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Psychology
Journal of Language and Social
http://jls.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/05/30/0261927X14534656
The online version of this article can be found at:
DOI: 10.1177/0261927X14534656
published online 4 June 2014 Journal of Language and Social Psychology
Steven McCornack, Kelly Morrison, Jihyun Esther Paik, Amy M. Wisner and Xun Zhu
Discourse Production
Information Manipulation Theory 2: A Propositional Theory of Deceptive
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Journal of Language and Social Psychology
1 30
2014 SAGE Publications
DOI: 10.1177/0261927X14534656
jls.sagepub.com
Article
Information Manipulation
Theory 2: A Propositional
Theory of Deceptive
Discourse Production
Steven McCornack
1
, Kelly Morrison
1
, Jihyun Esther
Paik
1
, Amy M. Wisner
1
, and Xun Zhu
1
Abstract
Information Manipulation Theory 2 (IMT2) is a propositional theory of deceptive
discourse production that conceptually frames deception as involving the covert
manipulation of information along multiple dimensions and as a contextual problem-
solving activity driven by the desire for quick, efficient, and viable communicative
solutions. IMT2 is rooted in linguistics, cognitive neuroscience, speech production,
and artificial intelligence. Synthesizing these literatures, IMT2 posits a central
premise with regard to deceptive discourse production and 11 empirically testable
(that is, falsifiable) propositions deriving from this premise. These propositions are
grouped into three propositional sets: intentional states (IS), cognitive load (CL),
and information manipulation (IM). The IS propositions pertain to the nature and
temporal placement of deceptive volition, in relation to speech production. The
CL propositions clarify the interrelationship between load, discourse, and context.
The IM propositions identify the specific conditions under which various forms of
information manipulation will (and will not) occur.
Keywords
deception, information manipulation, deceptive message production
We begin with a tale of transgression.
1
Imagine you have dated Chris for over a year
and in the past have felt very intimate. But now your feelings have changed. Chris is
extremely jealous, and the two of you have been frequently arguing. Whereas Chris
1
Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA
Corresponding Author:
Steven McCornack, Department of Communication, Michigan State University, 467 CAS, 404 Wilson
Road, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA.
Email: mccornac@msu.edu
534656JLSXXX10.1177/0261927X14534656Journal of Language and Social PsychologyMcCornack et al.
research-article2014
by guest on June 5, 2014 jls.sagepub.com Downloaded from
2 Journal of Language and Social Psychology
wants a committed relationship, you want to date others. Unbeknownst to Chris, you
have been seeing someone else. This other relationship started out as fun, but recently
has become more intense, both sexually and emotionally. One night, while you and
Chris are out, Chris suddenly looks at you and says, Lately youve been acting really
distant. Is there anything wrong? What would you say to Chris?
The tacitly presumed production model dominating deception research suggests
that in contexts such as this, people will produce one of two message types: a bald-
faced lie (BFL) or a bald-faced truth (BFT). For example,
2
No, Chris, there isnt anything wrong. Im just stressing about exams. (BFL)
Chris, I havent been honest with you. I dont feel the same about you or our relationship.
Were always fighting, and your constant jealousy really bothers me. Youve been putting
a lot of pressure on me to commit, and I just dont think Im ready right now. I know I
was wrong in waiting this long to tell you, but Ive been seeing someone else. It started
out as a fun thing but has recently gotten more intense. And yes, if youre wondering what
I mean by more intense, I mean more intense physically and emotionally. Im sorry if I
am hurting you by telling you this, but theres really no easy way to do this. (BFT)
Almost all extant deception research, across disciplines, presumes the BFL versus
BFT dichotomy (McCornack & Morrison, 2012). This bifurcation is perpetuated
through rationales, hypotheses, designs, and experimental procedures (McCornack,
1997). Certainly, occasional knowing nods are exchanged at conferences or disclaim-
ers added into discussion sections, confessing the truth that other forms of deception
exist.
3
Nevertheless, researchers continue to posit BFLs versus BFTs as the only dis-
course options worthy of scholarly interest (for a powerful illustration of this procliv-
ity, see deception meta-analyses by Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Sporer & Schwandt,
2007).
The BFLBFT dichotomy is treated as a truism not just within the detection litera-
ture, in which a narrow focus on truths versus lies is understandable, but also within
the production literature.
4
For example, in the past few years, several promising mod-
els of deceptive discourse production have emerged within psychology, communica-
tion, and cognitive neuroscience. These include Walczyks (2013) brilliantly rendered
ActivationDecisionConstructionAction Theory or ADCAT, work by Vrij,
Granhag, and Porter (2010) examining deception and cognitive load, Mohamed et al.s
(2006) neural-cognitive model of deception, and Sporer and Schwandts (2006, 2007)
Working Memory Model of deception. Although these models vary widely in the par-
ticular cognitive mechanisms proposed, and the specificity with which production pro-
cesses are explicated, only one of themADCATrecognizes and addresses the
possibility of deceptive discourse forms other than BFLs.
Yet even a casual glance at the kinds of discourse people actually generate within
situations such as Chris demonstrates the invalidity of the BFLBFT dichotomy.
Consider the following example, produced by a participant in McCornacks (1992)
original sample:
McCornack et al. 3
Chris, yeah, there is something wrong. Weve been fighting all the time! Your jealousy is
getting way out of hand. Youre pressing me to commit, and I just dont think Im ready
yet. Ive been feeling recently like I want to date other people. Dont think that I would
ever do something like that without telling you, because I wouldnt. Its just my feelings
toward you have changed. (p. 11)
This message is mundane, not strange or anomalous.
5
Yet it cannot readily be
explained by most existing models of deceptive discourse production.
The original Information Manipulation Theory (IMT; McCornack, 1992) was an
attempt to account for such messages. IMT suggested that when deceiving others,
people manipulate information in myriad ways that align with the maxims proposed
by philosopher Paul Grice (1989). Specifically, during interaction, people orient to
four maxims: Quantity (the amount of relevant information that is shared), Quality
(the veracity of shared information), Manner (the way in which disclosed information
is expressed), and Relation (the relevance of disclosed information).
6
People expect
that these maxims will be adhered to as part of a broader norm governing rational
human discourse, the Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1989): Make your conversational
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted pur-
pose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (p. 26).
Of course, Grice was interested not in those instances in which people abide by the
maxims; but instead, in which they grossly violate them so as to trigger conversational
implicatures: deductions about intended meanings that exceed the literal meaning of
the spoken words. So, for example, when a colleague asked Steve (i.e., the first author)
about a student who had requested that she be taken on as a research assistant, Tell
me everything you legally can about how she [ the student ] performed in your class,
Steve responded by saying, Well, she came to class. This blatant violation (i.e.,
flout) of Quantity
7
was intended to convey an implicature: namely, that class atten-
dance was all that the student had done. Ironically, Steves colleague responded by
saying, Thanksthats very informative!
IMT argued that, in contrast to the collaborative and cooperative effort between
speakers and hearers that occurs during flouts, deception is different. When one
deceives, one violates a conversational maxim; but does so covertly. As Grice (1989)
himself noted, the outcome of covert violations is that the listener is misled.
8
The natural implication of IMT is that people have at their disposal indefinite num-
bers of ways they can play with or manipulate information in deceiving others. As
described in the conclusion of the original IMT, Given that conversational interac-
tants possess expectations regarding information quantity, quality, manner, and rele-
vance, it is possible for speakers to violate any or all of these expectations in attempting
to deceive listeners (McCornack, 1992, p. 13).
All of which takes us back to our enigmatic example. Within the message, Chris,
yeah, there is something wrong . . . the source discloses most of the situationally
relevant information in a perfectly truthful fashion; including feelings have changed,
not ready to commit, and that she wants to date other people. But she also inserts
a single unit of false information into her discourse stream: Dont think that I would
ever do something like that without telling you, because I wouldnt. The result is a
message that is not BFL or BFT, but something else. From this, we can begin to see
that by placing messages into global categories (rather than construing them as exist-
ing at the intersection of multiple dimensions) we necessarily lose information rele-
vant to the subtle message features that potentially influence deceptiveness
(McCornack, 1992, p. 11).
