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Europe's others and the return of
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Thomas Diez
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Review of International Affairs, 17:2, 319-335, DOI: 10.1080/0955757042000245924
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Cambridge Review of International Affairs,
Volume 17, Number 2, July 2004
Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics
Thomas Diez
University of Birmingham
Abstract In the context of European Union enlargement and the discussions about a
European constitution, the question of Europes identity has once again entered the
limelight of political debates. From a poststructuralist perspective, identities are con-
structed through practices of othering, articulating a difference. In this article, I follow
Ole Wver to argue that for most of the time after the Second World War the most
important other in the construction of a European identity has been Europes own past.
This temporal form of othering offered the possibility to form an identity through less
antagonistic and exclusionary practices than was common in the modern international
society. However, since the 1990s geographic and cultural otherings are on the increase,
marking a return of geopolitics in European identity constructions and undermining the
notion of European integration as a fundamental challenge to the world of nation-states.
1
Europe/Europe
In her Journal of Common Market Studies lecture in 1997, Susan Strange posed the
question, Who are EU? (Strange 1998). She took her cue from Robert Reichs
problematisation of the simplistic notion of USAmerican competitiveness in an
age when it is difcult to determine which nationality a rm has or where
exactly it is located. This, Strange argued, was the same for the European Union
(EU). In addition, she pointed to the competition between EU member states in
terms of their national economic systems and their ability to attract investment
(Strange 1998, 104). Although this was not her primary concern, Strange thereby
questioned the notion of a European, or rather EU, identity that underlies (and
is constructed through) arguments of European competitiveness. Whatever
Europe is, it is certainly diverse, and some have indeed taken this diversity to
be at the very core of its identity. At the same time, this diversity makes it rather
difcult to pitch Europe against other international identities.
Stranges question, although in different terms than she elaborated, is becom-
ing increasingly pertinent to the political debate about European integration. A
short glance at some of the disputes in the late 1990s and early years of the new
millennium illustrates this: Is Turkey a European country? Is there a common
1
A previous version of this paper was presented at the workshop Other Europes,
organised by the Poststructuralism working group of the British International Studies
Association, Keele University, England, 16 May 2003. I would like to thank the workshop
participants, Alessandra Buonno, Bahar Rumelili and the three referees of this journal
for their critical and constructive comments.
ISSN 0955-7571 print/ISSN 1474-449X online/04/020319-17 2004 Centre of International Studies
DOI: 10.1080/0955757042000245924
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320 Thomas Diez
European history? Should there be a reference to God in a constitution for the
EU? Does enlargement represent a shift from old Europe to new Europe?
Questions such as these are not directly about the institutional structure of the
Union. They are questions of identity, of whether there is an essence, or at least
a shared common ground to Europe, and of how the European Union relates to
that Europe.
There are two complications here. First, while the European Union is often
simply referred to as Europe (as something), and taken to represent a
European perspective, its membership hardly comprises what most people
would describe as Europe (as somewhere; see Walker [2000, 17]). Switzerland
is the most obvious case outside the EU, but one could also list Norway, most
parts of former Yugoslavia, and a number of Eastern European states, including
Russia. Second, the very notion of Europe is contested. It is contested in
geographical as well as cultural terms. Take the case of Russia: geographically,
many would see Europe end at the Urals, but these not only run straight
through Russia, they are also a border drawn in particular historical circum-
stances, and by no means natural. Culturally, Christian Orthodoxy, despite its
common roots, has often been constructed as Eastern (European) and alien to
a Western (European) tradition, introducing a substantial divide that makes the
meaning of the very notion of Europe contestable.
When we talk about Europe, we therefore probably mean different Europes.
Europe is, in the terms of W.B. Gallie (1962), an essentially contested concept.
Consequently, what is often described as the search for Europes identity is not
so much a search as a construction or an imagination of Europe. There is
nothing special about this. All nations are imagined (Anderson 1991), and even
if Europe is not a nation in the traditional sense of the term at least, it is still
a kind of political identity that reaches beyond the immediate face-to-face
encounter and therefore needs imagination. Yet Benedict Andersons argument
was that imagining the nation was different from imagining previous forms of
identity, such as religious communities. Is the imagination of Europe different
from that of the nation?
From the angle of the discursive analyst, identities are constructed through
practices of othering that generate difference. This was of particular importance
in the modern, territorial state system, as I will explore further in the next
section. My main argument in this paper is that while the European Union
opened up the possibility of the construction of a political identity through a less
exclusionary practice of temporal difference (elaborated in the third section),
geographical and cultural otherings have since the 1990s become more import-
ant in the discourse on European identity (as elaborated in the fourth section).
If this observation is correct (and although I provide a number of illustrations,
the argument certainly warrants further empirical research), this represents a
return of geopolitics and undermines the idea of European integration as a
challenge to the modern territorial state.
