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THE EVOLUTION OF JEWISH TERRORISM

Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger
INTRODUCTION
In his highly acclaimed article: The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism,
1

David Rapoport portrayed the trajectory of the phenomenon of terrorism since the late nineteenth
century, while highlighting its undulating nature. As his main criteria for identifying each wave
of terrorism, Rapoport chose the ideology and objectives of the terrorists. This led him to
introduce a chronological typology that consists of four waves: anarchist (1880s-1920s),
anticolonial (1920s-1960s), leftwing (1960s-1970s) and religious (1970s-present). Rapoports
objective was to find an organizing principle for a century-long global phenomenon rather than
to focus on particular periods or regions. Indeed, we will argue that Jewish terrorism in Palestine
and later in Israel consists of only two periods: nationalist (1930s-1950s), which corresponds
with the anti-colonial wave, and its derivative, the nationalist-religious (1970s-present) which
overlaps with the religious wave.
2
Yet we find Rapoports framework highly appealing due to
the fact that the two missing waves, both of which were leftwing revolutionary, had a
tremendous impact on political and social processes in Israel in general, and on the evolution of
Jewish terrorism in particular. Hence, rather than focusing exclusively on the evolution of Jewish
terrorism we will place it in the broader comparative context that Rapoports framework
provides.
For many centuries Jews constituted a religious and ethnic minority group in predominantly
Christian and Islamic societies. Ceaseless outbreaks of anti-Semitic persecutions along with
lasting institutionalized discrimination forced Jewish communities to develop sharp survival
instincts. As a result, Jews generally refrained from taking part in activities that had the potential
of directing the wrath of the authorities against their communities.
3
Religion, which some
scholars consider to be the prevailing source of violence and terrorism,
4
served the opposite
purpose for Jews in the Diaspora. The religious ruling of Dina Demalchuta Dina (the law of the
land is the law) enabled the victimized minority to reconcile the differences between the Halakha
(the Jewish religious law) and the law of the state.
5
It is nonetheless important to note that
Judaism never advocated pacifism. Ancient Jewish history was clouded by excessive violence.
6

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Interestingly, Jewish violence and terrorism both early and contemporary is closely correlated
with one particular territory Palestine or Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel).
CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR THE JEWS
The late nineteenth century was a time of significant global upheaval that inter alia was
manifested in the first wave of terrorism. Indirectly, the first wave turned into a critical juncture
in the history of the Jewish people. One of the most prominent agents of the anarchist wave was
Narodnaya Volya, the anti-Tsarist group that is mostly known for the assassination of Tsar
Alexander the Second.
7
At the time of the assassination, Russia was experiencing a tide of anti-
Semitism as the Jews served as an ideal scapegoat. A local pogrom that took place a month after
the assassination in the city of Kirovohrad quickly turned into a tide of attacks against Jewish
communities all over the Pale of Settlement.
8
Despite its Socialist leanings and the fact that
several of its activists were of Jewish descent, members of Narodnaya Volya took an active role
in the pogroms that were initiated by the authorities. Their decision to participate in the riots was
justified by their commitment to represent the will of the Russian people. The year-long wave of
violence was followed by the May Laws of 1882 (aka Temporary Regulations Regarding the
Jews) which were enacted by Tsar Alexander the Third. The regulations that posed severe
limitations on the Jews freedoms of movement and occupation led to mass emigration of Jews
from Russia, mostly to North America. They also expedited the consolidation of Jewish
nationalism. The most significant essay of the time was Auto-Emancipation by Leon Pinsker,
in which he advocated the idea of self-determination for the Jewish people in their ancient
homeland.
9