Although IMT (McCornack, 1992) issued a clarion call for shifting toward a mul-
tidimensional characterization of deceptive discourse (a call little heeded by subse-
quent scholars), it suffered from two shortcomings (McCornack, 1997). First, it was
not a theory. No formal, testable, falsifiable propositions were posited. Second, no
account was offered regarding the production mechanisms underlying information
manipulation.
This work seeks to rectify those deficiencies. In doing so, we draw on classic and
contemporary scholarship in linguistics, artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience,
and speech production; and propose a theory for explaining deceptive (and truthful)
discourse production: Information Manipulation Theory 2, or IMT2. IMT2 consists
of a central premise and 11 propositions grouped into three propositional sets.
The remainder of this essay consists of five sections. First, we briefly overview the
prevailing model of deceptive discourse production. Second, we juxtapose this model
against scholarly works that have shaped our thinking about deception and on which
we base IMT2. Third, we present the central premise of IMT2. Fourth, we posit 11
theoretical propositions rooted in the central premise; propositions we intend as foun-
dational for future research. Finally, we conclude by discussing theoretical implica-
tions and practical applications of IMT2.
The Prevailing Model
Almost all extant deception research and theorizing is guided by a single tacit model
of discourse production (Levine, 2012; McCornack & Morrison, 2012). The model is
top-down, linear-sequential, and stepwise in nature. Despite the model having been
invalidated more than 15 years ago (see McCornack, 1997, pp. 117-122), it continues
to be embraced by deception scholars. The model consists of four presumed steps,
detailed below.
First, communicator X is faced with a complex situation. Situational complexity
derives from the presence of multiple and competing goals and the possession of infor-
mation thatif disclosedwould entail significant personal, professional, or rela-
tional punishments (for a superb discussion of situational complexity, see OKeefe,
1988, p. 91).
Second, X compares the message options of BFL versus BFT and decides to pro-
duce a BFL. This decision is made prior to actually generating a message; evoking the
quandary first elucidated by Barbara OKeefe more than 20 years ago (OKeefe,
1987): how? That is, how can a person, based on meansends reasoning, render deci-
sions about which message to select based on message outcomes, without having
McCornack et al. 5
already constructed the messages that are the basis for the comparison? Nevertheless,
this process is presumed (see OKeefe, 1987, for further discussion of this paradox).
Third, with a priori intent-to-deceive now firmly in cognitive place, X sets about
constructing the BFL. Realize, in the former stepthat is, comparing the potential
outcomes of BFL versus BFT and selecting BFLX still has not constructed the
actual BFL that will be deployed. As X begins building the BFL from scratch, X
experiences substantial cognitive load, because of the necessity of having to manu-
facture false information, coupled with the fear of being detected (see Buller,
Burgoon, Buslig, & Roiger, 1996; Buller, Burgoon, White, & Ebesu, 1994; Ekman,
1985; Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006).
Finally, once the BFL is cognitively constructed, X presents the BFL, in the form
of a verbal message accompanied by nonverbal behaviors. But because lie produc-
tion (Step 3) is so cognitively demanding and so much fear is experienced regarding
the potential of detection from ever-vigilant listeners (Buller et al., 1996; Burgoon,
Blair, & Strom, 2008; Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, White, & Rockwell, 1996; Burgoon,
Buller, Guerrero, Afifi, & Feldman, 1996), X also displays leakage cues deriving
from unrecognized or uncontrollable arousal (Ekman, 1985; Ekman & Friesen,
1969).
It is difficult to overstate the degree to which this model guides deception research,
whether its studies of interactive deception (Burgoon, Buller, & Floyd, 2001), cogni-
tive load (Vrij et al., 2006), the neurobiology of deception (Ganis, 2013), production
(Mohamed et al., 2006), computer-mediated deception (Hancock, Curry, Goorha, &
Woodworth, 2008), or detection (see Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Sporer & Schwandt,
2007). Yet the most intriguing thing about this model is not its ubiquity. Instead, it is
the fact that this model fails to correlate with theory and research from linguistics,
artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, and speech production. It is to this the-
ory and research that we now turn.
Foundational Works Underlying IMT2
IMT2 is the direct conceptual descendant of previous works authored by McCornack
(1992), most notably, his IMT, and his chapter on deceptive message production
(McCornack, 1997). In fact, many of the claims herein were foreshadowed by argu-
ments in the latter work (see 1997, pp. 111-117).
Apart from these antecedents, numerous writings have influenced IMT2, most
notably Walczyks (2013) ADCAT, the work of Ganis (2013) on the neuroscience of
deception, Greenes second-generation Action Assembly Theory or AAT2 (Greene
& Herbers, 2011), Baddeleys working memory model (1986, 2000, 2007, 2012), and
the local management model of speech production offered by OKeefe and Lambert
(1995). But six works in particular form the foundation for the central premise and
propositions of IMT2. We turn now to a brief discussion of these; focusing our com-
mentary on the implications they each suggest for valid theorizing about deceptive
discourse production.
Zipfs Principle of Least Effort
In his classic book, Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort: An Introduction
to Human Ecology, Zipf (1949) argued that virtually all of nature is guided by a bind-
ing principle, which he calls the principle of least effort (or PLE for short). The
PLE is an efficiency law: organic and industrial systems are compelled to maximize
outcomes and minimize effort. Applied to human behavior, the PLE suggests that
people overwhelmingly pursue action paths (to borrow Zipfs descriptor) judged as
the most efficient in terms of effort/reward ratio. Phrased as a simple imperative:
minimize effort!
9
As consequences of the PLE, efficient behaviors will be performed more frequently
than inefficient ones, and cycles of efficiency (and routine) will develop and endure;
frequent behaviors becoming quicker and easier to perform over time, thereby ensur-
ing additional efficiency. Of course, one less desirable outcome of the PLE is that
people often will choose disadvantageous, dysfunctional, or even destructive behav-
iors (e.g., cheating, deception), simply because they are quick and easy.
Related to Zipfs (1949) PLE is his notion of friction-of-distance. Friction-of-
distance posits that physical distance between individuals is prohibitive, because of
the effort that must be expended to bridge it. Hence, people will interact more fre-
quently with those who are geographically and spatially proximic, and quantity of
interaction will decline with increases in distance.
The PLE and friction-of-distance have been used for decades by population schol-
ars in predicting patterns of city-to-city urban migration (for a review and analysis, see
Soo, 2004), and criminologists in searching for serial killers (see, e.g., Godwin, 2001;
Godwin & Canter, 1997). Zipfs (1949) arguments also match findings from research
as diverse as Parks (2007) work examining social networks and romantic relationship
development, and Festinger, Schachter, and Backs (1950) classic study of friendship
and campus housing.
Applied to discourse production, Zipfs (1949) PLE compels speakers toward mak-
ing the most efficient word choices possible. For example, grammatical role assign-
ment in utterance structure depends on the effort associated with lexical encoding: the
easier it is to select a word to express a concept, the more likely it is that this word will
be encoded at the beginning of an utterance as the sentential subject (Dell, Chang, &
Griffin, 1999). Pushed to the philosophical extreme, Zipfs PLE compels speakers to
minimize the total number of spoken words produced and shift instead toward objec-
tively ambiguous language, the meaning of which is entirely based on speaker intent.
As elegantly described by Piantadosi, Tily, and Gibson (2012),
Speakers can minimize their effort if all meanings are expressed by one simple, maximally
ambiguous word, say, ba. To express a meaning such as, The accordion box is too
small, the speaker would simply say ba. To say It will rain next Wednesday, the
speaker would say ba. Such a system is very easy for speakers since they do not need to
expend any effort thinking about or searching memory to retrieve the correct linguistic
form to produce. (p. 281)
McCornack et al. 7
Of course, speakers cannot just walk around saying ba to everyone, as listeners
wouldnt be able to understand them. Hence, speech production in natural discourse
represents output responsive to a tension between the compulsion of speakers to maxi-
mize efficiency by saying the fewest, simplest words possible; and the need for speak-
ers to use disambiguated language so that they can be understood by listeners
(Piantadosi et al., 2012).
When applied to deceptive discourse production, the implications of Zipfs (1949)
PLE and his concept of friction-of-distance are startling and informative. First, as
noted by McCornack (1997), one of the truths about deception is its ubiquity. Every
study of naturally occurring deception (e.g., DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Epstein, &
Wyer, 1996; Levine, Serota, Carey, & Messer, 2013; Serota, Levine & Boster, 2010;
Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975) has found information manipulation to be a fre-
quent facet of everyday talk. Given its prevalence, deceptive discourse must present
cognitive efficiency advantages over truth telling within many contexts; otherwise, it
would not be so widely practiced (McCornack, 1997). To claim anything else is to
violate Zipfs (1949) PLE.