Underlying this argument is a distinction between temporal and geopolitical
forms of othering. My claim is that otherings between geographically dened
political entities tend to be more exclusive and antagonistic against out-groups
than otherings with a predominantly temporal dimension. It is obvious that the
temporal and the geopolitical often cannot be separated (Rumelili 2004, 46).
Colonial encounters, for instance, often drew geographical distinctions on the
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Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 321
basis of backwardness, which is a form of temporal othering (Said 1993, 13132,
149). The practice of orientalism has such a temporal dimension (Said 1979: 231),
and there are forms of temporal othering in traditional anthropology which
often are intertwined with colonial encounters (Fabian 1983; 1991). Any history
of Europe cannot be told without reference to such colonial types of othering
that constituted the occident as a geographical and cultural entity, but what I
have in mind as the challenge of European integration to these practices of
identity construction is a temporal othering that is self-reexive: it does not
represent another group as a threat, but the selfs own past. It is this self-
reexivity that makes the temporal othering more open than the geopolitical
othering: while it needs a denition of the self, this can be a loose denition (as
Europe has been and arguably still is), and it is circular in that the temporal
othering is itself part of the construction of the self. It generates a Europe that
refuses to x the deeper meaning of the European idea and thus also remains
open to those who currently remain outside the borders of the European Union
(Elbe 2003, 121). The temporal othering therefore is only problematic from an
ethical point of view that privileges pluralism and non-antagonistic diversity
over the exclusivity, antagonism and hegemony that have so often characterised
modern international society, if there is a prior denition of the self based on a
geopolitical othering.
Discourse and Identity
One of the main contributions of poststructuralism to international relations
theory is the theorisation of identity, and in particular its relationship to
difference. The argument can be summarised as follows.
First, identities are not simply given, but discursively constructed. To talk
about a European identity that somehow needs to nd a political expression is
therefore not an innocent statement but a political act that inscribes the notion
of a European identity into the political debate. The discursive move exhibited
in such statements is, in David Campbells words, an ontopological one (Camp-
bell 1998b, 3381). It presumes, but in so doing only constructs, a naturally
given, territorially dened existence that takes precedence over others.
Second, identities can never be entirely xed. While it is generally accepted
that national identities in particular are relatively stable, their discursively
constructed nature means that there are always alternative constructions against
which the dominant identity notions have to be defended, and which offer the
potential for change (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 4142, 96 et passim). Furthermore,
dominant constructions are in themselves not stable but vary both synchroni-
cally and diachronically. Thus, discourses narrating an uninterrupted, linear
history of, say, the English, impose such a history on a rather more diverse and
contested concept at any given point in time, as well as between historical
epochs.
Third, and most importantly for international relations (IR), identities are
always constructed against the difference of an other. Identity is unthinkable
without such a difference: it would make no sense to say I am European if this
did not imply a difference from being Asian, African or American. Tra-
ditional peace research has always highlighted the importance of enemy images
in war efforts (Flohr 1991), but the poststructuralist argument goes much deeper
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322 Thomas Diez
than this. It alerts us to what David Campbell (1993, 95) once called the radical
interdependence of our political identities. Our own identity is foundationally
linked to the other, or to many others, and these are present whenever we
invoke our identity as British or Europeans. The obvious puzzle posed by this
is, what are the processes of othering in those political speech acts that invoke
a European identity? And, who or what are the others? There is also perhaps a
more interesting question to be asked. If identity is always dependent on
difference, a critical theory addressing the problem of identity/difference de-
pends on the possibility of different kinds of difference: more or less exclusive,
antagonistic and violent ones. If there were no such possibility, the theory would
become fatalistic and would no longer be critical. To raise this issue does not
mean to fall back into an idealist notion of a global identity without difference
and the conicts brought with difference. Instead, there is a sense in the
literature that some forms of othering are more problematic than others. In
particular, the modern territorial state may be prone to violent forms of othering
because it links identity to a specic territory and therefore imposes centralisa-
tion and a hierarchy of identity. If that is the case, and provided that the
European Union is generally considered to be a novel form of political organis-
ation, does it offer an opening towards a less antagonistic, less violent form of
the articulation of identity and difference in international politics?
Self, Other and the Modern State
The modern state is different from other forms of political identity in at least two
respects. Firstly, its construction of identity extends beyond face-to-face or
family relations and therefore has to be imagined outside the realm of daily
experience (Anderson 1991). This, however, was also true for the church. What
distinguishes the modern state from the Papal authority of Roman Catholicism
is, following Max Weber, its monopolisation of violence in the hands of the
government within a particular territory. The imagination of the nation is
important for the modern state, since it legitimises this monopolisation: if there
is a plurality of contending identities, such as in medieval continental Europe,
allegiance with one identity, such as the church, may be in conict with
allegiance to the state, and the monopolisation of violence in the hands of the
latter therefore unacceptable. If, however, there is one overriding national
identity, the concentration of power in those who can claim to represent this
identity becomes acceptable.
