Van dorn vs romillo

Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen
of the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their
residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced
in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioners business in
Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the
business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by
the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the
subject of the certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien
spouse.
HELD: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his
own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Pilapil vs ibay-somera
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half
years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce
proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still
married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant
Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city
fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against
the petitioner. The case entitled PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to
the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent.
Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO,
seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for
adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for
adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE
and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO
issued in this case is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action,
it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical
consequence since the raison detre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the
time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of
a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the
accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the
same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture
that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Garcia vs. recio

366 SCRA 437 Civil Law Conflict of Laws - Foreign Law Divorce
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1,
1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian
Family Court. On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. Subsequently,
Recio entered into marriage with Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. Starting October
22, 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground
of bigamy. Recio contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of
divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry Garcia. The trial court
rendered the decision declaring the marriage between Garcia and Recio dissolved and both
parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to
remarry.
HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records,
the court cannot conclude that Recio who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally
capacitated to marry Garcia. Neither can the court grant Garcias prayer to declare her marriage
null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was
really capacitated to marry Garcia as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the
following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.

quita vs Court of Appeals

December 22, 1998
Fact of the Case:
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married inthe
Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.Both
of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the
respondentherewith. They were blessed with six children.
On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to whowill be
the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held thatthe
divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private
respondentstressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the
ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized
in thePhilippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner
herselfanswered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she
alsostated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the
shewas no longer a Filipino citizen.
The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estatewas
ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and
thePadlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial
reconsiderationwas granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis,
entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half
to Fe Quita.Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was
declared voidsince it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner.Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was
decidedwithout a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
(1)
Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio.
(2)
Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as
surviving spouse of Arturo.
Held:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita at
the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here sinceshe was
already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in theircountrys
national law.
Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the
primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.

Perez vs. CA, GR No. 118870, March 29, 1996

Facts: Respondent father, a doctor of medicine and petitioner mother, a registered
nurse working in the US are married couples who are separated in fact with only one
child.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody
of their son. The RTC issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his
mother, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code.
Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and
awarded custody of the boy to him ruling that there were enough reasons to deny
petitioner custody over the child even under seven years old. It held that granting
custody to the boys father would be for the childs best interest and welfare.
Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents that no child under 7 years
of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.
Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states that No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds there are
compelling reasons therefore.
Issue: WON custody of the child is to be given to the father.
Held: No. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a child under seven years of
age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule
99, Sec 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term separation.
The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven
years old shall not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed
the earlier Article 17, par 3 of the Child and youth Welfare Code which reduced the
childs age to 5 years.

San luis vs. san luis

Bigamy Void Marriage
During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos dad) contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children.
On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed
a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon
death of his dad Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed
that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to
Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because
this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo is bigamous.
HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there
is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law
and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of
the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Amor-catalan vs. ca
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy?
RULING:
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. Petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After
all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce
decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that
they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce
decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.