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RELIGIOUS
BELIEF
MARTINSOUTHWOLD
University
ofManchester
Those who loyallysubscribeto a religionnormallydo believe at leastitsbasic tenets.Such
believing is an importantpartof religiousbehaviour,and we should understandand describe
it more exactly. To dismissbelief as a matterfor psychologyis an error,which restson a
fallacy.Though Leach has falleninto thiserrorhe has also pointedto a fruitful
approach.The
fromfactualtruth:it may be called symbolic
truthof at leastbasic religioustenetsis different
truth. It is argued that basic religious tenets are empirically indeterminate,axiomatic,
symbolic,and collective. From thisthe most appropriatecognitiveattitudeto them can be
inferred:it is suggestedthatreligiousbeliefmay commonly approximateto this.Religious
noted:
believersdo not lack rationalityin believingtenetswhich have thefourcharacteristics
it would be less rationalto preferarticlesof faithwhich did not have them.
I
Justwhat does 'belief' mean in a religiouscontext?Of all theproblemssurroundingattempts
to conduct anthropologicalanalysisof religion this is the one that has perhaps been most
troublesomeand thereforethe most oftenavoided, usually by relegatingit to psychology,
that raffishoutcast discipline to which social anthropologistsare forever consigning
phenomena they are unable to deal with within the framework of a denatured
Durkheimianism.But theproblemwill notgo away, it is not'merely' psychological(nothing
social is), and no anthropologicaltheoryof religionwhich failsto attackit is worthyof the
name (Geertz I966: 24-5).
II
By theseremarksLeach appearsto be sayingthatan ethnographicreport
thata people believe a certainpropositionreportstheiradherenceto a dogma
and onlythat:it does not tellus thatthepeople believe-in the ordinarysense
of 'hold as true'"-the proposition.Put like this, the contentionappears
implausible,not to say perverse.2Leach's referenceto 'inner psychological
attitudes',in place of the second 'believe', servesto obscure thisfact.It also
providesan argument,albeit fallacious,in supportof the contention.And it
Man (N.S.) I4,
628-44.
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
629
2)
Intermittently
at least,Leach supposesthatwe have to understandreports
thatpeople believe what is palpablyuntrueforthem:
what,thatis,theydo not
believe,i.e. hold as true.
3) Spiro interpretedLeach's words as I have: thus he summarisesLeach's
argumentas containing:
... two main theses:the culturalbeliefconcerningconception does not meanwhat it says,
and, even ifit does, the nativesdo not believewhat it says(I968: 243).
6).
630
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
lateraccount(I932:
earlyreport(I9I6) andin hismoreconsidered
I53-78).
He reportscategoricallythattheTrobriandersdeniedthatconceptionis caused
by copulation. But he also makes it obvious why they did. Christian
missionarieshad preached 'the doctrineand ideal of Paternity'againstthe
Trobriandethos:
Only during my thirdexpedition to New Guinea did I discover that the nativeshad been
somewhat exasperatedby having an 'absurdity' preached at them, and by findingme, so
unmissionary'as a rule,engaged in the same futileargument(I932: I 59).
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
63I
632
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
I did not at the time grasp theseissues.I explore them now with a view to
betterresearchin the future,by othersand by me. It should be possible to
sampleof people,what the cognitiveattitudes
determine,fora representative
to religioustenetsreallyare; and it shouldbe done. Cognitiveattitudesare not
wholly inner and psychological:we do have informationabout them,and
could and should have more. There is not a dichotomy between mere
themostimportantattitudeslie betweenthese
adherenceand fundamentalism:
two. Not to get thisclearis both to demeanthosepeople whose believingwe
write about, and also to fail to understanda fundamentalaspectof religious
behaviour.'Justwhat does "belief" mean in a religiouscontext?'
