was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty
electoral contest. He assumed office from May 9, 2006 until
the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007.

As a result of such reversal, the Court declared Abundo eligible
for another term as Mayor to which he was duly elected in the
May 2010 elections and immediately reinstated him to such
position. Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes were also
ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and
Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively and to revert to
their original positions of Vice-Mayor and first Councilor,
respectively, upon receipt of this Decision, which is
immediately executory. The Court likewise lifted the
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) it issued on July 3, 2012 to
restrain the COMELEC from enforcing the abovementioned
resolutions.

As provided for in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
and Sec. 43(b) of the Local Government Code, the three-term
limit rule constitutes a disqualification to run for an elective
local office when an official has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and has
fully served those three consecutive terms.

In the Courts 35-page decision, written by Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., it unanimously held that Abundo did not serve
three consecutive terms as Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes due to
an actual involuntary interruption during the 2004-2007 term.
This was because he assumed the mayoralty post only on May
9, 2006 and served a little over one year and one month only.
Thus, the two-year period which his opponent, Torres, was
serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption,
which effectively removed Abundos case from the ambit of
the three-term limit rule, ruled the Court.O VS COMELEC
ONG VS. ALEGRE
FAILURE OF ELECTION
BUT COMPLETED TERM
EFFECT
when an official is defeated in an election protest and
decision becomes final only after the official had served
the full term for the office, then his loss in the election
contest does not constitute an interruption since he has
managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service should be counted in the application of term limits
because the nullification of his proclamation came after
the expiration of the term
BOLOR VS COMELEC
VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION
95. SUCCESSION
NAVARRO VS COMELEC
LAST VACANCIES;POLITICAL PARTY WHERE THE ONE
WHO CREATED THE LAST VACANCY CAME FROM-
REASON
Page 105 of 119

LAST VACANCY CREATED BY SANGUNIANG BAYAN
MEMBER WHO BECAME VICE MAYOR
NOT NO 8
OTHERWISE ABSURDITY ARISES
FARINAS VS. BARBA
RECOM BY SANGUNIANG BAYAN CONCERNED
FACTS:
Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On
March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without
leave to the United States.

To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a
recommendation for the appointment of Edward
Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of
San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to
Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the
recommendation, was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte
purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act
under this provision of the Local Government
Code, disapproved the resolution for the reason
that the authority and power to appoint
Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the
Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the
appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June 8,
1994, the Governor appointed petitioner Nacino
and swore him in office that same day. On the
other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed
respondent Edward Palafox to the same position.

On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for
quo warranto and prohibition.

On July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its
decision, upholding the appointment of
respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba.

ISSUE:
Who can appoint the replacement and in
accordance with what procedure?

HELD:
The person who has the power to appoint under
such circumstance is the Governor upon the
recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned
which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas
where the vacancy occurs.

The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since
neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent
Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner
indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither is
entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by
member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner
Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial
governor, he was not recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other
hand, respondent Edward Palafox was
recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it
was the mayor and not the provincial governor
who appointed him.
Page 106 of 119

96. RECALL: termination of official relationship for loss of confidence
prior the expiration of his term through will of the people
Limitations:
a.) Any elective local official may be subject of a recall only once
during his term of office for loss of confidence;
b.) No recall shall take place within 1year of the officials
assumption to office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular
election
SOCRATES VS COMELEC
FACTS:Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of
Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-
1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the
three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for
the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in
which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway
into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the
recall election held, Hagedorn run for the formers
unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorns
disqualification under the three-term limit rule.

