4/

1 9 9 4
Execut i ve Resear ch Proj ect
$28
U. S. Army and Mari ne Corps
Mari t i me Pr e pos i t i oni ng:
The Ri ght Cours e For The
21st Cent ury?
Lieutenant Colonel
Al b e r t A. Wa s h i n g t o n
United States M a r i n e Corps
Faculty Research Advisor
Mr. James E. Toth
/
DI S CL AI ME R
Thi s research report r epr esent s t he views of t he aut hor and does not necessari l y
reflect t he official opinion of t he I ndust r i al College of t he Armed Forces, t he Nat i onal Defense
Uni versi t y, or t he Depar t ment of Defense.
Thi s document is t he propert y of t he Uni t ed St at es Gover nment and is not to be
reproduced i n whole or i n par t for di st ri but i on outside t he federal executive br anch wi t hout
permi ssi on of t he Di rect or of Research and Publ i cat i ons, I ndust r i al College of t he Armed
Forces, Fort Lesl ey J. McNair, Washi ngt on, D.C. 20319-6000.
"I n the new style of war, superior logistics becomes the engine t hat allows American
military forces to reach an enemy from all points of the globe and arri ve ready to fight.
Speed of dosur e and buildup nat ural l y increases the psychological st at ure of the deploying
force and reduces the risk of destruction to those forces t hat deploy first. In contrast,
dribbling forces into a t heat er by ai r or sea raises the risk of defeat in detail."
Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gul f Wa r
Office of the Chief of Staff,
United States Army, 1993
United States Army and Marine Corps
Maritime Prepositioning:
The Right Course for the 21st Century?
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Forty years before the United States participated in the Gulf
War and experienced an enduring lesson in the value of forward
prepositioning, Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles championed the future
utility of advance "floating bases" in 1950 to support forward
deployed forces where "the supplies, services and replacement of
equipment ..... are provided from auxiliary ships and craft based
within an anchorage" (Eccles, Operational Naval Loqistics 87).
Despite the fact that Admiral Eccles and other leading logisticians
from the World War II era proclaimed the importance of strategic
logistics reach through advance positioning and forward floating
bases, the defense establishment paid little attention to such
concepts until decades later.
In support of the Gulf War, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and
Air Force wrote a new chapter in the effective use of strategic
logistics reach through the successful employment of advance
"floating bases" in the form of Maritime Prepositioning Ships
(MPS). This combined seabased and airlifted forward projected
force provided an early, balanced air and ground combat capability
that was fully interoperable with afloat Naval aviation as well as
deploying Army and Air Force elements. The successes enjoyed by the
employment of MPS during the rapid closure and initial buildup
phases in Desert Shield served in stark contrast to the slower,
"dribbling" theater delivery of other war materiel aboard Ready
Reserve Fleet shipping. In the aftermath of the war, the rapid
response of MPS moved Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD)
to examine the future strategic mobility requirements of the
nation's armed forces with particular emphasis on the value of
maritime prepositioning.
This examination took the form of the detailed DOD-sponsored
Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) that was initiated in the fall of
1990 (Brown and Henderson, 11-13). Among the many strategic
mobility enhancements recommended was the creation of an Army
Afloat Prepositioning program. With strong support from the former
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, JCS Chairman General Colin Powell
and Congress, the MRS maritime prepositioning recommendations were
approved and funded. By the fall of 1993, the first Army Afloat
Prepositioning ships were embarked with the initial equipment and
supplies to support a lead heavy brigade that will probably be
prepositioned in Southwest Asia.
As our nation approaches the 21st Century with new emphasis
on post-Cold War defense "bottom-up" economic downsizings, several
concerns should be addressed in reference to the duality of the
Army and Marine Corps maritime prepositioning programs:
- M i s s i o n / S i z i n g : What is the basic mission of each
respective program? Is each program sized correctly to
meet the demands of the potential missions assigned?
- F l e x i b i l i t y : How much flexibility does each program
possess to perform other missions (i.e., humanitarian,
disaster relief, etc.)?
- C o m p l e m e n t a r y / R e d u n d a n t C a p a b i l i t i e s : Does our current
approach make sense for the introduction of joint
forces overseas? In v i e w of operational and resource
limitations are there other approaches w h i c h m a k e m o r e
sense?
- F u t u r e V i a b i l i t y : What are the future challenges
that each p r o g r a m faces? Will they remain a relevant
m i l i t a r y tool in the 21st Century? What economies
could be p r o d u c e d to m a x i m i z e their value to the
nation?
In a d d r e s s i n g each of these concerns, this paper presents a
CINC and/or Joint Task Force C o m m a n d e r p e r s p e c t i v e on m a r i t i m e
p r e p o s i t i o n i n g in that it contains: (i) an o v e r v i e w of the events
leading to the inception of both p r e p o s i t i o n i n g programs; (2) a
review of their current missions and organizations; (3) an analysis
of their c o m p l e m e n t a r y / r e d u n d a n t capabilities; and (4) a c o m m e n t a r y
with r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s on h o w each m a y be improved to best serve our
nation's interests into the next century.
I N C E P T I O N T O M A T U R A T I O N : M A R I T I M E P R E P O S I T I O N I N G C O N C E P T S
The U.S. Army first applied the concept of maritime
prepositioning on a limited scale in 1964 with the creation of a
Forward Floating Depot (FFD) ship squadron that was configured to
provide broad base support materiel support to a generic three
brigade task force in the Pacific Ocean region (ASMP Briefing
Papers, Apr 1993). The equipment and supplies from the FFD were
utilized during the early days of the Vietnam War. In answer to
the massive Warsaw Pact threat, the Army also initiated the
successful Prepositioning of Organizational Material Configured in
Unit Sets (POMCUS) program which achieved credibility in the 1970s
with the prepositioning of forward land based materiel and supplies
in Europe. Emphasis in the POMCUS program was placed on the land
prepositioning of unit equipment and sets that could be immediately
married to incoming combat units airlifted from CONUS. This
concept was carried forth in the later development of maritime
prepositioning programs.
In 1979 the United States and President Jimmy Carter received
a jolting lesson in the importance of strategic reach when the
world's leading superpower suddenly found itself incapable of
projecting a credible forward presence in response to the Iranian
hostage crisis and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. In
the aftermath, significant concerns were raised in regards to the
nation's ability to effectively project adequate forces to retain
open access to Middle East oil supplies.
These concerns led to the pronouncement of the "Carter
Doctrine" in January 1980. The Carter Doctrine proclaimed that oil
supplies in the Persian Gulf region represented a vital national
interest. As a direct result the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
was formed at MacDill Air Force Base near Tampa, Florida under the
command of Marine General P.X. Kelley in February 1980. General
Kelley's main task consisted of establishing a realistic,
sustainable presence in the region that went beyond the existing
capabilities resident in the carrier battle groups and amphibious
forces (Summers, On Strateqy II 88-90).
Answering the concerns of President Carter and the Defense
Department, the Marine Corps Commandant, General Robert Barrow and
General Kelley recommended that the void be filled with a
prepositioned Marine Amphibious Brigade's (MAB) suite of equipment
and 15 days of supplies embarked aboard existing Military Sealift
Command shipping and berthed at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
With the backing of Secretary of Defense Brown, the Near-Term
Prepositioning Ships (NTPS) program was born. The NTPS grew to a
squadron of eighteen ships by early 1982 that could support a MAB
with 30 days of supply and provided Army and Air Force units with
selected bulk supplies (Summers, 88).