10
Second, Zipfs (1949) notion of friction-of-distance suggests that BFLs likely will
be constructed from information in long-term memory stored within neural neighbor-
hoods associated with the activated, relevant, truthful information; or information that
already has been uploaded into working memory. In this sense, the search for informa-
tion from which to construct lies should operate in much the same way as the search
for new cities of residence during urban migration: we settle in the nearest, most con-
venient place.
Such an argument meshes well with current theory and research on human memory
(e.g., Baddeley, 1986, 2000, 2007, 2012). Specifically, Baddeleys model of working
memory suggests that during complex cognitive operations, such as speech produc-
tion, a central executive (consisting of focal attention under conscious control) will
search long-term memory and upload relevant information to an episodic buffer within
working memory. The episodic buffer combines information related to speech, visual
input, and movement that has been stored in long-term memory into a coherent mem-
ory episode or chunk. The search and retrieval process within long-term memory
is guided by salience and ease-of-access.
The notion that BFL construction is guided by ease of memory access is revelatory.
Deception scholars have long presumed that the content from which BFLs are con-
structed is determined by strategic plausibility (e.g., Burgoon, Buller, Floyd, et al.,
1996; Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, et al., 1996). Zipfs (1949) PLE and friction-of-dis-
tance suggest an alternative guiding imperative: choose information that is readily
accessible. The result is a radically different paradigm of lie production. Rather than
deceivers mindfully selecting between carefully compared information units, based on
potential plausibility, many, and perhaps most, lies will be constructed from the first
available information units within activated, associated memory chunks; and likely
those that already have been imported from long-term memory into working memory
through attentional focus.
Opportunistic Problem-Solving Models
Problem-solving models are conceptual schemes within artificial intelligence that for-
mally specify the reasoning steps and domain knowledge needed to construct solutions
to particular dilemmas (Nii, 1986, 1989). They typically posit some form of problem
space in which all information relevant to the problem solution resides (Newell &
Simon, 1972).
Problem-solving models take one of three forms: backward reasoning, forward rea-
soning, or opportunistic. In backward-reasoning models, the problem-solving process
entails moving backward through the problem space from the desired end-state toward
the initial state. In forward-reasoning models, the inference steps are applied from
initial state toward the end state. In opportunistic models, however, knowledge is
applied either backward or forward at the most opportunistic time (Nii, 1989). As Nii
(1989) explains, Opportunistic reasoning is applied within . . . the solution space . . .
that is, which module of knowledge to apply is determined dynamically, one step at a
time, resulting in the incremental generation of partial solutions (p. 5).
Applying opportunistic problem-solving models to deception suggests intriguing
possibilities related to the reasoning processes underlying deceptive discourse produc-
tion (McCornack, 1997). Specifically, such models allow for the interleaved planning
characteristic of human discourse. As Hovy (1990) elaborates, We usually begin to
speak before we have planned out a full utterance, and then proceed while performing
certain planning tasks (p. 166). Consider what this means for deception. The prevail-
ing model of deceptive discourse production presumes a top-down, linear-sequential,
stepwise process: people decide a priori to lie, cognitively construct a deceptive mes-
sage, and then present this message as verbal and nonverbal behavior. In contrast, an
opportunistic problem-solving model of deception suggests that we often begin speak-
ing before any intent to deceive exists, and before such discourse actually becomes
deceptive. While we are speaking (and streaming activated, relevant, truthful informa-
tion from memory to speech production), we often opt on the fly to delete relevant
information or include false information that then renders our discoursemid-utter-
ancefunctionally deceptive. Why? Because, while we are speaking, we continue to
calculate initial-state/end-state discrepancies. And as new truthful information is acti-
vated in memory and marked as relevant for disclosure, if this information widens
(rather than narrows) these discrepancies, well respond by deleting or distorting it.
As a brief illustration, let us revisit our previous example (i.e., Chris, yeah, there
is something wrong . . .). Whereas this message cannot be explained by traditional
models (which have nothing more to say than, the speaker selected this message as a
deception type), an opportunistic reasoning model provides a compelling elucidation.
The speaker begins her utterance by disclosing initial-state information from memory
activated by partners query of, Is there anything wrong? This includes associated
information units, such as fighting, jealousy, and not ready for commitment.
However, as she streams relevant information from memory to speech production,
11

based on initial-state demands, she accesses and discloses I want to date other peo-
ple. This unit of information, while responsive to initial-state considerations, clashes
McCornack et al. 9
with the desired end-state of preserving a close relationship with Chris. More specifi-
cally, the speaker graspswhile she is speakingthat disclosure of this information
may provoke Chris, in the next turn slot, to query whether she already is seeing other
people. To forestall this problematic possibility, she opportunistically inserts a single
unit of falsehoodDont think that I would ever do something like that without telling
you, because I wouldntand then immediately reverts back to disclosing honest, rel-
evant, information from memory, Its just my feelings toward you have changed.
The result is a blended message; one that is largely (i.e., 7/8) truthful, yet is funda-
mentally misleading. It is also a message reflective of only temporary deceptive intent.
There is no reason, in accounting for this message, to presume that it was constructed
with a priori intent to deceive; nor is there any reason to presume that deceptive intent
persisted for more than the few micromoments necessary to generate the one piece of
false information. This latter point illustrates one of the most profound implications of
adopting a problem-solving view of deceptive discourse production: intent to deceive
may occur before or during the production of discourse that is functionally decep-
tivebut most certainly need not precede discourse production.
12
Design Theory
Drawing on the work of artificial intelligence scholars Newell and Simon (1972), cog-
nitive neuroscientists Goel and Pirolli (1992) elaborated the features of design prob-
lem spaces. That is, when faced with the task of design (e.g., creating architectural
plans, mechanical engineering, instructional design), how does the human brain rea-
son through these problems, and what features of both the external environment and
internal cognitive mechanics constrain such reasoning?
Goel and Pirolli (1992) note that, regardless of the specific task with which the
brain is faced, all design problem-solving follows the same basic steps (p. 397), explo-
ration and decomposition of the problem, identification of the interconnections among
the components, solution of the subproblems in isolation, and combination of the par-
tial solutions into the overall solution (i.e., synthesis).
Although Goel and Pirolli (1992) did not focus on discourse production as a design
activity, several of their observations about design reasoning are relevant for discourse
production in general, and deception in particular. Specifically, in their discussion of
the 12 invariant characteristics of design problem spaces (Goel & Pirolli, 1992, pp.
405-406), they make three observations of critical importance. First, the human brain
does not attack problems in toto; but instead, parses them into bits that are outsourced
to different modules dedicated to creating solutions to those specific subproblems. As
Goel and Pirolli (1992) describe, Given the size and complexity of design problems
and the limited capacity of short-term memory, one would expect decomposition of
the problem into a large number of modules (p. 405).
13
At the same time, such parsing
is guaranteed to leave at least some aspects of situations unattended to: given the fact
that there are few or no logical connections among modules but only contingent
ones, one would expect the designer to attend to some of these and ignore the others
(p. 405). Second, the evaluation of design solutions, and the stop rules that designers
use to regulate the cessation of solution-generation, will be derived from personal
experience. Third, deductive, top-down reasoning plays only a minimal role in the
problem-solving process (Goel & Pirolli, 1992, p. 406). Instead, most [design] deci-
sions are a result of memory retrieval and nondeductive inference (p. 406).
The Goel and Pirolli (1992) observations provide us with three key insights rele-
vant to deceptive discourse production. First, the production of discourse (both truth-
ful and deceptive), as with all cognitive acts of design and production, is the result of
problem solving involving modular processing. That is, when faced with an external
problem, a person will break down the situation into component parts and export
each of these parts to different modules dedicated to generating solutions to those
specific problem aspects. The subsequent problem-solution bits will be reintegrated
by the conscious mind and fed to behavioral output. At the same time, because the link
between solution bits is tenuous, some will be ignored or dismissed, resulting in fre-
quent imperfect solutions. Second, past personal experience with similar problem
demands will guide current problem-solution generation. Thirdand perhaps most
importantmemory, and not higher-order deductive reasoning, will have dominant
effects in shaping the specific nature of the problem-solutions that are generated.