This is of course an ideal-typical set-up. There is no such thing as the
modern statethe states that we know today come in many different varieties,
and they are different from the states of the 19th century. The Peace of
Westphalia is often overstated in its importance as a watershed in the history of
the modern state, which on closer inspection evolved rather more gradually
(Teschke 2003). And the notion of a national identity similarly evolved over a
longer time, tied into the history of nationalism. It is not a necessary ingredient
of an autocratic state in which power is legitimised by reference to God,
although in many instances the reference to God comes with a reference to the
nation. In sum, the notion of a territorial form of governance tied into a national
identity is the minimum common denominator for the discursive construction of
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Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 323
a state within modern international society as congured in diplomacy, the
United Nations and the textbooks of IR.
In a Hobbesian world, the monopolisation of violence is seen as progress
from a world in which competing identities on the same territory lead to
constant war and a life solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short (Hobbes 1968,
186). Violence in such a world is not banished, but in part relocated to
international relations, although Hobbes took a much more societal view of
inter-state relations than the simple realist picture of international anarchy
(Walker 1993, 11012). The processes of othering that legitimise violence now
become processes of imposing a difference between nations, rather than clans,
religions or classes, although the latter are often woven into specic construc-
tions of the nation.
The national identity of the modern state is a geopolitical rendering of
identity. The geographic organisation of political identities, however, requires
the imposition of identities over particular territories. This is a crucial difference
to the organisation of power and identity of the church. The power of religion
extends over believers only, unless it is coupled with worldly, territorial power.
While religion has historically been spread by force, its power does not require
the allegiance of a particular person as long as there is a community of believers.
In a world of states, the individual becomes recognisable only through belonging
to a state, and the state legally imposes an identity onto all its citizens: one can
convert to another creed without the involvement of pubic authority, but one
cannot convert to another citizenship as easily, since it requires some form of
legal procedure.
The pacication of the domestic sphere within the modern state does
therefore not constitute a linear progress, but is much more ambiguous and
involves itself in a twofold violence: the violence of imposing a national identity
within its borders, and the violence of imposing its borders and maintaining the
difference between national self and the other outside. History is full of exam-
ples of this violence, such as the hereditary enmity between Germany and
France that led to a series of wars during the constitution of Germany in the 19th
and 20th centuries. As often, the contest over territory and identity was most
erce in the context of the border regions, such as Alsace/Elsass. The post-1945
European Movement therefore turned Hobbes on his head. The nation-state no
longer seemed the pacier that guaranteed a good life, but the origin of hatred
and war.
The European UnionA Special Case?
In terms of the construction of national identities, David Campbell has argued
that the United States of America is a special case:
No state possesses a prediscursive identity Yet for no state is this condition as
central as it is for America. If all states are imagined communities, devoid of
ontological being apart from the many practices that constitute their reality, then
America is the imagined community par excellence. For there never has been a
country called America, nor a people known as Americans from whom a
national identity is drawn. (Campbell 1998a, 91)
Campbell qualies this statement in the epilogue to the revised second edition
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324 Thomas Diez
of Writing Security: Similar specic readings could be offered from a range of
cultural, national and political sites (1998a, 208). However, the argument for
these practices to be even more central to the continuous production of Ameri-
can identity raises the question of whether they would also be more central to
the EU. If one substituted Europe for America in the quote from Campbell
above, it would still ring true, leaving aside that the EU is no state (one could
also replace state with political entity). Therefore, what is special about the US
should apply to the EU as well. What we should nd is the attempt to x the
meaning of Europe, not only by bundling together other discourses on funda-
mental questions of politics and human life in general, which, as metanarratives,
would produce a specic notion of what Europe is (see Diez 2001), but also by
drawing sharp distinctions between Europe and an other. Indeed, many have
commented about such attempts to construct Europe against Russia or Asia or
simply the East, against Turkey or sometimes Islam, or against America, and
specically the United States.
Before I turn to these practices of othering, however, it is worthwhile to
pause, not least because it is clear that, in contrast to the US, none of these
attempts has as yet been so successful as to be able to claim hegemonic status.
This is obviously bound up with the general status of European governance as
more than just an intergovernmental cooperation (therefore the need to construct
a European identity in the rst place), but not constituting a modern territorial
state in itself. Instead, the EU is a complex system of governance that John
Ruggie (1993, 172) has aptly described as multiperspectival, and by now there
are plenty of arguments following his line and conceptualisation of the EU as a
postmodern polity. Ole Wver (1996, 127) draws out the potential conse-
quences of this for how we conceptualise identity: In a post-sovereign state like
Europe we have to view identity simultaneously as something impossible to
ll, always incomplete due to the presence of the outside in the inside, but also
as dened by this impossibility.
