Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189793

April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND
GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this
original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and
citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District
From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making
any issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12
October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821, 2 distributed among
four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
District

Municipalities/Cities

Population

1st District Del Gallego

Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando

417,304

2nd District Gainza

Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo

Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

474,899

3rd District Caramoan

Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

372,548

4th District Iriga

Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

429,070

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district. The following table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
District

Municipalities/Cities

1st District

Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

2nd District

Libmanan
Minalabac

Population
176,383

San Fernando
Gainza

276,777

Pamplona
Pasacao

Milaor

3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga

Pili
Ocampo
Canaman

Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

439,043

4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan

Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

372,548

5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga

Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

429,070

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill that became the law
show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2)
against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of
Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us,
concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new
district.4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is
the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were
taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former
third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard
that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The petitioners
claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because
the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. 6 The
provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum population requirement for the
creation of a legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district
created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid. 8 Under this view, existing
legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population
of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace
of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum
population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a
population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional
Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account
the projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986. 10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people
represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative. 11 Thus, the 250,000
population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by
the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the creation of a province, Congress is
bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original
apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:

1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the
population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs
(1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1),
(3) and (4) of the Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present petition based on
procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners
committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain
and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative
districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of districts in provinces.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should
be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have
committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they
were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the
same could have been ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate,
not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any
substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners
lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance,
need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural rules, 14 as well as relaxed the requirement
of locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to society. 15

Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) 16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17 this Court
sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of
paramount public importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 18 Tatad v. Executive
Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of
direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled
promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent
decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go
directly to the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation
of a new legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality. 24 Before a law may be
declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been
violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there
is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain. 25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with
what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative
district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about
population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand"
from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city,
but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative,
but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court
in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC. 27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality
of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati,
which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000,
considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the
validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to
more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)

The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative
district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to
be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to
additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering
moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon
creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance,
of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable
income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on the words and meaning of
Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the
records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an
ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the
250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and
Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan
Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at
issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many
districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country into two hundred (200)
districts, which corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional
Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a
population of at least 250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan
Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 31 Commissioner Davide,
who later became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark 32 for the Ordinance to be
appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and
cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as
the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that
each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each
of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,
Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever
appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within
the province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other
than population as already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was more affinity with the southern
town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the
Second District. He then queried whether population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the
Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan

Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be
compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then inquired
what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the
northern towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and
Coron are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to
Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the
towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not
interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff
study said proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that District I has a total population
of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however,
that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering
that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District,
the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no
substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment and districting for the
province of Palawan was approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the importance of the towns and the city that
eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening
of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was
toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could
be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District
together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the year, but the transient
population would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions, it is
beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions and
offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest
of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to
the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the
matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer
capital, the venue and situs of many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier approval of the
apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.

Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members
voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District
shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La
Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I. 35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the distribution of its three cities, with
each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing
area," because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of compactness." 36 In the districting of
Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability and common interest among the people in the area" and the
possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was
mentioned that municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner
Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and population." 38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require
mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation
through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that
every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an additional provincial legislative
district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support. And the formulation of
the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of
250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth
has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the formula and constant
number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces
and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly,
petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit
an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against strict conformity
with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other
than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is
176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and Two. 41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and
Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, 42 that would warrant the invalidation of
Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of Camarines
Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only
factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the
text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented
by this petition.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District
From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
41

Sen. Aquino, Mr. President, we have to respond to the last statement. The others that have been recommended together
with the Camarines Sur bill were all tested based on one standard, not separate standards for everybody. It is our opinion and
that is the source of this discussion and of this debate; that we hold that there is a 250,000-rule embodied in so many
provisions of the Constitution. Our distinguished collegue from the Bicol and Makati areas does not agree. I think we have
established that we do not agree on our interpretation of the Constitution.
With his permission, Mr. President, since I am against of his time, may we move on to the next point so as not to be
accused of delaying the passage of the bill any further?
May we ask: Why was Libmanan not considered to be a portion of the proposed first district? Because having done
the same, instead of having the 170,000-figure, we would have a 269,222 population figure.
Sen. Arroyo. All right. Look at that map.
Sen. Aquino. May we just move to another rostrum, Mr. President. We cannot view the details from this particular
rostrum, with the indulgence of our distinguished colleague.
Sen. Arroyo. x x x.
x x x x.
Now, the first district of Camarines Sur is so big that it consists of 40% of the province, area-wise. Libmanan is the
biggest municipality in the entire or present first district. It stuck in the middle. We cannot move that no matter what
because that is the biggest. Anyway, we move it left, we move it right, it would change the configuration. Those
are the practical difficulties in trying to figure out how. That is the situation. As we see, there is a water extension of
the gulf. We cannot connect them because they are separated by water. So it is no longer contiguous because it is
separated by water and there is nothing we can do about it. That is what I was saying about mathematical formula.
We cannot have mathematical formula when a natural boundary like water cannot make the municipalities
contiguous. That is the picture. It is all there.
The violet is the tagalog-speaking province. The green is the Bicol-speaking province so that is the only way to
divide it. So much has been done in the Lower House in trying to figure it out. But as long as the three Congressman
do not agree, then there is nothing we can do about it. That Representative, what the Congressman say in his district
is "king". He is the king there, there is nothing we can do about it. We respect that.
Libmanan is the biggest one. We cannot move that anyway. (TSN, Senate Plenary Debates on H.B. No. 4264, 22
September 2009).
42

Grave abuse of discretion contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of law. (Cabrera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182084, 6 October
2008, 567 SCRA 686, 691).

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent. The majority opinion wreaks havoc on the bedrock principle of our "democratic and republican State" 1 that all votes are
equal. Instead, the majority opinion introduces the Orwellian concept that some votes are more equal than others. The majority
opinion allows, for the first time under the 1987 Constitution, voters in a legislative district created by Congress to send one
representative to Congress even if the district has a population of only 176,383. In sharp contrast, all other legislative districts created
by Congress send one representative each because they all meet the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
The assailed Republic Act No. 9716 (RA 9716) is unconstitutional for being utterly repugnant to the clear and precise "standards"
prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution for the creation of legislative districts. Section 5(4) 2 of Article VI
mandates that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards" fixed in Section 5. These
constitutional standards, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) minimum population of 250,000
per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity
in apportionment of legislative districts "in provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." The assailed RA 9716 grossly
violates these constitutional standards.

Legislators Represent People, Not Provinces or Cities

There was never any debate3 in the design of our government that the members of the House of Representatives, just like the members
of the Senate, represent people not provinces, cities, or any other political unit.4 The only difference is that the members of the
Senate represent the people at large while the members of the House represent the people in legislative districts. Thus, population or
the number of inhabitants in a district is the essential measure of representation in the House of Representatives. 5 Section 5(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, just like in the previous Constitutions, 6 could not be any clearer:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the idea of the people, as individuals, electing their representatives under the principle of "one person, one vote,"7 is the
cardinal feature of any polity, like ours, claiming to be a "democratic and republican State." 8 A democracy in its pure state is one
where the majority of the people, under the principle of "one person, one vote," directly run the government. 9 A republic is one which
has no monarch, royalty or nobility,10 ruled by a representative government elected by the majority of the people under the principle of
"one person, one vote," where all citizens are equally subject to the laws. 11 A republic is also known as a representative democracy.
The democratic and republican ideals are intertwined, and converge on the common principle of equality -- equality in voting power,
and equality under the law.
The constitutional standard of proportional representation is rooted in equality in voting power -- that each vote is worth the same as
any other vote,
not more or less. Regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, occupation, poverty, wealth or literacy, voters have an equal vote.
Translated in terms of legislative redistricting, this means equal representation for equal numbers of people12 or equal voting weight
per legislative district. In constitutional parlance, this means representation for every legislative district "in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" 13 or proportional representation. Thus, the
principle of "one person, one vote" or equality in voting power is inherent in proportional representation.
It was in obedience to the rule on proportional representation that this Court unanimously struck down an apportionment law which:
(a) x x x gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) x x x gave Manila four
members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; (c) [gave] Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and
Cotabato x x x more than both, five members having been assigned to it; (d) [gave] Samar (with 871,857) four members while Davao
with 903,224 got three only; (e) [gave] Bulacan with 557,691 x x x two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three,
and (f) [gave] Misamis Oriental with 387,839 x x x one member only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two. 14 x x x x
for being repugnant to the constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution that the Members of the House of Representatives "shall be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants." 15
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is even more precise by providing that the Members of the House "shall be elected
from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x." The phrase "as nearly as may be according to the number of
their respective inhabitants" in the 1935 Constitution has been changed in the 1987 Constitution to the more precise "in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x." The addition of the phrase
"on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" was meant to stress that the rule on proportional representation shall apply uniformly
in the apportionment of every legislative district.
The phrase "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants," which precedes the phrase "provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area," means that legislative districts in provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area shall be apportioned
according to proportional representation or equal representation for equal numbers of people. Thus, there shall be one legislative
district for every given number of people, whether inhabiting in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area.
The phrase "on the basis of a uniform x x x ratio" means that the ratio of one legislative district for every given number of people shall
be applied uniformly in all apportionments, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area. Section 5(3) of Article VI
mandates that "[e]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x shall have at least one representative."
Consequently, a population of 250,000 serves as the default minimum population applicable to every legislative district following the
rule on uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or in the Metropolitan Manila area.
The phrase "progressive ratio" means that the number of legislative districts shall increase as the number of the population increases,
whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area. Thus, a province shall have one
legislative district if it has a population of 250,000, and two legislative districts if it has 500,000. This insures that proportional
representation is maintained if there are increases in the population of a province, city, or the Metropolitan Manila area. This is what is
meant by a "progressive ratio" in the apportionment of legislative districts, a ratio that must also be uniformly applied.
Obviously, the 1987 Constitution has laid down clear and precise standards in the apportionment of legislative districts compared to
the 1935 Constitution. What is inescapable is that the 1987 Constitution has strengthened and tightened the requirement of uniformity
in the apportionment of legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area.

To now declare, as the majority opinion holds, that apportionment in provinces can disregard the minimum population requirement
because the Constitution speaks of a minimum population only in cities is logically flawed, constitutionally repulsive, and fatally
corrosive of the bedrock notion that this country is a "democratic and republican State." 16 This ruling of the majority strikes a
debilitating blow at the heart of our democratic and republican system of government.
Under the majoritys ruling, Congress can create legislative districts in provinces without regard to any minimum population. Such
legislative districts can have a population of 150,000, 100,000, 50,000 or even 100, thus throwing out of the window the constitutional
standards of proportional representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative districts. To disregard the minimum population
requirement of 250,000 in provincial legislative districts while
maintaining it in city legislative districts is to disregard, as a necessary consequence, the constitutional standards of proportional
representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." This
means that legislative districts in provinces can have a minimum population of anywhere from 100 (or even less) to 250,000, while
legislative districts in cities will always have a minimum population of 250,000. This will spell the end of our democratic and
republican system of government as we know it and as envisioned in the 1987 Constitution.
Constitutional Standards for Reapportionment:
Population and Territory
The Constitution itself provides the "standards" against which reapportionment laws like RA 9716 will be tested, following its
command that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section,"17
referring to Section 5, Article VI. These standards relate to first, population, and second, territory. Section 5 admits of no other
standards.
On population, the standards of the 1987 Constitution have four elements. First is the rule on proportional representation, which is the
universal standard in direct representation in legislatures. Second is the rule on a minimum population of 250,000 per legislative
district, which was not present in our previous Constitutions. Third is the rule on progressive ratio, which means that the number of
legislative districts shall increase as the number of the population increases in accordance with the rule on proportional representation.
Fourth is the rule on uniformity, which requires that the first three rules shall apply uniformly in all apportionments in provinces, cities
and the Metropolitan Manila area.
The Constitution18 and the Ordinance19 appended to the 1987 Constitution fixes the minimum population of a legislative district at
250,000. Although textually relating to cities, this minimum population requirement applies equally to legislative districts apportioned
in provinces and the Metropolitan Manila area because of the constitutional command that "legislative districts [shall be] apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." To reiterate, the Constitution commands that this rule on uniformity shall apply to
legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." Otherwise, districts apportioned in provinces, if freed
from the minimum population requirement, will have constituencies two, four, ten times lower than in districts apportioned in cities,
violating the constitutional command that apportionment shall be based on a uniform ratio in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area."
In short, the constitutional "standards" in the apportionment of legislative districts under Section 5 of Article VI, as far as population is
concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) a minimum "population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" per legislative
district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in the
apportionment of legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area."
For territory, the Constitution prescribes the "standards" that a legislative district must be, "as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent."
To repeat, other than population and territory, there are no other standards prescribed in Section 5 of Article VI. This Court cannot add
other standards not found in Section 5.
The Malapportionment of RA 9716 Flouts
the Constitutional Standards on Population
RA 9716 grossly malapportions Camarines Surs proposed five legislative districts by flouting the standards of proportional
representation among legislative districts and the minimum population per legislative district.
Based on the 2007 census, the proposed First District under RA 9716 will have a population of only 176,383, which is 29% below the
constitutional minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district. In contrast, the remaining four proposed districts have
populations way above the minimum with the highest at 439,043 (proposed Third District), lowest at 276,777 (proposed Second
District) and an average of 379,359. Indeed, the disparity is so high that three of the proposed districts (Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Districts) have populations more than double that of the proposed First District. 20 This results in wide variances among the districts
populations. Still using the 2007 census, the ideal per district population for Camarines Sur is 338,764. 21 The populations of the
proposed districts swing from this ideal by a high of positive 29.6% (Third
District) to a low of negative 47.9% (First District).22 This means that the smallest proposed district (First District) is underpopulated
by nearly 50% of the ideal and the biggest proposed district (Third District) is overpopulated by nearly 30% of the ideal.
The resulting vote undervaluation (for voters in the disfavored districts) and vote overvaluation (for voters in the First District) fails
even the most liberal application of the constitutional standards. Votes in the proposed First District are overvalued by more than
200% compared to votes from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts and by more than 60% compared to votes in the Second District.

Conversely, votes from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts are undervalued by more than 200% compared to votes in the First
District while those in the Second District suffer more than 60% undervaluation.
Proportional representation in redistricting does not mean exact numbers of population, to the last digit, for every legislative district.
However, under the assailed RA 9716, the variances swing from negative 47.9% to positive 29.6%. Under any redistricting yardstick,
such variances are grossly anomalous and destructive of the concept of proportional representation. In the United States, the Supreme
Court there ruled that a variance of even less than 1% is unconstitutional in the absence of proof of a good faith effort to achieve a
mathematically exact apportionment.23
Significantly, petitioner Senator Aquinos attempt to redraw districting lines to make all five proposed districts compliant with the
minimum population requirement (and thus lessen the wide variances in population among the districts) was thwarted chiefly for
political expediency: his colleagues in the Senate deemed the existing districts in Camarines Sur "untouchable" because "[a
Congressman] is king [in his district]." 24 This shows a stark absence of a good faith effort to
achieve a more precise proportional representation in the redistricting under the assailed RA 9716. Clearly, RA 9716 tinkers with vote
valuation, and consequently with the constitutional standard of proportional representation, based solely on the whims of incumbent
Congressmen, an invalid standard for redistricting under Section 5 of Article VI.
Equally important, RA 9716 violates the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in creating the proposed First District, which
will have a population of only 176,383. The minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district admits of no variance and must be
complied with to the last digit. The Constitution mandates a population of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" for a legislative
district in a city, and under the principle of "uniform and progressive ratio," for every legislative district in provinces and in the
Metropolitan Manila area.
Entitlement of "Each Province" to "at Least One Representative"
No Basis to Ignore Standard of Uniform Population Ratio
The directive in Section 5(3) of Article VI that "each province, shall have at least one representative" means only that when a province
is created, a legislative district must also be created with it.25 Can this district have a population below 250,000? To answer in the
affirmative is to ignore the constitutional mandate that districts in provinces be apportioned "in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." That the Constitution never meant to exclude provinces
from the requirement of proportional representation is evident in the opening provision of Section 5(1), which states:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x." (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In short, the Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of legislative districts in provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area
must comply with proportional representation, on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. 26
Apportionment in the Ordinance Appended to the 1987 Constitution
Distinct from Legislative Reapportionments
It will not do to hoist the apportionment under the Ordinance appended to the Constitution or Mariano v. COMELEC 27 and Bagabuyo
v. COMELEC28 as normative props to shore up the hollow proposition that reapportionment in provinces can dispense with the
minimum population of 250,000 as prescribed in Section 5 of Article VI. In the first place, the Constitutional Commission, exercising
constituent powers, enjoyed absolute discretion to relax the standards it textualized in Section 5, Article VI, in the interest of creating
legislative districts en masse cognizant of legitimate concerns.29 Only the people, through the instrument of ratification, possessed the
greater sovereign power to overrule the Constitutional Commission. By overwhelmingly ratifying the 1987 Constitution, the people in
the exercise of their sovereign power sanctioned the Constitutional Commissions discretionary judgments.
In contrast, Congress enacted RA 9716 in the exercise of its legislative powers under the 1987 Constitution and subject to the
reapportionment standards in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. Congress is strictly bound by the reapportionment standards in
Section 5, unlike the Constitutional Commission which could create one-time exceptions subject to ratification by the sovereign
people. Until it enacted RA 9716, Congress never deviated from the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in creating a
legislative district. Thus, in Republic Act No. 7854 (RA 7854) which doubled the legislative districts in Makati City, the Court in
Mariano v. COMELEC took note of the certification by the National Statistics Office that at the time of the enactment of RA 7854, the
population of Makati City was 508,174, entitling it to two representatives. 30
Footnote 13 in Mariano v. COMELEC states: "As per the certificate issued by Administrator Tomas Africa of the National Census and
Statistics Office, the population of Makati as of 1994 stood at 508,174; August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on House Bill No. 12240
(converting Makati into a highly urbanized city) x x x."
Similarly, in Republic Act No. 9371 (RA 9371) which also doubled the legislative districts in Cagayan de Oro City, the two districts
created complied with the minimum population of 250,000 (254,644 and 299,322, respectively), as the Court noted in Bagabuyo v.
COMELEC.31 Contrary to the assertion of the majority opinion, neither Mariano v. COMELEC nor Bagabuyo v. COMELEC supports
the claim that Congress can create a legislative district with a population of less than 250,000. On the contrary, these cases confirm
that every legislative district must have a minimum population of 250,000. Only very recently, this Court in Aldaba v. COMELEC32
struck down a law creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos, which has a population just short of the 250,000 minimum
requirement.
RA 9716 Harbinger for Wave of Malapportionments