The Marine Corps' portion of the NTPS program was later
reconfigured and enlarged with the new Maritime Prepositioning
Ships (MPS) program which entered service in 1984. The MPS program
provided the Marine Corps with 13 modern contracted commercial
roll-on/roll-off (R0/R0) cargo/container ships that were divided
6
into three squadrons (MPSRONs). Each of the three squadrons were
embarked w i t h sufficient equipment and supplies to support a M a r i n e
E x p e d i t i o n a r y Brigade (MEB) of 16,500 personnel for 30 days. Today,
MPS-I is c o m p r i s e d of four ships w h i c h are b a s e d in the eastern
Atlantic Ocean; MPS-2 w i t h five ships is based in Diego Garcia; and
MPS-3 configured w i t h four ships is based in the G u a m / T i n i a n area.
All three MPS squadrons w e r e called into service during the
Operation Desert Shield portion of the Gulf War. The 7th M E B was
the first m a j o r M a r i n e Corps unit to deploy to Saudi Arabia after
the initial alert order was issued on 8 August 1990. Eight days
after entering the air deployment flow, the b r i g a d e had o f f l o a d e d
the equipment and supplies from MPS-2 and had taken initial
defensive positions in the n o r t h e a s t e r n Saudi desert, near the port
of A1 Jubayl (Naval Institute Proceedinqs Nov 1991:58). The
arrival of the equipment and supplies on MPS-3 followed w i t h i n two
weeks of the MPS-2 offload at A1 Jubayl. The M a r i n e Corps MPS
assets p r o v i d e d the primary allied armor capability in theater from
m i d - A u g u s t thru late September 1990.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. defense p l a n n i n g for
Army force depoyment centered on supporting NATO and their combat
forces in Europe. Due to the type and size of rapid o f f e n s i v e
attacks expected from the Soviet Union and its W a r s a w Pact allies,
EUCOM and Army planners p l a c e d their strategic lift emphasis on
rapid personnel and logistics reinforcements arriving via strategic
airlift. Outside of four p r e p o s i t i o n i n g ships embarked w i t h bulk
supplies in Diego Garcia, the Army had placed its strategic sealift
7
dependence on the 96 ships comprising the Ready Reserve Fleet.
During Desert Shield, the Army was faced w i t h the d a u n t i n g task of
moving war m a t e r i e l by sealift a total of 8,450 nautical miles
(from the east coast of the U n i t e d States to Saudi Arabia) c o m p a r e d
to the 4,000 nautical mile trip endured from the east coast to
N o r m a n d y in W o r l d War II (Association of the U.S. Army, "The
Logistics Perspective", 1991:6).
Despite the fact that the Army was able to m o v e over 2 m i l l i o n
tons of cargo by sea (92 percent of the total d e l i v e r e d by all
methods of strategic lift), general d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n over the
p e r f o r m a n c e and a v a i l a b i l i t y of strategic sealift was e x p r e s s e d by
Army general officers at the conclusion of the war. The Ready
Reserve Fleet e x p e r i e n c e d numerous delays because some ships had
d e t e r i o r a t e d due to prior y e a r cutbacks in m a i n t e n a n c e funding and
all faced the general p r o b l e m of m a n p o w e r in the form of qualified,
able b o d i e d crews. The m e a n activation time for Ready R e s e r v e
Fleet vessels was ii days ("The Logistics Perspective", 1991:7).
The reality that a future conflict in Southwest Asia or other
inaccessible parts of the globe might not allow for a six m o n t h
logistic buildup as Desert Shield a f f o r d e d and the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s
of the M a r i n e Corps' MPS was not lost on senior Army officers and
their logistics planners:
"Sealift is the weakest link in today's global bridge. Not
only are there too few high-speed ships, but experience
in Desert Shield indicates that maritime forces must become
far more responsive, flexible and accommodating if heavy Army
forces are to close quickly in theater in shape to fight.
The 24th Division would have found it very difficult to
fight on arrival in ad-Dammam had they loaded to maximize
efficiency or had they adhered to established regulations and
procedures intended for a NATO-like contingency prior to
departure. As our Army is increasingly based in the United
States, more fast sealift ships are needed. At the same time
we must modernize our "fort to port" infrastructure to handle
the demands of a crisis-response Army ..... The concept depends
for success on strategic stockpiles of bulk items such as
ammunition, both in POMCUS sites overseas and afloat aboard
maritime prepositioned ships." (U.S. Army, Certain Victory, 376)
Under a m a n d a t e established by Congress, the D e p a r t m e n t of
Defense conducted the M o b i l i t y Requirements Study (MRS) in the fall
of 1990 to determine the future strategic m o b i l i t y requirements of
the armed services and to develop a comphrensive plan to meet those
needs. The p a r t i c i p a n t s in the study included the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, all Service H e a d q u a r t e r s and
the U.S. T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Command and its component commands: the
M i l i t a r y Sealift Command, Air M o b i l i t y Command and M i l i t a r y Traffic
M a n a g e m e n t C o m m a n d ( " M o b i l i t y Requirements Study", HQMC Top Level
School R e f e r e n c e Papers, May 1993).
Volume I of the MRS was completed on 23 J a n u a r y 1992 and
included the study of intertheater mobility, CONUS i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
and supporting sealift requirements. In v i e w of the Army's Gulf War
experiences and the coming reduction of ground m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e
overseas, the study r e c o m m e n d e d the a c q u i s i t i o n of 20 Large, M e d i u m
Speed R o l l - O n / R o l l - O f f (LMSR) ships, 23 m o d e r n i z e d commercial Roll-
On/Roll-Off vessels and the retention of eight Fast Sealift Ships
(FSS) to support the requirements of the "crisis-response" force
(ASMP Briefing Papers, Apr 1993). The study also r e c o m m e n d e d the
creation of a "gap filler" force for rapid response in a crisis
situation to m a k e way for additional follow-on heavy forces. The
gap filler force would introduce a heavy (mechanized) force in
theater by C+14. In a radical departure from traditional Army use
of strategic sealift, the MRS established the requirement for an
Army Afloat Prepositioning Program to meet the gap filler role that
will ensure the placement of a lead prepositioned Army Heavy
Brigade (with war materiel embarked aboard eight of the new LMSR
vessels and eight auxiliary ships) on the ground by C+4 (four days
after the deployment flow begins) (ASMP Briefing Papers, Apr 1993).
These MRS recommendations were approved and funded ($3.1 billion)
after receiving strong backing from both the Bush and Clinton
administrations and Congress.
As an adjunct to the MRS, the Army developed the Army
Strategic Mobility Plan (ASMP) which sets forth the future mobility
objective of their largely CONUS-based force: to deploy a
sustainable Corps of five divisions anywhere in the world in 75
days, with the first three (two of which are heavy divisions)
arriving within 30 days. The keystone of this Corps deployment
concept is the early arrival of the heavy brigade which is
prepositioned afloat (MPS/PREPO AFLOAT Symposium, MCU 19 Jan 1994).