While only three percent of the refugees arrived in Palestine and many of them left shortly after
their arrival, they are considered the first wave of immigrants who were motivated by Jewish
nationalism (Zionism).
10
Most of the immigrants settled in the cities,
11
while a minority decided
to settle in rural areas and become farmers.
12
The scattering of new Jewish settlements in
predominantly Arab areas generated friction. Initially, most of the conflicts revolved around
scarce resources such as land and water. Damage to the properties and crops of the struggling
Jewish farmers became routine.
13
Moreover, the authorities of the decaying Ottoman empire
were unwilling to provide the immigrants with adequate protection. The void generated a
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noteworthy debate among the Jewish settlers. Some farmers believed that they should dedicate
all their energy to cultivating their farms. Thus, they chose to outsource the protection of their
colonies to Arab sub-contractors. This approach however lost much of its relevance once the
clashes assumed an ethnic and religious nature.
The first organized Jewish defense groups in Palestine Bar Giora
14
and its successor,
Hashomer (The Watchman) were established by Socialist immigrants of the Second Aliyah
who arrived mainly from Russia throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century (1904-
1914). Like their predecessors these immigrants were also traumatized by anti-Semitic violence,
most notably the Kishinev pogrom of 1903. The prominent poet Hayim Nahman Bialik who was
sent to interview the survivors of the pogrom was rattled by their testimonies and subsequently
wrote two influential poems: City of the Killings and The Slaughter.
15
Thus, it was not surprising
that immigrant leaders, most of them members of the Poale Zion (Workers of Zion) party,
argued that it was time for the Jews to establish independent military organizations. The groups
were organized locally and their main designation was to defend Jewish settlements.
16
By the
1920s Hashomer was succeeded by a national body the Haganah (Defense). However, the
organizational transformation was not accompanied by a doctrinal one. Until the mid-1930s the
defensive approach known as Havlagah (Restraint basically focusing on defensive activities
rather than being proactive) was the official policy of the Haganah.
Rapoport identified the 1920s as the point at which the second wave of terrorism appeared on the
global scene and rightfully categorized the Etzel (The National Military Organization in the Land
of Israel aka the Irgun) and the Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel aka the Stern Gang) as
authentic representatives of this second wave.
17
Before we discuss the debut of Jewish terrorism
in Palestine, it is important to note that unlike violent conflicts in other parts of the world during
that period, the Jewish struggle for self-determination in Palestine cannot be characterized as
anti-colonial for two main reasons. First, while both the Etzel and especially the Lehi targeted
British officials (see also Figure 1), Palestine was never part of the British Empire. The League
of Nations gave Britain a temporary mandate over Palestine which was aimed at filling the void
that was left with the collapse of Ottoman rule by the end of the First World War. Furthermore,
one of the main initial objectives of the Mandate was to facilitate the implementation of the
Balfour Declaration of 1917 in which Britain stated its official support for establishing a
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homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine. Second, anti-colonial struggles are generally
associated with uprisings of indigenous populations against foreign rule. The vast majority of the
Jews from the Etzel and the Lehi who struggled for the establishment of the independent State of
Israel, were immigrants while their main opponents, namely, the Palestinians, were natives of the
land.
In late August 1929, 133 Jews were murdered during a pogrom that spread from Jerusalem to
Hebron. The slaughter generated a fierce debate within the ranks of the Haganah. Under the
leadership of Avraham Tehomi, a group of Haganah activists from Jerusalem who had grown
impatient with the policy of restraint split from the organization and formed the Haganah B
which was later renamed Etzel.
18
Although it advocated a militant line and called for decisive
retaliation following Arab attacks against Jews, in its formative years, the activities of the Etzel
did not deviate much from the defensive line of the Haganah.
The outbreak of the Arab Revolt in the spring of 1936 was a turning point for both the Haganah
and the Etzel. Yitzhak Sadeh, the Haganah senior strategist came to the conclusion that the static
defensive doctrine was no longer effective. Thus, he assembled a group of young men and
formed Nodedet (Mobile Force). While the main objective of the new unit was defending Jewish
civilians, the unit adhered to the notion that the best defense is an effective offense. Sadeh and
his protgs introduced a new counterinsurgency doctrine. Rather than waiting for Arab attacks,
they took the initiative and launched offensives against the insurgents bases and ambushed their
convoys on the roads.
19
These operations do not fall under the category of terrorism.
20
They were
not aimed at innocent non-combatants and their objective was not to generate a widespread sense
of fear. That was not the case with the Etzel. While the organization did not officially
acknowledge its decision to turn to terrorism, the random killing of two Arab workers in a
banana plantation on April, 20
th
1936, indicated otherwise. Between 1936 and 1939 the Etzel
initiated a campaign of terrorist attacks, mostly against Arab civilians.
21
This violent campaign
helped the Etzel to effectively distinguish itself from the Haganah, to consolidate itself as an
alternative for those supporting a more militant approach in the face of the Arab Revolt, as well
as to garner important operational experience. (Indeed, during the campaign there was a clear
increase in the level of sophistication of the organizations violent activities.)
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In 1939 the Etzel reached a major crossroads. The White Paper of 1939, published by the British
Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald, was a significant reversal of Britains policy towards
Palestine. The Mandate authorities withdrew their commitment to the founding of a Jewish state
and imposed limitations on the immigration of Jews to Palestine as well as on the purchase of
land by Jews.
22
Four months after the initiation of the new policy, the Second World War broke
out and Britain became a significant power in the struggle against Nazi Germany. Like most
Jewish factions in Palestine, the Etzel was torn between its animosity towards new British
policies in Palestine and its commitment to the struggle against Hitler. While the leadership of
the Etzel accepted the position of the Haganah according to which the struggle against Germany
took precedence over the local struggle against Britain, a group of Etzel members who objected
to this line decided to split and form a new group: the Etzel in Israel, which was later named
Lehi. Despite its militant image, most of the Lehi operations were actually aimed at British
military installations and public officials. Indiscriminate attacks against civilians were less
common in the groups repertoire (see also Figure 1).
It is noteworthy that while the Mandate authorities were fighting the Jewish terrorists, by 1938
they were contributing to its proliferation. Orde Charles Wingate, a British officer, was granted
permission by his superiors to form a new unit called the Special Night Squads (SNS), whose
objective was to protect British and Jewish targets from Arab insurgents. Wingates unit was
composed of British soldiers and Jewish fighters, including former members of the Nodedet. He
introduced the young members of the Haganah to advanced counterinsurgency tactics as well as
(and unlike Sadeh) to the utility of collective punishment as an effective deterrence. On several
occasions he arbitrarily executed innocent Arab villagers.
23
Both the leaders of the Haganah and
British authorities were rattled by the rumors of Wingates tactics and he was subsequently
removed from Palestine. The Haganah never adopted terrorism as a tactic and even assisted the
British campaign against the Etzel in late 1944 in what became known as the Saison.
Nonetheless, by 1945, once the Second World War was over and the magnitude of the Holocaust
was unveiled, it joined forces with the Etzel and the Lehi and formed the Jewish Resistance
Movement. The union was an outcome of the deep disappointment with Britains continued
adherence to the policies of the 1939 White Paper. The various factions agreed to carry out
attacks against legitimate targets of strategic significance such as trains, airplanes, central bridges
and police stations. The objective of the operations was to coerce Britain to change its policies.
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The union was short-lived. On July 22
nd
1946, a group of Etzel fighters planted 770 lbs of
explosives on the ground floor of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. The hotel, housing several
governmental offices as well as the headquarters of the British armed forces in the region, was
considered a legitimate target even by the Haganah. However, the high number of fatalities,
estimated at above eighty and including civilians, drove the Haganah to part ways with the Etzel
and the Lehi.
24