More than 20 years after the 1987 Constitution took effect, Congress has yet to comply with the Constitutions mandate that "[w]ithin
three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section." 33 Instead, Congress has contented itself with enacting piecemeal reapportionment laws for
individual areas, either for this sole purpose34 or ancillary to the conversion35 or creation36 of a local government unit, at the behest of
legislators representing the area. As movements
of district lines spell doom or salvation for entrenched political interests, this process subjects Congress to intense pressure to keep off
certain districts.
Until RA 9716 came along, Congress was able to balance political exigency with constitutional imperatives. RA 9716 marks a
tectonic shift by tilting the balance in favor of entrenched interests, sacrificing the Constitution and ultimately, the ideals of
representative democracy, at the altar of political expediency. If left unchecked, laws like RA 9716 will fill the House of
Representatives with two breeds of legislators, one, representing districts two, four, ten times more populous than other favored
districts, elected by voters holding "mickey mouse votes" and another, representing small, favored districts, elected by voters holding
"premium votes" two, four, ten times more valuable than the votes in disfavored districts.
Our oath of office as Justices of this Court forbids us from legitimizing this constitutionally abhorrent scheme, a scheme that for the
first time under the 1987 Constitution creates a new politically privileged class of legislators in what is supposed to be a "democratic
and republican State."37 To uphold RA 9716 is to uphold the blatant violation of the constitutional standards requiring proportional
representation and a minimum population in the creation of legislative districts. This will derail our one person, one vote
representative democracy from the tracks clearly and precisely laid down in the 1987 Constitution.
And for what end -- to create a special class of legislative districts represented by a new political elite exercising more legislative
power than their votes command? Such a grant of privileged political status is the modern day equivalent of a royalty or nobility title,
which is banned under the 1987 Constitution. History will not be kind to those who embark on a grotesquely anomalous constitutional
revision that is repulsive to our ideals of a "democratic and republican State."
The ruling of the majority today could sound the death knell for the principle of "one person, one vote" that insures equality in voting
power. All votes are equal, and there is no vote more equal than others. This equality in voting power is the essence of our democracy.
This Court is supposed to be the last bulwark of our democracy. Sadly, here the Court, in ruling that there are some votes more equal
than others, has failed in its primordial constitutional duty to protect the essence of our democracy.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL Republic Act No. 9716 for grossly violating
the standards of proportional representation and minimum population in the creation of legislative districts as prescribed in Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
I concur with the ponencias discussion on the procedural issue.
"Transcendental importance" doctrine aside, petitioners have the requisite locus standi. Petitioners are suing not only as lawmakers but
as taxpayers and citizens as well. At the initiative of a taxpayer, a statute may be nullified, on the supposition that expenditure of
public funds for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 1 Republic Act No.
9716 (R.A. 9716) mandates the creation of another legislative district and indubitably involves the expenditure of public funds.
I DISSENT, however, on the ponencias conclusion, on the substantive issue, that a population of 250,000 is not an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
Contrary to the ponencias assertion, petitioners do not merely rely on Article VI, Section 5 (3) but also on Section 5 (1) of the same
Article. 2 Both provisions must be read together in light of the constitutional requirements of population and contiguity.
Section 5 (3) of Article VI disregards the 250,000 population requirement only with respect to existing provinces whose population
does not exceed 250,000 or to newly created provinces under the Local Government Code (as long as the income and territory
requirements are met).
The ponencia misinterprets Mariano v. Comelec.3 The actual population of the City of Makati during the Senate deliberations in 1994
on House Bill (H.B.) No. 4264 that was to be enacted into R.A. No. 7854 was 508,174.4 That is why the Court in Mariano declared:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least
one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000),
its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to
more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.5 (emphasis in the
original)

Nothing in Mariano reflects that the Court disregarded the 250,000 population requirement as it merely stated that Makatis legislative
district may still be increased as long as the minimum population requirement is met. The permissive declaration at that time
presupposes that Makati must still meet the constitutional requirements before it can have another congressional district.
The Local Government Code likewise is not in point since Section 461 thereof tackles the creation of a province and not the
reapportioning of a legislative district based on increasing population. There is thus no point in asserting that population is merely an
alternative addition to the income requirement.
The ponencia likewise misinterprets Bagabuyo v. Comelec.6 Notably, the ponencia spliced that portion of the decision in Bagabuyo
which it cited to suit its argument. Thus the ponencia quotes:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require
mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x To ensure quality
representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution
requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (emphasis
and underscoring in the original by the ponente)
It omitted that portion which specified the respective total population of the two districts as above 250,000. Thus the full text of the
pertinent portion of the decision reads:
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take
judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National Statistics
Office which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oros first district have a total population of 254,644 while the second
district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution,
however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The two legislative districts of Cagayan de Oro subject of Bagabuyo met the minimum population requirement at the time of
reappportionment. The ponencias construal of the disparity in population sizes of the districts involved in Bagabuyo clearly differs
from the disparity of population in the present case.
The Record of the Constitutional Commission itself declares that the 250,000 benchmark was used in apportioning the legislative
districts in the country. The sponsorship speech of Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr. 7 reflects so.
x x x x. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city or each
province with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one Representative. This is Section 5 of the Article on the
Legislative. x x x x The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among the provinces and
cities with a population of at least 250,000 and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official
enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the
mandate that each city with at least 250,000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we at first allotted
one seat for each of the 73 provinces; and one each for all cities with a population of at least 250,000, which are the Cities of Manila,
Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we
then proceeded to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with number of their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. x x x x. (capitalization, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended to apply the minimum population requirement of 250,000 to both cities and provinces in the
initial apportionment, in proportion to the countrys total population at that time (56 million).
Yet the ponencia asserts that the 250,000 benchmark was used only for the purpose of the 1986 initial apportionment of the legislative
districts, and now disregards the benchmarks application in the present petition. It is eerily silent, however, on what the present
population yardstick is. If the present estimated population of 90 million is to be the dividend, 8 then there would roughly be one
legislative district representative for every 450,000.
Following the constitutional mandate, the population requirement cannot fall below 250,000. This is the average "uniform and
progressive ratio" that should prevail. Thus, using the present population figure, the benchmark should be anywhere between 250,000450,000 persons per district. Using anything less than 250,000 is illogical, for it would operate to allow more than 360 representatives
of legislative districts alone on some capricious basis other than the variable of population.
A case in point is the congressional reapportionment done in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat and Zamboanga Sibugay effected
through Republic Act No. 93579 and Republic Act No. 9360,10 respectively. At the time of the congressional deliberations and
effectivity of these laws, the population count in these provinces more than met the basic standard. Sultan Kudarat already had a
population of 522,187 during the 1995 census year, 11 while Zamboanga Sibugay met the population threshold in 2001 with an
estimated 503,700 headcount.12
The ponencia sweepingly declares that "population was explicitly removed as a factor." 13 Far from it. Population remains the
controlling factor. From the discussions in the initial apportionment and districting of Puerto Princesa, Baguio, Cavite, Laguna,
Maguindanao and Cebu in 1986, it is clear that population and contiguity were the primary considerations, and the extraneous factors
considered were circumspectly subsumed thereto.

The ponencia harps on petitioners admission that Camarines Sur is actually entitled to SIX legislative districts, given its population of
1,693,821, to justify its conclusion that there is nothing wrong in the creation of another legislative district in the province. This is a
wrong premise. It bears noting that petitioners raised the legislative entitlement to underscore the GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
committed in the enactment of R.A. 9716.
R.A. 9716 created one legislative district by reconfiguring the first and second districts. It did not, however, touch the third and fourth
districts which, when properly reapportioned, can easily form another district. No reasons were offered except Senator Joker Arroyos
during the Senate Plenary Debates on H.B. No. 4264, viz: "When it comes to their district, congressmen are kings. We cannot touch
them. He [referring to Rep. Villafuerte] does not also want it [referring to the district of Rep. Villafuerte] touched... even if they have a
pregnant populace or inhabitants, he does not want it touched." 14
The resulting population distribution in the present case violates the uniform and progressive ratio prescribed in the
Constitution.
Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9716, the tally of population percentage per district in Camarines Sur based on its population of
1,693,821 was as follows:
District 1: 24.6%
District 2: 28.03%
District 3: 21.99%
District 4: 25.33%
Compare now the population percentage per district after the passage of R.A. 9716:
District 1: 10.4%
District 2: 16.34%
District 3: 25.9%
District 4: 21.99% (former District 3)
District 5: 25.33% (former District 4)
Remarkably, before R.A. No. 9716, the first district met the 250,000 minimum. After R.A. No. 9716, it suffered a very significant
drop in its population from 416,680 to 176,157.
The extraneous factors15 cited by the ponencia do not suffice to justify the redistricting, particularly the inclusion of the municipality
of Libmanan in the second district. Linguistic difference is a weak basis to segregate the municipalities in the redistricting. To sanction
that as basis would see a wholesale redistricting of the entire country, given the hundreds of dialects being spoken. Imagine Binondo
being segregated from the Tagalog-speaking district of Tondo or Sta. Cruz in Manila on the ground that Fookien is largely spoken in
Binondo.
The former first district supposedly occupied 40% of the total land area of Camarines Sur. But the former fourth district (which is now
the fifth) comprises the same percentage of land area, if not bigger. If land area was a factor, then the former fourth district should
have been re-districted also since it is endowed with a big area like the former first district.
The municipality of Libmanan is supposedly isolated by a body of water from the first district. But so is the municipality of Cabusao
which is situated northeast of Libmanan and which is bordered by the same body of water. Yet Cabusao is part of the new first district.
Considering the similar geographical location of the two municipalities, there is no compelling reason to segregate Libmanan from the
first district and tack it to the newly created second district.
The seminal case of Reynolds v. Sims16 had already ruled that these factors cannot be permissively considered in legislative
reapportionment.
x x x Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for judgment in legislative
apportionment controversies. x x x [We] hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, [equal protection] requires that the seats in both
houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individuals right to vote for state
legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens
living in other parts of the [State].
xxxx
[Equal protection] requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as
nearly of equal population as is practicable. We realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each
one has an identical number of residents, citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional
requirement. So long as the divergences from a strict population principle are constitutionally permissible, but neither history alone,

nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based
representation. Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations of area alone provide an insufficient justification
for deviations from the equal-population principle. Again, people, not land or trees or pastures, vote. x x x (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Undoubtedly, Camarines Surs malapportionment largely partakes of gerrymandering. 17
A final word. By pronouncing that "other factors," aside from population, should be considered in the composition of additional
districts, thereby adding other requisites despite the Constitutions clear limitation to population and contiguity, the ponencia
effectively opens the floodgates to opportunistic lawmakers to reconfigure their own principalia and bantam districts. Leaving open
Section 5 of Article VI to arbitrary factors, such as economic, political, socio-cultural, racial and even religious ones, is an invitation
to a free-for-all.
In light of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition and DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL Republic Act No. 9716.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951

February 15, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu;
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality
of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177499
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk, Province of
Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte; Municipality
of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178056
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of Carcar,
Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and Department
of Budget and Management, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For consideration of this Court are the following pleadings:
1. Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010 dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by
respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al.; and
2. Opposition [To the "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010"].

Meanwhile, respondents also filed on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
August 24, 2010" for Hearing. This motion was, however, already denied by the Court En Banc.
A brief background
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of
Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,1 each converting the municipality
covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote,2 granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood
Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.
In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a 7-5 vote,3 denied the first motion for reconsideration.
On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 6-6,4 which denied the second motion for reconsideration for
being a prohibited pleading.
In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009 Resolution in this wise
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained."
Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore
allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration is no longer a
prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed
the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading.
However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the
Court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution. 5
Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4,6 declared the Cityhood Laws as
constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6,7 resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and the Ad Cautelam Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta
City, reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision. Hence, the aforementioned pleadings.
Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice changed its position on the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood
Laws, and especially taking note of the novelty of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion for Reconsideration of the
"Resolution" dated August 24, 2010 deserves favorable action by this Court on the basis of the following cogent points:
1.
The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.
Article X, Section 10 provides
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution is that the exemption clauses in
the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), particularly
Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, which took effect on June 30, 2001, viz.
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a
locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00)
for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance,
of at least P20,000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant prices.

Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bills filed for
conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities. During the 11th Congress (June 1998-June 2001), 33 of these bills were
enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities that were converted into component
cities through the Cityhood Laws.
The rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be gleaned from the sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel on Senate Bill No.
2157, to wit
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in the whole set of proposed amendments that we have
introduced to precisely amend the Local Government Code. However, it is a fact that there is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to
be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the Local Government was approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number has
increased to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for conversion to the same status. At the rate we are going, I am
apprehensive that before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no municipalities.
It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other things, that the financial requirement, which, under the Local
Government Code, is fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality to have the right to be converted into a
city, and the P100 million should be sourced from locally generated funds.
What has been happening, Mr. President, is, the municipalities aspiring to become cities say that they qualify in terms of financial
requirements by incorporating the Internal Revenue share of the taxes of the nation on to their regularly generated revenue. Under that
requirement, it looks clear to me that practically all municipalities in this country would qualify to become cities.
It is precisely for that reason, therefore, that we are seeking the approval of this Chamber to amend, particularly Section 450 of
Republic Act No. 7160, the requisite for the average annual income of a municipality to be converted into a city or cluster of
barangays which seek to be converted into a city, raising that revenue requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the last two
consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices.8
While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several
municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws, desiring to become component cities which qualified under the P20
million income requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC. The interpellation of Senate President Franklin Drilon of Senator
Pimentel is revealing, thus
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a number of
municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present standard.
We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the standard as
proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill, on the assumption that it is approved, retroact to the bills
that are pending in the Senate conversion from municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber,
assuming that this bill becomes a law tomorrow, that it will apply to those bills which are already approved by the House under the old
version of the Local Government Code and are now pending in the Senate? The Chair does not know if we can craft a language which
will limit the application to those which are not yet in the Senate. Or is that a policy that the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that provision because what we are saying here
will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not think that the bill would have any
retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber will not be affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman.9
Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not
be covered by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the LGC was amended by
R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by
which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged.
Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of
Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were
enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent
municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.

Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate President Drilon and Senator Pimentel, it cannot be denied
that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement imposed
by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component
cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of
transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it is
worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each respondent municipality, viz
Batac, Ilocos Norte It is the biggest municipality of the 2nd District of Ilocos Norte, 2nd largest and most progressive town in the
province of Ilocos Norte and the natural convergence point for the neighboring towns to transact their commercial ventures and other
daily activities. A growing metropolis, Batac is equipped with amenities of modern living like banking institutions, satellite cable
systems, telecommunications systems. Adequate roads, markets, hospitals, public transport systems, sports, and entertainment
facilities. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5941, introduced by Rep. Imee R. Marcos.]
El Salvador, Misamis Oriental It is located at the center of the Cagayan-Iligan Industrial Corridor and home to a number of
industrial companies and corporations. Investment and financial affluence of El Salvador is aptly credited to its industrious and
preserving people. Thus, it has become the growing investment choice even besting nearby cities and municipalities. It is home to
Asia Brewery as distribution port of their product in Mindanao. The Gokongwei Group of Companies is also doing business in the
area. So, the conversion is primarily envisioned to spur economic and financial prosperity to this coastal place in North-Western
Misamis Oriental. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 6003, introduced by Rep. Augusto H. Bacullo.]
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte It is the largest of the eleven (11) municipalities in the province of Agusan del Norte. It plays
strategic importance to the administrative and socio-economic life and development of Agusan del Norte. It is the foremost in terms of
trade, commerce, and industry. Hence, the municipality was declared as the new seat and capital of the provincial government of
Agusan del Norte pursuant to Republic Act No. 8811 enacted into law on August 16, 2000. Its conversion will certainly promote,
invigorate, and reinforce the economic potential of the province in establishing itself as an agro-industrial center in the Caraga region
and accelerate the development of the area. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3094, introduced by Rep. Ma. Angelica Rosedell M.
Amante.]
Borongan, Eastern Samar It is the capital town of Eastern Samar and the development of Eastern Samar will depend to a certain
degree of its urbanization. It will serve as a catalyst for the modernization and progress of adjacent towns considering the frequent
interactions between the populace. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 2640, introduced by Rep. Marcelino C. Libanan.]
Lamitan, Basilan Before Basilan City was converted into a separate province, Lamitan was the most progressive part of the city. It
has been for centuries the center of commerce and the seat of the Sultanate of the Yakan people of Basilan. The source of its income is
agro-industrial and others notably copra, rubber, coffee and host of income generating ventures. As the most progressive town in
Basilan, Lamitan continues to be the center of commerce catering to the municipalities of Tuburan, Tipo-Tipo and Sumisip.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5786, introduced by Rep. Gerry A. Salapuddin.]
Catbalogan, Samar It has always been the socio-economic-political capital of the Island of Samar even during the Spanish era. It is
the seat of government of the two congressional districts of Samar. Ideally located at the crossroad between Northern and Eastern
Samar, Catbalogan also hosts trade and commerce activates among the more prosperous cities of the Visayas like Tacloban City, Cebu
City and the cities of Bicol region. The numerous banks and telecommunication facilities showcases the healthy economic
environment of the municipality. The preeminent and sustainable economic situation of Catbalogan has further boosted the call of
residents for a more vigorous involvement of governance of the municipal government that is inherent in a city government.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 2088, introduced by Rep. Catalino V. Figueroa.]
Bogo, Cebu Bogo is very qualified for a city in terms of income, population and area among others. It has been elevated to the Hall
of Fame being a five-time winner nationwide in the clean and green program. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3042, introduced
by Rep. Clavel A. Martinez.]
Tandag, Surigao del Sur This over 350 year old capital town the province has long sought its conversion into a city that will pave the
way not only for its own growth and advancement but also help in the development of its neighboring municipalities and the province
as a whole. Furthermore, it can enhance its role as the provinces trade, financial and government center. [Explanatory Note of House
Bill No. 5940, introduced by Rep. Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.]
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur It is a first class municipality and the biggest in terms of population in the entire province. It has the most
progressive and thickly populated area among the 14 municipalities that comprise the province. Thus, it has become the center for
trade and commerce in Agusan del Sur. It has a more developed infrastructure and facilities than other municipalities in the province.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 1899, introduced by Rep. Rodolfo "Ompong" G. Plaza.]
Carcar, Cebu Through the years, Carcar metamorphosed from rural to urban and now boast of its manufacturing industry,
agricultural farming, fishing and prawn industry and its thousands of large and small commercial establishments contributing to the
bulk of economic activities in the municipality. Based on consultation with multi-sectoral groups, political and non-government
agencies, residents and common folk in Carcar, they expressed their desire for the conversion of the municipality into a component
city. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3990, introduced by Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas.]
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental Its population is second highest in the province, next only to the provincial capital and higher than
Canlaon City and Bais City. Agriculture contributes heavily to its economy. There are very good prospects in agricultural production
brought about by its favorable climate. It has also the Tanon Strait that provides a good fishing ground for its numerous fishermen. Its
potential to grow commercially is certain. Its strategic location brought about by its existing linkage networks and the major
transportation corridors traversing the municipality has established Guihulngan as the center of commerce and trade in this part of