Global Workspace Theory
Baarss Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988, 1997a, 1997b, 2002) argues for a
distributed-processing architecture of human cognition, consisting of a focal con-
sciousness (in which all conscious operations occur), informed by a multitude of inde-
pendent, modular, specialized-purpose processes that reside outside of the conscious
sphere (that is, within the unconscious mind). Information transit between indepen-
dent, unconscious modules and the conscious workspace is constant. As Baars
(1997b) notes, our brains use a distributed style of functioning, in which the detailed
work is done by millions of specialized neural groupings (p. 296). He goes on to
describe,
Consciousness gives us vast access to billions of neurons in the brain and body, to the
mental lexicon, and to an inestimably large source of autobiographical memories.
Consciousness is also needed to trigger a great number of automatic routines that make
up specific actions. All these effects of consciousness are unconscious. Consciousness
may be considered as the gateway to these unconscious sources of knowledge. (p. 298)
Similar to Goel and Pirolli (1992), Baars and Franklin (2007) argue that when faced
with novel or challenging problems, solution-generation is outsourced to activated,
relevant modules, which function independently and in parallel but are united through
the central workspace of conscious attention that connects them.
14
Critical to the model of cognitive functioning and behavioral production depicted
by Baars is the recognition that human consciousness and focal attention do not exist
as a steady, unbroken stream; although subjectively they often are perceived as such.
Instead, consciousness exists as a series of rapid-fire routines, in which surrounding
McCornack et al. 11
environments and internal states are cognitively surveyed, and information from this
sampling is fed back to the conscious workspace and relevant unconscious modular
subsystems (Baars & Franklin, 2007). These rapid routines are called cognitive cycles
(Baars & Franklin, 2003; Franklin, Baars, Ramamurthy, & Ventura, 2005) and often
endure for no more than a few milliseconds (Baars & Franklin, 2007). Findings con-
sistent with cognitive cycles have been reported by numerous neuroscientists (e.g.,
Fuster, Bodner, & Kroger, 2000).
Baars (Baars & Franklin, 2007) model suggests two important implications for
those interested in deceptive discourse production. First, deceptive discoursesimilar
to all discourseis not produced as discrete, unitary messages, in a linear-sequential,
stepwise fashion. Instead, the production of deceptive discourse results from a series
of micro-bursts of mental activity consisting of cyclical processing; as conscious-
ness interacts with unconscious, modular, subsystems including memory, motivations,
and speech production.
Second, because most of this processing and behavioral production occurs at the
unconscious level, it may very well be the case that so-called decisions about decep-
tion actually are made prior to conscious awareness. Bluntly expressed, we often
decide to deceive before we decide to deceive. The deception decision is (in effect)
made for us; based on contextual parameters and corresponding calculations produced
by unconscious, independent modules related to situational problem solving and
speech production.
This latter possibility is all the more plausible, when one considers the first three
steps involved in most cognitive cycles, as detailed by Baars and Franklin (2007):
incoming sensory stimuli is filtered through preconscious perception, where meaning
is added and a percept produced; the current percept moves to preconscious working
memory, where it participates, along with undecayed percepts from previous cycles, in
the structure building of higher level perception; and the current structure from work-
ing memory cues transient episodic memory and declarative memory, producing local
associations, which are stored in long-term working memory (pp. 959-960). Applied
to deception, our conscious minds do not begin to actively work on solving demanding
situations until after such situations already have been interpreted by relevant uncon-
scious modules involving perceptual processing, problem solving, and memory. But
the situation representation created by such modules, and fed to conscious mind, will
largely predetermine the relevant course of action, based on efficiency. Thus, much of
our conscious pondering and metaphorical hand wringing about whether or not to be
honest is likely for show. By the time we get to the pondering, we already have plot-
ted the optimal solution, andmore importanthave already begun to enact it: infor-
mation from memory already will be streaming to speech production to begin the
process of spoken discourse.
15
Theo Herrmann and Pars Pro Toto
In his classic work Speech and Situation, Herrmann (1983) laid out many of the supposi-
tions that later would be characterized as the Mannheim model of speech production.
According to Herrmann, speakers during interaction preconsciously construct situational
representations. From these, a propositional base is built, comprising all of the informa-
tion that may be relevant to disclose; semantic input is selected for disclosure; and this
input is fed to speech production. In order to do this, however, one must reduce the set of
information from all relevant to that which will be disclosed. To accomplish this,
speakers follow a range of transformation principles, the most prominent of which is
pars pro totothe part from the whole (p. 38). As Herrmann describes,
In trying to convey what he (sic) means, the speaker invariably verbalizes only part of
what he has in mind: he verbalizes pars pro toto. In trying to grasp what the speaker
means, the listener will have decoded the semantic input of the utterance and may now
use it to reconstruct totum ex partethe whole from the partthe propositional base of
the utterance. (p. 38)
What guides pars pro toto? Two factors, according to Herrmann (1983): the salience
of the information and the match between the information and the instrumental goals
desired within the context. Put differently, people will select the information that is
most strongly activated within working memory, and that best solves the difference
between the initial state and the desired end state (pp. 40-41).
Herrmanns (1983) model of speech production is rooted in problem solving. As he
describes, speech production begins with a cognitive assessment of the existing prob-
lem space: Is there any discrepancy between the current condition and the desired
condition? If yes, how can it be resolved? Will an utterance aid in achieving the goal?
(p. 45). If the answer to the latter question is Yes, then a propositional base is acti-
vated (and flooded with relevant information from memory), and semantic input is
shaped pars pro toto, based on the information that is most salient, and functionally
suited toward resolving the initial-state/end-state discrepancy. Importantly, The prop-
ositional base may either emerge ready-made from memory or may be enriched or
elaborated through perceptual and thought processes. Much of this may be taking place
at a time when the speaker has already begun issuing the utterance [italics added]
(Herrmann, 1983, p. 36).
Herrmanns (1983) model of speech production suggests five significant implica-
tions regarding deception. First and foremost, it clarifies the concatenation between
problem solving and speech production. Consequently, we can see from his model that
opportunistic problem solving is not just an intriguing metaphor for how deceptive
discourse production might occur; it is the root force compelling such production (as
it is with all speech). Second, it suggests that the start point for such production is the
preconscious construction of a situational representation that activates corresponding
memories. Third, it reminds us, yet again, that the structure of information within
memory guides discourse production, more so than top-down reasoning. Fourth, simi-
lar to Hovys (1990) recognition of interleaved planning, Herrmanns model notes
how discourse production frequently occurs while discourse planning and memory
activation are still occurring; these processes happening in parallel. And finally,
Herrmanns reasoning opens the door for a little-studied or understood form of
McCornack et al. 13
commonplace deception: deceiving through implication. Because speakers reasonably
can anticipate how listeners might inferentially construct totum ex parte, they can
design utterances in such a way as to exploit thistriggering deceptive implicatures
that never actually are spoken.
16
Incrementality
The final foundation stone undergirding IMT2 is the work of Franklin Chang, Gary
Dell, and their colleagues examining speech production and lexical encoding patterns
(Chang, 2002; Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006; Chang, Griffin, Dell, & Bock, 1997; Dell
et al., 1999). As Dell et al. (1999) note, the first step in the speech production process
is the activation within memory of salient, relevant content (akin to Hermanns notion
of the propositional base). This content is then mapped onto a series of lemmas
nonphonological cognitive representations of words. In the process of phonological
encoding that follows, cognitive lemmas are converted into actual speech sounds, in
the form of words (Chang et al., 2006; see also Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999; Rapp
& Goldrick, 2000). This process is not strictly linear, but occurs in parallel (Chang et
al., 2006): that is, phonological encoding and speech output begin before lemma des-
ignation has been completed (Cutting & Ferreira, 1999; Peterson & Savoy, 1998).
As Dell et al. (1999) describe, during real-world conversations, utterances are,
for the most part, constructed piecemeal from beginning to end: the words that are
initially retrieved tend to be placed early in the sentence and these initial placements
constrain subsequent lexical and structural decisions (p. 518). This is known as
incrementality.
17
Importantly, incrementality of production exists as a cyclical feedback loop, inter-
woven with interpretation. As discourse is produced, presentation of lexical forms
feeds back to ones own comprehension, as well as ones understanding of the context.
