Robert A.

McNeil
4400 Memorial Dr. #1200
Houston, Texas 77007
713-806-5199
October 5, 2007
Mr. Roger Caris
Revenue Officer
Employee #76-42930
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
8701 S. Gessner, STOP5433HAL
Houston, Texas 77074
Subject: Response to Summons Collection Information Statement
Tax Year: 2002
Dear Mr. Caris:
I recently received a document entitled Summons Collection Information Statement, dated
September 19, 2007. The Summons stated that I am required to appear before you on October 5,
2007 to give testimony and to bring for examination certain information for the period August 1,
2007 to present, related to tax period 2002. Attached to the Summons was Form 433-A
Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals. (Please
see Exhibit 1)
The Summons stated that the IRS will use this information to prepare a Collection Information
Statement.
As any prudent person would do, I read the entire document very carefully. I took special notice
of the fact that the Summons was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to me, Robert
A. McNeil, under the authority of the Internal Revenue Code, and was signed in the bottom
portion of the page by you, Roger Caris, Revenue Officer. There was no signature of an
Approving Officer on the Summons, so, I can only conclude that you are operating without
oversight.
I turned the page over and read the Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code on the back,
noting that the authority of the Commissioner to issue the Summons apparently comes from:
Section 7602 Examination of books and witnesses
Section 7603 Service of summons
Section 7604 Enforcement of summons
Section 7605 Time and place of examination
Section 7610 Fees and costs of witnesses
Section 7210 Failure to obey summons
Page 2
A reasonable person would conclude that, since the Summons references Section 76XX as its
source of authority, you are claiming authority to enforce the Summons under Section 7608
Authority of internal revenue enforcement officers.
Based on my research of the following case law, I am required by the U.S. Supreme Court to
know the authority of the agent who is taking such action.
State ex rel McConnell v. First State Bank, 22 Tenn. App. 577, 124 S.W.2d 726, 733 (1938):
Bank insolvency case:
"All personsdealingwithpublicofficersareboundtotakenoticeof thelaw
prescribingtheir authorityandpowers."
Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 113 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1940):
"Public officers aremerelytheagents of thepublic, whosepowers andauthorityare
definedandlimitedbylaw. Anyact without thescopeof theauthoritysodefineddoes
not bind the principal, and all persons dealing with such agents are charged with
knowledgeof theextent of their authority," 113F.2d, at 286.
Section 1132.55 of the Internal Revenue Manual (entitled Criminal Investigation Division)
begins as follows:
The Criminal I nvestigation Division enforces the criminal statutes applicable to
income, estate, gift, employment, and excise tax laws involving United States
citizens residing in foreign countries and nonresident aliens subject to Federal
incometaxfilingrequirements [IRM, Section 1132.55 (1991 Ed.)]
The decision reached in the case of Bothke v. Fluor Engineers and Constructors, Inc. 713 F.2d
1405 (9th Cir. 1983) states in part,
"When andif I RS Personnel arenotifiedtoirregularities, protests, objections, etc., it
is up to theofficer or agent to proveauthority." I f theI RS officer or agent fails to
proveauthoritywhenchallenged, s/hemaybeheldliable, without immunity, if it later
proves that there were in fact, procedural flaws and authority was imposed without
theforceof law.
Per Ryder v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 2031, 132 L.Ed.2d 136, 515 U.S. 177, I am required to
initiate a direct challenge to authority of anyone representing himself or herself as a government
officer or agent prior to the finality of any proceeding in order to avoid implications of de facto
officer doctrine. When challenged, those posing as government officers and agents are
required to affirmatively prove whatever authority they claim. (Emphasis added)
Page 3
In the absence of proof, they may be held personally accountable for loss, injury and damages.
See particularly, the former 26 U.S.C. 7804(b), now published in notes following 7801. Per
26 U.S.C. 7214(a), if and when IRS personnel exceed authority prescribed by law, or fail
to carry out duties imposed by law, they are criminally liable. (Emphasis added)
Putting my research skills to work, I set out to find the implementing regulations for each of the
Sections referenced on the back of the Summons.
As you are probably aware, the Parallel Table of Authorities lists rulemaking authority (except 5
U.S.C. 301) for regulations codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. During my extensive
research, I have learned that each law must have a statute at large AND an implementing
regulation. Otherwise, it is not law, and that is as stated by the U.S. Code and the Supreme Court
of the United States.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/parallel/parallel_table.html
[Code of Federal Regulations]
[Parallel Table]
[Revised as of January 1, 2006]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
PARALLEL TABLE OF AUTHORI TI ESANDRULES
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following table lists rulemaking authority (except 5 U.S.C. 301) for regulations codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations. Also included are statutory citations which are noted as being interpreted or applied by those
regulations.
The table is divided into four segments: United States Code citations, United States Statutes at Large citations,
public law citations, and Presidential document citations. Within each segment, the citations are arranged in
numerical order:
For the United States Code, by title and section;
For the United States Statutes at Large, by volume and page number;
For public laws, by number; and
For Presidential documents (Proclamations, Executive orders, and Reorganization plans), by document number.
Entries in the table are taken directly from the rulemaking authority citation provided by Federal agencies in their
regulations. Federal agencies are responsible for keeping these citations current and accurate. Because Federal
agencies sometimes present these citations in an inconsistent manner, the table cannot be considered all-inclusive.
