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Religious Belief

Author(s): Martin Southwold


Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Dec., 1979), pp. 628-644
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
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RELIGIOUS

BELIEF

MARTINSOUTHWOLD
University
ofManchester
Those who loyallysubscribeto a religionnormallydo believe at leastitsbasic tenets.Such
believing is an importantpartof religiousbehaviour,and we should understandand describe
it more exactly. To dismissbelief as a matterfor psychologyis an error,which restson a
fallacy.Though Leach has falleninto thiserrorhe has also pointedto a fruitful
approach.The
fromfactualtruth:it may be called symbolic
truthof at leastbasic religioustenetsis different
truth. It is argued that basic religious tenets are empirically indeterminate,axiomatic,
symbolic,and collective. From thisthe most appropriatecognitiveattitudeto them can be
inferred:it is suggestedthatreligiousbeliefmay commonly approximateto this.Religious
noted:
believersdo not lack rationalityin believingtenetswhich have thefourcharacteristics
it would be less rationalto preferarticlesof faithwhich did not have them.

I
Justwhat does 'belief' mean in a religiouscontext?Of all theproblemssurroundingattempts
to conduct anthropologicalanalysisof religion this is the one that has perhaps been most
troublesomeand thereforethe most oftenavoided, usually by relegatingit to psychology,
that raffishoutcast discipline to which social anthropologistsare forever consigning
phenomena they are unable to deal with within the framework of a denatured
Durkheimianism.But theproblemwill notgo away, it is not'merely' psychological(nothing
social is), and no anthropologicaltheoryof religionwhich failsto attackit is worthyof the
name (Geertz I966: 24-5).

ShortlyafterwardsLeach producedan apt illustrationof thisevasionwhen


he wrote,in his paper'Virgin birth':
When an ethnographerreportsthat'members of the X tribebelieve that. . .' he is giving a
descriptionof an orthodoxy,a dogma, somethingwhich is trueof thecultureas a whole. But
ProfessorSpiro (and all the neo-Tylorianswho thinklike him) desperatelywants to believe
that the evidence can tell us much more than that-that dogma and ritualmust somehow
correspond to the inner psychological attitudesof the actors concerned. We need only
considerthe customsof our own societyto see thatthisis not so (Leach I967: 40).

II
By theseremarksLeach appearsto be sayingthatan ethnographicreport
thata people believe a certainpropositionreportstheiradherenceto a dogma
and onlythat:it does not tellus thatthepeople believe-in the ordinarysense
of 'hold as true'"-the proposition.Put like this, the contentionappears
implausible,not to say perverse.2Leach's referenceto 'inner psychological
attitudes',in place of the second 'believe', servesto obscure thisfact.It also
providesan argument,albeit fallacious,in supportof the contention.And it
Man (N.S.) I4,

628-44.

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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

629

also has the effectof confoundingtwo contentions:the one we have noticed,


which is wrong,and anotherwhich is rightand fruitful.
of 'inner psychologicalattitudes'as a
Let us firstjustifyour interpretation
paraphrasefor'believe'.
i)

Immediatelyafterthepassagecited,Leach writesofwomen going through


theEnglishmarriageservice,which he brieflyoutlines.He comments:
But all this tells me absolutely nothing about the inner psychologicalstateof the lady in
question: I cannot inferfromthe ritualeitherwhat she feelsor what she knows. She may be
an outrightatheist.Alternativelyshe may believe thata churchmarriageis essentialforthe
well-beingof her futurechildren(I967: 40).

2)

Leach explainswhat he is tryingto say.


... partly I am interested in the problem of method ... how should we interpret
ethnographicalstatementsabout palpable untruth?.. . Why do all these people believe in
somethingwhich is untrue? (I967: 44).

Intermittently
at least,Leach supposesthatwe have to understandreports
thatpeople believe what is palpablyuntrueforthem:
what,thatis,theydo not
believe,i.e. hold as true.
3) Spiro interpretedLeach's words as I have: thus he summarisesLeach's
argumentas containing:
... two main theses:the culturalbeliefconcerningconception does not meanwhat it says,
and, even ifit does, the nativesdo not believewhat it says(I968: 243).

4) So too did Needham (I972: 5-7); thusin repudiatingLeach'sapproachhe


statesbluntly:
Somethingthatis believed by nobody is not a belief... (I972:

6).

Now thereis a grainof truthin thiscontentionwhich we have understood


fromLeach's words. It does happenthatindividualswho publiclyadhereto a
more or lessprivately,disbelieveit: certainlyI foundthis
dogma nevertheless,
There can be situationsin which a dogma is
among my Sinhaleseinformants.
maintainedin a societyeven though most,conceivablyall, membersof the
societydisbelieve it. But it is most unlikelythat a competentethnographer
reportingon such a situationwould barelyreportthatthe people believe the
dogma: he would surely realise,and report,that the people maintainthe
dogma but do notbelieve it. If a competentethnographerreportsthat his
people believe something,he surelymeansthattheydobelieve it,i.e. hold it as
truein some sense.
Leach was misled by the few obscure-reportswhich appear to say that
certainpeoples maintaina dogma thatcopulationdoes not cause conception:
which,as he argues,mustbe palpablyuntrueforthem.I do not wish to take
spaceto re-openthishoarycontroversy;but it shouldbe remarkedthatLeach,
misreadthe evidence. The principallocus
like many other anthropologists,
was a passage by W. E. Roth describinga group of Australian
disputandi
Aborigines;it may convenientlybe consultedin Spiro I968: 242, citingRoth
I903: 22. Leach seems to have supposed that Roth reported that these
Aboriginesmaintainedthatcopulationis not a cause of conception.But Roth

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630

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

did not.What he wrotewas thattheydo not 'recognise'thisconnexion.There


is a subtle distinctionbetween not recognisinga factin certaincontextsof
discourse,and denyingthatit is a fact.This is similarto the distinctionwhich
Spiro (I968: 256) draws betweenignoringa known factand being ignorant
thatit is a fact.
Malinowski was indeed more positiveabout the Trobrianders,both in his

lateraccount(I932:
earlyreport(I9I6) andin hismoreconsidered

I53-78).