The United States will thus enter the 21st Century with dual
Army and Marine Corps maritime prepositioning programs which will
produce both complementary and redundant capabilities. The
questions that will remain in the future for joint strategic
planners, logisticians, and the individual CINCs is how and where
each maritime prepositioning program can best "fit" and be utilized
to bring the necessary force to bear in a response to a crisis.
i0
T H E M A R I N E C O R P S M A R I T I M E P R E P O S I T I O N I N G S H I P S P R O G R A M
"Yes, MPS d i d fill the gap .... w i t h o u t question. The
7th MEB was the first force on the g r o u n d that o f f e r e d
a c r e d i b l e d e f e n s e against m e c h a n i z e d attack. The A r m y
airborne troops w h o got there first w e r e good, but
w e r e too lightly a r m e d and supplied to stop tanks for
very long. The q u i c k arrival of the 7th MEB and the
MPS s q u a d r o n must have put Saddam H u s s e i n on n o t i c e
that our President was serious about d e f e n d i n g Saudi
Arabia, for openers."
L T G E N W a l t e r E. Boomer, USMC
Naval Proceedings, N o v e m b e r 1991
M I S S I O N : S i n c e i t s i n c e p t i o n , t h e M a r i n e C o r p s h a s v i e w e d i t s
M a r i t i m e P r e p o s i t i o n i n g p r o g r a m as a s t r a t e g i c d e p l o y m e n t o p t i o n
w i t h t h e m a i n m i s s i o n of r a p i d l y c o m b i n i n g t h e s u b s t a n t i a l
p r e p o s i t i o n e d s t o c k of e q u i p m e n t a n d s u p p l i e s a b o a r d t h e s h i p s of
o n e t h e t h r e e M P S R O N s w i t h t h e a i r l i f t e d m a n p o w e r o f a M a r i n e
E x p e d i t i o n a r y B r i g a d e (MEB) to e s t a b l i s h a f o r m i d a b l e f o r c e c a p a b l e
of s u s t a i n e d o p e r a t i o n s f o r 30 d a y s a n y w h e r e a r o u n d t h e g l o b e
w i t h o u t r e p l e n i s h m e n t . U p o n a r r i v a l in t h e a t e r (the a r r i v a l a n d
a s s e m b l y p h a s e ) t h e M E B c a n c o m p l e t e o f f l o a d of e s s e n t i a l e q u i p m e n t
a n d b e d e c l a r e d r e a d y f o r c o m b a t i n as l i t t l e as 7 d a y s . T h i s
M a r i t i m e P r e p o s i t i o n i n g F o r c e (MPF) of 1 6 , 5 0 0 p e r s o n n e l c a n :
- C o n d u c t b o t h g r o u n d a n d a i r o p e r a t i o n s i n t e r o p e r a b l e w i t h
j o i n t f o r c e s d e p l o y e d in t h e a t e r b e f o r e o r a f t e r w a r d s
- R e i n f o r c e a n a m p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n
- O c c u p y / r e i n f o r c e a d v a n c e n a v a l b a s e s
- O c c u p y a n d d e f e n d a l o n g k e y l i n e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n
- S u p p o r t a n a l l y o r f r i e n d l y n a t i o n t h r o u g h f o r w a r d
p r e s e n c e
- S e n d a p o l i t i c a l / d i p l o m a t i c s i g n a l
ii
- E s t a b l i s h a s i z a b l e force in support of a s u s t a i n e d
o p e r a t i o n a s h o r e
- P r o v i d e h u m a n i t a r i a n / d i s a s t e r r e l i e f
M P F o p e r a t i o n s a n d a m p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n s are c o m p l e m e n t a r y
M a r i n e Corps c a p a b i l i t i e s . A m p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n s p r o v i d e the m e a n s
for f o r c i b l e entry, w h i l e M P F o p e r a t i o n s p r o v i d e the c a p a b i l i t y to
r a p i d l y d e p l o y to a r e a s w h e r e force i n t r o d u c t i o n is u n o p p o s e d (i.e.
D e s e r t Shield) t h r o u g h the i n i t i a l stages of the a r r i v a l a n d
a s s e m b l y phase.
As p r o v e n d u r i n g the Gulf War, the M P F c a p a b i l i t i e s d i r e c t l y
c o n t r i b u t e to two of the four m a i n c o m p o n e n t s of set f o r t h in the
N a t i o n a l M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y (Strategic D e t e r r e n c e a n d Defense,
F o r w a r d Presence, C r i s i s R e s p o n s e and R e c o n s t i t u t i o n ) :
- F o r w a r d Presence: The 3 M P S R O N S are s t r a t e g i c a l l y
d e p l o y e d a r o u n d the w o r l d and s t a n d r e a d y to be
l i n k e d w i t h an a i r l i f t e d M E B w i t h i n days. This
c a p a b i l i t y d e m o n s t r a t e s d e p t h in U.S. s t r a t e g i c
reach, r e i n f o r c e s a l l i a n c e s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s w i t h
o t h e r n a t i o n s and e n h a n c e s r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y .
- C r i s i s R e s p o n s e : The M P F c a p a b i l i t i e s o f f e r the
n a t i o n a q u i c k a n d c r e d i b l e m e t h o d to r e s p o n d to
a c r i s i s situation. W h e t h e r a "show the flag"
p r e s e n c e or a c t u a l combat forces are required,
the M P F is c a p a b l e of t a i l o r i n g the c o r r e c t
r e s p o n s e in r e a c t i o n to any n u m b e r of r e g i o n a l
crises to i n c l u d e h u m a n i t a r i a n relief m i s s i o n s
("Maritime P r e p o s i t i o n i n g Force", H Q M C Top Level
12
S c h o o l R e f e r e n c e Papers, J u n e 1993).