This cycle of produce comprehend perceive context produce occurs con-
stantly, related to individual word production, in microbursts of mental activity that
may be only milliseconds in duration.
18
What factors guide selection of utterance elements, as speakers incrementally con-
struct streams of discourse? Relevance of content based on contextual priming and
ease of access (Dell et al., 1999). These two factorsmemory salience and ease
determine not just utterance content, but grammatical ordering. As Dell et al. (1999)
note, grammatical encoding is highly opportunistic; the most prominent message ele-
ments are the first to be lexicalized and the earliest lexicalized concepts are assigned
to the earliest occurring grammatical roles, such as sentential subject (p. 530).
Chang, Dell, and colleagues (Chang, 2002; Chang et al., 1997; Chang et al., 2006;
Dell et al., 1999) work on speech production suggests several provocative implications
for modeling deception. First, people do not produce deceptive discourse as discrete,
unitary, linguistic messages. Deceptive utterances, like all utterances, typically are
constructed piecemeal in an opportunistic fashion, based on salience and accessibility
of information. Second, and perhaps most important, the Chang and Dell model sug-
gests a particular process for how individuals might come to produce utterances that
violate (the Gricean maxim of) Quantity versus utterances that violate both Quantity
and Quality (e.g., BFLs). When individuals are faced with contexts in which the most
salient propositional content is deemed appropriate for disclosure, they will begin
utterance construction (and begin speaking) in a truthful fashion. As they construct
their utterance incrementally, if information associated with the primary, salient infor-
mation proves problematic, they will simply delete it from the production process. The
result will be a Quantity violation. Importantly, such an edit-out as you go process
will be largely effortless, as it mirrors what we normally do when we talk with oth-
ersthat is, select out associated information deemed irrelevant for current disclo-
sure, or pars pro toto as Herrmann (1983) described.
Now consider the production of BFLs. When individuals are faced with contexts in
which the most salient propositional content is problematic, they face a dilemma: how
do I produce the speech that is requisite, quickly, when I cannot stream the primary
activated information to speech production? The simplest solution should be for
speakers to jump to associated information in working or long-term memoryinfor-
mation that quickly can be streamed to speech production to fill the gap. The result
will be a lie.
To illustrate this more vividly, imagine yourself in the following situation. Last
night you attended the party of a good friend, Joe. Your romantic partner is OK with
you partying and likes Joe. During the course of the party, you consumed two beers,
watched part of a football game, and chatted amiably with several acquaintances. You
also fiercely flirted for a few minutes with a very attractive person. When your partner,
the next day, inquires So, what did you do last night?, the primary, salient, episodic
memory chunk (Baddeley, 2007) that will be activated is Party at Joes, within which
all the specific episodic information relevant to party is nested. Because disclosure of
party attendance is salient and nonproblematic for disclosure (i.e., your partner likes
Joe; your partner supports your partying), utterance construction (speech production)
will immediately begin, and party will be placed structurally at the front of the utter-
ance, Well, I went to a party at Joes house, and . . . As you speak, additional acti-
vated information nested as a part of the episodic memory chunk party at Joes will
be fed as propositional content to production, including watched game and drank
beers. Lemmas based on these information units will be activated and phonologically
converted into speech, added into the utterance that you already are presenting, . . . I
had a couple of beers, and watched the game on his big-screen. When the information
unit of flirted becomes activated, however, it will be judged as problematic for dis-
closuregiven your relationship with your partnerand consequently deleted from
the production process. The resulting message will exemplify a typical Quantity
violation:
Well, I went to a party at Joes house, and I had a couple of beers, and watched the game
on his big-screen. I also chatted for awhile with Bill and Jen. It was a lot of fun!
Of course, such a message is fundamentally deceptive, in that it omits information
your partner likely would deem relevant for disclosure: namely, flirting with someone
McCornack et al. 15
else. Should your partner discover from a mutual friend that you flirted, you likely
would be accused of dishonesty, or at a minimum, withholding.
Consider, in contrast, what happens within contexts in which the primary activated
memory chunk is judged as too problematic to disclose. Borrowing from the former
example, you told your partner that you would be at the library working. And in fact,
you began the evening with the intent of doing so, by walking toward the library. But
then your friend Joe texted you and invited you to his party. Abandoning your prior
plan, you went to his party instead. However, your partner disapproves of you partying
and strongly dislikes Joe. The next day, when your partner asks you, So, what did you
do last night?, this immediately puts you in a production bind. The primary informa-
tion activated within working memory (party at Joes) normally would assume
pride of placement at the front end of the utterance (as sentential subject)deter-
mining and constraining all subsequent utterance construction. But it cannot be spo-
ken, without substantial personal and relational costs. What do you do now? At this
point, constructing a BFL should be tempting, simply to fill the required conversa-
tional space, and be responsive to your partners query. Andfollowing Dell et al.s
(1999) observations (as well as the arguments of Zipf)the content from which the
BFL is constructed likely will be information that is easiest to access. For instance,
given the salience of what you were supposed to be doing (i.e., working at the
library), and the fact that it has been uploaded to working memory by your partners
query,
19
you are likely to cognitively jump to that information as your story, and
immediately begin utterance construction and speech (Well, I was working at the
library . . .). As you begin presenting your lie about being at the library, additional
information associated with previous library visits will be uploaded to working mem-
ory from long-term memory, allowing you to build your utterance piecemeal from this
information (e.g., I sat in that cubicle on the 3rd floor that I always sit at and worked
on the manuscript Im preparing, and . . .).
Central Premise of IMT2
Using the implications we have extrapolated from this prior literature as a foundation,
we now are in a position to posit several theoretical claims regarding deceptive dis-
course production. We begin with the central premise of our theory:
Deceptive and truthful discourse both are output from a speech production system
involving parallel-distributed-processing guided by efficiency, memory, and means-ends
reasoning; and this production process involves a rapid-fire series of cognitive cycles
(involving distinct modules united by a conscious workspace), and modification of
incrementally-constructed discourse during the turn-at-talk in response to dynamic
current-state/end-state discrepancies.
This premise constitutes a summation of the previously reviewed literature, encap-
sulated within a single declarative statement. As such, it spotlights five truths about
deception that any and all viable theories must have as their conceptual cornerstones.
First, deceptive and truthful discourse both are output from the same speech produc-
tion system (Mohamed et al., 2006; Walczyk, 2013). This may strike readers as obvi-
ous, given recent evidence documenting the lack of neurological differences between
liars and truth tellers during speech production (e.g., Ganis 2013). But historically,
most conceptualizations of deception have presumed that truth and deception entail
very different production processes; resulting in differential levels of arousal and cor-
responding leakage behaviors.
Second, the production of deceptive and truthful discourse involves parallel-
distributed-processing. Again, such a claim is hardly revelatory, when one consults the
literature on cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Baars & Franklin, 2007). Yet surprisingly,
almost all extant models and theories of deceptive discourse production are top-down
and linear-sequential, rooted in the presumption that deception always begins with a
conscious, a priori, decision to deceive, and proceeds in a step-by-single-step fashion
(the one exception being Walczyks ADCAT, 2013).
Third, the cognitive processing that guides both deceptive and truthful discourse
production is constrained by at least three factors: an overarching compulsion to maxi-
mize efficiency, the structure of working and long-term memory, and the cognitive
framing of contexts as problems-to-be-solved (i.e., the desire to reduce discrepancies
between initial states and desired end states). In simple terms, deception is all about
creating quick problem solutions using the most-easily-available information. Hence,
the future study of deception (and the positing of corresponding theories) should be
rooted in the study of memory and problem solving; and scholars who eschew these
literatures do so at their own conceptual peril.
Fourth, the production of deceptive and truthful discourse occurs incrementally,
involving brief micro-bursts of focused attention. This fact, perhaps more than any
other, represents a radical shift in how we must think about deception. People simply
do not create messages in their heads and then spit them out as behavior; nor is con-
sciousness steady-stream. Instead, consciousness consists of millions of tiny cognitive
cycles of activity (Baars & Franklin, 2007), and discourse is incrementally constructed
accordingly (Dell et al., 1999).