Whatever the substance of this argument (which is in itself a construction
that works on the basis of an othering, on which more in a moment), the
ambiguity of the EU within a discourse of states offers the possibility that the
construction of a European identity might not follow the example of the US, or
that of states in general. Jacques Derrida therefore asked,
What if Europe was nothing but the opening, the beginning of a history, for which
the change of course, the change of the heading, the relation to the other heading
or to the other of the heading, would become a continuously existing possibility?
Could Europe in some sense carry the responsibility for this opening, which is the
opposite of exclusion? Could Europe in a constitutive way be the responsibility for
this opening? (Derrida 1992, 1718; emphasis in original; my translation)
This possibility of the opening puts into place an alternative horizon of an open
and diverse Europe, the boundaries of which can never be xed and which
recognises its multiplicity and institutionalises an ethos of pluralisation (Con-
nolly 1995). In the next section, I argue that the traditionally dominant other in
the debate about European identity is compatible with such an alternative
horizon because it is a temporal rather than a geopolitical other. However, this
othering is increasingly contested.
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Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 325
Europes Temporal Other
Since the modern state is based on a territorial entity, the most common
processes of othering in international society are geographic in nature. They
establish an inside and an outside, represent the outside as a danger to the
presupposed identity of the inside and thereby construct and reproduce that
very identity. For a long time after the Second World War, the logic of the
dominant othering in the process of European integration, however, has not
been primarily geographic but temporal. Ole Wver has made this argument
most succinctly: Europes other, the enemy image, is today not to a very large
extent Islamic fundamentalism, the Russians or anything similarrather
Europes other is Europes own past which should not be allowed to become its
future (1998, 90).
One could indeed make a long list of contributions to the debate about
European integration in which European governance and continued European
integration are justied by reference to Europes war-torn past and the need to
overcome this, and the representation of post-war (for a long time, Western)
Europe as a new Europe that has overcome the menace of war. Indeed, such is
the force of this argument that European Union representatives often strongly
identify with the notion of being a force for peace and human rightsthe notion
of a normative power (Manners 2002). Consider the following two speeches as
examples for this rhetoric.
Firstly, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, in his speech on the future
of Europe at the Humboldt University in Berlin on 12 May 2000:
Fifty years ago almost to the day, Robert Schuman presented his vision of a
European Federation for the preservation of peace. This heralded a completely
new era in the history of Europe. European integration was the response to
centuries of a precarious balance of powers on this continent which again and
again resulted in terrible hegemonic wars culminating in the two World Wars
between 1914 and 1945. The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still
is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic
ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia
in 1648, a rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the
transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions.
(Fischer 2000)
Of course, Fischer is often seen as a federalist, and his speech was contested and
kicked off an intense debate about the future of Europe. The British Prime
Minister, Tony Blair, in a less high-prole speech in Glasgow on 15 February
2003, however, made a similar argument:
For hundreds of years, Europe was at war, the boundaries of many nations
shifting with each passing army, small countries occupied and re-occupied, their
people never at peace. Large countries fought each other literally for decades at
a time with only the briefest respite to draw breath before the resumption of
hostilities. For my fathers generation that was the Europe they were brought up
in. Today in Europe former enemies are friends, at one, if not always diplomati-
cally. The EU is a massive achievement of peace and prosperity. (Blair 2003)
This temporal othering pervades the discourse on European integration much
more thoroughly than it initially seems. It pops up, for instance, in the academic
analysis of the nature of European governance and the distinction between a
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326 Thomas Diez
modern and a postmodern form of governance discussed above. Indeed, the
degree to which the European Union does represent a new form of governance
is contested. Intergovernmentalists, for example, while conceding that the level
of supranationalism brought about without force requires explanation, base
those explanations in the interests of member states, however derived (Moravc-
sik 1998). While this debate can be seen as being about a matter of degree, it is
exactly because of this possibility of different readings that any statement about
the character of the European Union is also a construction of its identityin the
above discussion of a postmodern versus a modern one.
Finally, the temporal othering is also performed by NGOs promoting Eu-
ropean integration. This is most prominent perhaps in the so-called
Newropeans, an NGO that claims to represent the Post-Treaty of Rome
Generations for whom Europe is a citizen-reality to rule, no longer an institu-
tional project to build ( www.newropeans.org).
All of this does not mean that there is no geographical othering in the
discourse about European integration. Indeed, my argument is that this tra-
ditional kind of othering is on the increase and therefore undermining a core
impetus for integration, and closing the window for alternative, less exclusive
forms of identity construction. The next two subsections look at two instances of
temporal othering, which, however, incorporate an explicit geopolitical dimen-
sion.