Despite the collapse of the Jewish Resistance Movement, the violent struggle of the Etzel and
Lehi against the British authorities continued in full force until the last days of the British
Mandate. Eventually, the growing legitimacy in the international community for ideas of self-
determination and anti-colonialism, the impact of the Holocaust, as well as internal pressure
within the UK, led the British to decide to return the Mandate in Palestine to the UN. On
November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly approved a partition plan for dividing Palestine
into two states, a Palestinian one and a Jewish one.
While the establishment of the new state of Israel was supposed to facilitate the dismantling of
both Lehi and Etzel, since their main goal had been accomplished, the process was more painful
than expected. This was mainly because both organizations hoped that preserving their
organizational framework would help in the face of the upcoming military struggle of the Jewish
community with the Arab states (which had declared their intention of preventing the
establishment of a Jewish state by force) as well as for promoting their political interests within
the framework of the new state. The leaders of the Jewish community (and indirectly of the
Haganah) however, who enjoyed the support of most of the Jewish population (it should be
noted that the Jewish community in Palestine was highly organized via various political, social
and economic institutions which were led by elected officials) refused to allow the existence of
armed militias outside of the newly formed framework of the army of the Jewish state (which
would eventually be called Israel Defense Forces or IDF).
The contradicting agendas eventually clashed when the Etzel organized the arrival of an
ammunition supply ship, the Altalena, to the shores of Palestine in June 1948, during a UN
enforced cease fire (which included a prohibition on the import) of any ammunition by both
sides). After the Etzel refused to comply with the Israeli transitional government demands to
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surrender the ammunition (and that it would be allocated to the various IDF units and not just to
Etzels predominant units), a violent clash erupted on the shores of Tel Aviv. The battle ended
eventually with the sinking of Altalena by IDF artillery. This was followed by a series of IDF
operations against Etzel activists, bases and leaders and to the dismantling of the organization
and its transformation into a non-violent political movement.
25
The strong stand of the Israeli
government could be explained by its determination to ensure its monopoly on the use of force
within the new state, the hostility between the political stream which the Etzel represented (the
Revisionist Movement) and the Labor Party (which controlled the transitional government), and
the strong need to centralize resources in the struggle against the Arab countries.
The Lehi ended its life shortly after when members of the organization assassinated the UN
mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte on September 16, 1948. The Israeli government responded by
declaring the organization a terrorist entity, raiding the Lehi bases and conducting mass arrests of
its members, practically leading to the collapse of its organizational infrastructure. The Lehi as
well eventually reemerged as a political party before the first Israeli elections.
Figure 1 around here Number of Jewish Terrorist Attacks by Group and Target (1936-1948)