ISSUE: WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the
three-term limit rule

HELD: These constitutional and statutory provisions have
two parts. The first part provides that an elective local
official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms
count in determining the three--term limit rule. The second
part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service.
The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office
for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the interruption from
being joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot
immediate re-election for a fourth term, The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the same office
following the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election like a
recall election, is no longer an immediate reelection after
the three consecutive terms; and 2) The intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he
became a private citizen until the recall election of
September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his
closest opponent, Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September
24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates.
During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private
citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the
continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not because of
his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition.
GROUND : loss of electorate confidence
THERE WAS ALREADY INTERRUPTION
RECALL NOT THE IMMEDIATE ELECTION
97. PLEBISCITE
WHO SHALL PARTICIPATE
Page 107 of 119

TOBIAS VS. ABALOS
98. DUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LGU
a.) Public or governmental- acts as an agent of the State for
government of territory and inhabitants; and
b.) Private or proprietary- act as agent of community in
administration of local affairs. It acts as a separate entity for its
own purposes and not as subdivision of State
LIABILITIES
TORIO VS FONTANILLA
Facts:The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan,
passed Resolution No. 159 to manage the 1959
Malasiqui town fiesta celebration The 1959
Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee was
created, which, in turn, organized a sub-committee on
entertainment and stage.
A zarzuela troupe, of which Vicente Fontanilla was a
member, arrived for their performance on January 22.
During the zarzuela, the stage collapsed and
Fontanilla was pinned underneath. He was
immediately hospitalized, but died the following day.
Fontanillas heirs filed a complaint to recover damages
against the Municipality of Malasiqui, its Municipal
Council and all the Councils individual members.
The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as
a legally and duly organized public corporation it
performs sovereign functions and the holding of a
town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental
functions from which no liability can arise to answer
for the negligence of any of its agents.
The councilors maintained that they merely acted as
the municipalitys agents in carrying out the municipal
ordinance and as such they are likewise not liable for
damages as the undertaking was not one for profit;
furthermore, they had exercised due care and
diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance.
After trial, the RTC dismisses the complaint,
concluding that the Executive Committee had
exercised due diligence and care in selecting a
competent man for the construction of the stage, and
the collapse was due to forces beyond the control of
the committee. Consequently, the defendants were
not liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to
pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla
the sums of P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual
damages:P1200.00 its attorneys fees; and the costs.

Issue: Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui
may be held liable.

Held: Yes.
Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political
bodies endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised by and through their
respective municipal governments in conformity with
law, and in their proper corporate name, they may
inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be
contracted with.
The powers of a municipality are two-fold in
character: public, governmental or political on the one
hand; and corporate, private, or proprietary on the
other. Governmental powers are those exercised by
the corporation in administering the powers of the
state and promoting the public welfare. These include
the legislative, judicial public, and political. Municipal
powers, on the other hand, are exercised for the
special benefit and advantage of the community.
These include those which are ministerial, private and
corporate.
Page 108 of 119

This distinction of powers are necessary in
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts
of its agents which result in injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance
of a governmental function/duty, no recovery can be
had from the municipality unless there is an existing
statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long as
they performed their duties honestly and in good faith
or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.
With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule
is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to
third persons ex contract or ex delicto. They may also
be subject to suit upon contracts and its tort.
PALAFOX VS PROVINCE OF IN
PROVINCE OF LA UNION VS FIRME
Facts:A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney
owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and
sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a
dumptruck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Dueto the impact, several
passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr.
died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4)
others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. On
December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a
complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario
Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver,
respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the
aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against
the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses
such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State,
prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the
owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the
proximate cause of the collision. Respondent Judge Romeo
N. Firme ordered defendants Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and
severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses .Private
respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that
every court, including respondent court, has the inherent
power to amend and control its process and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice.

Issue:Whether or not the respondent court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to
resolve the defense of non-suability of the State
amounting tolack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.

Ruling:Non-suability of the state.

