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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPM ENT SB LAW JOURNAL M ARCH 2010

SOVEREIGNTY OVER NAT IONAL RESOURCES: CHA NGE OF CONCEPT OR PE RCEPTION BEDA LAW
JOURNAL

SEC. 16 ART II DECLA RATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
MINORS OPOSA V. DENR JULY 30 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO
and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERT A NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA,
CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGFRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.
PASIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL
and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPARADO,
CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA.
MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents
ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed
ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL and
IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,
STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT,
BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., Petitioners, v.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, Respondents.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND
HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, CONSTRUED. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same article: "SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them." While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the
first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced
and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
2. ID.; ID.; TIMBER LICENSES; NATURE THEREOF; NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE MAY NOT BE INVOKED; CASE AT BAR.
all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution. In Tan v. Director of Forestry, (125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983]) This Court held: ". . . A timber license is

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an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom
it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court
held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People v. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576) . . ." We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary: (190 SCRA 673 684
[1990])." . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession
area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of
Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]." Since
timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed." In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet
be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot
still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only
been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp., (110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]) this Court
stated: "The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare." The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia v. New York, (291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L.
ed. 940 947-949) quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. v. Auditor General, (22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968]) to wit:" Under
our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to
work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest." In court, the nonimpairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. (Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp.,
supra; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. v. Auditor General, supra; Alalyan v. NLRC, 24 scra 172 [1968]; Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling v. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987]).
3. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; NO LONGER IMPAIRED BY THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE; RATIONALE. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Commenting on this
provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says: "The first part of
the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The
second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government. As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to
declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the
meaning of grave abuse of discretion, which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary." In Daza v. Singson, (180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also Coseteng v. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales v.
Macaraig, 191 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991]) Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for
this Court, noted: "In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even
if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADINGS; CAUSE OF ACTION, DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. the right of the petitioners (and all those
they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that
right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. A cause of action is
defined as: ". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal
right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." (Marao

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Sugar Central Co. v. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and Finance Corp. v. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere v.
vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseas v. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona
v. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].
5. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION, AS A GROUND; RULE; CASE AT BAR. It is settled in this
jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the
court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore,
the truth or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be
resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint? In Militante v. Edrosolano, this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If
that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute." After a careful examination of the petitioners
complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the subheading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may
thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LOCUS STANDI, CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. The Court explicitly states that petitioners have
the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff
must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this
"class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future it appears to me that everyone who may be
expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries right of action in the field of environmental protection, as
against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of
activity involved. Whether such a beneficiaries right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to
act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"),
is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO "A BALANCE AND
HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY" ; INTERPRETATION. The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one
specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It
is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and
healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubric appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention
and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and
raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and
inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or
slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and
other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements
pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Sections 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health"). As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing
and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those
implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
3. ID.; RIGHT TO HEALTH; SHOULD SPECIFICALLY EXIST IN OUR CORPUS OF LAW. Justice Feliciano suggestion is simply
that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the
Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial
court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; LEGAL RIGHTS, AS ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS;
STANDARDS. the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a

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constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively;
in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation
of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads: "Section 1 . . . Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right
to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualifications. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
policy making departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue
of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."cralaw virtua1aw library
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI),
a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable
Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers class
suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the countrys virgin tropical rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed
for that judgment be rendered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements."cralaw virtua1aw
library
and granting the plaintiffs." . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna
may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order
to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the countrys land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%)
for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from the drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of
the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the countrys unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the

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disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipinos indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of
rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the
purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earths capacity
to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global
warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."cralaw virtua1aw library
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to
present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
countrys land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of
the countrys land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass
of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that defendants predecessors have granted timber license agreements (TLAs) to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex A.
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the
plaintiff minors generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental
damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this
rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant
a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex B.
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLAs, to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLAs is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff
minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines has been abundantly blessed with.