He reportscategoricallythattheTrobriandersdeniedthatconceptionis caused
by copulation. But he also makes it obvious why they did. Christian
missionarieshad preached 'the doctrineand ideal of Paternity'againstthe
Trobriandethos:
Only during my thirdexpedition to New Guinea did I discover that the nativeshad been
somewhat exasperatedby having an 'absurdity' preached at them, and by findingme, so
unmissionary'as a rule,engaged in the same futileargument(I932: I 59).

What people say in understandableexasperationought not be interpreted,


or reported,as theirestablisheddogma, stilllessas what theybelieve.
When ethnographers
reportthattheirpeople believesomething,theymean
what their words would naturallybe understoodto mean. They may be
mistakenor confusedabout the facts,as Malinowski was,just as theymay be
wrong about factsof otherkinds.But it does not appear thatour fallibility
concerningbelieving is of such an exceptional order that all ascriptionsof
believing must be discounted.Leach does, however, seem to imply that,
whateverethnographersmean,we cannottake theirreportsas evidence that
dogmas are believed, in the ordinarysense of the term. By referringto
believingas 'inner psychologicalattitudes'Leach suggeststhatit is,normally
at least,unknowable because inaccessible.He confirmedthatthiswas indeed
his implicationwhen he wrote,in a letterreplyingto his critics:
I claim thatthe anthropologisthas absolutelyno informationabout what is inwardlyfeltby
any professedbeliever (I 968: 65 5).

thisis plainlyuntrue;on a subtlerinterpretation,


On a simpleinterpretation
which Leach surelyintended,it restson a confusion.Whatevermay be thecase
regardingavowals ofbelievingin thefirstperson('I believe . . .'),it is fallacious
to suppose that ascriptionsof believingto a thirdparty ('he believes. . .' or
indeed 'they believe.. .') necessarilydescribehis innerstateof mind,and are
thereforeunwarrantedto theextentthathis innerstateof mind is unknown.
I explain below (p. 633) why this is a fallacy,showing that ascriptionsof
believing to othersare statementsabout theirobservable behaviour,which
can make,shouldmake,and do make,forthemostpartreliably
ethnographers
As Geertz said, to categorisequestionsabout believingas
and informatively.
psychological,and thus beyond our competence,is to shirkissuesof major
anthropologicalconcernon which we can,and should,bringour competence
to bear.
III
Leach's unsatisfactory
formulationdistractsthe readerfrom another,and
valuable,contentionthatcan be understoodfromlaterpartsof his paper.He

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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

63I

comes to concede thatan ethnographicreportthata people believesomething


does imply thattheyhold it to be truein some sense: the importantquestion
thenis,in what sense?
If we are not Tylorians we can say what Powell's Trobriand informantssaid. There are
different
kindsof truth.Which is also what good Catholics say ... (I967: 44).
An alternativeway of explaininga beliefwhich is factuallyuntrueis to say thatit is a species
of religiousdogma; thetruthwhich it expressesdoes not relateto theordinarymatter-of-fact
world of everydaythingsbut to metaphysics(I967: 45).

This takes us right away from the obscurantismof 'inner psychological


attitudes'.It directsour attentionto the cognitiveattitudes-which,though
inferential,are inferablefrom overt behaviour-appropriate to truthsof
kinds.It invitesus to examinewhetherbelieving-holding as truedifferent
is a more complex and subtlematterthanwe have sometimessupposed.
In Englishtheword 'true' hasa wide spanofmeaning.Much thesameseems
to apply to parallel termsin other languages (e.g. Dinka: Lienhardt I96I:
to misinterpret
what an informant
I 39): and thismightcause an ethnographer
is sayingwhen he employssuch a term.But it is more importantto consider
how we use 'true'
themeaningofour Englishword: chieflybecausethisaffects
and hence'hold as true',i.e. 'believe'; and perhapsalso becausea similarpattern
may be presentin otherlanguages.The ShorterOxford EnglishDictionary
listssixteensensesand sub-sensesforthe adjective'true'. Only one of theseis
specifiedas 'of a statementor belief',and thisis:
the thingas it is'.
'Consistentwith fact;agreeingwith reality;representing

This is of coursetheordinary,or unmarked,senseof'true' in modernEnglish;


I shall referto it henceforthas 'factualtruth'.Some of the other senses,or
somethinglike them,mightbe applied to propositions,and notablyreligious
tenets.Inspectionsuggeststhata themewhich underliesmost,ifnot all, senses
is the notion of 'fitting',whetherin the directsenseof takingits place in a
structure,physical,social, or conceptual,or in the derived sense of being
'proper','appropriate','seemly'. (Indeed we saythata factuallytruestatement
'fitsthefacts'.)
It is conceivable,then,thata personwho describesa dogma as 'true' might
mean that it is seemly: presumablymost adherentswould consentto that.
There are in our own society,and presumablyin others,personswho regard
religioustenetsas eyewash,but appropriatefor keepingthe lower ordersin
their proper place. But I assume that such attitudes,held exclusively,are
exceptional;mostof thosewho believe a tenethold it to be truein a stronger
sense than this. This was my experiencein fieldworkamong two notably
sophisticatedand rationalpeoples,theGanda and theSinhalese;and it is what
I understandfrommonographson otherpeoples. I have the impressionthat
many Sinhaleseheld theirtenetsas true withoutqualification,i.e. in a sense
including factualtruth.This is hardly surprisingwhen one considersthat
fundamentalists
are common enough in our own highlycriticalculture.But
I also had theimpressionthatsome people were not fundamentalists,
but held
sense.
theirtenetsas truein a subtler,more discriminating
I regretthatI can reportonly impressions;I did not get harderfactsbecause