The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly
provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to
wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and
cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the
sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are
subject to suit even in the performance of such functions
because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued."Suability depends on the consent of the state to be
sued, liability on the applicable law and the established
facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can
never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable
for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability
of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver,
acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing
governmental or proprietary functions
Page 109 of 119

99. COCKPIT
CANET VS DECENA
SB HAS THE POWER TO ISSUE PERMIT TO OPERATE
COCKPIT; NOT THE MAYOR
ULTRA VIRES ACT OF MAYOR
Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, Camarines Sur
while Decena was the mayor therein. In 1998, Canet,
by virtue of a council resolution, was allowed to
operate a cockpit in Bula. In 1999, the Sangguniang
Bayan passed Ordinance 001 entitled An Ordinance
Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and Other
Related Game-Fowl Activities in the Municipality of
Bula, Camarines Sur and Providing Penalties for any
Violation to (sic) the Provisions Thereof. This
ordinance was submitted to Decena for her approval
but she denied it because the said ordinance does not
contain rules and regulations as well as a separability
clause. The council then decided to shelf the ordinance
indefinitely.

Meanwhile, Canet applied for a mayors permit for the
operation of his cockpit. Decena denied Canets
application on the ground that under the LGC of 1991
(Section 447 (a) (3) (v)), the authority to give licenses
for the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cockpits as well as the regulation of cockfighting and
commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in the
Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore, she cannot issue the
said permit inasmuch as there was no ordinance
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the
same. Canet then sued Decena on the ground that he
should be given a permit based on the 1998 resolution
allowing him to operate a cockpit as by virtue of local
municipal tax ordinances which generally provide for
the issuance of a mayors permit for the operation of
businesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not Decena can be compelled to
issue a permit sans a municipal ordinance which would
empower her to do so.

HELD: No. To compel Decena to issue the mayors
permit would not only be a violation of the explicit
provisions of Section 447 of the Local Government
Code of 1991, but would also be an undue
encroachment on Decenas administrative
prerogatives. Further, the 1998 resolution allowing
Canet to operate cockpits cannot be implemented
without an ordinance allowing the operation of a
cockpit (ordinance vs resolution). The tax ordinances
Canet mentioned contain general provisions for the
issuance of business permits but do not contain
specific provisions prescribing the reasonable fees to
be paid in the operation of cockpits and other game
fowl activities.
XVIII. PUBLIC OFFICERS
100. NATURE
Public Office: right, authority and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed
by law or enduring at pleasure of creating power and
individual is vested with sovereign functions of
government to be exercised by him for the benefit of
public
101. LOSS OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
RESIGNATION: refers to the act of giving up or the act of
the public officer by which he declines his office and
renounces the further right to use it
Page 110 of 119

ESTRADA VS. DISIERTO
ORAL; WRITING; ANY FORM
DOCTRINE OF ADOPTIVE ADMISSION
FACTS:

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong
doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and
other forms of corruption were made against Estrada
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On
November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the
Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings
were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada
were made and were only stopped on January 16,
2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President,
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against
Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown
into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked
out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after
casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their
support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election
to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not
run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that
the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo
took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family
later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed
petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought
to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in cases filed
against him not until his term as president ends. He
also prayed for judgment confirming Estrada to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office.
ISSUE: WoN Estrada resigned as President.
RULING:
Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign
and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present
when President Estrada left the Palace.

Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing material relevant
issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have
resigned constructive resignation.

SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada
could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his
final statement:

1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent
as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process
(he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of
disability and that he was going to reassume the
Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);

3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);

Page 111 of 119

4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come in the same service of the
country;

5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion
of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.

Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of
relinquishmentact or omission before, during and
after January 20, 2001.