Eastern Enlargement and the Incarnation of the Temporal Other
Throughout the majority of Europes integration, Europes past as Europes
other was related to the European self: the self was also its other. It is this
self-reference that distinguishes this process of othering from others: the danger
lies within, rather than outside, and so adds an ambiguity to the identity thus
constructed that is missing from the traditional otherings analysed in much of
the literature. This changed with the debates about Eastern enlargement after the
end of the Cold War.
The representation of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after the end of the
Cold War remained within the discursive logic of past as other, but added a
geographical notion. Central and Eastern Europe now became the incarnation of
Europes past, a past that the West had overcome, and a zone of war and
nationalism that was stuck in history. This shift took place within the context of
securitisation as a legitimisation strategy for enlargement, as Atsuko Higashino
(2003) shows. Security arguments in which backward CEE was represented as a
threat not only to its own peace, but also to the peace of the then EU, played a
crucial role in the transformation from enlargement as an option in the faraway
future to enlargement as a necessity to maintain peace and stability in Europe.
The war in Kosovo was particularly instrumental in this transformationit was
around 1999 that policymakers were increasingly pushing for enlargement
because otherwise peace in Europe could not be guaranteed, not only in the CEE
countries, but in Europe as a whole (Higashino 2003).
The effect of this discourse was not only to legitimise and push forward
enlargement, but also to reinforce both the power of the EU to prescribe a
particular future for CEE and the self-image of a region as having overcome the
dangers of war and acting as a force for peace. The same rhetoric was used not
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Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 327
only in relation to the future member states, but also in other locales of CEE. In
Bosnia, for instance, where the EU has been particularly active, Commission
President Romano Prodi, in a speech in Sarajevo on 6 April 2002, compared the
history of Bosnia and Herzegovina to a potted version of Europes own. He
continued,
Confrontation, nationalism and extremism must give way to a new outlook. Let
me make that clear: in a united Europe there is simply no place for such attitudes
or for those who hold them. European integration has allowed us to cast off this
narrow mindset. We no longer see ourselves solely in terms of nationality,
community or State The European Union is founded on dialogue, cooperation
and mutual respect. Dialogue, cooperation and mutual respect are also vital for
the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no reason why the communities
that make up this country cannot cooperate in their common interest for the sake
of a better future for all. Just as many other former enemies are doing so
successfully within the Union. Dialogue and cooperation are just as crucial to
Sarajevo as they are to Europe. And Sarajevo, the European capital of a European
State, should stand as an example of multi-ethnicity. Regional cooperation is the
key to lasting peace. (Prodi 2002)
Central and Eastern Europe is not the rst incarnation of the EUs temporal
other. The sanctions imposed by the other member states against Austria in 1999,
when the right-wing Liberal Party (FPO

) and its then head, Jo rg Haider, who

was accused of racism, formed a coalition government with the Peoples Party
(O

VP), can equally be read as an attempt to construct a European identity as

human-rights-observing and peaceful, a moral community, against an Austria
that displayed non-European characteristics (see Diez 2000). As with CEE, the
problem with the sanctions was that while the public statements of FPO

politicians had been more than worrying, the othering of Austria conveniently
ignored that some member states, such as Denmark, pursued at least equally
problematic policies when it came to immigration, and displayed similar tenden-
cies towards racism.
Old Europe, New Europe
The logic of the past as other argument was turned on its head by United States
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in his remarks to the foreign press in
Washington on 22 January 2003: Now, youre thinking of Europe as Germany
and France. I dont. I think thats old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO
Europe today, the centre of gravity is shifting to the east. And there are a lot of
new members (Rumsfeld 2003). Although Rumsfeld did not use the term new
Europe during the press conference, this soon became a widespread debate
about new versus old Europe, and both terms are now used widely in the
media in a stark contrast to their original post-1945 meanings.
Although this debate still has a temporal dimension to it, its geopolitical
connotations are overwhelming, and it ts a more traditional form of othering,
in which the other is represented as backward. These otherings follow the
structure of a typical logocentric practice (see Ashley 1989, 216): they dichoto-
mise two entities constructed as clearly separated, and then privilege one (new)
over the other (old). In the old Europe/new Europe debate, this is then used
to split a European identity. Compared with the traditional integration debate,
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328 Thomas Diez
new Europe now becomes old Europe, and old Europe (the incarnation of the
past as other in enlargement parlance) becomes new Europe (see also Joenniemi
2004).
Rumsfelds rhetorical move was particularly effective (and provocative to his
old Europeans) because it used an already existing discursive trope, turned its
meaning on its head and reinforced its geopolitical connotations. This seems to
t into a wider move towards a return to geopolitics, also by EU actors, as
reected most clearly in renewed efforts to contrast Europe to an Islamic world
or America. Europes temporal other, while still running alongside these identity
constructions as the quotes from Blair and Fischer at the beginning of this
section have shown, is losing in importance. The next section provides some
illustrations of this return of geopolitical othering.