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632

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

I did not at the time grasp theseissues.I explore them now with a view to
betterresearchin the future,by othersand by me. It should be possible to
sampleof people,what the cognitiveattitudes
determine,fora representative
to religioustenetsreallyare; and it shouldbe done. Cognitiveattitudesare not
wholly inner and psychological:we do have informationabout them,and
could and should have more. There is not a dichotomy between mere
themostimportantattitudeslie betweenthese
adherenceand fundamentalism:
two. Not to get thisclearis both to demeanthosepeople whose believingwe
write about, and also to fail to understanda fundamentalaspectof religious
behaviour.'Justwhat does "belief" mean in a religiouscontext?'
IV
As I have indicated,within one communitydifferent
personsmay have
different
cognitiveattitudestowards religioustenets.The same person may
have different
attitudesin different
situationsand contexts(see, e.g., Powell
I956: 277-8 quoted in Leach I967: 48 (note 5), and ofcourseEvans-Pritchard
tenets:thus
attitudesto different
I937 passim).And theremay be different
among the SinhaleseI foundit not uncommon forpeople to expressdissent
fromsome tenets,whereastherewere othertenetswhich no one told me, or
even showed me, thathe doubted.These unquestionedarticlesof faithwere,
unsurprisingly,
thosewhich are logicallybasicto practicalBuddhism:thoseto
deny which would carry away a large part of what is characteristically
Buddhist.
Thus religiousbeliefis not one thing:it is a complex of cognitiveattitudes
which,I am arguing,we shoulddescribemoreexactlythanwe usuallydo. My
immediatepurposeis to definea cognitiveattitudewhich is mostappropriate
towards at least basic religioustenets,and which I sensed was actuallythe
Because we
attitudeof at leastmy more sensitiveand thoughtfulinformants.
anthropologistsourselves are either unbelievers or at best rather crude
to identifythisattitudeand to distinguishit from
believers,we findit difficult
others.But ifwe can see what to look for,we may in factfindit is as common
as what we should recogniseas intelligentattitudesto othermatters.To do so
should lead to considerablerevisionof our judgementsof the rationalityof
of the place of
religiousbelievers:it mighteven enhanceour understanding
religionin our culture-which, as Durkheimremarkedon thefirstpage of his
Elementary
formsof the religiouslife,is an objective of the anthropologyof
religion( 9 I 5: I-2).
The tenetsof Buddhismcan be broadlyorderedalong a continuumranging
fromthe most basic and indispensableto the most accessoryand optional; as
I have remarked,such distinctions
in thecognitiveattitudesof at
are reflected
leastsome Buddhists.For example,it is basic to hold thatrebirth,determined
by Karma, is real; thatNirvana is a realstateattainableby humanbeings;that
the Buddha and othershave attainedit; thatthe Buddha's teachingprovides
efficaciousdirectionsfor attainingit. But it is optional to hold, e.g., that
participationin ritesis conduciveto attainment;thatthe servicesof Buddhist
clergyare essentialat funeralsand mortuaryceremonies;thatgodlike beings

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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

633

exist.Similardistinctionsmay be made among the tenetsof any religionthat


have been subjectedto rationalanalysis.What I have to say appliesprimarily
to more basic tenets,and may be less trueof more accessorytenets.I seek to
show thatat leastbasic religioustenetsare
i) empiricallyindeterminate,
3) symbolic,and

axiomatic,
4) collective.
2)

From these characteristics


we can inferthe appropriatecognitive attitude
towardsthem; and I suggestthatthisappropriateattitudeactuallyoccursand
could be identifiedifwe looked forit.
Leach suggestedthatthetruthwhich a religiousdogma expresses'does not
world of everyday things but to
relate to the ordinary matter-of-fact
metaphysics'(I967: 45). Let us start from this appropriatelyindefinite
Even in thatmode ofdiscoursewhichis concernedto describe
characterisation.
and analyse the objective physical world-i.e., in physics-metaphysical
propositionshave a place. Here, a metaphysicalpropositiondoes not serve
directlyto describethe world-rather it servesto establisha frameworkfora
mode of discoursewithinwhich theworld can be described.Since it does not
directlydescribetheworld it is not directlyfalsifiable;and ifit is not falsifiable
it is not verifiable either (i.e. it cannot be sufficiently
confirmed or
corroborated). But if the physical statementsmade within the mode of
discourseit foundsare directlyfalsified,
thenit may be indirectlyfalsified.
Religious tenetsmay be used to found a mode of physicaldiscourse,as
Horton has argued (i967; I973, etc.). But sometimesat least they are so
formulatedthattheycannotbe falsified
even indirectly:thusforexample the
propositionthatGod existsseemsto be undecidable,directlyor indirectly,
by
referenceto empiricalevidence.Propositions(doctrines,tenets,notions,etc.)
which are so formulatedthat they are inherentlyimmune to empirical
falsificationor verificationI have termed 'empirically indeterminate'
(Southwold I978: 374). As theterm'indeterminate'has been used of mystical
propositionsin a slightlydifferent
senseby Cooper (I97 5) and Salmon (I978),
I mustclarify.I do not use the term'indeterminate'in preciselythe senseof
Reichenbach (I944),
which Cooper claims to have taken over. I am not
suggesting,as Cooper does, thatreligiousbelieversactuallyemploy a threevalued logic. I do not know of any language which admitsto the true/false
paradigma thirdtermof equal weight.Referringto Putnam (I957), Salmon
writes:'To say a sentenceis indeterminate
entailsthatthe sentencewill never
be verifiedor falsified'(I978: 448). I say that basic religious tenetsare
indeterminatein thissense.I neitherassertnor deny thatbelievers
objectively
themselvesrecognisepreciselythis; I find it '. . . difficultor impossibleto
distinguishan attitudeofdoubt or suspendedbelief,i.e. no assignmentoftruthvalue, froman assignmentof the value indeterminate'(Salmon I978). This
can be bridgedby sayingthatbelieversdo not treatreligioustenets
uncertainty
as factuallytruenor as factuallyfalse.Such non-assignment
of true/false
value
seemsto be describedforthe Azande by Evans-Pritchard(I937: 8i). I argue
that it is appropriate for doctrines which objectively are empirically
and may be common,even normal.
indeterminate,

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634

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

Now althoughbasic religioustenetsmay serveto founda mode of physical


discourse,this is not theirsole nor even theirprincipalfunction.Religious
discourseservesratherto interpret,
and shape,our experienceof reality,than
directlyto describereality(cf. LienhardtI96I: I48). It includesmythsand
similar imaginative and evocative forms. It normally includes ethical
propositions,which are of courseprescriptiveratherthandescriptive.Indeed
religioustenetsfoundmore thancan reasonablybe includedundera 'mode of
discourse': theyfound,forexample,ethicalconduct,and ritual.They found
not just a mode of discoursebut a way of life,and one which is socially
nor conduct,neithera way of lifenor
established.Since neitherprescriptions
a society,have factualtruth-value,
it is obvious why religiouslymetaphysical
propositionscannoteven indirectlybe falsified.
Contraryto the conventional
wisdom concerningour own religioushistory,a religioncomes to be rejected
not as simplyfalsebut ratheras inappropriateor unfitting.