The portion of the table listing the United States Code citations is the most comprehensive, as these citations are
entered into the table whenever they are given in the authority citations provided by the agencies. United States
Statutes at Large and public law citations are carried in the table only when there are no corresponding United
States
Code citations given.
This table is revised as of January 1, 2006.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Page 4
Just a few minutes of research revealed that the Sections of Title 26, referenced on the Summons,
provide rulemaking authority for the relevant Parts of Title 27, as shown below:
26 U.S.C. (1986 I.R.C.)
7601-760627 Part 70
7602.27 Parts 29, 46, 296
7608.27 Part 70, 296
7610..27 Part 70
Please note that there are no CFR parts for which 26 USC 7210 provides authority, as shown
below.
You can imagine my surprise and confusion when I searched the internet for Title 27 and found
the following:
Source:
http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&rgn=div6&view=text&node=27:2.0.1.4.7.1&idno=27
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
TITLE 27--Alcohol, TobaccoProductsandFirearms
CHAPTER I --ALCOHOL ANDTOBACCOTAX ANDTRADE BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Page 5
I decided to read further, in the hopes that I could see the connection between a Summons for an
alleged tax liability under 26 USC Subtitles A and C Internal Revenue Code, and your claim of
authority to summon me along with my books and records, under 26 USC Section 7608, which
provides rulemaking authority for 27 CFR Part 70 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms.
So, I started at the beginning and clicked on the link to Subpart A Scope, taking note of the
paragraphs related to the issuance of summonses, examination of books and records, entry of
premises, and preparation of returns.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Title 27: Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
PART 70PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION
Subpart AScope
70.1 General.
(a) The regulations in Subparts C, D, and E of this part set forth the procedural and
administrative rules of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau for:
(1) The issuance and enforcement of summonses, examination of books of account and witnesses,
administration of oaths, entry of premises for examination of taxable objects, granting of
rewards for information, canvass of regions for taxable objects and persons, and authority of
TTB officers.
(3) The preparing or executing of returns; deposits; payment on notice and demand;
assessment; abatements, credits and refunds; limitations on assessment; limitations on credit or
refund; periods of limitation in judicial proceedings; interest; additions to tax, additional
amounts, and assessable penalties; enforced collection activities; authority for establishment,
alteration, and distribution of stamps, marks, or labels; jeopardy assessment of alcohol, tobacco,
and firearms taxes, and registration of persons paying a special tax.
[T.D. ATF376, 61 FR 31031, June 19, 1996, as amended by T.D. TTB44, 71 FR 16958, Apr.
4, 2006]
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
As you can see, Subpart A talks solely about matters related to alcohol, tobacco products, and
firearms, therefore, I could find no legal basis for your claim of authority, under 26 USC Section
7608, which provides rulemaking authority for 27 CFR Part 70 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and
Firearms.
In addition, 27 CFR 29 pertains to regulations related to stills, as shown below:
TITLE 27--Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms
CHAPTER I--ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU,
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
SUBCHAPTER A--LIQUORS
PART 29--STILLS AND MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS
Page 6
Further research revealed that 27 CFR 46 provides regulations for the following activity:
TITLE 27--Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms
CHAPTER I--ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU,
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
SUBCHAPTER B--TOBACCO
PART 46--MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS RELATING TO TOBACCO
PRODUCTS AND CIGARETTE PAPERS AND TUBES
Finally, to add to the confusion, Section 7602 entitled Examination of books and records,
Paragraph (a) entitled Authority to Summon, talks about determining the liability of any
person for any internal revenue tax. The phrase any internal revenue tax suggests that there
might be more than one.
In fact, on the bottom left of the Summons, it states Authority to examine books and witnesses
is also provided under sec. 6420(e)(2)-Gasoline used on farms; sec 6421(g)(2) Gasoline used for
certain nonhighway purposes by local transit systems, or sold for certain exempt purposes; and
sec. 6427(j)(2)-Fuels not used for taxable purposes.
So, in my mind, the Summons fails to clearly state either a) the internal revenue tax that the IRS
claims I am liable for, or; b) the section of the U.S. Code for which you claim authority to issue
the Summons.
If I have erred in my research and you claim authority under a different Section of the U. S.
Code, or Commissioners Delegation Order (CDO), or Treasury Delegation Order (TDO), you
will have the opportunity to clarify that point in your response to the Affidavit of Authority,
attached to this letter as Exhibit 2.
Until I receive the completed Affidavit from you, I offer this response to the Summons:
I, Robert A. McNeil, state, unequivocally, that I have not now, nor have I ever been,
engaged in any activity related to alcohol, tobacco products, or firearms; or gasoline used
on farms; or gasoline used for certain nonhighway purposes by local transit systems, or
sold for certain exempt purposes; or fuels not used for taxable purposes.. Therefore, I
have no documents responsive to the Summons.