Negros Oriental with the first congressional district as its immediate area of influence. Moreover, it has beautiful tourist spots that are
being availed of by local and foreign tourists. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3628, introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras.]
Tayabas, Quezon It flourished and expanded into an important politico-cultural center in [the] Tagalog region. For 131 years (11791910), it served as the cabecera of the province which originally carried the cabeceras own name, Tayabas. The locality is rich in
culture, heritage and trade. It was at the outset one of the more active centers of coordination and delivery of basic, regular and diverse
goods and services within the first district of Quezon Province. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3348, introduced by Rep. Rafael
P. Nantes.]
Tabuk, Kalinga It not only serves as the main hub of commerce and trade, but also the cultural center of the rich customs and
traditions of the different municipalities in the province. For the past several years, the income of Tabuk has been steadily increasing,
which is an indication that its economy is likewise progressively growing. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3068, introduced by
Rep. Laurence P. Wacnang.]
Available information on Baybay, Leyte; Mati, Davao Oriental; and Naga, Cebu shows their economic viability, thus:
Covering an area of 46,050 hectares, Baybay [Leyte] is composed of 92 barangays, 23 of which are in the poblacion. The remaining
69 are rural barangays. Baybay City is classified as a first class city. It is situated on the western coast of the province of Leyte. It has
a Type 4 climate, which is generally wet. Its topography is generally mountainous in the eastern portion as it slopes down west
towards the shore line. Generally an agricultural city, the common means of livelihood are farming and fishing. Some are engaged in
hunting and in forestall activities. The most common crops grown are rice, corn, root crops, fruits, and vegetables. Industries operating
include the Specialty Products Manufacturing, Inc. and the Visayan Oil Mill. Various cottage industries can also be found in the city
such as bamboo and rattan craft, ceramics, dress-making, fiber craft, food preservation, mat weaving, metal craft, fine Philippine
furniture manufacturing and other related activities. Baybay has great potential as a tourist destination, especially for tennis players. It
is not only rich in biodiversity and history, but it also houses the campus of the Visayas State University (formerly the Leyte State
University/Visayas State College of Agriculture/Visayas Agricultural College/Baybay National Agricultural School/Baybay
Agricultural High School and the Jungle Valley Park.) Likewise, it has river systems fit for river cruising, numerous caves for
spelunking, forests, beaches, and marine treasures. This richness, coupled with the friendly Baybayanos, will be an element of a
successful tourism program. Considering the role of tourism in development, Baybay City intends to harness its tourism potential.
(<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baybay City> visited September 19, 2008)
Mati [Davao Oriental] is located on the eastern part of the island of Mindanao. It is one hundred sixty-five (165) kilometers away from
Davao City, a one and a half-hour drive from Tagum City. Visitors can travel from Davao City through the Madaum diversion road,
which is shorter than taking the Davao-Tagum highway. Travels by air and sea are possible, with the existence of an airport and
seaport. Mati boasts of being the coconut capital of Mindanao if not the whole country. A large portion of its fertile land is planted to
coconuts, and a significant number of its population is largely dependent on it. Other agricultural crops such as mango, banana, corn,
coffee and cacao are also being cultivated, as well as the famous Menzi pomelo and Valencia oranges. Mati has a long stretch of
shoreline and one can find beaches of pure, powder-like white sand. A number of resorts have been developed and are now open to
serve both local and international tourists. Some of these resorts are situated along the coast of Pujada Bay and the Pacific Ocean.
Along the western coast of the bay lies Mt. Hamiguitan, the home of the pygmy forest, where bonsai plants and trees grow, some of
which are believed to be a hundred years old or more. On its peak is a lake, called "Tinagong Dagat," or hidden sea, so covered by
dense vegetation a climber has to hike trails for hours to reach it. The mountain is also host to rare species of flora and fauna, thus
becoming a wildlife sanctuary for these life forms. (<http://mati.wetpain.com/?t=anon> accessed on September 19, 2008.)
Mati is abundant with nickel, chromite, and copper. Louie Rabat, Chamber President of the Davao Oriental Eastern Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, emphasized the big potential of the mining industry in the province of Davao Oriental. As such, he strongly
recommends Mati as the mining hub in the Region.
(<http://www.pia.gov.ph/default.asp?m=12&sec=reader&rp=1&fi=p080115.htm&no.=9&date, accessed on September 19, 2008)
Naga [Cebu]: Historical BackgroundIn the early times, the place now known as Naga was full of huge trees locally called as
"Narra." The first settlers referred to this place as Narra, derived from the huge trees, which later simply became Naga. Considered as
one of the oldest settlements in the Province of Cebu, Naga became a municipality on June 12, 1829. The municipality has gone
through a series of classifications as its economic development has undergone changes and growth. The tranquil farming and fishing
villages of the natives were agitated as the Spaniards came and discovered coal in the uplands. Coal was the first export of the
municipality, as the Spaniards mined and sent it to Spain. The mining industry triggered the industrial development of Naga. As the
years progressed, manufacturing and other industries followed, making Naga one of the industrialized municipalities in the Province
of Cebu.
Class of Municipality 1st class
Province Cebu
Distance from Cebu City 22 kms.
Number of Barangays 28
No. of Registered Voters 44,643 as of May 14, 2007
Total No. of Precincts 237 (as of May 14, 2007)

Ann. Income (as of Dec. 31, 2006) Php112,219,718.35 Agricultural, Industrial, Agro-Industrial, Mining Product
(<http://www.nagacebu.com/index.php?option=com.content&view=article id=53:naga-facts-and-figures&catid=51:nagafacts-and-figures&Itemid=75> visited September 19, 2008)
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. 10 The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their
original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government.
Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged
it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and
extends to matters of general concern or common interest. 11
Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it
did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood
Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local
government unitsincome, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the
conversion of municipalities into component cities when
it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources. However, Congress
deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold
its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy,
especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through
the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory
R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18,
2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their
exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.
2.
The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Both the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution impress that the Cityhood Laws violate the equal
protection clause enshrined in the Constitution. Further, it was also ruled that Section 6, Article X was violated because the Cityhood
Laws infringed on the "just share" that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention shall receive from the national taxes (IRA) to be
automatically released to them.
Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we declare that there was valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate
the equal protection clause.
As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification, provided that it: (1) rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally
to all members of the same class.12
The petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
and municipalities that did not have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material
difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. This contention misses the point.
It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the interpellation by Senate President Drilon of Senator Pimentel that the
purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the "mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities" and
the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities and without municipalities. It should be pointed out that the
imposition of the P100 million average annual income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made. To be
sure, there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very
high income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to
become component cities. And to highlight such arbitrariness and the absurdity of the situation created thereby, R.A. No. 9009 has, in
effect, placed component cities at a higher standing than highly urbanized cities under Section 452 of the LGC, to wit
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. (a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office, and with the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be considered component cities of the province in which they are
geographically located. (Emphasis supplied)
The P100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009, being an arbitrary amount, cannot be conclusively said to be the
only amount "sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special
functions

commensurate with the size of its population," per Section 7 13 of the LGC. It was imposed merely because it is difficult to comply
with. While it could be argued that P100 million, being more than P20 million, could, of course, provide the essential government
facilities, services, and special functions vis--vis the population of a municipality wanting to become a component city, it cannot be
said that the minimum amount of P20 million would be insufficient. This is evident from the existing cities whose income, up to now,
do not comply with the P100 million income requirement, some of which have lower than the P20 million average annual income.
Consider the list14 below
CITY

AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME

1. Marawi City

5,291,522.10

2. Palayan City

6,714,651.77

3. Sipalay City

9,713,120.00

4. Canlaon City

13,552,493.79

5. Himamaylan City

15,808,530.00

6. Isabela City

16,811,246.79

7. Munoz City

19,693,358.61

8. Dapitan City

20,529,181.08

9. Tangub City

20,943,810.04

10. Bayawan City

22,943,810.04

11. Island Garden City of Samal

23,034,731.83

12. Tanjay City

23,723,612.44

13. Tabaco City

24,152,853.71

14. Oroquieta City

24,279,966.51

15. Ligao City

28,326,745.86

16. Sorsogon City

30,403,324.59

17. Maasin City

30,572,113.65

18. Escalante City

32,113,970.00

19. Iriga City

32,757,871.44

20. Gapan City

34,254,986.47

21. Candon City

36,327,705.86

22. Gingoog City

37,327,705.86

23. Masbate City

39,454,508.28

24. Passi City

40,314,620.00

25. Calbayog City

40,943,128.73

26. Calapan City

41,870,239.21

27. Cadiz City

43,827,060.00

28. Alaminos City

44,352,501.00

29. Bais City

44, 646,826.48

30. San Carlos City

46,306,129.13

31. Silay City

47,351,730.00

32. Bislig City

47,360,716.24

33. Tacurong City

49,026,281.56

34. Talisay City (Negros Occidental) 52,609,790.00

35. Kabankalan City

53,560,580.00

36. Malaybalay City

54,423,408.55

37. La Carlota City

54,760,290.00

38. Vigan City

56,831,797.19

39. Balanga City

61,556,700.49

40. Sagay City

64,266,350.00

41. Cavite City

64,566,079.05

42. Koronadal City

66,231,717.19

43. Cotabato City

66,302,114.52

44. Toledo City

70,157,331.12

45. San Jose City

70,309,233.43

46. Danao City

72,621,955.30

47. Bago City

74,305,000.00

48. Valencia City

74,557,298.92

49. Victorias City

75,757,298.92

50. Cauayan City

82,949,135.46

51. Santiago City

83,816,025.89

52. Roxas City

85,397,830.00

53. Dipolog City

85,503,262.85

54. Trece Martires City

87,413,786.64

55. Talisay City (Cebu)

87,964,972.97

56. Ozamis city

89,054,056.12

57. Surigao City

89,960,971.33

58. Panabo City

91,425,301.39

59. Digos City

92,647,699.13

The undeniable fact that these cities remain viable as component cities of their respective provinces emphasizes the arbitrariness of the
amount of P100 million as the new income requirement for the conversion of municipalities into component cities. This arbitrariness
can also be clearly gleaned from the respective distinctive traits and level of economic development of the individual respondent
municipalities as above submitted.
Verily, the determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the
mere pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. This Court sees the bigger picture. The existence of substantial
distinction with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A.
No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a), thus
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of
the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government
units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the
National Government to the local government units.
Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their
respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to
become the States partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the
LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the
present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to
exist.
Petitioners in these cases complain about the purported reduction of their "just share" in the IRA. To be sure, petitioners are entitled to
a "just share," not a specific amount. But the feared reduction proved to be false when, after the implementation of the Cityhood Laws,
their respective shares increased, not decreased. Consider the table 15 below
1avvphi1
CITY

CY 2006 IRA
(Before Implementation of Sixteen [16]
Cityhood Laws)

CY 2008 IRA
(Actual Release After Implementation of Sixteen [16]
Cityhood Laws)

Bais

219,338,056.00

242,193,156.00

Batangas

334,371,984.00

388,871,770.00

Bayawan

353,150,158.00

388,840,062.00

Cadiz

329,491,285.00

361,019,211.00

Calapan

227,772,199.00

252,587,779.00

Calbayog

438,603,378.00

485,653,769.00

Cauayan

250,477,157.00

277,120,828.00

Gen. Santos

518,388,557.00

631,864,977.00

Gingoog

314,425,637.00

347,207,725.00

Himamaylan

248,154,381.00

277,532,458.00

Iloilo

358,394,268.00

412,506,278.00

Iriga

183,132,036.00

203,072,932.00

Legaspi

235,314,016.00

266,537,785.00

Ligao

215,608,112.00

239,696,441.00

Oroquieta

191,803,213.00

211,449,720.00

Pagadian

292,788,255.00

327,401,672.00

San Carlos

239,524,249.00

260,515,711.00

San
Fernando

182,320,356.00

204,140,940.00

Santiago

508,326,072.00

563,679,572.00

Silay

216,372,314.00

241,363,845.00

Surigao

233,968,119.00

260,708,071.00

Tacurong

179,795,271.00

197,880,665.00

Tagaytay

130,159,136.00

152,445,295.00

Tarlac

348,186,756.00

405,611,581.00

Tangub

162,248,610.00

180,640,621.00

Urdaneta

187,721,031.00

207,129,386.00

Victorias

176,367,959.00

194,162,687.00

Zamboanga

918,013,016.00

1,009,972,704.00

What these petitioner cities were stating as a reduction of their respective IRA shares was based on a computation of what they would
receive if respondent municipalities were not to become component cities at all. Of course, that would mean a bigger amount to which
they have staked their claim. After considering these, it all boils down to money and how much more they would receive if respondent
municipalities remain as municipalities and not share in the 23% fixed IRA from the national government for cities.
Moreover, the debates in the Senate on R.A. No. 9009, should prove enlightening:
SENATOR SOTTO. Mr. President, we just want to be enlightened again on the previous qualification and the present one being
proposed. Before there were three
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There are three requisites for a municipality to become a city. Let us start with the finance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Will the distinguished sponsor please refresh us? I used to be the chairman of the Committee on Local
Government, but the new job that was given to me by the Senate has erased completely my memory as far as the Local Government
Code is concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President, with pleasure. There are three requirements. One is financial.
SENATOR SOTTO. All right. It used to be P20 million.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. It is P20 million. Now we are raising it to P100 million of locally generated funds.
SENATOR SOTTO. In other words, the P20 million before includes the IRA.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. No, Mr. President.
SENATOR SOTTO. It should not have been included?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. The internal revenue share should never have been included. That was not the intention when we first crafted
the Local Government Code. The financial capacity was supposed to be demonstrated by the municipality wishing to become a city by
its own effort, meaning to say, it should not rely on the internal revenue share that comes from the government. Unfortunately, I think
what happened in past conversions of municipalities into cities was, the Department of Budget and Management, along with the

Department of Finance, had included the internal revenue share as a part of the municipality, demonstration that they are now
financially capable and can measure up to the requirement of the Local Government Code of having a revenue of at least P20 million.
SENATOR SOTTO. I am glad that the sponsor, Mr. President, has spread that into the Record because otherwise, if he did not
mention the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, then I would have been blamed for the
misinterpretation. But anyway, the gentleman is correct. That was the interpretation given to us during the hearings.
So now, from P20 million, we make it P100 million from locally generated income as far as population is concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. As far as population is concerned, there will be no change, Mr. President. Still 150,000.
SENATOR SOTTO. Still 150,000?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. And then the land area?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. As to the land area, there is no change; it is still 100 square kilometers.
SENATOR SOTTO. But before it was "either/or"?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is correct. As long as it has one of the three requirements, basically, as long as it meets the financial
requirement, then it may meet the territorial requirement or the population requirement.
SENATOR SOTTO. So, it remains "or"?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. We are now changing it into AND.
SENATOR SOTTO. AND?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is the proposal, Mr. President. In other words
SENATOR SOTTO. Does the gentleman not think there will no longer be any municipality that will qualify, Mr. President?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There may still be municipalities which can qualify, but it will take a little time. They will have to produce
more babies. I do not knowexpand their territories, whatever, by reclamation or otherwise. But the whole proposal is geared towards
making it difficult for municipalities to convert into cities.
On the other hand, I would like to advert to the fact that in the amendments that we are proposing for the entire Local Government
Code, we are also raising the internal revenue share of the municipalities.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. So that, more or less, hindi naman sila dehado in this particular instance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Well, then, because of that information, Mr. President, I throw my full support behind the measure.
Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Thank you very much, Mr. President. (Emphasis supplied) 16
From the foregoing, the justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood Laws becomes obvious, especially considering that 33
municipalities were converted into component cities almost immediately prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the enactment of
the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the
abrupt increase in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009, acknowledging the "privilege" that they have already given to those
newly-converted component cities, which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same footing or "class" as
the respondent municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces.
Petitioners complain of the projects that they would not be able to pursue and the expenditures that they would not be able to meet, but
totally ignored the respondent municipalities obligations arising from the contracts they have already entered into, the employees that
they have already hired, and the projects that they have already initiated and completed as component cities. Petitioners have
completely overlooked the need of respondent municipalities to become effective vehicles intending to accelerate economic growth in
the countryside. It is like the elder siblings wanting to kill the newly-borns so that their inheritance would not be diminished.

Apropos is the following parable:

There was a landowner who went out at dawn to hire workmen for his vineyard. After reaching an agreement with them for the usual
daily wage, he sent them out to his vineyard. He came out about midmorning and saw other men standing around the marketplace
without work, so he said to them, "You too go along to my vineyard and I will pay you whatever is fair." They went. He came out
again around noon and mid-afternoon and did the same. Finally, going out in late afternoon he found still others standing around. To
these he said, "Why have you been standing here idle all day?" "No one has hired us," they told him. He said, "You go to the vineyard
too." When evening came, the owner of the vineyard said to his foreman, "Call the workmen and give them their pay, but begin with
the last group and end with the first." When those hired late in the afternoon came up they received a full days pay, and when the first
group appeared they thought they would get more, yet they received the same daily wage. Thereupon they complained to the owner,
"This last group did only an hours work, but you have paid them on the same basis as us who have worked a full day in the scorching
heat." "My friend," he said to one in reply, "I do you no injustice. You agreed on the usual wage, did you not? Take your pay and go
home. I intend to give this man who was hired last the same pay as you. I am free to do as I please with my money, am I not? Or are
you envious because I am generous?"17
Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of respondent municipalities,
having seen their respective capacities to become component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A.
No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose
of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government units "enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals," which is
the very mandate of the Constitution.
Finally, we should not be restricted by technical rules of procedure at the expense of the transcendental interest of justice and equity.
While it is true that litigation must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is nobler rather for this Court of last resort, as
vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions and doubt, as the following pronouncement of this Court instructs:
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are
invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts invariably give the most careful
consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with
great deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they should never
declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a
legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution x x x, the case must be
so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent
respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its
validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative
act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.18
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010, dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by
respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Cityhood LawsRepublic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435,
9436, and 9491are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

LOIDA
NICOLAS-LEWIS,
GREGORIO
B.
MACABENTA,
ALEJANDRO
A.
ESCLAMADO,
ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC
LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA
OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA,
CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D. NATIVIDAD,

G.R. No. 162759

Present:

Petitioners,
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,

- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.

TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 4, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and
others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
20031[1] (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and register
as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.

The facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such
applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration
and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC
letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 20032[2], they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to
their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different
Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would
contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal vs. COMELEC 3[3] on the
residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response:
Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality , it is the Commission's position that those who have
availed of the law cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them.
Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence
now stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency, among others under Section 1, Article
5 of the Constitution. 4[4]
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include
them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5[5] filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari
and mandamus.
A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment,6[6] therein
praying for the denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that
all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so , observing, however,
that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic.7[7]
The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar
only as petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed
in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing duals to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains
unresolved.

Observing the petitioners and the COMELECs respective formulations of the issues, the same may be reduced into the
question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship
pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the petition.
In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on the right of suffrage is, therefore,
indicated.
We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows:

SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. xxx.
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote.
On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may,
as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote.

In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL8[8] - identifying in its Section 4 who can vote
under it and in the following section who cannot, as follows:

Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at
least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.
Section 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
(a)

Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;

(b)
Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance
to a foreign country;
(c)
Those who have [been] convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense
punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have been found guilty of
Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, .;
(d)
An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall
resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her
registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident
from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
(e)
Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent
authority . (Words in bracket added.)

Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the
enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the
disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional challenge on the ground that, as narrated in Macalintal, it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. [The

challenger] cites Caasi vs. Court of Appeals 9[9] to support his claim [where] the Court held that a green card holder immigrant
to the [US] is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
[The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the
legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by
providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a
Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the
election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.10[10] (Words
in bracket added.)
As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 mainly on the
strength of the following premises:
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or
permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country because immigration or permanent residence in
another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an
immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that
he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of
Article V that all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the right
of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical
residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to
establish a system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or
enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or
permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an
explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the
execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes provisional registration or a
promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise. 11[11]

Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of
which reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be
deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1)
Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as The Overseas

Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other existing laws;

(2)
Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship ;
3)

xxx

(4) xxx

xxx
xxx

xxx.
xxx;

(5)
That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot
be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a)
are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which
they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b)
are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the
armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now
invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to the same Section 5 (1) providing that
duals can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what at first blush is the clashing provisions of the aforecited
provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires residency in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a
Filipino non-resident absentee voting rights,12[12] COMELEC argues:
4.

DUALS MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/ RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES

4.01.

The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225 is logical. The duals,
upon renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and acquisition of foreign citizenship, have
practically and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their legal ties to the homeland as a
consequence. Having subsequently acquired a second citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, duals
must, for purposes of voting, first of all, decisively and definitely establish their domicile through
positive acts; 13[13]

The Court disagrees.

As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in
implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that
granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as
possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are
qualified to vote. Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal:
It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as
much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission
even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 [Article V] immediately
after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, ,
the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the
actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in
effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do
not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in
Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No.