V
The relation between a basic tenet and the religion it serves to found
resembles that between an axiom and a theory based on it. Boudon's
observationis illuminating:
raised by the concept of axiom did not vanish until it was
The epistemologicaldifficulties
understood that an axiom was not a propositionplaced at the beginning of a deductive
argumentbecause it was untestable-but rathera propositionmade untestableby itslocation
at the beginningof the argument(I97I:
IO).

We have oftenasked ourselveswhy religionspropound 'mystical' (or, as I


preferto say,empiricallyindeterminate)
doctrines,and have tendedto answer
by disparagingthe rationalityof believers.It should be evidentthatreligious
tenetsare, like axioms, necessarilyuntestablebecause of their place at the
beginning,the foundation,notjust of a deductiveargumentbut of a way of
formtheywould be falsified,
and could then
life.Iftheywere castin falsifiable
ifat all: what is to serveeffectively
servetheirpurposewith greatdifficulty
as
an axiom fora collectiveway of lifemustbe immuneto falsification.
We are
grosslymistakenwhen we criticiseotherpeoplesas not rationalforholdingas
true tenetswhich are mystical,non-demonstrable:their rationalitywould
ratherfailiftheybased theirlives on tenetswhich were not so.
If we have oftenassumed the religioustenetsof othersto be false-an
assumptionwhich Evans-Pritchardmistakenlybuilt into his definitionof
mysticalnotions(I937: I 2; see Southwold I978: 375)-this has usuallybeen
becausewe did notshare,or greatlyrespect,theways oflifewhichtheyfound;
religioustenetsin fact are normallynot falsebut unfalsifiable,
empirically
indeterminate.By similar measure, the tenets not only are objectively
axiomatic,in the senseof servingas axioms: theyalso seem to believersto be
axiomaticin thesenseof unquestionable(see,e.g.,Evans-Pritchard
I956: 9 for
the way in which the existenceof God is taken for grantedby Nuer). This
mustbe so: if the truthof a basic tenetis seen as a necessarypreconditionfor

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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

635

the religionforwhich it is axiomatic,thento considerit mightnot be trueis


to impugn the religion,the cultureit orders,and hence theselfthatis shaped
by the culture.To doubt is not only to thinkthat one's thoughtis wrong
thatone'sselfis invalid.Those
(Evans-Pritchard
I937:
I95), it is to suppose
who can sincerelyconsideror discussthe truthof basic tenetshave already
ceasedto be believers,in thesenseof fullyparticipatingin the religiouslife.

VI
I have suggestedthatbelievers,or at leastthe more sensitiveamong them,
show signsof recognisingthatreligioustenetsare neithertruenor false;I have
now arguedthatnevertheless
thesetenetsare regardedas unquestionablytrue.
These two positionsare consistentif we recognisethatthe truthof religious
tenetsis not factualtruthbut anotherkind: I shallcall it symbolictruth.
Something like this was recognised by Leach when he wrote, in the

Introduction
to hisPolitical
systems
Burma:
ofhighland

In sumthen,myviewhereis thatritualactionandbeliefarealiketo be understood


as forms
ofsymbolicstatement
aboutthesocialorder(I954: I4).

That formulationrequirescorrection.Religiousbeliefs,or tenets,are certainly


symbolicof much more thanthe social order.And symbolscommunicatein
a way thatis much less like thatof language thanLeach assumed(cf Langer
I95 I: 74-7). But withthesecorrections
made,Leach'sview is sound.Religious
tenetsare indeed symbols,functioningin very much the same ways as the
concreteobjectsor actionsthatare more readilyrecognisedas ritualsymbols;
and theactsofaffirming,
assentingto,or even adheringto,suchtenetsare ritual
acts,like immolation,genuflexion,and so forth.
I offerno exact definitionof ritual symbols or symbolism: indeed the
categoryappearsto be farfromhomogeneous.But I do outline some basic
based largelyon Langer I95 I . In the mostgeneralsense
distinctions,
butarevehicles
fortheconception
ofobjects(I95:
Symbolsarenotproxyfortheirobjects,

60: I).

This formulationwas adoptedby Geertz(I966: 5); and it doubtlessunderlies


Barth's characterisationof ritual acts and objects as 'vehicles for concepts,

and emotions'(I975:
understandings,

i i).

If we allow symbolsto include

linguisticforms,in theeverydayusage of language,thenit is essentialthatwe


make a distinctionof thekind thatLangertermsthatbetween'discursive'and
'non-discursive'or 'presentational'symbolism(I95 I: 94-7, and passim).
The
formercovers the mannerin which languagein itseverydayusage signifies;
kindsof meaningto be foundin art,music,ritual,myth,
thelatterthedifferent
and of course religious'belief. At least part of the distinctionis thatwhich

Barthdrawsbetween'digital'and'analogic'codes(I975:

ch.25). Thereseems

too to be a strikingparallel with the differentmodes of thinkingwhich


and neurophysiologists
psychologists
reportto be specialisedin theleftand the
righthemispheresof the cerebralcortex (see Sagan I977: ch. 7).
Presentationalsymbolismdoes convey conceptionswhich are, at one or

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636

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

more removes,about reality.Justhow it does so is noteasyto grasp,but at least


it is clear thatit normallydiffers
fromdiscursivesymbolism.Some thingswe
call symbolsseem to signifymuch as metaphors;for otherswe need a less
familiarmodel. Sperber rightlydraws our attentionto the term that the
Ndembu use to designatesymbols:
... theword chijikijilu,
whichmeans'a landmark'.A landmark
is nota signbutan index
whichservescognitively
ourexperience
ofspace.ThisNdembumetaphor
to organise
seems
muchmoreappositeandsubtleto me thantheWesternmetaphor
whichcomparessymbols

to words (I 975: 3 3)3.