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19. Defendants refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLAs is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977).
20. Furthermore, defendants continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLAs is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the
State to
a. effect a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth and make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic).
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b.protect the nations marine wealth. (Section 2, ibid);
c.conserve and promote the nations cultural heritage and resources (sic). (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d.protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendants act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs right to selfpreservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
countrys vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendants abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendants claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning
their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of mans inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.
Petitioners likewise rely on the respondents correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, the safeguard the peoples right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretarys alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements
(TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitutions non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not
apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause,

HOMEWORK 1
it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners recourse is not to file an action in court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law.
Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same
can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The
original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them
before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations,
file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the
"rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible
to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judges challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order read as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

"After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe
that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are
seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to
state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public
policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of Separation of Powers of the three
(3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to impairment of contracts abhored (sic) by
the fundamental law." 11

HOMEWORK 1
We do not agree with the trial courts conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nations constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature."cralaw virtua1aw library
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."cralaw
virtua1aw library
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the
Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"MR. VILLACORTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same
and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance." 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the countrys forests. Without such
forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions
of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the countrys natural resources, 13 then President Corazon
C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper
use of the countrys environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be
provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and
use of the countrys natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state
to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization; development
and conservation of our natural resources."cralaw virtua1aw library
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in Section 1
thereof which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

HOMEWORK 1
"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development
as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications
relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agencys being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of
the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the countrys natural resources."cralaw virtua1aw library
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D.
No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,
maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to
fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to
the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs duty under
its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause
of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the
plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should
be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante v. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action]
lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."cralaw virtua1aw
library
After a careful examination of the petitioners complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as
the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar
as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.

HOMEWORK 1
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right visa-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative
actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."cralaw virtua1aw library
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court,
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what
was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of grave abuse of discretion, which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Daza v. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides: . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution.
The court a quo declared that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to impairment of contracts abhored (sic) by
the fundamental law." 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber
license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan v. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which
can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People v. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

HOMEWORK 1
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession
area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of
Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still
be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only
been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 28 this Court
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare."cralaw virtua1aw library
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia v. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. v. Auditor
General, 30 to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public
concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest."
In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of
right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of
18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part; related to one of the parties.
Puno, J., took no part in the deliberations.
Vitug, J., took no part; I was not yet with the Court when the case was deliberated upon.
Separate Opinions

HOMEWORK 1
FELICIANO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J . in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most
important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence
profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all
the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to
be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision,
pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi
to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of
"class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future it
appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to
take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries right of action in the
field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities
operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such a beneficiaries right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown
("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is
"fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very
great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to
fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of
particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubric appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic
fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland
and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land,
streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction
of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of
ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3,
Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6
June 1977 all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Sections 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of
more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to
an extremely wide range of topics:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

HOMEWORK 1
(vii) mineral resources.
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or
provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.
Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation
and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of
implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above
noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are
too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a
significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act,
imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed
for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our
corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code,
and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a
motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather
than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively;
in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII
of the Constitution which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area
of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional
qualifications. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative
and executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to
implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLAs petitioners demand
public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners entitlement to the
relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of
their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is
that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual
nexus between petitioners specific legal right and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency.
They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which
exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of
extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Courts decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer
examination.

HOMEWORK 1
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, , VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITT EE ON PRIVATIZATION AND OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL,.
ELLOSILLO, J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision
is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part
of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC 1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest
Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation
System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel) are obtained.[3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner
in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.[4] In a
subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS
refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51%
of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition
and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was
then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

HOMEWORK 1
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage
and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its
power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony.[6] Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part
of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of
the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the
national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate
that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate,
there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be done.[9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second
paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the
hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony
of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a
personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the
shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had
lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the
privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be
awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion
in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no
clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments
their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception
in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered.[11] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount
and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

HOMEWORK 1
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws
and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.[12] A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself
and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent
of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in
effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that
a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view
is, as it has always been, that x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.[15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from
discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of
PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who
are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because the existing laws or prospective
laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply
for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so
long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the selfexecuting nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by
the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy
for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The
mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision
for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that
a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in
harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.[17] Subsequent legislation however
does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

HOMEWORK 1
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and
third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.[18] The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully
owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be
self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another.[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which
are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation[20] speaks of constitutional provisions on personal
dignity,[21] the sanctity of family life,[22] the vital role of the youth in nation-building,[23] the promotion of social justice,[24] and the
values of education.[25] Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance[26] refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights[27]
and on education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare,[30] the sanctity of
family life,[31] the vital role of the youth in nation-building[32] and the promotion of total human liberation and development.[33] A
reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for
legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa
loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission[34] explains The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural
heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands,
forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it
first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of
various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the
festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it
plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.[37] During World War II
the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in
the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the
hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and
ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President of the
Philippine Republic.