C O M B A T UNIT SIZE A N D EQUIPMENT: The n o t i o n a l M P F M E B is c o m p r i s e d
of a R e g i m e n t a l L a n d i n g T e a m (RLT), a c o m p o s i t e M a r i n e A i r c r a f t
Group (MAG), a n d a B r i g a d e S e r v i c e S u p p o r t G r o u p (BSSG). W h e n
c o m b i n e d w i t h the N a v a l S u p p o r t E l e m e n t (NSE) w h i c h s u p p o r t s the
o f f l o a d of the M P S ships and the fixed a n d r o t o r M A G a s s e t s that
are a i r l i f t e d or flight f e r r i e d in, the M a r i n e forces can p r o j e c t
a fully c o m b a t c a p a b l e M a r i n e A i r G r o u n d T a s k F o r c e (MAGTF) of
16,500 p e r s o n n e l a n y w h e r e on the g l o b e w i t h i n i0 days. W h e n
e m p l o y e d the M P F M E B m a y u t i l i z e the f o l l o w i n g m a j o r items of
e q u i p m e n t a l r e a d y p r e p o s i t i o n e d a b o a r d each of the t h r e e M P S R O N s :
G r o u n d Combat EquiDment:
30
109
25
72
30
MIAI Tanks
A m p h i b i o u s A s s a u l t V e h i c l e s
L i g h t A r m o r e d V e h i c l e s
T O W C a r r i e r T r u c k s
H o w i t z e r s , M e d i u m M 1 9 8
A v i a t i o n Combat EquiDment:
24
20
12
12
12
12
6
6
45
6
(Notional C o m p o s i t e ) *
F / A - 1 8 F i g h t e r / A t t a c k A i r c r a f t
AV-8 H a r r i e r V / S T O L A t t a c k A i r c r a f t
C H - 5 3 E S u p e r S t a l l i o n H e l i c o p t e r s
CH-46 Sea K n i g h t H e l i c o p t e r s
U H - I H e l i c o p t e r s
A H - I W S u p e r C o b r a A t t a c k H e l i c o p t e r s
E A - 6 B P r o w l e r EW A i r c r a f t
K C - 1 3 0 H e r c u l e s A e r i a l R e f u e l e r s
S t i n g e r A i r D e f e n s e Teams
H A W K M i s s i l e L a u n c h e r s
* F i x e d a n d R o t o r W i n g A i r c r a f t are F l i g h t F e r r i e d to A r e a of
O p e r a t i o n s
13
G e n e r a l G r o u n d / A v i a t i o n SuDDort:
1200+
14
8
8
320+
6
2
17
i00+
41
1500+
8
ii00+
2
1
S t a t i o n a r y / M o b i l e Radio Sets
Rough Terrain Cargo Handlers, 50K
25 Ton Drott Crane
600K Amphibious Asslt Fuel Systems
M o b i l e Electric Power Generators
Road Graders
Runway Sweepers
D7G C a t e r p i l l a r Tractors
Forklifts (10K, 6K and 4K models)
Reverse Osmosis W a t e r Purifier Sets
Tents
H e l i c o p t e r Expedient Refuel Systems
Light, M e d i u m and Heavy Trucks
Field Hospitals (120 and 60 beds)
Aviation IMA (Maintenance) F a c i l i t y
(Embarked aboard A v i a t i o n Logistics
Support Ship (TAVB))
In addition, each M P S R O N is also p r e p o s i t i o n e d w i t h 30 Days
of Supply (DOS) in all DOD supply categories (USMC, Concepts and
Issues 93, 105).
O P E R A T I O N A L F L E X I B I L I T Y : Since O p e r a t i o n Desert Storm, the M a r i n e
Corps has u t i l i z e d the MPF capabilities to support two m i n o r and
one major h u m a n i t a r i a n relief operation. In both O p e r a t i o n W a t e r
Pitcher (Chuuk Islands, Pacific Ocean) and T y p h o o n Omar (Guam)
relief operations the p r e p o s i t i o n e d MPS engineer assets (mobile
electric power generators, w a t e r p u r i f i c a t i o n units, etc.) p r o v e d
their w o r t h in restoring a basic quality of life. In O p e r a t i o n
Restore Hope, the rapid partial MPS offload of c o m b a t and combat
service support equipment enabled joint U.S. task forces to q u i c k l y
assemble a credible p r e s e n c e on the ground in Somalia and begin
a p p l i c a t i o n of h u m a n i t a r i a n aid (USMC, Concepts and Issues 93, 48).
14
In early 1991, MPS p l a n n e r s d e v i s e d w h a t w e r e c a l l e d "Crisis
A c t i o n M o d u l e s " (CAMs) that i n v o k e d a m e t h o d in w h i c h M P S ships
from each s q u a d r o n w o u l d be e m b a r k e d w i t h c e r t a i n sets or m o d u l e s
of e q u i p m e n t a n d s u p p l i e s (i.e., w a t e r p u r i f i c a t i o n sets,
g e n e r a t o r s a n d M e a l s - R e a d y - t o - E a t ) that p r o v i d e d s p e c i f i c tools to
be o f f l o a d e d by e x c e p t i o n to m e e t u n i q u e m i s s i o n s such as
h u m a n i t a r i a n o p e r a t i o n s w i t h o u t d e g r a d i n g the o v e r a l l M P F M E B
c a p a b i l i t i e s . C u r r e n t l y , these CAMs are k n o w n as F o r c e M o d u l e s , but
the b a s i c c o n c e p t r e m a i n s the same w i t h each M P S R O N b e i n g e m b a r k e d
w i t h s p e c i f i c sets of e q u i p m e n t and s u p p l i e s that can be
s e l e c t i v e l y o f f l o a d e d to s u p p o r t h u m a n i t a r i a n o p e r a t i o n s , short
t e r m M a r i n e E x p e d i t i o n a r y Unit (MEUs w i t h less than 2,500
p e r s o n n e l ) o p e r a t i o n s , and low i n t e n s i t y c o n f l i c t s r e q u i r i n g less
than the full M P F M E B d e p l o y m e n t . The M a r i n e C o r p s sees the c o n c e p t
of F o r c e M o d u l e s as a m e t h o d that will m a k e the M P S s t r a t e g i c tool
b e c o m e m o r e " C I N C - f r i e n d l y " w h e n a crisis r e s p o n s e is required.
M A I N T E N A N C E CONCEP T : All M a r i n e Corps M P S m a i n t e n a n c e is c o n d u c t e d
at the port of B l o u n t I s l a n d (Jacksonville), F l o r i d a w h e r e e a c h of
the t h i r t e e n ships r o t a t e in a p p r o x i m a t e l y e v e r y t h i r t y m o n t h s to
c o m p l e t e l y o f f l o a d t h e i r c a r g o a n d u n d e r g o s c h e d u l e d m a i n t e n a n c e
a l o n g w i t h a r i g i d Coast G u a r d hull e x a m i n a t i o n / c e r t i f i c a t i o n
p r o c e s s for s e a w o r t h i n e s s . The M a r i n e C o r p s e q u i p m e n t a n d s u p p l i e s
are r e p l e n i s h e d , r e f u r b i s h e d or r e p l a c e d b y M a r i n e C o r p s l o g i s t i c s
p e r s o n n e l a n d c o n t r a c t e d civilians. The C l a s s V o r d n a n c e items are
s h i p p e d by rail to N a v a l W e a p o n s Station, C h a r l e s t o n , S o u t h
15
Carolina where individual stocks are checked for serviceability and
replenished. The entire process lasts for 42 to 45 days per ship
and is called the MPS Maintenance Cycle (MMC). The MMC is managed
by the Commanding Officer, Blount Island Command who is directly
responsible to the Commanding General, Marine Corps Logistics Base,
Albany, Georgia.
The major MPS maintenance concern for the Marine Corps lies
in use of the Blount Island facility into the next decade. In 1985
the Marine Corps formally leased the Blount Island port facility
thru year 2005 from the Gate Petroleum Company (Interview w/Major
Lavigne, HQMC Feb 94).
Since that time the civilian companies~corporations and the
Jacksonville Port Authority that share the geography of Blount
Island have enjoyed an economic boom period. Access to roads and
facilities have increasingly become more congested and ground space
is held at a premium. In this period of economic defense
downsizing it is doubtful that the Marine Corps can enter into any
future long term negotiated lease or purchase agreement with Gate
that can compete with the lucrative commercial prices which the
property will certainly demand by the next century.