It is certainlya major taskforthe anthropologyof religionto describeand


analyse more fully and preciselyjust how presentationalsymbolismdoes
convey conceptionsabout reality;and it is one which is well in hand. For my
presentpurposeitis necessaryneitherto reviewtheresultswe alreadyhave nor
to anticipatethosewe may hope to get.It is enough,first,
to acknowledgethat
ritual symbols-including tenets,beliefs,dogmas-do convey conceptions
about reality,and hencemay be regardedas trueor false.And second,thatsince
the relationof such a symbol to realityis different
from that of discursive
symbolism(everydayor scientificlanguage), this kind of truthis different
fromfactualtruthas we normallyunderstandit.
If people regard a presentationalsymbol-more especially a tenet-as
having a 'fitting'or 'appropriate'relationto reality,I say theyregardit as
'symbolicallytrue'. Hence thereis a senseof 'believe' which means 'hold as
symbolicallytrue',and thismay be markedas 'believehts'.It is distinctfrom
'hold as factuallytrue', which may be writtenas 'believehtF'4-though the
two are easilyand oftenconfused.I seekto exploresome of thedifferences
and
similaritiesbetweenthesetwo kindsof believing.
Cooper (I975: 252-3) suggeststhatit may be unjustified
to say thatpeople
'believe' magico-religiouspropositionswhich theyregardas untestable,and
which have some similaritywith metaphysicalpropositions.In view of the
wide varietyofsensesoftheword 'believe', and thedifficulty
ofdistinguishing
and controllingthem,I thinkit is prudentto tryto avoid using the word
in scientific
altogether
contexts(cf.NeedhamI972: I92-3). But it is quite
impracticalto tryto restrict
thesenseofbelief-terms
(i.e. theverb'believe' and
thenoun 'belief) to 'hold as factuallytrue',and to ruleout theirapplicationto
religious'belief. The latterapplicationis a salientand ineradicablefeatureof
Englishusage; what we have to do is to make surethatwe understandthefacts
thathave been,and may be, reportedthroughtheusage.

VII
The way in which 'believehts'differs
from'believehtF'can bestbe brought
out by consideringcarefullyjust what the lattermeans.To say thata person
holds a propositionas factuallytrue is to say that he regardsit as correctly
describingsome partor aspectofreality;or thathe holdsthatthestateofaffairs
it describesexistsin reality.Or, betterstill,it is to say thatthispropositionis

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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

637

to whichhe assessesand
an elementin hisinternalmodel ofrealityby reference
with reality.
guideshis transactions
Hence thereare fourconditionswhich mustbe satisfiedifwe are to say of
a certainproposition:
a person,with sufficient
warrant,thathe believeshtF
with
in whichsomesetsofactsare consistent
i) There mustbe some situations
(or better,if possible, rationallyentailed by) the proposition'sbeing
setof actsare consistentwith (or entailedby)
factuallytrue,and a different
frequently
itsbeingfalse;and he mustencountersuchsituationssufficiently
observations.-Under 'acts' I includeverbal
to allow us to make sufficient
acts, and notably those of assertingor unequivocally implying the
proposition,and of avowing it as true/false.
In such situationshe mustpredominantlydo thoseactsthatare consistent
2)
with itstruthratherthanthosethatare consistentwith itsfalsity.
ofconductwithbeliefwould deprivethe
a) To requireperfectconsistency
conceptof use: normalpeople are not perfectlyconsistent.But thereis
oftenenough a cleardistinctionbetweenconductwhich is as consistent
with a belief as it is reasonable*to expect, and that which is grossly
with it.
inconsistent
b) Though therelevantactsincludeverbalacts,theyshouldifpossiblealso
includenon-verbalacts.As Gombrich(I 97I: 4-5) rightlyremarks,we
say a persondoes not reallybelieve what he professesif his non-verbal
with it. There are two good reasonsfor
acts are seriouslyinconsistent
this:
i) If to believehtFa propositionis to have it as an elementin one's
conduct is
internalmodel of reality,thenall one's reality-oriented
potentiallyrelevantin decidingwhetherit actuallyis an elementin
thatmodel.
bysimulating
ii) Ifa personisdeceivingothers,and perhapsalso himself,
a beliefhe does not reallyhold,it is normallyeasier,and cheaper,to
do so by verbalfalsehoodsthanby non-verbalpretences.
3) There must be evidence thathe entertainsthispropositionin association
with theseacts. Philosophersare agreed that a person cannot be held to
believe a propositionthathe has never'entertained'or considered;and as
we have knownsinceEvans-Pritchard
(I 937) thatpeoplepractisesituational
selection of their beliefs,we have to establishthat the propositionis
entertainedin the contextof the acts relevantto believingit. One cannot
infer that a certain propositionis believed merely from the fact that
observed conduct is consistentwith it, since any course of conduct is
overlooks
consistentwith more than one proposition(Gombrich (I97I)
this-see my commentsin Southwold I978: 366).
of a propositionis mostplainlyestablishedif the person
Entertainment
expressesit in or withhisact: thisis why verbalassertionsor endorsements,
thoughunreliableevidenceofholdingas true,are importantas evidenceof
is also establishedifthe
believing.It may be lessobvious thatentertainment
actordeniesthepropositionas he acts-provided he does so spontaneously,
and not merelyin replyto a leading question.If thiswere all, we should
resultthatit is hardestto establishthatpeople believe
have thefrustrating