To conclude, the nationalist wave in the Jewish context was manifested by the activities of two
organizations. However, as can be seen in Figure 1, while the Lehis target selection
corresponded with the target selection of most nationalist sub-state organizations which were
active during the 1950s and 1960s, focusing mainly on military and (colonial) government
affiliated targets,
26
the Etzel was more diverse and focused some of its violence against the
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Palestinian targets British Targets Infrastructure
Lehi
Etzel
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competing national movement. Other differences between the Jewish case and other anti-colonial
struggles should also be noted. First, while in most cases of the fourth wave, the terrorist
organizations were the extension of the dominant political force within their communities; as
illustrated above, that was not the case with the Etzel and Lehi, whose members were termed by
the majority of the Jewish community Haporshim (The dissidents), and who suffered from lack
of popular legitimacy. Secondly, it is not just that the Jews in Palestine were not the native
population in Palestine in the classic sense of the term, but in many ways the Jewish leadership
in Palestine was not even the major political power in the Jewish world. (Various international
Jewish organizations such as the Jewish Agency were the framework in which most of the
political power was concentrated within world Jewry.) Finally, one cannot find serious intra-
communal (Jewish) violence (except for the Altalena affair), despite the significant hostility
between the different national Jewish political streams in Palestine, a phenomenon which was
not absent in many other anti-colonial struggles.
27

While two small groups of ultra-orthodox Jews (protesting against the secularization of the new
Jewish state) and former Lehi members (protesting against the treatment of Jews in the Soviet
bloc, hence attacking diplomatic targets of Communist states) were involved in short term
violent campaigns during Israels first years of independence, by the mid 1950s Jewish political
violence had disappeared from the Israeli political sphere. It only reared its head again in the
early 1970s, in what could be perceived as the first seeds of the religious (fourth) wave.
THE NATIONALIST RELIGIOUS WAVE
The events that took place in Haight-Ashbury during the summer of 1967 reflected a much
stronger tide.
28
Young women and men in the US and in Western Europe increasingly identified
with oppressed people who were struggling against what they perceived as Western imperialism.
This was the moment at which the second and third waves of terrorism overlapped.
Inadvertently, the proliferation of ideas that emphasized egalitarianism, peace and justice for
people in every corner of the world overlapped with the objectives of another empire the Soviet
bloc. The Communist states supported the new movements both directly and indirectly and
considered them as important proxies that could serve as revolutionary Trojan horses in the
West.
29
The attempts of the USSR and its allies to divert the protest into subversive violent
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activities were successful in one key way. While only a minority of activists chose the path of
terrorism, their actions captivated the attention of the media and generated unprecedented
support for the struggles of the Viet Cong, the IRA and the PLO.
The summer of 1967 was a significant milestone in Israels history as well. On June 16
th
, when
tens of thousands of youths from the US and other countries gathered in Monterey County
Fairgrounds for the International Pop Music Festival, the Jews of Israel were still coming to
terms with the outcomes of the Six Day War that had ended a week earlier. The previous month,
Israel had celebrated its nineteenth year of independence. On that very Independence Day, the
Egyptian army had broken the status quo and deployed troops in the Sinai Peninsula. This
marked the beginning of three weeks during which the Israeli Jewsl were consumed by collective
anxiety. During those three weeks, Israel finally also managed to put the old conflict between the
Etzel and the Haganah to rest. Menachem Begin, the leader of the opposition Herut party, which
was the parliamentary incarnation of the Etzel, was invited to serve as a minister in the
emergency National Unity Cabinet. This was a significant moment for Begin, who was still
labeled by many Israelis as a terrorist, and for his movement which, from the founding of the
state, had been treated as a pariah [David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister made an explicit
pledge never to invite Herut (as well as the Communists) to take part in any coalition
government].
The swift and decisive victory over the Soviet backed Arab militaries had taken both the Israelis
and the Palestinians by surprise. The occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the
war subjected the Palestinians, who constituted the majority in these areas, to Israeli occupation
for the second time in less than two decades.
30
The departure of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) from its sponsoring states two years later expedited the attachment of the
Palestinian struggle to the third wave of terrorism which was already underway.
31
The fact that
the PLO, which was led by a nationalistic faction (Fatah), was an umbrella organization that
incorporated Marxist groups, most notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP), brought the Palestinians even closer to the Soviet bloc.
32
The political and military
support that the Soviets and their allies provided the PLO, together with the expanding network
of collaboration with Marxist groups from other arenas (such as the Red Army Faction and the
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Japanese Red Army) helped them to accelerate the campaign of terrorism against Israel both in
the domestic and international arenas.
33