16
F U T U R E C H A L L E N G E S : The M a r i n e Corps faces two challenges that are
key to the survival of the MPS p r o g r a m as a realistic strategic
deployment option through the b e g i n n i n g of the 21st Century:
i. R e d u c e d D e p e n d e n c e on L e a s e d A s s e t s : As d i s c u s s e d in the
previous section on maintenance, the Blount Island C o m m a n d port
facility is leased through y e a r 2005. The 13
commercial RO/RO ships comprising MPS are also leased from three
separate sources. The ships' leases will i n d i v i d u a l l y expire
b e g i n n i n g in 2009 through 2011 (Interview w / M a j o r Lavigne, HQMC Feb
1994). It is surmised that operational expediency took p r e c e d e n c e
over v i s i o n in converting the old NTPS concept to a economical MPS
l e a s e d - b a s e d p r o g r a m in the early 1980s; however, the current and
future constraints p l a c e d on the defense budget does not bode well
for m a s s i v e expenditures to renew leases or p u r c h a s e m u l t i m i l l i o n
dollar acreage and ships. The Marines must a g g r e s s i v e l y search for
a long term solution that will either lead to ownership of current
assets or more forcefully restate their future MPS r e q u i r e m e n t s as
a late a p p e n d i x to the MRS.
2. E n h a n c e m e n t of M P F C a p a b i l i t i e s : The current capabilities
of MPF can s i g n i f i c a n t l y be enhanced if one additional ship is
added to each of the three MPSRONs. As p o r t r a y e d in the M a r i n e
Corps' Concepts and Issues '93 edition and p r e s e n t e d in several JCS
briefings, current MPF MEB lift capacity in the form of MPS sealift
and strategic airlift can no longer satisfy the growth of the MEB's
e m b a r k a t i o n footprint. The addition of one ship w o u l d not only
satisfy those requirements, but also allow for an overall
17
e n h a n c e m e n t of MPF. The first m a j o r e n h a n c e m e n t w o u l d be the
a d d i t i o n of 28 M I A I Tanks that w o u l d b r i n g M P F c a p a b i l i t i e s b a c k to
p r e - D e s e r t S h i e l d tank b a t t a l i o n (-) s t r e n g t h w i t h a total of 58
p e r MPSRON. The s e c o n d m a j o r e n h a n c e m e n t w o u l d be the e m b a r k a t i o n
of the E x p e d i t i o n a r y A i r f i e l d 2000 w h i c h c o u l d p r o v i d e for a 5,000
foot r u n w a y or a 3,840 foot r u n w a y w i t h ramp space for 78 aircraft.
In addition, r o o m w o u l d r e m a i n for a N a v y M o b i l e C o n s t r u c t i o n
(Seabees) p a c k a g e that c o u l d p r o v i d e for r a p i d b u i l d u p in the f o r m
of v e r t i c a l / h o r i z o n t a l c o n s t r u c t i o n , r o a d / r u n w a y e m p l a c e m e n t a n d
r e p a i r a n d w e l l drilling. Finally, that one a d d i t i o n a l ship c o u l d
also p r o v i d e the space for a N a v a l Fleet H o s p i t a l w i t h a c a p a c i t y
of up to 500 beds (USMC B r i e f i n g Papers, 13 Dec 93).
M a n y M a r i n e s feel that this e n h a n c e m e n t of M P F w o u l d m e e t the
a f o r e m e n t i o n e d M R S r e q u i r e m e n t for a "gap filler" force at a
s i g n i f i c a n t s a v i n g s w i t h the a d d i t i o n a l M I A I tanks m e e t i n g the
h e a v y combat force r e q u i r e m e n t (USMC, C o n c e p t s a n d Issues 93, 33).
Like any o t h e r m a j o r w e a p o n s system, the M P F c a p a b i l i t y c a n n o t be
a l l o w e d to s t a n d pat a n d s u f f e r atrophy. O n c e again, the M a r i n e s
must i n i t i a t e a p e r s u a s i v e d i a l o g u e w i t h the p o w e r s r e s i d e n t in
W a s h i n g t o n , D.C. if the M P F c a p a b i l i t y is to be enhanced. To do
less c o u l d r e l e g a t e the M P F to an "also ran" s t r a t e g i c d e p l o y m e n t
o p t i o n in the 21st Century.
18
THE ARMY AFLOAT PREPOSITIONING PROGRAM
"The Army must provide a Corps of five divisions
that is tailorable, sustainable, and with airborne,
vertical insertion capability. The lead brigade
must be on the ground by C+4, the lead division by
C+12. Two heavy divisions (sealifted) arrive from
CONUS by C+30 (armored, mechanized, air assault,
mix per CINC). The full Corps (five divisions and
a COSCOM) closes by C+75. A fully supported heavy
combat brigade, with sufficient supplies to sustain
the Corps until lines of communication are established,
must be prepositioned afloat."
The Army Position,
The Army Strategic Mobility Program
Information Briefing, June 1993
Headquarters, Department of the Army
MISSION: In early 1991, the Chief of Staff of the Army, in
testimony before Congress first p r o n o u n c e d what the new A r m y
strategic m o b i l i t y capability and requirements should be in m e e t i n g
the demands of future regional conflict. The above "Army Position"
evolved w i t h the Army citing m a r i t i m e p r e p o s i t i o n i n g as a key
ingredient in their future ability to rapidly p r o j e c t power (ASMP
Briefing Papers, June 1993). As framed in the Army Strategic
M o b i l i t y Program study, the Army P r e p o s i t i o n i n g Afloat (PREPO
AFLOAT) Program will allow for the early introduction of a heavy
combat brigade (two armor battalions and two m e c h a n i z e d b a t t a l i o n s
with r e q u i r e d support) to be e s t a b l i s h e d in theater as the lead
combat element of a five division Army Corps. The overall goal
calls for this lead heavy b r i g a d e to be operational w i t h i n four
days or less after o f f l o a d of the PREPO A F L O A T ships c o m m e n c e s and
forces are m a r r i e d w i t h the p r e p o s i t i o n e d equipment and supplies.
Like the M a r i n e Corps MPS program, the PREPO A F L O A T o p e r a t i o n s
will be b a s e d upon the concept of flying the brigade personnel in
19
theater via strategic airlift and m e e t i n g the p r e p o s i t i o n e d ships
to begin the arrival and assembly phase. The PREPO A F L O A T Heavy
Brigade w i t h a t a i l o r e d force of anywhere from 6,000+ to 1,000
soldiers and 15 days of p r e p o s i t i o n e d sustainment support can:
- Augment an amphibious deployment or o p e r a t i o n
- Occupy or augment an a d v a n c e d lodgement
- E s t a b l i s h a b l o c k i n g or delaying p o s i t i o n for b o t h
offensive and defensive operations
- R e i n f o r c e an ally with a credible force prior to
hostilities, and sustain relations w i t h allies and
coalition partners through routine exercises and
operations
- E s t a b l i s h a sizeable combat force to enable closure
of additional forces and to support the theater
commander's campaign
- Provide a rapid p e a c e t i m e response in support of
operations other than war
- Provide economy of force through r e d u c t i o n of
strategic airlift requirements (U.S. Army HQ, T r a i n i n g and
Doctrine Command, Draft of AR-3 Army P r e p o s i t i o n e d Afloat)
The p u r p o s e of a PREPO A F L O A T o p e r a t i o n is to "rapidly
reinforce a lodgement established by Army early entry forces and/or
by USMC amphibious assault elements (e.g., an Army Light D i v i s i o n
or a M a r i n e Air G r o u n d Task Force) and be p r e p a r e d to conduct
subsequent operations across the range of m i l i t a r y operations"
(Draft, AR-3 Army P r e p o s i t i o n e d Afloat, i-i thru 1-9).