IV
As I have indicated,within one communitydifferent
personsmay have
different
cognitiveattitudestowards religioustenets.The same person may
have different
attitudesin different
situationsand contexts(see, e.g., Powell
I956: 277-8 quoted in Leach I967: 48 (note 5), and ofcourseEvans-Pritchard
tenets:thus
attitudesto different
I937 passim).And theremay be different
among the SinhaleseI foundit not uncommon forpeople to expressdissent
fromsome tenets,whereastherewere othertenetswhich no one told me, or
even showed me, thathe doubted.These unquestionedarticlesof faithwere,
unsurprisingly,
thosewhich are logicallybasicto practicalBuddhism:thoseto
deny which would carry away a large part of what is characteristically
Buddhist.
Thus religiousbeliefis not one thing:it is a complex of cognitiveattitudes
which,I am arguing,we shoulddescribemoreexactlythanwe usuallydo. My
immediatepurposeis to definea cognitiveattitudewhich is mostappropriate
towards at least basic religioustenets,and which I sensed was actuallythe
Because we
attitudeof at leastmy more sensitiveand thoughtfulinformants.
anthropologistsourselves are either unbelievers or at best rather crude
to identifythisattitudeand to distinguishit from
believers,we findit difficult
others.But ifwe can see what to look for,we may in factfindit is as common
as what we should recogniseas intelligentattitudesto othermatters.To do so
should lead to considerablerevisionof our judgementsof the rationalityof
of the place of
religiousbelievers:it mighteven enhanceour understanding
religionin our culture-which, as Durkheimremarkedon thefirstpage of his
Elementary
formsof the religiouslife,is an objective of the anthropologyof
religion( 9 I 5: I-2).
The tenetsof Buddhismcan be broadlyorderedalong a continuumranging
fromthe most basic and indispensableto the most accessoryand optional; as
I have remarked,such distinctions
in thecognitiveattitudesof at
are reflected
leastsome Buddhists.For example,it is basic to hold thatrebirth,determined
by Karma, is real; thatNirvana is a realstateattainableby humanbeings;that
the Buddha and othershave attainedit; thatthe Buddha's teachingprovides
efficaciousdirectionsfor attainingit. But it is optional to hold, e.g., that
participationin ritesis conduciveto attainment;thatthe servicesof Buddhist
clergyare essentialat funeralsand mortuaryceremonies;thatgodlike beings
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
633
axiomatic,
4) collective.
2)
634
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
V
The relation between a basic tenet and the religion it serves to found
resembles that between an axiom and a theory based on it. Boudon's
observationis illuminating:
raised by the concept of axiom did not vanish until it was
The epistemologicaldifficulties
understood that an axiom was not a propositionplaced at the beginning of a deductive
argumentbecause it was untestable-but rathera propositionmade untestableby itslocation
at the beginningof the argument(I97I:
IO).
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
635
VI
I have suggestedthatbelievers,or at leastthe more sensitiveamong them,
show signsof recognisingthatreligioustenetsare neithertruenor false;I have
now arguedthatnevertheless
thesetenetsare regardedas unquestionablytrue.
These two positionsare consistentif we recognisethatthe truthof religious
tenetsis not factualtruthbut anotherkind: I shallcall it symbolictruth.
Something like this was recognised by Leach when he wrote, in the
Introduction
to hisPolitical
systems
Burma:
ofhighland
60: I).
and emotions'(I975:
understandings,
i i).
Barthdrawsbetween'digital'and'analogic'codes(I975:
ch.25). Thereseems
636
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
VII
The way in which 'believehts'differs
from'believehtF'can bestbe brought
out by consideringcarefullyjust what the lattermeans.To say thata person
holds a propositionas factuallytrue is to say that he regardsit as correctly
describingsome partor aspectofreality;or thathe holdsthatthestateofaffairs
it describesexistsin reality.Or, betterstill,it is to say thatthispropositionis
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
637
to whichhe assessesand
an elementin hisinternalmodel ofrealityby reference
with reality.
guideshis transactions
Hence thereare fourconditionswhich mustbe satisfiedifwe are to say of
a certainproposition:
a person,with sufficient
warrant,thathe believeshtF
with
in whichsomesetsofactsare consistent
i) There mustbe some situations
(or better,if possible, rationallyentailed by) the proposition'sbeing
setof actsare consistentwith (or entailedby)
factuallytrue,and a different
frequently
itsbeingfalse;and he mustencountersuchsituationssufficiently
observations.-Under 'acts' I includeverbal
to allow us to make sufficient
acts, and notably those of assertingor unequivocally implying the
proposition,and of avowing it as true/false.