Fifth and finally, because discourse construction is guided in part by meansends
reasoning and is incrementally constructed, mid-utterance modifications of discourse
streams will be the norm, not the exception. That is, people will commonly change it
up mid-utterance, from truth to deception (and back again), depending on dynamic
changes in perceived discrepancies between initial states and desired end states
(McCornack & Morrison, 2012).
IMT2 Propositional Sets
With the central premise and corresponding truths in mind, we now turn to the propo-
sitions of IMT2. We have organized these propositions thematically into three sets:
intentional states intentional states, cognitive load, and information manipulation. As
the reasoning underlying these propositions already has been explicated throughout
this essay, we shall keep such discussion to a minimum.
McCornack et al. 17
Intentional States (IS)
The IS propositions pertain to the nature and temporal placement of deceptive voli-
tion, in relation to speech production. Given the amorphous nature of volition, these
propositions will be the most difficult to put to the test empirically. Nevertheless, we
believe that they logically follow from all that previously has been argued.
IS1: Deceptive intent, and conscious awareness of it, both arise only after initial-
state/end-state gaps are perceived as irreconcilable through truth.
Proposition IS1 posits two key insights regarding deceptive volition, conscious
awareness, and deceptive discourse production. First, it establishes the causal anteced-
ent of all three: namely, contextual problem-solving calculations suggesting that
deception is the most efficient solution. Second, it emphasizes the parallel nature of
these distinct yet intertwined cognitive processes. When deception is calculated as the
most efficient problem solution for reconciling initial-state/end-state gaps, deceptive
volition should arise simultaneous to this solution being routed to speech production
and the solution becoming consciously recognized. At the same time, because initial-
state/end-state gaps are dynamic across time:
IS2: Deceptive intent may arise, exist, and decay at any temporal point during the
production of deceptive discourse.
Proposition IS2 spotlights the variability in temporal locations of deception voli-
tion relative to deceptive discourse production. The intent to deceive others certainly
may, and often does, precede spoken discourse. But it neednt. According to IMT2,
deceptive volitional states may occur at any time during the speech production pro-
cess, as they exist in parallel to production rather than (necessarily) a priori. This sug-
gests a critical insight about deception; one reflective of discourse patterns observed
in previous data (e.g., McCornack, 1992): people often change course from truth to
deception (and back again) while they incrementally construct their turns-at-talk.
Such midstream course changes reflect transient rather than enduring or antecedent
volitions.
Cognitive Load (CL)
The CL propositions serve as correctives to previous conceptualizations positing
deception as always more load-intensive than truthful discourse (see Vrij & Granhag,
2012, p. 112; Vrij, Semin, & Bull, 1996, p. 546). These propositions also clarify the
interrelationship between load, discourse, and context.
CL1: The comparative cognitive load associated with the production of truthful
versus deceptive discourse is based on the gap between activated information units
in memory, the functional demands of the initial state, and the desired end state
that is, the difficulty of reasoning through perceived problem spaces.
Proposition CL1 clarifies an enormously important and oft-overlooked fact about
deception: high cognitive load is not intrinsic to deceptive discourse production.
Instead, both truthful and deceptive discourse production may generate high or low
cognitive load, depending on the information activated within memory and the contex-
tual degrees of freedom constraining potential problem solutions (McCornack, 1997;
Walczyk, 2013). For a detailed elaboration of the specific factors affecting the cogni-
tive load associated with truthful versus deceptive discourse, readers are encouraged
to consult Walczyks ADCAT, table 3 (2013, p. 40).
CL2: Communicators disclose information units in their discourse that comprise
the most efficient communicative paths through perceived problem spaces.
Proposition CL2 inverts the commonly presumed relationship between cognitive
load and truthful versus deceptive discourse argued for by adherents of the prevailing
model (e.g., Buller et al., 1996; Burgoon, Buller, Floyd, et al., 1996; Burgoon, Stoner,
Bonito, & Dunbar, 2003; Vrij et al., 2006; Vrij & Granhag, 2012). That is, rather than
an a priori decision to lie or tell the truth being the determinant of consequent cogni-
tive load, the projected cognitive load of potential problem solutions should determine
whether one pursues a discourse path that ends up being truthful or deceptive.
CL3: Deceptive discourse that proves successful in efficiently reconciling prob-
lematic initial-state/end-state discrepancies is repeated recurrently when similar
states arise.
Two truisms with regard to human cognition are that people are compelled to repeat
action patterns that net successful outcomes; and that such patterns, once repeated, are
easier to reproduce recurrently than novel ones (Dell et al., 1999; Greene & Herbers,
2011; Goel & Pirolli, 1992; Zipf, 1949). Hence, Proposition CL3 posits that in the case
of deceptive discourse production, deceivers who succeed in attaining desired end
states through producing certain patterns of talk should trend toward repeating similar
patterns in the future within similar contextssimply because such patterns provide
an optimally efficient, well-practiced path.
Information Manipulation (IM)
To be considered viable, a production theory of deception must specify how exactly infor-
mation is manipulated within spoken discourse. It is not sufficient to merely comment on
the psychological processes underlying production, or to posit discourse as bifurcated into
lies and truths. The following propositions, accordingly, identify the conditions under
which various forms of information manipulation will (and will not) occur.
IM1: Communicators produce BFL Quality and Quantity violations when the
most salient, activated information units within memory are perceived as untenable
to disclose.
McCornack et al. 19
Proposition IM1 makes two things clear about the production of BFLs: they arise
from very particular intersections of memory and context, and they should be rela-
tively rare. BFLs should occur only within situations in which the most salient infor-
mation made relevant for disclosure is problematic.
20
Of course, this necessarily
implies that BFL production (for most people) will be infrequent; at least when con-
trasted with truthful discourse, and other forms of deception, such as Quantity viola-
tions. This precisely matches data from naturalistic studies of deception frequency
(e.g., DePaulo et al., 1996; Serota et al., 2010; Turner et al., 1975). If this reasoning is
correct, we also would expect that:
IM2: Quantity violations are the most frequent form of deceptive discourse.
Proposition IM2 is a straightforward product of efficiency in problem solving and
the nature of human memory. In situations where information chunks in memory
are made relevant to disclose, and small bits of those activated chunks are prob-
lematic (but the chunks, as a whole, are not), people will simply edit out the bad
bits as they construct their turns-at-talk, akin to pars pro toto (Herrmann, 1983).
Because such editing should evoke little, if any, cognitive load (i.e., should be
highly efficient), Quantity violations should be the go-to form of deception for
most speakers.
21
IM3: Relation violations are the least frequent form of deceptive discourse.
Data from the original IMT documents that Relation violations are the rarest
form of deceptive discourse (McCornack, 1992). However, IMT offered no expla-
nation for why this is the case. We believe that the answer is largely one of prag-
matic constraints; that is, the contextual degrees-of-freedom encumbering efficient
problem solutions.
To be successfully deceptive, the information manipulation that occurs within ones
discourse stream must remain covert. Yet Relation violations are, by definition, overt.
Put personally, if you abruptly change topic, or fail to answer a question, such devia-
tions from conversational coherence are grossly apparent to listeners. Thus, speakers
will eschew Relation violations as efficacious problem solutions. They only should
occur under very particular circumstances; namely when sources are faced with (in
effect) unanswerable questions. That is, when the truthful information relevant for
disclosure is simply too damaging to reveal, yet no other substitutable information is
available in either working or long-term memory that quickly can be streamed to
speech production, one solution available to speakers is to violate Relation by chang-
ing the topic or ignoring the question altogether (for other options and outcomes, see
our discussion following Proposition IM5). Thus, Relation violations are the last lin-
guistic refuge of truly desperate deceivers.
IM4: Manner violations will occur less frequently than Quantity and/or Quality
violations, but more frequently than Relation violations.
Proposition IM4, in conjunction with IM3 and IM2, suggests a particular, empiri-
cally testable, rank-ordering in frequency of information manipulation forms. Quantity
violations should be the most common; Quality violations second (although BFLs
should be comparatively rare); Manner violations third; and Relation violations fourth.