As in the case of the M a r i n e Corps' MPF, Army PREPO A F L O A T
forces will contribute to two of the four m a i n components of the
National M i l i t a r y Strategy: Forward Presence and Crisis Response.
20
C O M B A T U N I T SIZE A N D E Q U I P M E N T : The Army PREPO A F L O A T forces
(designated as Army Reserve-3 or AR-3) represent a n e w w a r f i g h t i n g
capability centered around a heavy brigade. The AR-3 Heavy Brigade
will draw the m a j o r i t y of its sustaining combat, combat support
(CS) and combat service support (CSS) equipment and supplies from
the PREPO AFLOAT ships. As stated before, the AR-3 Heavy Brigade
will be comprised of two armor battalions and two m e c h a n i z e d
battalions entering a theater w i t h the capability to be tailored to
meet a m u l t i t u d e of individual CINC requirements. The A r m y projects
that the AR-3 Heavy Brigade will be on the ground and combat
capable by C+4 (4 days after the deployment flow begins). W h e n
employed the AR-3 Heavy Brigade may utilize the following m a j o r
items of e q u i p m e n t / c a p a b i l i t i e s p r e p o s i t i o n e d a b o a r d the PREPO
A F L O A T ships:
G r o u n d C o m b a t E q u i p m e n t :
123
154
24
9
344
1
MIAI Tanks
Bradley Fighting Vehicles
S e l f - P r o p e l l e d Howitzers (155MM)
M u l t i p l e - L a u n c h Rocket Systems
Misc. Track Vehicles
Air Defense A r t i l l e r y Battery (-)
H e a v y / M e d i u m G r o u n d Transports: 2 , 3 5 2 W h e e l e d V e h i c l e s
1,273 Trailers
A m m u n i t i o n H a n d l i n g / D i s t r i b u t i o n
Engineer C o m b a t / S e r v i c e s Support
POL S t o r a g e / D i s t r i b u t i o n
Supply S t o r a g e / D i s t r i b u t i o n
Port O p e n i n g / C o n s t r u c t i o n
300 Bed Field Hospital
In addition, the PREPO A F L O A T ships are p r e p o s i t i o n e d w i t h 15
Days of Supply (DOS) (Army ASMP Briefing Papers, Feb 1994).
21
G e n e r a l G r o u n d C S / C S S C a p a b i l i t i e s :
O P E R A T I O N A L F L E X I B I L I T Y : In o r d e r to m a x i m i z e o p e r a t i o n a l
flexibility, d e c r e a s e initial o p e r a t i o n a l f r i c t i o n a n d i m p r o v e
d e p l o y a b i l i t y , the P R E P O A F L O A T ships will be c o n f i g u r e d to s u p p o r t
four b a s i c force m o d u l e s :
- F o r c e M o d u l e "D": F o r c e structure, e q u i p m e n t a n d s u s t a i n m e n t
to p r o v i d e s u p p o r t for i n i t i a l port o p e n i n g for small
h u m a n i t a r i a n m i s s i o n s .
- F o r c e M o d u l e "C": F o r c e structure, e q u i p m e n t a n d s u s t a i n m e n t
to p r o v i d e s u p p o r t for m i n i m u m port s u p p o r t for m a j o r p e a c e
e n f o r c i n g and h u m a n i t a r i a n m i s s i o n s .
- F o r c e M o d u l e "B": F o r c e structure, e q u i p m e n t a n d s u s t a i n m e n t
to p r o v i d e s u p p o r t for l i m i t e d port s u p p o r t o p e r a t i o n s for
small r e g i o n a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s .
- F o r c e M o d u l e "A": F o r c e structure, e q u i p m e n t a n d s u s t a i n m e n t
to p r o v i d e s u p p o r t for full port support o p e r a t i o n s for
m a j o r r e g i o n a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s (Draft, AR-3 A r m y P r e p o s i t i o n e d
Afloat, 1-5 a n d 1-6).
As in the case of a M a r i n e C o r p s M P F operation, "a P R E P O
A F L O A T o p e r a t i o n can consist of one ship a n d a p p r o p r i a t e s i z e d
e l e m e n t s of the brigade, or at the o t h e r end of the scale all the
PREPO A F L O A T v e s s e l s " (Army A S M P B r i e f i n g Papers, F e b 1994). This
force m o d u l e c o n c e p t is c e r t a i n to m a k e the A r m y P R E P O A F L O A T
c o m p e t i t i v e w i t h the M a r i n e ' s t a i l o r e d M P F force m o d u l e s w h e n the
time a r i s e s for a C I N C to c h o o s e the p r e p o s i t i o n e d force (or
c o m b i n a t i o n of forces) to best m e e t his c r i s i s r e s p o n s e needs.
22
M A I N T E N A N C E C O N C E P T : The Army PREPO A F L O A T m a i n t e n a n c e will be
conducted at existing U.S. Navy facilities in Charleston, South
Carolina. The Army logistics planners evidently learned from the
difficulties e n c o u n t e r e d by the Marine Corps at Blount Island,
Florida in choosing the site because it offers the advantages of
low life cycle cost, the permanent use of g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d
facilities, growth potential on Department of D e f e n s e p r o p e r t y and
the utility of w o r k i n g major ammunition r e p l e n i s h m e n t s on site
without additional safety waivers (Army ASMP B r i e f i n g Papers, Feb
1994).
The Army M a t e r i e l Command (AMC) will be r e s p o n s i b l e for the
m a n a g e m e n t and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of all equipment and supplies (less
Class VIII). AMC will initially procure, assemble, p a c k a g e and
embark all PREPO A F L O A T stocks. When the PREPO A F L O A T ships enter
their p r e s c r i b e d m a i n t e n a n c e cycles (to begin in 1996) the AMC will
also coordinate the offload, r e p l e n i s h m e n t / r e p l a c e m e n t and repair
of all items (Army Maqazine, Jan 1994, 51).
Unlike the M a r i n e Corps, the Army will enjoy the a d v a n t a g e of
m o v i n g forward into the 21st C e n t u r y w i t h a g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d
m a r i t i m e p r e p o s i t i o n i n g m a i n t e n a n c e facility that is u n h i n d e r e d by
competing commercial growth and congestion.
23
FUTURE CHALLENGES: In the near term, the Army PREPO A F L O A T p r o g r a m
will face one significant challenge that will affect its
composition and u t i l i t y from present day thru the b e g i n n i n g of the
21st Century .... attainment of a clearly defined role as a maritime
prepositioning force.
Even though the Army p o s i t i v e l y views PREPO AFLOAT's Heavy
Brigade as the "gap filler" force in answer to those requirements
identified in the M o b i l i t y R e q u i r e m e n t s Study, they also admit to
limitations involved in employing a heavy brigade:
- Dense jungles and forests, steep and rugged terrain and
prominent w a t e r obstacles restrict mobility.
- U r b a n i z e d terrain restricts maneuver.
- Large numbers of heavy equipment restricts strategic
mobility.
- The heavy b r i g a d e consumes an inordinate amount of
supplies (especially Classes III, V and IX).