The explicit support of the international radical left for the Palestinian struggle led to the further
marginalization of the Israeli radical left.
34
Despite the fact that many of the forefathers of the
State of Israel were Socialists, the founding principle of the state was Jewish nationalism. Hence,
the third wave stood little chance of setting roots among Jews in Israel. Indeed, not a single act of
terrorism was perpetrated by Jews of the radical left during the period of the third wave. Matzpen
(Compass), a small group in which Jews constituted an even smaller minority was treated
harshly by the press, the political system and the courts after several of its members were
involved in an espionage plot.
35

In the Israeli context, the 1967 war thrust the Jews in Israel from a crippling state of existential
anxiety into a sense of unprecedented empowerment. In the months following the war the sense
of patriotism among Israelis reached unprecedented heights. However, the vast territories that
Israel had occupied turned the old hypothetical debate between territorial maximalists and
minimalists into an acute political fissure. Most of the adherents of the Greater Israel agenda
were politicians and public intellectuals from both main political factions. The first group
consisted of Labor Party activists, many of whom were veterans of the Palmach (the elite force
of the Haganah) who considered the occupied territories primarily as strategic assets. However,
they were also sympathetic to the arguments of the second group that brought together veterans
of the Etzel and the Lehi. Their main contention was that Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem, the Cave
of the Patriarchs in Hebron and above all the "holy basin" in Jerusalem, were the cradle of the
Jewish people and thus should never be ruled by foreigners. These two movements were joined
by a relatively small group of young activists who had grown up in the confines of the pragmatic
Zionist religious camp, but had undergone a significant ideological and theological
transformation under the guidance of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook who had developed a theology
that sanctified the State of Israel and emphasized the right of the Jewish people over the
promised land. Kooks followers served as the founding enclave of the Gush Emunim (Bloc of
the Faithful) movement that became known for its relentless and mostly illegal settling
activities.
36
This movement regarded the realization of the vision of the Greater Land of Israel by
Jewish settlement in the West Bank as a decisive phase in the salvation of the People of Israel,
37

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and in the establishment of a religious Jewish state (a redemption process). Over the years, their
messianic concept has become dominant in the religious-Zionist sector, which comprises the
decisive majority of the settler population.
38

However, it took Gush Emunim activists more than a decade before they generated their first
terrorist network.
39
The true harbinger of the fourth wave was Rabbi Meir Kahane who
introduced it in Israel almost a decade before it appeared in other parts of the world. Kahane
gained his first publicity through the Jewish Defense League, which he founded in New York in
1968. This organizations motto was Never Again,
40
and its early activities were mainly
devoted to protecting elderly Jews, residents of New Yorks poorer neighborhoods, from assault
by African Americans, whom the JDL activists despised. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s,
the JDL assumed a more militant approach and engaged in various illegal and violent activities
against Soviet targets (as a protest against the Soviet authorities policy of preventing the
immigration of Jews to Israel) and non-Jewish minority groups, while expanding to more than a
dozen campuses all over the US.
41
The increasingly violent nature of the JDLs activities, led the
FBI to recognize the organization as one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the US, to
intensify its operations against the organizations infrastructure and leadership, and eventually
also to force Kahane to leave the country.
42

Upon Kahanes arrival in Israel in 1972, he established the organizational and operational
foundations for a new political movement. The Kach (this way in Hebrew) movement
promoted a mix of ultra-nationalist, xenophobic and religious ideological sentiments, a formula
that served as a blue print for future Jewish terrorist groups. Moreover, Kahane promoted
militant and violent activism when he emphasized to his followers the obligation to take revenge
on Israels enemies. Kahane opined that harm to a Jew was considered a desecration of Gods
name, thus making vengeance against the gentiles a religious precept. Kahane was also not
concerned about the potential of a clash between his movement and the mainstream political
parties/movements in Israel as he viewed the secular government in Israel as a temporary evil
that would eventually pass. Thus, Kahane resolutely lashed out at the very idea of democracy. He
repeatedly invoked the story of the Hashmonai (Hasmonean) Revolt with the Seleucid regime
representing the Israeli democracy, which he defined as foreign and hostile to Judaism.
43