Europes Geographical Others
Europe and Islam
An exhibition in Berlins Museum for Islamic Art in autumn 2003 showed
pictures by the artist Claudio Lange taken in French and Spanish cathedrals of
statues depicting Muslims, all of them as inferior creatures (see Lange 2003). The
representation of Islam as the other of a Christian Europe has a long tradition,
and is an integral part of many aspects of European (and Islamic) culture. It
would be na ve to assume that this discourse was irrelevant to the discussions
about a European identity even in the post-1945 age of integration. However,
during the predominance of the temporal other, the other of Islam played at
worst a secondary and at best a silent background role. Today, the construction
of Islam as Europes other is back in the headlines, ironically at a time when a
substantial number of EU citizens are Muslims.
The discursive site where most of the othering of Europe against Islam is
performed is Turkey. Turkeys representation in relation to Europe has always
been ambiguous. Historically, the Ottoman Empire was a synonym for the
Muslim other, while at the same time a power in Europe. Geographically, the
line dividing Europe and Asia has traditionally been drawn through Turkey,
large parts of which came to be known as Asia Minor, indicating that it wasnt
really part of Asia either. Kemal Atatu rk, and the Kemalists who dominated
Turkish politics until recently, wanted Turkey to modernise, which to some
extent also meant Europeanise, and thereby located Turkey on the road to,
rather than within Europe (and with diverging understandings of Europe and
the West; see Jung [1998]; Mu ftu ler-Bac [1997, 3]).
The contrast with Cyprus, itself for a long time part of the Ottoman Empire,
could not be starker. Its Europeanness was never in doubt during the accession
assessments, even though its geographical location (and its food) make it a clear
member of the Middle East. No one doubted the European credentials even of
the islands north, by and large populated by Muslims. Instead, the (Greek)
Cypriot government successfully represented the island as being the cradle of
European civilisation, stressing antiquity (the birthplace of Aphrodite; see dis-
cussion in Diez [2002, 14748]), and representing itself as a bridge to, but by
implication also separate from, the Middle East.
Interestingly, Turkey sent ve delegates to the International Council of the
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Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 329
European Movement in The Hague in 1949 (European Movement 1949, 39), and
subsequently became a member of the Council of Europe and NATO, but not of
the predecessors of the European Union. When it concluded an Association
Agreement with the then European Economic Community in 1963, this was not
seen as leading to Turkish membership, although membership was mentioned
as an option that the association process should facilitate (OJ 217, 29/12/1964,
3687 [preamble]). The European Union could, however, no longer evade the
issue of Turkeys Europeanness when the country led a membership appli-
cation in 1987: the EU Treaty stipulates in Article 49 that only European states
can join the Union.
The ambiguous representation of Turkey has since been continued. While the
Commission and the Council have in principle agreed to Turkeys eligibility and
accepted Turkey as a membership candidate, the discussion about Turkeys
membership operates on several levels. There are, on the one hand, serious
problems with the political system, although a large part of these are currently
being rectied by an overhaul of the constitution. There remains the problem of
human rights violations, which include the Turkish involvement in northern
Cyprus if the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights is taken as the
measure. And there are serious problems of economic performance and admin-
istrative capabilities. Yet on the other hand, Turkeys Europeanness continues to
be questioned, both openly, and often also indirectly in discussions about
political, economic and administrative criteria.
This is a well-known story; therefore three examples from the last decade can
sufce. In 1994, the then head of the Christian-Democrat and Christian-Social
(CDU/CSU) grouping in the German parliament, Wolfgang Schauble, argued
that Turkey was not part of the Christianoccidental tradition and therefore
could not be a member of the EU (Su ddeutsche Zeitung 1994). Three years later,
the heads of European Christian Democrats, after a meeting of the European
Peoples Party in Luxembourg, made their infamous statement to the same
effect.
2
Finally, when the President of the convention for a European consti-
tution, Giscard dEstaing, was interviewed on 7 November 2002, he also stated
that Turkey is not a European country (BBC 2002).
One of the reasons why the Europe versus Islam discourse remained a silent
and minor one during much of the Cold War period was that the Europeanness
of the then EU members had not been challenged. One exception was the
application by Morocco in 1987 (see Rumelili 2004, 4143), which was not even
considered because Morocco was not deemed to be a European country, and
therefore did not spark debates similar to those about Turkey. During the Cold
War, the then Soviet Union came perhaps closest to being an other for the then
European Community, although, as Iver Neumann (1999, 111) argues, its
specicity as Europes other resides not along the spatial but along the
temporal dimension, as the country that is perpetually seen as being in some
stage of transition to Europeanization. Neumann notes that this is reected in
discourses within Russiaas is the case with Turkey. The main complication
with the Soviet Union as a European other, however, was that it played that
function for the West as a whole, and that there is also an increasingly important
2
Turkish Press Review, 3 April 1997, http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/chr/
ing97/04/97x04x03.txt .