(Draft, AR-3 Army P r e p o s i t i o n i n q Afloat, 9-2)
In the future, individual CINC planners will most c e r t a i n l y be
looking for less than the heavy "gap filler" c a p a b i l i t y in those
cases that require either a smaller c o n t i n g e n c y combat force or
h u m a n i t a r i a n / p e a c e k e e p i n g forces. It is crucial that the Army
s u c c e s s f u l l y prove (through actual operations and exercises) that
PREPO A F L O A T forces are flexible and quick enough to t r a n s i t i o n
from the heavy brigade force m o d u l e combat set to a smaller, more
conventional, u t i l i t a r i a n force. To do less could cause m a n y to
v i e w PREPO A F L O A T as a heavy, "one dimensional" strategic option.
24
J O I N T N E S S : T H E R I G H T C O U R S E F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y ?
M u c h c o n j e c t u r e a b o u n d s w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s of the P e n t a g o n
and C o n g r e s s on w h e t h e r or not the p r o p o n e n t s of the n e w A r m y
A F L O A T P R E P O a n d the M a r i n e C o r p s MPS p r o g r a m s h a v e s o w e d n e w
f e r t i l e g r o u n d for a n o t h e r t i m e - h o n o r e d a r m e d s e r v i c e s roles a n d
m i s s i o n s battle. T h e p r o g r a m s share m a j o r c a p a b i l i t i e s that are
b o t h r e d u n d a n t a n d c o m p l e m e n t a r y :
C A P A B I L I T Y A R M Y
F o r c e M o d u l e s :
M a j o r R e g i o n a l C o n f l i c t X
S m a l l e r C o n t i n g e n c i e s X
H u m a n i t a r i a n O p e r a t i o n s X
Port O p e n i n g O p e r a t i o n s X
A i r C o m b a t E l e m e n t (Fixed/Rotor)
H e a v y A r m o r E m p h a s i s X
S u s t a i n m e n t 15 DOS
USMC
X
X
X
X (+TAVB)
30 D O S
The A r m y and M a r i n e C o r p s p o s s e s s s t r o n g m a r i t i m e
p r e p o s i t i o n i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s that can b o t h p r o j e c t a r a p i d A m e r i c a n
f o r w a r d p r e s e n c e that in the past was i m p o s s i b l e to attain. B o t h
p r e p o s i t i o n i n g p r o g r a m s a l s o h a v e c e r t a i n w e a k n e s s e s p r e v i o u s l y
d i s c u s s e d that c o u l d h a m p e r t h e i r f u t u r e e f f e c t i v e n e s s . T h e A r m y
faces the a w e s o m e t a s k of m o v i n g P R E P O A F L O A T t o w a r d s the
o p e r a t i o n a l s t a r t i n g b l o c k s w h i l e the M a r i n e C o r p s s e a r c h e s for
f i s c a l l y s o u n d s o l u t i o n s in t h e i r e f f o r t s to r e b u i l d a c r e d i b l e
p r e p o s i t i o n e d a r m o r c a p a b i l i t y a n d r e s o l v e t h e i r M P S l e a s e d asset
p r o b l e m s . D e s p i t e these facts s e n i o r o p e r a t i o n s p l a n n e r s f r o m b o t h
25
services are clearly depending on the speed and flexibility of
maritime prepositioning to provide the initial combat edge in
future conflicts.
At recent National Defense University appearances, both the
Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
stressed the importance of jointness in combat operations and
operations other than war. In this era of shrinking national
resources, downsized defense budgets and worldwide regional
turmoil, it would seem prudent for both services to unite and
provide our nation with the best that this unique strategic
deployment option has to offer. With billions of dollars already
invested, the Army and the Marine Corps should jointly pursue a
course of mutual cooperation and planning that will yield the most
responsive yet economical maritime prepositioning program that will
best serve the nation's interests in the 21st Century. The
recommendations listed below are offered as to how this might be
accomplished:
* C r e a t i o n of a J o i n t M a r i t i m e P r e p o s i t i o n i n g C o m m a n d : Just as the
CINCs coordinate all operational and logistical planning for their
respective regions of the world, the senior commander of the Joint
Maritime Prepositioning Command would coordinate all such planning
as it applies to both the Army and Marine Corps programs. The
commander (a Major General equivalent) would be located at the
designated maintenance site and be responsible for all maintenance
(equipment and supplies) and shipboard repairs as necessary. The
26
command would be staffed with the "best and brightest" Army and
Marine Corps operators and logisticians who are experienced in the
art of warfare and prepositioning. This command would also provide
a small forward deployed "enabling cell" comprised of
prepositioning offload specialists that could rapidly close with
the CINC's planners in the theater to optimize the use of
prepositioned assets.
* Development of Joint Operational Prepositioning Plans: Under the
aegis of the Joint Prepositioning Command, operational planners
from both services could draw from the individual strengths of
their programs to provide the CINCs with the best prepositioning
solutions to their individual forward presence problems. A
situation that requires less than a full prepositioning response
(e.g., disaster/humanitarian operations in typhoon ravaged
Bangladesh or the peacekeeping/humanitarian operations in Somalia)
is more likely to require a U.S. response in the future than a full
blown MRC like Desert Storm. An example of how such joint planning
would enhance U.S. forward presence can be found in the case of a
low intensity Third World peacekeeping mission which could combine
the rapid forward presence of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to
establish initial order using a Force Module from MPS together with
the Army port opening prepositioned capabilities to allow for the
introduction of additional combat power as required. Our nation
would benefit from the strengths of both programs and enjoy an
overall e c o n o m y in the application of prepositioned forces.
27
* C r e a t i o n of a Joint P r e p o s i t i o n i n g M a i n t e n a n c e Facility: W i t h
the n e w A r m y f a c i l i t y b e i n g e s t a b l i s h e d at an e x i s t i n g g o v e r n m e n t -
o w n e d f a c i l i t y (naval base) in C h a r l e s t o n , S o u t h C a r o l i n a the
p o w e r s w i t h i n the P e n t a g o n s h o u l d d e m o n s t r a t e e c o n o m i c c o m m o n sense
a n d r e l o c a t e the M a r i n e C o r p s w i t h the A r m y by 2005 ( t e r m i n a t i o n of
the lease at B l o u n t Island). M P S m a i n t e n a n c e f u n c t i o n s at B l o u n t
I s l a n d c o u l d be s l o w l y p h a s e d out and t r a n s f e r r e d to the C h a r l e s t o n
f a c i l i t y o v e r the next ten years. As d i s c u s s e d earlier, the
C h a r l e s t o n f a c i l i t y o f f e r s all the a d v a n t a g e s of g o v e r n m e n t
o w n e r s h i p (i.e., r o o m to expand, e x i s t i n g long t e r m o r d n a n c e
h a n d l i n g waivers, etc.) w i t h n o n e of the h e a d a c h e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h
a c o n g e s t e d c o m m e r c i a l facility. A joint f a c i l i t y w o u l d also a l l o w
for m a j o r e c o n o m i e s to be e n j o y e d in the area of g r o u n d e q u i p m e n t
m a i n t e n a n c e w h e r e the A r m y a n d M a r i n e s s h a r e a large n u m b e r of
c o m m o n r e q u i r e m e n t s . The A r m y is p l a n n i n g o v e r 52 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s
w o r t h of f a c i l i t y i m p r o v e m e n t s to the C h a r l e s t o n site b e t w e e n n o w
a n d FY98 (Army A S M P B r i e f i n g Papers, Feb 1994). A p r u d e n t joint
m o v e w o u l d be to p l a n a n d fund for the a d d i t i o n of M a r i n e C o r p s
f a c i l i t i e s at C h a r l e s t o n b e t w e e n n o w a n d 2004.