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638

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

just what theydo mostfirmlybelieve:-forifa tenetis axiomaticit tendsto


be taken for grantedratherthan statedexplicitly.Hence we must allow
thatifan act is customaryin theculturein question,and ifwe can establish
thatit is also customaryto entertaina particularpropositionin association
with such acts,then any member of the culturedoing that act may be
assumedto entertainthatproposition.
4) His conduct cannot with comparable plausibilitybe explained by an
alternativehypothesis.
a) It may happenthattheevidencegivesequal supportto theascriptionof
beliefs.This is no problem: people do operate with
several different
alternativeschemesofinterpretation,
and so to saythata personbelieves
one thingneed not be understoodas precludinghisbelievingsomething
else-not even when, abstractedfrom contexts,the two beliefsare
logicallyinconsistent.
to the
b) A person'sconductmay be fullyaccountedforwithoutreference
beliefby which he explainsit. This does not in itselfshow thathe does
not believe what he professes:at mostit may show thathis beliefis not
the cause,or the only cause,of his conduct.
c) The kind of alternativehypothesiswhich really calls in question an
ascriptionof beliefis one thattheactoris deceivingothers,and perhaps
himself.We can neverbe certainthatthisis not so; but we can oftenbe
confident.Certaintyis unattainablein empiricalscience,and
sufficiently
especiallyin that concerninghuman behaviour; the uncertaintythat
attendsascriptionsof beliefis not so specialas to place themoutsidethe
normal area of scientificlikelihood.
This analysisservesto make plain why it is thatascriptionsof believingstatements
thatsomeoneotherthanoneselfbelievessomething-do notrequire
specialknowledgeof theinnermentalstate(or psychologicalattitudes)of the
believer.It shouldbe evidentthattheverb'believe' designatesa relationrather
than a state: a relation,firstlybetween the believer and a proposition,and
secondly from the believer through the proposition to reality.What is
purportedto occur is doubtlessmentalin largepart,and specialpsychological
knowledgewould doubtlesshelpus to assessand understandit better.But such
specialknowledgeis notnecessary,
sincein factwe use 'believe' in a way which
enablesus to regardthe mind of the believeras a 'black box' (see,e.g.,Ashby
i964: 86sqq.). The factswe referto are the inputsand outputsof the 'black
box', and the relationsbetween them: we are not committedto giving an
accountofjustwhat goes on withinthe'black box'.5
VIII
Now since we use 'believe' for 'hold as symbolicallytrue' as well as for
'hold as factuallytrue',it is impliedthatthissame schemashouldbe applicable
to ascriptionsofbelievinghtS.
In largepartit is. But thecrucialdifference
is that
thefirstcondition,and consequentlythesecond,cannotbe satisfied,
eticallyat
least.
Cooper (I975: 253) points out that if a propositionis untestable(in my

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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

639

terms,empiricallyindeterminate)it is hard to see how behaviour could be


distinguishedas consistentwith itstruthratherthanits falsity.A proposition
is empiricallyindeterminateif and only ifeverystateof affairswhich can be
determinedas holdingin the real world is as consistentwith itstruthas with
itsfalsity.Ifsome courseof actionwere objectivelydemonstrableas consistent
courseof actiondemonstrableas consistentwith
with itstruth,and a different
its falsity,then the different
consequencesof these coursesof action would
provide evidenceof thetruth-valueof theproposition,contraryto definition.
This would not be so only if the two coursesof action had no discernibly
different
consequences;whichis perhapscommon,as theancientplea,'why do
sinnersprosper...?', bears witness.Empiricallywe do in fact find that a
remarkablywide rangeof kindsof conductis held to be consistentwith,and
indeed legitimatedby,a given religioustenet.
Yet it is also clear, and important,that the range is usually not infinite:
withina particularreligioustraditionsome kindsof conductare difficultand
some virtuallyimpossible,to legitimateby acceptedtenets.In Buddhism,for
example, it is difficultto legitimatethe participationof Buddhistclergyin
allow the factthat Buddhist
war: though traditiondoes, albeit reluctantly,
clergy,temporarilydisrobed, served in the army of King Dutthagamani
(Gombrich I97I: 29). It would be virtuallyimpossible to legitimatethe
service of a Buddhist cleric as general or war-leader,and history,I think,
between
recordsno instanceof this.This is plainly an importantdifference
Buddhistand Islamicsocieties-with Christendomfallingsomewherebetween
thesepoles.
There are certainlyemic,thoughnotetic,criteriawhich distinguishvarious
kindsof conduct as consistent,and othersas inconsistent,
with believinghtsa
particularreligioustruth.In Sri Lanka, for example, it is maintainedthat a
Buddhist layman who believes the Dhamma (the Buddhistdoctrines)will
endeavour to observe the Five Precepts.Hence a man who regularlyand
wantonlykills living beings (in breach of the FirstPrecept),or is regularly
drunk (in breach of the Fifth),is shown therebynot really to believe the
Dhamma. But the criteriaare characteristically
imprecise.Most Buddhist
and will kill at leastthe
laymendeliberatelytakelife:e.g. theyuse insecticides,
most dangerous kind of snake (the Russell's Viper); and in their own
judgements,and those of most of their fellows,this does not make them
unbelievers.And many men,at least,considerit allowable to drinkliquor in
moderation.The standardsare not precisianbut customary:those of the
reasonableratherthantheuprightman (Gluckman I955: I25-6). Not only is
it emically determinedwhat kinds of conduct shall be held consistentor
inconsistent
withreligiousbelief:itis also emicallydeterminedwhatbehaviour
is or is not to be classifiedas fallingwithinthosekindsof conduct.
This makes it difficultto argue (as Spiro I 97 I does) that customary
behaviour itselfis inconsistentwith accepted religioustenets,thus showing
thatthetenetsare not reallybelieved.When we perceivesuchinconsistency
it
is betweenthe behaviourand what we take to be the meaningof the tenets;
but it may be thatwe have misinterpreted
thatmeaning,and thebehaviouris
consistentwith theirpropermeaning.Now ifwe takeseriouslythe view that