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It is therefore not surprising that starting from the early 1970s and until the present, Kahanist
groups and individuals have carried out a significant portion of Jewish terrorism in Israel. In
addition, probably the most infamous and deadly act of Jewish terrorism was perpetrated by one
of Kahane's followers, Baruch Goldstein, who, on the morning of February 25, 1994, perpetrated
what is known until today as the Cave of the Patriarch Massacre, killing 29 Muslim worshipers
and injuring more than 125. Some of the more notable violent groups which have been
comprised of Kahane followers are TNT (Terrorism against Terrorism) and Kahane Lives which
have mostly been involved in attacks against Palestinians in the West Bank during the 1980s and
1990s.
44

In the early 1980s, the fourth wave in its Jewish form intensified when the Kahanist groups were
joined by a new breed of religious Jewish terrorism that was comprised of the more militant
factions of the Gush Emunim movement. The activist approach of these factions stems from their
belief that the redemption process of the people of Israel can be expedited by the acts of human
beings. Thus, the Jewish Underground members believed for example that bombing the
Mosques on the Temple Mount and in that way, making this holy area available for the
building of the Jewish Third Temple would be not just a practical step to accelerate the
redemption process, but would also be a watershed moment with dramatic effect on the Israeli
public, which would facilitate the dissemination of Gush Emunims ideology.
45
Some other
groups which emerged from Gush Emunim and from the settlers movement were less ambitious
and mainly focused on vigilante acts against West Bank Palestinians, as the latter's nationalistic
aspirations (accompanied by a violent struggle which severely impacted the Jewish settlers in the
West Bank) were perceived as the major threat to the realization of the vision of the greater land
of Israel and the progress of the redemption process.
46

One of the interesting (and probably understudied) characteristics of the fourth wave is the
tendency of many religious groups to engage in violence not just against members of other
religious traditions, but also, and sometimes mainly, against members of their own religious
collective who are perceived as not devoted enough, apostate, or as direct ideological enemies of
the righteous path. In these cases, terrorism serves as a signaling mechanism to reshape the
boundaries of the religious collective, and the definitions of outsiders and insiders. For
example, a report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point in 2009 exemplified that
13 | P a g e

most victims of Al-Qaeda were actually Muslims residing in countries controlled by apostate
regimes.
47

This trend was not absent from the Jewish manifestation of the fourth wave, as already in the
1980s, groups such as the Sikarikin started to target left-wing political and media figures. But
without doubt, the pinnacle of this trend was the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin on November 4
th
1994 by Yigal Amir. Amir was a religious Zionist in his 20s,
who, like most of the young religious Zionists of his generation, grew up absorbing the
redemption ideas of Rabbi Kook from a young age. Thus, the decision of Rabin to engage in a
peace process with the PLO, the success of which meant a dramatic blow to the realization of the
idea of the Greater Land of Israel, created a tremendous crisis in the religious Zionist camp. Its
leaders denounced the legitimacy of the left-wing government from all venues and even called
Yitzhak Rabin a traitor to his people and to Zionism.
48
Some even called for him to be
removed from the political arena. Rabbis and political leaders from the religious-Zionist sector
could be heard constantly debating what type of measures could legitimately be used to stop the
peace process.
49
Listening to and internalizing these calls, by late 1993, Amir and his older
brother Hagai began amassing arms and ammunition as a first step in their plan to form an
underground group that would put a stop to the implementation of the Oslo Accords. Rabins
assassination quickly became their preferred alternative and after a few unsuccessful plots, Amir
was able to ambush Rabin when he was on his way to his limousine after he had addressed
thousands of supporters who were attending a mass demonstration in support for the peace
process.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The fourth wave was manifested in the Israeli case via the violence of groups which were
affiliated to two movements, that of Kahane and his followers, and Gush Emunim. However,
while some of the ideological tenets of the Jewish groups were compatible with the
characterization of the fourth wave, some significant gaps exist between the Jewish case and
other cases of religious violence. First, the Jewish groups traditionally mixed religious and
nationalist sentiments. This is not surprising, especially considering that this mixture of religious
and nationalist symbols and practices has characterized the Israeli political and social
environment since the establishment of the state (which is actually defined in its Proclamation of
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Independence as a Jewish state). And while this kind of hybrid ideological framework is also
manifested in some of the other cases of religious terrorism (i.e., Hamas, Hezbollah), it should be
mentioned that some of the major actors of the fourth wave tend to distance themselves from
political/national aspirations. The ideologists of Al-Qaeda, for example, traditionally and
furiously rejected the concept of nation-state.
50