9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus:

Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the
constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the Constitution is supreme in
any statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have resided in the Philippines.
They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so they are barred under the
Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee amendment which in fact does not alter
the original text of the bill will have any effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various fora.
This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of residence is
synonymous with domicile.
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is the intent to return to one's
home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the Philippines and
may be physically a resident of the United States, for example, but has a clear intent to return to
the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of the Philippines under this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we that Congress
must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding physical
presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan,
Mr. President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it
reads: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as
well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is qualified. In other words, anything
that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be anchored on the proposition
that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot vote. And residents (sic) is a
qualification.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election.
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros . We are separated only by a creek. But one
who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is
how restrictive our Constitution is. .
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so. But
he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise, he is not qualified to
vote.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already welldebated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of Article V
was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year residency requirement is to demonstrate
unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the sixmonth/one-year residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must
remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence residency has
been interpreted as synonymous with domicile.
But the third more practical reason, is, if we follow the interpretation of the
gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to
overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is quite ridiculous because
that is exactly the whole point of this exercise to enfranchise them and empower them to
vote. 14[14] (Emphasis and words in bracket added; citations omitted)

Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. According to the poll body:
1.05
With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently expanded so as to include
Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of
RA 9225; 15[15]
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law
with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru
the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the
following wise:
Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their
right to vote;
Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under
this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of
R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the
inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be
deemed citizens of the Philippines.
It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18)
years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of "duals" may nonetheless
avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no
rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas
absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those
who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No.
9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 201716

January 8, 2013

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case

In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) assails and seeks to nullify (1) the February 8,
2012 Resolution1 of the Second Division, Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and (2) the May 10,
2012 Resolution2 of the COMELEC en banc affirming that divisions disposition. The assailed issuances, in turn, affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55
declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as,
Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the
position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning
mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of
the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004
mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on
June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of
candidacy3 for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the formers disqualification to run,
the corresponding petition,4 docketed as SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. On June 16,
2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution5 finding for Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes 6 and
was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification case Torres initiated against
Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto 7 action before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac,
Catanduanes, docketed as Election Case No. 55, to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to
disqualify.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor, disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as
municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
SO ORDERED.9
In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC, 10 found Abundo to have already served three consecutive mayoralty
terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term. Abundo, the
RTC noted, had been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and
actually served as Viga mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be exact. To the RTC,
the year and a month service constitutes a complete and full service of Abundos second term as mayor.
Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010.
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELECs Second Division rendered the first assailed Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac, Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and
the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.11
Just like the RTC, the COMELECs Second Division ruled against Abundo on the strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of
the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as service for one full term
within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule.
In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its equally assailed Resolution of May 10,
2012. The fallo of the COMELEC en bancs Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc held in essence the following: first, there was no
involuntary interruption of Abundos 2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he is
considered never to have lost title to the disputed office after he won in his election protest; and second, what the Constitution

prohibits is for an elective official to be in office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms and not to the service of
the term.
Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction.
Intervening Events
In the meantime, following the issuance by the COMELEC of its May 10, 2012 Resolution denying Abundos motion for
reconsideration, the following events transpired:
1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Order13 declaring its May 10, 2012 Resolution final and executory. The
following day, June 21, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Entry of Judgment.14
2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for Execution 15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes.
3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on Vegas counsels motion 16 filed a day earlier, issued an Order17 directing the
bailiff of ECAD (COMELEC) to personally deliver the entire records to said RTC.
On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the entire records of the instant case to, and were duly
received by, the clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43.
4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records, the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes granted
Vegas Motion for Execution through an Order18 of even date. And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on the same day.
5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and served the same at the office of Mayor Abundo
on the same day via substituted service.
6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO20 enjoining the enforcement of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Courts July 3, 2012 Resolution 21 and a copy of the TRO. On the same day, ViceMayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of office 22 as mayor
and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively.
8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of Abundos Seventh (7th) Most Extremely Urgent Manifestation and Motion 23
dated June 28, 2012 praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or status quo ante Order. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio
M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervanteswho had taken their oaths of office the day beforeassumed the posts of
mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.24
9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To Admit Attached Manifestation) 25 and Manifestation with Leave to Admit26
dated July 5, 2012 stating that the TRO thus issued by the Court has become functus officio owing to the execution of the
RTCs Decision in Election Case No. 55.
10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his Comment/Opposition with Leave to the Petitioners Prayer for the Issuance of a Status
Quo Ante Order27 reiterating the argument that since Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes
already assumed the posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante Order would serve no
purpose.
11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert the July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status
Quo Ante Order (In View of the Unreasonable and Inappropriate Progression of Events). 28
It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was dislodged from his post as incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be
sure, the speed which characterized Abundos ouster despite the supervening issuance by the Court of a TRO on July 3, 2012 is not
lost on the Court. While it is not clear whether Vice-Mayor Tarin and First Councilor Cervantes knew of or put on notice about the
TRO either before they took their oaths of office on July 4, 2012 or before assuming the posts of mayor and vice-mayor on July 5,
2012, the confluence of events following the issuance of the assailed COMELEC en banc irresistibly tends to show that the TRO
issued as it were to maintain the status quo, thus averting the premature ouster of Abundo pending this Courts resolution of his
appealappears to have been trivialized.
On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment on Abundos petition, followed not long after by public respondent COMELECs
Consolidated Comment.29
The Issues
Abundo raises the following grounds for the allowance of the petition:
6.1 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared the arguments in Abundos motion for reconsideration as mere rehash and reiterations of the claims he raised prior
to the promulgation of the Resolution.

6.2 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared that Abundo has consecutively served for three terms despite the fact that he only served the remaining one year and
one month of the second term as a result of an election protest. 30
First Issue:
Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not Mere Reiteration
The COMELEC en banc denied Abundos motion for reconsideration on the basis that his arguments in said motion are mere
reiterations of what he already brought up in his appeal Brief before the COMELEC Second Division. In this petition, petitioner
claims otherwise.
Petitioners assertion is devoid of merit.
A comparison of Abundos arguments in the latters Brief vis--vis those in his Motion for Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the
arguments in the MR are elucidations and amplications of the same issues raised in the brief. First, in his Brief, Abundo raised the sole
issue of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to consider the quo warranto case since the alleged violation of the three-term limit has already
been rejected by the COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), while in his MR, Abundo raised the similar ground of
the conclusiveness of the COMELECs finding on the issue of his qualification to run for the current term. Second, in his Brief,
Abundo assailed RTCs reliance on Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued that the Courts pronouncement in Aldovino, Jr., which
dealt with preventive suspension, is not applicable to the instant case as it involves only a partial service of the term. Abundo argued
in his Brief that his situation cannot be equated with the case of preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he
argued before that the almost two years which he did not sit as mayor during the 2004-2007 term is an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term.
Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the issues in the MR are a rehash of those in the Brief.
Core Issue:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms
The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from
his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the
application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.
On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and
was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the
rightful choice of the electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis Ours.)
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions,
the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.31
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus, has its complicated side. We
shall revisit and analyze the various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the Court on the matter.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by
the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. In

Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the observation that the law "does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only
actual interruption of service that does not affect continuity of service for a full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule."32
As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections,33 the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and
that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, following his
third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term, 34 albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position
after the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually
occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a
"voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned was elected." This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local
official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary
interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes resulting from the varying
interpretations applied on local officials who were elected and served for three terms or more, but whose terms or service was
punctuated by what they view as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed,
fourth term. Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or assumption of office by
operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the
proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election,
removal of the official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.
This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms were considered or not considered as
having been "involuntarily interrupted or broken."
(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr. 35 (1998) and Montebon v. Commission on Elections36 (2008), the
Court delved on the effects of "assumption to office by operation of law" on the three-term limit rule. This contemplates a situation
wherein an elective local official fills by succession a higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the
following contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. 37
In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, Capco became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja. Capco was then
elected and served as mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. When Capco expressed his intention to run again for the mayoralty
position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification
for violation of the three-term limit rule.
Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, "it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply."38 There was, the Court ruled, no violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was not elected to the
office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law" 39 when a permanent vacancy occurred
in that office.
The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There, Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as
municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second
term, Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When
Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on
the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that Montebons assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of
his continuity of service as councilor. The Court emphasized that succession in local government office is by operation of law and as
such, it is an involuntary severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to
assume office as vice-mayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his
position as councilor.
(2) Recall Election
With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service, Adormeo v. Commission on Elections 40 (2002) and the
aforementioned case of Socrates (2002) provide guidance.
In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was
conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in
2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms for violation of the
three term-limit rule. The Court held therein that the remainder of Tagaraos term after the recall election during which Talaga served
as mayor should not be considered for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the continuity of
Talagas mayorship was disrupted by his defeat during the 1998 elections.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in that case assailed the COMELEC Resolution which
declared Edward Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been elected and served as
mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-

term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and
eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for
the formers unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorns disqualification under the three-term limit rule.
In upholding Hagedorns candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled:
x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002
when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same
period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor,
not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.41
The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term and, hence,
any subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer covered x x x." 42
(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City
On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent officials continuity
of service. The Court said so in Latasa v. Commission on Elections43 (2003).
Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao
del Sur for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During his third term, Digos was converted into a component city, with the
corresponding cityhood law providing the holdover of elective officials. When Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as mayor for
the 2001 elections, the Court declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City for violation of the three-term limit rule on
the basis of the following ratiocination:
This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed
abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city
mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa
never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and
responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
(Emphasis supplied.)
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension
In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the period during which a local elected official is under
preventive suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of his service. The Court explained why so:
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption
that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption
because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. 44 (Emphasis supplied.)
(5) Election Protest
With regard to the effects of an election protest vis--vis the three-term limit rule, jurisprudence presents a more differing picture. The
Courts pronouncements in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections45 (1999), Ong v. Alegre46 (2006), Rivera III v. Commission on
Elections47 (2007) and Dizon v. Commission on Elections48 (2009), all protest cases, are illuminating.
In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992,
1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the
RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three months before
the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued.
Lonzanidas opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of
candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three
consecutive terms in the same post. The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must concur for the three-term
limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms." 49
In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent in the case of Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of office as mayor
"cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation." And as a corollary point, the
Court stated that Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term, a situation which amounts to an involuntary relinquishment of office.This Court deviated from the ruling in
Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre50 owing to a variance in the factual situations attendant.

In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001,
and 2001-2004. During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during his supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified Ongs
proclamation on the postulate that Ong lost during the 1998 elections. However, the COMELECs decision became final and
executory on July 4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the
2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position as mayor, which his opponent opposed for violation of the three-term limit rule.
Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be considered as having served as mayor from 1998-2001 because
he was not duly elected to the post and merely assumed office as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing Ongs argument, the Court held
that his assumption of office as mayor for the term 1998-2001 constitutes "service for the full term" and hence, should be counted for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions stated in Lonzanida in the sense that Ongs service was
deemed and counted as service for a full term because Ongs proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the term. The Court
noted that the COMELEC decision which declared Ong as not having won the 1998 elections was "without practical and legal use and
value" promulgated as it was after the contested term has expired. The Court further reasoned:
Petitioner Francis Ongs contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under
protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election
coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally
be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would
under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when
another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. 51 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of Ong was different, to wit:
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty
election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of
Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there
was an effective interruption of the continuity of service. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ongs slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the consolidated cases of Rivera III v. Commission on
Elections53 and Dee v. Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the following consecutive terms:
1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004. In relation to the 2004 elections, Morales again ran as mayor of the same town, emerged as
garnering the majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. A petition for
quo warranto was later filed against Morales predicated on the ground that he is ineligible to run for a "fourth" term, having served as
mayor for three consecutive terms. In his answer, Morales averred that his supposed 1998-2001 term cannot be considered against
him, for, although he was proclaimed by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as elected mayor vis--vis the 1998 elections and
discharged the duties of mayor until June 30, 2001, his proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his closest
rival, Anthony Dee, proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served as a mere
caretaker.
The Court found Morales posture untenable and held that the case of Morales presents a factual milieu similar with Ong, not with
Lonzanida. For ease of reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong, in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like Morales, had served the
three-year term from the start to the end of the term. Hence, the Court concluded that Morales exceeded the three-term limit rule, to
wit:
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until
June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by
petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an
interruption in serving the full term.
xxxx
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1,
1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. 55 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the expiry of the term, cannot constitute an interruption in
Morales service of the full term; neither can Morales, as he argued, be considered merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de
facto officer" for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule.
In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections, 56 the Court would again find the same Mayor Morales as respondent in a
disqualification proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty candidate during the 2007 elections for a term ending June 30, 2010.
Having been unseated from his post by virtue of this Courts ruling in Rivera, Morales would argue this time around that the threeterm limit rule was no longer applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled in his favor, holding that for purposes
of the 2007 elections, the three-term limit rule was no longer a disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote:
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the

vice mayors office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of
service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. 57 (Emphasis supplied)
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary
interruption, viz:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules
on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated
as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the
application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the
higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or
interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could
be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the officials service. For, he had
become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to
interrupt the incumbent officials continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officers continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during
this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he
loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the
unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need
not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided
the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full
term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the
term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
The Case of Abundo
Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling that he had already served three consecutive terms and is,
thus, barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the current 2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo arguments run thusly:
1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt with preventive suspension which does not
interrupt the continuity of service of a term;
2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be interrupted so as to remove him from the reach of the
constitutional three-term limitation;
3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its reliance on a mere portion of the Decision
and not on the unified logic in the disquisition;
4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida 58 and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections.59
5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no interruption in the service of Abundo since what he
considered as an "interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred before his term started; and
6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation was adjudged invalid was interrupted while that of the
protestant (Abundo) who was eventually proclaimed winner was not so interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical.
Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr. finds application in the instant case. The
COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to the office as his victory in the protest case confirmed his entitlement to said office
and he was only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office during the pendency of the election protest.
We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election protest, for which the rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera
and Dizon appear to be more attuned than the case of Aldovino Jr., the interrupting effects of the imposition of a preventive
suspension being the very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the same, We find that Abundos case presents a different factual
backdrop.
Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in the
election protest and each declared loser during the elections, Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was declared the
rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both unseated toward the end of their
respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had assumed the remainder of the term.

Notwithstanding, We still find this Courts pronouncements in the past as instructive, and consider several doctrines established from
the 1998 case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving at this Courts conclusion.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of political power" and prevent elected
officials from breeding "proprietary interest in their position" 60 but also to "enhance the peoples freedom of choice." 61 In the words of
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "while people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should
be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed." 62
In the present case, the Court finds Abundos case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his opponent,
Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundos case from the ambit of the
three-term limit rule.
It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly
elected mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his election protest against Torres and his consequent proclamation as duly
elected mayor. Accordingly, the first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the
official has been elected is satisfied.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served for "three consecutive terms," as the phrase is
juridically understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately before the 2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this
issue is of course the question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during the three three-year periods,
resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundos mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term.
There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his
favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over
one year and one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo
was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, 63 means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office." 64 It also means the "time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another." 65 It is the period of time during which a
duly elected official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160, 66 the term
for local elected officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June 30 of the first year of said term.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly
claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve
the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right
to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the
office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate
in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for
local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is
that Abundo actually served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundos opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be
considered an involuntary interruption of Abundos continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of
the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.67
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of
service. The word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension. 68 To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or
prevent.69 When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of
the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the
elective office. On the other hand, the word "renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce
is to give up, abandon, decline or resign.70 Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give
up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to.
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, applying Aldovino, Jr., 71 held:
It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence deems an exception to the three-term limit rule, implies
that the service of the term has begun before it was interrupted. Here, the respondent did not lose title to the office. As the assailed
Resolution states:
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the office. On the contrary, he actively sought entitlement to the
office when he lodged the election protest case. And respondent-appellants victory in the said case is a final confirmation that he was
validly elected for the mayoralty post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007. At most, respondent-appellant was only unable to
temporarily discharge the functions of the office to which he was validly elected during the pendency of the election protest, but he
never lost title to the said office.72 (Emphasis added.)
The COMELECs Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the actual length of service by the public official in a given
term is immaterial by reckoning said service for the term in the application of the three-term limit rule, thus:

As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this formulationno more than three consecutive termsis a clear command suggesting the
existence of an inflexible rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe to the argument that since respondent Abundo served only a portion of
the term, his 2004-2007 "term" should not be considered for purposes of the application of the three term limit rule. When the framers
of the Constitution drafted and incorporated the three term limit rule, it is clear that reference is to the term, not the actual length of the
service the public official may render. Therefore, ones actual service of term no matter how long or how short is immaterial. 73
In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the actual service of the term is immaterial in his case as
he was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor.
The COMELECs case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commend themselves for concurrence. The Court
cannot simply find its way clear to understand the poll bodys determination that Abundo was only temporarily unable to discharge his
functions as mayor during the pendency of the election protest.
As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term,
Abundos full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual
involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.
This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest,
Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying
the mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004the start of the termuntil May 9, 2006 or during
which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the
outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such
declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office and, in
fact, had no legal right to said position.
Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondents cause of action, or to COMELECs resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino
Jr., the Court succinctly defines what temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective office means, thus:
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not
be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from
holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided
by law.74
We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that
Abundo merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post. For one, during the intervening
period of almost two years, reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the
mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such
elective office. For another, not having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one
cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration
in the election protest accords him title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective office
until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor.1wphi1
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective interruption of his service, until he assumed
the office and served barely over a year of the remaining term. At this juncture, We observe the apparent similarities of Mayor
Abundos case with the cases of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were
not proclaimed winners since they were non-candidates in the regularelections. They were proclaimed winners during the recall
elections and clearly were not able to fully serve the terms of the deposed incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the Court
deemed their terms as involuntarily interrupted, Abundo also became or was a private citizen during the period over which his
opponent was serving as mayor. If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanidas service because of his
subsequent defeat in the election protest, then with more reason, Abundos term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted since he
was not proclaimed winner after the 2004 elections and was able to assume the office and serve only for a little more than a year after
winning the protest.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the "law contemplates a rest period during which the local
elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit." 75 Applying the said principle in the present case, there is no question that during the pendency of the
election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people of Viga, Catanduanes.
Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service
because, as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who was exercising such
powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundos case differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because while
Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his
constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess
the mandate to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a fortress against the
injustices it may bring.
In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave injustice to Abundoan elected official who was
belatedly declared as the winner and assumed office for only a short period of the term. If in the cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this
Court ruled in favor of a losing candidateor the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office but

held it anywayWe find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by popular vote, deserves title to the
public office but whose opportunity to hold the same was halted by an invalid proclamation.
Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice that may likewise be committed against the
people of Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of the Constitution, We bear in
mind that We "cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want" 76 and hence, should, as much as possible,
"allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to curtail the power when it overreaches
itself."77 For democracy draws strength from the choice the people make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed February 8, 2012 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No.
A-25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election
Case No. 55, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly
elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal, Emeterio M.
Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes,
respectively, and shall revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.
The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
BRION, J.:
I agree with Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.'s conclusion that the proclamation of Jose Torres, as the "apparent winner" in the 2004
elections, effectively interrupted what could have been Abelardo Abundo, Sr.'s full term. I write this Opinion to briefly expound on the
Court's ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections 1 which the Commission on
Elections ( COMELEC) erroneously relied upon in affirming the grant of the quo warranto petition against Abundo, and to express my
own views on how our present Decision should be read in light of other three-term limit cases that have been decided under a protest
case scenario.
The Aldovino ruling
The issue in Aldovino was whether the preventive suspension of a local elective official amounted to an interruption in the continuity
of his term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit rule. The issue arose because an elective local official who is preventively
suspended is prevented, under legal compulsion, from exercising the functions of his office; thus, the question is there then an
interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule of the Constitution?
After analyzing the first clause of the three-term limit rule (Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution) which provides:
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
the Court observed that the limitation specifically refers to the term (or the period of time an official has title to office and can serve),
not to the service of a term.
Complementing the term limitation is the second clause of the same provision on voluntary renunciation stating that:
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
The Court construed "voluntary renunciation" as "a loss of title to office by conscious choice." 2
Based on its analysis of the provision and after a survey of jurisprudence on the three-term limit rule, the Court concluded that the
interruption of a term that would prevent the operation of the rule involves "no less than the involuntary loss of title to office" or "at
least an effective break from holding office." 3
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated
with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office holders term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise
his functions for reasons established by law. x x x.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by structure and substance fixes an elective
officials term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing
voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in