REMOVAL: forcible and permanent separation of the
incumbent from office before the expiration of his term
DUE PROCESS
REORGANIZATION: involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy and redundancy of functions
DARIO CASE
GOOD FAITH
Reorganization in this jurisdiction has been regarded as
valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, reorganization is carried out in good faith
if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal
or separation actually occurs because the position
itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of
tenure would not be Chinese wall
REASSIGNMENT
NIEVES VS BLANCO
WITH OR WITHOUT CONSENT
102. SUSPENSION
PUNITIVE
PREVENTIVE
OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN VS APOLONIO
INCLUDES ELECTIVE EXCEPT IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSIONIS MERELY PREVENTIVE MEASURES,
[PRELINMINARY STEP IN ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION
TO PREVENT THE OFFICER FROM USING HIS POSITION TO
INFLUENCE POTENTIAL WITNESSES AND TAMPER THE
RECORDS WHICH MAY BE VITAL TO THE PROSECUTION OF
HIS CASE
IF AFTER THE INVESTIGATION HE IS FOUND GUILTY HE IS
REMOVED, THAT IS PENALTY
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS NOT A PENALTY
103. SECURITY OF TENURE
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF CAMARINES NORTE VS
GONZALES
PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICES
IF CONFIDENCE IS LOST AND THE OFFICER IS
REMOVED, IT IS NOT REMOVAL BUT EXPIRATION OF
TERM
JUST CAUSE IS THE LOSS OF CONFIDENCE
Page 112 of 119

104. 3 FOLD RESPONSIBILITY
a.) If the individual is damaged by such violation, the official shall,
in some cases be held liable civilly to reimburse the injured
party
b.) If the law has attached a penal sanction, the officer may be
punished criminally; and
c.) If the administrations disciplinary power is strong, such
violation may lead to reprimand, suspension or removal from
office as the case may be

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT VS CATAQUIZ
FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento
was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for
the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz,
Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open
the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a
letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial
was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was
issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution
of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint,
respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or
enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order
requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue
a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and
(3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent
judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision
enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing
resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local
governments objection to the lotto, such resolution is
valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to
air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
governments. However, this freedom to exercise contrary
views does not mean that local governments may actually
enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by
Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in
this case could not and should not be interpreted as a
measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n
our system of government, the power of local government
units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is
merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held
in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an
existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this
is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp
DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASE DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
105. NEPOTISM: all appointments in the national, provincial, city and
municipal governments or any branch or instrumentality thereof,
including GOCC, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or
recommending authority of the chief of the bureau or office or of
the persons exercising immediate supervision over him.Prohibited
Under LGC: Nepotism exists when an appointment is made within
4
th
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the appointing or
recommending authority
Page 113 of 119

3
RD
DEGREE OF CONSAGUINITY AND AFFINITY
EXCEPTIONS
NOT APPLICABLE TO
AFP
TEACHERS
DOCTORS
REPORT TO CSC IS REQUIRED
XIX. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
106. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
RULE MAKING POWER ( Quasi- Legislative; subordinate
legislation)- power of administrative agencies to issue rules
and regulations intended in order to implement the law
and legislative policy fixed by legislature
Kinds:
1. Supplementary or detailed legislation rules and
regulations to fix the details in the execution and
enforcement of a policy set out in the law e.g IRR
2. Interpretative legislation- rules and regulations
construing or interpreting the provisions of a statute to
be enforced and they are binding on all concerned
until they are changed e.g BIR Circulars
3. Contingent legislation- rules and regulations made in
administrative authority on the existence of certain
facts or things upon the enforcement of the law
depends
ADJUDICATORY POWER (Quasi-Judicial) - proceedings
partake of nature of judicial proceedings. Administrative
body granted authority to promulgate its own rules.
LIMITATIONS
a.) Issued under the authority of law;
b.) Within the scope and purview of the law;
c.) Reasonable; and
d.) Published
GRANDE VS ANTONIO
LAW USES MAY
ADMIN REGULATION USES SHALL
REASON FOR ADJUDICATORY POWER: only incidental
to their function of enforcing law
DISTINCTIONS QUASI-
LEGISLATIVE
QUASI-JUDICIAL

AS TO NATURE
-Power of
subordinate
legislation;
- Power of
adjudication
-Public in nature -Private in
nature
-Permits the
body to
promulgate
rules intended
to carry out the
provisions of
-Enables the
body to resolve
in a manner
essentially
judicial, factual
and sometimes
Page 114 of 119

particular laws even legal
questions
incidental to its
primary power
of enforcement
of the law

