24 October 2014

Aprille S. Alviarne
Selected Cases: Criminal Procedure
IVLER VS HON. SAN PEDRO
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Reckless imprudence is a single crime, its
consequences on persons and property are
material only to determine the penalty.
Reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a
single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes, such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense
bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting
acts.

ABELITA VS. DORIA;
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
The plain view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular
area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
Supreme Court stated that the police officers
were justified in seizing the firearms because
the police authorities were in the area because
that was where they caught up with petitioner
after the chase. They saw the firearms inside
the vehicle when petitioner opened the door.
Since a shooting incident just took place and it
was reported that petitioner was involved in the
incident, it was apparent to the police officers
that the firearms may be evidence of a crime.
Hence, they were justified in seizing the
firearms
LEGALITY OF ARREST
The arrest is legal. Section 5(b) of Rule 113
provides two requisites; (1) Offender just
committed an offense (2) arresting officer has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
Personal knowledge based on Probable cause
which means actual belief or reasonable
grounds for suspicion. Section 5 does not
require that the arresting officers has personally
witness the commission of the offense with
their own eyes.
In the case; (1) Doria received a report, SP03
Ramirez investigated and learned from
witnesses that petitioner was involved in
accident. (2) Petitioners act of trying to get
away coupled with the incident report is
enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the
part of authorities as to the existence of
probable cause.

ZALAMEDA VS PEOPLE
POT SESSION; IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO ARREST
Paragraph 5(a) of Section 5, Rule 113 is
commonly known as an in flagrante delicto
arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused
caught in flagrante delicto to be valid,
24 October 2014
Aprille S. Alviarne
Selected Cases: Criminal Procedure
two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
At the place where the two accused were
frisked and arrested, the responding police
officers verified from a slightly opened door and
saw the petitioner and Villaflor "sniffing
smoke". As it turned out, the petitioner indeed
possessed a prohibited drug and, together with
Villaflor, was even using a prohibited drug and
likewise illegally possessed drug paraphernalia,
contrary to law. When an accused is caught in
flagrante delicto, the police officers are not only
authorized but are duty-bound to arrest him
even without a warrant.
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST
Section 13. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest.
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search
warrant. The seizure of the various drug
paraphernalia is likewise beyond question.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in
the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
This doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b)
the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent
to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure. All the foregoing
requirements for a lawful search and seizure
are present in this case. The police officers had
prior justification to be at the petitioners place
as they were dispatched by their desk officer;
they arrested the petitioner and Villaflor as they
had reason to believe that they were illegally
using and possessing a prohibited drug and drug
paraphernalia. The search of the petitioner
incident to his arrest yielded the confiscated
crystalline substance which later proved to be
shabu. In the course of their lawful intrusion,
they inadvertently saw the various drug
paraphernalia scattered on the bed. As these
items were plainly visible, the police officers
were justified in seizing them.

PEOPLE VS ALUNDAY
MARIJUANA PLANTATION; IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO
Section 5(a), Rule 113 refers to arrest in
flagrante delicto. In flagrante delicto means
caught in the act of committing a crime. This
rule, which warrants the arrest of a person
without warrant, requires that the person
24 October 2014
Aprille S. Alviarne
Selected Cases: Criminal Procedure
arrested has just committed a crime, or is
committing it, or is about to commit an offense,
in the presence or within view of the arresting
officer.
It took three months for the police officer to
affect arrest because a series of validations was
first made to confirm that indeed a marijuana
plantation existed at the area. During the day
of the arrest the arresting team of SPO1 Saipen
proceeded to the marijuana plantation and
Saipen saw Alunday personally cutting and
gathering marijuana plants. Therefore, his
arrest was legal because he was caught in
flagrante delicto. Furthermore, the accused
deemed waived the regularity of the arrest
when he failed to object to it before he enters
his plea. He is stopped when he didnt quash
the information. He actively participated in the
trial.

PEOPLE VS. CEREDON
NO IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILT
The rule is where the accused desires to plead
guilty to a capital offense, the court is enjoined
to observe the following:
1. It must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires
to present evidence in his behalf and allow him
to do so if he desires.
(1) Records reveal that appellant was duly
assisted by his counsel, both in his first
arraignment and re-arraignment. In fact, it was
his counsel who manifested before the trial
court that appellant desired to change his plea
from "not guilty" to "guilty" on all ten charges
of rape filed against him by his younger sister.
(2) When appellant was re-arraigned, the
charges were read and explained to him in
Ilocano, his native tongue.

He cannot now claim
that he was unaware of the consequences of his
change of plea. (3) Appellant admitted raping
private complainant AAA
At any rate, contrary to appellant's assertion, he
was convicted by the trial court, not on the
basis of his plea of guilty, but on the strength of
the evidence adduced by the prosecution. As
consistently held by the Court, while convictions
based on pleas of guilt to capital offenses have
been set aside because of the improvidence of
the plea, the same holds true only when such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment
EXACT DATES OF COMMISSIONNEED NOT BE
ALLEGED
The date or time of the commission of the rape
need not be alleged with precision. It is enough
for the information or complaint to state that
the crime has been committed at a time as near
as possible to the date of its actual commission.
24 October 2014
Aprille S. Alviarne
Selected Cases: Criminal Procedure
Failure to allege the exact date when the crime
happened does not render the information
defective, much less void