HOMEWORK 1
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos;
its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the
hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy
provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor
the land upon which the building stands.[38]
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which
is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting
the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation
that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino
citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to individuals and not to juridical
personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the
word Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or
entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the
Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

HOMEWORK 1
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino First policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in
the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony.[42]
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by
Commissioner Nolledo[43] Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO
FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the
common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment
to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counterproductive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a
qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified
bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner
has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.[44]
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and
requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by the government itself - is
only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some
of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source
of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling,
implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided
that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of
the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not
the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every
time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a
separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be
carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without
doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command.[46]

HOMEWORK 1
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate
directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly
provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and
secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos
the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing
the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known
to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the
bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution
lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS
may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share.[47] Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a
stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while
this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing
into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware
from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited
to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest
bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of
the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality
then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent
disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on
selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays
down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with
no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the
sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS

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to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the
Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked
to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of
foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference
for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more
appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive
about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions
perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development x x x x in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts
First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in a major daily
to the effect that that injunction again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set
itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution
or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never
shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character
of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued
at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will
always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy
as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.[49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the
Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the
goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic
concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that
has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads
of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their
official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of
twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history
of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country.[51]
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old
Dame of hotels in Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot
be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign
silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila
Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is
entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in
the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision
of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly
watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and
DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at

HOMEWORK 1
P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances
and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
MMDA, CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY DEC 18 20 02
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Petitioners, vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,
MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA,
FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,
FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, Respondents.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve
Manila Bay in their different capacities. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and
the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of
subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and
preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR
Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development,
and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary
government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for
the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is
ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the
DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management
programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river
systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (ParaaqueZapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge
water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic
septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require
non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes,
sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or
imposition of fines and other sanctions.

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(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste
water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install,
operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the
provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is
also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized
methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in
coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent
marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered
to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into
the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro
Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments established or
built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las
Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as
the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan,
Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other
concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA
7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite)
River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one
(1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal
cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws
on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine
if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming
from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the
necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution
prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds
and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a
balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover
the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys
development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine
waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of
MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the
Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.

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SO ORDERED.
The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the Decision became final in January 2009.
The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December 18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was
created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said
decision and to monitor the execution phase.
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their
assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of
the Philippines.
This view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because
the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the
power of the Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over
executive functions.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these directives are but
part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section 47 of Rule 39 reads:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been so adjudged but also those matters "actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is
necessarily encompassed by said judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases:
Sec. 7. Judgment.If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform
an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful
or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of
the judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor
compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or observations on the execution of the judgment.
Sec. 8. Return of the writ.The periodic reports submitted by the respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained
in partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to the court by the respondent.
If the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket.
(Emphasis supplied.)
With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies
have shown full compliance with the Courts orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the
judgment.
There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall now proceed to the recommendation of the Manila Bay
Advisory Committee.
Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory Committee. 2 An evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports has
shown that (1) there are voluminous quarterly progressive reports that are being submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not have a uniform

HOMEWORK 1
manner of reporting their cleanup, rehabilitation and preservation activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines have been set by petitioner
DENR as to petitioner-agencies timeframe for their respective duties; (4) as of June 2010 there has been a change in leadership in both
the national and local levels; and (5) some agencies have encountered difficulties in complying with the Courts directives.
In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be issued by the Court to address the said concerns.
Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the Court hereby resolves to ORDER the following:
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency in the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall
submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy.
The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality of Manila Bay waters for all four quarters of 2010 on or before
June 30, 2011.
The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of persons and companies in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan that generate toxic and hazardous waste on or before September 30, 2011.
(2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall order the Mayors of all cities in Metro
Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in said
provinces to inspect all factories, commercial establishments and private homes along the banks of the major river systemssuch as but
not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (Paranaque-Zapote, Las Pinas) Rivers, the NavotasMalabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite)
River, and the Laguna De Bayand other minor rivers and waterways within their jurisdiction that eventually discharge water into the
Manila Bay and the lands abutting it, to determine if they have wastewater treatment facilities and/or hygienic septic tanks, as prescribed
by existing laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. Said local government unit (LGU) officials are given up to September 30, 2011 to
finish the inspection of said establishments and houses.
In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action to ensure compliance by non-complying factories, commercial
establishments and private homes with said law, rules and regulations requiring the construction or installment of wastewater treatment
facilities or hygienic septic tanks.
The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or before December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports
which will contain the names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-complying factories, commercial establishments and
private homes, copy furnished the concerned environmental agency, be it the local DENR office or the Laguna Lake Development
Authority.
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying
factories, commercial establishments, and private homes.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila shall consider providing land for the wastewater
facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water, Inc.) within
their respective jurisdictions.
(3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have
the necessary wastewater treatment facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their plans and
projects for the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion period for said facilities, which
shall not go beyond 2037.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as
sewerage fees in their respective areas of operation as of December 31, 2010.
(4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or before September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and
maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for said works, which shall be fully
implemented by December 31, 2020.