In such situationshe mustpredominantlydo thoseactsthatare consistent
2)
with itstruthratherthanthosethatare consistentwith itsfalsity.
ofconductwithbeliefwould deprivethe
a) To requireperfectconsistency
conceptof use: normalpeople are not perfectlyconsistent.But thereis
oftenenough a cleardistinctionbetweenconductwhich is as consistent
with a belief as it is reasonable*to expect, and that which is grossly
with it.
inconsistent
b) Though therelevantactsincludeverbalacts,theyshouldifpossiblealso
includenon-verbalacts.As Gombrich(I 97I: 4-5) rightlyremarks,we
say a persondoes not reallybelieve what he professesif his non-verbal
with it. There are two good reasonsfor
acts are seriouslyinconsistent
this:
i) If to believehtFa propositionis to have it as an elementin one's
conduct is
internalmodel of reality,thenall one's reality-oriented
potentiallyrelevantin decidingwhetherit actuallyis an elementin
thatmodel.
bysimulating
ii) Ifa personisdeceivingothers,and perhapsalso himself,
a beliefhe does not reallyhold,it is normallyeasier,and cheaper,to
do so by verbalfalsehoodsthanby non-verbalpretences.
3) There must be evidence thathe entertainsthispropositionin association
with theseacts. Philosophersare agreed that a person cannot be held to
believe a propositionthathe has never'entertained'or considered;and as
we have knownsinceEvans-Pritchard
(I 937) thatpeoplepractisesituational
selection of their beliefs,we have to establishthat the propositionis
entertainedin the contextof the acts relevantto believingit. One cannot
infer that a certain propositionis believed merely from the fact that
observed conduct is consistentwith it, since any course of conduct is
overlooks
consistentwith more than one proposition(Gombrich (I97I)
this-see my commentsin Southwold I978: 366).
of a propositionis mostplainlyestablishedif the person
Entertainment
expressesit in or withhisact: thisis why verbalassertionsor endorsements,
thoughunreliableevidenceofholdingas true,are importantas evidenceof
is also establishedifthe
believing.It may be lessobvious thatentertainment
actordeniesthepropositionas he acts-provided he does so spontaneously,
and not merelyin replyto a leading question.If thiswere all, we should
resultthatit is hardestto establishthatpeople believe
have thefrustrating
638
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
639
640
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
64I
Ix
Sometimesthingsbecome symbolicfora particularindividualbut not for
his fellows generally: we may speak of these as private and idiosyncratic
symbols.Similarlypropositionsmay acquire idiosyncraticsymbolictruthfor
particularindividuals.Such privatesymbolismsshould not have a largeplace
in ethnographicreports,the primaryconcernof which is to reportwhat is
common to membersof a society,what constitutestheirculture.It seems
likely,moreover,thatthe greaterpart of the symbolictruthsthata normal
personholds are collective,in a numberof sensesand forvariousreasons.
Most people do in factlearnmostof theirideas and attitudesfromothers,
and are not much inclinedto be originaland creative.A person'ssymbolic
forthemostpart,likelyto be collectivein theobvious
truthsare therefore,
senseof having been acquiredfromhis culture.
be collectivein a second obvious sense,thatof being
2) They will therefore
common to and sharedby the membersof a community.Much of their
power as symbolsderivesfromthisfact.