Second, while most religious groups which are usually identified with the fourth wave (AQ,
Hezbullah, Hamas, Islamic Egyptian Jihad and others) represent, or are affiliated with, ethnic
groups or religious streams with limited formal political power in the countries where they are
based, the case of Jewish terrorism represents an outlier in this aspect. While the Kahane
movement never garnered significant political power (despite the fact that Kahane himself was
elected {and served one term} in the Israeli Knesset) the Gush Emunim and the settlers
movements were able to accumulate significant political power through the years and to build
permanent power bases both within the political system and in the infrastructure of the Israeli
public administration.
51
Thus, at least in the case of Jewish religious terrorism, we are not
dealing with movements which have suffered from limited access to state resources and political
representation or those who have experienced some kind of systematic deprivation, as in the case
of most of the other religious movements/groups that comprise the fourth wave. Moreover, in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip (until 2005) they were actually (or enjoyed the backing of) the
strong side in the conflict. If terrorism is the weapon of the weak, this was not completely true in
the case of fourth wave of Jewish terrorism.
Finally, from an organizational-operational perspective, it seems that the religious Jewish
terrorist groups, unlike their counterparts from other arenas, were never able to form a
sustainable organizational mechanism that would allow them to engage in a really effective long-
term campaign of violence. Most of the terrorist groups were small social networks based on
primary or secondary relations, with limited organizational sophistication or complexity
(manifested for example in the lack of training or recruitment procedures, long-term operational
plans and formal leadership). The latter may also explain why very few of the group members, if
any, were real full time terrorists (most of them had a day job and terrorist activity constituted
a minor part of their lives).
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To conclude, probably the most important similarity between the fourth wave of terrorism in the
Jewish context and other cases of religious terrorism is also the reason why we cannot be
optimistic about the (lack of) prospects of future manifestations of religious Jewish terrorism.
Religious Jewish terrorism is motivated by the fundamental aspiration to transform Israel into a
theocratic entity which will be run according to the Halakha, will ensure territorial unity of the
Land of Israel and finally will promote internal homogeneity as much as possible within the
Land of Israel. The significant obstacles for achieving any of these goals, especially considering
the current political environment in the Middle East, the growing legitimacy in the international
community for Palestinian national aspirations, the fragmentation within Jewish society in Israel,
and the growing inability of the Israeli political system to generate effective governance, all
point to the strong probability that religious Jewish terrorism will not fade away any time soon.