the context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The "voluntary renunciation" it
speaks of refers only to the elective officials voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the
temporary "cessation of the exercise of power or authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only
one of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:
Indeed, The law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise
power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. 4 (italics supplied; citation
omitted)
The Court further concluded that while preventive suspension is involuntary in nature, its imposition on an elective local official
cannot amount to an interruption of a term "because the suspended official continues x x x in office although he is barred from
exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period." 5
Based on these clear rulings, I consider it a grave error for the Comelec to equate the situation of a preventively suspended elective
local official with the situation of a non-proclaimed candidate who was later found to have actually won the election. With its
conclusion, the Comelec thereby grossly disregarded the nature and effects of a preventive suspension, and at the same time glossed
over the legal and factual realities that obtain in a protested election situation where one candidate is proclaimed, only to lose out later
during the term to the winner in the protest case. To state the obvious, election protests are quite common and it is best for the Court to
already provide guidance on how a reversal decision in a protest case affects the three-term limit rule.
The proclamation alone of an apparent winner (i.e., the candidate immediately proclaimed but whose election is protested) entitles him
to take his oath of office and to perform his duties as a newly-elected local official. That he may be characterized merely as a
"presumptive winner"6 during the pendency of a protest against him does not make him any less of a duly elected local official; for the
time being, he possesses all the rights and is burdened with all the duties of his office under the law. In stark contrast with his
situation, the non-proclaimed candidate cannot but be considered a private citizen while prosecuting his election protest; 7 he carries no
title to office and is denied the exercise of the rights and the performance of the duties and functions of an elected official.
It is from these perspectives that Aldovino cannot be used as basis for the conclusion that there had been no interruption in the case of
Abundo the eventual election winner who is so recognized only after winning his protest case. Notably in Aldovino, while a
preventive suspension is an involuntary imposition, what it affects is merely the authority to discharge the functions of an office that
the suspended local official continues to hold. As already mentioned above, the local elective official continuous to possess title to his
office while under preventive suspension, so that no interruption of his term ensues.
In the present case, Torres (instead of Abundo) was immediately proclaimed the winner in the 2004 elections and effectively held title
to the office until he was unseated. This circumstance necessarily implied that Abundo had no title to the office of Mayor in the
meanwhile or, at least, had an effective break in the continuity of his term as mayor; from his first (2001-2004) term, he did not
immediately continue into his second (2004-2007) term and for a time during this term completely ceased to exercise authority in the
local government unit. It was not a mere cessation of the authority to exercise the rights and prerogatives of the office of Mayor as in
the case of Aldovino; he was not the Mayor and had no title to this office in the meanwhile. No better proof of his loss of title exists
than the need to file an election protest to claim the seat Torres already occupied after his proclamation. From this perspective, the
Aldovino ruling cannot be used as basis for the conclusion that Abundo enjoyed an uninterrupted 2001-2004 term.
Election to office
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,8 reiterated in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections,9 the Court ruled that a local elective
official can seek reelection in the same local government position unless two requisites concur: the official has been elected for three
consecutive terms to the same local government post, and that he fully served the three consecutive terms. It is from the prism of these
requisites that the three-term limit rule must be viewed; in Abundos case, the continuity of his first and third terms are not at issue;
the issue is confined to his second term.
That Abundo has been elected to the position of Mayor in the 2004 elections is a matter that is now beyond dispute based on the legal
reality that he was eventually found, in his election protest, to be the true choice of the electorate. This legal reality, however, is
complicated by an intervening development the wrongful proclamation of another candidate (Torres) so that he (Abundo) could
only take his oath of office and discharge the duties of a Mayor very much later into the 2004-2007 mayoralty term. As I have argued
above to contradict the use of the Aldovino ruling, the factual reality that he had no title to office and did not serve as Mayor while he
was a protestant cannot simply be glossed over, and cannot likewise be brushed aside by trying to draw a conclusion from a combined
reading of Ong v. Alegre10 and Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections.11 The Court cannot avoid considering the attendant factual and
legal realities, based on the requirements that Borja Jr. established, and has no choice but to adjust its appreciation of these realities, as
may be necessary, as it had done in Ong. This, I believe, is the approach and appreciation that should be made, not the drawing of a
forced conclusion from a combined reading of Ong and Lonzanida.
In Lonzanida (where Lonzanida was the protestee), the Court considered both the requisites for the application of the three-term limit
rule absent where a local officials (Lonzanidas) proclamation, supposedly for his third consecutive term in office, was later
invalidated prior to the expiration of this third term, i.e., from 1995 to 1998. With the invalidation, Lonzanida could not really be
considered as having been elected to the office since he was found not to be the real choice of the electorate this is the legal reality
for Lonzanida. Too, he did not fully serve his (supposedly third) term because of the intervening ruling ordering him to vacate his
post. This ruling, no less equivalent to involuntary renunciation, is the factual reality in Lonzanidas case. Thus, an interruption of the
three consecutive terms took place.
Ong v. Alegre12 involved facts close, but not completely similar, to Lonzanida. For in Ong, the ruling ordering the apparent winner
and protestee (Francis Ong) to vacate his post came after the expiration of the contested term, i.e., after Ongs second term from 1998
to 2001. In holding that both requisites were present (so that there was effectively no interruption), the Court again took the attendant

legal and factual realities into account. Its appreciation of these realities, however, came with a twist to allow for the attendant factual
situation. The Court ruled that while Joseph Alegre was later adjudged the "winner" in the 1998 elections and, "therefore, was the
legally elected mayor," this legal conclusion "was without practical and legal use and value." 13
Ongs contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not
make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.14
Effectively, while the Court defined the legalities arising from the given factual situation, it recognized that the given facts rendered its
legal conclusion moot and academic or, in short, useless and irrelevant; while Ong effectively lost the election, he had served the full
term that should belong to the winning candidate. Based on this recognition, the Court ruled that no effective interruption took place
for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
From these perspectives, Ong did not "supersede" or "supplant" Lonzanida.1wphi1 Neither Ong nor the subsequent case of Rivera III
v. Commission on Elections15 says so. The evident factual variance in Ong simply called for an adjusted appreciation of the element of
"election" under the three-term limit rule. This is what a sensible reading of these two cases yields.
In considering the case of Abundo with Lonzanida and Ong, a noticeable distinction that sets Abundo apart is his situation as
protestant, as against Lonzanida and Ong who were both protestees the presumptive winners whose election and proclamation were
protested. Both protestees lost in the protest and effectively were not "elected," although this was appreciated by the Court with twist
in Ong, as mentioned above. Abundo, on the other hand, successfully prosecuted his protest and was thus recognized as the candidate
whom the people voted for, subject only to the question raised in the present case whether this recognition or declaration rendered
him "elected" from the start of his term.
The differing factual situations of the cited cases and Abundo that necessarily gave rise to different perspectives in appreciating the
same legal question, immediately suggest that the Courts rulings in the cited cases cannot simply be combined nor wholly be bodily
lifted and applied to Abundo. At the simplest, both Lonzanida and Ong were protestees who faced the same legal reality of losing the
election, although Ong fully served the elected term; for Abundo, the legal reality is his recognized and declared election victory. In
terms of factual reality, Lonzanida and Abundo may be the same since they only partially served their term, but this similarity is fully
negated by their differing legal realities with respect to the element of "election." Ong and Abundo, on the other hand, have differing
legal and factual realities; aside from their differing election results, Ong served the full term, while Abundo only enjoyed an
abbreviated term.
If at all, the parallelism that can be drawn from Ong, that can fully serve the resolution of Abundo' s case, is the practical and
purposive approach that the Court used in Ong when it implicitly recognized that dwelling on and giving full stress to the "election"
element of the three-term limit rule (as established in Borja, Jr.) is irrelevant and pointless, given that Ong had served the full
contested term.
Under this same approach, Abundo should not be considered to have been elected for the full term for purposes of the three-term limit
rule, despite the legal reality that he won the election; as in Ong, the factual reality should prevail, and that reality is that he served for
less than this full term. Thus, where less than a full term is served by a winning protestant, no continuous and uninterrupted term
should be recognized. This is the view that best serves the purposes of the three-term limit rule.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
EN BANC
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR
NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),
Petitioner,
- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers),
Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE
PROFESSIONALS,

G.R. No. 179271

Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO,
Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS
OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS),
Intervenor.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR

G.R. No. 179295

TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION

Present:

AND HARMONY TOWARDS

EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC.,
and ABONO,

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,

Petitioners,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,

- versus -

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Promulgated:

Respondent.
_______________________
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) in a
petition for certiorari and mandamus,16[1] assails the Resolution17[2] promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of
BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition,18[3] assails NBC Resolution No. 07-6019[4] promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation
of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The
COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of
each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC20[5] (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene
in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.21[6]
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and the
Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.22[7] There were no
intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60
proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna,
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 0760 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for
Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty
three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the
National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one
hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated

15,283,659

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ untabulated

(i.e. canvass deferred)
1,337,032
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from
areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City;
Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao)

102,430
Maximum Total Party-List Votes

16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%)
threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in
Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition
receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have
been completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four
thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANK

PARTY/ORGANIZATION/

VOTES

COALITION

RECEIVED

BUHAY

1,163,218

BAYAN MUNA

972,730

CIBAC

760,260

GABRIELA

610,451

APEC

538,971

A TEACHER

476,036

AKBAYAN

470,872

ALAGAD

423,076

BUTIL

405,052

10

COOP-NATCO

390,029

11

BATAS

386,361

12

ANAK PAWIS

376,036

13

ARC

338,194

14

ABONO

337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an
URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST
NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250,
all the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the
party-list system of representation in the meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order
No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National
Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following
parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
1

Buhay Hayaan Yumabong

Bayan Muna

Citizens Battle Against Corruption

Gabriela Womens Party

Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

APEC

Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through

Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.

A TEACHER

Akbayan! Citizens Action Party

AKBAYAN

Alagad

Luzon Farmers Party

10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party

11 Anak Pawis
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns
13 Abono

BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA

ALAGAD
BUTIL
COOP-NATCCO
ANAKPAWIS
ARC
ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established
to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final
resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall
likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.23[8] (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which
declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of the Veterans
formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes
from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat
each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the
projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included
in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that
the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-List

Projected total number of votes

BUHAY

1,178,747

BAYAN MUNA

977,476

CIBAC

755,964

GABRIELA

621,718

APEC

622,489

A TEACHER

492,369

AKBAYAN

462,674

ALAGAD

423,190

BUTIL

409,298

10

COOP-NATCO

412,920

11

ANAKPAWIS

370,165

12

ARC

375,846

13

ABONO

340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among the
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the first party in accordance with Veterans Federation Party
versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation that
have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme
Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the first party, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:
Number of votes of first party
---------------------

Proportion of votes of first

=

Total votes for party-list system

party relative to total votes for

party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:
Proportion of votes received

Additional seats

by the first party

Equal to or at least 6%

Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6%

One (1) additional seat

Less than 4%

No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

1,178,747
--------

= 0.07248 or 7.2%

16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct
formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
No. of votes of

Additional seats for

a concerned party

concerned party

No. of additional

------------------- x

seats allocated to

No. of votes of

first party

first party
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List

Percentage

Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA

1.65

CIBAC

1.28

GABRIELA

1.05

APEC

1.05

A TEACHER

0.83

AKBAYAN

0.78

ALAGAD

0.71

BUTIL

0.69

COOP-NATCO

0.69

ANAKPAWIS

0.62

ARC

0.63

ABONO

0.57

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No.
144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board
of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled
to additional seats, to wit:
Party List

Additional Seats

BUHAY

BAYAN MUNA

CIBAC

GABRIELA

APEC

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to
have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or
to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall
likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.24[9]
Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by
the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) partylist, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and
recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its
Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution
prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
1.
That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated
by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.
2.
Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be
harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA
7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on
the basis of their initial/first ranking.
3.

The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4.
Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every
2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section
12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in
relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the
corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the
formula/procedure prescribed in the ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX A of
COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of
determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to
representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].
5.
In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and
that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA
7941 shall be followed.
RECOMMENDATION:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution
No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the
Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and
Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT
for being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.25[10]
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file
a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use
the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of
Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC.26[11]
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list
organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the
Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),27[12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),28[13] and An Waray.29[14] Per the certification30[15] by COMELEC,
the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List

No. of Seat(s)

1.1

Buhay

1.2

Bayan Muna

1.3

CIBAC

1.4

Gabriela

1.5

APEC

1.6

A Teacher

1.7

Akbayan

1.8

Alagad

1.9

Butil

1.10

Coop-Natco [sic]

1.11

Anak Pawis

1.12

ARC

1.13

Abono

1.14

AGAP

1.15

AMIN

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for
Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order)
has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC
No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1.
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
mandatory
or is it merely a ceiling?

provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution

2.

Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941

constitutional?

3.

Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the

4.

How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?31[16]

same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:
I.
Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of
Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution
No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule
in the allocation of
seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
A.

Violates the constitutional principle of proportional

representation.

B.

Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1.

The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in

violates the principle of proportional representation

allocating additional seats for the

under RA 7941.

2.
Party and

The use of two formulas in the allocation of

another for the qualifying parties, violates Section

additional seats, one for the First

11(b) of RA 7941.

3.
required under RA

The proportional relationships under the First Party

7941;

Rule are different from those

First Party

C.
same case of

Violates the Four Inviolable Parameters of the Philippine

Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

party-list system as provided for under the

II.
Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction
when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats
to qualified party-list organizations, the
same being merely in
consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v.
COMELEC, the instant Petition is a
justiciable case as the issues
involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct
interpretation and
implementation of RA 7941, and are of
transcendental importance to our nation.32[17]
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following issues in
our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1.
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in
mandatory or merely a
ceiling?

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution

2.

Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3.

Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?

4.

How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5.

Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major
political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?33[18]
The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters
as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of
the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes.34[19]
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term proportional representation, this
Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%)
of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of district
representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the
House of Representatives.

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number
of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts.
On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats available to

legislative districts

Number of seats available to

x .20 =

party-list representatives

.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a
legislative district is created by law. Since the 14 th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats
available to party-list representatives.

220

x .20 =

55

.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution
left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well as
on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes.
However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of additional seats under the

Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,35[20] and Justice Vicente V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented
Germanys Niemeyer formula36[21] as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives.
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,37[22] the following procedure shall be observed:
(a)
The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b)
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the
total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A.
No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
(a)
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of Representatives
including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941
and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14 th Congress, there shall
be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b)
All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they
obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c)
The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding
paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in
accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.38[23]
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and
apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a)

shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions

(b)

rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

on a nationwide basis;

(c)
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system.39[24]
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received by each party
as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes
as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats.40[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs second
interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and the
Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not
factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat
cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a
qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by
multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to
using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties
are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked
from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up.41[26]
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the
elections.42[27]

Rank

Party

1 BUHAY

Votes
Garnered
1,169,234

Rank

Party

Votes
Garnered

48 KALAHI

88,868

2 BAYAN MUNA

979,039

49 APOI

79,386

3 CIBAC

755,686

50 BP

78,541

4 GABRIELA

621,171

51 AHONBAYAN

78,424

5 APEC

619,657

52 BIGKIS

77,327

6 A TEACHER

490,379

53 PMAP

75,200

7 AKBAYAN

466,112

54 AKAPIN

74,686

8 ALAGAD

423,149

55 PBA

71,544

9 COOP-NATCCO

409,883

56 GRECON

62,220

10 BUTIL

409,160

57 BTM

60,993

11 BATAS

385,810

58 A SMILE

58,717

12 ARC

374,288

59 NELFFI

57,872

13 ANAKPAWIS

370,261

60 AKSA

57,012

14 ABONO

339,990

61 BAGO

55,846

15 AMIN

338,185

62 BANDILA

54,751

16 AGAP

328,724

63 AHON

54,522

17 AN WARAY

321,503

64 ASAHAN MO

51,722

18 YACAP

310,889

65 AGBIAG!

50,837

19 FPJPM

300,923

66 SPI

50,478

20 UNI-MAD

245,382

67 BAHANDI

46,612

21 ABS

235,086

68 ADD

45,624

22 KAKUSA

228,999

69 AMANG

43,062

23 KABATAAN

228,637

70 ABAY PARAK

42,282

24 ABA-AKO

218,818

71 BABAE KA

36,512

25 ALIF

217,822

72 SB

34,835

26 SENIOR
CITIZENS

213,058

73 ASAP

34,098

27 AT

197,872

74 PEP

33,938

28 VFP

196,266

75 ABA ILONGGO

33,903

29 ANAD

188,521

76 VENDORS

33,691

30 BANAT

177,028

77 ADD-TRIBAL

32,896

31 ANG
KASANGGA

170,531

78 ALMANA

32,255

32 BANTAY

169,801

79 AANGAT KA
PILIPINO

29,130

33 ABAKADA

166,747

80 AAPS

26,271

34 1-UTAK

164,980

81 HAPI

25,781

35 TUCP

162,647

82 AAWAS

22,946

36 COCOFED

155,920

83 SM

20,744

37 AGHAM

146,032

84 AG

16,916

38 ANAK

141,817

85 AGING PINOY

16,729

39 ABANSE!
PINAY

130,356

86 APO

16,421

40 PM

119,054

87 BIYAYANG
BUKID

16,241

41 AVE

110,769

88 ATS

14,161

42 SUARA

110,732

89 UMDJ

9,445

43 ASSALAM

110,440

90 BUKLOD
FILIPINA

8,915

44 DIWA

107,021

91 LYPAD

8,471

45 ANC

99,636

92 AA-KASOSYO

8,406

46 SANLAKAS

97,375

93 KASAPI

6,221

47 ABC

90,058

TOTAL

15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause guarantees a seat to the
two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered
by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all
party-list candidates.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the partylist.43[28]

Rank

Party

1 BUHAY

Votes
Garnered
1,169,234

Votes Garnered
over Total Votes
for Party-List, in
%
7.33%

Guaranteed
Seat
1

2 BAYAN MUNA

979,039

6.14%

3 CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

4 GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

5 APEC

619,657

3.88%

6 A TEACHER

490,379

3.07%

7 AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

8 ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

9 COOP-NATCCO

409,883

2.57%

10 BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

11 BATAS44[29]

385,810

2.42%

12 ARC

374,288

2.35%

13 ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

14 ABONO

339,990

2.13%

15 AMIN

338,185

2.12%

16 AGAP

328,724

2.06%

17 AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

Total

17

18 YACAP

310,889

1.95%

19 FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

20 UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes
cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are
entitled to one seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. This is where petitioners and intervenors
problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause in proportion to their total number of votes to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court
finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats
when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of
the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume
that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and
even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every
party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is
present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.45[30]
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:

1.
The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
2.
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3.
Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4.

Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated,
at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum
seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in
R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to
the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round
of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second,
we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of
the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Additional
Guaranteed
Seat

(B) plus
(C), in
whole
integers

Seats

Votes
Garnered
over

Applying
the three
seat cap

Total Votes
for Party
List, in %
Rank

Party

Votes
Garnered

(First Round)

(Second
Round)

(A)
(E)

(D)

(B)
(C)
1

BUHAY

1,169,234

7.33%

2.79

N.A.

BAYAN
MUNA

979,039

6.14%

2.33

N.A.

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

1.80

N.A.

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

1.48

N.A.

APEC

619,657

3.88%

1.48

N.A.