3) Through being sharedtheyacquire a kind of verisimilitudewhich,while
not beingthetruthofmattersoffact,hasthat'aura offactuality'thatGeertz
to religionas a culturalsystem.Our warrantfor
(I966) seesas fundamental
sayingthatsomethingexistsis simplythatthehypothesisthatit does is the
most satisfactory
way of accountingfor a set of given experiences.The
claim that,e.g.,God existsis warrantedto the extentthatobservedevents
are bestfittedto thatsupposition:and thisseemsto be so of social eventsif
membersof societyare indeed actingon thatsupposition.(We may prefer
to account for theseeventsby the hypothesisthatthe actorsbelieve that
God exists;but believerscannotbe expectedto recognisethisas a distinct
hypothesiswithoutallowing thatthe beliefmightbe false,and this,as we
arguedabove (p. 635), is hardlypossibleforthem.)
4) It is not only that,throughbeing shared,religioustenetsacquire thataura
of factuality
which makesthemappearto be simplytrue:inasmuchas they
are empiricallyindeterminate
thisis the only way theycan come to seem
factuallytrue. As I remarkedin an earlierpaper,'The apparenttruthor
falsityof such doctrines seems to depend wholly on social factors'
(Southwold I978: 374).
Further,
as we have seen,the criteriaforreallybelievingsymbolictruths
5)
are emic, customary,and hence collective: e.g. a man reallybelievesthe
Dhamma only ifhe sufficiently
refrainsfromtakinglife.
i)
642
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
of membershipof a group,a
6) Thus symbolictruthsbecome representative
community,a Church. Not to overload the term'symbolic' stillfurther,
I would follow a hintof Nadel's and saythattheyare 'emblematic'of such
membership
(Nadel I 95 I: 262, citedin FirthI 973: I 74). Theyrepresent
such membershipboth internally,as expressingattachmentto the group
one as a
and solidaritywith fellowmembers,and externallyas identifying
member of thisgroup in contrastwith outsidersand with othergroups.
on liturgical
This emblematicfunctionis prominentin credalaffirmations
and other formaloccasions,and is perhapsalways presentin avowals of
believing a religioustenet.We should ask ourselveshow farinformants'
as conveying
can safelybe interpreted
avowals of beliefto an ethnographer
cognitiveattitudesratherthanas simplyassertinggroup identity.
7) Ifthesymbolsare landmarksfororderinga world,it is importantthatthey
a person'ssocialworld.
be sharedamong thosewhoseinteractionconstitutes
8) When symbolic truthsare held in common they can be acted upon
collectivelythroughritual; they serve thus to alter as well as to order
I96I:
experience
(cf.Lienhardt
250, 291).
i o) It would seemthatsymbolictruthsareusually,ifnotinvariably,collective
in yet anothersense: theirprincipalreferenceis to collectiveaffairsand
concerns,whether it be moralityin the most general sense,or more
specificsocial orjural valuessuch as matrilinealdescent.
Thus it would seem thatsymbolicpropositions,and theholdingof themas
true,are eminentlycollective.It is of courseindividualswho believehtsthem:
but theydo so primarilyin theircapacitynot as individualsbut as membersof
a collectivity.Because this is so, the fact of such believing is most exactly
reportedby saying,of thebelievers,'theybelieve . . .' in thecollectiverather
than the distributive7sense.This is the germ of truthin Leach's contention
which we began by considering. As we have argued, however, 'they
believe . . .' is normallyalso truein thedistributive
sensewhich sumsa set,of
'he believes . . .' ascriptions;thisis not, as Leach supposed,excluded,but it
would seem to be secondaryand derivative.When, as is all too easy, we
interpret'they believe . . .' reportssimply in the distributivesense, this
conducesto understanding
'believe' in thesenseof'hold as factuallytrue'.This
in turn leads to those misconceiveddebates about rationalitywhich Leach
(I 954: I 3) dismissedas mostly'scholasticnonsense'.
x
I have attributedfour characteristics
to basic religious tenets: they are
empiricallyindeterminate,
axiomatic,symbolic,and collective.These characteristicsare closely connected.It is because theyare axiomatic thattheyare
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
643
ShorterOxford EnglishDictionary,under'believe':
'3. With clause or infinitivephrase:To hold it as truethat . . ., to think'.
thatkeeptheindividualon hiscourse'(I945:
I44).
644
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
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