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330 Thomas Diez
discourse that represents America, or more specically, the United States, and
therefore part of the West, as Europes other.
Europe and the United States
When George W. Bush assumed power as the United States 43rd president, the
Dubya jokes in Europe were part of a double stereotype that serves to construct
and reproduce European cultural superiority: Bush seems like a caricature of the
Wild-West American, while, from a Bush-friendly perspective, this criticism
represents a caricature of European cultural arrogance. Both images operate
along the lines of standard practices of othering, and they are situated in a
longer history of European identity constructions against the United States.
When the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, declared 1973 to be the
Year of Europe without consulting the Europeans (see Urwin 1991, 160), he
unleashed a soul-searching enterprise that led to the Copenhagen Document
on European Identity, in which, among other things, the member states
declared their aim to be recognised by the international society as a single entity
with its own character (reprinted in Gasteyger 1994, 3025). For many, especially
those of a federalist persuasion, one aim of the integration process had always
been to turn Europe into a third superpower that would follow its own
economic and political path and could act as a mediator between the Soviet
Union and the United States. After World War II, the Socialist Movement for a
United States of Europe adopted the further aim of becoming a third force,
which found common ground with the conservative Count Coudenhove-Ka-
lergi, doyen of the European federalists, who thought a United States of Europe
would be the only way to survive in a world of Great Powers (Europe Unites
1949, 19).
Underlying these proposals, as well as later ones, was the notion of Europe
being different from the United States: less prone to laissez-faire capitalism, more
cultured, more concerned about the environment, as well as more peaceful. The
trade disputes between the EU and the US that have become more outspoken
since the 1990s are partly entanglements in these identity constructions, as is the
promotion of human rights and especially the abolition of the death penalty,
over which the EU regularly clashes with the US. The idea of the European
Union as a normative power (Manners 2002) is largely articulated in contrast
to the US, which is constructed as conducting its foreign policy by military
means rather than by the force of norms.
This process of othering works, of course, both ways. Located in this context
is a popular bestseller of 2003, Robert Kagans Paradise and Power (2003), where
Kagan sets the paradise EU, where peaceful means and condence in inter-
national norms dominate foreign policy, against the power US, which takes a
more realist(ic) view and relies on military force. While Europeans may
disagree with Kagan in the nal analysis (i.e. that the paradise needs power
to exist, and that Europes foreign policy emerges from weakness), there is no
doubt that the paradise/power imagery is shared by many (the book has been
widely discussed in the media and on endless discussion forums), and that it ties
into the past as other discourse in that the past is a past of power politics and
unilateralism. (Read the above quotes from Fischer and Blair against Kagan.)
To focus on these othering processes is not to say that there is no difference
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Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 331
between the conduct of foreign policy between the European Union and the
United States. Instead, foreign policy is itself interwoven with the discourse on
a European identity. In this respect, I would like to maintain an ambiguity in my
argument. On the one hand, I do believe that the EU constitutes a different kind
of power, both in its organisation of politics and in its pursuit of foreign policy,
and that its policies are less antagonistic. On the other hand, the dichotomisation
of paradise and power leads to forgetting the dark sides of Europethe still
present xenophobia and racism; the involvement of EU member states in the
arms trade; the waste of agricultural production; to name but a few. The
challenge therefore is to reinforce the difference without reinforcing the antago-
nism in the othering. The temporal othering offers a way to do so by inserting
a degree of self-reexivity. The return of geopolitics seems to move Europe away
from this opening.
The Geopoliticisation of European Identity and Its Alternatives
What we have been witnessing since the 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty and
the end of the Cold War is a move from the construction of European identity
through a temporal othering, which is not tied to xed geographical borders and
does not thematise territory explicitly, to the increasingly widespread construc-
tion of Europe through practices of othering, in which identity, politics and
geography are intimately linked with each other, and which can therefore be
called geopolitical otherings. Such an increase in geopolitical othering is not
surprising given the development of the EU, and the international society in
which it is embedded, since the beginning of the 1990s. The end of the Cold War
and the expansion of both NATO and the EU have raised questions of what it
means to be European that had been less urgent before, as the Turkish case
illustrates. In other words, these developments have led to the explication and
politicisation of the hitherto much less problematic ambiguity of the notion of
Europe. It is a common argument in a variety of literatures that it is in such
situations of ambiguity that attempts to x identities are staged.
3
In addition, the attacks of 9/11, as well as the 2004 Madrid bombings, have
intensied the making of a European territory that needs to be secured from
the threats of illegal immigration, and in particular from the threats of Islamism.