AS TO
APPLICATION
General
application
Specific
application
Prescribing a
rule for the
future
Application of a
rule of the past

AS TO
REQUISITES
Publication is
required in the
issuance of
legislative rules;
no publication
for
interpretative
rules
Notice and
hearing are
generally
required in
administrative
adjudication

107. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES- whenever there is
an available administrative remedy provided by the law, no judicial
recourse can be made until such remedies have been availed of
and exhausted
Doctrine of Prior Resort (Doctrine of Primary Administrative
Jurisdiction) - where there is competence or jurisdiction vested
upon administrative body to act upon the matter, no resort to
courts may be made before such administrative body shall have
acted upon the matter
Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action- no resort to courts
will be allowed unless administrative action has been completed
and there is nothing left to be done in administrative structure
Judicial Relief from Threatened Administrative Action- courts will
not render a decree in advance of administrative action and
thereby render such action nugatory. It is not for the court to stop
an administrative officer from performing his statutory duty to fear
he will perform it wrongly
EXCEPTIONS
a.) Doctrine of qualified political agency; except where
law expressly provides exhaustion;
b.) Administrative remedy is fruitless;
c.) Where there is estoppel on the part of administrative
agency;
d.) Issue is purely legal;
e.) Administrative action is patently illegal, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction;
f.) Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction;
g.) Where there is irreparable injury or threat thereof,
unless judicial recourse is immediately made;
h.) In land case, subject matter is private land;
i.) Where the law does not make exhaustion a condition
precedent to judicial recourse;
j.) Where observance of the doctrine will result in
nullification of claim;
k.) Where there are special reasons or circumstances
demanding immediate court action; and
l.) When the due process of law is clearly violated
REGINO VS PANGASINAN COLLEGE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY (Exception: purely question of law)
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of
PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her
final examinations; she was already enrolled in another
Page 115 of 119

educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained
of would not adequately redress her grievances; under the
circumstances, the consequences of respondents' acts
could no longer be undone or rectified.

Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable when there is competence on the part of the
administrative body to act upon the matter complained of.
Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither
part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial
tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power
to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have
commenced her case before the Commission.

Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of
which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within
the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner's action for
damages inevitably calls for the application and the
interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within
the jurisdiction of the courts.
CABALLER VS SISON
108. PENALTIES
PROVISION BY LAW
DEFINED BY LAW
PUBLISHED
109. RIGHTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION

XX. GENERAL PROVISIONS
110. SOCIAL JUSTICE
BINAY VS COA
THOSE WHO HAVE LESS IN LIFE SHOULD HAVE MORE
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public
purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally
benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out
by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards
social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to
provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II,
Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5,
Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity
and respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid." (Comment, p.
12)

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty.
The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of
police power in the promotion of the common good.

There is no violation of the equal protection clause in
classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to
our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus,
statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the
disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of
the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program
of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The
loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is
more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such
death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late
President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life,
should have more in law." This decision, however must not be
taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
Page 116 of 119

governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate
dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
IN LAW

JEREMIAS VS ESTATE OF LATE IRENE MARIANO

Facts

: Irene P. Mariano (Irene), a widow, owned two parcels of land
located at Barangay Balatas, Naga City, Camarines Sur, with an
aggregate area of a little more than 27 hectares. In 1972, the 2
parcels of land were placed under the Operation Land Transfer
program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. The tenanted
portion of the landholdings were subdivided among identied
tenant-beneciaries, and a subdivision plan was made.
Santiago Jeremias (father of petitioner Leopoldo) was one the
40 tenant-beneciaries. On June 26, 1988, Irene died intestate
who was succeeded by his two children, Jose P. Mariano and
Erlinda M. Villanueva. On 14 May 1989, Helen Mariano, Jose's
wife, allegedly instituted Ruben Vias (Ruben) as a tenant,
through an unsigned handwritten letter, despite the estate of
the late Irene still unpartitioned and under intestate
proceedings.