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640

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

religioustenetsare ritualor 'presentational'symbols,theirmeaningcannotbe


thewordsin which theyareexpressed,as ifwe were
discoveredby translating
dealing with the ordinarydiscursiveuse of language. The meaning of a
religioustenet,as of any otherkind of ritualsymbol,is theway it functionsin
experience;itsfunctionas a 'landmark'perhaps:
shaping,ordering,interpreting
This can be discoveredonly by determininghow it is in factrelatedto theway
of lifeforwhich it servessymbolically.The significanceof a symbol,like the
meaningofa word,liesin itsuse: it can be determinedonlyby analysisofwhat
people actuallydo, and cannot then be turnedto judge what they do. The
anthropologistmustdeterminehow a tenetis actuallyemployedin theway of
lifein which it functions:and he mustreportthisas the symbolicmeaningit
actuallybears.If,forexample,he finds,as he will, thatmost Buddhistsspeak
of nirvana as the summumbonum,yet so far fromactivelyendeavouringto
attainthatstateas soon as possibletheyactuallypursuegoals theyacknowledge
with it,while postponingtheireventualattainmentof nirvana
as inconsistent
into the remotefuture:thenthe conclusionmustbe thatthe doctrinesabout
nirvana do not signifyto them a prescriptionfor attainingan immediate
meaningwhich we have to
personalgoal, but ratherhave some transformed
discover.
Spiro'serrorderivesfromassumingthat
As Tambiah (I970: 4I-2) suggests,
the meaning of Buddhisttenetscan be known by readingthem as theyare
presentedin the Scriptures.Even ifwe allow theratherlargeassumptionsthat
we can know what a tenetmeantin thecontextof thescripturalwritings,and
thatthiscan be takenin some defensiblesenseas havingonce been itsstandard
meaning,it still does not follow that this is its meaning in contemporary
with thatmeaning,we have to
practicalBuddhism: if practiceis inconsistent
meaning,no doubt as a result
registerthe factthatpracticerevealsa different
of symbolictransformation.
It must,however,be said thatit is not only Spiro and otheroutsiderswho
withpracticein practical
give Buddhisttenetsa meaningwhich is inconsistent
Buddhism:so,in Sri Lanka at least,do manyBuddhistseven in thesmallworld
to pointto the unworthinessof
of the villages,and theyuse thisinconsistency
practice.We should not be surprisedthat religioustenets,like other ritual
symbols,sustaina varietyof meanings.And we may remarkthatit would be
a poor sort of religion that could only validate the actual, without also
proclaimingan ideal matchedagainstwhich theactualcan be seento fallshort.
of Buddhistdoctrinesand
The tensionbetweenthe normativeinterpretations
thesymbolicmeaningstheybear in thecontextof actuallifeis an aspectof an
importantdynamicin Buddhistsocieties.But neitherthisnor otherfeaturesof
Buddhistreligiouslifecan be correctlygraspedwithoutrecognisingthatthe
doctrinesdo have symbolicmeaningsin actuallife.
It follows that assessmentof a symbolic proposition must be radically
fromthatof a factualproposition.With a factualproposition,ifit is
different
properly formulated,it is relativelysimple to know what it means: the
importantquestion is whetherit is true.6But a symbolicproposition-and
especiallya basic religioustenet-is, forthosewho maintainit,axiomatically
true: the importantquestionis, what does it mean? For the anthropologist,

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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

64I

then,the questionis not whether


theybelieve it but how.This throwslighton
a notable oddity in Christiantheology.In the Bible-as among the Nuer
(Evans-PritchardI956: 9)-the existenceof God is taken for granted:it is
axiomaticallytrue,and the focusof concernis with the religioussignificance
ofthisdatum.But formanymodernChristians,as foravowed unbelievers,the
significanceis takenforgranted,but thetruthis consideredto be at issue.This
is, in effect,
to mistakea symbolicpropositionas a factualproposition:which
may be why the religiousresulttendsto be somewhatprosthetic.

Ix
Sometimesthingsbecome symbolicfora particularindividualbut not for
his fellows generally: we may speak of these as private and idiosyncratic
symbols.Similarlypropositionsmay acquire idiosyncraticsymbolictruthfor
particularindividuals.Such privatesymbolismsshould not have a largeplace
in ethnographicreports,the primaryconcernof which is to reportwhat is
common to membersof a society,what constitutestheirculture.It seems
likely,moreover,thatthe greaterpart of the symbolictruthsthata normal
personholds are collective,in a numberof sensesand forvariousreasons.
Most people do in factlearnmostof theirideas and attitudesfromothers,
and are not much inclinedto be originaland creative.A person'ssymbolic
forthemostpart,likelyto be collectivein theobvious
truthsare therefore,
senseof having been acquiredfromhis culture.
be collectivein a second obvious sense,thatof being
2) They will therefore
common to and sharedby the membersof a community.Much of their
power as symbolsderivesfromthisfact.
3) Through being sharedtheyacquire a kind of verisimilitudewhich,while
not beingthetruthofmattersoffact,hasthat'aura offactuality'thatGeertz
to religionas a culturalsystem.Our warrantfor
(I966) seesas fundamental
sayingthatsomethingexistsis simplythatthehypothesisthatit does is the
most satisfactory
way of accountingfor a set of given experiences.The
claim that,e.g.,God existsis warrantedto the extentthatobservedevents
are bestfittedto thatsupposition:and thisseemsto be so of social eventsif
membersof societyare indeed actingon thatsupposition.(We may prefer
to account for theseeventsby the hypothesisthatthe actorsbelieve that
God exists;but believerscannotbe expectedto recognisethisas a distinct
hypothesiswithoutallowing thatthe beliefmightbe false,and this,as we
arguedabove (p. 635), is hardlypossibleforthem.)
4) It is not only that,throughbeing shared,religioustenetsacquire thataura
of factuality
which makesthemappearto be simplytrue:inasmuchas they
are empiricallyindeterminate
thisis the only way theycan come to seem
factuallytrue. As I remarkedin an earlierpaper,'The apparenttruthor
falsityof such doctrines seems to depend wholly on social factors'
(Southwold I978: 374).
Further,
as we have seen,the criteriaforreallybelievingsymbolictruths
5)
are emic, customary,and hence collective: e.g. a man reallybelievesthe
Dhamma only ifhe sufficiently
refrainsfromtakinglife.
i)

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642

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

of membershipof a group,a
6) Thus symbolictruthsbecome representative
community,a Church. Not to overload the term'symbolic' stillfurther,
I would follow a hintof Nadel's and saythattheyare 'emblematic'of such
membership
(Nadel I 95 I: 262, citedin FirthI 973: I 74). Theyrepresent
such membershipboth internally,as expressingattachmentto the group
one as a
and solidaritywith fellowmembers,and externallyas identifying
member of thisgroup in contrastwith outsidersand with othergroups.
on liturgical
This emblematicfunctionis prominentin credalaffirmations
and other formaloccasions,and is perhapsalways presentin avowals of
believing a religioustenet.We should ask ourselveshow farinformants'
as conveying
can safelybe interpreted
avowals of beliefto an ethnographer
cognitiveattitudesratherthanas simplyassertinggroup identity.
7) Ifthesymbolsare landmarksfororderinga world,it is importantthatthey
a person'ssocialworld.
be sharedamong thosewhoseinteractionconstitutes
8) When symbolic truthsare held in common they can be acted upon
collectivelythroughritual; they serve thus to alter as well as to order
I96I:
experience
(cf.Lienhardt

250, 291).