In fact, I have no income subject to any income tax law, and the IRS knows it. I say this with
certainty because I have served notice to the IRS, on numerous occasions, of the following court
cases supporting my position:
Butcher's Union vs. Cresent City, 111 US 746, 756 (1884)
Pollock vs. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 US 429, 629 (1895)
Flint vs. Stone Tracy, 220 US 107, 151 - 152 (1911)
U.S. vs. Whitridge, 231 US 144, 147 (1913)
Page 7
Stratton's Independence, 231 US 399, 417 (1913)
Merchants Loan & Trust Co. vs. Smietanka, 255 US 509, 518 - 519 (1921)
Brushaber vs. Union Pacific, 240 US 1, 12 (1916)
Stanton vs. Baltic Mining Co., 240 US 103, 112 -114 (1916)
Doyle vs. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 183 (1918)
Peck vs. Lowe, 247 US 165, 173 (1918)
Southern Pacific vs. Lowe, 247 US 330, 335 (1918)
Evans vs. Gore, 253 US 245, 263 (1920)
Eisner vs. Macomber, 252 US 189, 205 - 206 (1920)
Bowers vs. Kerbaugh-Empire, 271 US 170, 174 (1926)
Jerome H. Sheip Co. vs. Amos, 100 Fla. 863, 130 So. 699, 705 (1930)
Redfield vs. Fisher, 135 Or. 180, 292 P. 813, 819 (Ore. 1930)
Helvering vs. Edison Brothers, 8th Cir. 133 F2d 575 (1943)
U.S. vs. Ballard, 535 F2d 400 (1976)
Further information regarding these cases can be found in Exhibit 3 attached.
It should be noted that the IRS consistent response to legal arguments based on these cases is to
refer to them as frivolous and to contend that they have no basis in law. When challenged in
court, however, the U.S. Attorneys consistently cite U.S. Tax Court cases and unpublished lower
court decisions to refute the U.S. Supreme Court cases, in clear violation of stare decisis, the
doctrine of precedence under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same
points arise again in litigation.
Which leads me to the subject of Constructive Notice:
ConstructiveNotice: Noticearisingbypresumption of lawfromtheexistenceof facts
andcircumstances that a partyhada dutytotakenoticeof... noticepresumedbylaw
to have been acquired by a person and thus imputed to that person. (Black's Law
Dictionary, SeventhEdition)
Constructive Notice serves to inform a party of the existence of facts and circumstances that a
party had duty to take notice of. It also serves to deny the informed party the defense that he/she
had no knowledge of the facts and circumstances relevant to the issues at hand.
Which leads me to the subject of fraud:
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED of the definition of the word fraud:
A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to
induce another to act to his or her detriment. Blacks Law Dictionary ~ Third
Pocket Edition ~ 2006, page 300.
Page 8
Further,
Fraud: Deceit, deception, artifice, or trickery operating prejudicially on the rights of
another, and so intended, by inducing himto part with property or surrender some legal
right. 23 AmJ 2d Fraud 2. Anything calculated to deceive another to his prejudice and
accomplishingthepurpose, whether it beanact, aword, silence, thesuppressionof thetruth,
or other device contrary to the plain rules of common honesty. 23 AmJ 2d Fraud 2. An
affirmation of a fact rather than a promise or statement of intent to do something in the
future. McI nnesvSutliff, 241111521, 89NE 651.
Morrison v. Coddington, 662 P. 2d. 155, 135 Ariz. 480(1983). Fraud and deceit may
arise from silence where there is a duty to speak the truth, as well as fromspeaking an
untruth.
McNallyv. U.S., 483 U.S. 350, 371-372, QuotingU.S. v Holzer, 816 F.2d. 304, 307:
Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit includes the deliberate
concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public
official is a fiduciary toward the public, and if he deliberately conceals material
informationfromthemheisguiltyof fraud.
It is well established in American jurisprudence that:
Frauddestroysthevalidityof everythingintowhich it enters, Nuddv. Burrows, 91
U.S 426; Fraud vitiates everything, Boycev. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210; Fraud vitiates
themost solemn contracts, documents and even judgments, U.S. v. Throckmorton,
98 U.S. 61.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED that, without proper authority, the Summons issued by the
Commissioner, through you, is fraudulent and, therefore, null and void.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED that it is fraud for an IRS agent to impersonate a criminal
investigator of the Intelligence Division, and fraud vitiates everything that it enters into,
including this summons. In your response to the Affidavit of Authority, you will be required to
provide evidence of your authority to act as a criminal investigator in the Intelligence Division.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED of the following case law related to the search and seizure of
private books and papers:
BOYD v. U S, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886): "The search for and seizure of stolen or
forfeitedgoods, or goods liabletoduties andconcealedto avoidthepayment thereof,
aretotallydifferent thingsfromasearchfor andseizureof aman'sprivatebooksand
papers for thepurposeof obtaininginformation therein contained, or of usingthem
as evidence against him. The two things differ toto coelo. I n the one case, the
government is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not."
"Papersaretheowner's goodsandchattels; theyarehis dearest property, andareso
far fromenduringaseizure, that theywill hardlybear an inspection; andthough the
eyecannot bythelawsof Englandbeguiltyof atrespass, yet whereprivatepapersare
Page 9
removed and erried away thesecret natureof thosegoods will bean aggravation of
thetrespass, and demand moreconsiderabledamages in that respect. Whereis the
written law that gives any magistrate such a power? I can safely answer, there is
none; and therefore it is too much for us, without such authority, to pronounce a
practicelegal whichwouldbesubversiveof all thecomfortsof society.", at 628.