I have not elaborated these practices further in this article, but even though
European responses to 9/11 might have been less worrisome for civil liberties
than those of the Bush government (Rorty 2004), the securitisation of migration
has started to dominate public discourse in Europe, too, and in particular
in conation with the othering of Islam, from the intensication of border
controls and the construction of the wearing of a headscarf as a forbidden
religious symbol in schools, to the headlines of the tabloid press and the publi-
cation of more high-brow books (see Buonno 2004). All of this warrants further
investigation, but the central practices seem to be in line with what Campbell
describes as the writing of security and identity in the US: while professing to
be non-discriminatory, they single out a particular other, construct it as a
3
For different perspectives on this argument, see Norton (1987, 7), Campbell (1990,
272), but also, from a social constructivist angle, Marcussen et al. (2002, 103), where
critical junctures can be read as moments of ambivalence.
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332 Thomas Diez
potential existential threat and, despite large Muslim populations within EU
member states, locate the threat on the outside, as something against which
Europe must be defended.
This does not mean that there is no geopolitical dimension to the temporal
othering. There are three aspects to this discussion. First, the past as other
argument is still tied to a European space: it is Europes past and present. Yet
because it does not explicate the geographical contours of this Europe, it is
principally more open, geographically and culturally, than the geopolitical
othering. When temporal othering takes precedence, there is an opportunity to
articulate spatial or cultural difference without the articulation of existential
threats, because the main existential threat is related to the self. In this respect,
I agree with Bahar Rumelilis argument that any temporal-internal differen-
tiation requires the presumption be made that the community is unequivocally
bounded (Rumelili 2004, 46), but, in contrast to her, I nonetheless see a decisive
qualitative difference between the self-reexivity of the temporal othering, and
the antagonism and externalisation of threat in many forms of geopolitical
otherings.
Second, as indicated above, there has always been a subtext to the temporal
othering that presented Islam for instance as an other, but also the United States.
To the extent that this was thematised openly, however, until recently the past
as other argument provided effective boundaries for an antagonistic articulation
of difference. In that sense, while one might read the construction of Turkey as
the other that has to modernise as the temporalisation of a geographical
difference, similar to the construction of backwardness in the colonial discourse,
the signicance of the arguments about Turkey is that they have become a
central, if contested, part of the discourse about European identity only over the
past decade. Indeed, as the discussion of Ataturks modernisation strategy in the
previous section has shown, the temporal othering was articulated long before
then.
Third, the past as other discourse exhibits some signicant silencesthe
present dark sides of Europe referred to above, but also its colonial past and
the shaping of its identity through this historical context, and the shadows it
casts over the present. Yet, while this past cannot be eradicated, and while the
past as other discourse does not problematise Europes colonial past to any
signicant degree, it does at least provide a reference point to address this past
in a similar way as the nationalism and wars within Europe. A geopoliticised
identity discourse is much more problematic in this respect, because it is prone
to replicate colonial attitudes of supremacy in that it relies on the construction
of an inferior other and a superior self, which in turn is transposed onto the
other, while at the same time omitting the kind of self-reexivity exhibited in the
temporal othering outlined above.
The geopoliticisation of European identity constructions is, however, by no
means a necessary outcome. The ambiguity emerging in the 1990s is discursively
textured, and the responses discursively manufactured. Consider that the tem-
poral othering does not problematise the location and existence of Europe; it
knows where Europe is supposed to be (Walker 2000). The denition of and the
response to the ambiguity display modern traits supposed to have been over-
come. Their aim is to reinforce clear territorial boundaries rather than taking the
chance to rethink the possibilities of politics on the basis that Europe really
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Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 333
isnt there (ibid., 2829). Instead of opting for the maintenance of the ambiguity,
many, it seems, are opting for its abandonment, although it remains to be seen
whether this is met with the ultimate success of installing a hegemonic discourse
of the other.
The return of geopolitics closes the opening presented by European inte-
gration and undermines conceptions of integration as a network horizon, in
which the European polity is envisaged not as a unitary entity with xed
boundaries, but as a complex of interwoven regional and functional units (see
Diez 1997). Such a horizon is not devoid of differences. However, these are
constantly negotiated, overlapping and therefore not exclusive. They institution-
alise a discourse of radical interdependence (Campbell 1994), and therefore
empower subject positions different from state-centric conceptualisations of
European governance. Therefore, while the notion of Europe as a postmodern
polity is in itself a construction based on othering, its rendition as a temporal
other is far less exclusive than the conation of temporal and geographic other.
While the dangers of the modern/postmodern dichotomisation must be resisted,
a return to modernity and therefore geopolitics is also to be avoided if our
concern is the simultaneity of one Europe and many Europes,
4
and the
openness and diversity that this would bring with it.
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