A Teacher

490,379

3.07%

1.17

N.A.

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

1.11

N.A.

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

1.01

N.A.

946[31] COOPNATCCO

409,883

2.57%

N.A.

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

N.A.

11

BATAS

385,810

2.42%

N.A.

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

N.A.

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

N.A.

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

N.A.

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

N.A.

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

N.A.

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

N.A.

18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

N.A.

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

N.A.

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

N.A.

21

ABS

235,086

1.47%

N.A.

22

KAKUSA

228,999

1.44%

N.A.

23

KABATAAN

228,637

1.43%

N.A.

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

1.37%

N.A.

25

ALIF

217,822

1.37%

N.A.

26

SENIOR
CITIZENS

213,058

1.34%

N.A.

27

AT

197,872

1.24%

N.A.

28

VFP

196,266

1.23%

N.A.

29

ANAD

188,521

1.18%

N.A.

30

BANAT

177,028

1.11%

N.A.

31

ANG
KASANGGA

170,531

1.07%

N.A.

32

BANTAY

169,801

1.06%

N.A.

33

ABAKADA

166,747

1.05%

N.A.

34

1-UTAK

164,980

1.03%

N.A.

35

TUCP

162,647

1.02%

N.A.

36

COCOFED

155,920

0.98%

N.A.

Total

17

55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36
winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with
sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the partylist elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted
to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and
we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this:
Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list
concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for
the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30
percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party list
system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized
sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would
he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who
would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political
parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral
lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party
list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and
probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be
allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek
common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make
common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of
mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now
being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we
belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be
radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political
parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the
parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we
may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example,
distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence
there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties and
mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this
Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this
[Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the
sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become
actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
x x x 47[32] (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No.
7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the
coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On
the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in
the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.48[33] In defining a party that participates in party-list
elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will
participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution,
the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the
law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem
if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further
illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can
field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity49[34] as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,50[35] that is, if the nominee represents the
fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives
found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the
members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling;
party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the
continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may
occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the
party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court
is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3
August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional
the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from
participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179271

July 8, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND
HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:
The House of Representatives, represented by Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, filed a motion for leave to intervene in G.R. Nos.
179271 and 179295. The House of Representatives filed a motion for clarification in intervention and enumerated the issues for
clarification as follows:
A. There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220. Accordingly, the alloted seats for party-list representation should only
be 54 and not 55. The House of Representatives seeks clarification on which of the party-list representatives shall be admitted
to the Roll of Members considering that the Court declared as winners 55 party-list representatives.
B. The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on whether it should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32 named partylist representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such number of representatives that would complete the 250 member
maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. In the event that it is ordered to admit all 32, will this act
not violate the above-cited Constitutional provision considering that the total members would now rise to 270.
C. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats to party-list groups which did not attain the
minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one seat. Clarification is, therefore, sought whether the term "additional
seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining available seats. Corollary thereto, the House of Representatives wishes
to be clarified whether there is no more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.
D. For the guidance of the House of Representatives, clarification is sought as to whether the principle laid down in Veterans
that "the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list representatives is not mandatory," has been abandoned. 1
On the other hand, Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee of Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), filed a motion
for leave for partial reconsideration-in-intervention, alleging that:
The Supreme Court, in ruling on the procedure for distribution of seats, has deprived without due process and in violation of the equal
protection clause, parties with more significant constituencies, such as CIBAC, Gabriela and APEC, in favor of parties who did not
even meet the 2% threshold.2
Following the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) submitted to this Court on 27 April
2009 National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 09-001. NBC Resolution No. 09-001 updated the data used by this Court in
its Decision of 21 April 2009. The total votes for party-list is now 15,723,764 following the cancellation of the registration of partylist group Filipinos for Peace, Justice and Progress Movement (FPJPM). Moreover, the total number of legislative districts is now 219
following the annulment of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Thus, the
percentage and ranking of the actual winning party-list groups are different from Table 3 of the Decision in G.R. Nos. 179271 and
179295.
The Number of Members of the House of Representatives
in the 2007 Elections
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis
supplied)
The 1987 Constitution fixes the maximum number of members of the House of Representatives at 250. However, the 1987
Constitution expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives provided a law is enacted for
the purpose. This is clear from the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" in Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The Legislature has the option to choose whether the increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives is done by
piecemeal legislation or by enactment of a law authorizing a general increase. Legislation that makes piecemeal increases of the
number of district representatives is no less valid than legislation that makes a general increase.
In 1987, there were only 200 legislative districts. Twenty legislative districts were added by piecemeal legislation after the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution:
Republic Act

Year Signed
into Law

Legislative District

7160

1992

Biliran

7675

1994

Mandaluyong City

7854

1994

Makati (2nd District)

7878

1995

Apayao

7896 and 7897

1995

Guimaras

7926

1995

Muntinlupa City

8470

1998

Compostela Valley

8487

1998

Taguig City (2nd District)

8526

1998

Valenzuela City (2nd District)

10

9229

2003

Paraaque (2nd District)

11

9230

2003

San Jose del Monte City

12

8508 and 9232

1998 and 2003

Antipolo (1st District)

13

9232

2003

Antipolo (2nd District)

14

9269

2004

Zamboanga City (2nd District)

15

9355

2006

Dinagat Island

16

9357

2006

Sultan Kudarat (2nd District)

17

9360

2006

Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd District)

18

9364

2006

Marikina City (2nd District)

19

9371

2007

Cagayan de Oro (2nd District)

20

9387

2007

Navotas City

Thus, for purposes of the 2007 elections, there were only 219 district representatives. Navotas City became a separate district on 24
June 2007, more than a month after the 14 May 2007 elections.
The Number of Party-List Seats
in the 2007 Elections
Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part:
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the partylist. x x x
The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to district representatives. This ratio automatically applies whenever
the number of district representatives is increased by law. The mathematical formula for determining the number of seats available to
party-list representatives is
Number of seats available
to legislative districts

.20

Number of seats available to

party-list representatives

.80
As we stated in our Decision of 21 April 2009, "[t]his formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats
available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law." Thus, for every four district
representatives, the 1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list representative. There is no need for legislation to
create an additional party-list seat whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution automatically creates such additional party-list seat.
We use the table below to illustrate the relationship between the number of legislative districts and the number of party-list seats for
every election year after 1987.

Election
Year

Number of Legislative
Districts

Number of
Party-List
Seats

Total Number of Members of

the House of Representatives

1992

200

50

250

1995

206

51

257

52

261

New Districts:
Biliran
Mandaluyong City
Makati (2nd District)
Apayao
Guimaras
Muntinlupa City
1998

209

New Districts:
Compostela Valley
Taguig City (2nd
District)
Valenzuela City (2nd
District)
2001

209

52

261

2004

214

53

267

54

273

55

275

New Districts:
Paraaque City (2nd
District)
San Jose del Monte City
Antipolo (1st District)
Antipolo (2nd District)
Zamboanga City (2nd
District)
2007

219
New Districts:
Dinagat Island
Sultan Kudarat (2nd
District)
Zamboanga Sibugay
(2nd District)
Marikina City (2nd
District)
Cagayan de Oro (2nd
District)

2010

220
New District:
Navotas City
(assuming no additional
districts are created)

We see that, as early as the election year of 1995, the total number of members of the House of Representatives is already beyond the
initial maximum of 250 members as fixed in the 1987 Constitution.
Any change in the number of legislative districts brings a corresponding change in the number of party-list seats. However, the
increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives went unnoticed as the available seats for party-list representatives
have never been filled up before. As of the oral arguments in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, there were 220 legislative districts. Fiftyfive party-list seats were thus allocated. However, the number of legislative districts was subsequently reduced to 219 with our ruling
on 16 July 2008 declaring void the creation of the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan. 3 Thus, in the 2007 elections, the number of party-list
seats available for distribution should be correspondingly reduced from 55 to 54.
The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of
participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54
seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the
three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats.
Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This 2% threshold for the first
round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Court upholds this 2% threshold for the
guaranteed seats as a valid exercise of legislative power.1avvphi1
In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court
has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of
the Party-List Act stating that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the
proportion to their total number of votes" can no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total
membership of the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up.
However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat allocation. What
is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the number of participating
parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat
allocation. To continue the example above, if only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election and each party received only
one thousand votes, then each of the ten parties would receive 10% of the votes cast. All are guaranteed one seat, and are further
entitled to receive two more seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Similarly, a presidential candidate may win the elections even if he receives only one thousand votes as long as all his opponents
receive less than one thousand votes. A winning presidential candidate only needs to receive more votes than his opponents. The same

policy applies in every election to public office, from the presidential to the barangay level. Except for the guaranteed party-list seat,
there is no minimum vote requirement before a candidate in any election, for any elective office, can be proclaimed the winner. Of
course, the winning candidate must receive at least one vote, assuming he has no opponents or all his opponents do not receive a
single vote.
In the absence of a minimum vote requirement in the second round of party-list seat allocation, there is no need to belabor the
disparity between the votes obtained by the first and last ranked winning parties in the 2007 party-list elections. In the same manner,
no one belabors the disparity between the votes obtained by the highest and lowest ranked winners in the senatorial elections.
However, for those interested in comparing the votes received by party-list representatives vis-a-vis the votes received by district
representatives, the 162,678 votes cast in favor of TUCP, the last party to obtain a party-list seat, is significantly higher than the votes
received by 214 of the 218 elected district representatives. 4
The Actual Number of Party-List Representatives
in the 2007 Elections
The data used in Table 3 of our Decision promulgated on 21 April 2009 was based on the submissions of the parties. We used the
figures from Party-List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 6:00 p.m. of 31 August 2007. The NBC issued NBC Report No. 33 on 11 June
2008, updating the 31 August 2007 report. The parties did not furnish this Court with a copy of NBC Report No. 33. In any case,
we stated in the dispositive portion of our Decision that "[t]he allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in
accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this decision." Party-List Canvass Report No. 32 is not part of the
procedure.1avvphi1
The computation of the COMELEC in NBC No. 09-001 applying the procedure laid down in our Decision requires correction for
purposes of accuracy. Instead of multiplying the percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for party-list by 36, the COMELEC
multiplied the percentage by 37. Thirty-six is the proper multiplier as it is the difference between 54, the number of available party-list
seats, and 18, the number of guaranteed seats. Only the figures in column (C) are affected. The allocation of seats to the winning
party-list organizations, however, remains the same as in NBC No. 09-001. Our modification of the COMELECs computation in
NBC No. 09-001 is shown below:

Rank

Party

Votes
Garnered

Votes
Garnered over
Total Votes for
Party List, in
%
(A)

Guaranteed
Seat
(First
Round)
(B)

Additional
Seats
(Second
Round)
(C)

(B) plus (C), in

whole integers
(D)

Applying the
three seat cap
(E)

BUHAY

1,169,338

7.44%

2.68

N.A.

BAYAN
MUNA

979,189

6.23%

2.24

N.A.

CIBAC

755,735

4.81%

1.73

N.A.

GABRIELA

621,266

3.95%

1.42

N.A.

APEC

619,733

3.94%

1.42

N.A.

A Teacher

490,853

3.12%

1.12

N.A.

AKBAYAN

466,448

2.97%

1.07

N.A.

85

ALAGAD

423,165

2.69%

N.A.

COOPNATCCO

409,987

2.61%

N.A.

10

BUTIL

409,168

2.60%

N.A.

11

BATAS

385,956

2.45%

N.A.

12

ARC

374,349

2.38%

N.A.

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,323

2.36%

N.A.

14

AMIN

347,527

2.21%

N.A.

15

ABONO

340,002

2.16%

N.A.

16

YACAP

331,623

2.11%

N.A.

17

AGAP

328,814

2.09%

N.A.

18

AN WARAY

321,516

2.04%

N.A.

19

UNI-MAD

251,804

1.60%

N.A.

20

ABS

235,152

1.50%

N.A.

21

ALIF

229,267

1.46%

N.A.

22

KAKUSA

229,036

1.46%

N.A.

23

KABATAAN

228,700

1.45%

N.A.

24

ABA-AKO

219,363

1.40%

N.A.

25

SENIOR
CITIZENS

213,095

1.36%

N.A.

26

AT

200,030

1.27%

N.A.

27

VFP

196,358

1.25%

N.A.

28

ANAD

188,573

1.20%

N.A.

29

BANAT

177,068

1.13%

N.A.

30

ANG
KASANGGA

170,594

1.08%

N.A.

31

BANTAY

169,869

1.08%

N.A.

32

ABAKADA

166,897

1.06%

N.A.

33

1-UTAK

165,012

1.05%

N.A.

34

TUCP

162,678

1.03%

N.A.

35

COCOFED

156,007

0.99%

N.A.

Total

18

54

Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) and Ang Laban ng Indiginong Filipino (ALIF) both have
pending cases before the COMELEC. The COMELEC correctly deferred the proclamation of both BATAS and ALIF as the outcome
of their cases may affect the final composition of party-list representatives. The computation and allocation of seats may still be
modified in the event that the COMELEC decides against BATAS and/or ALIF.
To address Roa-Borjes motion for partial reconsideration-in-intervention and for purposes of computing the results in future party-list
elections, we reiterate that in the second step of the second round of seat allocation, the preference in the distribution of seats should
be in accordance with the higher percentage and higher rank, without limiting the distribution
to parties receiving two-percent of the votes.6 To limit the distribution of seats to the two-percenters would mathematically prevent the
filling up of all the available party-list seats.
In the table above, CIBAC cannot claim a third seat from the seat allocated to TUCP, the last ranked party allocated with a seat.
CIBAC's 2.81% (from the percentage of 4.81% less the 2% for its guaranteed seat) has a lower fractional seat value after the allocation
of its second seat compared to TUCP's 1.03%. CIBAC's fractional seat after receiving two seats is only 0.03 compared to TUCP's 0.38
fractional seat. Multiplying CIBAC's 2.81% by 37, the additional seats for distribution in the second round, gives 1.03 seat, leaving
0.03 fractional seat. Multiplying TUCP's 1.03% by 37 gives a fractional seat of 0.38, higher than CIBAC's fractional seat of 0.03. The
fractional seats become material only in the second step of the second round of seat allocation to determine the ranking of parties.
Thus, for purposes of the second step in the second round of seat allocation,7 TUCP has a higher rank than CIBAC.
Roa-Borjes position stems from the perceived need for absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. However, the
1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties and
organizations. (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
The phrase "legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" in Section 5(1) of Article VI requires that
legislative districts shall be apportioned according to proportional representation. However, this principle of proportional
representation applies only to legislative districts, not to the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the party-list system is
governed by the last phrase of Section 5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be "those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system," giving the Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation of party-list seats.
Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional representation in the allocation of party-list seats in the House
of Representatives.
Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the "State shall promote proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or

organizations or coalitions thereof x x x." However, this proportional representation in Section 2 is qualified by Section 11(b) 8 of the
same law which mandates a three-seat cap, which is intended to bar any single party-list organization from dominating the party-list
system. Section 11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing a two percent cut-off for those entitled to the
guaranteed seats. These statutory qualifications are valid because they do not violate the Constitution, which does not require absolute
proportional representation for the party-list system.
To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats
available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative
districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The
guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total
party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list
organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two
percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold
mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed
to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April
2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating
the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute
proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as
long as it is not violative of the Constitution.
These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision that party-list representatives
shall comprise twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At the same time, these four parameters uphold as
much as possible the Party-List Act, striking down only that provision of the Party-List Act that could not be reconciled anymore with
the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009 in the present case is clarified accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
SEPARATE OPINION
NACHURA, J.:
This will clarify my position in these consolidated cases.
I concurred in the April 24, 2009 ponencia of the Honorable Justice Antonio T. Carpio subject to my submission that Section 11, 1
Republic Act No. 79412 or the Party-List System Act, insofar as it requires a two percent (2%) threshold vote to entitle a party,
sectoral organization or coalition to a seat in the House of Representatives under the party-list system, is unconstitutional. As
explained in my Separate Opinion, the 2% minimum vote requirement poses an insurmountable barrier to the full implementation of
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.
My advocacy, however, does not extend to the complete disregard of a threshold vote. I expressed full agreement with [now Chief]
Justice Reynato S. Puno who, in his Separate Concurring Opinion in Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections,3
validated the need for a minimum vote requirement, in order
1. to avaoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low, from participating in the
elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system from opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard and earn their seats within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elective representatives in the legislative body,
rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an
appointment by the President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by
the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament
through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.4
Thus, we proposed that, until Congress shall have effected an acceptable amendment to Section 11, R.A. 7941, we should abide by the
sensible standard of "proportional representation" and adopt a gradually regressive threshold vote requirement, inversely proportional
to the increase in the number of party-list seats. Expressed differently, we do not propose that Section 11 or a paragraph thereof be
scrapped for being unconstitutional. It is only the ratio of 2% that we find as unconstitutionalthe steady increase in the party-list seat
allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed
2% vote requirement/ratio is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is,
in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.
Obviously, the ponencia did not fully accept our submission. It declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold vote only with respect to
the second round of allocating party-list seats (on the additional seats); it continued to apply the 2% minimum vote requirement for
entitlement to a seat under the first round of allocation (on the guaranteed seats). This, clearly, was not the intent of our modified
concurrence to the ponencia, as expressed in our Separate Opinion.
As expressed in that opinion, the formula which must be adoptedscrapping only the 2% ratio but still adopting a threshold vote
requirement, is as follows:
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)

= 1.8518%

54 party-list seats (as clarified)

Clearly, the minimum vote requirement will gradually lessen as the number of party-list seats increases. Thus, in a scenario in which
there are 100 party-list seats, the threshold vote is computed as follows:
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)

= 1%

100 party-list seats

This is the more logical and equitable formula. It would judiciously respond to the inevitable changes in the composition of the House
of Representatives; it would open opportunities for the broadest peoples representation in the House of Representatives; and more
importantly, it would not violate the Constitution. Moreover, the threshold vote requirement, as enacted by Congress and as validated
by this Court in Veterans, is maintained.
Additionally, the formula will not be discriminatory as it will not only apply in the first round of allocation of seats, but will also be
applicable in the second round. While I do not wish to belabor the point, the erroneous application by the ponencia of a threshold vote
(2%) in the first round of allocation of seats, and its disregard in the second round, might cause an unintended transgression of the
equal protection clause, which requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.5
Thus, as I have expressed before, with respect to the fixed threshold vote of 2% (only the ratio) in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, I join
the Court in declaring it unconstitutional, since all enactments inconsistent with the Constitution should be invalidated.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 190582

April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different choices choices we
would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices
are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of
public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for,
diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of morality. In many cases,
where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the
paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement.
This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than
intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously,
then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
dated November 11, 20092 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 3 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a partylist organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad
again filed a Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and
violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad
complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.6
Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its
platform of governance.7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral
grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT)
Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with,
individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In
Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature:
And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that
which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we
rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said:
"O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record:

In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and
Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine
ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature;
and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts
or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows,
whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or
condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend
any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order,
morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when
it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the
teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing
homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section 13, Article
II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners
Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion
for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman,
breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its underrepresentation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a
whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional representatives is
to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the
law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather,
the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations only
that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes
when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its
application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays,
homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is

not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect
or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad
constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies
to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any
particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally
accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of
Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these
are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the
penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It
penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these
legal provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are
already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission
x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all unlawful. 10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to
grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction
against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by
January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than
12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.11 Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be
given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners
application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment. 14
The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010. 15
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the
Assailed Resolutions.16
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae,
attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated
the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene18 which motion was granted on February 2, 2010. 19
The Parties Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the
Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioners application for
registration since there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special
interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the
purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had
been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the
nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among
the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the
Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence
through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that
"save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country." 21
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence" is a new one;
previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere was this
ground for denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious,
considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the
First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a
serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never
claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was
estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in
its electronic discussion group.22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates
around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"
Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila

 Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila

Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City23
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that
petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in
Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records
has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites
under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack
thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." 24
Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." 25 We thus find that it was grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC
is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must
act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:26
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds.
"Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only
on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled
religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or
endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a
result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are
disapproved are second-class citizens.1avvphi1
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have
a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or
the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public
deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents
of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to
regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law
could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular
purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the

elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent
neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to
uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated
by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.27
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has
long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the
people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having
sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our
civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence. 28
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt
of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the
preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally
accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that
"there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts." 30
The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere
attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral
thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays."
Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth.
Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to
regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue
to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the
loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal
reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not
remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which
shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any
local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. 32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on
the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals
from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any
particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person be denied equal protection of
the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists
in the same treatment of similar persons." 33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived
of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the
classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end. 35 In Central Bank Employees Association,
Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x
x have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a
law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution." 37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and
this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed
no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if
we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of
an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection

clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of
legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the
party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome.
Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on
the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is
concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances
would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal
protection clause.38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We
have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has
merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an
unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its
position through normal democratic means.39 It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be
distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every
opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the
order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these
citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which
convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people
deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral
judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream
or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including
protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small not only for a majority, however large but for each of us"
the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the
dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those
that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose
its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both
expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are
protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct
violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.41 European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled
in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign
and international texts.42 To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face
here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may
nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and
lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must
show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the
constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic
principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by
peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas
may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 44 A political group should not be hindered
solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone
concerned.45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside
the protection of the freedom of association guarantee. 46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are
entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that
relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold
and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one
part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will
only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments
of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights
claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members
have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or
association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to
review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful
exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of
elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which
cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and
immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public life
through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x47
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and as
advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent,
therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a political
party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there
has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law, in particular, has
grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with
inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be
effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular, we
explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and
the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to
all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for
discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26
should be construed to include "sexual orientation." 48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.49
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by the Human
Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to
vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the
Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective
opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the people and
in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have
a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective
and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or
discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer
discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the
legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective office. 50
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines
international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the
petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity),51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines.
There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and
do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain
their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or demands is automatically a human
right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what
passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims
that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of
the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights" language, then they are no longer controversial.1avvphi1
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law
professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of
contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote
international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires,
without the support of either State practice or opinio juris. 53
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are
in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of
acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in
the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and
December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT
petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, C.J.:
I concur with the groundbreaking ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mariano C. del Castillo. Nonetheless, I respectfully
submit this separate opinion to underscore some points that I deem significant.
FIRST. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-establishment clause1 of the
Constitution. There was cypher effort on the part of the COMELEC to couch its reasoning in legal much less constitutional terms,
as it denied Ang Ladlads petition for registration as a sectoral party principally on the ground that it "tolerates immorality which
offends religious (i.e., Christian2 and Muslim3) beliefs." To be sure, the COMELECs ruling is completely antithetical to the

fundamental rule that "[t]he public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular[,] for in our constitutional order, the religion
clauses prohibit the state from establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions." 4 As we explained in Estrada v. Escritor,5 the
requirement of an articulable and discernible secular purpose is meant to give flesh to the constitutional policy of full religious
freedom for all, viz.:
Religion also dictates "how we ought to live" for the nature of religion is not just to know, but often, to act in accordance with man's
"views of his relations to His Creator." But the Establishment Clause puts a negative bar against establishment of this morality arising
from one religion or the other, and implies the affirmative "establishment" of a civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes.
This agreement on a secular mechanism is the price of ending the "war of all sects against all"; the establishment of a secular public
moral order is the social contract produced by religious truce.
Thus, when the law speaks of "immorality" in the Civil Service Law or "immoral" in the Code of Professional Responsibility for
lawyers, or "public morals" in the Revised Penal Code, or "morals" in the New Civil Code, or "moral character" in the Constitution,
the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. The
morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious
teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on
grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals,
the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The nonbelievers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled
religion;" anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or
endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a
result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are
disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of
religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. 6 (citations omitted and italics
supplied)
Consequently, the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the constitutional directive that no religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.7 Ang Ladlads right of political participation was unduly infringed when the
COMELEC, swayed by the private biases and personal prejudices of its constituent members, arrogated unto itself the role of a
religious court or worse, a morality police.
The COMELEC attempts to disengage itself from this "excessive entanglement" 8 with religion by arguing that we "cannot ignore our
strict religious upbringing, whether Christian or Muslim" 9 since the "moral precepts espoused by [these] religions have slipped into
society and are now publicly accepted moral norms." 10 However, as correctly observed by Mr. Justice del Castillo, the Philippines
has not seen fit to disparage homosexual conduct as to actually criminalize it. Indeed, even if the State has legislated to this effect, the
law is vulnerable to constitutional attack on privacy grounds. 11 These alleged "generally accepted public morals" have not, in reality,
crossed over from the religious to the secular sphere.
Some people may find homosexuality and bisexuality deviant, odious, and offensive. Nevertheless, private discrimination, however
unfounded, cannot be attributed or ascribed to the State. Mr. Justice Kennedy, speaking for the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in
the landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas,12 opined:
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries there have been
powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of
right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and
deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives.
These considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State
to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the law. "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code."13
SECOND. The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlads definition of the term "sexual orientation," 14 as well as its citation of the
number of Filipino men who have sex with men,15 as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual immorality.
This position, however, would deny homosexual and bisexual individuals a fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate
exercise of personal liberty. For, the "ability to [independently] define ones identity that is central to any concept of liberty" cannot
truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the "emotional enrichment from close ties with others." 16 As Mr. Justice Blackmun
so eloquently said in his stinging dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick17 (overturned by the United States Supreme Court seventeen years
later in Lawrence v. Texas18):
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central
to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality[.]" 19 The fact that individuals define themselves in a
significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many
"right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an
individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds. 20
In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct
their lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will make different choices. For example, in holding that the clearly
important state interest in public education should give way to a competing claim by the Amish to the effect that extended formal
schooling threatened their way of life, the Court declared: "There can be no assumption that today's majority is right and the Amish
and others like them are wrong. A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be
condemned because it is different."21 The Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have in
controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others. (italics supplied)

It has been said that freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. 22 Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.23 These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the due process clause.24 At the
heart of liberty is the right to define ones own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.25
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 26 Lawrence
v. Texas27 is again instructive:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward,
just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws
involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties
and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in
the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal
recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its
boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice. (italics supplied)
THIRD. The ponencia of Mr. Justice del Castillo refused to characterize homosexuals and bisexuals as a class in themselves for
purposes of the equal protection clause. Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using the most liberal basis of judicial
scrutiny, the rational basis test, according to which government need only show that the challenged classification is rationally related
to serving a legitimate state interest.
I humbly submit, however, that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a
heightened level of review.
Preliminarily, in our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the rational basis
test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.28 However, Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,29 carved out an exception to this general rule, such that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution
requires stricter judicial scrutiny than mere rationality, viz.:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect
by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice. (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Considering thus that labor enjoys such special and protected status under our fundamental law, the Court ruled in favor of the Central
Bank Employees Association, Inc. in this wise:
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws
exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.
xxxx
According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal protection clause
because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs
were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are
also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the
charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz.:
xxxx
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket
exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly...
xxxx
The abovementioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the
reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the
proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification albeit made indirectly as
a consequence of the passage of eight other laws between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification
must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons
who are without differences.

Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs
(aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional
scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to
classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly
through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of
the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as
opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to
determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby
proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to
the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy
determination even those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to
sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently
sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection
of the Constitution.
xxxx
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the
seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the
anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
xxxx
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable
badge of invidious discrimination no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket
and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes
without any rational basis.
xxxx
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent
operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be
no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in
our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor,
compel this approach.
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we held in International School Alliance
of Educators v. Quisumbing:
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against
these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include
principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation all embody the general principle against discrimination, the
very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national
laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by
the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the
physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides
that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter
of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its
eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work,
which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed
conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work."
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries.
xxxx
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad
discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the
legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons
favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would
call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This
is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities.
Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction
based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades.
Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried
employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid
the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank possessing higher and better education and opportunities
for career advancement are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the
rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it
is they and not the officers who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with the policy
of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and
improve the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by
this Court before it can pass muster. (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Corollarily, American case law provides that a state action questioned on equal protection grounds is subject to one of three levels of
judicial scrutiny. The level of review, on a sliding scale basis, varies with the type of classification utilized and the nature of the right
affected.30
If a legislative classification disadvantages a "suspect class" or impinges upon the exercise of a "fundamental right," then the courts
will employ strict scrutiny and the statute must fall unless the government can demonstrate that the classification has been precisely
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.31 Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has determined that suspect
classes for equal protection purposes include classifications based on race, religion, alienage, national origin, and ancestry.32 The
underlying rationale of this theory is that where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality
fades because traditional political processes may have broken down.33 In such a case, the State bears a heavy burden of justification,
and the government action will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose.34
On the other hand, if the classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless gives rise to recurring constitutional difficulties, or if
a classification disadvantages a "quasi-suspect class," it will be treated under intermediate or heightened review. 35 To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be substantially related to that interest, but
the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations. 36 Noteworthy, and of special
interest to us in this case, quasi-suspect classes include classifications based on gender or illegitimacy. 37
If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then the statute will be tested for mere rationality. 38 This is a relatively relaxed
standard reflecting the Courts awareness that the drawing of lines which creates distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an
unavoidable one.39 The presumption is in favor of the classification, of the reasonableness and fairness of state action, and of
legitimate grounds of distinction, if any such grounds exist, on which the State acted. 40
Instead of adopting a rigid formula to determine whether certain legislative classifications warrant more demanding constitutional
analysis, the United States Supreme Court has looked to four factors,41 thus:
(1) The history of invidious discrimination against the class burdened by the legislation; 42
(2) Whether the characteristics that distinguish the class indicate a typical class member's ability to contribute to society;43
(3) Whether the distinguishing characteristic is "immutable" or beyond the class members' control; 44 and
(4) The political power of the subject class.45

These factors, it must be emphasized, are not constitutive essential elements of a suspect or quasi-suspect class, as to individually
demand a certain weight.46 The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the four factors in a flexible manner; it has neither required, nor even
discussed, every factor in every case.47 Indeed, no single talisman can define those groups likely to be the target of classifications
offensive to the equal protection clause and therefore warranting heightened or strict scrutiny; experience, not abstract logic, must be
the primary guide.48
In any event, the first two factors history of intentional discrimination and relationship of classifying characteristic to a person's
ability to contribute have always been present when heightened scrutiny has been applied. 49 They have been critical to the analysis
and could be considered as prerequisites to concluding a group is a suspect or quasi-suspect class.50 However, the last two factors
immutability of the characteristic and political powerlessness of the group are considered simply to supplement the analysis as a
means to discern whether a need for heightened scrutiny exists. 51
Guided by this framework, and considering further that classifications based on sex or gender albeit on a male/female, man/woman
basis have been previously held to trigger heightened scrutiny, I respectfully submit that classification on the basis of sexual
orientation (i.e., homosexuality and/or bisexuality) is a quasi-suspect classification that prompts intermediate review.
The first consideration is whether homosexuals have suffered a history of purposeful unequal treatment because of their sexual
orientation.52 One cannot, in good faith, dispute that gay and lesbian persons historically have been, and continue to be, the target of
purposeful and pernicious discrimination due solely to their sexual orientation.53 Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Ang Ladlads Petition for
Registration for party-list accreditation in fact state:
6. There have been documented cases of discrimination and violence perpetuated against the LGBT Community, among
which are:
(a) Effeminate or gay youths being beaten up by their parents and/or guardians to make them conform to standard
gender norms of behavior;
(b) Fathers and/or guardians who allow their daughters who are butch lesbians to be raped[, so as] to "cure" them
into becoming straight women;
(c) Effeminate gays and butch lesbians are kicked out of school, NGOs, and choirs because of their identity;
(d) Effeminate youths and masculine young women are refused admission from (sic) certain schools, are suspended
or are automatically put on probation;
(e) Denial of jobs, promotions, trainings and other work benefits once ones sexual orientation and gender identity is
(sic) revealed;
(f) Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age, are broken up by their
parents or guardians using the [A]nti-kidnapping [L]aw;
(g) Pray-overs, exorcisms, and other religious cures are performed on gays and lesbians to "reform" them;
(h) Young gays and lesbians are forcibly subjected to psychiatric counseling and therapy to cure them[,] despite the
de-listing (sic) of homosexuality and lesbianism as a mental disorder by the American Psychiatric Association;
(i) Transgenders, or individuals who were born mail but who self-identity as women and dress as such, are denied
entry or services in certain restaurants and establishments; and
(j) Several murders from the years 2003-3006 were committed against gay men, but were not acknowledged by
police as hate crimes or violent acts of bigotry.
7. In the recent May 2009 US asylum case of Philip Belarmino, he testified that as a young gay person in the Philippines, he
was subjected to a variety of sexual abuse and violence, including repeated rapes[,] which he could not report to [the] police
[or speak of] to his own parents.
Accordingly, this history of discrimination suggests that any legislative burden placed on lesbian and gay people as a class is "more
likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective." 54
A second relevant consideration is whether the character-in-issue is related to the persons ability to contribute to society. 55
Heightened scrutiny is applied when the classification bears no relationship to this ability; the existence of this factor indicates the
classification is likely based on irrelevant stereotypes and prejudice. 56 Insofar as sexual orientation is concerned, it is gainful to repair
to Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health,57 viz.:
The defendants also concede that sexual orientation bears no relation to a person's ability to participate in or contribute to society, a
fact that many courts have acknowledged, as well. x x x If homosexuals were afflicted with some sort of impediment to their ability to
perform and to contribute to society, the entire phenomenon of staying in the [c]loset and of coming out would not exist; their
impediment would betray their status. x x x In this critical respect, gay persons stand in stark contrast to other groups that have been
denied suspect or quasi-suspect class recognition, despite a history of discrimination, because the distinguishing characteristics of
those groups adversely affect their ability or capacity to perform certain functions or to discharge certain responsibilities in society.58

Unlike the characteristics unique to those groups, however, "homosexuality bears no relation at all to [an] individual's ability to
contribute fully to society."59 Indeed, because an individual's homosexual orientation "implies no impairment in judgment, stability,
reliability or general social or vocational capabilities";60 the observation of the United States Supreme Court that race, alienage and
national origin -all suspect classes entitled to the highest level of constitutional protection- "are so seldom relevant to the achievement
of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy" 61 is no less
applicable to gay persons. (italics supplied)
Clearly, homosexual orientation is no more relevant to a person's ability to perform and contribute to society than is heterosexual
orientation.62
A third factor that courts have considered in determining whether the members of a class are entitled to heightened protection for
equal protection purposes is whether the attribute or characteristic that distinguishes them is immutable or otherwise beyond their
control.63 Of course, the characteristic that distinguishes gay persons from others and qualifies them for recognition as a distinct and
discrete group is the characteristic that historically has resulted in their social and legal ostracism, namely, their attraction to persons
of the same sex.64
Immutability is a factor in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny because the inability of a person to change a characteristic that
is used to justify different treatment makes the discrimination violative of the rather "basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility." 65 However, the constitutional relevance of the immutability factor is not
reserved to those instances in which the trait defining the burdened class is absolutely impossible to change. 66 That is, the immutability
prong of the suspectness inquiry surely is satisfied when the identifying trait is "so central to a person's identity that it would be
abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change [it]." 67
Prescinding from these premises, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order
to avoid discriminatory treatment, because a person's sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one's identity. 68 Consequently,
because sexual orientation "may be altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant damage to the individuals sense of self,"
classifications based thereon "are no less entitled to consideration as a suspect or quasi-suspect class than any other group that has
been deemed to exhibit an immutable characteristic."69 Stated differently, sexual orientation is not the type of human trait that allows
courts to relax their standard of review because the barrier is temporary or susceptible to self-help.70
The final factor that bears consideration is whether the group is "a minority or politically powerless." 71 However, the political
powerlessness factor of the level-of-scrutiny inquiry does not require a showing of absolute political powerlessness. 72 Rather, the
touchstone of the analysis should be "whether the group lacks sufficient political strength to bring a prompt end to the prejudice and
discrimination through traditional political means."73
Applying this standard, it would not be difficult to conclude that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional protection
despite some recent political progress.74 The discrimination that they have suffered has been so pervasive and severe even though
their sexual orientation has no bearing at all on their ability to contribute to or perform in society that it is highly unlikely that
legislative enactments alone will suffice to eliminate that discrimination. 75 Furthermore, insofar as the LGBT community plays a role
in the political process, it is apparent that their numbers reflect their status as a small and insular minority. 76
It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays, bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate
treatment is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and stereotyping. 77
In this case, the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC unmistakably fail the intermediate level of review. Regrettably, they betray no
more than bigotry and intolerance; they raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected78 (that is, lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans-gendered individuals). In our constitutional system, status-based
classification undertaken for its own sake cannot survive. 79
FOURTH. It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in the party-list system because it is not a "marginalized
and underrepresented sector" enumerated either in the Constitution80 or Republic Act No. (RA) 7941.81 However, this position is
belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,82 where we clearly held that the enumeration of
marginalized and underrepresented sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive.
I likewise see no logical or factual obstacle to classifying the members of the LGBT community as marginalized and
underrepresented, considering their long history (and indeed, ongoing narrative) of persecution, discrimination, and pathos. In my
humble view, marginalization for purposes of party-list representation encompasses social marginalization as well. To hold otherwise
is tantamount to trivializing socially marginalized groups as "mere passive recipients of the States benevolence" and denying them
the right to "participate directly [in the mainstream of representative democracy] in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them."83
The party-list system could not have been conceptualized to perpetuate this injustice.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
DISSENTING OPINION
CORONA, J.:

Stripped of the complicated and contentious issues of morality and religion, I believe the basic issue here is simple: does petitioner
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualify, under the terms of the Constitution and RA 7941, as a marginalized and underrepresented sector in
the party-list system?
The relevant facts are likewise relatively uncomplicated. Petitioner seeks accreditation by the respondent Commission on Elections as
a political organization of a marginalized and underrepresented sector under the party-list system. Finding that petitioner is not a
marginalized sector under RA 7941, the Commission on Elections denied its petition.
A System For Marginalized
And Underrepresented Sectors
The party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a tool for the advancement of social justice with the
fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping of public
policy and the crafting of national laws. It is premised on the proposition that the advancement of the interests of the marginalized
sectors contributes to the advancement of the common good and of our nations democratic ideals.
But who are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors for whom the party-list system was designed?
The Texts of the Constitution
And of RA1 7941
The resolution of a constitutional issue primarily requires that the text of the fundamental law be consulted. Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution directs the course of our present inquiry. It provides:
SEC. 5. x x x
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of Representatives including those under the
party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (emphasis supplied)
The Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as "marginalized" to the hands of Congress.
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995. The law provides:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House
of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide
the simplest scheme possible.
xxx

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Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the partylist system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for
decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization
or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. (emphasis
supplied)
The Courts Previous Pronouncements
As the oracle of the Constitution, this Court divined the intent of the party-list system and defined its meaning in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections:2
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization
or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of
the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. x x x
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
[Section 2 of RA 7941] mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list
system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined
constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is
national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation
of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation
is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization
must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a
congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become
members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life,
but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing
law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied
according to its express terms.
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941,
which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the partylist system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that
not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words
employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases
with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in
immediate association.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners
of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSGs position to treat them similarly defies
reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted during the Oral Argument
that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective
sectors.
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical
limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of ones constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise
more directly from the number and amount of ones bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give
them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice
in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new
hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the
urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated
during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only
dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The
party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice
of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the Court stressed that the party-list system is reserved only for those sectors
marginalized and underrepresented in the past (e.g., labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and even those in the underground movement who wish to
come out and participate). They are those sectors traditionally and historically marginalized and deprived of an opportunity to
participate in the formulation of national policy although their sectoral interests are also traditionally and historically regarded as vital
to the national interest. That is why Section 2 of RA 7941 speaks of "marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole."
How should the matter of whether a particular sectoral interest is vital to national interest (and therefore beneficial to the nation as a
whole) be determined? Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos opinion3 in Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections4 offers valuable insight:
Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political parties from participating in the
election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good"; the right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making; the right of
women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation; the
right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with its role as a
primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the
consideration of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and policies, and the indispensable role
of the private sector in the national economy.
As such, the interests of marginalized sectors are by tradition and history vital to national interest and therefore beneficial to the nation
as a whole because the Constitution declares a national policy recognizing the role of these sectors in the nations life. In other words,
the concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list scheme has been carefully refined by concrete examples
involving sectors deemed to be significant in our legal tradition. They are essentially sectors with a constitutional bond, that is,
specific sectors subject of specific provisions in the Constitution, namely, labor,5 peasant,6 urban poor,7 indigenous cultural
communities,8 women,9 youth,10 veterans,11 fisherfolk,12 elderly,13 handicapped,14 overseas workers15 and professionals.16
The premise is that the advancement of the interests of these important yet traditionally and historically marginalized sectors promotes
the national interest. The Filipino people as a whole are benefited by the empowerment of these sectors.