In 1991, Danilo Mariano was appointed as administrator of the
estate of Irene Mariano. He lodged before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) separate complaints of
ejectment and damages against both Ruben Vias and
Leopoldo Jeremias for their refusal to vacate despite oral and
formal demands. Ruben's basis for saying he was a tenant is
the unsigned letter by Helen Mariano, while on the other hand,
Leopoldo claims that by virtue of succession, he lawfully
acquired right to cultivate granted by Irene to his father
Santiago Jeremias.

Issue:

Whether or not Leopoldo Jeremias and Ruben Vias are
tenants of the lands belonging to the late Irene Mariano which
entitles them to security of tenure

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that they are not considered tenants
entitle to security of tenure under the law. Tenancy
relationship arises if all the following essential requisites are
present:

1)that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee;

2)that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural
land;

3)that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;


4)that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production;

5)that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and

6)that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.

Claims by one of the existence tenancy do not automatically
give rise to security of tenure. In this case, there is no
substantial evidence that the petitioners were installed by the
owner of the lots in question as agricultural tenants on the
property. There is, likewise, no evidence that the petitioners
shared with the landowner the harvest and/or produce from
Page 117 of 119

the landholding. Hence, the Court reinstated the decision of
the PARAD.

SAME AS BINAY; EXCEPT

111. ACADEMIC FREEDOM the State recognizes the complementary
roles of public and private institutions in educational system and
shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all
educational institution:
GARCIA VS FACULTY OF ADMISSION, LOYOLA SCHOOL OF
THEOLOGY
WHAT ARE SUBSUMMED IN ACADEMIC FREEDOM
POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES OF ADMINISTRATION,
ETC IS PART OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
WOMAN CANNOT BE ADMITTED TO PRIESTHOOD
SCHOOL
Facts

:1. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted
Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A.in Theology;2.
That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to
enroll for the same course for thefirst semester, 1975-
1976 respondent told her about the letter he had
written her,informing her of the faculty's decision to
bar her from re-admission in their schoolreason in the
letter: Petitioners frequent questions and difficulties
had the effect of slowing down the progress of the
class.3. Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the
compromises she was offering wereunacceptable,
their decision was final, and that it were better for her
to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School4.
Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said
school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her
graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she
was informedthat she could enroll at the UST
Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to
fulfiltheir requirements for Baccalaureate in
Philosophy in order to have her degree later
inTheology which would entail about four to five
years more of studies whereas inthe Loyola School
of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused
readmission, itwould entail only about two years
more.5. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the
purpose of allowing her to enroll in thecurrent
semester

Issue:

Whether or not the Faculty Admissions Committee had
authority and discretion inallowing petitioner to
continue studying or not?

Held:

Yes. Being a particular educational institution
(seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of
merit.Petitioner cannot compel the mandamus to
admit her into further studies since therespondent had
no clear duty to admit the petitioner. That respondent
Fr. Lambino andLoyola School of Technology has the
discretion whether to admit the petitioner or
not.Factors that were considered are academic
standards, personality traits, character orientation and
nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary.
112. ACQUISITION OF LAND BY ALIENS
DUALS - NOT LIMITED
Page 118 of 119

FORMER NATURAL BORN CITIZEN
5,000 SQM- URBAN
3 HECTARES- RURAL
REPUBLIC VS CA
FILIPINOS BROUGHT UNREGISTERED LAND
BECAME CANADIANS
CAN STILL REGISTER
BEUMER VS AMORES
SUMMARYDutch national seeks to reimburse funds he
invested in allowing his Filipina spouse tobuy parcels of Filipino
land after their marriage was declared null.
FACTS: Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina,
married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC
declared the nullity of their marriage. Consequently,petitioner
filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated
praying for thedistribution of properties claimed to have been
acquired during the subsistence of their marriage. During trial,
petitioner testified that while Lots W, X, Y, and Z, parcels of
land,were registered in the name of respondent, these
properties were acquired with themoney he received from the
Dutch government as his disability benefit sincerespondent did
not have sufficient income. He also claimed that the joint
affidavit theysubmitted was contrary to Article 89 of the Family
Code, hence, invalid. The RTC ruledthat, regardless of the
source of funds for the acquisition of Lots W, X, Y and
Z,petitioner could not have acquired any right whatsoever over
these properties aspetitioner still attempted to acquire them
notwithstanding his knowledge of theconstitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of private lands. This was
madeevident by the sworn statements petitioner executed
purporting to show that the subjectparcels of land were
purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the
hereinrespondent.