DINO VS. OLIVARES
WHO MAY CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
The Constitution, particularly Article IX, Section
20, empowers the COMELEC to investigate and,
when appropriate, prosecute election cases.
Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized
legal officers, has the exclusive power to
conduct a preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under the
Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the
same. The COMELEC may avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government.
Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure details the continuing delegation of
authority to other prosecuting arms of the
government, which authority the COMELEC may
revoke or withdraw anytime in the proper
exercise of its judgment
It is clear that the Chief State Prosecutor, all
Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their
respective assistants have been given
continuing authority, as deputies of the
Commission, to conduct a preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election
offenses under the election laws and to
prosecute the same. Such authority may be
revoked or withdrawn anytime by the
COMELEC, either expressly or impliedly, when
in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is
necessary to protect the integrity of the process
to promote the common good, or where it
believes that successful prosecution of the case
can be done by the COMELEC. Moreover, being
mere deputies or agents of the COMELEC,
provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are
expected to act in accord with and not contrary
to or in derogation of its resolutions, directives
or orders in relation to election cases that such
prosecutors are deputized to investigate and
prosecute.
9
Being mere deputies, provincial and
city prosecutors, acting on behalf of the
COMELEC, must proceed within the lawful
scope of their delegated authority.

PEOPLE VS. CAJIGAL
AMENDMENT VS. SUBSTITUTION
The change of the offense charged from
Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment
or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for
Murder, a reading of the Information shows
that the only change made was in the caption of
the case; and in the opening paragraph or
preamble of the Information, with the crossing
out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by
the word "Murder." There was no change in the
24 October 2014
Aprille S. Alviarne
Selected Cases: Criminal Procedure
recital of facts constituting the offense charged
or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the
court. The averments in the amended
Information for Murder are exactly the same as
those already alleged in the original Information
for Homicide, as there was not at all any change
in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing
of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the
amendment made in the caption and preamble
from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
There is double jeopardy when the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a
second jeopardy is for the same offense as in
the first. As to the first requisite, the first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (e) when the accused was
acquitted or convicted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by
Section 7 presupposes a definite or
unconditional dismissal which terminates the
case.

And for the dismissal to be a bar under the
jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of
acquittal.
The respondent judge's Order was for the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information but not to dismiss the same upon
the filing of a new Information charging the
proper offense as contemplated under the last
paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court and Section 19, Rule 119.
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule
110, applies only when the offense charged is
wholly different from the offense proved, i.e.,
the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with
which he was not charged in the information
even if it be proven, in which case, there must
be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution
of a new information charging the proper
offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second
information, which involves the same offense or
an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information. In
this connection, the offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when
the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting
the latter.
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of
murder; thus, the respondent judge merely
ordered the amendment of the Information and
not the dismissal of the original Information. To
24 October 2014
Aprille S. Alviarne
Selected Cases: Criminal Procedure
repeat, it was the same original information
that was amended by merely crossing out the
word "Homicide" and writing the word
"Murder," instead, which showed that there
was no dismissal of the homicide case.

PEOPLE VS. SALANGUIT
EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
The fact that there was no probable cause to
support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion
that the search warrant is void. This fact would
be material only if drug paraphernalia was in
fact seized by the police. The fact is that none
was taken by virtue of the search warrant
issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is
void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of
drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as
to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence.
SPECIFICITY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
Although the specific section of the Dangerous
Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question
at all of the specific offense alleged to have
been committed as a basis for the finding of
probable cause. The search warrant also
satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of
the particularity of the description to be made
of the "place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."
PARTICULARLY OF THE PLACE
The rule is that a description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended to be searched.
SEIZURE OF MARIJUANA; PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE
For the PVD to apply, there must be: (a) prior
justification; (b ) inadvertent discovery of the
evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality
of the evidence before the police.
No prior justification and discovery not
inadvertent. Once the valid portion of the
search warrant has been executed, the "plain
view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -
for admitting the other items subsequently
found. The police failed to allege in this case the
time when the marijuana was
found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of
the warrant, or whether it was recovered on
accused-appellant's person or in an area within
his immediate control.
Not Apparent Illegality of the Evidence. The
marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint.
There was no apparent illegality to justify their
seizure

PEOPLE VS. MARTI
PACKAGES WITH SHABU; ILLEGAL SEARCH AND
SEIZURE CANNOT BE INVOKED AGAIST PRIVATE
PERSONS
24 October 2014
Aprille S. Alviarne
Selected Cases: Criminal Procedure
If a search is made at the behest or initiative of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be invoked.
After Reyes opened the box containing the illicit
cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI
and later summoned the agents to his place of
business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel
containing the rest of the shipment and
entrusted the care and custody thereof to the
NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no
search and seizure, much less an illegal one,
contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is
not a search.

UNILAB VS ISIP
VALIDITY OF THE SEIZURE OF THE SEALED
BOXES AND ITS CONTENTS OF DISUDRIN AND
INOFLOX; PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
However, seized things not described in the
warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The
State must adduce evidence to prove that the
elements for the doctrine to apply are present,
namely: (a) the executing law enforcement
officer has a prior justification for an initial
intrusion or otherwise properly in a position
from which he can view a particular order; (b)
the officer must discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items they
observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and
the petitioner to prove their claim that the
items were seized based on the plain view
doctrine. There is no showing that the NBI and
the petitioner even attempted to adduce
evidence. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI
failed to present any of the NBI agents who
executed the warrant, or any of the petitioners
representative who was present at the time of
the enforcement of the warrant to prove that
the enforcing officers discovered the sealed
boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and
their contents were incriminating and
immediately apparent. It must be stressed that
only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the
warrant had personal knowledge whether the
sealed boxes and their contents thereof were
incriminating and that they were immediately
apparent. There is even no showing that the
NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed
boxes before they were opened. In sum then,
the Court finds that the petitioner and the NBI
failed to prove the essential requirements for
the application of the plain view doctrine.