9) The awareness that symbolic truthsare held in common, and their


activationin collectiveritual,evokes,and chargesthesymbolictruthswith,
thesenseof strengththatmen feelin thesupportof theirfellows:
of
bothin theordinary
secularaffairs
Individuals
areweak,butsocialgroupsarestrong,
I96I: 247).
lifeandin dealingwiththePowers(Lienhardt

i o) It would seemthatsymbolictruthsareusually,ifnotinvariably,collective
in yet anothersense: theirprincipalreferenceis to collectiveaffairsand
concerns,whether it be moralityin the most general sense,or more
specificsocial orjural valuessuch as matrilinealdescent.
Thus it would seem thatsymbolicpropositions,and theholdingof themas
true,are eminentlycollective.It is of courseindividualswho believehtsthem:
but theydo so primarilyin theircapacitynot as individualsbut as membersof
a collectivity.Because this is so, the fact of such believing is most exactly
reportedby saying,of thebelievers,'theybelieve . . .' in thecollectiverather
than the distributive7sense.This is the germ of truthin Leach's contention
which we began by considering. As we have argued, however, 'they
believe . . .' is normallyalso truein thedistributive
sensewhich sumsa set,of
'he believes . . .' ascriptions;thisis not, as Leach supposed,excluded,but it
would seem to be secondaryand derivative.When, as is all too easy, we
interpret'they believe . . .' reportssimply in the distributivesense, this
conducesto understanding
'believe' in thesenseof'hold as factuallytrue'.This
in turn leads to those misconceiveddebates about rationalitywhich Leach
(I 954: I 3) dismissedas mostly'scholasticnonsense'.
x
I have attributedfour characteristics
to basic religious tenets: they are
empiricallyindeterminate,
axiomatic,symbolic,and collective.These characteristicsare closely connected.It is because theyare axiomatic thattheyare

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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

643

collective,and becausetheyarecollectivethattheyareaxiomatic.Their power


as symbolslargelyderivesfromtheirbeingcollective:theirabilityas symbols
to sustaina varietyof meaningshelps to make them commonly and hence
collectivelyacceptable.Their place as axioms makesit naturalthattheyshould
be empiricallyindeterminate;and, as we argued,it is functionalthat they
shouldbe,sinceiffalsifiable
Theirfunctionas symbolic
theywould be falsified.
truthsalso makes it desirablethattheyshould be empiricallyindeterminate,
lest question and doubts about their factualtruthconfuseor confutetheir
symbolicrole.
The logically proper attitudetowardssuch propositions,if one maintains
them,is thattheyare symbolicallytruebut not factuallytrue.This is a difficult
positionto maintainexplicitly,when one'slanguageand conceptualsystemdo
not clearlydistinguishbetweenthesetwo kindsof truth,and do assumea twovalued logic by which 'not factuallytrue' is equivalent to 'factuallyfalse'.
I do see signs that the cognitive attitudeof more
Despite this difficulty,
sensitivebelieversis at leastimplicitlyclose to what is logicallyproper: and I
urge thatwe should look forfirmerevidenceof this.
I have littledoubt thatmany,ifnot most,religiousbelieverstakethesimpler
and more robustview thattheirtenetsarefactuallytrueas well as symbolically
fromthe appropriateview, and we should
true.This is but subtlydifferent
hardlydescribepeople as irrationalbecause theyfailto mark such a difficult
an assumptionthatan empirically
distinction:themore so since,by definition,
indeterminatepropositionis factuallytruecan never conflictwith empirical
evidence.They are no more mistakenor irrationalin takingtheirtenetsto be
factuallytruethanwe are,as we oftenhave been,in assumingthemto be false;
and theyhave farbetterexcuse.
NOTES

ShorterOxford EnglishDictionary,under'believe':
'3. With clause or infinitivephrase:To hold it as truethat . . ., to think'.

-Leach actually illustratesthis sense in the same sentencewhen he writes,'But Professor


Spiro . . . desperatelywants to believe that
2 As Needhamn
argues (I972: 5-7).
3 Sperber cites Turner I969: I 5 as his source; Turner reportstherefurther
subtletiesof the
Ndembu idiom.-As Firth(I973: i68) has remindedus,the notion of a symbol as a landmark
had earlierbeen employedby Fortes:'Totemic and othersymbolsare theideological landmarks

thatkeeptheindividualon hiscourse'(I945:

I44).

I have made myselfa rule that when using subscriptsto distinguishdifferentsensesof a


word, a change to different
level of distinctionshould be marked by a change of fount(lower
case, capitals,numerals,etc.). Thus the two lower-caseletters'ht' can be understoodas making
one distinction:the change to capitals,'S' and 'F', indicatesthattheseserve furtherto segment
the sensemarked by 'ht'.
5 It is not only Leach who failsto see this: the erroris verycommon. Most of the problems
with which Needham (I972) wrestlesarisefromthe fallaciousassumptionthatbeliefmust be
regardedas an innermentalstate;and,as he shows,thefallacyis widespreadamong philosophers.
It seemsto arisefromtwo basic errorsof method:
4

i) Ifone analysesusage ofthe noun 'belief ratherthantheverb 'believe' it is farlessevidentthat


a relationratherthana stateis designated.
2) Again concentrationon usage of the noun obscuresthe crucial factthatthe semanticsof'he
believes' are significantly
different
fromthoseof 'I believe'. If the latteris erroneouslytakento
be paradigmaticfor both, then the way is opened for indulging the favouritephilosophical

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644

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

techniqueof introspection.The resultsare irrelevantand confusingforanalysingascriptionsof


believing to thirdparties-i.e. statementsof the form'he believes' or 'they believe'.
These pointsare farfromobvious, and to thatextentdeserveto be proved. I am assumingthat
anthropologistsare too little committed to the philosophical errors to care to see them
extensivelyrefuted.
6 And the harderit is to get it properlyformulatedso as to make the question of its factual
truthat leastin principledecidable,the more likelyit is to be functioningnot as a factualbut as
a symbolicproposition.
'Distributive: referringto each individual of a class separately;opposed to "collective"'
(ShorterOxford EnglishDictionary).
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