* E n h a n c e m e n t of B o t h P r e p o s i t i o n i n g Programs for Joint
C o m p l e m e n t a r y Support: As p r e v i o u s l y discussed, the M a r i n e C o r p s
can p r o j e c t a m u c h i m p r o v e d c a p a b i l i t y in terms of w a r f i g h t i n g and
c o m b a t s e r v i c e s u p p o r t s t r e n g t h w i t h the a d d i t i o n of a s i n g l e R O / R O
ship to each MPSRON. This p r o p o s e d e n h a n c e m e n t w o u l d be of
28
p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e in the "two MRC" s c e n a r i o w i d e l y a d v e r t i s e d in the
B o t t o m - U p R e v i e w w i t h the a d d i t i o n of the 28 M I A I tanks p e r ship
a n d the p r o v i s i o n i n g of e x t e n d e d a v i a t i o n r u n w a y c a p a b i l i t i e s . W i t h
such an e n h a n c e m e n t , the M a r i n e Corps c o u l d c o m b i n e two M P S R O N s to
p r o v i d e 116 M I A I tanks and a c a p a b i l i t y to e s t a b l i s h two m a j o r
f i x e d / r o t o r w i n g sites to c o m p l e m e n t the A r m y P R E P O A F L O A T H e a v y
Brigade. The A r m y s h o u l d also m o v e f o r w a r d to e n h a n c e a true h e a v y
a r m o r c a p a b i l i t y a b o a r d PREPO A F L O A T w i t h the a d d i t i o n of 60 to 120
M I A I tanks in lieu of o t h e r types of m e c h a n i z e d v e h i c l e s . A
s i z e a b l e A r m y 3+ b a t t a l i o n tank force w o u l d s e e m to be of g r e a t e r
joint w a r f i g h t i n g v a l u e in a w o r s t case "two MRC" s c e n a r i o than one
w i t h only two b a t t a l i o n s . L o g i s t i c a l l y , the A r m y must: (i) e n h a n c e
PREPO A F L O A T s u s t a i n m e n t from 15 DOS to 30 DOS if the H e a v y B r i g a d e
is to fight e f f e c t i v e l y in s c e n a r i o s w h e r e m a s s i v e a m o u n t s of fuel,
a m m u n i t i o n a n d w a t e r c o u l d be c o n s u m e d in a m a t t e r of days (as was
w i t n e s s e d in the I s r a e l i - A r a b W a r of 1973) a n d (2) e n h a n c e p o r t
o p e n i n g / t e r m i n a l b u i l d u p c a p a b i l i t i e s w i t h a d d i t i o n a l q u a n t i t i e s of
m a t e r i a l h a n d l i n g a n d e a r t h m o v i n g e q u i p m e n t that w i l l p r o v i d e
i n c o m i n g A r m y C o r p s S u p p o r t C o m m a n d (COSCOM) units, N a v y C a r g o
H a n d l i n g a n d Port G r o u p s (NAVCHAPGRUs) a n d A i r F o r c e e l e m e n t s w i t h
a s i g n i f i c a n t h e a d start in the r a p i d e s t a b l i s h m e n t of b a s e s for
f o l l o w - o n s u s t a i n m e n t in theater. G i v e n that a m a r i t i m e
p r e p o s i t i o n i n g o f f l o a d of e q u i p m e n t a n d s u p p l i e s r e q u i r e s a b e n i g n
e n v i r o n m e n t a n d the M a r i n e Corps a l r e a d y p o s s e s s e s an i n t r o d u c t o r y
l o d g e m e n t a n d d e f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t y r e s i d e n t in the t h r e e M P S R O N s ,
an e n h a n c e d A r m y port o p e n i n g e q u i p m e n t p a c k a g e w o u l d b e t t e r s e r v e
29
the immediate needs of a joint task force attempting to buildup and
expand a logistics foothold. The early provisioning of adequate
Army PREPO AFLOAT c o m b a t service support with its unique port and
terminal capabilities may well be recognized as being more valuable
to the success of future maritime prepositioning operations than
the combat equipment embarked aboard.
The key to future improvements in both prepositioning programs
resides in the abilities of the Army and Marine Corps to put
service rivalries aside and actively seeking joint opportunities
for innovative collaboration that will enhance warfighting
capabilities and serve the nation's best interests. As Admiral
Eccles explained in Operational Naval Loqistics 44 years ago: "The
desirable flexibility and economy of floating base operations can
only be obtained as the result of sound planning done years
beforehand at national and departmental levels."
30
W O R K S C I T E D
"Army Launches Prepo Afloat Project" Army Maqazine. Jan 1994:51.
Association of the U n i t e d States Army. "Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm: The Logistics Perspective" Washington:
Sept 1991: 6-7.
Brown, David B. and Henderson, David G. "Maritime P r e p o s i t i o n i n g -
A Powerful Presence". Amphibious W a r f a r e Review. Vol ii,
No. 2: 1993: 11-13.
Eccles, Henry E. O p e r a t i o n a l Naval Loqistics. Washington: B u r e a u
of Naval Personnel: 1950.
Headquarters, Department of the U n i t e d States Army. Army S t r a t e g i c
Mobility Plan (ASMP)Briefing Papers: April, June 1993;
Feb 1994.
Hopkins, J.I. "This Was No Drill"
Proceedinqs. N o v 1991: 58.
U n i t e d States Naval I n s t i t u t e
Lavigne, Michael M a j o r USMC, Section Head LPO-2, H e a d q u a r t e r s
U n i t e d States M a r i n e Corps Interview. 8 Feb 1994.
Office of the Chief of Staff, U n i t e d States Army. C e r t a i n Victory:
United States Army in the Gulf War. Washington: 1993.
Summers, Harry G. Jr. On Strateq~ II: A Critical Analysis of the
Gulf War. N e w York: Dell Publishing, 1992.
U n i t e d States Army Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command.
AR-3 Army P r e p o s i t i o n e d Afloat. V e r s i o n 1 (Draft): Undated.
U n i t e d States Marine Corps. Concepts and Issues 93. H e a d q u a r t e r s
Marine Corps: Washington: 1993.
United States M a r i n e Corps. "Maritime Prepositioning Force". Head-
quarters, Marine Corps Top Level School R e f e r e n c e Papers,
Washington: June 1993.
U n i t e d States Marine Corps. "Mobility Requirements Study" Head-
quarters, Marine Corps Top Level School R e f e r e n c e Papers,
Washington: May 1993.
U n i t e d States Marine Corps. "MPF Enhancements". B r i e f i n g Papers, 13
Dec 1993.
U n i t e d States Marine Corps University. Marine Corps C o m m a n d and
Staff College S y m p o s i u m "Maritime P r e p o s i t i o n i n g and A r m y
P r e p o s i t i o n i n g Afloat" Quantico, VA. 19 Jan 1994.
31
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
I I l | i i l l i l l l l l | l !
3 0 7 2 7 0 2 4 4 4 8 8 6