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(5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, shall submit to the Court on or before
June 30, 2011 a report on areas in Manila Bay where marine life has to be restored or improved and the assistance it has extended to the
LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic resources in Manila
Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the marine life in said areas. Within the same period, it shall submit its five-year plan to
restore and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the
completion period for said undertakings.
The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the baseline data as of September 30, 2010 on the pollution loading
into the Manila Bay system from agricultural and livestock sources.
(6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the list of violators it has apprehended and the status of
their cases. The PPA is further ordered to include in its report the names, make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA
shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement its compliance with paragraph 7 of
the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the completion dates of such measures.
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire that collects and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other
ship-generated wastes, which shall state the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced by it since August 2003 up to the present date,
the dates the ships docked at PPA ports, the number of days the ship was at sea with the corresponding number of passengers and crew per
trip, the volume of solid, liquid and other wastes collected from said ships, the treatment undertaken and the disposal site for said wastes.
(7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the
measures and activities it intends to undertake to apprehend the violators of Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code
of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful
prosecution of violators.
The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities
they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree No. 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993
or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to
ensure the successful prosecution of violators.
(8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and
addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila who, as of December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses, structures, constructions and
other encroachments established or built along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros, in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid
houses, structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for said activities, which shall be fully implemented
not later than December 31, 2015.
The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary
landfill facility for Metro Manila in compliance with the standards under RA 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the location of open and controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose
operations are illegal after February 21, 2006, 3 pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan for the closure of these open and
controlled dumps to be accomplished not later than December 31, 2012. Also, on or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, as
Chairperson of the National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC), shall submit a report on the location of all open and
controlled dumps in Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as NSWMC Chairperson, shall submit a report on whether or not the
following landfills strictly comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of RA 9003 on the establishment and operation of sanitary landfills, to wit:
National Capital Region
1. Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City
2. Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon City

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Region III
3. Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan
4. Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan
5. Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan
6. Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija
7. Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special Economic Zone
Region IV-A
8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna
9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna
10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna
11. Morong, Rizal
12. Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal (ISWIMS)
13. Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC)
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila are ordered to jointly submit a report on the
average amount of garbage collected monthly per district in all the cities in Metro Manila from January 2009 up to December 31, 2010
vis--vis the average amount of garbage disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly report for the last quarter of 2010
and thereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for violations of the penal provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws on
pollution for the said period.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the names
and addresses of the informal settlers in their respective areas who, as of September 30, 2010, own or occupy houses, structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the
Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna de Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila
Bay, in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit
their plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and encroachments, as well
as the completion dates for such activities which shall be implemented not later than December 31, 2012.
(9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the owners of
septic and sludge companies including those that do not have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks.
The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental Sanitation Clearances and shall require companies to procure a license
to operate from the DOH.
The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a toxic and hazardous waste management system by June 30,
2011 which will implement segregation of hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes and prevent mixing with municipal solid waste.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said companies have proper disposal facilities and the
completion dates of compliance.1avvphi1
(10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on or before May 31, 2011 a report on the specific subjects on
pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, environmental laws and the like that it has integrated into the school
curricula in all levels for the school year 2011-2012.

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On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure compliance of all the schools under its supervision
with respect to the integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which shall be fully implemented by June 30, 2012.
(11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports electronically using the forms below. The agencies may add other key
performance indicators that they have identified.
SO ORDERED.