Why should Manner violations hold rank in third place? Markedly different from
both Quantity and Quality violations (but akin to Relation violations), Manner viola-
tions are difficult to deploy covertly. But they should increase in frequency within situ-
ations in which the conditional relevance allows large degrees-of-freedom in potential
response patterns (e.g., nonspecific questions; open-ended statements). Consider, as
an illustration, the Intruding Jo scenario from the original IMTa context that
evoked numerous deceptive Manner violations (see McCornack, 1992, pp. 8-13). In
this scenario, a romantic interest (Jo) spontaneously stops by your apartment 5 min-
utes before the projected arrival of your date for the evening. But rather than asking
your plans for the evening (ala, What are you doing tonight?), Jo says, I thought
you might like some company. An utterance such as this, that allows broad flexibility
in what will constitute a relevant response, pragmatically opens the door on a host
of deceptive Manner violations, such as Im sorry Jo, but I already have plans or
Im busy tonight. Because the conditional relevance established by the antecedent
utterance is so nonconstraining, such Manner violations do not appear to be overtly
ambiguous, hence are frequently used. This is precisely what McCornack (1992)
observed: in contexts in which a particular question was asked, Manner violations did
not occur, and when no question was asked, they occurred with substantial frequency
(although not as often as Quantity or Quality violations). Of course, one practical
implication of this is that the particular forms of information manipulation used by
speakers in everyday talk have little to do with the free will of speakers, and much
to do with the pragmatic constraints established by the immediately preceding dis-
course (which, after all, function in large part to define the perceived problem space).
IM5: Within deceptive discourse, disclosed information units that violate Quality
derive from truthful information units that previously have been stored in long-term
memory, and that are activated within working memory by initial-state conditions.
When human beings speak, the information that forms the content of their utter-
ances is streamed to speech production from long-term and working memory. Hence,
when human beings violate Quality, they do not make things up. Instead, like all
forms of discourse, the information that constitutes such violations is drawn from
memory. Thus, Proposition IM5 highlights a transformative revelation about the
nature of deception: lies are built from truths. That is, the information from which
Quality violations are constructed is truthful information stored in working and long-
term memory. This insight is echoed by ADCATs plausibility principle (Walczyk,
2013). As Walczyk describes, lies typically are built from the truth or a related epi-
sodic memory of an event, personally or vicariously experienced, and recently
encoded or activated memories will be preferred because of minimal decay of detail
(Walczyk, 2013, p. 17).
McCornack et al. 21
Perhaps more than any other proposition of our theory, IM5 suggests the need for a
revision of current thinking about, and theoretical models of, deceptive discourse pro-
duction. Rather than deception being completely different from truth telling, it
should be fundamentally similarespecially for those instances in which the truth is
not readily available in working memory, but instead must be searched-for in long-
term memory and reconstructed. IM5 also helps explain why (as noted previously) no
consistent neurological differences exist between the brain scans of liars versus truth
tellers during discourse production (Ganis, 2013).
When one considers IM1 and IM5 in tandem, an additional, and final, quandary
arises: what happens within contexts in which no readily available information is
accessible within memory from which to construct BFLs?
IM6: When the activated units of truthful information in memory are judged as
untenable to disclose, but no alternative, associated information units are activated
from which speakers can construct Quality violations, discourse production
falters.
The production of discourse involving Quality violations necessarily draws on
associated information within long-term memory that is activated within working
memory by the initial-state demands (IM5). Proposition IM6 posits that when mem-
ory-searching nets no alternative, plausible, information units from which to construct
false discourse, speakers should behaviorally falter. No information can be streamed
to speech production; yet speech production is contextually requisite. Hence, speakers
output should be marked by longer-than-usual hesitations, filled pauses, incoherent
verbiage (as irrelevant content from working memory is fed to speech production to
fill the space), and other cues indicative of disrupted cognitive processing.
22
Based on IM6, at least three factors should intersect to create the potential for pro-
duction disruption: the possession and activation of truthful information untenable for
disclosure, the asking of questions that place demands on speakers for specific and
detailed information, and the failure (through memory search and retrieval processes)
to find associated false information that quickly can be deployed to construct a Quality
violation responsive to these questions. The practical implication of this is profound:
within certain contexts, deceptionor more precisely, the possession of problematic
informationshould be detectable. The key to such detection is asking the right ques-
tions (Levine, Clare, et al., 2013; Levine, Shaw, & Shulman, 2010).
Two additional issues implied by IM6 merit mention. First, the behavioral disrup-
tion that should be observable in such circumstances is not a product of cognitive load
per se; but instead, failed memory searching, interrupted speech production, and
embarrassment-related arousal that such interruption should evoke. Certainly, cogni-
tive load may be an additional outcome of such strained memory searching, but it is
not the causal antecedent.
Second, following the faltering of speech production, speakers may simply
default to confession of truth. Because the truth already will be activated within
working memorybut they cannot find plausible alternative information from which
to build a problem solutionspeakers may spontaneously decide that the simplest,
most efficient path for resolving the situation (despite the high projected costs associ-
ated with disclosure) is to dump all salient truthful mental contents. Thus, it is not just
that the right questions may allow for deception detection; the right questions may
trigger confessions (see Levine, Clare, et al., 2013, for empirical evidence of this).
Discussion
Taken as a whole, IMT2 represents a radical paradigm shift in conceptualizing decep-
tion. The central premise and propositions suggest myriad paths for future empirical
testing and a host of associated theoretical and practical implications. In our discus-
sion, however, we choose to focus our attention narrowly on two issues that we believe
merit additional commentary: cognitive load and intentionality.
Deception and Cognitive Load
As is clear from the arguments of IMT2, no valid scientific reason exists for presuming
that the production of deceptive discourse is intrinsically more difficult than the pro-
duction of truthful discourse. This is especially the case with regard to the most com-
mon form of deception used in conversations: Quantity violations (McCornack, 1997).
Such violations borrow on similar production mechanisms to everyday truth telling,
namely, pars pro toto (Herrmann, 1983); hence, they should not evoke escalation in
load above and beyond truth.
Certainly, deception should evoke greater load than truth telling when four condi-
tions obtain: the form of deception being produced is a BFL, the truthful information
one possesses is contextually unproblematic, the truthful information is easily acces-
sible within memory (i.e., involves data that recently were uploaded to working mem-
ory), and any false information that might be used to construct the BFL must be
retrieved from long-term memory. In such cases, the generation of a BFL should
involve more cognitive effort than the generation of a BFT.
Here is the catch. In such situations as above, people do not produce BFLs; unless
they are sociopathic, recreational liars. That is, when the truth is not difficult to dis-
close (because it is easily accessible to conscious mind and contextually palatable),
people disclose it. When do people lie? When they judge the truthful information as
being so problematic that it cannot be disclosed (McCornack, 1997). And why do they
lie? Because it is less load-intensive to construct a message based on situationally
appropriate, false information than it is trying to package the problematic truthful
information into face-maintaining linguistic form (McCornack, 1997).
What is the practical, empirical implication of this? Researchers should cease con-
ducting studies in which they pit zero-consequence, easily-memory-accessible BFTs
against BFLs. For example, the typical MRI brain scan deception experiment has
subjects tell the truth and lie about such contextually problematic content as what
card am I holding up? and whats your favorite color? (see Ganis, 2013). Such
designs simply reify the notion that lies are more cognitively demanding than truths,
McCornack et al. 23
by using procedures that stack the scientific deck in precisely such a way so as to
observe thisand (importantly) in such a fashion as rarely occurs in the real world.
Information and Deception Volition
According to the prevailing model, deceptive discourse production begins with decep-
tion volition. Communicators faced with difficult contexts choose to lie based on a
host of considerations (both internal and external), and deception volition conse-
quently compels the production of BFLs. The centrality of deception volition is para-
mount: volition is posited as the primary causal antecedent by virtually every extant
definition and model of deception (McCornack & Morrison, 2012).
In contrast, the production model suggested by IMT2 dethrones volition and rele-
gates it to a humbler position as an ancillary consequence of a new ruling antecedent:
information. Our premise is simple: The single strongest determinant of whether or
not someone will deceive is the nature of the information they possess in working and
long-term memory. When people possess information that they deem too problematic
to disclose, they will deceive. Contrastively, in situations where little personal, rela-
tional, or professional costs are attached to disclosing information, people will tell the
truth. In either case, the driving force behind such behaviors is the nature of the pos-
sessed information, or more precisely, its practical, contextual goodness-of-fit. As a
consequence, the causal ordering between volition and memory within IMT2 is largely
reversed. Rather than a decision to lie or tell the truth activating a memory search,
information activated within memory from a cognitive percept (Baars & Franklin,
2007) compels both volition and speech production in parallel toward particular prob-
lem solutions.