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1
David Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," Current History 100, no. 650
(2001).
2
Ehud Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin
Assassination (New York, NY: Free Press, 1999). 321-23.
3
Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The Causes of Vigilante Political Violence: The case of Jewish Settlers," Civil
Wars 6, no. 3 (2003). Ehud Sprinzak, "Elite Illegalism in Israel and the Question of Democracy," in Israeli
Democracy under Stress, ed. Ehud Sprinzak and Larry Diamond (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993).
4
This argument is mostly made with particular reference to Islam. See: Raphael Israeli, The Spread of Islamikaze
Terrorism in Europe: The Third Islamic Invasion (London ; Portland, OR: Vallentine Mitchell, 2008).
5
See: Eran Zaidise, Daphna Canetti-Nisim, and Ami Pedahzur, "Politics of God or Politics of Man? The Role of
Religion and Deprivation in Predicting Support for Political Violence in Israel," Political Studies 55, no. 3 (2007).
6
David Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," The American Political Science
Review 78, no. 3 (1984).
7
Audrey Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns
(Preniceton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 124.
8
The area in which Jews were allowed to reside permanently between 1791 and 1917.
9
Martin Buber, On Zion: The History of an Idea (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973). 123-29.
10
First Aliyah (Ascendance) 1881-1904
11
See: Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism (New York: Schocken Books, 2003).
12
Yossi Ben-Artzi, Jewish Moshava Settlements in Eretz-Israel (1882-1914) (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi
1988).
13
David Lesch, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 33-34.
14
Named after Shimon Bar Giora a prominent leader during the First Jewish-Roman War of the 1
st
century.
15
Hayim Nahman Bialik, Songs from Bialik: Selected Poems of Hayim Nahman Bialik (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 2000).
16
Mordechai Naor. Hashomer - the myth was born already in Second Aliya. In Mordechai Naor, ed., The Second
aliya, 1903-1914 (Jerusalem: Yad Itzhak Ben-Zvi, 1985) (Hebrew).
<http://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=12916> (12 March 2006); Ian S. Lustick. Terrorism in Israeli-Arab
Conflict: Targets and Audiences. In Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in context (Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1995), 520.
17
Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," 54.
18
Joseph Kister, The National Military Organization 1931-1948 (Tel Aviv: Etzel Museum, 1998). 4.
19
Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999 (New York: Knopf, 1999).
147-48.
20
See: Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, "The Challenges of Conceptualizing
Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4 (2004).
21
Arie Perliger and Leonard Weinberg, "Jewish Self-Defence and Terrorist Groups Prior to the Establishment of the
State of Israel: Roots and Traditions," Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions 4, no. 3 (2003): 100.
22
Ibid.
23
Gili Haskin, "The Special Night Squads (SNS): Formation, Operations, Contribution and Morality,"
Article,(Unknown), http://www.gilihaskin.com/Article.Asp?ArticleNum=453.
24
David Niv, Battle for Freedom: The Irgun Zvai Leumi part two (Tel Aviv- Klausner Institute, 1966). 201.
25
Sholomo Nakdimon, Altalena (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1978), 175-311.
26
Laqueur, Walter, The New Terrorism (UK: Oxford University Press, 1999). 22-24.
27
See for example - Crenshaw, Martha. 2001. The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War, in Martha
Crenshaw (Ed.) Terrorism in Context, University Park: Penn State Press.
28
Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Tise of Detente (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2003).
29
Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2005). 1-2.
30
The first time was in 1948. During the battles, many Palestinians fled their homes in what became sovereign Israel
and relocated to the West Bank, Gaza and other countries.
31
Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," 56.
32
Hanuch Bazov, "Relations between the USSR and PLO from 1968 to 1985" (Bar-Ilan, 2008).
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33
Eli Karmon, Coalitions between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists, and Islamists (Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff Brill Academic Pub, 2005).
34
Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin
Assassination: 119-21.
35
Nira Yuval David, Matzpen. The Socialist Organization In Israel (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1977).
36
Ehud Sprinzak, "Gush Emunim: The Tip of the Iceberg," Jerusalem Quarterly 21(1981).
37
(Raanan, 1981; Zertal and Eldar, 2004)
38
(Zertal and Eldar, 2004)
39
Ehud Sprinzak, "From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim
Underground," The Journal of Strategic Studies 10, no. 4 (1987).
40
The JDL slogan Never Again was once the slogan of Jewish resistance fighters in the Warsaw ghetto. It was
interpreted as a cry never to allow the Holocaust to happen again, or never to allow the destruction of Israel, or never
to allow genocide to be perpetrated against any other people.
41
Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, Jewish Terrorism in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009),
chapter 4; For review of Kahanes early days see - Robert I. Friedman, The False Prophet: Rabbi Meir Kahane:
From FBI informant to Knesset Member (London: Faber and Faber, 1990); Raphael Cohen-Almagor, The
Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance: The Struggle against Kahanism in Israel (Gainesville, FL: University Press of
Florida, 1994); Raphael Mergui and Philippe Simonnot, Israels Ayatollahs: Meir Kahane and the Far Right in
Israel (London: Saqi Books, 1990).
42
Yair Kotler, Heil Kahane (Tel Aviv: Modan, 1985), 100 (Hebrew).
43
Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, Jewish Terrorism in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 74-
75.
44
See for example Israelis Arrest Kahane's Son for an Attack on a Mosque, New York Times, April 21, 1992,
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/21/world/israelis-arrest-kahane-s-son-for-an-attack-on-a-mosque.html.
45
For more information on the Jewish underground please see - Carmi Gillon, Shabak among the Shreds (Tel Aviv:
Yedioth Ahronoth, 2000), 101-102 (Hebrew); Hagai Segal, Dear Brothers: The Story of the Jewish Underground
(Jerusalem: Keter, 1987).
46
Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, Jewish Terrorism in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
Chapters 3-5.
47
Scott Helfstein, Nassir Abdullah and Muhammad alObaidi, Deadly Vanguards: A Study of alQaidas Violence
Against Muslims (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center Occasional Paper series, 2009).
48
Walter Rogers. "Anti-Rabin sentiment turned ugly," CNN, 5 November 1995,
<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/rabin/why_now/index.html> (18 April 2006); See also Ami Pedahzur and Arie
Perliger, Jewish Terrorism in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), Chapter 5.
49
For a survey about the discussion regarding the means that can be used for stopping the diplomatic process, see:
Amnon Kapeliouk, Rabin Political Murder (Tel-Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1996),82-84. (Hebrew).
50
Nelly Lahoud. "Revolution in Tunisia and Egypt: A Blow to the Jihadist Narrative?"CTC Sentinel 4 no.2 (2011):
1.
51
Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land (Kinneret ,Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2004).