Petitioners plea for reimbursement for the amount he had
paid to purchase the foregoing properties on the basis of
equity was likewise denied for not having cometo court with
clean hands. CA affirmed. Petitioner appealed.
ISSUEW/N a foreigner may reimburse his investment in the
purchase of Filipino land
DECISIONThe Court AFFIRMED the rulings of the RTC and CA. In

In Re: Petition For Separationof Property-Elena Buenaventura
Muller v. Helmut Muller the Court had already denied aclaim
for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of
Philippine land institutedby a foreigner against his former
Filipina spouse. It held that the foreigner cannot
seekreimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowinglybought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine
landenshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. Undeniably,petitioner openly admitted
that he "is well aware of the above-cited
constitutionalprohibition" and even asseverated that, because
of such prohibition, he and respondentregistered the subject
properties in the latters name. Clearly, petitioners
actuationsshowed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional
prohibition. On the basis of suchadmission, the Court finds no
reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling. The time-
honored principle is that he who has done inequity shall not be
accorded equity. Thus, alitigant may be denied relief by a court
of equity on the ground that his conduct hasbeen inequitable,
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. Surely, a
contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and
void, vests no rights, creates noobligations and produces no
legal effect at all. Neither can the Court grant petitioners

Page 119 of 119

claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. It
does not apply if the actionis proscribed by the Constitution.
PACIFIC ACE FINANCIAL CORPORATION VS YANAGASIWA
CHEESEMAN VS CA
ALIENS CANNOT ACQUIRE LAND
GODINEZ VS PAK LAEN
EXCEPTION
113. CORPORATIONS
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS CA
POSSESSION OF LAND OF PUBLIC DOMAIN OVER 30
YEARS
LEASE
OWNERSHIP
114. FILIPINIZATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- RECOGNOTION OF SENSITIVE
AND VITAL POSITION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES IN NATIONAL SECURITY
AND ECO SYSTEM;
MEANING OF CAPITAL
115. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM
MASS MEDIA- 100%
EDUCATION-60-40
ADVERTISING- 70-30
CRISOSTOMO VS CA
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS
INVESTED IN HOSPITAL
NOT PRACTICE OF PROFESSION
116. FILIPINO FIRST POLICY
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS
117. WRIT OF AMPARO
PADOR VS. ARCAYAN ET AL GR NO 183460
Substantial evidence proving deprivation of right to life,
liberty and security, by virtue of an unlawful act or
omission, must be presented for a petition for the Writ of
Amparo to be granted
THE PETITIONER WAS ANCHORED ON THE FACT THAT
RESPONDENTS CONDUCTED RAID ON THE PROPRTY OF
PETITIONER DUE TO REPORTS THAT HE WAS
CULTIVATING MARIJUANA WHICH WAS ADMITTEC BY
THE RESPONDENTS
ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS REALLY ENTRY WITHOUT
THEIR CONSENT, THE WRIT OF AMPARO DOES NOT
ENVISAGE THE PROTECTION OF CONCERNS THAT ARE
PURELY PROPRIETARY OR COMMERCIAL IN NATURE
TAPUS VS DEL. ROSARIO
118. WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
GAMBOA VS CAHN ET AL
STATE INTEREST IN DISMANTLING PRIVATE ARMED
GROUP