It appears, therefore, that there is no written law giving you the power to search for and
seize my personal books and records.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED of the following U.S. Supreme Court case, setting forth the
essential elements of tax evasion and willful failure to file, which the Government is required to
prove:
CHEEK v. UNITED STATES, 498 U.S. 192 (1991): Willfulness, asconstruedbyour
prior decisions in criminal tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the (1)
lawimposedadutyonthedefendant, (2) that thedefendant knewof thisduty, and(3)
that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty." There are three essential
elements to the crime of tax evasion, namely (1) willfulness; (2) existence of a tax
deficiency; and(3) an affirmativeact constitutingan evasion or attemptedevasion of
thetax. Sansonev. UnitedStates, 380U.S. 343, at 351, 85S.Ct. 1004, at 1010(1965);
UnitedStatesv. Bishop, 264F.3d535(5thCir. 2001); UnitedStatesv. Dack, 747F.2d
1172, at 1174(7thCir. 1984); andUnitedStatesv. Mal, 942F.2d682, at 687(9thCir.
1991); United States v. Silkman, 156 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Lawn v.
UnitedStates, 355U.S. 339, at 361, 78S.Ct. 311(1958.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED of the recent case against Tommy K. Cryer (Case #06-
50164-01), involving tax evasion and willful failure to file. After two years of investigation and
preparation, the Department of Justice attorneys withdrew the felony tax evasion charges at the
start of the trial. In addition, the attorneys could not provide the law that made the defendant
liable for the Federal Income Tax. As a result, Mr. Cryer was acquitted by the jury of the
charges of willful failure to file. This case was decided on July 13, 2007. (Please see Exhibit 4)
UnitedStatesv. TommyK. Cryer
No. 06-50164-01
WesternDistrict of Louisiana
Shreveport Division
Apparently, Mr. Cryer did a good job of explaining to the jury what he read in the Brushaber,
Stanton, and Eisner Supreme Court cases about the legal meaning of the word "income" and
what he read in the Internal Revenue Code - everything but the law that required him to file. He
had asked the IRS to show him the law that made him liable, but the IRS did not respond.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED of the numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases prohibiting a
direct tax on the citizens of the United States without apportionment according to the census, as
set forth in Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 and Article I, Section 9, Clause 4. (Please see Exhibit
3)
Page 10
In the Tommy Cryer case, as well as others, the Department of Justice attorneys committed fraud
by claiming that these Supreme Court cases had been overturned by Tax Court cases and by
unpublished decisions.
In truth, these Supreme Court cases have never been overturned and support the fact that Article
I, Section 2, Clause 3 and Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution remain in full effect
today.
These clauses are stated below:
Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3: Representatives anddirect Taxes shall beapportionedamong
the several states which may be included in this Union, according to their respective
Numbers..
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4: NoCapitation, or other direct, Taxshall belaid, unlessin
ProportiontotheCensusor enumerationhereinbeforedirectedtobetaken.
The conclusion to be reached by this discussion is that there is no law requiring me or any
other U.S. citizen to file a tax return or pay Federal Income Taxes.
If you have knowledge of such a law, you will have the opportunity to state it in the Affidavit of
Authority.
Which brings me to the following:
My first contact from the IRS for an alleged tax liability occurred when I received a Proposed
Individual Income Tax Assessment for the tax year 2002. That document was dated July 25,
2005. Over the next 18 months, I repeatedly provided the IRS with evidence that I did not have
a tax liability for 2002, or any other year.
My first contact with you was your letter to me on February 9, 2007, informing me that you were
in the process of gathering information from various third parties related to unfiled returns.
Since that time, you have taken the following actions:
Refused to acknowledge the U. S. Supreme Court cases cited;
Refused twice to fill out and return the Affidavit of Authority (even going so far as to
detach the Affidavit from my original letter and mailing it back to me, staple holes and
all);
Refused to provide me with a list of all persons contacted by any employee, contractor,
agent, officer, or other representative of the Internal Revenue Service, along with the
name(s) and employee number(s) of any employee(s), contractor(s), agent(s), officer(s)
or other representative(s) of the Internal Revenue Service who contacted them, as I
requested in my letter dated March 16, 2007;
Placed Federal Tax Liens on my assets;
Confiscated $1,358.76 from my bank accounts;
Caused me to incur $136.00 in insufficient funds charges, as a result of the confiscation
of my funds;
Page 11
Threatened and intimidated my clients, causing them to remit $18,937.71 to the
Department of Treasury for a tax liability that I do not owe;
As a direct result of your threats, at least one client has refused to engage me for any
future projects, thereby depriving me of my most basic right.. the right to contract and
work where and for whom I choose.
Butcher's Union vs. Crescent City, 111 US 746, 756 (1884) "I t hasbeen well
said that the property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the
original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and
inviolable.";
Murdock vs. Com. of Penn., 319 US 105, at 113; 63 S Ct at 875; 87 L Ed at
1298 (1943): A statemaynot imposeachargefor theenjoyment of aright
grantedbytheFederal Constitution.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED that your actions have damaged my standing in the business
community, are in violation of the U. S. Constitution, and show a total disregard for the Supreme
Court rulings cited. As a result, you have subjected yourself to prosecution for multiple counts
of provable fraud.
Sadly, your refusal to provide evidence of your authority, or to respond to the issues raised in my
letters, is consistent with the actions of other IRS employees, as well, as shown below:
Jan Sinclair, Operations Manager, Automatic Substitute For Return (ASFR),
Holtsville, New York, who refused to provide evidence of authority or respond to the
issues raised in my letters dated August 25, 2005 and January 21, 2006.
Scott Prentky, Field Director, Compliance Services, Ogden, Utah, who, in effect,
referred to the U.S. Constitution and Supreme Court rulings as frivolous and
refused to respond to the issues raised in my letter dated August 25, 2005.
Larry Leder, Operations Manager, Automated Collection System (ACS), Bensalem,
Pennsylvania, who refused to provide evidence of authority or respond to the issues
raised in my letter dated September 13, 2006.
Mary Hannah, Operations Manager, Automated Collection System (ACS), Bensalem,
Pennsylvania, who refused to provide evidence of authority or respond to the issues
raised in my letter dated February 12, 2007.
Theresa Harley, Operations Manager, Collection, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, who
refused to provide evidence of authority or respond to the issues raised in my letter
dated February 12, 2007.
The silence and evasion exhibited by you and the above-referenced IRS employees clearly
demonstrates a pattern of bad faith dealing, and occurred in spite of the fact that I served notice
to all parties of relevant case law which requires me to know the authority of the agent who is
taking such action:
Based on your actions over the past several months, including the issuance of this Summons, I
can only conclude that you are contemplating further unlawful acts against me.
Page 12
Proceed as you will, Mr. Caris, but, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED that I intend to
vigorously defend myself as a Pro Se litigant and will exercise all of my rights under the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the numerous Supreme
Court cases I have cited, as well as Miranda (MIRANDA v. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436 1966).
Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Amendment VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.
Finally, I hereby demand that you fill out and return the attached Affidavit of Authority
(Exhibit 2) to me by Certified Mail within 10 calendar days of the date of this letter. This
Affidavit will serve as proof of your authority under the laws of this country to take any action
against me.
Exhibit 1
Summons Collection Information Statement
Exhibit 2
Affidavit of Authority
Please fill out the following Affidavit and return by certified mail to Robert A. McNeil
within 10 days. You may fill out only those items that you are prepared to swear to or
affirm. You may refuse certain items by drawing a line through the items and initialing
those items in the margin.
Please be notified that if you refuse to swear to or affirm any of the listed items, relying on
your 5
th
amendment rights of not being compelled to testify against yourself, that such
refusal shall be the equivalent of standing mute and the court will be forced to make its
determinations based on the sworn testimony and evidence provided by Robert A. McNeil.
Affidavit of Authority
I am an authorized representative of the Internal Revenue Service.
1) I understand that Robert A. McNeil is a citizen of Texas and the United States and
is not engaged in a corporate activity and is not liable for the income tax under the
corporate income (excise) tax and does not have earnings from foreign sources.
2) Robert A. McNeil is liable for the individual income tax, that is a direct tax on his
property, levied without the Apportionment provision of the U.S. Constitution.
3) IRC section 7608 or section _________ authorizes agents with my title to perform
collection actions under subtitle A and C.
4) I certify that I am duly delegated to issue Notices of Lien and Levy by Delegation
Order number ____________ from the Secretary.
5) My delegation orders from the Secretary to perform collection actions under IRC
Section 6331 are listed in delegation order number(s) ________________.
6) I am authorized to take collection actions against Robert A. McNeil, under the
authority of the 16
th
Amendment without the constitutional requirements of
Apportionment. I understand that Robert A. McNeil is not operating as a corporate
entity and has not received taxable income under the definition of income in the
16
th
Amendment, as stated by U.S. Supreme Court rulings.
7) The Internal Revenue Service has the lawful authority under subtitle A to require
Robert A. McNeil to file 1040s and require him to include his sources of income as if
those sources were income defined by the U.S. Supreme Court.
8) The Internal Revenue Service has the lawful authority to require Robert A. McNeil
to file form 1040s under penalty of perjury for any and all years in question and this
would not violate Robert A. McNeils Constitutional protections.
9) Our lawful authority to impose an individual direct tax without Apportionment,
that makes Robert A. McNeil liable for the individual income tax, is the Internal
Revenue Code, section _______, paragraph(s) ________, and regulation number
___________, paragraph ________ of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26.
10) I further certify that the IRS is acting under all lawful and correct collection
procedures.
I declare under the penalty of perjury and under the laws of the United States that the foregoing
is true and correct, except for items that I have crossed out and initialed.
Signed _______________________________ Date: ___________________
Printed Name of Agent __________________________________________
Agents Employee Number ______________________
Agents Title ________________________
Agents IRS Division Name _______________________________
Witness Signature and Printed Name _________________________________
The State of Texas
County of _________________________
Before me, a Notary Public, on this day personally appeared_____________________________, known to me (or
proved to me on the oath of__________________________) to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
forgoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for the purpose and consideration therein
expressed.
Given under my hand and seal of office this _______day of _________________ A.D. 20_______
________________________________________
Notary Public, State of Texas
________________________________________
(Print name of Notary Public here)
My commission expires the______ day of____________________20______
Notice of Non-Compliance
Notice is hereby given that if you fail to produce this affidavit, signed by an authorized
agent, your failure to do so shall be construed as prima facie evidence that there is no agent
in your department or agency who is authorized to take collection actions under IRC
section 6331, or subtitle A or C, or under Title 26 and shall create the legal presumption or
conclusion that you have been taking illegal collection actions against Robert A. McNeil,
while acting under color of law and are engaged in an extortion and fraud scheme
against Robert A. McNeil.
Important footnotes follow;
In Federal CropI nsurancev. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, the Supreme Court ruled:
Whatever the form in which the government functions, anyone entering into an
arrangement with the government takes a risk of having accurately ascertained that he
who purports to act for the government stays within the bounds of his authority, even
though the agent himself may be unaware of the limitations upon his authority. Also
see Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389; United States v. Stewart,
311 U.S. 60; and generally, in re Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666.
Federal TradeCommissionv. RaladamCo., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587 (1931):
"Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and necessary implications of
the grant. If broader powers be desirable, they must be conferred by Congress. They
cannot be merely assumed by administrative officers; nor can they be created by the
courts in the proper exercise of their judicial functions," 283 U.S., at 649.
Stateexrel McConnell v. First StateBank, 22 Tenn. App. 577, 124 S.W.2d 726, 733 (1938):
"All persons dealing with public officers are bound to take notice of the law prescribing
their authority and powers."
Continental CasualtyCo. v. UnitedStates, 113 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1940):
"Public officers are merely the agents of the public, whose powers and authority are
defined and limited by law. Any act without the scope of the authority so defined does
not bind the principal, and all persons dealing with such agents are charged with
knowledge of the extent of their authority," 113 F.2d, at 286.
Exhibit 3
The U.S. Constitution and the 16
th
Amendment
The Constitution of the United States prohibits a direct un-apportioned tax in two places: Article
1, Section2, Clause3and Article1, Section9, Clause4.
Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3: Representativeand direct Taxes shall beapportioned among
the several states which may be included in this Union, according to their respective
Numbers..
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4: NoCapitation, or other direct, Taxshall belaid, unlessin
ProportiontotheCensusor enumerationhereinbeforedirectedtobetaken.
This prohibition against a direct un-apportioned tax remains in full force and effect today.
16
th
Amendment (Passed by Congress July 2, 1909. Ratified February 3, 1913): TheCongress
shall havepower tolayandcollect taxesonincomes, fromwhatever sourcederived, without
apportionment amongtheseveral States, andwithout regardtoanycensusor enumeration.
The Internal Revenue Service falsely states that the Constitution and the 16th Amendment
authorize a tax on every individual. The following cases show that such claim is false and
fraudulent.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. COM. OF MASSACHUSETTS, 37 U.S. 657 (1838): "The
government of theUnitedStatesmay, therefore, exerciseall, but nomorethan all thejudicial
power providedfor it bytheconstitution." 37US657, 672. (Underline emphasis)
Murdock vs. Com. of Penn., 319 US 105, at 113; 63 S Ct at 875; 87 L Ed at 1298 (1943): A
state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal
Constitution.
Nothing can be clearer than that what the constitution intended to guard against was the
exercisebythegeneral government of thepower of directlytaxingpersonsandpropertywithin
any statethrough a majority madeup fromtheother states. Pollock vs. Farmers Loan and
Trust Co. on original intent, 157 US 429, 582 (1895).
Brushaber vs. Union Pacific, 240 US 1, 12 (1916), on original intent, "... the all embracing
character of thetwo great classifications, including, on theonehand, Direct Taxes subject to
apportionment, and on theother, excises, duties, and imposts subject to uniformity, held the
lawtobeunconstitutional insubstancefor thesereasons: concludingthat theclassificationof
Direct was adopted for the purpose of rendering it impossible to burden by taxation
accumulationsof property, real or personal, except subject totheregulationof apportionment,
..." (Underline emphasis)
10th Amendment to the Constitution states: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the People."
Pollock vs. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 US 429, 629 (1895): "Excise' isdefinedtobean
inland imposition, sometimes upon the consumption of the commodity, and sometimes upon
theretail sale; sometimesuponthemanufacturer, andsometimesuponthevendor.
Knowlton vs. Moore, 178 US 41, 47 (1900): "Direct Taxesbear uponpersons, uponpossession
andtheenjoyment of rights";
FLINT v STONE TRACY, 220 US 107, 151 - 152 (1911): Duties and imposts are terms
commonly applied to levies made by governments on the importation or exportation of
commodities. Excises are 'taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale, or consumption of
commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations, and upon
corporateprivileges.' Cooley, Const. Lim. 7thed. 680. (Underline emphasis)
Thus, inthematter of taxation, theconstitution recognizesthetwogreat classesof direct and
indirect taxes, and lays down two rules bywhich their imposition must begoverned, namely,
theruleof apportionment as to direct taxes, and theruleof uniformityas to duties, imposts,
andexcises. Pollock, 157 US 429, 556 (1895);
The Code of Federal Regulations cites direct and indirect taxes in 19 CFR 351.102 Definitions.
Direct tax. ``Direct tax'' meansatax on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, andall other
formsof income, ataxontheownershipof real property, or asocial welfarecharge.
I ndirect tax. ``I ndirect tax'' means a sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp,
transfer, inventory, or equipment tax, aborder tax, or anyother tax other than a direct tax or
animport charge.
See above Brushaber vs. Union Pacific, 240 US 1, 12 (1916), on original intent.
U.S. vs. Whitridge, 231 US 144, 147 (1913): "As repeatedly pointed out by this court, the
corporation tax lawof 1909... imposed an exciseor privilegetax, and not in any sensea tax
uponpropertyor uponincomemerelyasincome.";
MERCHANTS LOAN & TRUST CO. v SMIETANKA, 255 US 509, 518 - 519 (1921): The
Corporation ExciseTax Act of August 5, 1909, wasnot an incometax law, but adefinition of
the word income was so necessary in its administration I t is obvious that these
decisions in principlerulethecaseat bar if theword income has thesamemeaning in the
I ncomeTaxAct of 1913that it hadintheCorporationExciseTaxAct of 1909, andthat it has
thesamescopeof meaningwas in effect decidedin Southern Pacific vLowe, whereit was
assumedfor thepurposeof decisionthat therewasnodifferencein itsmeaningasusedinthe
act of 1909andin theI ncomeTax Act of 1913. Therecan beno doubt that thewordmust be
given thesamemeaningandcontent in theI ncomeTax Acts of 1916and1917that it hadin
theact of 1913. When weaddto this, Eisner v Macomberthedefinition of income which
was applied was adopted fromStrattons I ndependence v Howbert, supra, arising under the
Corporation ExciseTaxAct of 1909 therewouldseemtobenoroomtodoubt that theword
must begiventhesamemeaninginall theI ncomeTaxActsof Congressthat wasgiventoit in
the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely
settledbydecisionsof thisCourt. (Underline emphasis)
EISNER v MACOMBER, 252 US 189, 205 - 206 (1920): The 16
th
Amendment must be
construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect
attributedtothembeforetheamendment wasadopted.
Asrepeatedlyheld, thisdidnot extendthetaxingpower tonewsubjects
it becomesessential todistinguishbetweenwhat isandisnot income, asthetermisthere
used..
we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the
CorporationTaxAct of 1909(StrattonsandDoyle)
SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. v. LOWE, 247 U.S. 330, 335 (1918): "Wemust reject in thiscase,
aswehaverejectedin casesarisingunder theCorporation ExciseTax Act of 1909, thebroad
contention submitted on behalf of thegovernment that all receipts, everything that comes in,
are income within the proper definition of the term 'gross income'. Certainly the term
'income' hasnobroader meaningintheI ncomeTaxAct of 1913thanin that of 1909, andfor
thepresent purposeweassumethereisnodifferenceinitsmeaningasusedinthetwoacts."
FLINT v. STONE TRACY CO., 220 U.S. 107, 162 (1911): I nthecaseat bar wehavealready
discussed thelimitations which the Constitution imposes upon theright to levy excise taxes,
andit couldnot besaid, even if theprinciples of the14th Amendment wereapplicableto the
present case, that thereisnosubstantial differencebetweenthecarryingon of businessbythe
corporations taxed, and the same business when conducted by a private firmor individual.
Thethingtaxedisnot themeredealingin merchandise, in which theactual transactionsmay
be the same, whether conducted by individuals or corporations, but the tax is laid upon the
privileges which exist in conducting business with the advantages which inhere in the
corporatecapacityof thosetaxed, andwhich arenot enjoyedbyprivatefirmsor individuals.
(Underline emphasis)
Stratton's Independence, 231 US 399, 417 (1913): EvidentlyCongress adopted theincomeas
themeasureof thetax to beimposed with respect to thedoing of business in corporateform
becauseit desiredthat theexciseshouldbeimposed, approximatelyat least, withregardtothe
amount of benefit presumablyderivedbysuchcorporationsfromthecurrent operationsof the
government. I n Flint v. StoneTracyCo. 220U.S. 107, 165, 55S. L. ed. 107, 419, 31Sup. Ct.
Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912B. 1312, it was held that Congress, in exercising theright to tax a
legitimatesubject of taxationasafranchise[231U.S. 399, 417] or privilege, wasnot debarred
bytheConstitution frommeasuringthetaxation bythetotal income, although derivedin part
frompropertywhich, consideredbyitself, wasnot taxable. (Underline emphasis);
Sims v. Ahrens et al., 271 SW Reporter at 730: I ncomeis necessarilytheproduct of thejoint
efforts of the state and the recipient of the income, the state furnishing the protection
necessarytoenabletherecipient toproduce, receive, andenjoyit, andataxthereoninthelast
analysis is simplya portion cut fromtheincomeandappropriatedbythestateasits share
(Underline emphasis)
Redfield v. Fisher, 135 Or. 180, 292 P. 813, 819 (Ore. 1930): "The individual, unlike the
corporation, cannot betaxedfor themereprivilegeof existing. Thecorporationisanartificial
entity which owes its existenceand charter powers to thestate; but the individual's rights to
live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be
imposed." (Underline emphasis)
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 183 (1918): "An examination of these and other
provisions of theAct (Corporation ExciseTax Act of August 5, 1909) makeit plain that the
legislativepurposewas not to tax propertyas such, or themereconversion of property, but to
tax theconduct of thebusiness of corporations organizedfor profit upon thegainful returns
fromtheir businessoperations." (Underline emphasis)
STANTON v BALTIC MINING CO., 240 US 103, 112 -114 (1916): Not being within the
authorityof the16
th
Amendment, thetax is therefore, within theruling of Pollack a direct
tax and void for want of compliance with the regulation of apportionment.; (Underline
emphasis)
STANTON v BALTIC MINING CO., 240 US 103, 112 -114 (1916): it was settled in
Strattons I ndependence that such tax is not a tax upon property but a trueexciselevied
ontheresult of thebusiness... (Underline emphasis);
Jerome H. Sheip Co. v. Amos, 100 Fla. 863, 130 So. 699, 705 (1930): "A man is free to lay
handupon hisown property. Toacquireandpossesspropertyisaright, not aprivilege... The
right to acquireand possess property cannot alonebemadethesubject of an excise .... nor,
generallyspeaking, can an excisebelaidupon themereright to possess thefruits thereof, as
that right isthechief attributeof ownership." (Underline emphasis);
U.S. v. BALLARD, 535 F2d 400 (1976): Gross income and not gross receipts is the
foundationof incometaxliability At 404, Thegeneral termincome isnot definedinthe
I nternal Revenue Code. At 404, gross income means the total sales, less the cost of
goods sold, plus any income frominvestments and fromincidental or outside operations or
sources.
Doyle vs. Mitchell, 247 US 179, at 183, at 185 (1918): "Whatever difficultytheremaybeabout
a precise and scientific definition of 'income"; it imports, as used here, something entirely
distinct fromprincipal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax;
conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising fromcorporate activities." (Underline
emphasis);
Evans vs. Gore, 253 US 245, 263 (1920); "... It manifestly disregards the fact that by the
previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new
power of taxation." (Underline emphasis);
Brushaber vs. Union Pacific, 240 US 1, 12 (1916), "... the whole purpose of the Amendment
wastorelieveall incometaxeswhen imposedfromapportionment fromaconsiderationof the
source..." and on thecontraryshows that it was drawn with theobject of maintainingthe
limitationsof theConstitutionandharmonizingtheir operation. (Underline emphasis);
Peck vs. Lowe, 247 US 165, 173 (1918); "TheSixteenth Amendment, although referredto in
argument, hasnoreal bearingandmaybeput out of view. Aspointedout inrecent decisions,
it doesnot extendthetaxingpower tonewor exceptedsubjects (Underline emphasis)
Bowers vs. Kerbaugh-Empire, 271 US 170, 174 (1926), "I t wasnot thepurposeor effect of that
Amendment tobringanynewsubject withinthetaxingpower." (Underline emphasis);
Helvering vs. Edison Brothers, 8th Cir. 133 F2d 575 (1943); "The Treasury cannot by
interpretive regulation make income of that which is not income within the meaning of the
revenue acts of Congress, nor can Congress, without apportionment, tax that which is not
incomewithinthemeaningof the16thAmendment.";
Also see Southern Pacific vs. Lowe, 247 US 330, 335 (1918); Butcher's Union vs. Cresent City,
111 US 746, 756 (1884) "I t has been well said that thepropertywhich every man has in his
own labor, as it is theoriginal foundation of all other property, so it is themost sacred and
inviolable.";
Pollack, 157 US 429, 556, 573, 582, and 436-441 (1895), No capitation, or other direct, tax
shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census. And, As to the states and their
municipalities, this (contributions to expense of government) is reached largely through the
imposition of direct taxes. As to thefederal government, it is attainedin part through excises
andindirect taxes upon luxuries andconsumption generally, to which direct taxation maybe
addedtotheextent theruleof apportionment allows.;
Flint vs. Stone Tracy, 220 US 107, 161, 165 (1911); Coppage vs. State of Kansas, 236 US 1, 23-
24 (1915), Thecourt heldit unconstitutional, saying: 'Theright tofollowanylawful vocation
andtomakecontractsisascompletelywithin theprotection of theConstitutionastheright to
hold property free fromunwarranted seizure, or the liberty to go when and where one will.
Oneof theways of obtainingpropertyis bycontract. Theright, therefore, to contract cannot
beinfringedbythelegislaturewithout violatingtheletter andspirit of theConstitution. Every
citizenisprotectedinhisright towork whereandfor whomhewill. Hemayselect not onlyhis
employer, but alsohisassociates.(Underline emphasis);
Truax vs. Corrigan, 257 US 312, 348 (1921); That theright toconduct alawful business, and
therebyacquirepecuniaryprofits, isproperty, isindisputable.
Meyer vs. State of Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399 (1923); Without doubt, it denotes not merely
freedomfrombodilyrestraint but also theright of theindividual tocontract, toengagein any
of thecommonoccupationsof life..."
Sims vs. Ahrens, 167 Ark. 557; 271 S.W. 720, 730-733 (1925), "Thelegislaturehas no power
to declare as a privilege and tax for revenue purposes, occupations that are of common
right..." (Underline emphasis);
Taft vs. Bowers, 278 US 470, 481 (1929); Under former decisions herethesettleddoctrineis
that theSixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to defineand tax as income
without apportionment somethingwhich theretoforecouldnot havebeen properlyregardedas
income.;
Jack Cole vs. MacFarland, 337 S.W. 2d 453, 455-56 (Tenn. 1960), "Realizing and receiving
incomeor earningsisnot aprivilegethat can betaxed." ... "Sincetheright toreceiveincome
or earnings is a right belonging to every person. This right cannot be taxed as a privilege."
(Underline emphasis)
Exhibit 4
Shreveport Times
July 13, 2007
Tommy Cryer
Case #06-50164-01