23
Consider two practical implications of this. First, this suggests that everyone will
deceive if the information they have in working or long-term memory that is made
relevant for disclosure is sufficiently problematic so that deception trumps truth in
efficiency-of-solution. This is not meant as a cynical claim; but merely a statement of
fact. What is more, we should be able to plot the probability of deception, based on the
nature of information made relevant. In general, the more situationally problematic the
information, the greater the likelihood of deception.
24
Second, if one presumes that deceptive volition and behavior is driven primarily by
the possession of problematic information; who is going to be more likely to deceive?
Those people who possess greater amounts of problematic information in working
and long-term memory. Who possesses problematic information in memory? People
who think problematic thoughts or who have behaved in problematic ways. Whereas
dishonesty has long been thought of as a trait-like aspect of character (akin to other
antisocial traits, such as chronic hostility, tendency toward betrayal, narcissism, klep-
tomania, etc.), the reasoning of IMT2 suggests that deception is actually an outcome
of these other negative traits. Expressed in the first person, if I am the kind of person
who cheats, steals, and betrays, I am going to have to deceive to keep others from
punishing me for these failings. Rather than deception complicating peoples lives,
this suggests that people living complicated, dysfunctional lives are compelled to
deceive as the most efficient solution to their self-induced problems; the irony being
that these acts of deception ensure that their lives only worsen further (i.e., when they
are discovered and punished not just for the original crime, but for deception as well).
Or take a less extreme example. If I decide to go into politicsa profession that will
frequently place me within situations in which I cannot reveal my true feelings without
suffering enormous professional costsI naturally will deceive more frequently,
purely as a function of my profession. Hence, the causality is reversed: it is not that
liars are drawn to politics,
25
but rather, occupying a position in professional politics
pragmatically forces people to have to deceive. On the flip side, this line of reason-
ing also suggests that people of high integrity will generally have little reason to
deceive, as they have nothing to hide in terms of information relevant for disclosure
(excepting everyday light forms of politeness deception). In a sense, how one lives
ones life either destines one to become trapped in a web of duplicity or a spiral of
truth, although most of us live our lives somewhere in between these polar extremes.
Conclusion
To conclude, we do not presume that IMT2 is the one and only solution to the
perplexing puzzle of deceptive discourse production. Nor do we know that our prop-
ositions are correct. Time and careful testing will demonstrate the validity or inva-
lidity of what we have proposed. However, we do steadfastly maintain that any
viable theory of deception and corresponding research program must be rooted in
the recognition that deceptive discourse production is inextricably intertwined with
efficiency, problem solving, parallel-distributed processing, modularity, memory,
and incrementality. To overlook or eschew these constitutive characteristics when
theorizing, modeling, or empirically examining deception, is to disregard the nature
of the human mind itself.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Howard Giles for his generosity and assistance and Tim Levine for support.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.
Notes
1. McCornack (1992, p. 8). Adapted from the original for brevity.
2. Message examples adapted from McCornack (1992, pp. 9-10). The labels BFL and
BFT derive from McCornack (1997).
McCornack et al. 25
3. For an excellent, recent attempt at capturing the diversity of deception types, see the tax-
onomy developed by Gupta and Laine (2013).
4. Additionally, within the literature on the language of deception (e.g., Hancock, Curry,
Goorha, & Woodworth, 2008), scholars routinely conflate deception with BFLsusing
the terms interchangeablyand then generalize linguistic attributes associated with BFLs
(e.g., lack of immediacy, pronominal usage) to all deceptive discourse.
5. In fact, such blended forms dominate the data when respondents are given the oppor-
tunity to freely construct discourse in response to problematic situations (McCornack,
1997).
6. For brevity, we are paraphrasing Grices (1989) explication of the particular maxims and
submaxims. Please see Grice (1989, pp. 26-37), for a full description.
7. Specifically, Quantity Submaxim A, Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of exchange). See Grice (1989, p. 26).
8. In Grices (1989) words, He (sic) may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maximum; if
so, in some cases he will be liable to mislead (p. 30).
9. Similar presumptions guide many models of social cognition and perception, for example,
the cognitive miser model suggested by Fiske and Taylor (1991).
10. Nevertheless, some scholars continue to insist that deception is more cognitively taxing
than truth telling. Such arguments fly in the face of Zipfs (1949) PLE, what we know
about the nature of cognition, data from studies of naturalistic deception, and the ubiquity
of deceptive discourse itself.
11. In Baddeleys (2012) latest iteration of his model, long-term episodic memory and lan-
guage centers of the brain are directly connected, rather than having them mediated by the
central executive (see p. 12, figure 2). So, although the central executive certainly plays an
oversight role in interacting with the phonological loop during speech production, much
of the activated information within long-term memory can be streamed directly to speech
production. This structural feature, in part, is what allows us to construct elaborate utter-
ances using activated information from memory with exceptional speed.
12. See McCornack (1997, pp. 115-117) for further discussion of the issue of intention and
deception.
13. This feature of modularity and cognitive outsourcing to dedicated function parts of the
brain is also characteristic of prevailing models of working memory, such as that posited
by Baddeley (2007, 2012).
14. Baarss model is mirrored within cognitive psychology by models of working memory
(e.g., Baddeley, 2007, 2012), which posit a central executive that serves as the primary
transit point and disseminator of tasks and information between working memory, pho-
nological processing, interpretation of audio and visual input, and long-term memory.
Baddeley himself notes the similarity between his notion of a central executive and that of
Baars (see Baddeley, 2012, pp. 15-16).
15. The plausibility of this argument is further bolstered by recent evidence suggesting that
the link between long-term memory and language processing is not mediated by working
memory or consciousness, but is, instead, direct (see Baddeley, 2012).
16. McCornack (1992) noted this possibility in the discussion section of his original Information
Manipulation Theory (see 1992, p. 14).
17. Incrementality also is a key feature of models of language learning and language process-
ing (see Chang, 2002; Chang et al., 2006).
18. This feature allows us to explain our Committed Chris message example discussed ear-
lier, in which the person, midway through her utterance, says, Dont think I would ever
do something like that without telling you . . . This reflects an instance in which current
output responds to immediately preceding output.
19. See Baddeley (2007) for a detailed description of this process.
20. The fact that information is both salient within memory and contextually problematic is not
to be conflated with information being important (McCornack & Levine, 1990). Salient,
contextually problematic information that triggers BFL production may be mundane
such as the requested evaluation of an ugly shirt that a friend loves.
21. Quantity violations may also be more common because they are less socially proscribed
than Quality violations (McCornack, 1997; Turner et al., 1975).
22. Such disruption may, in certain limited instances, be followed by the production of a
Relation violation, as discussed previously under IM3.
23. This is not to suggest that deceptive volition never compels behavior. Instead, it suggests
that volition will always be a consequence of information, and that in most typical speech
situations, volition and behavior will occur simultaneously.
24. The relationship between specific forms of information manipulation and situational com-
plexity is likely to be curvilinear rather than linear, however. For additional information
on the nature of this curvilinearity, please contact the first author, as an associated line of
research testing this premise is currently in progress.
25. Of course, this may be the case in certain instances.
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Author Biographies
Steven McCornack (PhD, 1990, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) is an associate
professor in the Department of Communication at Michigan State University. His primary
research area is deceptive discourse production.
Kelly Morrison (PhD, 1996, Michigan State University) is an associate professor in the
Department of Communication at Michigan State University. Her research areas include decep-
tion, persuasion, and interpersonal health.
Jihyun Esther Paik (MA, Michigan State University) is a doctoral student in the Department
of Communication Arts and Sciences at the Pennsylvania State University. Her research
areas include face threats in support communication, recipient-requested versus provider-
proffered support, deception as a means of saving face, and coaching in supervisorsubordi-
nate relationship.
Amy M. Wisner (MA, University of Hawaii at Manoa) is a doctoral candidate in the
Department of Communication at Michigan State University. Her research areas include decep-
tion, truth bias, bad news delivery, and discrimination.
Xun Zhu (MA, Michigan State University) is a doctoral student in the Department of
Communication Arts and Sciences at the Pennsylvania State University. His research areas
include stigma communication, the role of discrete emotions on persuasion in health contexts,
and deception in disclosing negative health status.

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