The long-muffled voices of marginalized sectors must be heard because their respective interests are intimately and indispensably
woven into the fabric of the national democratic agenda. The social, economic and political aspects of discrimination and
marginalization should not be divorced from the role of a particular sector or group in the advancement of the collective goals of
Philippine society as a whole. In other words, marginalized sectors should be given a say in governance through the party-list system,
not simply because they desire to say something constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of their traditionally and
historically decisive role in Philippine society.
A Unifying Thread
Fidelity to the Constitution requires commitment to its text. Thus, in the exercise of its function as official interpreter of the
Constitution, the Court should always bear in mind that judicial prudence means that it is safer to construe the Constitution from what
appears upon its face.17
With regard to the matter of what qualifies as marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system, Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mentions "the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." On the other hand, the law speaks of "labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."18
Surely, the enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized and underrepresented in the fundamental law and in the implementing
law (RA 7941) cannot be without significance. To ignore them is to disregard the texts of the Constitution and of RA 7941. For,
indeed, the very first of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Partys eight guidelines for screening party-list participants is this: the
parties, sectors or organizations "must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941." 19
For this reason, I submit the majoritys decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of the issue of whether petitioner is a
marginalized and underrepresented sector in the following manner:
The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
The resolution of petitions for accreditation in the party-list system on a case-to-case basis not tethered to the enumeration of the
Constitution and of RA 7941 invites the exercise of unbridled discretion. Unless firmly anchored on the fundamental law and the
implementing statute, the party-list system will be a ship floating aimlessly in the ocean of uncertainty, easily tossed by sudden waves
of flux and tipped by shifting winds of change in societal attitudes towards certain groups. Surely, the Constitution and RA 7941 did
not envision such kind of a system.
Indeed, the significance of the enumeration in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941 is clearly
explained in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party:
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is
national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation
of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation
is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization
must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
xxx

xxx

xxx

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941,
which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the partylist system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that
not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words
employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases
with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in
immediate association.20 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
More importantly, in defining the concept of a "sectoral party," Section 3(d) of RA 7941 limits "marginalized and underrepresented
sectors" and expressly refers to the list in Section 5 thereof:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. x x x

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector, x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner does not question the constitutionality of Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941. (Its charges of violation of non-establishment
of religion, equal protection, free speech and free association are all leveled at the assailed resolutions of the Commission on
Elections.) Thus, petitioner admits and accepts that its case must rise or fall based on the aforementioned provisions of RA 7941.
Following the texts of the Constitution and of RA 7941, and in accordance with established rules of statutory construction and the
Courts pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the meaning of "marginalized sectors" under the party list system is
limited and qualified. Hence, other sectors that may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented should have a close connection to
the sectors mentioned in the Constitution and in the law. In other words, the marginalized and underrepresented sectors qualified to
participate in the party-list system refer only to the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and other related or similar sectors.
This interpretation is faithful to and deeply rooted in the language of the fundamental law and of its implementing statute. It is
coherent with the mandate of the Constitution that marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system but not
mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are "such other sectors as may be provided by law" duly enacted by Congress. It is also
consistent with the basic canon of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, which requires that a general word or phrase that follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase should be construed to include, or to be
restricted to persons, things or cases, akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.21 Moreover, it
reins in the subjective elements of passion and prejudice that accompany discussions of issues with moral or religious implications as
it avoids the need for complex balancing and undue policy-making.
What is the unifying thread that runs through the marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system? What are the
family resemblances that would characterize them?22
Based on the language of the Constitution and of RA 7941 and considering the pronouncements of this Court in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party and BANAT, the following factors are significant:
(a) they must be among, or closely connected with or similar to, the sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941;
(b) they must be sectors whose interests are traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the national interest but they
have long been relegated to the fringes of society and deprived of an opportunity to participate in the formulation of national
policy;
(c) the vinculum that will establish the close connection with or similarity of sectors to those expressly mentioned in Section
5 of RA 7941 is a constitutional provision specifically recognizing the special significance of the said sectors (other than
peoples organizations, unless such peoples organizations represent sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941)23 to the
advancement of the national interest and
(d) while lacking in well-defined political constituencies, they must have regional or national presence to ensure that their
interests and agenda will be beneficial not only to their respective sectors but, more importantly, to the nation as a whole.
For Purposes of the Party-List System,
Petitioner is Not a Marginalized Sector
In this case, petitioner asserts that it is entitled to accreditation as a marginalized and underrepresented sector under the party-list
system. However, the Commission on Elections disagrees.
The majority reverses the Commission on Elections. While it focuses on the contentious issues of morality, religion, equal protection,
and freedom of expression and association, by granting the petition, the majority effectively rules that petitioner is a qualified
marginalized and underrepresented sector, thereby allowing its accreditation and participation in the party-list system.
I disagree.
Even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is
underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as marginalized under the party-list system. First, petitioner is not included in the
sectors mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941. Unless an overly strained interpretation is
resorted to, the LGBT sector cannot establish a close connection to any of the said sectors. Indeed, petitioner does not even try to show
its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it represents itself as an altogether distinct sector with its own peculiar interests and agenda.
Second, petitioners interest as a sector, which is basically the legal recognition of its members sexual orientation as a right, cannot be
reasonably considered as an interest that is traditionally and historically considered as vital to national interest. At best, petitioner may
cite an emergent awareness of the implications of sexual orientation on the national human rights agenda. However, an emergent
awareness is but a confirmation of lack of traditional and historical recognition. 24 Moreover, even the majority admits that there is no
"clear cut consensus favorable to gay rights claims." 25
Third, petitioner is cut off from the common constitutional thread that runs through the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
under the party-list system. It lacks the vinculum, a constitutional bond, a provision in the fundamental law that specifically recognizes

the LGBT sector as specially significant to the national interest. This standard, implied in BANAT, is required to create the necessary
link of a particular sector to those sectors expressly mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA
7941.
Finally, considering our history and tradition as a people, to consider the promotion of the LGBT agenda and "gay rights" as a national
policy as beneficial to the nation as a whole is debatable at best. Even the majority (aside from extensively invoking foreign practice
and international conventions rather than Philippine laws) states:
We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims.26
This is so unlike the significance of the interests of the sectors in Section 5 of RA 7941 which are, without doubt, indisputable.
Regardless of the personal beliefs and biases of its individual members, this Court can only apply and interpret the Constitution and
the laws. Its power is not to create policy but to recognize, review or reverse the policy crafted by the political departments if and
when a proper case is brought before it. Otherwise, it will tread on the dangerous grounds of judicial legislation.
In this instance, Congress, in the exercise of its authority under Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, enacted RA 7941.
Sections 2, 3(d) and (5) of the said law instituted a policy when it enumerated certain sectors as qualified marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. Respect for that policy and fidelity to the Courts duty in our scheme of
government require us to declare that only sectors expressly mentioned or closely related to those sectors mentioned in Section 5 of
RA 7941 are qualified to participate in the party-list system. That is the tenor of the Courts rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party and BANAT. As there is no strong reason for the Court to rule otherwise, stare decisis compels a similar conclusion in
this case.
The Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint in this case by strictly adhering to, rather than expanding, legislative policy on
the matter of marginalized sectors as expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941. The Court has no power to amend and
expand Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941 in the guise of interpretation. The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the authority
to determine "such other [marginalized] sectors" qualified to participate in the party-list system to Congress. Thus, until and unless
Congress amends the law to include the LGBT and other sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress determination on the
matter is proper.
A Final Word
To be succinctly clear about it, I do not say that there is no truth to petitioners claim of discriminatory and oppressive acts against its
members. I am in no position to make that claim. Nor do I claim that petitioner has no right to speak, to assemble or to access our
political departments, particularly the legislature, to promote the interests of its constituency. Social perceptions of sexual and other
moral issues may change over time, and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters is the
best.27 But persuading ones fellow citizens is one thing and insisting on a right to participate in the party-list system is something else.
Considering the facts, the law and jurisprudence, petitioner cannot properly insist on its entitlement to use the party-list system as a
vehicle for advancing its social and political agenda.
While bigotry, social stereotyping and other forms of discrimination must be given no place in a truly just, democratic and libertarian
society, the party-list system has a well-defined purpose. The party-list system was not designed as a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors. Rather, it is a platform for the realization of the aspirations of marginalized
sectors whose interests are, by nature and history, also the nations but which interests have not been sufficiently brought to public
attention because of these sectors underrepresentation.
Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented.
The Courts task is to respect that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly expand such
congressional determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an act of political will and not of judicial judgment.
Accordingly, I respectfully vote to dismiss the petition.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
SEPARATE OPINION
ABAD, J.:
I have to concur only in the result set forth in the well-written ponencia of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo because I arrived at the
same conclusion following a different path.
I also felt that the Court needs, in resolving the issues in this case, to say more about what the Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.)
7941 intends in the case of the party-list system to abate the aggravations and confusion caused by the alarming overnight proliferation
of sectoral parties.
The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society
an opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections (COMELEC),1 the Court laid down guidelines for accreditation, but these seem to leave the COMELEC like everyone else

even more perplexed and dumbfounded about what organizations, clubs, or associations can pass for sectoral parties with a right to
claim a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court can, in adjudicating this case, unravel some of the difficulties.
Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied Ang Ladlads petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and
moral grounds. The COMELEC has never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress. There is no reason for it to apply
them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly discussed this point.
What I am more concerned about is COMELECs claim in its comment on the petition that the Ang Ladlad sectoral party was not
marginalized and underrepresented since it is not among, or even associated with, the sectors specified in the Constitution and in R.A.
7941.2 Ang Ladlad, it claims, did not qualify as a marginalized and underrepresented group of people like those representing labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals. This is effectively the COMELECs frame of mind in adjudicating applications for accreditation.
But, the COMELECs proposition imposes an unwarranted restriction which is inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the
Constitution and the law. A reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Courts reading, neither the Constitution nor
R.A. 7941 intends the excessively limited coverage that the COMELEC now suggests. In fact, the Court said in that case that the list
in R.A. 7941 is not exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant for all sectors of society, it was envisioned as a social
justice tool for the marginalized and underrepresented in general.
As it happened, the only clue that the Constitution provides respecting the identity of the sectors that will make up the party-list
system is found in the examples it gives, namely, the labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the women,
and the youth segments of society. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(2) The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector." (Underscoring supplied.)
Getting its bearing from the examples given above, the Congress provided in Section 2 of R.A. 7941 a broad standard for screening
and identifying those who may qualify for the party-list system. Thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
(Underscoring supplied.)
The above speaks of "marginalized and underrepresented sectoral parties or organizations x x x lack well defined political
constituencies x x x who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation." But, as the Court said in Ang
Bagong Bayani, the whole thing boils down to ascertaining whether the party seeking accreditation belongs to the "marginalized and
underrepresented."3
Unfortunately, Congress did not provide a definition of the term "marginalized and underrepresented." Nor did the Court dare provide
one in its decision in Ang Bagong Bayani. It is possible, however, to get a sense of what Congress intended in adopting such term. No
doubt, Congress crafted that termmarginalized and underrepresentedfrom its reading of the concrete examples that the
Constitution itself gives of groupings that are entitled to accreditation. These examples are the labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the
indigenous cultural minorities, the women, and the youth sectors. Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described by examples of
what they are, which was what those who drafted the 1987 Constitution did, rather than by an abstract description of them.
For Congress it was much like looking at a gathering of "a dog, a cat, a horse, an elephant, and a tiger" and concluding that it is a
gathering of "animals." Here, it looked at the samples of qualified groups (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities,
women, and youth) and found a common thread that passes through them all. Congress concluded that these groups belonged to the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
So what is the meaning of the term "marginalized and underrepresented?" The examples given (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural minorities, women, and youth) should be the starting point in any search for definition. Congress has added six others to this
list: the fisherfolk, the elderly, the handicapped, the veterans, the overseas workers, and the professionals. 4 Thus, the pertinent portion
of Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides:
Sec. 5. Registration. x x x Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
If one were to analyze these Constitutional and statutory examples of qualified parties, it should be evident that they represent the
working class (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, overseas workers), the service class (professionals), the economically deprived (urban
poor), the social outcasts (indigenous cultural minorities), the vulnerable (women, youth) and the work impaired (elderly,
handicapped, veterans). This analysis provides some understanding of who, in the eyes of Congress, are marginalized and
underrepresented.

The parties of the marginalized and underrepresented should be more than just lobby or interest groups. They must have an authentic
identity that goes beyond mere similarities in background or circumstances. It is not enough that their members belong to the same
industry, speak the same dialect, have a common hobby or sport, or wish to promote public support for their mutual interests. The
group should be characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine issues affecting basic human rights as these apply to their groups.
This is in keeping with the statutory objective of sharing with them seats in the House of Representatives so they can take part in
enacting beneficial legislation.
It should be borne in mind, however, that both the Constitution and R.A. 7941 merely provide by examples a sense of what the
qualified organizations should look like. As the Court acknowledged in Ang Bagong Bayani, these examples are not exclusive. For
instance, there are groups which are pushed to the margin because they advocate an extremist political ideology, such as the extreme
right and the extreme left of the political divide. They may be regarded, if the evidence warrants, as qualified sectors.
Further, to qualify, a party applying for accreditation must represent a narrow rather than a specific definition of the class of people
they seek to represent. For example, the Constitution uses the term "labor," a narrower definition than the broad and more abstract
term, "working class," without slipping down to the more specific and concrete definition like "carpenters," "security guards,"
"microchips factory workers," "barbers," "tricycle drivers," and similar sub-groupings in the "labor" group. See the other illustrations
below.
Broad
Definition

*Narrow
Definition

Specifically Defined Groups

Working Class

Labor

Carpenters, security guards, microchip

factory workers, barbers, tricycle drivers

Economically
Deprived

Urban
Poor

Informal settlers, the jobless, persons displaced by domestic wars

The Vulnerable

Women

Working women, battered women,

victims of slavery

Work Impaired

HandiCapped

Deaf and dumb, the blind, people on wheelchairs

*The definition that the Constitution and R.A. 7941 use by their examples.
Obviously, the level of representation desired by both the Constitution and R.A. 7941 for the party-list system is the second, the
narrow definition of the sector that the law regards as "marginalized and underrepresented." The implication of this is that, if any of
the sub-groupings (the carpenters, the security guards, the microchips factory workers, the barbers, the tricycle drivers in the example)
within the sector desires to apply for accreditation as a party-list group, it must compete with other sub-groups for the seat allotted to
the "labor sector" in the House of Representatives. This is the apparent intent of the Constitution and the law.
An interpretation that will allow concretely or specifically defined groups to seek election as a separate party-list sector by itself will
result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives. It will defeat altogether the
objectives of the party-list system. If they can muster enough votes, the country may have a party-list of pedicab drivers and another of
tricycle drivers. There will be an irrational apportionment of party-list seats in the legislature.
In addition, Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides that parties interested in taking part in the party-list system must state if they are to be
considered as national, regional, or sectoral parties. Thus:
Sec. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, x x x.
This provision, taken alongside with the territorial character of the sample sectors provided by the Constitution and R.A. 7941,
indicates that every sectoral party-list applicant must have an inherently regional presence (indigenous cultural minorities) or a
national presence (all the rest).
The people they represent are not bound up by the territorial borders of provinces, cities, or municipalities. A sectoral group
representing the sugar plantation workers of Negros Occidental, for example, will not qualify because it does not represent the
inherently national character of the labor sector.
Finally, as the Court held in Ang Bagong Bayani, it is not enough for a party to claim that it represents the marginalized and
underrepresented. That is easy to do. The party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented. It must
present to the COMELEC clear and convincing evidence of its history, authenticity, advocacy, and magnitude of presence. The
COMELEC must reject those who put up building props overnight as in the movies to create an illusion of sectoral presence so they
can get through the door of Congress without running for a seat in a regular legislative district.
In sum, to qualify for accreditation:
One, the applying party must show that it represents the "marginalized and underrepresented," exemplified by the working
class, the service class, the economically deprived, the social outcasts, the vulnerable, the work impaired, or some such
similar class of persons.

Two, the applying party should be characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine issues affecting basic human rights as
these apply to the sector it represents.
Three, the applying party must share the cause of their sector, narrowly defined as shown above. If such party is a sub-group
within that sector, it must compete with other sub-groups for the seat allocated to their sector.
Four, the members of the party seeking accreditation must have an inherent regional or national presence.
And five, except for matters the COMELEC can take judicial notice of, the party applying for accreditation must prove its
claims by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons
(LGBTs). Applying the universally accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is an LGBT of a certain kind, 5 the Filipino
LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million. Despite this, however, they are by and large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from the
mainstream, discriminated against, and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads petition on religious and moral grounds
is proof of this discrimination.
Ang Ladlad claims that many cases of intolerance and violence against LGBTs have been documented. At home, effeminate or gay
youths are subjected to physical abuse by parents or guardians to make them conform to standard gender norms of behavior, while
lesbian youths are raped to cure them of their perceived affliction. LGBTs are refused admission from certain schools, or are
suspended and put on probation. Meanwhile, in the workplace, they are denied promotions or benefits which are otherwise available to
heterosexuals holding the same positions. There is bigotry for their group.
Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party accreditation. Their members are in the vulnerable class
like the women and the youth. Ang Ladlad represents a narrow definition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a concrete and specific
definition of a sub-group within the class (group of gay beauticians, for example). The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to represent have
a national presence.
The lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-gendered persons in our communities are our brothers, sisters, friends, or colleagues who have
suffered in silence all these years. True, the party-list system is not necessarily a tool for advocating tolerance or acceptance of their
practices or beliefs. But it does promise them, as a marginalized and underrepresented group, the chance to have a direct involvement
in crafting legislations that impact on their lives and existence. It is an opportunity for true and effective representation which is the
very essence of our party-list system.
For the above reasons, I vote to GRANT the petition.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice