Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81954

August 8, 1989

CESAR Z. DARIO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME and HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in their respective capacities as
Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, and Executive Secretary,respondents.
G.R. No. 81967

August 8, 1989

VICENTE A. FERIA JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME, and HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in their respective capacities as
Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, and Executive Secretary,respondents.
G.R. No. 82023

August 8, 1989

ADOLFO CASARENO, PACIFICO LAGLEVA, JULIAN C. ESPIRITU, DENNIS A. AZARRAGA, RENATO DE JESUS, NICASIO C.
GAMBOA, CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES, FELICITACION R. GELUZ, LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA, SUBAER PACASUM,
ZENAIDA LANARIA, JOSE B. ORTIZ, GLICERIO R. DOLAR, CORNELIO NAPA, PABLO B. SANTOS, FERMIN RODRIGUEZ,
DALISAY BAUTISTA, LEONARDO JOSE, ALBERTO LONTOK, PORFIRIO TABINO, JOSE BARREDO, ROBERTO ARNALDO,
ESTER TAN, PEDRO BAKAL, ROSARIO DAVID, RODOLFO AFUANG, LORENZO CATRE, LEONCIA CATRE, ROBERTO
ABADA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER SALVADOR M. MISON, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
G.R. No. 83737

August 8, 1989

BENEDICTO L. AMASA and WILLIAM S. DIONISIO, petitioners,

vs.
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, respondents.
G.R. No. 85310

August 8, 1989

SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ABACA, SISINIO T., ABAD, ROGELIO C., ABADIANO, JOSE P., ABCEDE, NEMECIO C.,
ABIOG, ELY F., ABLAZA, AURORA M., AGBAYANI, NELSON I., AGRES ANICETO, AGUILAR, FLOR, AGUILUCHO MA.
TERESA R., AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T., ALANO, ALEX P., ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR., ALBANO, ROBERT B., ALCANTARA, JOSE G.,
ALMARIO, RODOLFO F., ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R., AMISTAD RUDY M., AMOS, FRANCIS F., ANDRES, RODRIGO V., ANGELES,
RICARDO S., ANOLIN, MILAGROS H., AQUINO, PASCASIO E., ARABE, MELINDA M., ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S., JR., ARPON,
ULPLIANO U., JR., ARREZA, ARTEMIO M., JR., ARROJO, ANTONIO P., ARVISU, ALEXANDER S., ASCA;O, ANTONIO T.,
ASLAHON, JULAHON P., ASUNCION, VICTOR R., ATANGAN, LORNA S., ATIENZA, ALEXANDER R., BACAL, URSULINO C.,
BA;AGA, MARLOWE, Z., BANTA, ALBERTO T., BARREDO, JOSE B., BARROS, VICTOR C., BARTOLOME, FELIPE A.,
BAYSAC, REYNALDO S., BELENO, ANTONIO B., BERNARDO, ROMEO D., BERNAS, MARCIANO S., BOHOL, AUXILIADOR
G., BRAVO, VICTOR M., BULEG, BALILIS R., CALNEA, MERCEDES M., CALVO, HONESTO G., CAMACHO, CARLOS V.,
CAMPOS, RODOLFO C., CAPULONG, RODRIGO G., CARINGAL, GRACIA Z., CARLOS, LORENZO B., CARRANTO, FIDEL U.,
CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M., CASTRO, PATRICIA J., CATELO, ROGELIO B., CATURLA, MANUEL B., CENIZAL, JOSEFINA
F., CINCO, LUISITO, CONDE0, JOSE C., JR., CORCUERA, FIDEL S., CORNETA, VICENTE S., CORONADO, RICARDO S.,
CRUZ, EDUARDO S., CRUZ, EDILBERTO A., CRUZ, EFIGENIA B., CRUZADO, MARCIAL C., CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M.,
DABON, NORMA M., DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D., DANDAL, EDEN F., DATUHARON, SATA A., DAZO, GODOFREDO L., DE
CASTRO, LEOPAPA, DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO A., DE GUZMAN, RENATO E., DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR., DE LA CRUZ,
FRANCISCO C., DE LA PE;A, LEONARDO, DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO, DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR., DEMESA, WILHELMINA
T., DIMAKUTA, SALIC L., DIZON, FELICITAS A., DOCTOR, HEIDY M., DOLAR, GLICERIO R., DOMINGO, NICANOR J.,
DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR., DUAY, JUANA G., DYSANGCO, RENATO F., EDILLOR, ALFREDO P., ELEVAZO, LEONARDO
A., ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR., ESMERIA, ANTONIO E., ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H., ESPINA, FRANCO A., ESTURCO,
RODOLFO C., EVANGELINO, FERMIN I., FELIX, ERNESTO G., FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M., FERRAREN, ANTONIO C.,
FERRERA, WENCESLAO A., FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S., JR., FUENTES, RUDY L., GAGALANG, RENATO V., GALANG,
EDGARDO R., GAMBOA, ANTONIO C., GAN, ALBERTO R., GARCIA, GILBERT M., GARCIA, EDNA V., GARCIA, JUAN L.,
GAVIOLA, LILIAN V., GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G., GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B., GRATE, FREDERICK R., GREGORIO,
LAURO P., GUARTICO, AMMON H., GUIANG, MYRNA N., GUINTO, DELFIN C., HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A., HONRALES,
LORETO N., HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H., HULAR , LANNYROSS E., IBA;EZ, ESTER C., ILAGAN, HONORATO C., INFANTE,
REYNALDO C., ISAIS, RAY C., ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B., JANOLO, VIRGILIO M., JAVIER, AMADOR L., JAVIER, ROBERTO
S., JAVIER, WILLIAM R., JOVEN, MEMIA A., JULIAN, REYNALDO V., JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A., JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F.,
KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR., KOH, NANIE G., LABILLES, ERNESTO S., LABRADOR, WILFREDO M., LAGA, BIENVENIDO M.,
LAGLEVA, PACIFICO Z., LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G., LAMPONG, WILFREDO G., LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A., LAPITAN,
CAMILO M., LAURENTE, REYNALDO A., LICARTE, EVARISTO R., LIPIO, VICTOR O., LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z., LOPEZ,

MELENCIO L., LUMBA, OLIVIA., MACAISA, BENITO T., MACAISA, ERLINDA C., MAGAT, ELPIDIO, MAGLAYA, FERNANDO
P., MALABANAN, ALFREDO C., MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D., MALIJAN, LAZARO V., MALLI, JAVIER M., MANAHAN, RAMON S.,
MANUEL, ELPIDIO R., MARAVILLA, GIL B., MARCELO, GIL C., MARI;AS, RODOLFO V., MAROKET, JESUS C., MARTIN,
NEMENCIO A., MARTINEZ, ROMEO M., MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M., MATIBAG, ANGELINA G., MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.,
MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T., MAYUGA, PORTIA E., MEDINA, NESTOR M., MEDINA, ROLANDO S., MENDAVIA, AVELINO I.,
MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G., MIL, RAY M., MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L., MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR., G., MONTANO,
ERNESTO F., MONTERO, JUAN M. III., MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR., MORALES, CONCHITA D.L., MORALES, NESTOR P.,
MORALES, SHIRLEY S., MUNAR, JUANITA L., MU;OZ, VICENTE R., MURILLO, MANUEL M., NACION, PEDRO R., NAGAL,
HENRY N., NAPA, CORNELIO B., NAVARRO, HENRY L., NEJAL, FREDRICK E., NICOLAS, REYNALDO S., NIEVES, RUFINO
A., OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T., OLEGARIO, LEO Q., ORTEGA, ARLENE R., ORTEGA, JESUS R., OSORIO, ABNER S., PAPIO,
FLORENTINO T. II, PASCUA, ARNULFO A., PASTOR, ROSARIO, PELAYO, ROSARIO L., PE;A, AIDA C., PEREZ,
ESPERIDION B., PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M., PRE, ISIDRO A., PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S., PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N.,
PURA, ARNOLD T., QUINONES, EDGARDO I., QUINTOS, AMADEO C., JR., QUIRAY, NICOLAS C., RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P.,
RA;ADA, RODRIGO C., RARAS, ANTONIO A., RAVAL, VIOLETA V., RAZAL, BETTY R., REGALA, PONCE F., REYES,
LIBERATO R., REYES, MANUEL E., REYES, NORMA Z., REYES, TELESFORO F., RIVERA, ROSITA L., ROCES, ROBERTO V.,
ROQUE, TERESITA S., ROSANES, MARILOU M., ROSETE, ADAN I., RUANTO, REY, CRISTO C., JR., SABLADA, PASCASIO G.,
SALAZAR, SILVERIA S., SALAZAR, VICTORIA A., SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C., SALMINGO, LOURDES M., SANTIAGO,
EMELITA B., SATINA, PORFIRIO C., SEKITO, COSME B., JR., SIMON, RAMON P., SINGSON, MELECIO C., SORIANO,
ANGELO L., SORIANO, MAGDALENA R., SUMULONG, ISIDRO L., JR., SUNICO, ABELARDO T., TABIJE, EMMA B., TAN,
RUDY, GOROSPE, TAN, ESTER S., TAN, JULITA S., TECSON, BEATRIZ B., TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A., TURINGAN, ENRICO T.,
JR., UMPA, ALI A., VALIC, LUCIO E., VASQUEZ, NICANOR B., VELARDE, EDGARDO C., VERA, AVELINO A., VERAME,
OSCAR E., VIADO, LILIAN T., VIERNES, NAPOLEON K., VILLALON, DENNIS A., VILLAR, LUZ L., VILLALUZ, EMELITO V.,
ZATA, ANGEL A., JR., ACHARON, CRISTETO, ALBA, RENATO B., AMON, JULITA C., AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C., CALO,
RAYMUNDO M., CENTENO, BENJAMIN R., DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA C ., DONATO, ESTELITA P., DONATO, FELIPE S.,
FLORES, PEDRITO S., GALAROSA, RENATO, MALAWI, MAUYAG, MONTENEGRO, FRANCISCO M., OMEGA, PETRONILO
T., SANTOS, GUILLERMO F., TEMPLO, CELSO, VALDERAMA, JAIME B., and VALDEZ, NORA M., respondents.
G.R. No. 85335

August 8, 1989

FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, ADAN I. ROSETE, FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, LEODEGARDIO H.
FLORESCA, LEONARDO A. DELA PE;A, ABELARDO T. SUNICO, MELENCIO L. LOPEZ, NEMENCIO A. MARTIN, RUDY M.
AMISTAD, ERNESTO T. MATUGAS, SILVERIA S. SALAZAR, LILLIAN V. GAVIOLA, MILAGROS ANOLIN, JOSE B. ORTIZ,
ARTEMIO ARREZA, JR., GILVERTO M. GARCIA, ANTONIO A. RARAS, FLORDELINA B. GOBENCIONG, ANICETO AGRES,
EDGAR Y. QUINONES, MANUEL B. CATURLA, ELY F. ABIOG, RODRIGO C. RANADA, LAURO GREGORIO, ALBERTO I. GAN,
EDGARDO GALANG, RAY C. ISAIS, NICANOR B. VASQUEZ, MANUEL ESCUYOS, JR., ANTONIO B. BELENO, ELPIO R.
MANUEL, AUXILIADOR C. BOHOL, LEONARDO ELEVAZO, VICENTE S. CORNETA,petitioners,
vs.
COM. SALVADOR M. MISON/BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
G.R. No. 86241

August 8, 1989

SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, SENEN S. DIMAGUILA, ROMEO P. ARABE BERNARDO S. QUINTONG, GREGORIO P. REYES,
and ROMULO C. BADILLO respondents

SARMIENTO, J.:

The Court writes finis to this contreversy that has raged bitterly for the several months. It does so out of ligitimate presentement of more suits
reaching it as a consequence of the government reorganization and the instability it has wrought on the performance and efficiency of the
bureaucracy. The Court is apprehensive that unless the final word is given and the ground rules are settled, the issue will fester, and likely foment
on the constitutional crisis for the nation, itself biset with grave and serious problems.
The facts are not in dispute.
On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT
THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION,
AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION." Among other things,
Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. ...
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime; 1
...
Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:

SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given to measures to promote economy, efficiency, and the
eradication of graft and corruption.
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a
period of one year from February 25, 1986.
SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of the organization effected under this Proclamation
shall, if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder.
SECTION 4. The records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other properties of all government offices shall be carefully preserved. In
case any office or body is abolished or reorganized pursuant to this Proclamation, its FUNDS and properties shall be transferred to the
office or body to which its powers, functions and responsibilities substantially pertain. 2
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the President, in her first act in office, called upon "all appointive
public officials to submit their courtesy resignation(s) beginning with the members of the Supreme Court."3 Later on, she abolished the Batasang
Pambansa4 and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet 5 under the 1973 Constitution.
Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and directives reorganizing various other government offices, a number of
which, with respect to elected local officials, has been challenged in this Court, 6 and two of which, with respect to appointed functionaries, have
likewise been questioned herein. 7
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the
"unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government reorganization had generated,
and prescribed as "grounds for the separation/replacement of personnel," the following:
SECTION 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation replacement of personnel:
1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Mnistry Head
concerned;
3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his separation/replacement is
in the interest of the service.8
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE." 9 Among other
offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs 10 and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, 11 the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the
Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," 12 prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided:
1. By February 28, 1988, the employees covered by Executive Order 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of
Customs by the President of the Philippines on reorganization shall be:
a) informed of their re-appointment, or
b) offered another position in the same department or agency or
c) informed of their termination. 13
On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged with adjudicating appeals from removals under the
above Memorandum. 14 On January 26, 1988, Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials, in the tenor as
follows:
Sir:
Please be informed that the Bureau is now in the process of implementing the Reorganization Program under Executive Order No. 127.
Pursuant to Section 59 of the same Executive Order, all officers and employees of the Department of Finance, or the Bureau of Customs
in particular, shall continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that those incumbents
whose positions are not carried in the new reorganization pattern, or who are not re- appointed, shall be deemed separated from the
service.
In this connection, we regret to inform you that your services are hereby terminated as of February 28, 1988. Subject to the normal
clearances, you may receive the retirement benefits to which you may be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations.
In the meantime, your name will be included in the consolidated list compiled by the Civil Service Commission so that you may be
given priority for future employment with the Government as the need arises.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd) SALVADOR M. MISON

Commissioner15
As far as the records will yield, the following were recipients of these notices:
1. CESAR DARIO
2. VICENTE FERIA, JR.
3. ADOLFO CASARENO
4. PACIFICO LAGLEVA
5. JULIAN C. ESPIRITU
6. DENNIS A. AZARRAGA
7. RENATO DE JESUS
8. NICASIO C. GAMBOA
9. CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES
10. FELICITACION R. GELUZ
11. LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA
12. SUBAER PACASUM
13. ZENAIDA LANARIA
14. JOSE B. ORTIZ
15. GLICERIO R. DOLAR
16. CORNELIO NAPA
17. PABLO B. SANTOS
18. FERMIN RODRIGUEZ
19. DALISAY BAUTISTA
20. LEONARDO JOSE
21. ALBERTO LONTOK
22. PORFIRIO TABINO
23. JOSE BARREDO
24. ROBERTO ARNALDO
25. ESTER TAN
26. PEDRO BAKAL

27. ROSARIO DAVID

28. RODOLFO AFUANG
29. LORENZO CATRE
30. LEONCIA CATRE
31. ROBERTO ABADA
32. ABACA, SISINIO T.
33. ABAD, ROGELIO C.
34. ABADIANO, JOSE P
35. ABCEDE, NEMECIO C.
36. ABIOG, ELY F.
37. ABLAZA, AURORA M.
38. AGBAYANI, NELSON I.
39. AGRES, ANICETO
40. AGUILAR, FLOR
41. AGUILUCHO, MA. TERESA R.
42. AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T.
43. ALANO, ALEX P.
44. ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR.
45. ALBANO, ROBERT B.
46. ALCANTARA, JOSE G.
47. ALMARIO, RODOLFO F.
48. ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R.
49. AMISTAD, RUDY M.
50. AMOS, FRANCIS F.
51. ANDRES, RODRIGO V.
52. ANGELES, RICARDO S.
53. ANOLIN, MILAGROS H.
54. AQUINO, PASCASIO E. L.

55. ARABE, MELINDA M.

56. ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S, JR.
57. ARPON, ULPIANO U., JR.
58. ARREZA, ARTEMIO M, JR.
59. ARROJO, ANTONIO P.
60. ARVISU, ALEXANDER S.
61. ASCA;O, ANTONIO T.
62. ASLAHON, JULAHON P.
63. ASUNCION, VICTOR R.
64. ATANGAN, LORNA S.
65. ANTIENZA, ALEXANDER R.
66. BACAL URSULINO C.
67. BA;AGA, MARLOWE Z.
68. BANTA, ALBERTO T.
69. BARROS, VICTOR C.
70. BARTOLOME, FELIPE A.
71. BAYSAC, REYNALDO S.
72. BELENO, ANTONIO B.
73. BERNARDO, ROMEO D.
74. BERNAS, MARCIANO S.
75. BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G.
76. BRAVO, VICTOR M.
77. BULEG, BALILIS R.
78. CALNEA, MERCEDES M.
79. CALVO, HONESTO G.
80. CAMACHO, CARLOS V.
81. CAMPOS, RODOLFO C.
82. CAPULONG, RODRIGO G.

83. CARINGAL, GRACIA Z.

84. CARLOS, LORENZO B.
85. CARRANTO, FIDEL U.
86. CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M.
87. CASTRO, PATRICIA J.
88. CATELO, ROGELIO B.
89. CATURLA, MANUEL B.
90. CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F.
91. CINCO, LUISITO
92. CONDE, JOSE C., JR.
93. CORCUERA, FIDEL S.
94. CORNETA, VICENTE S.
95. CORONADO, RICARDO S.
96. CRUZ, EDUARDO S.
97. CRUZ, EDILBERTO A,
98. CRUZ, EFIGENIA B.
99. CRUZADO,NORMA M.
100. CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M.
101. DABON, NORMA M.
102. DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D.
103. DANDAL, EDEN F.
104. DATUHARON, SATA A.
105. DAZO, GODOFREDO L.
106. DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA
107. DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO A.
108. DE GUZMAN, RENATO E.
109. DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR.
110. DE LA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C.

111. DE LA PE;A, LEONARDO

112. DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO
113. DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR.
114. DEMESA, WILHELMINA T.
115. DIMAKUTA, SALIC L.
116. DIZON, FELICITAS A.
117. DOCTOR, HEIDY M.
118. DOMINGO, NICANOR J.
119. DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR.
120. DUAY, JUANA G.
121. DYSANGCO, RENATO F.
122. EDILLOR, ALFREDO P.
123. ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A
124. ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR.
125. ESMERIA, ANTONIO E.
126. ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H.
127. ESPINA, FRANCO A.
128. ESTURCO, RODOLFO C.
129. EVANGELINO, FERMIN I.
130. FELIX, ERNESTO G.
131. FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M.
132. FERRAREN, ANTONIO C.
133. FERRERA, WENCESLAO A.
134. FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S, JR.
135. FUENTES, RUDY L.
136. GAGALANG, RENATO V.
137. GALANG, EDGARDO R.
138. GAMBOA, ANTONIO C.

139. GAN, ALBERTO P

140. GARCIA, GILBERT M.
141. GARCIA, EDNA V.
142. GARCIA, JUAN L.
143. GAVIOIA, LILIAN V.
144. GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G.
145. GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B.
146. GRATE, FREDERICK R.
147. GREGORIO, LAURO P.
148. GUARTICO, AMMON H.
149. GUIANG, MYRNA N.
150. GUINTO, DELFIN C.
151. HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A.
152. HONRALES, LORETO N.
153. HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H.
154. HULAR, LANNYROSS E.
155. IBA;EZ, ESTER C.
156. ILAGAN, HONORATO C.
157. INFANTE, REYNALDO C.
158. ISAIS, RAY C.
159. ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B.
160. JANOLO, VIRGILIO M.
161. JAVIER, AMADOR L.
162. JAVIER, ROBERTO S.
163. JAVIER, WILLIAM R.
164. JOVEN, MEMIA A.
165. JULIAN, REYNALDO V.
166. JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A.

167. JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F.

168. KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR.
169. KOH, NANIE G.
170. LABILLES, ERNESTO S.
171. LABRADOR, WILFREDO M.
172. LAGA, BIENVENIDO M.
173. LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G.
174. LAMPONG, WILFREDO G.
175. LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A.
176. LAPITAN, CAMILO M.
177. LAURENTE, REYNALDO A.
178. LICARTE, EVARISTO R.
179. LIPIO, VICTOR O.
180. LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z.
181. LOPEZ, MELENCIO L.
182. LUMBA, OLIVIA R.
183. MACAISA, BENITO T.
184. MACAISA, ERLINDA C.
185. MAGAT, ELPIDIO
186. MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P.
187. MALABANAN, ALFREDO C.
188. MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D.
189. MALIJAN, LAZARO V.
190. MALLI, JAVIER M.
191. MANAHAN, RAMON S.
192. MANUEL, ELPIDIO R.
193. MARAVILLA, GIL B.
194. MARCELO, GIL C.

195. MARI;AS, RODOLFO V.

196. MAROKET ,JESUS C.
197. MARTIN, NEMENCIO A.
198. MARTINEZ, ROMEO M.
199. MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M.
200. MATIBAG, ANGELINA G.
201. MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.
202. MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T.
203. MAYUGA, PORTIA E.
204. MEDINA, NESTOR M.
205. MEDINA, ROLANDO S.
206. MENDAVIA, AVELINO
207. MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G.
208. MIL, RAY M.
209. MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L.
210. MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR. G.
211. MONTANO, ERNESTO F.
212. MONTERO, JUAN M. III
213. MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR.
214. MORALES, CONCHITA D. L
215. MORALES, NESTOR P.
216. MORALES, SHIRLEY S.
217. MUNAR, JUANITA L.
218. MU;OZ, VICENTE R.
219. MURILLO, MANUEL M.
220. NACION, PEDRO R.
221. NAGAL, HENRY N.
222. NAVARRO, HENRY L.

223. NEJAL FREDRICK E.

224. NICOLAS, REYNALDO S.
225. NIEVES, RUFINO A.
226. OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T.
227. OLEGARIO, LEO Q.
228. ORTEGA, ARLENE R.
229. ORTEGA, JESUS R.
230. OSORIO, ABNER S.
231. PAPIO FLORENTINO T. II
232. PASCUA, ARNULFO A.
233. PASTOR, ROSARIO
234. PELAYO, ROSARIO L.
235. PE;A, AIDA C.
236. PEREZ, ESPERIDION B.
237. PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M.
238. PRE, ISIDRO A.
239. PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S.
240. PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N.
241. PURA, ARNOLD T.
242. QUINONES, EDGARDO I.
243. QUINTOS, AMADEO C., JR.
244. QUIRAY, NICOLAS C.
245. RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P.
246. RANADA, RODRIGO C.
247. RARAS, ANTONIO A.
248. RAVAL, VIOLETA V.
249. RAZAL, BETTY R.
250. REGALA, PONCE F.

251. REYES, LIBERATO R.

252. REYES, MANUEL E.
253. REYES, NORMA Z.
254. REYES, TELESPORO F.
255. RIVERA, ROSITA L.
256. ROCES, ROBERTO V.
257. ROQUE, TERESITA S.
258. ROSANES, MARILOU M.
259. ROSETE, ADAN I.
260. RUANTO, REY CRISTO C., JR.
261. SABLADA, PASCASIO G.
262. SALAZAR, SILVERIA S.
263. SALAZAR, VICTORIA A.
264. SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C.
265. SALMINGO, LOURDES M.
266. SANTIAGO, EMELITA B.
267. SATINA, PORFIRIO C.
268. SEKITO, COSME B JR.
269. SIMON, RAMON P.
270. SINGSON, MELENCIO C.
271. SORIANO, ANGELO L.
272. SORIANO, MAGDALENA R.
273. SUNICO, ABELARDO T .
274. TABIJE, EMMA B.
275. TAN, RUDY GOROSPE
276. TAN, ESTER S.
277. TAN, JULITA S.
278. TECSON, BEATRIZ B.

279. TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A.

280. TURINGAN, ENRICO T JR.
281. UMPA, ALI A.
282. VALIC, LUCIO E.
283. VASQUEZ, NICANOR B.
284. VELARDE, EDGARDO C.
285. VERA, AVELINO A.
286. VERAME, OSCAR E.
287. VIADO, LILIAN T.
288. VIERNES, NAPOLEON K
289. VILLALON, DENNIS A.
290. VILLAR, LUZ L.
291. VILLALUZ, EMELITO V.
292. VILLAR, LUZ L.
293. ZATA, ANGELA JR.
294. ACHARON, CRISTETO
295. ALBA, RENATO B.
296. AMON, JULITA C.
297. AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C.
298. CALO, RAYMUNDO M.
299. CENTENO, BENJAMIN R.
300. DONATO, ESTELITA P.
301. DONATO, FELIPE S
302. FLORES, PEDRITO S.
303. GALAROSA, RENATO
304. MALAWI, MAUYAG
305. MONTENEGRO, FRANSISCO M.
306. OMEGA, PETRONILO T.

307. SANTOS, GUILLERMO P.

308. TEMPLO, CELSO
309. VALDERAMA, JAIME B.
310. VALDEZ, NORA M.
Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954; Vicente Feria, Jr., is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967; Messrs. Adolfo Caserano Pacifico Lagleva
Julian C. Espiritu, Dennis A. Azarraga Renato de Jesus, Nicasio C. Gamboa, Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nieves and Felicitacion R. Geluz Messrs.
Leodegario H. Floresca, Subaer Pacasum Ms. Zenaida Lanaria Mr. Jose B. Ortiz, Ms. Gliceria R. Dolar, Ms. Cornelia Napa, Pablo B. Santos,
Fermin Rodriguez, Ms. Daligay Bautista, Messrs. Leonardo Jose, Alberto Lontok, Porfirio Tabino Jose Barredo, Roberto Arnaldo, Ms. Ester Tan,
Messrs. Pedro Bakal, Rosario David, Rodolfo Afuang, Lorenzo Catre,, Ms. Leoncia Catre, and Roberto Abaca, are the petitioners in G.R. No.
82023; the last 279 16 individuals mentioned are the private respondents in G.R. No. 85310.
As far as the records will likewise reveal, 17 a total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices of
separation. A number supposedly sought reinstatement with the Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the Civil Service
Commission. The first thirty-one mentioned above came directly to this Court.
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the 279 employees, the 279 private
respondents in G.R. No. 85310, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of comparable or equivalent rank in the Bureau of Customs without
loss of seniority rights;
2. Appellants be paid their back salaries reckoned from the dates of their illegal termination based on the rates under the
approved new staffing pattern but not lower than their former salaries.
This action of the Commission should not, however, be interpreted as an exoneration of the appellants from any accusation of
wrongdoing and, therefore, their reappointments are without prejudice to:
1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending administrative cases, and where investigations have been
finished, to promptly, render the appropriate decisions;
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against appellants with derogatory reports or information if evidence so
warrants.
SO ORDERED. 18
On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a motion for reconsideration Acting on the motion, the Civil
Service Commission, on September 20, 1988, denied reconsideration. 19
On October 20, 1988, Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings with this Court, docketed, as above-stated, as G.R. No. 85310 of this
Court.
On November 16,1988, the Civil Service Commission further disposed the appeal (from the resolution of the Reorganization Appeals Board) of
five more employees, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of comparable or equivalent rank in the Bureau of Customs without
loss of seniority rights; and
2. Appellants be paid their back salaries to be reckoned from the date of their illegal termination based on the rates under the
approved new staffing pattern but not lower than their former salaries.
This action of the Commission should not, however, be interpreted as an exoneration of the herein appellants from any accusation of
any wrongdoing and therefore, their reappointments are without prejudice to:
1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending administrative cases, if any, and where investigations have been
finished, to promptly, render the appropriate decisions; and
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against appellant with derogatory reports or information, if any, and if
evidence so warrants.
SO ORDERED. 20
On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the Civil Service Commission's Resolution in this Court; his petitioner has been docketed
herein as G.R. No. 86241. The employees ordered to be reinstated are Senen Dimaguila, Romeo Arabe, Bemardo Quintong,Gregorio Reyes, and
Romulo Badillo. 21
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION," 22 was signed into law. Under Section 7, thereof:

Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions
of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the
period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, including casuals and temporary employees, who have
been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and other
benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or from the date of the receipt of
the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has
been made by the corresponding department or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in
the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority
of payment out of the savings of the department or agency concerned. 23
On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio, customs examiners appointed by Commissioner Mison pursuant to the ostensible
reorganization subject of this controversy, petitioned the Court to contest the validity of the statute. The petition is docketed as G.R. No. 83737.
On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more Customs officials whom the Civil Service Commission had ordered reinstated by its June 30,1988
Resolution filed their own petition to compel the Commissioner of Customs to comply with the said Resolution. The petition is docketed as G.R.
No. 85335.
On November 29, 1988, we resolved to consolidate all seven petitions.
On the same date, we resolved to set the matter for hearing on January 12, 1989. At the said hearing, the parties, represented by their counsels (a)
retired Justice Ruperto Martin; (b) retired Justice Lino Patajo. (c) former Dean Froilan Bacungan (d) Atty. Lester Escobar (e) Atty. Faustino
Tugade and (f) Atty. Alexander Padilla, presented their arguments. Solicitor General Francisco Chavez argued on behalf of the Commissioner of
Customs (except in G.R. 85335, in which he represented the Bureau of Customs and the Civil Service Commission). lwph1.t Former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla also appeared and argued as amicus curiae Thereafter, we resolved to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda
which they did in due time.
There is no question that the administration may validly carry out a government reorganization insofar as these cases are concerned, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs by mandate not only of the Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders
decreed by the Chief Executive in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government. It should also be
noted that under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit implied, that a government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken,
subject to certain conditions. 24
The Court understands that the parties are agreed on the validity of a reorganization per se the only question being, as shall be later seen: What is
the nature and extent of this government reorganization?
The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the standing of certain parties to sue, 25 and
other technical objections, for two reasons, "[b]ecause of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public
service,"26 and because of the serious implications of these cases on the administration of the Philippine civil service and the rights of public
servants.
The urgings in G.R. Nos. 85335 and 85310, that the Civil Service Commission's Resolution dated June 30, 1988 had attained a character of
finality for failure of Commissioner Mison to apply for judicial review or ask for reconsideration seasonalbly under Presidential Decree No.
807, 27 or under Republic Act No. 6656, 28 or under the Constitution, 29 are likewise rejected. The records show that the Bureau of Customs had
until July 15, 1988 to ask for reconsideration or come to this Court pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 807. The records likewise
show that the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration on July 15, 1988.30 The Civil Service Commission issued its Resolution
denying reconsideration on September 20, 1988; a copy of this Resolution was received by the Bureau on September 23, 1988.31 Hence the
Bureau had until October 23, 1988 to elevate the matter on certiorari to this Court.32 Since the Bureau's petition was filed on October 20, 1988, it
was filed on time.
We reject, finally, contentions that the Bureau's petition (in G.R. 85310) raises no jurisdictional questions, and is therefore bereft of any basis as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 33 We find that the questions raised in Commissioner Mison's petition (in G.R. 85310)
are, indeed, proper for certiorari, if by "jurisdictional questions" we mean questions having to do with "an indifferent disregard of the law,
arbitrariness and caprice, or omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation, 34as distinguished
from questions that require "digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment 35 which is the office, on the other hand, of review under
Rule 45 of the said Rules. What cannot be denied is the fact that the act of the Civil Service Commission of reinstating hundreds of Customs
employees Commissioner Mison had separated, has implications not only on the entire reorganization process decreed no less than by the
Provisional Constitution, but on the Philippine bureaucracy in general; these implications are of such a magnitude that it cannot be said that
assuming that the Civil Service Commission erred the Commission committed a plain "error of judgment" that Aratuc says cannot be corrected
by the extraordinary remedy ofcertiorari or any special civil action. We reaffirm the teaching of Aratuc as regards recourse to this Court with
respect to rulings of the Civil Service Commission which is that judgments of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In Aratuc we declared:
It is once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the
role of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest
elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions,
orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court'. And since instead of maintaining that provision intact,
it ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead 'brought to the Supreme Court oncertiorari", We cannot insist that there was no
intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in
remedial law.36
We observe no fundamental difference between the Commission on Elections and the Civil Service Commission (or the Commission on Audit for
that matter) in terms of the constitutional intent to leave the constitutional bodies alone in the enforcement of laws relative to elections, with

respect to the former, and the civil service, with respect to the latter (or the audit of government accounts, with respect to the Commission on
Audit). As the poll body is the "sole judge" 37 of all election cases, so is the Civil Service Commission the single arbiter of all controversies
pertaining to the civil service.
It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973 Charter, "any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari," 38 which, as Aratuc tells us, "technically connotes something less than saying that the same 'shall be
subject to review by the Supreme Court,' " 39 which in turn suggests an appeal by petition for review under Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction
over cases emanating from the Civil Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65.
While Republic Act No. 6656 states that judgments of the Commission are "final and executory"40 and hence, unappealable, under Rule
65, certiorari precisely lies in the absence of an appeal. 41
Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Mison petition (G.R. No. 85310) which clearly charges the Civil Service Commission with grave abuse of
discretion, a proper subject of certiorari, although it may not have so stated in explicit terms.
As to charges that the said petition has been filed out of time, we reiterate that it has been filed seasonably. It is to be stressed that the Solicitor
General had thirty days from September 23, 1988 (the date the Resolution, dated September 20,1988, of the Civil Service Commission, denying
reconsideration, was received) to commence the instant certiorari proceedings. As we stated, under the Constitution, an aggrieved party has thirty
days within which to challenge "any decision, order, or ruling" 42 of the Commission. To say that the period should be counted from the
Solicitor's receipt of the main Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, is to say that he should not have asked for reconsideration But to say that is to
deny him the right to contest (by a motion for reconsideration) any ruling, other than the main decision, when, precisely, the Constitution gives
him such a right. That is also to place him at a "no-win" situation because if he did not move for a reconsideration, he would have been faulted for
demanding certiorari too early, under the general rule that a motion for reconsideration should preface a resort to a special civil action. 43 Hence,
we must reckon the thirty-day period from receipt of the order of denial.
We come to the merits of these cases.
G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967, 82023, and 85335:
The Case for the Employees
The petitioner in G.R. No. 81954, Cesar Dario was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs until his relief on orders of
Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. In essence, he questions the legality of his dismiss, which he alleges was upon the authority of Section
59 of Executive Order No. 127, supra, hereinbelow reproduced as follows:
SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall, in a
holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits
unless in the meantime they are separated from government service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article III of the
Freedom Constitution.
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry shall be approved and prescribed by the Minister within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive Order and the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular
appointments by him or by the President, as the case may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not
reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those separated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to which
they may be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month basic salary
for every year of service, or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of highest salary received but in no
case shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months salary.
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order to enjoin the separation/replacement
of any officer or employee effected under this Executive Order.44
a provision he claims the Commissioner could not have legally invoked. He avers that he could not have been legally deemed to be an
"[incumbent] whose [position] [is] not included therein or who [is] not reappointed"45 to justify his separation from the service. He contends that
neither the Executive Order (under the second paragraph of the section) nor the staffing pattern proposed by the Secretary of Finance 46 abolished
the office of Deputy Commissioner of Customs, but, rather, increased it to three. 47 Nor can it be said, so he further maintains, that he had not
been "reappointed" 48 (under the second paragraph of the section) because "[[r]eappointment therein presupposes that the position to which it
refers is a new one in lieu of that which has been abolished or although an existing one, has absorbed that which has been abolished." 49 He
claims, finally, that under the Provisional Constitution, the power to dismiss public officials without cause ended on February 25, 1987,50 and that
thereafter, public officials enjoyed security of tenure under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.51
Like Dario Vicente Feria, the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967, was a Deputy Commissioner at the Bureau until his separation directed by
Commissioner Mison. And like Dario he claims that under the 1987 Constitution, he has acquired security of tenure and that he cannot be said to
be covered by Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, having been appointed on April 22, 1986 during the effectivity of the Provisional
Constitution. He adds that under Executive Order No. 39, "ENLARGING THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS,"52 the Commissioner of Customs has the power "[t]o appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President," 53 and
that his position, which is that of a Presidential appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison for purposes of reorganization.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 82023, collectors and examiners in venous ports of the Philippines, say, on the other hand, that the purpose of
reorganization is to end corruption at the Bureau of Customs and that since there is no finding that they are guilty of corruption, they cannot be
validly dismissed from the service.
The Case for Commissioner Mison
In his comments, the Commissioner relies on this Court's resolution in Jose v. Arroyo54 in which the following statement appears in the last

paragraph thereof:
The contention of petitioner that Executive Order No. 127 is violative of the provision of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing career
civil service employees security of tenure overlooks the provisions of Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly
authorize the removal of career civil service employees "not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No.
3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution." By virtue of said provision, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of the Constitution,
and career civil service employees may be separated from the service without cause as a result of such reorganization.55
For this reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense. He further states that the deadline prescribed by
the Provisional Constitution (February 25, 1987) has been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory provisions
thereof, 56 which allows a reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very Court has so declared in Jose v. Arroyo. Mison submits
that contrary to the employees' argument, Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 is applicable (in particular, to Dario and Feria in the sense that
retention in the Bureau, under the Executive Order, depends on either retention of the position in the new staffing pattern or reappointment of the
incumbent, and since the dismissed employees had not been reappointed, they had been considered legally separated. Moreover, Mison proffers
that under Section 59 incumbents are considered on holdover status, "which means that all those positions were considered vacant."57 The
Solicitor General denies the applicability of Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz 58 because that case supposedly involved a mere transfer and not a
separation. He rejects, finally, the force and effect of Executive Order Nos. 17 and 39 for the reason that Executive Order No. 17, which was
meant to implement the Provisional Constitution, 59 had ceased to have force and effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and that,
under Executive Order No. 39, the dismissals contemplated were "for cause" while the separations now under question were "not for cause" and
were a result of government reorganize organization decreed by Executive Order No. 127. Anent Republic Act No. 6656, he expresses doubts on
the constitutionality of the grant of retroactivity therein (as regards the reinforcement of security of tenure) since the new Constitution clearly
allows reorganization after its effectivity.
G.R. Nos. 85310 and 86241
The Position of Commissioner Mison
Commissioner's twin petitions are direct challenges to three rulings of the Civil Service Commission: (1) the Resolution, dated June 30, 1988,
reinstating the 265 customs employees above-stated; (2) the Resolution, dated September 20, 1988, denying reconsideration; and (3) the
Resolution, dated November 16, 1988, reinstating five employees. The Commissioner's arguments are as follows:
1. The ongoing government reorganization is in the nature of a "progressive" 60 reorganization "impelled by the need to overhaul the entire
government bureaucracy" 61 following the people power revolution of 1986;
2. There was faithful compliance by the Bureau of the various guidelines issued by the President, in particular, as to deliberation, and selection of
personnel for appointment under the new staffing pattern;
3. The separated employees have been, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, on mere holdover standing, "which means that all positions
are declared vacant;" 62
4. Jose v. Arroyo has declared the validity of Executive Order No. 127 under the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution;
5. Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful constitutionality.
The Ruling of the Civil Service Commission
The position of the Civil Service Commission is as follows:
1. Reorganizations occur where there has been a reduction in personnel or redundancy of functions; there is no showing that the reorganization in
question has been carried out for either purpose on the contrary, the dismissals now disputed were carried out by mere service of notices;
2. The current Customs reorganization has not been made according to Malaca;ang guidelines; information on file with the Commission shows
that Commissioner Mison has been appointing unqualified personnel;
3. Jose v. Arroyo, in validating Executive Order No. 127, did not countenance illegal removals;
4. Republic Act No. 6656 protects security of tenure in the course of reorganizations.
The Court's ruling
Reorganization, Fundamental Principles of.
I.
The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution. We quote:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shag be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the
time of their separation. In lieul thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government or
in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, had been accepted. 63
The Court considers the above provision critical for two reasons: (1) It is the only provision in so far as it mentions removals not for cause
that would arguably support the challenged dismissals by mere notice, and (2) It is the single existing law on reorganization after the ratification
of the 1987 Charter, except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much later, on June 10, 1988. [Nota been Executive Orders No. 116 (covering the
Ministry of Agriculture & Food), 117 (Ministry of Education, Culture & Sports), 119 (Health), 120 (Tourism), 123 (Social Welfare &

Development), 124 (Public Works & Highways), 125 transportation & Communications), 126 (Labor & Employment), 127 (Finance), 128
(Science & Technology), 129 (Agrarian Reform), 131 (Natural Resources), 132 (Foreign Affairs), and 133 (Trade & Industry) were all
promulgated on January 30,1987, prior to the adoption of the Constitution on February 2, 1987].64
It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect reorganizations under the past Constitutions, the above provision comes as a mere
recognition of the right of the Government to reorganize its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1935
Constitution:
Section 4. All officers and employees in the existing Government of the Philippine Islands shall continue in office until the Congress
shall provide otherwise, but all officers whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the President shall vacate their respective
office(s) upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from the
date of the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 65
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Charter:
Section 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by this
Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices upon the appointment and qualification of their
successors. 66
The Freedom Constitution is, as earlier seen, couched in similar language:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a
period of one year from February 25, 1986.67
Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution," there is no provision for "automatic" vacancies under the
1987 Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from
the old to the new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure.
At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of
reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove
good faith.68 In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is not hard put to prove
anything, plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it.
Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the Government to
remove career public officials it could have validly done under an "automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.
As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987
Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms, as its
1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts had so stated.
The constitutional "lapse" means either one of two things: (1) The Constitution meant to continue the reorganization under the prior Charter (of
the Revolutionary Government), in the sense that the latter provides for "automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to put a stop to those 'automatic"
vacancies. By itself, however, it is ambiguous, referring as it does to two stages of reorganization the first, to its conferment or authorization
under Proclamation No. 3 (Freedom Charter) and the second, to its implementation on its effectivity date (February 2, 1987). lwph1.t But as
we asserted, if the intent of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution were to extend the effects of reorganize tion under the Freedom
Constitution, it should have said so in clear terms. It is illogical why it should talk of two phases of reorganization when it could have simply
acknowledged the continuing effect of the first reorganization.
Second, plainly the concern of Section 16 is to ensure compensation for victims" of constitutional revamps whether under the Freedom or
existing Constitution and only secondarily and impliedly, to allow reorganization. We turn to the records of the Constitutional Commission:
INQUIRY OF MR. PADILLA
On the query of Mr. Padilla whether there is a need for a specific reference to Proclamation No. 3 and not merely state "result of the
reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution', Mr. Suarez, on behalf of the Committee, replied that it is necessary,
inasmuch as there are two stages of reorganization covered by the Section.
Mr. Padilla pointed out that since the proposal of the Commission on Government Reorganization have not been implemented yet, it
would be better to use the phrase "reorganization before or after the ratification of the Constitution' to simplify the Section. Mr. Suarez
instead suggested the phrase "as a result of the reorganization effected before or after the ratification of the Constitution' on the
understanding that the provision would apply to employees terminated because of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
and even those affected by the reorganization during the Marcos regime. Additionally, Mr. Suarez pointed out that it is also for this
reason that the Committee specified the two Constitutions the Freedom Constitution and the 1986 [1987] Constitution. 69
Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service. And the separation contemplated must be due to or the
result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the
resignations of career officers tendered in line with the existing policy and which resignations have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is
clearly and primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service employees separated "for cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to
the benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one negative and the other positive, must
concur, to wit:

1. the separation must not be for cause, and

2. the separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence
to February 2, 1987. 70 It Can only mean, then, that whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and
necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not be legitimately stated that we are merely continuing what the
revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary Government had started. We are through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution
the first stage. We are on the second stage that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document.
This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, supra, but is apparent from the Charter's own words. It also
warrants our holding in Esguerra and Palma-Fernandez, in which we categorically declared that after February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and
employees have acquired security of tenure, which is not a deterrent against separation by reorganization under the quondam fundamental law.
Finally, there is the concern of the State to ensure that this reorganization is no "purge" like the execrated reorganizations under martial rule. And,
of course, we also have the democratic character of the Charter itself.
Commissioner Mison would have had a point, insofar as he contends that the reorganization is open-ended ("progressive"), had it been a
reorganization under the revolutionary authority, specifically of the Provisional Constitution. For then, the power to remove government
employees would have been truly wide ranging and limitless, not only because Proclamation No. 3 permitted it, but because of the nature of
revolutionary authority itself, its totalitarian tendencies, and the monopoly of power in the men and women who wield it.
What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolutionary powers, the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in
her rule. This is apparent from Executive Order No. 17, which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity that
accompanies reorganizations notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom were "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that such
removals would have been valid and unquestionable. Despite that, the Chief Executive saw, as we said, the "unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization" in the government rank and file that reorganization was causing, and prescribed guidelines for personnel action. Specifically, she
said on May 28, 1986:
WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees, particularly in
the career civil service, it is necessary to prescribe the rules and regulations for implementing the said constitutional provision to protect
career civil servants whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of service demanded by the New Government, and to
ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated from the government service; 71
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and
unfitness to render public service.*
The President's Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be considered. We quote, in part:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that there will be no further layoffs this year of
personnel as a result of the government reorganization. 72
Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a manner that would have been permissible in a revolutionary setting
as Commissioner Mison so purports, it would seem that the Commissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order dismissals at the
Customs Bureau left and right. Hence, even if we accepted his "progressive" reorganization theory, he would still have to come to terms with the
Chief Executive's subsequent directives moderating the revolutionary authority's plenary power to separate government officials and employees.
Reorganization under the 1987 Constitution, Nature, Extent, and Limitations of; Jose v. Arroyo, clarified.
The controversy seems to be that we have, ourselves, supposedly extended the effects of government reorganization under the Provisional
Constitution to the regime of the 1987 Constitution. Jose v. Arroyo73 is said to be the authority for this argument. Evidently, if Arroyo indeed so
ruled, Arroyo would be inconsistent with the earlier pronouncement of Esguerra and the later holding of Palma-Fernandez. The question,
however, is: Did Arroyo, in fact, extend the effects of reorganization under the revolutionary Charter to the era of the new Constitution?
There are a few points about Arroyo that have to be explained. First, the opinion expressed therein that "[b]y virtue of said provision the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of this constitution and career
civil service employees may be separated from the service without cause as a result of such reorganization" 74 is in the nature of an obiter dictum.
We dismissed Jose's petition 75 primarily because it was "clearly premature, speculative, and purely anticipatory, based merely on newspaper
reports which do not show any direct or threatened injury," 76 it appearing that the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs had not been, then,
set in motion. Jose therefore had no cause for complaint, which was enough basis to dismiss the petition. The remark anent separation "without
cause" was therefore not necessary for the disposition of the case. In Morales v. Parades,77 it was held that an obiter dictum "lacks the force of an
adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such."78
Secondly, Arroyo is an unsigned resolution while Palma Fernandez is a full-blown decision, although both are en banc cases. While a resolution
of the Court is no less forceful than a decision, the latter has a special weight.
Thirdly, Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz comes as a later doctrine. (Jose v. Arroyo was promulgated on August 11, 1987 while PalmaFernandez was decided on August 31, 1987.) It is well-established that a later judgment supersedes a prior one in case of an inconsistency.
As we have suggested, the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution allude to two stages of the reorganization, the first stage being the
reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 which had already been consummated the second stage being that adverted to in the transitory
provisions themselves which is underway. Hence, when we spoke, in Arroyo, of reorganization after the effectivity of the new Constitution, we
referred to the second stage of the reorganization. Accordingly, we cannot be said to have carried over reorganization under the Freedom
Constitution to its 1987 counterpart.
Finally, Arroyo is not necessarily incompatible with Palma-Fernandez (or Esguerra).

As we have demonstrated, reorganization under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution is not as stern as reorganization under the prior Charter.
Whereas the latter, sans the President's subsequently imposed constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be said of the reorganization
inferred under the new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution seeks to usher in a democratic regime. But even if we concede ex
gratia argumenti that Section 16 is an exception to due process and no-removal-"except for cause provided by law" principles enshrined in the
very same 1987 Constitution, 79 which may possibly justify removals "not for cause," there is no contradiction in terms here because, while the
former Constitution left the axe to fall where it might, the present organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must be as a result of
reorganization. As we observed, the Constitution does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It must also pass the test of good faith a test not
obviously required under the revolutionary government formerly prevailing, but a test well-established in democratic societies and in this
government under a democratic Charter.
When, therefore, Arroyo permitted a reorganization under Executive Order No. 127 after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, Arroyo permitted a reorganization provided that it is done in good faith. Otherwise, security of tenure would be an insuperable
implement. 80
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. 81 As a general rule, a reorganization is
carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a
dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.
Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat sty of
tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition' takes place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid
"abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, 82 or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample
funds. 83
It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we are not, as a consequence, imposing a "cause" for
restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to "grounds" or
conditions that call for disciplinary action.**
Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case. However, under Republic Act
No. 6656, we are told:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid
cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the
Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where
there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where
an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those
less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department
or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal
violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. 84
It is in light hereof that we take up questions about Commissioner Mison's good faith, or lack of it.
Reorganization
Lack of Good Faith in.

of

the

Bureau

of

Customs,

The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy except for the change of personnel has
occurred, which would have justified (an things being equal) the contested dismisses. The contention that the staffing pattern at the Bureau (which
would have furnished a justification for a personnel movement) is the same s pattern prescribed by Section 34 of Executive Order No. 127 already
prevailing when Commissioner Mison took over the Customs helm, has not been successfully contradicted 85There is no showing that legitimate
structural changes have been made or a reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison
assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees. There can therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of,
in the sense, say, of reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions, but a
revamp of personnel pure and simple.
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel but replaced them with 522 as of August 18,
1988. 86 This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to halt further
layoffs as a consequence of reorganization.87 Finally, he was aware that layoffs should observe the procedure laid down by Executive Order No.
17.
We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the Constitution. While the act is valid, still and all, the means
with which it was implemented is not. 88
Executive Order No. 127, Specific Case of.
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59 thereof, "[t]hose incumbents whose positions are
not included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service." He submits that because the 394 removed personnel
have not been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin with, the Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of
Executive Order No. 39. Under Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all Bureau personnel, except those
appointed by the President." 89
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr., Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated
them, they being Presidential appointees.
Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been rendered inoperative according to our holding inPalma-Fernandez.

That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been on a mere holdover status cannot mean that the positions held
by them had become vacant. In Palma-Fernandez, we said in no uncertain terms:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the
performance of her duties merely in a hold over capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal
rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have
lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became
effective (De Leon. et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions of
the latter on security of tenure govern. 90
It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring Commissioner Mison from carrying out a reorganization under the transitory provisions of the
1987 Constitution. But such a reorganization should be subject to the criterion of good faith.
Resume.
In resume, we restate as follows:
1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected or appointed, without cause but only before the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 (De Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this connection, Section 59 (on
non-reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a basis for termination;
2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and retirement benefits or upon their option be given reemployment opportunities
(CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16; Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);
3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the Government resulting in the separation of career civil service
employees [CONST. (1987), supra] provided, that such a reorganization is made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)
G.R. No. 83737
This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we have indicated, G.R. No. 83737 is a challenge to the validity of Republic Act No. 6656. In
brief, it is argued that the Act, insofar as it strengthens security of tenure91 and as far as it provides for a retroactive effect, 92 runs counter to the
transitory provisions of the new Constitution on removals not for cause.
It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for reinstatament of employees separated without "a valid cause and after due notice and
hearing" 93 is not contrary to the transitory provisions of the new Constitution. The Court reiterates that although the Charter's transitory
provisions mention separations "not for cause," separations thereunder must nevertheless be on account of a valid reorganization and which do not
come about automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure may be invoked. Moreover, it can be seen that the statute itself recognizes removals
without cause. However, it also acknowledges the possibility of the leadership using the artifice of reorganization to frustrate security of tenure.
For this reason, it has installed safeguards. There is nothing unconstitutional about the Act.
We recognize the injury Commissioner Mison's replacements would sustain. We also commisserate with them. But our concern is the greater
wrong inflicted on the dismissed employees on account of their regal separation from the civil service.
WHEREFORE, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DATED JUNE 30, 1988, SEPTEMBER 20, 1988,
NOVEMBER 16, 1988, INVOLVED IN G.R. NOS. 85310, 85335, AND 86241, AND MAY 8, 1989, INVOLVED IN G.R. NO. 85310, ARE
AFFIRMED.
THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 81954, 81967, 82023, AND 85335 ARE GRANTED. THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 83737, 85310 AND
86241 ARE DISMISSED.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO REINSTATE THE EMPLOYEES SEPARATED AS A RESULT OF HIS NOTICES
DATED JANUARY 26, 1988.
THE EMPLOYEES WHOM COMMISSIONER MISON MAY HAVE APPOINTED AS REPLACEMENTS ARE ORDERED TO VACATE
THEIR POSTS SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF WHATEVER BENEFITS THAT MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
NO COSTS.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority view so ably presented by Mr. Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento. While additional comments may seem superfluous in
view of the exhaustiveness of his ponencia, I nevertheless offer the following brief observations for whatever they may be worth.
Emphasizing Article XVII, Section 16 of the Constitution, the dissenting opinion considers the ongoing government reorganization valid because
it is merely a continuation of the reorganization begun during the transition period. The reason for this conclusion is the phrase "and the
reorganization following the ratification of the Constitution," that is to say, after February 2, 1987, appearing in the said provision. The
consequence (and I hope I have not misread it) is that the present reorganization may still be undertaken with the same "absoluteness" that was

allowed the revolutionary reorganization although the Freedom Constitution is no longer in force.
Reorganization of the government may be required by the legislature even independently of specific constitutional authorization, as in the case,
for example, of R.A. No. 51 and B.P. No. 129. Being revolutionary in nature, the reorganization decreed by Article III of the Freedom
Constitution was unlimited as to its methodexcept only as it was later restricted by President Aquino herself through various issuances,
particularly E.O. No. 17. But this reorganization, for all its permitted summariness, was not indefinite. Under Section 3 of the said Article III, it
was allowed only up to February 29,1987 (which we advanced to February 2, 1987, when the new Constitution became effective).
The clear implication is that any government reorganization that may be undertaken thereafter must be authorized by the legislature only and may
not be allowed the special liberties and protection enjoyed by the revolutionary reorganization. Otherwise, there would have been no necessity at
all for the time limitation expressly prescribed by the Freedom Constitution.
I cannot accept the view that Section 16 is an authorization for the open-ended reorganization of the government "following the ratification of the
Constitution." I read the provision as merely conferring benefits deservedly or not on persons separated from the government as a result of
the reorganization of the government, whether undertaken during the transition period or as a result of a law passed thereafter. What the grants is
privileges to the retirees, not power to the provision government. It is axiomatic that grants of power are not lightly inferred, especially if these
impinge on individual rights, and I do not see why we should depart from this rule.
To hold that the present reorganization is a continuation of the one begun during the transition period is to recognize the theory of the public
respondent that all officers and employees not separated earlier remain in a hold-over capacity only and so may be replaced at any time even
without cause. That is a dangerous proposition that threatens the security and stability of every civil servant in the executive department. What is
worse is that this situation may continue indefinitely as the claimed "progressive" reorganization has no limitation as to time.
Removal imports the forcible separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his term and can be done only for cause as provided by law.
Contrary to common belief, a reorganization does not result in removal but in a different mode of terminating official relations known as abolition
of the office (and the security of tenure attached thereto.) The erstwhile holder of the abolished office cannot claim he has been removed without
cause in violation of his constitutional security of tenure. The reason is that the right itself has disappeared with the abolished office as an
accessory following the principal. (Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, 51 O.G. 147; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294; Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil.
903.)
This notwithstanding, the power to reorganize is not unlimited. It is essential that it be based on a valid purpose, such as the promotion of
efficiency and economy in the government through a pruning of offices or the streamlining of their functions. (Cervantes v. Auditor-General, 91
Phil. 359.) Normally, a reorganization cannot be validly undertaken as a means of purging the undesirables for this would be a removal in disguise
undertaken en masse to circumvent the constitutional requirement of legal cause. (Eradication of graft and corruption was one of the expressed
purposes of the revolutionary organization, but this was authorized by the Freedom Constitution itself.) In short, a reorganization, to be valid,
must be done in good faith. (Urgelio v. Osmena, 9 SCRA 317; Cuneta v. Court of Appeals, 1 SCRA 663; Carino v. ACCFA, 18 SCRA 183.)
A mere recitation no matter how lengthy of the directives, guidelines, memoranda, etc. issued by the government and the action purportedly
taken thereunder does not by itself prove good faith. We know only too well that these instructions, for all their noble and sterile purposes, are
rarely followed in their actual implementation. The reality in this case, as the majority opinion has pointed out and as clearly established in the
hearing we held, is that the supposed reorganization was undertaken with an eye not to achieving the avowed objectives but to accommodating
new appointees at the expense of the dislodged petitioners. That was also the finding of the Civil Service Commission, to which we must accord a
becoming respect as the constitutional office charged with the protection of the civil service from the evils of the spoils system.
The present administration deserves full support in its desire to improve the civil service, but this objective must be pursued in a manner
consistent with the Constitution. This praiseworthy purpose cannot be accomplished by an indiscriminate reorganization that will sweep in its
wake the innocent along with the redundant and inept, for the benefit of the current favorites.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
The historical underpinnings of Government efforts at reorganization hark back to the people power phenomenon of 22-24 February 1986, and
Proclamation No. 1 of President Corazon C. Aquino, issued on 25 February 1986, stating in no uncertain terms that "the people expect a
reorganization of government." In its wake followed Executive Order No. 5, issued on 12 March 1986, "Creating a Presidential Commission on
Government Reorganization," with the following relevant provisions:
WHEREAS, there is need to effect the necessary and proper changes in the organizational and functional structures of the national and
local governments, its agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, in order to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services
xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 2. The functional jurisdiction of the PCGR shall encompass, as necessary, the reorganization of the national and local
governments, its agencies and instrumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Succeeding it was Proclamation No. 3, dated 25 March 1986, also known as the Freedom Constitution, declaring, in part, in its Preamble as
follows:
WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the people as manifested by their extraordinary action demands the complete reorganization of
the government, ... (Emphasis supplied)
and pertinently providing:
ARTICLE II

Section I
xxx

xxx

xxx

The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government and eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime;" (Emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

ARTICLE III GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

Section 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is
made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
Section 3. Any public office or employee separated from the service as a result of the reorganization effected under this Proclamation
shall, if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder. (Emphasis ours)
On 28 May 1986, Executive Order No. 17 was issued "Prescribing Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of Section 2, Article III of the
Freedom Constitution' providing, inter alia, as follows:
Section 1. In the course of implementing Article III, Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution, the Head of each Ministry shall see to it
that the separation or replacement of officers and employees is made only for justifiable reasons, to prevent indiscriminate dismissal, of
personnel in the career civil service whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of public service of the New
Government.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Ministry concerned shall adopt its own rules and procedures for the review and assessment of its own personnel, including the
identification of sensitive positions which require more rigid assessment of the incumbents, and shall complete such review/assessment
as expeditiously as possible but not later than February 24, 1987 to prevent undue demoralization in the public service.
Section 2. The Ministry Head concerned, on the basis of such review and assessment shall determine who shall be separated from the
service. Thereafter, he shall issue to the official or employee concerned a notice of separation which shall indicate therein the reason/s
or ground /s for such separation and the fact that the separated official or employee has the right to file a petition for reconsideration
pursuant to this Order. Separation from the service shall be effective upon receipt of such notice, either personally by the official or
employee concerned or on his behalf by a person of sufficient discretion.
Section 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation/ replacement of personnel:
1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2. Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act as determined by the
Ministry Head concerned;
3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4. Misuse of Public office for partisan political purposes;
5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.
Section 11. This Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those designated to replace them, presidential appointees, casual
and contractual employees, or officials and employees removed pursuant to disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law and
rules, and to those laid off as a result of the reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No. 5. (Emphasis supplied)
On 6 August 1986, Executive Order No. 39 was issued by the President "Enlarging the Powers and Functions of the Commissioner of Customs",
as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 1. In addition to the powers and functions of the Commissioner of Customs, he is hereby authorized, subject to the Civil
Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations:
a) To appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President;
b) To discipline, suspend, dismiss or otherwise penalize erring Bureau officers and employees;
c) To act on all matters pertaining to promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment, reinstatement, reemployment and
other personnel action, involving officers and employees of the Bureau of Customs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 127 was issued "Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance." Similar Orders, approximately thirteen (13) in
all, 1 were issued in respect of the other executive departments. The relevant provisions relative to the Bureau of Customs read:
RECALLING that the reorganization of the government is mandated expressly in Article II, Section l(a) and Article III of the Freedom
Constitution;

HAVING IN MIND that pursuant to Executive Order No. 5 (1986), it is directed that the necessary and proper changes in the
organizational and functional structures of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote efficiency
and effectiveness in the delivery of public services;
BELIEVING that it is necessary to reorganize the Ministry of Finance to make it more capable and responsive, organizationally and
functionally, in its primary mandate of judiciously generating and efficiently managing the financial resources of the Government, its
subdivisions and instrumentalities in order to attain the socio-economic objectives of the national development programs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SEC. 2. Reorganization. The Ministry of Finance, hereinafter referred to as Ministry, is hereby reorganized, structurally and
functionally, in accordance with the provisions of this Executive Order.
SEC. 33. Bureau of Customs.
... Executive Order No. 39 dated 6 August 1986 which grants autonomy to the Commissioner of Customs in matters of appointment and
discipline of Customs personnel shall remain in effect.
SEC. 55. Abolition of Units Integral to Ministry. All units not included in the structural organization as herein provided and all
positions thereof are hereby deemed abolished. ... Their personnel shall be entitled to the benefits provided in the second paragraph of
Section 59 hereof.
SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall, in a
holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and
benefits unless in the meantime they are separated from government service pursuant to executive Order No. 17 (1986) or article III of
the Freedom Constitution.
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the ministry shall be approved and prescribed by the Minister within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive Order and the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular
appointments by him or by the President, as the case may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are
not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those separated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to
which they may be entitled under the existing laws, rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month
basic salary for every year of service or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of highest salary received,
but in no case shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months salary.
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ or preliminary junction or restraining order to enjoin the separation/replacement of
any officer or employee affected under this Executive Order.
Section 67 All laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive
Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis ours)

On 2 February 1987, the present Constitution took effect (De Leon, et al., vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987153 SCRA 602).
Reorganization in the Government service pursuant to Proclamation No. 3,supra, was provided for in its Section 16, Article XVIII entitled
Transitory Provisions, reading:
Section 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the
time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government or
in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Ms provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, has been accepted.
On 24 May 1987 the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander A. Padilla, transmitted to the Department of Finance for approval the proposed
"position structure and staffing pattern" of the Bureau of Customs. Said Department gave its imprimatur. Thereafter, the staffing pattern was
transmitted to and approved by the Department of Budget and Management on 7 September 1987 for implementation. Under the old staffing
pattern, there were 7,302 positions while under the new staffing pattern, there are 6,530 positions CSC Resolution in CSC Case No. 1, dated 20
September 1988, pp. 3-4).
On 22 September 1987, Salvador M. Mison assumed office as Commissioner of Customs.
On 2 October 1987 "Malacanang Memorandum Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders" was issued reading,
insofar as revelant to these cases, as follows:
It is my concern that ongoing process of government reorganization be conducted in a manner that is expeditious, as well as sensitive to
the dislocating consequences arising from specific personnel decisions.
The entire process of reorganization, and in particular the process of separation from service, must be carried out in the most humane
manner possible.
For this purpose, the following guidelines shall be strictly followed:
1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive Orders for each agency on reorganization shall
be:
a. informed of their reappointment or

b. offered another position in the same department/ agency or

c. informed of their termination.
2. In the event of an offer for a lower position, there will be no reduction in the salary.
xxx

xxx

xxx
4. Each department/agency shall constitute a Reorganization Appeals Board at the central office, on or before
October 21, 1987, to review or reconsider appeals or complaints relative to reorganization. All cases submitted to
the Boards shall be resolved subject to the following guidelines:
a. publication or posting of the appeal procedure promulgated by the Department Secretary;
b. adherence to due process;
c. disposition within 30 days from submission of the case;
d written notification of the action taken and the grounds thereof.

Action by the Appeals Review Board does not preclude appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
5. Placement in the new staffing pattern of incumbent personnel shall be completed prior to the hiring of new
personnel, if any.
xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis ours)

On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison wrote the President requesting a grace period until the end of February 1988 within which to
completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Executive Order No. 127 dated 30 January 1987. Said request was
granted in a letter-reply by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., dated 22 December 1987.
On 6 January 1988, within the extended period requested, Bureau of Customs Memorandum "Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders" was issued in the same tenor as the Malacanang Memorandum of 2 October 1987, providing inter alia:
To effectively implement the reorganization at the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the selection and placement of personnel, and
insure that the best qualified and most competent personnel in the career service are retained, the following guidelines are hereby
prescribed for the guidance of all concerned
1. By February 28, 1988 all employees covered by Executive Order No. 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of
Customs by the President of the Philippines on reorganization shall be:
a. informed of their reappointment, or
b. offered another position in the same department or agency or
c. informed of their termination.
2. In the event of termination, the employee shall:
a. be included in a consolidated list compiled by the Civil Service Commission. All departments who are recruiting
shall give preference to the employees in the list; and
b. continue to receive salary and benefits until February 28, 1988, and
c. be guaranteed the release of separation benefits within 45 days from termination and in no case later than June
15, 1988.
xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis supplied)

It is to be noted that paragraph 1 above and its sub-sections reproduced verbatim the Malacanang Guidelines of 2 October 1987 in that the
employees concerned were merely to be informed of their termination.
On 28 January 1988 Commissioner Mison addressed identical letters of termination to Bureau of Customs officers and employees effective on 28
February 1988.
As of 18 August 1988, Commissioner Mison appointed five hundred twenty-two (522) officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs (CSC
Resolution in CSC Case No. 1, dated 20 September 1988, p. 6). In fact, in a letter dated 27 January 1988, Commissioner Mison recommended
Jose M. Balde for appointment to President Aquino as one of three (3) Deputy Commissioners under Executive Order No. 127.
In the interim, during the pendency of these Petitions, Republic Act No. 6656, entitled "An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization" was passed by Congress on 9 June 1988. The President signed it
into law on 10 June 1988 and the statute took effect on 29 June 1988.
On 20 June 1988 Motions were filed, in these cases pending before this Court, invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 6656. The relevant
provisions thereof read:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to protect the security of tenure of civil service officers and employees in the
reorganization of the various agencies of the National government ....
SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing . A
valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or

there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed
by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in
the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency
concerned;
(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full
pay for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, including casuals and temporary
employees, who have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and
retirement and other benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or from the
date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That application for clearance has been filed and no
action thereon has been made by the corresponding department or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a
separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such separation pay and retirement
benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of the department or agency concerned.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 11. The executive branch of the government shall implement reorganization schemes within a specified period of time
authorized by law.
In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and agencies which are authorized by executive orders
promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act within which to implement their
respective reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 13. All laws, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly. The rights and benefits under this Act shall be retroactive as of June 30, 1987.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
Given the foregoing statutory backdrop, the issues can now be addressed.
Scope of Section 16, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution
Crucial to the present controversy is the construction to be given to the abovementioned Constitutional provision (SECTION 16, for brevity),
which speaks of.
Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause
but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986
and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution ... (paragraphing supplied).
To our minds, SECTION 16 clearly recognizes (1) the reorganization authorized by Proclamation No. 3; (2) that such separation is
NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to said Proclamation; and (3) that the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 may be continued even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution during the transition period.
Separation NOT FOR CAUSE
The canon for the removal or suspension of a civil service officer or employee is that it must be FOR CAUSE. That means a guarantee of both
procedural and substantive due process. Basically, procedural due process would require that suspension or dismissal come only after notice and
hearing. Substantive due process would require that suspension or dismissal be 'for cause'." Bernas The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, First Edition, 1988, p. 334)
The guarantee of removal FOR CAUSE is enshrined in Article IX-B, Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution, which states that 'No officer or
employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except FOR CAUSE provided by law."
There can be no question then as to the meaning of the phrase FOR CAUSE. It simply means the observance of both procedural and substantive
due process in cases of removal of officers or employees of the civil service. When SECTION 16 speaks, therefore, of separation from the service
NOT FOR CAUSE, it can only mean the diametrical opposite. The constitutional intent to exempt the separation of civil service employees
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 from the operation of Article IX-B, Section 2(3), becomes readily apparent. A distinction is explicitly made
between removal FOR CAUSE, which as aforestated, requires due process, and dismissal NOT FOR CAUSE, which implies that the latter is not
bound by the "fetters' of due process.
It is obviously for that reason that Section 16 grants separation pay and retirement benefits to those separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of

the reorganization precisely to soften the impact of the non-observance of due process. "What is envisioned in Section 16 is not a remedy for
arbitrary removal of civil servants enjoying security of tenure but some form of relief for members of the career civil service who may have been
or may be legally but involuntarily 'reorganized out' of the service or may have voluntarily resigned pursuant to the reorganization policy" ( ibid.,
p. 615).
Reorganization Pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 to Continue Transitorily Even After Ratification
By its very context, SECTION 16 envisages the continuance of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 even after ratification of the
Constitution and during the transition period. The two [2] stages contemplated, namely, (1) the stage before and (2) after ratification, refer to the
same nature of separation "NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of Proclamation No. 3." No valid reason has been advanced for a different treatment
after ratification as the majority opines i.e., that separation NOT FOR CAUSE is allowed before ratification but that, thereafter, separation can
only be FOR CAUSE.
A fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to assure the realization of the purpose of the framers of the organic law and of the
people who adopted it.
That the reorganization commenced pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 was envisioned to continue even after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, at least transitorily, is evident from the intent of its authors discoverable from their deliberations held on 3 October 1986 and
evincing their awareness that such reorganization had not as yet been fully implemented. Thus:
Mr. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer, on lines 2 to 5 is the clause 'pursuant to the provisions of Article III of Proclamation No. 3, issued
on March 25, 1986, and the reorganization.' Are those words necessary? Can we not just say 'result of the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution'? In other words, must we make specific reference to Proclamation No. 3?
Mr. SUAREZ. Yes. I think the committee feels that is necessary, because in truth there has been a reorganization by virtue of
Proclamation No. 3. In other words, there are two stages of reorganization covered by this section.
Mr. PADILIA. I understand there is a reorganization committee headed by a minister?
Mr. SUAREZ. Philippine Commission on Government Reorganization.
Mr. PADILLA. But whether that has already been implemented or not, I do not believe in it. There has been a plan, but I do not think it
has been implemented. If we want to include any previous reorganization after or before the ratification, why do we not just say
reorganization before or after the ratification' to simplify the provision and eliminate two-and-a-half sentences that may not be
necessary? And as a result of the reorganization, if the committee feels there has been reorganization before ratification and there be
reorganization after, we just say 'before or after the ratification of this Constitution.
Mr. SUAREZ. Something like this as a result of the reorganization effected before or after the ratification of the Constitution on the
understanding, with the statement into the records, that this would be applicable to those reorganized out pursuant to the Freedom
Constitution also.
Mr. PADILLA. That is understood if there has been a reorganization before the ratification or a reorganization after the ratification."
(RECORDS of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 5, p. 416) (Emphasis provided)
It should also be recalled that the deadline for the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 was "one year from February 25, 1986" (Article III,
Section 2), or up to February 24, 1987. Executive Order No. 17 itself provided that the review/assessment of personnel be completed "not later
than February 24, 1987." But, confronted with the reality of the ratification of the Constitution before that deadline without reorganization having
been completed, there was need for a provision allowing for its continuance even after ratification and until completed. It was also to beat that
deadline that EO 127 and similar issuances, providing for the reorganization of departments of government, were all dated 30 January 1987 or
prior to the plebiscite held on 2 February 1987. The intent to continue and complete the reorganizations started is self- evident in SECTION 16.
In Jose vs. Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 78435, August 11, 1987), which was a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition to enjoin the implementation of
Executive Order No. 127, we recognized that the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 as mandated by SECTION 16, was to continue
even after ratification when we stated:
The contention of petitioner that EO No. 127 is violative of the provision of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing career civil service
employees security of tenure overlooks the provision of Section 16, Art. XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorizes the
removal of career civil service employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March
25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of the Constitution. By virtue of said provision, the reorganization of the
Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of this Constitution and career civil service
employees may be separated from the service without cause as a result of such reorganization. (Emphasis ours)
With due respect to the majority, we disagree with its conclusion that the foregoing pronouncement is mere "obiter dictum."
An obiter dictum or dictum has been defined as a remark or opinion uttered, by the way. It is a statement of the court concerning a
question which was not directly before it (In re Hess 23 A. 2d. 298, 301, 20 N.J. Misc. 12).lwph1.t It is language unnecessary to a
decision, (a) ruling on an issue not raised, or (an) opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution or determination of the
court, and is made without argument or full consideration of the point (Lawson v. US, 176 F2d 49, 51, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 167). It is an
expression of opinion by the court or judge on a collateral question not directly involved, (Crescent Ring Co. v. Travelers Indemnity
Co. 132 A. 106, 107, 102 N.J. Law 85) or not necessary for the decision Du Bell v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 29, So. 2d 709, 712;
211 La. 167).
In the case at bar, however, directly involved and squarely before the Court was the issue of whether EO 127 violates Section 2(3) of Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution against removal of civil service employees except for cause." Petitioner batted for the affirmative of the proposition,
while respondents contended that "removal of civil service employees without cause is allowed not only under the Provisional Constitution but
also under the 1987 Constitution if the same is made pursuant to a reorganization after the ratification of the Constitution."

It may be that the Court dismissed that Petition for being premature, speculative and purely anticipatory" inasmuch as petitioner therein had "not
received any communication terminating or threatening to terminate his services." But that was only one consideration. The Court still proceeded
to decide all the issues adversatively contested by the parties, namely "1) that the expiration date of February 25, 1 987 fixed by Section 2 of
Proclamation No. 3 on which said Executive order is based had already lapsed; 2) that the Executive Order has not been published in the Official
Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 1 1 of the Revised Administrative Code; and 3) that its enforcement violates
Section 2(3) of Article IX B of the 1987 Constitution against removal of civil service employees except for cause."
The ruling of the Court, therefore, on the Constitutional issues presented, particularly, the lapse of the period mandated by Proclamation No. 3,
and the validity of EO 127, cannot be said to be mere "obiter." They were ultimate issues directly before the Court, expressly decided in the
course of the consideration of the case, so that any resolution thereon must be considered as authoritative precedent, and not a mere dictum (See
Valli v. US, 94 F2d 687 certiorari granted 58 S. Ct. 760, 303 U.S. 82 L. Ed. 1092; See also Weedin v. Tayokichi Yamada 4 F. (2d) 455). Such
resolution would not lose its value as a precedent just because the disposition of the case was also made on some other ground.
.....And this rule applies as to all pertinent questions although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular
course of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final conclusion (Northern Pac. Ry Co. v. Baker, D.C. Wash., 3 F. Suppl. 1;
See also Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. City of Beloit 254 NW 119; Chase v. American Cartage Co. 186 N.W. 598; City of Detroit,
et al. v. Public Utilities Comm. 286 N.W. 368). Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the
disposition of the case is made on some other ground. (Wagner v. Com Products Refining Co. D.C. N.J. 28 F 2d 617) Where a case
presents two or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points,
the case is an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having merely the status of a
dictum (See U.S. Title Insurance and Trust Co., Cal., 44 S. Ct. 621, 265 U.S. 472, 68 L. Ed. 1110; Van Dyke v. Parker 83 F. (2d) 35) and
one point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered.
(Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. U.S. 48 S. Ct. 194, 275 U.S. 331, 72 L. Ed. 303)"
It is true that in Palma-Fernandez vs. de la Paz (G.R. No. 78946, April 15, 1986, 160 SCRA 751), we had stated:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision (Section 26 of Executive Order No. 119, or the 'Reorganization Act of the Ministry of
Health'), petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a holdover capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a
position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the
Provisional Constitution), but advanced to 2 February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon, et al., vs. Hon.
Esguerra, et al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 602). After the d date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure
govern.
The factual situation in the two cases, however, radically differ. In the cited case, Dra. Palma-Fernandez, the petitioner, had already been extended
a permanent appointment as Assistant Director for Professional Services of the East Avenue Medical Center but was still being transferred by the
Medical Center Chief to the Research Office against her consent. Separation from the service as a result of reorganization was not involved. The
question then arose as to whether the latter official had the authority to transfer or whether the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers
and employees was lodged in the Secretary of Health. Related to that issue was the vital one of whether or not her transfer, effected on 29 May
1987, was tantamount to a removal without cause. Significant, too, is the fact that the transfer was basically made "in the interest of the service"
pursuant to Section 24(c) of PD No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree, and not because she was being reorganized out by virtue of EO 119 or the
"Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health," although the said Act was invoked after the fact. And so it was that SECTION 16 was never
mentioned, much less invoked in the Palma-Fernandez case.
Finally, on this point, it is inaccurate for the majority to state that there were no reorganization orders after ratification. There were, namely, EO
181 (Reorganization Act of the Civil Service Commission), June 1, 1987; EO 193 (Reorganization Act of the Office of Energy Affairs), June 10,
1987; EO 230 (Reorganization Act of NEDA), July 22, 1987; EO 262 (Reorganization Act of the Department of Local Government), July 25,
1987; EO 297 (Reorganization Act of the Office of the Press Secretary), July 25, 1987.
The Element of Good Faith
The majority concedes that reorganization can be undertaken provided it be in good faith but concludes that Commissioner Mison was not in good
faith.
The aforesaid conclusion is contradicted by the records.
Executive Order No. 127, dated 30 January 1987, specifically authorized the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs "structurally and
functionally" and provided for the abolition of all units and positions thereof not included in the structural organization S election 55).
As stated heretofore, it was the former Commissioner of Customs, Alexander A. Padilla who, on 24 May 1987, transmitted to the Department of
Finance for approval the proposed "position structure and staffing pattern" of the Bureau of Customs. This was approved by the Department of
Finance. Thereafter, it was transmitted to and approved by the Department of Budget and Management on 7 September 1987 for implementation.
Under the old staffing pattern, there were 7,302 positions while under the new staffing pattern, there are 6,530 positions.
On 2 October 1987 "Malacanang Memorandum Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders" provided:
By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:
a. informed of their reappointment, or
b. offered another position in the same department or agency, or
c. informed of their termination. (emphasis supplied)
On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison asked for and was granted by the President an extension up to February 1988 within which to
completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs.

On 6 January 1988, he issued Bureau of Customs Memorandum "Re Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders"
reiterating the above- quoted portion of the Malacanang Memorandum of 2 October 1987. Pursuant thereto, on 28 January 1988, Commissioner
Mison addressed uniform letters of termination to the employees listed on pages 15, 16 and 17 of the majority opinion, effective on 28 February
1988, within the extended period granted.
The records further show that upon Commissioner Mison's official inquiry, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordo;ez, rendered the following
Opinion:
. . . It is believed that customs employees who are reorganized out in the course of the implementation of E.O. No. 127 (reorganizing
the Department of Finance) need not be informed of the nature and cause of their separation from the service. It is enough that they be
'informed of their termination' pursuant to section 1(c) of the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 of President Aquino, which reads:
1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:
xxx

xxx

xxx

c) Informed of their terminations.

The constitutional mandate that 'no officer or employee of the civil service shall be renewed or suspended except for cause as provided
by law' (Sec. 2(4) (sic), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution) does not apply to employees who are separated from office as a result of
the reorganization of that Bureau as directed in Executive Order No. 127.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Regarding your (third) query, the issue as to the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 127 is set at rest, after the Supreme Court
resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari questioning its enforceability, for lack of merit (see Jose vs. Arroyo, et al., supra).
(Opinion No. 41, s. 1988, March 3, 1988) (Emphasis supplied)
The former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Celerina G. Gotladera likewise periodically consulted by Commissioner Mison, also
expressed the opinion that "it is not a prerequisite prior to the separation of an employee pursuant to reorganization that he be administratively
charged." (Annex 16, p. 411, Rollo, G.R. No. 85310)
Moreover, the records show that the final selection and placement of personnel was done by a Placement Committee, one of whose members is
the Head of the Civil Service Commission Field Office, namely, Mrs. Purificacion Cuerdo The appointment of employees made by Commissioner
Mison was based on the list approved by said Placement Committee.
But the majority further faults Mison for defying the President's directive to halt further layoffs as a consequence of reorganization, citing OP
Memo of 14 October 1987, reading:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that there will be no further layoffs this year of
personnel as a result of the government reorganization. (p. 45, Decision)
The foregoing, however, must be deemed superseded by later developments, namely, the grant to Commissioner Mison by the President on 22
December 1987 of a grace period until the end of February 1988 within which to completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs, which was, in fact, accomplished by 28 February 1988.
To further show lack of good faith, the majority states that Commissioner Mison failed to observe the procedure laid down by EO 17, supra,
directing inter alia that a notice of separation be issued to an employee to be terminated indicating therein the reason/s or ground/s for such
separation. That requirement, however, does not appear in Section 59 of EO 127, which provides on the contrary "that those incumbents whose
positions are not included in the new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated
from the service." The right granted by EO 17 to an employee to be informed of the ground for his separation must be deemed to have been
revoked by the repealing clause of EO 127 (Section 67) providing that "all laws, ordinances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this
Executive Order, are hereby repealed and modified accordingly."
Moreover, Section 11 of EO 17 explicitly excepts from its coverage a reorganization pursuant to EO 5. Thus
The Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those designated to replace them, presidential appointees, casual and
contractual employees, or officials and employees removed pursuant to desciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service law and rules,
and to those laid off as a result of reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No. 5. (Emphasis ours)
That EO 127 was issued pursuant to or in implementation of EO 5, is shown by its introductory portion reading:
Recalling that the reorganization of the government is mandated expressly by Article II, Section 1 (a) and Article III of the Freedom
Constitution;
Having in mind that pursuant to Executive order No. 5 (1986), it is directed that the necessary and proper changes in the organizational
and functional structures of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote efficiency and
effectiveness in the delivery of public service; (Italics supplied)
Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6656
The majority also relies on Republic Act No. 6656 entitled an "Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in
the Implementation of Government Reorganization," particularly Section 2 thereof, to test the good faith of Commissioner Mison.
We are of the view, however, that in providing for retroactivity in its Section 13, RA 6656 clashes frontally with SECTION 16.
1) SECTION 16 clearly recognizes that career service employees separated from the service by reason of the "complete reorganization of the
government" pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 may be separated NOT FOR CAUSE. And yet, RA 6656 requires the exact opposite separation

FOR CAUSE. It would not be remiss to quote the provision again:

SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid
cause for removal exist when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the
Civil Service law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where
there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where
an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those
less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department
or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal
violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. (Republic Act No. 6156)
The standards laid down are the "traditional" criteria for removal of employees from the career service, e.g. valid cause, due notice and hearing,
abolition of, or redundancy of offices. Proclamation No. 3, on the other hand, effectuates the "progressive" type of reorganization dictated by the
exigencies of the historical and political upheaval at the time. The "traditional" type is limited in scope. It is concerned with the individual
approach where the particular employee involved is charged administratively and where the requisites of notice and hearing have to be observed.
The "progressive" kind of reorganization, on the other hand, is the collective way. It is wider in scope, and is the reorganization contemplated
under SECTION 16.
2) By providing for reinstatement in its Section 9, RA 6656 adds a benefit not included in SECTION 16. The benefits granted by the latter
provision to employees separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a consequence of reorganization are "separation pay, retirement, and other benefits
accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation." The benefit of reinstatement is not included. RA
6656, however, allows reinstatement. That it cannot do because under SECTION 16, it is not one of the laws "in force at the time of their
separation."
The Constitution is the paramount law to which all laws must conform. It is from the Constitution that all statutes must derive their bearings. The
legislative authority of the State must yield to the expression of the sovereign will. No statutory enactment can disregard the Charter from which it
draws its own existence (Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 [1952]). But, that is exactly what RA
6656 does in providing for retroactivity it disregards and contravenes a Constitutional imperative. To save it, it should be applied and construed
prospectively and not retroactively notwithstanding its explicit provision. Then, and only then, would it make good law.
Effects of Reorganization
To be sure, the reorganization could effect the tenure of members of the career service as defined in Section 5, Article IV of Presidential Decree
No. 807, and may even result in the separation from the office of some meritorious employees. But even then, the greater good of the greatest
number and the right of the citizenry to a good government, and as they themselves have mandated through the vehicle of Proclamation No. 3,
provide the justification for the said injury to the individual. In terms of values, the interest of an employee to security of tenure must yield to the
interest of the entire populace and to an efficient and honest government.
But a reorganized employee is not without rights. His right lies in his past services, the entitlement to which must be provided for by law. EO 127
provides for the same in its Section 59, and so does SECTION 16 when the latter specified that career civil service employees separated from the
service not for cause:
shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for
employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing
policy, has been accepted.
This is a reward for the employee's past service to the Government. But this is all There is no vested property right to be reemployed in a
reorganized office.
The right to an office or to employment with government or any of its agencies is not a vested property right, and removal therefrom
will not support the question of due process" Yantsin v. Aberdeen, 54 Wash 2d 787, 345 P 2d 178). A civil service employee does not
have a constitutionally protected right to his position, which position is in the nature of a public office, political in character and held by
way of grant or privilege extended by government; generally he has been held to have no property right or vested interest to which due
process guaranties extend (See Taylor v. Beckham 178 U.S. 548, 44 L Ed. 1187; Angilly v. US CA2 NY 199 F 2d 642; People ex. rel.
Baker v. Wilson, 39 III App 2d 443, 189 NE 2d 1; Kelliheller v. NY State Civil Service Com 21 Misc 2d 1034, 194 NYS 2d 89).
To ensure, however, that no meritorious employee has been separated from the service, there would be no harm, in fact, it could do a lot of good,
if the Commissioner of Customs reviews the evaluation and placements he has so far made and sees to it that those terminated are included in a
consolidated list to be given preference by departments who are recruiting (Section 2[a], BOC Memorandum, January 6,1988).lwph1.t
Conclusion
Premises considered, and subject to the observation hereinabove made, it is our considered view that the separation from the service "NOT FOR
CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986" of the affected officers and employees of the
Bureau of Customs should be UPHELD, and the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission, dated 30 June 1988, 20 September 1988, and 16
November 1988 should be SET ASIDE for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
Republic Act No. 6656, in so far as it provides for retroactivity, should be declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being repugnant to the letter and
spirit of Section 16, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Feliciano, Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority view so ably presented by Mr. Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento. While additional comments may seem superfluous in
view of the exhaustiveness of his ponencia, I nevertheless offer the following brief observations for whatever they may be worth.
Emphasizing Article XVII, Section 16 of the Constitution, the dissenting opinion considers the ongoing government reorganization valid because
it is merely a continuation of the reorganization begun during the transition period. The reason for this conclusion is the phrase "and the
reorganization following the ratification of the Constitution," that is to say, after February 2, 1987, appearing in the said provision. The
consequence (and I hope I have not misread it) is that the present reorganization may still be undertaken with the same "absoluteness" that was
allowed the revolutionary reorganization although the Freedom Constitution is no longer in force.
Reorganization of the government may be required by the legislature even independently of specific constitutional authorization, as in the case,
for example, of R.A. No. 51 and B.P. No. 129. Being revolutionary in nature, the reorganization decreed by Article III of the Freedom
Constitution was unlimited as to its methodexcept only as it was later restricted by President Aquino herself through various issuances,
particularly E.O. No. 17. But this reorganization, for all its permitted summariness, was not indefinite. Under Section 3 of the said Article III, it
was allowed only up to February 29,1987 (which we advanced to February 2, 1987, when the new Constitution became effective).
The clear implication is that any government reorganization that may be undertaken thereafter must be authorized by the legislature only and may
not be allowed the special liberties and protection enjoyed by the revolutionary reorganization. Otherwise, there would have been no necessity at
all for the time limitation expressly prescribed by the Freedom Constitution.
I cannot accept the view that Section 16 is an authorization for the open-ended reorganization of the government "following the ratification of the
Constitution." I read the provision as merely conferring benefits deservedly or not on persons separated from the government as a result of
the reorganization of the government, whether undertaken during the transition period or as a result of a law passed thereafter. What the grants is
privileges to the retirees, not power to the provision government. It is axiomatic that grants of power are not lightly inferred, especially if these
impinge on individual rights, and I do not see why we should depart from this rule.
To hold that the present reorganization is a continuation of the one begun during the transition period is to recognize the theory of the public
respondent that all officers and employees not separated earlier remain in a hold-over capacity only and so may be replaced at any time even
without cause. That is a dangerous proposition that threatens the security and stability of every civil servant in the executive department. What is
worse is that this situation may continue indefinitely as the claimed "progressive" reorganization has no limitation as to time.
Removal imports the forcible separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his term and can be done only for cause as provided by law.
Contrary to common belief, a reorganization does not result in removal but in a different mode of terminating official relations known as abolition
of the office (and the security of tenure attached thereto.) The erstwhile holder of the abolished office cannot claim he has been removed without
cause in violation of his constitutional security of tenure. The reason is that the right itself has disappeared with the abolished office as an
accessory following the principal. (Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, 51 O.G. 147; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294; Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil.
903.)
This notwithstanding, the power to reorganize is not unlimited. It is essential that it be based on a valid purpose, such as the promotion of
efficiency and economy in the government through a pruning of offices or the streamlining of their functions. (Cervantes v. Auditor-General, 91
Phil. 359.) Normally, a reorganization cannot be validly undertaken as a means of purging the undesirables for this would be a removal in disguise
undertaken en masse to circumvent the constitutional requirement of legal cause. (Eradication of graft and corruption was one of the expressed
purposes of the revolutionary organization, but this was authorized by the Freedom Constitution itself.) In short, a reorganization, to be valid,
must be done in good faith. (Urgelio v. Osmena, 9 SCRA 317; Cuneta v. Court of Appeals, 1 SCRA 663; Carino v. ACCFA, 18 SCRA 183.)
A mere recitation no matter how lengthy of the directives, guidelines, memoranda, etc. issued by the government and the action purportedly
taken thereunder does not by itself prove good faith. We know only too well that these instructions, for all their noble and sterile purposes, are
rarely followed in their actual implementation. The reality in this case, as the majority opinion has pointed out and as clearly established in the
hearing we held, is that the supposed reorganization was undertaken with an eye not to achieving the avowed objectives but to accommodating
new appointees at the expense of the dislodged petitioners. That was also the finding of the Civil Service Commission, to which we must accord a
becoming respect as the constitutional office charged with the protection of the civil service from the evils of the spoils system.
The present administration deserves full support in its desire to improve the civil service, but this objective must be pursued in a manner
consistent with the Constitution. This praiseworthy purpose cannot be accomplished by an indiscriminate reorganization that will sweep in its
wake the innocent along with the redundant and inept, for the benefit of the current favorites.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

The historical underpinnings of Government efforts at reorganization hark back to the people power phenomenon of 22-24 February 1986, and
Proclamation No. 1 of President Corazon C. Aquino, issued on 25 February 1986, stating in no uncertain terms that "the people expect a
reorganization of government." In its wake followed Executive Order No. 5, issued on 12 March 1986, "Creating a Presidential Commission on
Government Reorganization," with the following relevant provisions:
WHEREAS, there is need to effect the necessary and proper changes in the organizational and functional structures of the national and
local governments, its agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, in order to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services

xxx

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Section 2. The functional jurisdiction of the PCGR shall encompass, as necessary, the reorganization of the national and local
governments, its agencies and instrumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
xxx

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xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Succeeding it was Proclamation No. 3, dated 25 March 1986, also known as the Freedom Constitution, declaring, in part, in its Preamble as
follows:
WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the people as manifested by their extraordinary action demands the complete reorganization of
the government, ... (Emphasis supplied)
and pertinently providing:
ARTICLE II
Section I
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The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government and eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime;" (Emphasis supplied)
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xxx

ARTICLE III GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

Section 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is
made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
Section 3. Any public office or employee separated from the service as a result of the reorganization effected under this Proclamation
shall, if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder. (Emphasis ours)
On 28 May 1986, Executive Order No. 17 was issued "Prescribing Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of Section 2, Article III of the
Freedom Constitution' providing, inter alia, as follows:
Section 1. In the course of implementing Article III, Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution, the Head of each Ministry shall see to it
that the separation or replacement of officers and employees is made only for justifiable reasons, to prevent indiscriminate dismissal, of
personnel in the career civil service whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of public service of the New
Government.
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The Ministry concerned shall adopt its own rules and procedures for the review and assessment of its own personnel, including the
identification of sensitive positions which require more rigid assessment of the incumbents, and shall complete such review/assessment
as expeditiously as possible but not later than February 24, 1987 to prevent undue demoralization in the public service.
Section 2. The Ministry Head concerned, on the basis of such review and assessment shall determine who shall be separated from the
service. Thereafter, he shall issue to the official or employee concerned a notice of separation which shall indicate therein the reason/s
or ground /s for such separation and the fact that the separated official or employee has the right to file a petition for reconsideration
pursuant to this Order. Separation from the service shall be effective upon receipt of such notice, either personally by the official or
employee concerned or on his behalf by a person of sufficient discretion.
Section 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation/ replacement of personnel:
1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2. Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act as determined by the
Ministry Head concerned;
3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4. Misuse of Public office for partisan political purposes;
5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.
Section 11. This Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those designated to replace them, presidential appointees, casual
and contractual employees, or officials and employees removed pursuant to disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law and
rules, and to those laid off as a result of the reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No. 5. (Emphasis supplied)
On 6 August 1986, Executive Order No. 39 was issued by the President "Enlarging the Powers and Functions of the Commissioner of Customs",
as follows:
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SECTION 1. In addition to the powers and functions of the Commissioner of Customs, he is hereby authorized, subject to the Civil
Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations:
a) To appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President;
b) To discipline, suspend, dismiss or otherwise penalize erring Bureau officers and employees;
c) To act on all matters pertaining to promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment, reinstatement, reemployment and
other personnel action, involving officers and employees of the Bureau of Customs.
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On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 127 was issued "Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance." Similar Orders, approximately thirteen (13) in
all, 1 were issued in respect of the other executive departments. The relevant provisions relative to the Bureau of Customs read:
RECALLING that the reorganization of the government is mandated expressly in Article II, Section l(a) and Article III of the Freedom
Constitution;
HAVING IN MIND that pursuant to Executive Order No. 5 (1986), it is directed that the necessary and proper changes in the
organizational and functional structures of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote efficiency
and effectiveness in the delivery of public services;
BELIEVING that it is necessary to reorganize the Ministry of Finance to make it more capable and responsive, organizationally and
functionally, in its primary mandate of judiciously generating and efficiently managing the financial resources of the Government, its
subdivisions and instrumentalities in order to attain the socio-economic objectives of the national development programs.
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SEC. 2. Reorganization. The Ministry of Finance, hereinafter referred to as Ministry, is hereby reorganized, structurally and
functionally, in accordance with the provisions of this Executive Order.
SEC. 33. Bureau of Customs.
... Executive Order No. 39 dated 6 August 1986 which grants autonomy to the Commissioner of Customs in matters of appointment and
discipline of Customs personnel shall remain in effect.
SEC. 55. Abolition of Units Integral to Ministry. All units not included in the structural organization as herein provided and all
positions thereof are hereby deemed abolished. ... Their personnel shall be entitled to the benefits provided in the second paragraph of
Section 59 hereof.
SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall, in a
holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and
benefits unless in the meantime they are separated from government service pursuant to executive Order No. 17 (1986) or article III of
the Freedom Constitution.
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the ministry shall be approved and prescribed by the Minister within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive Order and the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular
appointments by him or by the President, as the case may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are
not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those separated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to
which they may be entitled under the existing laws, rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month
basic salary for every year of service or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of highest salary received,
but in no case shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months salary.
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ or preliminary junction or restraining order to enjoin the separation/replacement of
any officer or employee affected under this Executive Order.
Section 67 All laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive
Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
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xxx (Emphasis ours)

On 2 February 1987, the present Constitution took effect (De Leon, et al., vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987153 SCRA 602).
Reorganization in the Government service pursuant to Proclamation No. 3,supra, was provided for in its Section 16, Article XVIII entitled
Transitory Provisions, reading:
Section 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the
time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government or
in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Ms provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, has been accepted.
On 24 May 1987 the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander A. Padilla, transmitted to the Department of Finance for approval the proposed
"position structure and staffing pattern" of the Bureau of Customs. Said Department gave its imprimatur. Thereafter, the staffing pattern was
transmitted to and approved by the Department of Budget and Management on 7 September 1987 for implementation. Under the old staffing
pattern, there were 7,302 positions while under the new staffing pattern, there are 6,530 positions CSC Resolution in CSC Case No. 1, dated 20
September 1988, pp. 3-4).

On 22 September 1987, Salvador M. Mison assumed office as Commissioner of Customs.

On 2 October 1987 "Malacanang Memorandum Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders" was issued reading,
insofar as revelant to these cases, as follows:
It is my concern that ongoing process of government reorganization be conducted in a manner that is expeditious, as well as sensitive to
the dislocating consequences arising from specific personnel decisions.
The entire process of reorganization, and in particular the process of separation from service, must be carried out in the most humane
manner possible.
For this purpose, the following guidelines shall be strictly followed:
1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive Orders for each agency on reorganization shall
be:
a. informed of their reappointment or
b. offered another position in the same department/ agency or
c. informed of their termination.
2. In the event of an offer for a lower position, there will be no reduction in the salary.
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4. Each department/agency shall constitute a Reorganization Appeals Board at the central office, on or before
October 21, 1987, to review or reconsider appeals or complaints relative to reorganization. All cases submitted to
the Boards shall be resolved subject to the following guidelines:
a. publication or posting of the appeal procedure promulgated by the Department Secretary;
b. adherence to due process;
c. disposition within 30 days from submission of the case;
d written notification of the action taken and the grounds thereof.
Action by the Appeals Review Board does not preclude appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
5. Placement in the new staffing pattern of incumbent personnel shall be completed prior to the hiring of new
personnel, if any.
xxx

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xxx (Emphasis ours)

On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison wrote the President requesting a grace period until the end of February 1988 within which to
completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Executive Order No. 127 dated 30 January 1987. Said request was
granted in a letter-reply by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., dated 22 December 1987.
On 6 January 1988, within the extended period requested, Bureau of Customs Memorandum "Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders" was issued in the same tenor as the Malacanang Memorandum of 2 October 1987, providing inter alia:
To effectively implement the reorganization at the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the selection and placement of personnel, and
insure that the best qualified and most competent personnel in the career service are retained, the following guidelines are hereby
prescribed for the guidance of all concerned
1. By February 28, 1988 all employees covered by Executive Order No. 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of
Customs by the President of the Philippines on reorganization shall be:
a. informed of their reappointment, or
b. offered another position in the same department or agency or
c. informed of their termination.
2. In the event of termination, the employee shall:
a. be included in a consolidated list compiled by the Civil Service Commission. All departments who are recruiting
shall give preference to the employees in the list; and
b. continue to receive salary and benefits until February 28, 1988, and
c. be guaranteed the release of separation benefits within 45 days from termination and in no case later than June
15, 1988.
xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis supplied)

It is to be noted that paragraph 1 above and its sub-sections reproduced verbatim the Malacanang Guidelines of 2 October 1987 in that the
employees concerned were merely to be informed of their termination.
On 28 January 1988 Commissioner Mison addressed identical letters of termination to Bureau of Customs officers and employees effective on 28

February 1988.
As of 18 August 1988, Commissioner Mison appointed five hundred twenty-two (522) officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs (CSC
Resolution in CSC Case No. 1, dated 20 September 1988, p. 6). In fact, in a letter dated 27 January 1988, Commissioner Mison recommended
Jose M. Balde for appointment to President Aquino as one of three (3) Deputy Commissioners under Executive Order No. 127.
In the interim, during the pendency of these Petitions, Republic Act No. 6656, entitled "An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization" was passed by Congress on 9 June 1988. The President signed it
into law on 10 June 1988 and the statute took effect on 29 June 1988.
On 20 June 1988 Motions were filed, in these cases pending before this Court, invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 6656. The relevant
provisions thereof read:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to protect the security of tenure of civil service officers and employees in the
reorganization of the various agencies of the National government ....
SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing . A
valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or
there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed
by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in
the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency
concerned;
(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
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SECTION 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full
pay for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, including casuals and temporary
employees, who have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and
retirement and other benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or from the
date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That application for clearance has been filed and no
action thereon has been made by the corresponding department or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a
separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such separation pay and retirement
benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of the department or agency concerned.
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SECTION 11. The executive branch of the government shall implement reorganization schemes within a specified period of time
authorized by law.
In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and agencies which are authorized by executive orders
promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act within which to implement their
respective reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
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SECTION 13. All laws, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly. The rights and benefits under this Act shall be retroactive as of June 30, 1987.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
Given the foregoing statutory backdrop, the issues can now be addressed.
Scope of Section 16, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution
Crucial to the present controversy is the construction to be given to the abovementioned Constitutional provision (SECTION 16, for brevity),
which speaks of.
Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause
but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986
and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution ... (paragraphing supplied).
To our minds, SECTION 16 clearly recognizes (1) the reorganization authorized by Proclamation No. 3; (2) that such separation is
NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to said Proclamation; and (3) that the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 may be continued even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution during the transition period.

Separation NOT FOR CAUSE

The canon for the removal or suspension of a civil service officer or employee is that it must be FOR CAUSE. That means a guarantee of both
procedural and substantive due process. Basically, procedural due process would require that suspension or dismissal come only after notice and
hearing. Substantive due process would require that suspension or dismissal be 'for cause'." Bernas The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, First Edition, 1988, p. 334)
The guarantee of removal FOR CAUSE is enshrined in Article IX-B, Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution, which states that 'No officer or
employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except FOR CAUSE provided by law."
There can be no question then as to the meaning of the phrase FOR CAUSE. It simply means the observance of both procedural and substantive
due process in cases of removal of officers or employees of the civil service. When SECTION 16 speaks, therefore, of separation from the service
NOT FOR CAUSE, it can only mean the diametrical opposite. The constitutional intent to exempt the separation of civil service employees
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 from the operation of Article IX-B, Section 2(3), becomes readily apparent. A distinction is explicitly made
between removal FOR CAUSE, which as aforestated, requires due process, and dismissal NOT FOR CAUSE, which implies that the latter is not
bound by the "fetters' of due process.
It is obviously for that reason that Section 16 grants separation pay and retirement benefits to those separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of
the reorganization precisely to soften the impact of the non-observance of due process. "What is envisioned in Section 16 is not a remedy for
arbitrary removal of civil servants enjoying security of tenure but some form of relief for members of the career civil service who may have been
or may be legally but involuntarily 'reorganized out' of the service or may have voluntarily resigned pursuant to the reorganization policy" ( ibid.,
p. 615).
Reorganization Pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 to Continue Transitorily Even After Ratification
By its very context, SECTION 16 envisages the continuance of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 even after ratification of the
Constitution and during the transition period. The two [2] stages contemplated, namely, (1) the stage before and (2) after ratification, refer to the
same nature of separation "NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of Proclamation No. 3." No valid reason has been advanced for a different treatment
after ratification as the majority opines i.e., that separation NOT FOR CAUSE is allowed before ratification but that, thereafter, separation can
only be FOR CAUSE.
A fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to assure the realization of the purpose of the framers of the organic law and of the
people who adopted it.
That the reorganization commenced pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 was envisioned to continue even after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, at least transitorily, is evident from the intent of its authors discoverable from their deliberations held on 3 October 1986 and
evincing their awareness that such reorganization had not as yet been fully implemented. Thus:
Mr. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer, on lines 2 to 5 is the clause 'pursuant to the provisions of Article III of Proclamation No. 3, issued
on March 25, 1986, and the reorganization.' Are those words necessary? Can we not just say 'result of the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution'? In other words, must we make specific reference to Proclamation No. 3?
Mr. SUAREZ. Yes. I think the committee feels that is necessary, because in truth there has been a reorganization by virtue of
Proclamation No. 3. In other words, there are two stages of reorganization covered by this section.
Mr. PADILIA. I understand there is a reorganization committee headed by a minister?
Mr. SUAREZ. Philippine Commission on Government Reorganization.
Mr. PADILLA. But whether that has already been implemented or not, I do not believe in it. There has been a plan, but I do not think it
has been implemented. If we want to include any previous reorganization after or before the ratification, why do we not just say
reorganization before or after the ratification' to simplify the provision and eliminate two-and-a-half sentences that may not be
necessary? And as a result of the reorganization, if the committee feels there has been reorganization before ratification and there be
reorganization after, we just say 'before or after the ratification of this Constitution.
Mr. SUAREZ. Something like this as a result of the reorganization effected before or after the ratification of the Constitution on the
understanding, with the statement into the records, that this would be applicable to those reorganized out pursuant to the Freedom
Constitution also.
Mr. PADILLA. That is understood if there has been a reorganization before the ratification or a reorganization after the ratification."
(RECORDS of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 5, p. 416) (Emphasis provided)
It should also be recalled that the deadline for the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 was "one year from February 25, 1986" (Article III,
Section 2), or up to February 24, 1987. Executive Order No. 17 itself provided that the review/assessment of personnel be completed "not later
than February 24, 1987." But, confronted with the reality of the ratification of the Constitution before that deadline without reorganization having
been completed, there was need for a provision allowing for its continuance even after ratification and until completed. It was also to beat that
deadline that EO 127 and similar issuances, providing for the reorganization of departments of government, were all dated 30 January 1987 or
prior to the plebiscite held on 2 February 1987. The intent to continue and complete the reorganizations started is self- evident in SECTION 16.
In Jose vs. Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 78435, August 11, 1987), which was a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition to enjoin the implementation of
Executive Order No. 127, we recognized that the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 as mandated by SECTION 16, was to continue
even after ratification when we stated:
The contention of petitioner that EO No. 127 is violative of the provision of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing career civil service
employees security of tenure overlooks the provision of Section 16, Art. XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorizes the
removal of career civil service employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March

25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of the Constitution. By virtue of said provision, the reorganization of the
Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of this Constitution and career civil service
employees may be separated from the service without cause as a result of such reorganization. (Emphasis ours)
With due respect to the majority, we disagree with its conclusion that the foregoing pronouncement is mere "obiter dictum."
An obiter dictum or dictum has been defined as a remark or opinion uttered, by the way. It is a statement of the court concerning a
question which was not directly before it (In re Hess 23 A. 2d. 298, 301, 20 N.J. Misc. 12). It is language unnecessary to a decision, (a)
ruling on an issue not raised, or (an) opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and is
made without argument or full consideration of the point (Lawson v. US, 176 F2d 49, 51, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 167). It is an expression of
opinion by the court or judge on a collateral question not directly involved, (Crescent Ring Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. 132 A. 106,
107, 102 N.J. Law 85) or not necessary for the decision Du Bell v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 29, So. 2d 709, 712; 211 La. 167).
In the case at bar, however, directly involved and squarely before the Court was the issue of whether EO 127 violates Section 2(3) of Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution against removal of civil service employees except for cause." Petitioner batted for the affirmative of the proposition,
while respondents contended that "removal of civil service employees without cause is allowed not only under the Provisional Constitution but
also under the 1987 Constitution if the same is made pursuant to a reorganization after the ratification of the Constitution."
It may be that the Court dismissed that Petition for being premature, speculative and purely anticipatory" inasmuch as petitioner therein had "not
received any communication terminating or threatening to terminate his services." But that was only one consideration. The Court still proceeded
to decide all the issues adversatively contested by the parties, namely "1) that the expiration date of February 25, 1 987 fixed by Section 2 of
Proclamation No. 3 on which said Executive order is based had already lapsed; 2) that the Executive Order has not been published in the Official
Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 1 1 of the Revised Administrative Code; and 3) that its enforcement violates
Section 2(3) of Article IX B of the 1987 Constitution against removal of civil service employees except for cause."
The ruling of the Court, therefore, on the Constitutional issues presented, particularly, the lapse of the period mandated by Proclamation No. 3,
and the validity of EO 127, cannot be said to be mere "obiter." They were ultimate issues directly before the Court, expressly decided in the
course of the consideration of the case, so that any resolution thereon must be considered as authoritative precedent, and not a mere dictum (See
Valli v. US, 94 F2d 687 certiorari granted 58 S. Ct. 760, 303 U.S. 82 L. Ed. 1092; See also Weedin v. Tayokichi Yamada 4 F. (2d)
455).lwph1.t Such resolution would not lose its value as a precedent just because the disposition of the case was also made on some other
ground.
.....And this rule applies as to all pertinent questions although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular
course of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final conclusion (Northern Pac. Ry Co. v. Baker, D.C. Wash., 3 F. Suppl. 1;
See also Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. City of Beloit 254 NW 119; Chase v. American Cartage Co. 186 N.W. 598; City of Detroit,
et al. v. Public Utilities Comm. 286 N.W. 368). Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the
disposition of the case is made on some other ground. (Wagner v. Com Products Refining Co. D.C. N.J. 28 F 2d 617) Where a case
presents two or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points,
the case is an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having merely the status of a
dictum (See U.S. Title Insurance and Trust Co., Cal., 44 S. Ct. 621, 265 U.S. 472, 68 L. Ed. 1110; Van Dyke v. Parker 83 F. (2d) 35) and
one point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered.
(Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. U.S. 48 S. Ct. 194, 275 U.S. 331, 72 L. Ed. 303)"
It is true that in Palma-Fernandez vs. de la Paz (G.R. No. 78946, April 15, 1986, 160 SCRA 751), we had stated:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision (Section 26 of Executive Order No. 119, or the 'Reorganization Act of the Ministry of
Health'), petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a holdover capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a
position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the
Provisional Constitution), but advanced to 2 February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon, et al., vs. Hon.
Esguerra, et al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 602). After the d date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure
govern.
The factual situation in the two cases, however, radically differ. In the cited case, Dra. Palma-Fernandez, the petitioner, had already been extended
a permanent appointment as Assistant Director for Professional Services of the East Avenue Medical Center but was still being transferred by the
Medical Center Chief to the Research Office against her consent. Separation from the service as a result of reorganization was not involved. The
question then arose as to whether the latter official had the authority to transfer or whether the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers
and employees was lodged in the Secretary of Health. Related to that issue was the vital one of whether or not her transfer, effected on 29 May
1987, was tantamount to a removal without cause. Significant, too, is the fact that the transfer was basically made "in the interest of the service"
pursuant to Section 24(c) of PD No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree, and not because she was being reorganized out by virtue of EO 119 or the
"Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health," although the said Act was invoked after the fact. And so it was that SECTION 16 was never
mentioned, much less invoked in the Palma-Fernandez case.
Finally, on this point, it is inaccurate for the majority to state that there were no reorganization orders after ratification. There were, namely, EO
181 (Reorganization Act of the Civil Service Commission), June 1, 1987; EO 193 (Reorganization Act of the Office of Energy Affairs), June 10,
1987; EO 230 (Reorganization Act of NEDA), July 22, 1987; EO 262 (Reorganization Act of the Department of Local Government), July 25,
1987; EO 297 (Reorganization Act of the Office of the Press Secretary), July 25, 1987.
The Element of Good Faith
The majority concedes that reorganization can be undertaken provided it be in good faith but concludes that Commissioner Mison was not in good
faith.
The aforesaid conclusion is contradicted by the records.

Executive Order No. 127, dated 30 January 1987, specifically authorized the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs "structurally and
functionally" and provided for the abolition of all units and positions thereof not included in the structural organization S election 55).
As stated heretofore, it was the former Commissioner of Customs, Alexander A. Padilla who, on 24 May 1987, transmitted to the Department of
Finance for approval the proposed "position structure and staffing pattern" of the Bureau of Customs. This was approved by the Department of
Finance. Thereafter, it was transmitted to and approved by the Department of Budget and Management on 7 September 1987 for implementation.
Under the old staffing pattern, there were 7,302 positions while under the new staffing pattern, there are 6,530 positions.
On 2 October 1987 "Malacanang Memorandum Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders" provided:
By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:
a. informed of their reappointment, or
b. offered another position in the same department or agency, or
c. informed of their termination. (emphasis supplied)
On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison asked for and was granted by the President an extension up to February 1988 within which to
completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs.
On 6 January 1988, he issued Bureau of Customs Memorandum "Re Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders"
reiterating the above- quoted portion of the Malacanang Memorandum of 2 October 1987. Pursuant thereto, on 28 January 1988, Commissioner
Mison addressed uniform letters of termination to the employees listed on pages 15, 16 and 17 of the majority opinion, effective on 28 February
1988, within the extended period granted.
The records further show that upon Commissioner Mison's official inquiry, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordo;ez, rendered the following
Opinion:
. . . It is believed that customs employees who are reorganized out in the course of the implementation of E.O. No. 127 (reorganizing
the Department of Finance) need not be informed of the nature and cause of their separation from the service. It is enough that they be
'informed of their termination' pursuant to section 1(c) of the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 of President Aquino, which reads:
1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:
xxx

xxx

xxx

c) Informed of their terminations.

The constitutional mandate that 'no officer or employee of the civil service shall be renewed or suspended except for cause as provided
by law' (Sec. 2(4) (sic), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution) does not apply to employees who are separated from office as a result of
the reorganization of that Bureau as directed in Executive Order No. 127.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Regarding your (third) query, the issue as to the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 127 is set at rest, after the Supreme Court
resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari questioning its enforceability, for lack of merit (see Jose vs. Arroyo, et al., supra).
(Opinion No. 41, s. 1988, March 3, 1988) (Emphasis supplied)
The former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Celerina G. Gotladera likewise periodically consulted by Commissioner Mison, also
expressed the opinion that "it is not a prerequisite prior to the separation of an employee pursuant to reorganization that he be administratively
charged." (Annex 16, p. 411, Rollo, G.R. No. 85310)
Moreover, the records show that the final selection and placement of personnel was done by a Placement Committee, one of whose members is
the Head of the Civil Service Commission Field Office, namely, Mrs. Purificacion Cuerdo The appointment of employees made by Commissioner
Mison was based on the list approved by said Placement Committee.
But the majority further faults Mison for defying the President's directive to halt further layoffs as a consequence of reorganization, citing OP
Memo of 14 October 1987, reading:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that there will be no further layoffs this year of
personnel as a result of the government reorganization. (p. 45, Decision)
The foregoing, however, must be deemed superseded by later developments, namely, the grant to Commissioner Mison by the President on 22
December 1987 of a grace period until the end of February 1988 within which to completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs, which was, in fact, accomplished by 28 February 1988.
To further show lack of good faith, the majority states that Commissioner Mison failed to observe the procedure laid down by EO 17, supra,
directing inter alia that a notice of separation be issued to an employee to be terminated indicating therein the reason/s or ground/s for such
separation. That requirement, however, does not appear in Section 59 of EO 127, which provides on the contrary "that those incumbents whose
positions are not included in the new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated
from the service." The right granted by EO 17 to an employee to be informed of the ground for his separation must be deemed to have been
revoked by the repealing clause of EO 127 (Section 67) providing that "all laws, ordinances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this
Executive Order, are hereby repealed and modified accordingly."
Moreover, Section 11 of EO 17 explicitly excepts from its coverage a reorganization pursuant to EO 5. Thus
The Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those designated to replace them, presidential appointees, casual and

contractual employees, or officials and employees removed pursuant to desciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service law and rules,
and to those laid off as a result of reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No. 5. (Emphasis ours)
That EO 127 was issued pursuant to or in implementation of EO 5, is shown by its introductory portion reading:
Recalling that the reorganization of the government is mandated expressly by Article II, Section 1 (a) and Article III of the Freedom
Constitution;
Having in mind that pursuant to Executive order No. 5 (1986), it is directed that the necessary and proper changes in the organizational
and functional structures of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote efficiency and
effectiveness in the delivery of public service; (Italics supplied)
Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6656
The majority also relies on Republic Act No. 6656 entitled an "Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in
the Implementation of Government Reorganization," particularly Section 2 thereof, to test the good faith of Commissioner Mison.
We are of the view, however, that in providing for retroactivity in its Section 13, RA 6656 clashes frontally with SECTION 16.
1) SECTION 16 clearly recognizes that career service employees separated from the service by reason of the "complete reorganization of the
government" pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 may be separated NOT FOR CAUSE. And yet, RA 6656 requires the exact opposite separation
FOR CAUSE. It would not be remiss to quote the provision again:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid
cause for removal exist when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the
Civil Service law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where
there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where
an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those
less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department
or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal
violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. (Republic Act No. 6156)
The standards laid down are the "traditional" criteria for removal of employees from the career service, e.g. valid cause, due notice and hearing,
abolition of, or redundancy of offices. Proclamation No. 3, on the other hand, effectuates the "progressive" type of reorganization dictated by the
exigencies of the historical and political upheaval at the time. The "traditional" type is limited in scope. It is concerned with the individual
approach where the particular employee involved is charged administratively and where the requisites of notice and hearing have to be observed.
The "progressive" kind of reorganization, on the other hand, is the collective way. It is wider in scope, and is the reorganization contemplated
under SECTION 16.
2) By providing for reinstatement in its Section 9, RA 6656 adds a benefit not included in SECTION 16. The benefits granted by the latter
provision to employees separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a consequence of reorganization are "separation pay, retirement, and other benefits
accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation." The benefit of reinstatement is not included. RA
6656, however, allows reinstatement. That it cannot do because under SECTION 16, it is not one of the laws "in force at the time of their
separation."
The Constitution is the paramount law to which all laws must conform. It is from the Constitution that all statutes must derive their bearings. The
legislative authority of the State must yield to the expression of the sovereign will. No statutory enactment can disregard the Charter from which it
draws its own existence (Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 [1952]). But, that is exactly what RA
6656 does in providing for retroactivity it disregards and contravenes a Constitutional imperative. To save it, it should be applied and construed
prospectively and not retroactively notwithstanding its explicit provision. Then, and only then, would it make good law.
Effects of Reorganization
To be sure, the reorganization could effect the tenure of members of the career service as defined in Section 5, Article IV of Presidential Decree
No. 807, and may even result in the separation from the office of some meritorious employees. But even then, the greater good of the greatest
number and the right of the citizenry to a good government, and as they themselves have mandated through the vehicle of Proclamation No. 3,
provide the justification for the said injury to the individual. In terms of values, the interest of an employee to security of tenure must yield to the
interest of the entire populace and to an efficient and honest government.
But a reorganized employee is not without rights. His right lies in his past services, the entitlement to which must be provided for by law. EO 127
provides for the same in its Section 59, and so does SECTION 16 when the latter specified that career civil service employees separated from the
service not for cause:
shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for
employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing
policy, has been accepted.
This is a reward for the employee's past service to the Government. But this is all There is no vested property right to be reemployed in a
reorganized office.
The right to an office or to employment with government or any of its agencies is not a vested property right, and removal therefrom
will not support the question of due process" Yantsin v. Aberdeen, 54 Wash 2d 787, 345 P 2d 178). A civil service employee does not

have a constitutionally protected right to his position, which position is in the nature of a public office, political in character and held by
way of grant or privilege extended by government; generally he has been held to have no property right or vested interest to which due
process guaranties extend (See Taylor v. Beckham 178 U.S. 548, 44 L Ed. 1187; Angilly v. US CA2 NY 199 F 2d 642; People ex. rel.
Baker v. Wilson, 39 III App 2d 443, 189 NE 2d 1; Kelliheller v. NY State Civil Service Com 21 Misc 2d 1034, 194 NYS 2d 89).
To ensure, however, that no meritorious employee has been separated from the service, there would be no harm, in fact, it could do a lot of good,
if the Commissioner of Customs reviews the evaluation and placements he has so far made and sees to it that those terminated are included in a
consolidated list to be given preference by departments who are recruiting (Section 2[a], BOC Memorandum, January 6,1988).
Conclusion
Premises considered, and subject to the observation hereinabove made, it is our considered view that the separation from the service "NOT FOR
CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986" of the affected officers and employees of the
Bureau of Customs should be UPHELD, and the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission, dated 30 June 1988, 20 September 1988, and 16
November 1988 should be SET ASIDE for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
Republic Act No. 6656, in so far as it provides for retroactivity, should be declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being repugnant to the letter and
spirit of Section 16, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Feliciano, Regalado, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989
THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L, GUADIZ, JR.,Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
Branch 147: NCR (MAKATI), and KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT CO., INC.,respondents.
K. V. Faylona & Associates for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting"
activities in the country (per Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002), asks the Court to hold as null and void
two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 24, 1987 1 and May 20, 1988, 2 reversing its Decision, dated October 24, 1986. 3 The
Decision set aside an Order, dated April 16, 1985, of the Regional Trial Court, 4 as well as its Order, dated August 21, 1985. The Resolution,
dated September 24, 1987 disposed of, and granted, the private respondent Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc.'s motion for reconsideration of the
October 24, 1986 Decision; the Resolution dated May 20, 1988, in turn, denied the petitioner's own motion for reconsideration.
The facts are not in controversy. We quote:
On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force
hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force for purposes of convenience, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160
and 161 against the petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans
Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine
Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P.
Lucman Enterprises.
The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized
member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the
PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the application for the issuance of
the six (6) search warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all
dated March 12, 1985. 5
Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner below) went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the
search warrants in question. 6 On March 13, 1985, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order [effective "for a period of five (5) days
notice " 7 ] and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985.
In disposing of the petition, the said court found the material issues to be:
1) Competency of this Court to act on petition filed by the petitioners;
2) Validity of the search warrants issued by respondent State Prosecutor;
3) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic because all the search warrants sought to be quashed had
already been implemented and executed. 8
On April 16, 1985, the lower court issued the first of its challenged Orders, and held:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161
to be null and void. Accordingly, the respondents are hereby ordered to return and surrender immediately all the personal
properties and documents seized by them from the petitioners by virtue of the aforementioned search warrants.
SO ORDERED. 9
On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration.
On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the twin
Order(s) of the lower court.
In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court held:
Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under PD 1936 to prosecute foreign
exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883.
The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at bar
had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and void.
Besides as correctly pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General the decision of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force is appealable to the Office of the President.10
On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a reconsideration, on the question primarily of whether or not the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is "such other responsible officer' countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and seizure.
As we have indicated, the Court of Appeals, on Karamfil's motion, reversed itself and issued its Resolution, dated September 1987, and
subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that in so issuing the Resolution(s) above-mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals
"committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction," 11 specifically:
a) In deviating from the settled policy and rulings of the Supreme Court that no Regional Trial Courts may countermand or
restrain the enforcement of lawful writs or decrees issued by a quasi-judicial body of equal and coordinate rank, like the
PADS Task Force;
b) For resorting to judicial legislation to arrive at its erroneous basis for reconsidering its previous Decision dated October
24, 1986 (see Annex "I") and thus promulgated the questioned Resolutions (Annexes "A" and "B"), which violated the
constitutional doctrine on separation of powers;
c) In not resolving directly the other important issues raised by the petitioner in its Petition in CA-G.R. No. 08622-SP despite
the fact that petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently and convincingly that respondent RTC, in issuing the questioned Orders
in Special Proceeding No. M-624 (see Annexes "C" and 'D"), committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of
jurisdiction:
1. In ruling that (a) the description of the things to be seized as stated in the contested search warrant were too general which
allegedly render the search warrants null and void; (b) the applications for the contested search warrants actually charged two
offenses in contravention of the 2nd paragraph, Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; and (c) this case has not become
moot and academic, even if the contested search warrants had already been fully implemented with positive results; and
2. In ruling that the petitioner PADS Task Force has not been granted under PD 1936 'judicial or quasi-judicial
jurisdiction. 12
We find, upon the foregoing facts, that the essential questions that confront us are- (i) is the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a quasijudicial body, and one co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction; and (ii) may
the said presidential body be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" to issue search warrants under the 1973
Constitution questions we take up seriatim.**
In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states that it is endowed with "express powers and functions under PD No. 1936, to
prosecute foreign exchange violations as defined and punished under PD No. 1883." 13 "By the very nature of its express powers as conferred by
the laws," so it is contended, "which are decidedly quasi-judicial or discretionary function, such as to conduct preliminary investigation on the
charges of foreign exchange violations, issue search warrants or warrants of arrest, hold departure orders, among others, and depending upon the
evidence presented, to dismiss the charges or to file the corresponding information in court of Executive Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations effective August 26, 1984), petitioner exercises quasi-judicial power or the power of adjudication ." 14
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution now assailed, 15 was of the opinion that "[t]he grant of quasi-judicial powers to petitioner did not
diminish the regular courts' judicial power of interpretation. The right to interpret a law and, if necessary to declare one unconstitutional,
exclusively pertains to the judiciary. In assuming this function, courts do not proceed on the theory that the judiciary is superior to the two other
coordinate branches of the government, but solely on the theory that they are required to declare the law in every case which come before
them." 16
This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the petitioner puts to question is the Regional Trial Court's act of assuming
jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition below and its subsequent countermand of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's
orders of search and seizure, for the reason that the presidential body, as an entity (allegedly) coordinate and co-equal with the Regional Trial
Court, was (is) not vested with such a jurisdiction. An examination of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's petition shows indeed its
recognition of judicial review (of the acts of Government) as a basic privilege of the courts. Its objection, precisely, is whether it is the Regional
Trial Court, or the superior courts, that may undertake such a review.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 17 the Court of Appeals exercises:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Court
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. 18
xxx xxx xxx
Under the present Constitution, with respect to its provisions on Constitutional Commissions, it is provided, in part that:
... Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. 19
On the other hand, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction:
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. 20
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise:
... The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to handle exclusively criminal cases,
juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian case, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasijudicial bodies and agencies and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy
and efficient administration of justice. 21
xxx xxx xxx
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983: 22
... The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court [now, Court of Appeals] from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be
governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg.
129. 23
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appeals from specified agencies. Any provision of existing law or Rule of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, decision, or judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations;
the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage
Law"; the Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the
"Industrial Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Social Security
Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to
the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact,
mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. From final judgments or decisions of the
Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. 24
Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts, 25 jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has to be,
consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes. Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations
Commission are final and executory, but, nevertheless, 'reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal." 26
Under the Property Registration Decree, decisions of the Commission of Land Registration, en consults, are appealable to the Court of
Appeals. 27
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate Court, 28 and so are decisions of the Social
Security Commission.29
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that such
bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial body, and
one whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts, other than the higher tribunals the Court of Appeals and this Court.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule making." 30 The most common types of such bodies have been listed as follows:
(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege,
like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans
Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like
the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the
Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines.
(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public, like
the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National

Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public
interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.
(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private
business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for
Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of
some strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the
Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors
Bureau. 31
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably
appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not
meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to
combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, 32 it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the
prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. We quote:
SECTION 1. Powers of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force.-The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force,
hereinafter referred to as Task Force, shall have the following powers and authority:
a) Motu proprio or upon complaint, to investigate and prosecute all dollar salting activities, including the overvaluation of
imports and the undervaluation of exports;
b) To administer oaths, summon persons or issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the
production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statements of accounts, agreements, and other as may be necessary in
the conduct of investigation;
c) To appoint or designate experts, consultants, state prosecutors or fiscals, investigators and hearing officers to assist the
Task Force in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities; gather data, information or documents; conduct hearings,
receive evidence, both oral and documentary, in all cases involving violation of foreign exchange laws or regulations; and
submit reports containing findings and recommendations for consideration of appropriate authorities;
d) To punish direct and indirect contempts with the appropriate penalties therefor under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and to
adopt such measures and take such actions as may be necessary to implement this Decree.
xxx xxx xxx
f. After due investigation but prior to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges with the fiscal's office or the courts as the
case may be, to impose a fine and/or administrative sanctions as the circumstances warrant, upon any person found
committing or to have committed acts constituting blackmarketing or salting abroad of foreign exchange, provided said
person voluntarily admits the facts and circumstances constituting the offense and presents proof that the foreign exchange
retained abroad has already been brought into the country.
Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted against said person before any other judicial regulatory or
administrative body for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1883.
The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman of the Presidential Anti- Dollar Salting Task Force and paid in
Pesos taking into consideration the amount of foreign exchange retained abroad, the exchange rate differentials, uncollected
taxes and duties thereon, undeclared profits, interest rates and such other relevant factors.
The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain Twenty percent (20 %) thereof. The informer, if any, shall be
entitled to Twenty percent (20 %) of the fine. Should there be no informer, the Task Force shall be entitle to retain Forty
percent (40 %) of the fine and the balance shall accrue to the general funds of the National government. The amount of the
fine to be retained by the Task Force shall form part of its Confidential Fund and be utilized for the operations of the Task
Force . 33
The Court sees nothing in the aforequoted provisions (except with respect to the Task Force's powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a
legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree No. 1883. Its
undertaking, as we said, is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court,
meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate authorities". It is not unlike a
fiscal's office that conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether or not prima facie evidence exists to justify haling the respondent to
court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court. For it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment
on the accused, not the fiscal.
It is not unlike the Presidential Commission on Good Government either, the executive body appointed to investigate and prosecute cases
involving "ill-gotten wealth". It had been vested with enormous powers, like the issuance of writs of sequestration, freeze orders, and similar
processes, but that did not, on account thereof alone, make it a quasi-judicial entity as defined by recognized authorities. It cannot pronounce
judgement of the accused's culpability, the jurisdiction to do which is exclusive upon the Sandiganbayan. 34
If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the
Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.

In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal's resolution sustaining the assumption of jurisdiction by the court a quo.
It will not do to say that the fact that the Presidential Task Force has been empowered to issue warrants of arrest, search, and seizure, makes
it, ergo, a "semi-court". Precisely, it is the objection interposed by the private respondent, whether or not it can under the 1973 Charter, issue such
kinds of processes.
It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are exclusive upon judges. 35 To that extent, the case has
become moot and academic. Nevertheless, since the question has been specifically put to the Court, we find it unavoidable to resolve it as the
final arbiter of legal controversies, pursuant to the provisions of the 1973 Constitution during whose regime the case was commenced.
Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and until it was so unceremoniously discarded in 1986, its provisions conferring the power to
issue arrest and search warrants upon an officer, other than a judge, by fiat of legislation have been at best controversial. In Lim v. Ponce de
Leon, 36 a 1975 decision, this Court ruled that a fiscal has no authority to issue search warrants, but held in the same vein that, by virtue of the
responsible officer" clause of the 1973 Bill of Rights, "any lawful officer authorized by law can issue a search warrant or warrant of
arrest.37 Authorities, however, have continued to express reservations whether or not fiscals may, by statute, be given such a power. 38
Less than a year later, we promulgated Collector of Customs v. Villaluz, 39 in which we categorically averred: Until now only the judge can issue
the warrant of arrest." 40 "No law or presidential decree has been enacted or promulgated vesting the same authority in a particular responsible
officer ." 41
Apparently, Villaluz had settled the debate, but the same question persisted following this Courts subsequent rulings upholding the President's
alleged emergency arrest powers .42 [Mr. Justice Hugo Gutierrez would hold, however, that a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is (was) not
a species of "arrest" in its technical sense, and that the (deposed) Chief Executive, in issuing one, does not do so in his capacity as a "responsible
officer" under the 1973 Charter, but rather, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in times of emergency, or in order to carry out the
deportation of undesirable aliens.43 In the distinguished Justice's opinion then, these are acts that can be done without need of judicial
intervention because they are not, precisely, judicial but Presidential actions.]
In Ponsica v. Ignalaga,44 however, we held that the mayor has been made a "responsible officer' by the Local Government Code, 45 but had
ceased to be one with the approval of the 1987 Constitution according judges sole authority to issue arrest and search warrants. But in the same
breath, we did not rule the grant under the Code unconstitutional based on the provisions of the former Constitution. We were agreed, though, that
the "responsible officer" referred to by the fundamental law should be one capable of approximating "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 46
In striking down Presidential Decree No. 1936 the respondent Court relied on American jurisprudence, notably, Katz v. United States, 47 Johnson
v. United States, 48 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire 49 in which the American Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors (like the petitioner) cannot
be given such powers because of their incapacity for a "detached scrutiny" 50 of the cases before them. We affirm the Appellate Court.
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it
cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a
magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to
secure the conviction of the person accused," 51 he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search
warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to
that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.
It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible officer" to whom the authority to issue arrest and search warrants may
be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that
the Charter itself makes the qualification that the officer himself must be "responsible". We are not saying, of course, that the Presidential AntiDollar Salting Task Force (or any similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible in discharging its duty. Rather, we take "responsibility", as used
by the Constitution, to mean not only skill and competence but more significantly, neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality
presumed of a judicial officer. A prosecutor can in no manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities.
According to the Court of Appeals, the implied exclusion of prosecutors under the 1973 Constitution was founded on the requirements of due
process, notably, the assurance to the respondent of an unbiased inquiry of the charges against him prior to the arrest of his person or seizure of his
property. We add that the exclusion is also demanded by the principle of separation of powers on which our republican structure rests. Prosecutors
exercise essentially an executive function (the petitioner itself is chaired by the Minister, now Secretary, of Trade and Industry), since under the
Constitution, the President has pledged to execute the laws. 52 As such, they cannot be made to issue judicial processes without unlawfully
impinging the prerogative of the courts.
At any rate, Ponsica v. Ignalaga should foreclose all questions on the matter, although the Court hopes that this disposition has clarified a
controversy that had generated often bitter debates and bickerings.
The Court joins the Government in its campaign against the scourge of "dollar- salting", a pernicious practice that has substantially drained the
nation's coffers and has seriously threatened its economy. We recognize the menace it has posed (and continues to pose) unto the very stability of
the country, the urgency for tough measures designed to contain if not eradicate it, and foremost, the need for cooperation from the citizenry in an
all-out campaign. But while we support the State's efforts, we do so not at the expense of fundamental rights and liberties and constitutional
safeguards against arbitrary and unreasonable acts of Government. If in the event that as a result of this ruling, we prove to be an "obstacle" to the
vital endeavour of stamping out the blackmarketing of valuable foreign exchange, we do not relish it and certainly, do not mean it. The
Constitution simply does not leave us much choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Cruz, Feliciano and Cortes, JJ. concur in the result.
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

THIRD DIVISION
G. R. No. 174350

August 13, 2008

SPOUSES BERNYL BALANGAUAN & KATHERENE BALANGAUAN, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL NINETEENTH (19 TH) DIVISION, CEBU CITY & THE HONGKONG AND
SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, LTD., respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the 28 April 2006 Decision1 and 29 June
2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00068, which annulled and set aside the 6 April 20043 and 30
August 20044 Resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in I.S. No. 02-9230-I, entitled "The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation v. Katherine Balangauan, et al." The twin resolutions of the DOJ affirmed, in essence, the Resolution of the Office of the
City Prosecutor,5 Cebu City, which dismissed for lack of probable cause the criminal complaint for Estafa and/or Qualified Estafa,
filed against petitioner-Spouses Bernyl Balangauan (Bernyl) and Katherene Balangauan (Katherene) by respondent Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. (HSBC).
In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene urge this Court to "reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, Special nineteenth (sic) [19 th] division (sic), Cebu City (sic) and accordingly, dismiss the complaint against the [petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene] in view of the absence of probable cause to warrant the filing of an information before the Court and for utter
lack of merit."6
As culled from the records, the antecedents of the present case are as follows:
Petitioner Katherene was a Premier Customer Services Representative (PCSR) of respondent bank, HSBC. As a PCSR, she
managed the accounts of HSBC depositors with Premier Status. One such client and/or depositor handled by her was Roger
Dwayne York (York).
York maintained several accounts with respondent HSBC. Sometime in April 2002, he went to respondent HSBCs Cebu Branch to
transact with petitioner Katherene respecting his Dollar and Peso Accounts. Petitioner Katherene being on vacation at the time, York
was attended to by another PCSR. While at the bank, York inquired about the status of his time deposit in the amount
of P2,500,000.00. The PCSR representative who attended to him, however, could not find any record of said placement in the banks
data base.
York adamantly insisted, though, that through petitioner Katherene, he made a placement of the aforementioned amount in a higherearning time deposit. York further elaborated that petitioner Katherene explained to him that the alleged higher-earning time deposit
scheme was supposedly being offered to Premier clients only. Upon further scrutiny and examination, respondent HSBCs bank
personnel discovered that: (1) on 18 January 2002, York pre-terminated a P1,000,000.00 time deposit; (2) there were cash
movement tickets and withdrawal slips all signed by York for the amount of P1,000,000.00; and (3) there were regular movements in
Yorks accounts, i.e., beginning in the month of January 2002, monthly deposits in the amount of P12,500.00 and P8,333.33 were
made, which York denied ever making, but surmised were the regular interest earnings from the placement of the P2,500,000.00.
It was likewise discovered that the above-mentioned deposits were transacted using petitioner Katherenes computer and work
station using the code or personal password "CEO8." The significance of code "CEO8," according to the bank personnel of
respondent HSBC, is that, "[i]t is only Ms. Balangauan who can transact from [the] computer in the work station CEO-8, as she is
provided with a swipe card which she keeps sole custody of and only she can use, and which she utilizes for purposes of performing
bank transactions from that computer."7
Bank personnel of respondent HSBC likewise recounted in their affidavits that prior to the filing of the complaint for estafa and/or
qualified estafa, they were in contact with petitioners Bernyl and Katherene. Petitioner Bernyl supposedly met with them on two
occasions. At first he disavowed any knowledge regarding the whereabouts of Yorks money but later on admitted that he knew that
his wife invested the funds with Shell Company. He likewise admitted that he made the phone banking deposit to credit Yorks
account with the P12,500.00 and the P8,333.33 using their landline telephone. With respect to petitioner Katherene, she allegedly
spoke to the bank personnel and York on several occasions and admitted that the funds were indeed invested with Shell Company
but that York knew about this.
So as not to ruin its name and goodwill among its clients, respondent HSBC reimbursed York theP2,500,000.00.
Based on the foregoing factual circumstances, respondent HSBC, through its personnel, filed a criminal complaint for Estafa and/or
Qualified Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cebu City.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene submitted their joint counter-affidavit basically denying the allegations contained in the affidavits of
the aforenamed employees of respondent HSBC as well as that made by York. They argued that the allegations in the ComplaintAffidavits were pure fabrications. Specifically, petitioner Katherene denied 1) having spoken on the telephone with Dy and York; and
2) having admitted to the personnel of respondent HSBC and York that she took the P2,500,000.00 of York and invested the same

with Shell Corporation. Petitioner Bernyl similarly denied 1) having met with Dy, Iigo, Cortes and Arcuri; and 2) having admitted to
them that York knew about petitioner Katherenes move of investing the formers money with Shell Corporation.
Respecting the P12,500.00 and P8,333.33 regular monthly deposits to Yorks account made using the code "CEO8," petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene, in their defense, argued that since it was a deposit, it was her duty to accept the funds for deposit. As regards
Yorks time deposit with respondent HSBC, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene insisted that the funds therein were never entrusted to
Katherene in the latters capacity as PCSR Employee of the former because monies deposited "at any bank would not and will not
be entrusted to specific bank employee but to the bank as a whole."
Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Victor C. Laborte, Prosecutor II of the OCP, Cebu
City, in a Resolution8 dated 21 February 2003, found no probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial
for the criminal complaint of estafa and/or qualified estafa, particularly Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the ACP
recommended the dismissal of respondent HSBCs complaint.
The ACP explained his finding, viz:
As in any other cases, we may never know the ultimate truth of this controversy. But on balance, the evidence on record
tend to be supportive of respondents contention rather than that of complaint.
xxxx
First of all, it is well to dwell on what Mr. York said in his affidavit. Thus:
`18. For purposes of opening these two time deposits (sic) accounts, Ms. Balangauan asked me to sign several
Bank documents on several occasions, the nature of which I was unfamiliar with.
`20. I discovered later that these were withdrawal slips and cash movement tickets, with which documents Ms.
Balangauan apparently was able to withdraw the amount from my accounts, and take the same from the
premises of the Bank.
In determining the credibility of an evidence, it is well to consider the probability or improbability of ones statements for it
has been said that there is no test of the truth of human testimony except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and
experience.
Mr. York could not have been that unwary and unknowingly innocent to claim unfamiliarity with withdrawal slips and cash
movement tickets which Ms. Balangauan made him to sign on several occasions. He is a premier client of HSBC
maintaining an account in millions of pesos. A withdrawal slip and cash movement tickets could not have had such intricate
wordings or terminology so as to render them non-understandable even to an ordinary account holder. Mr. York admittedly
is a long-standing client of the bank. Within the period of long-standing he certainly must have effected some withdrawals.
It goes without saying therefore that the occasions that Ms. Balangauan caused him to sign withdrawal slips are not his first
encounter with such kinds of documents.
The one ineluctable conclusion therefore that can be drawn from the premises is that Mr. York freely and knowingly knew
what was going on with his money, who has in possession of them and where it was invested. These take out the elements
of deceit, fraud, abuse of confidence and without the owners consent in the crimes charged.
The other leg on which complainants cause of action stands rest on its claim for sum of money against respondents
allegedly after it reimbursed Mr. York for his missing account supposedly taken/withdrawn by Ms. Balangauan. The banks
action against respondents would be a civil suit against them which apparently it already did after the bank steps into the
shoes of Mr. York and becomes the creditor of Ms. Balangauan.9
The ACP then concluded that:
By and large, the evidence on record do (sic) not engender enough bases to establish a probable cause against
respondents.10
On 1 July 2003, respondent HSBC appealed the above-quoted resolution and foregoing comment to the Secretary of the DOJ by
means of a Petition for Review.
In a Resolution dated 6 April 2004, the Chief State Prosecutor, Jovencito R. Zuo, for the Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the
petition. In denying respondent HSBCs recourse, the Chief State Prosecutor held that:
Sec. 12 (c) of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 2, 2000 provides that the Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio,
dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned resolution.
We carefully examined the petition and its attachments and found no reversible error that would justify a reversal of the
assailed resolution which is in accord with the law and evidence on the matter.
Respondent HSBCs Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality by the DOJ in a lengthier Resolution dated 30
August 2004.
The DOJ justified its ruling in this wise:
A perusal of the motion reveals no new matter or argument which was not taken into consideration in our review of the
case. Hence, we find no cogent reason to reconsider our resolution. Appellant failed to present any iota of evidence directly
showing that respondent Katherene Balangauan took the money and invested it somewhere else. All it tried to establish

was that Katherene unlawfully took the money and fraudulently invested it somewhere else x x x, because after the
withdrawals were made, the money never reached Roger York as appellant adopted hook, line and sinker the latters
declaration, despite Yorks signatures on the withdrawal slips covering the total amount of P2,500,000.00 x x x. While
appellant has every reason to suspect Katherene for the loss of the P2,500,000.00 as per Yorks bank statements, the cash
deposits were identified by the numerals "CEO8" and it was only Katherene who could transact from the computer in the
work station CEO-8, plus alleged photographs showing Katherene "leaving her office at 5:28 p.m. with a bulky plastic bag
presumably containing cash" since a portion of the funds was withdrawn, we do not, however, dwell on possibilities,
suspicion and speculation. We rule based on hard facts and solid evidence.
Moreover, an examination of the petition for review reveals that appellant failed to append thereto all annexes to
respondents urgent manifestations x x x together with supplementalaffidavits of Melanie de Ocampo and Rex B. Balucan x
x x, which are pertinent documents required under Section 5 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000. 11
Respondent HSBC then went to the Court of Appeals by means of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
On 28 April 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision granting respondent HSBCs petition, thereby annulling and setting
aside the twin resolutions of the DOJ.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this
case. The assailed Resolutions dated April 6, 2004 and August 30, 2004 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The City Prosecutor of Cebu City is hereby ORDERED to file the appropriate Information against the private
respondents.12
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherenes motion for reconsideration proved futile, as it was denied by the appellate court in
a Resolution dated 29 June 2006.
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene filed the present petition on the argument that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in reversing and setting aside the resolutions of the DOJ when: (1) "[i]t reversed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice,
Manila dated August 30, 2004 and correspondingly, gave due course to the Petition for Certiorari filed by HSBC on April 28, 2006
despite want of probable cause to warrant the filing of an information against the herein petitioners" 13; (2) "[i]t appreciated the
dubious evidence adduced by HSBC albeit the absence of legal standing or personality of the latter" 14; (3) "[i]t denied the motions
for reconsideration on June 29, 2006 notwithstanding the glaring evidence proving the innocence of the petitioners" 15; (4) "[i]t
rebuffed the evidence of the herein petitioners in spite of the fact that, examining such evidence alone would establish that the
money in question was already withdrawn by Mr. Roger Dwayne York" 16; and (5) "[i]t failed to dismiss outright the petition by HSBC
considering that the required affidavit of service was not made part or attached in the said petition pursuant to Section 13, Rule 13 in
relation to Section 3, Rule 46, and Section 2, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court." 17
Required to comment on the petition, respondent HSBC remarked that the filing of the present petition is improper and should be
dismissed. It argued that the correct remedy is an appeal by certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, on the other hand, asserted in their Reply18 that the petition filed under Rule 65 was rightfully filed
considering that not only questions of law were raised but questions of fact and error of jurisdiction as well. They insist that the Court
of Appeals "clearly usurped into the jurisdiction and authority of the Public Prosecutor/Secretary of justice (sic) x x x." 19
Given the foregoing arguments, there is need to address, first, the issue of the mode of appeal resorted to by petitioners Bernyl and
Katherene. The present petition is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Notice that what is being assailed
in this recourse is the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 28 April 2006 and 29 June 2006, respectively. The
Revised Rules of Court, particularly Rule 45 thereof, specifically provides that an appeal by certiorari from the judgments or final
orders or resolutions of the appellate court is by verified petition for review oncertiorari.20
In the present case, there is no question that the 28 April 2006 Decision and 29 June 2006 Resolutionof the Court of Appeals
granting the respondent HSBCs petition in CA-G.R. CEB. SP No. 00068 is already a disposition on the merits. Therefore, both
decision and resolution, issued by the Court of Appeals, are in the nature of a final disposition of the case set before it, and which,
under Rule 45, are appealable to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, viz:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order
or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is elementary in remedial law that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to an aggrieved party. A
remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioners from the injurious effects of the judgment
and the acts of the lower court or agency.21 In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate
remedy.22 And while it is true that in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial
justice,23 this Court has, before,24 treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly if the petition

for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari;25 this exception is not
applicable to the present factual milieu.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Time for filing; extension. The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time
after notice of the judgment. x x x.
a party litigant wishing to file a petition for review on certiorari must do so within 15 days from receipt of the judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be appealed. In this case, petitioners Bernyl and Katherenes motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts
Resolution was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 29 June 2006, a copy of which was received by petitioners on
4 July 2006. The present petition was filed on 1 September 2006; thus, at the time of the filing of said petition, 59 days had elapsed,
way beyond the 15-day period within which to file a petition for review under Rule 45, and even beyond an extended period of 30
days, the maximum period for extension allowed by the rules had petitioners sought to move for such extra time. As the facts stand,
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene had lost the right to appeal via Rule 45.
Be that as it may, alternatively, if the decision of the appellate court is attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, then such ruling is fatally defective on jurisdictional ground and may be questioned even after the lapse of the
period of appeal under Rule 4526 but still within the period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates and contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. 27 The word "capricious,"
usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the
corrective hand ofcertiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative. 28
In reversing and setting aside the resolutions of the DOJ, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene contend that the Court of Appeals acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals, when it resolved to grant the petition in CA-G.R. CEB. SP No. 00068, did so on two grounds, i.e., 1) that "the
public respondent (DOJ) gravely abused his discretion in finding that there was no reversible error on the part of the Cebu City
Prosecutor dismissing the case against the private respondent without stating the facts and the law upon which this conclusion was
made"29; and 2) that "the public respondent (DOJ) made reference to the facts and circumstances of the case leading to his finding
that no probable cause exists, x x x (the) very facts and circumstances (which) show that there exists a probable cause to believe
that indeed the private respondents committed the crimes x x x charged against them." 30
It explained that:
In refusing to file the appropriate information against the private respondents because he does not dwell on possibilities,
suspicion and speculation and that he rules based on hard facts and solid evidence, (sic) the public respondent exceeded
his authority and gravely abused his discretion. It must be remembered that a finding of probable cause does not require
an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. The term does not mean actual or positive cause; (sic) nor does
it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. [Citation omitted.] A trial is there precisely
for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
In this case, the petitioner had amply established that it has a prima facie case against the private respondents. As
observed by the public respondent in his second assailed resolution, petitioner was able to present photographs of private
respondent Ms. Balangauan leaving her office carrying a bulky plastic bag. There was also the fact that the transactions in
Mr. Yorks account used the code CEO8 which presumably point to the private respondent Ms. Balangauan as the author
thereof for she is the one assigned to such work station.
Furthermore, petitioner was able to establish that it was Ms. Balangauan who handled Mr. Yorks account and she was the
one authorized to make the placement of the sum of P2,500,000.00. Since said sum is nowhere to be found in the records
of the bank, then, apparently, Ms. Balangauan must be made to account for the same. 31
The appellate court then concluded that:
These facts engender a well-founded belief that that (sic) a crime has been committed and that the private respondents are
probably guilty thereof. In refusing to file the corresponding information against the private respondents despite the
presence of the circumstances making out a prima facie case against them, the public respondent gravely abused his
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.32
The Court of Appeals found fault in the DOJs failure to identify and discuss the issues raised by the respondent HSBC in its Petition
for Review filed therewith. And, in support thereof, respondent HSBC maintains that it is incorrect to argue that "it was not necessary
for the Secretary of Justice to have his resolution recite the facts and the law on which it was based," because courts and quasijudicial bodies should faithfully comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that decisions rendered by them
should state clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on which the decision is based. 33

Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, joined by the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, defends the DOJ and assert that
the questioned resolution was complete in that it stated the legal basis for denying respondent HSBCs petition for review "that
(after) an examination (of) the petition and its attachment [it] found no reversible error that would justify a reversal of the assailed
resolution which is in accord with the law and evidence on the matter."
It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable
cause. In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,34 this Court held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus:
[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass
judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases35 describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this
is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers
akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. 36 A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court
and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. 37 A quasi-judicial
agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same
effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine
probable cause to file an Information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing
the formers order or resolutions. In this case, since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
finds no application. Be that as it may, the DOJ rectified the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it
resolved respondent HSBCs motion for reconsideration.
Anent the substantial merit of the case, whether or not the Court of Appeals decision and resolution are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion in finding probable cause, this Court finds the petition dismissible.
The Court of Appeals cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
reversing and setting aside the resolutions of the DOJ. In the resolutions of the DOJ, it affirmed the recommendation of ACP Laborte
that no probable cause existed to warrant the filing in court of an Information for estafa and/or qualified estafa against petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene. It was the reasoning of the DOJ that "[w]hile appellant has every reason to suspect Katherene for the loss of
the P2,500,000.00 as per Yorks bank statements, the cash deposits were identified by the numerals CEO8 and it was only
Katherene who could transact from the computer in the work station CEO-8, plus alleged photographs showing Katherene leaving
her office at 5:28 p.m. with a bulky plastic bag presumably containing cash since a portion of the funds was withdrawn, we do not,
however, dwell on possibilities, suspicion and speculation. We rule based on hard facts and solid evidence." 38
We do not agree.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.39 A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. 40
The executive department of the government is accountable for the prosecution of crimes, its principal obligation being the faithful
execution of the laws of the land. A necessary component of the power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their
violators,41 the responsibility for which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence, the determination of whether or not probable cause exists to
warrant the prosecution in court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the nature of his office, a public
prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up
the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion.
But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the
investigating prosecutor has erroneously exercised the discretion lodged in him by law. This, however, does not render his act
amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.42
And while it is this Courts general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers
sufficient discretion to determine probable cause,43 we have nonetheless made some exceptions to the general rule, such as when
the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority, 44 resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. Although there is no general
formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause, since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination,
such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge (public prosecutor) or run counter to the clear dictates of reason. 45
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of DOJ for affirming the dismissal of the criminal complaints
for estafa and/or qualified estafa are determinative of whether or not it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In requiring "hard facts and solid evidence" as the basis for a finding of probable cause to hold petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial for the crime complained of, the DOJ disregards the definition of probable cause that it is
a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as

would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. 46 The
term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. 47 It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief;48 that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. While probable cause
demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify conviction." Herein, the DOJ reasoned as if
no evidence was actually presented by respondent HSBC when in fact the records of the case were teeming; or it discounted the
value of such substantiation when in fact the evidence presented was adequate to excite in a reasonable mind the probability that
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene committed the crime/s complained of. In so doing, the DOJ whimsically and capriciously exercised
its discretion, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, which rendered its resolutions amenable to correction and annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
From the records of the case, it is clear that a prima facie case for estafa/qualified estafa exists against petitioners Bernyl and
Katherene. A perusal of the records, i.e., the affidavits of respondent HSBCs witnesses, the documentary evidence presented, as
well as the analysis of the factual milieu of the case, leads this Court to agree with the Court of Appeals that, taken together, they are
enough to excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, that the Spouses Bernyl Balangauan and Katherene Balangauan are guilty of the
crime complained of. Whether or not they will be convicted by a trial court based on the same evidence is not a consideration. It is
enough that acts or omissions complained of by respondent HSBC constitute the crime of estafa and/or qualified estafa.
Collectively, the photographs of petitioner Katherene leaving the premises of respondent HSBC carrying a bulky plastic bag and the
affidavits of respondent HSBCs witnesses sufficiently establish acts adequate to constitute the crime of estafa and/or qualified
estafa. What the affidavits bear out are the following: that York was a Premier Client of respondent HSBC; that petitioner Katherene
handled all the accounts of York; that not one of Yorks accounts reflect the P2,500,000.00 allegedly deposited in a higher yielding
account; that prior to the discovery of her alleged acts and omissions, petitioner Katherene supposedly persuaded York to invest in a
"new product" of respondent HSBC, i.e., a higher interest yielding time deposit; that York made a total of P2,500,000.00 investment
in the "new product" by authorizing petitioner Balangauan to transfer said funds to it; that petitioner Katherene supposedly asked
York to sign several transaction documents in order to transfer the funds to the "new product"; that said documents turned out to be
withdrawal slips and cash movement tickets; that at no time did York receive the cash as a result of signing the documents that
turned out to be withdrawal slips/cash movement tickets; that Yorks account was regularly credited "loose change" in the amounts
ofP12,500.00 and P8,333.33 beginning in the month after the alleged "transfer" of Yorks funds to the "new product"; that the regular
deposits of loose change were transacted with the use of petitioner Katherenes work terminal accessed by her password "CEO8";
that the "CEO8" password was keyed in with the use of a swipe card always in the possession of petitioner Katherene; that one of
the loose-change deposits was transacted via the phone banking feature of respondent HSBC and that when traced, the phone
number used was the landline number of the house of petitioners Bernyl and Katherene; that respondent HSBCs bank personnel,
as well as York, supposedly a) talked with petitioner Katherene on the phone, and that she allegedly admitted that the missing funds
were invested with Shell Company, of which York approved, and that it was only for one year; and b) met with petitioner Bernyl, and
that the latter at first denied having knowledge of his wifes complicity, but later on admitted that he knew of the investment with Shell
Company, and that he supposedly made the loose-change deposit via phone banking; that after 23 April 2002, York was told that
respondent HSBC had no "new product" or that it was promoting investment with Shell Company; that York denied having any
knowledge that his money was invested outside of respondent HSBC; and that petitioner Katherene would not have been able to
facilitate the alleged acts or omissions without taking advantage of her position or office, as a consequence of which, HSBC had to
reimburse York the missing P2,500,000.00.
From the above, the alleged circumstances of the case at bar make up the elements of abuse of confidence, deceit or fraudulent
means, and damage under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code on estafa and/or qualified estafa. They give rise to the presumption
or reasonable belief that the offense of estafa has been committed; and, thus, the filing of an Information against petitioners Bernyl
and Katherene is warranted. That respondent HSBC is supposed to have no personality to file any criminal complaint against
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene does not ipso facto clear them of prima facie guilt. The same goes for their basic denial of the acts
or omissions complained of; or their attempt at shifting the doubt to the person of York; and their claim that witnesses of respondent
HSBC are guilty of fabricating the whole scenario. These are matters of defense; their validity needs to be tested in the crucible of a
full-blown trial. Lest it be forgotten, the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense, the truth of which can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Litigation will prove petitioners Bernyl and
Katherenes innocence if their defense be true.
In fine, the relaxation of procedural rules may be allowed only when there are exceptional circumstances to justify the same. Try as
we might, this Court cannot find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals, when it reversed and set aside the
resolutions of the DOJ. There is no showing that the appellate court acted in an arbitrary and despotic manner, so patent or gross as
to amount to an evasion or unilateral refusal to perform its legally mandated duty. On the contrary, we find the assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals to be more in accordance with the evidence on record and relevant laws and jurisprudence than
the resolutions of the DOJ.
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced and our disquisition above, we hereby dismiss the instant petition for
being the wrong remedy under the Revised Rules of Court, as well as for petitioner Bernyl and Katherenes failure to sufficiently
show that the challenged Decision andResolution of the Court of Appeals were rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The 28 April
2006 Decision and the 29 June 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB- SP No. 00068, are
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against petitioners -- Spouses Bernyl Balangauan and Katherene Balangauan.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

* DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATI ON
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81385 February 21, 1989
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER AND CONRADO S. REYES in their official capacity as FISCAL AGENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 48, MANILA, PRESIDED BY THE
HONORABLE JUDGE DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., M.B. OLIVARES, AUGUSTO VILLANUEVA, ARACELLI LINSANGAN,
LUISA LINSANGAN, ALEJANDRO MARAMAG, MANUEL SALAK, TURNITA SORIANO, LINO SISON DOMINGO FLORES,
MILAGROS HIZON and CARIDAD ORPIADA,respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Delia L. Hermoso for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The parameters of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in relation to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Sandiganbayan are
put into issue in this petition.
On December 17, 1987, private respondents filed a complaint for injunction and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against petitioners and Winston Marbella, Gaston
Ortigas, Robeto Federis, Manuel C. Villa-Real, Emanuel Soriano, Jack Arroyo and Benjamin Tulio.

The complaint alleges, among others, that private respondents are the only stockholders with the right to vote of the Philippine Journalists, Inc.
(PJI) Publisher of several daily periodicals such as Manila Journal, People's Journal, etc. Sometime in 1977, PJI obtained from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) certain financing accommodations and as security thereof executed a first mortgage in favor of DBP on its acts
enumerated in a list attached to the mortgage. The PJI stockholders assigned to DBP the voting rights over 67% of the total subscribed and
outstanding voting shares of stock of the company held by them. The DBP appointed said PJI stockholders as proxies to exercise its right to vote.
Due to some financial difficulty on its part, PJI requested for a restructuring of its loan obligation with certain conditions. The request was granted
by the DBP in a letter dated August 4, 1986. Due to the default on the part of the PJI the DBP cancelled the proxies in favor of the assigning
stockholders on September 30, 1986 and designated as its proxies petitioner Eduardo Olaguer, Jose Mari Velez and Manuel de Leon. DBP
scheduled a special stockholders meeting for the purpose of electing a new set of directors.
It is also alleged in the complaint that before the special meeting, petitioner Olaguer asked private respondent Rosario M. Barreto Olivares to
assign qualifying shares not only to the three proxies of DBP but also to two others to be chosen by him so as to enable the five of them to sit in
the PJI board of directors, and that, accordingly, they may be able to coordinate more effectively with DBP as regards the early evaluation and
approval of the request for another restructuring of the PJI loan. Thus respondent Olivares assigned her shareholdings covered by Stock
Certificate. No. 34 (which were at that time assigned to DBP) to petitioner Olaguer, Marbella, Ortigas, Mari Velez and De Leon, at one share
each. The deeds of assignment provided that the said assignment are valid only as long as the nominee is the person designated by the DBP as its
representative to sit in the board of directors.
The complaint also alleges that although Olaguer was elected chairman of the board and chief executive officer of PJI he failed to comply with his
commitment and that this gave private respondents a reason to cancel the assignment. Olaguer also committed certain illegal acts which gave rise
to the filing of several complaints against him. However, before these cases could be resolved, Olaguer's appointment as member of the board of
directors of DBP was terminated by President Corazon C. Aquino effective September 9, 1987. He was informed about his termination through
two letters dated August 27 and October 12, 1987.
It is likewise alleged that, the termination notwithstanding, Olaguer continued to exercise and retain full management and control of PJI The DBP
chief legal counsel wrote to petitioner Reyes informing him of Olaguer's removal from office and enjoining him from implementing or complying
with any instructions from Olaguer and from disposing of the properties of PJI and disbursing any funds without prior approval of the board of
directors of PJI which will soon be elected, except such amounts needed in the ordinary course of business. Accordingly, the DBP, acting through
its Chairman, Jesus Estanislao and its Director-in-Charge, Jose Mari Velez, entered into an Interim Agreement with private respondents. The said
agreement called for a special stockholders meeting for the purpose of electing a new board of directors which shall hold office until the next
regular stockholders meeting to be held on February 2, 1988.
The complaint further alleges that in a letter dated December 14, 1987, the DBP chief legal counsel informed the private respondents that the said
Interim Agreement cannot be implemented because Olaguer claims that he has just been designated the fiscal and team leader of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) assigned to the PJI and that all his actions are sanctioned and reported to PCGG Chairman Ramon A.
Diaz, and that it is the PCGG which exercises the voting rights of all PJI common stocks sequestered since 1986, including those assigned to DBP
and that the PJI qualifying share now held by PJI Directors came from shares sequestered by the PCGG. These observations are contained in a
letter dated October 31, 1987 written by petitioner Reyes in his capacity as chief legal counsel and corporate secretary of PJI It is stated therein
that Olaguer, together with Marbella, Ortigas, Soriano, Federis, Arroyo and Villa-Real have been acting as corporate officers and/or members of
the board without their having been elected by the majority vote of stockholders and without their owning in their own right even a single
qualifying share.
In addition, it is alleged that petitioner Reyes had been sending out notices to private respondents about an alleged stockholders meeting to be held
on December 21, 1987 at the PJI building, and that in the letter written by the DBP chief legal counsel, 1 it is stated that petitioner Olaguer and his
associates who claim to be members of the board and corporate officers of PJI do not represent DBP and that they are not authorized to act in its
behalf.
The complaint emphasizes that the claim of petitioner Reyes that Olaguer can sit as chairman of the board of directos of PJI even if he is no
longer a director of DBP but as long as he is the fiscal agent and team leader of the PCGG assigned is baseless because: (a) the writs of
sequestration on the shares of respondents Hizon, Orpiada, Maramag, Flores and Sison, served on them on or about February 19, 1987, and on
respondents Linsangan, Salak, Soriano and Villanueva, served on them on or about April 28, 1987, bad been automatically lifted last August 19,
1987 and October 28, 1987, respectively, pursuant to Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution; and only the sequestration on the shares
of respondent Olivares has not been lifted since a complaint was filed against her before the expiration of the constitutional deadline for filing
cases; (b) the sequestered shares of respondent Olivares could not be voted upon by petitioners herein and their companions under their claim of
being PCGG fiscal agents under the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in several cases clearly stating that sequestration does not
involve the right of ownership; (c) no other meeting has been validly called for the election of a new set of directors after the members of the
board elected last October 2, 1986 had ceased to be such directors, either by virtue of the cancellation of their qualifying shares or their
resignation; (d) with the filing of Civil Case No. 35 before the Sandiganbayan where the PJI was listed as one of the involved corporations, all
actions affecting said corporation, including those which will affect rights of ownership and disposition of assets, must have the prior approval of
the Sandiganbayan which excercises jurisdiction over these corporations as one of the properties in litigation; and (e) by order of President
Aquino, petitioner Olaguer's separation from the PJI was called for; that the acts of all the petitioners and their companions of either continuing to
sit in the board of directors of PJI and/or representing and acting as its corporate officers are illegal and are the acts of usurpers and intruders
violative of the rights of private respondents as stockholders and are causing great damage and prejudice to them as well as to the rights of the
DBP under the Deed of Assignment, and that such acts of usurpation should be enjoined by the trial court.
Under the second cause of action for damages, it is alleged that Olaguer acted illegally and outside the authority granted him as nominee of DBP
and, accordingly, Olivares cancelled the Deed of Assignment of one qualifying share to him as well as the Deed of Assignment in favor of
Marbella and Ortigas. The notice of cancellation was served upon them on December 5, 1986. As a consequence of such cancellation, the three
failed to qualify to sit as members of the board of PJI.
Private respondents also alleged that despite such notice, petitioner and his associates continued to sit in the board and that Olaguer took over the
complete management of the corporation and even caused the appointment of other members of the board and/or corporate officers even if such

appointees do not own PJI shares of stock in their own right. It is likewise alleged that the petitioner and his associates should be enjoined from
committing further acts of usurpation and that they should be held liable for all unlawful disbursements they have made. It is further alleged that
some of the private respondents had been unlawfully dismissed and/or retired one after another thereby depriving them of all benefits they are
entitled to and subjecting them to great mental anguish, sleepless nights, deep humiliation and great anxiety for which they must be paid damages
in an amount left to the sound discretion of the court. Private respondents also asked for exemplary damages as well as the sum of P200,000.00
for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Private respondents prayed that pending a hearing on the merits of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order be
issued against petitioner Reyes enjoining him from holding the special stockholders meeting scheduled at 8:00 A.M. on December 21, 1987, and
enjoining Olaguer and his associates from sitting and acting as members of the board of directors of PJI or as corporate officers. Private
respondents also prayed that such temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent after due hearing and that
Petitioner Olaguer and his associates be made to pay, jointly and severally, actual damages as may be proved after audit, including moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P200,000.00, and the costs of the suit. 2
On December 18, 1987, an order was issued by the trial court setting the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for bearing
on January 4, 1988 at 1:30 in the afternoon. A temporary restraining order was issued enjoining petitioner Reyes from holding the special
stockholders meeting scheduled for December 21, 1987 and enjoining all the other petitioners including Olaguer from sitting and acting as
members of the board and/or corporate officers of PJI until further orders of the court.
On January 4, 1988, a motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the persons of
petitioners; that they were not served summons and that the subject matter of the action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate
relations between and among stockholders which are covered by the provisions of Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A so that the matter is
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); that the venue for a petition seeking injunctive
relief should be the Sandiganbayan where aforesaid PCGG Case No. 0035 against Benjamin Romualdez, Rosario Olivares, et al. is pending,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 defining the jurisdiction over cases involving the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Former President Marcos, et
al.; that it is the SEC which should exercise jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A; and that the
complaint states no cause of action inasmuch as the petitioners and the other defendants hold shares emanating from the PCGG, and not from the
DBP; that the shares issued to DBP for Olivares, et al. on the basis of an erroneous DBP legal opinion have been declared void ab initio and
cancelled by the PCGG on November 4, 1987 so that the DBP is not a stockholder of record; that the call for the stockholders meeting by
petitioner Reyes was with the approval of the PCGG Chairman; that PJI is a sequestered corporation listed as item No. 49 under "Shares of Stock"
in "Assets and Other Property of Benjamin Romualdez" marked Annex "A", in Case No. 0035 for "Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting,
Restitution and Damages," entitled "Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff versus Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al.,"; that the PJI pursuant to
its Board Resolution No. 43, dated November 14, 1987, has authorized the filing of criminal complaints against Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez,
Rosario Olivares, Tuynita Soriano, Jose T. Abundo, Evelyn Nicasio, Alejandro Maramag, Caridad Orpiada and other former and present PJI
officers and employees who defrauded the company by conspiring in and/or authorizing the illegal disbursements of PJI funds amounting to P
10.6 million, all for the account and upon instructions of said Romualdez who was neither an officer, director, stockholder of record of PJI nor a
creditor or supplier thereof; that regarding the sequestration of PJI pursuant to orders of the PCGG dated April 22, 1986 and February 19, 1987,
the actual sequestration proceedings have not been terminated upon the filing of PCGG Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan on July 31,
1987.
Petitioners maintain that under the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the commencement of a judicial action does not ipso facto lift
the sequestration order. It is the non-filing of a judicial action within six months from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution if the sequestration
order is issued before the ratification, or within six months from the time sequestration order was issued if the same was issued after such
ratification, which will automatically lift the sequestration order. Petitioners also stated that while the PJI suffered huge loses under the
administration of private respondents, the corporation realized profits under the management of petitioner Olaguer. All the common and preferred
stocks of private respondents have been sequestered pursuant to the orders of the PCGG dated April 22, 1986 and February 19, 1987 and it is the
PCGG which exercises the voting rights pertaining to said sequestered shares pursuant to the Memorandum of President Aquino to the PCGG
dated June 26, 1986.
A Memorandum in support of the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by
counsel for private respondents.
On January 14, 1988, an order was issued by the trial court denying the motion to dismiss and issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed
for upon a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 to be filed by private respondents.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or a writ of
preliminary injunction wherein the main issue is whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
On January 26, 1988, a resolution was issued by this Court requiring the respondents to comment therein within ten (10) days from notice. A
temporary restraining order was issued enjoining the respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing the order of the trial court dated January
14, 1988 in Civil Case No. 87-43156 as well as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against petitioners.
Acting on the manifestation and motion filed by counsel for private respondents on February 4, 1988, this Court issued a resolution enjoining
petitioner Reyes and/or the corporate officers of PJI from holding another special stockholders meeting on February 5, 1988 or at any date
thereafter pending resolution of this case, and directing the parties to maintain the status quo until further orders from the Court.
The private respondents filed their comment on the petition. Thereafter, the petitioners filed their reply. On April 5, 1988, the court resolved to
give due course to the petition and considered the case submitted for decision. Nevertheless, the private respondents filed a rejoinder.
The petition is impressed with merit. There is no dispute that the PJI is now under sequestration by the PCGG and that Civil Case No. 0035 was
filed in the Sandiganbayan wherein the PJI is listed as among the corporations involved in the unexplained wealth case against former President
Marcos, Romualdez and many others. The records likewise show that petitioner Olaguer, among others, is a fiscal agent of the PCGG and that as
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the PJI he was acting for and in behalf of the PCGG. Under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14, the

Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding "the funds, moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired by
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents,
or nominees," 3 civil or criminal, including incidents arising from such cases. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is subject to review on
certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. 4
In the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body with the regional trial courts and co-equal bodies have no power to control the
other. 5 The regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable
Executive Orders and Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders
and actions of the PCGG. 6 By the same token, the regional trial courts have no jurisdiction over the acts of fiscal agents of the PCGG acting for
and in behalf of said commission.
The Commission should not be embroiled in and swamped by legal suits before inferior courts all over the land. Otherwise, the Commission will
be forced to spend valuable time defending all its actuations in such courts. This will defeat the very purpose behind the creation of the
Commission. Accordingly, Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 expressly accorded the Commission and its members immunity from suit for
damages in that: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task
contemplated by this order."
Civil Case No. 87-43156 pending before the respondent judge is denominated as one for "injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order and damages." Particularly, under paragraph 17(d) of the complaint, private respondents admitted that the PJI
is listed as one of the involved corporations in Civil Case No. 0035 pending before the Sandiganbayan which now exercises jurisdiction over the
said corporation. Petitioners Olaguer and Reyes appear to be fiscal agents of the PCGG. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the subject matter
of the action (the PJI its properties and assets) falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners, as fiscal agents of the PCGG, cannot be sued in such capacity before the ordinary courts. The tribunal for such purpose is the
Sandiganbayan.
It necessarily follows that the issues raised by the private respondents before the respondent judge to the effect that petitioners are usurpers and
have no right to sit in the board of directors or act as corporate officers of the PJI are issues which should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent judge is permanently enjoined from enforcing the order of the trial court dated
January 14, 1988. The restraining order issued by this Court dated February 4, 1988 enjoining petitioner Reyes and/or the corporate officers of the
PJI from holding the special stockholders meeting on February 5, 1988 or at any date thereafter, and to preserve and maintain the status quo, is
hereby lifted. The order of the trial court dated January 14, 1988 is hereby SET ASIDE and another order is hereby issued dismissing the
complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141949

October 14, 2002

CEFERINO PADUA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF MAKATI, RTC, BRANCH 137,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORP.,
TOLL REGULATORY BOARD,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. 151108

October 14, 2002

EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, petitioner,

vs.
TOLL REGULATORY BOARD AND CITRA METRO MANILA TOLLWAYS CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The focal point upon which these two consolidated cases converge is whether Resolution No. 2001-89 issued by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB)
is valid.
A brief narration of the factual backdrop is imperative, thus:
On November 9, 2001, the TRB issued Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway,
effective January 1, 2002,[1] thus:
"NOW THEREFORE, it is RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED:

1. That in view of urgent public interest, the Board hereby GRANTS to the Metro Manila Skyway Project, Provisional Relief in
accordance with Rule 10, Section 3 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearing before the Toll Regulatory Board which
states, among others "that the Board may grant (provisional relief)in its own initiativewithout prejudice to the final decision after
completion of the hearing;"
2. That the Provisional Relief shall be in form of an interim toll rate adjustment in accordance with Section 7.04(3) of the Supplemental
Toll Operation Agreement, dated November 27, 1995, referring to Interim Adjustments in Toll Rates upon the occurrence of a
significant currency devaluation:
"Be APPROVED, as it is hereby APPROVED.
"RESOLVED FURTHER, as it is hereby RESOLVED:
"That the ProvisionalToll Rates, which are not to exceed the following:
Unrounded
Toll Rates

Section
Elevated Portion

Toll Rates for Implementation

CLASS 1

CLASS 2

CLASS 3

75.00

75.00

150.00

225.00

Magallanes to Bicutan

19.35

19.50

38.50

58.00

Bicutan to Sucat

11.21

11.00

22.50

34.00

Sucat to Alabang

10.99

11.00

21.00

32.50

At-Grade Portion

* includes C5 entry/exit and Merville exit.

"For implementation starting January 1, 2002 after its publication once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation and that said Provisional Toll Rate Increase shall remain in effect until such time that the TRB Board has determined otherwise:
"Be APPROVED as it is hereby APPROVED.
"RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, as it is hereby RESOLVED that the Provisional Toll Rates be implemented in two (2) stages in accordance with
the following schedule:
Toll Rates for Implementation For Class 1 as Reference

Unrounded Toll Rates as

Maximum for One (1)
Year

JANUARY 1, 2002 to JULY 1, 2002

75.00

65.00

75.00

Magallanes to Bicutan

19.35

15.00

20.00

Bicutan to Sucat

11.21

9.00

11.00

Sucat to Alabang

10.99

9.00

11.00

Section

Elevated Portion

JUNE 30, 2002 to DECEMBER 31,

2002

At-Grade Portion

"PROVIDED that the recovery of the sum from the interim rate adjustment shall be applied starting the year 2003.
"APPROVED as it is hereby APPROVED."
On December 17, 24 and 31, 2001, the above Resolution approving provisional toll rate adjustments was published in the newspapers of general
circulation.[2]
Tracing back the events that led to the issuance of the said Resolution, it appears that on February 27, 2001 the Citra Metro Manila Tollways
Corporation (CITRA) filed with the TRB an application for an interim adjustment of the toll rates at the Metro Manila Skyway Project Stage 1.
[3] CITRA moored its petition on the provisions of the "Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement" (STOA),[4] authorizing it, as the investor, to
apply for and if warranted, to be granted an interim adjustment of toll rates in the event of a "significant currency devaluation." The relevant
portions of the STOA read:
a. The Investor and/or the Operator shall be entitled to apply for and if warranted, to be granted an interim adjustment of Toll Rates upon the
occurrence of any of the following events:
xxx
(ii) a significant currency devaluation

xxx

xxx

xxx

(i) A currency devaluation shall be deemed "significant" if it results in a depreciation of the value of the Philippine peso relative to the US dollar
by at least 10%. For purposes hereof the exchange rate between the Philippine peso and the US dollar which shall be applicable shall be the
exchange rate between the above mentioned currencies in effect as of the date of approval of the prevailing preceding Toll Rate.
(ii) The Investors right to apply for an interim Toll Rate adjustment under section 7.04 (3) (a) (ii) shall be effective only while any Financing is
outstanding and have not yet been paid in full.
xxx

xxx

(iv) An interim adjustment in Toll Rate shall be considered such amount as may be required to provide interim relief to the Investor from a
substantial increase in debt-service burden resulting from the devaluation."[5]
Claiming that the peso exchange rate to a U.S. dollar had devaluated from P26.1671 in 1995 to P48.00 in 2000, CITRA alleged that there was a
compelling need for the increase of the toll rates to meet the loan obligations of the Project and the substantial increase in debt-service burden.
Due to heavy opposition, CITRAs petition remained unresolved. This prompted CITRA to file on October 9, 2001 an "Urgent Motion for
Provisional Approval,"[6] this time, invoking Section 3, Rule 10 of the "Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearing Before the Toll
Regulatory Board" (TRB Rules of Procedure) which provides:
"SECTION 3. Provisional Relief. Upon the filing of an application or petition for the approval of the initial toll rate or toll rate adjustment, or at
any stage, thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or in its own initiative, the relief prayed for without prejudice to a final
decision after completion of the hearing should the Board find that the pleading, together with the affidavits and supporting documents attached
thereto and such additional evidence as may have been requested and presented, substantially support the provisional order; Provided: That the
Board may, motu proprio, continue to issue orders or grant relief in the exercise of its powers of general supervision under existing laws.
Provided: Finally, that pending finality of the decision, the Board may require the Petitioner to deposit in whole or in part in escrow the
provisionally approved adjustment or initial toll rates." (Emphasis supplied)
On October 30, 2001, CITRA moved to withdraw[7] its "Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval" without prejudice to its right to seek or be
granted provisional relief under the above-quoted provisions of the TRB Rules of Procedure, obviously, referring to the power of the Board to act
on its own initiative.
On November 7, 2001, CITRA wrote a letter[8] to TRB expressing its concern over the undue delay in the proceeding, stressing that any further
setback would bring the Projects financial condition, as well as the Philippine banking system, to a total collapse. CITRA recounted that out of
the US$354 million funding from creditors, two-thirds (2/3) thereof came from the Philippine banks and financial institutions, such as the
Landbank of the Philippines and the Government Service Insurance Services. Thus, CITRA requested TRB to find a timely solution to its
predicament.
On November 9, 2001, TRB granted CITRAs motion to withdraw[9] the Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval and, at the same time, issued
Resolution No. 2001-89,[10] earlier quoted.
Hence, petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo Zialcita assail before this Court the validity and legality of TRB Resolution No. 2001-89.
Petitioner Ceferino Padua, as a toll payer, filed an "Urgent Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order to Stop Arbitrary Toll Fee Increases"[11] in
G.R. No. 141949,[12] a petition for mandamus earlier filed by him. In that petition, Padua seeks to compel respondent Judge Santiago Ranada of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City, to issue a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Court of Appeals Decision dated
August 4, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13235. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals ordered the exclusion of certain portions of the expressways
(from Villamor Air Base to Alabang in the South, and from Balintawak to Tabang in the North) from the franchise of the PNCC.
In his urgent motion, petitioner Padua claims that: (1) Resolution No. 2001-89 was issued without the required publication and in violation of due
process; (2) alone, TRB Executive Director Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr., could not authorize the provisional toll rate adjustments because the TRB is a
collegial body; and (3) CITRA has no standing to apply for a toll fee increase since it is an "investor" and not a "franchisee-operator."
On January 4, 2002, petitioner Padua filed a "Supplemental Urgent Motion for a TRO against Toll Fee Increases,"[13] arguing further that: (1)
Resolution 2001-89 refers exclusively to the Metro Manila Skyway Project, hence, there is no legal basis for the imposition of the increased rate
at the at-grade portions; (2) Resolution No. 2001-89 was issued without basis considering that while it was signed by three (3) of the five
members of the TRB, none of them actually attended the hearing; and 3) the computation of the rate adjustment under the STOA is inconsistent
with the rate adjustment formula under Presidential Decree No. 1894.[14]
On January 10, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed, in behalf of public respondent TRB, Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and Judge Ranada, a "Consolidated Comment"[15] contending that:
(1) the TRB has the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relating to toll rates; (2) Resolution No. 2001-89 covers both the Skyway and the atgrade level of the South Luzon Expressway as provided under the STOA; (3) that while Resolution No. 2001-89 does not mention any factual
basis to justify its issuance, however, it does not mean that TRB's finding of facts is not supported by evidence; and (4) petitioner Padua cannot
assail the validity of the STOA because he is not a party thereto.
Upon the other hand, on January 9, 2002, petitioner Eduardo Zialcita, as a taxpayer and as Congressman of Paraaque City, filed the present
petition for prohibition[16] with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against TRB and CITRA, docketed
as G.R. No. 151108, impugning the same Resolution No. 2001-89.
Petitioner Zialcita asserts that the provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant and that the TRB violated its own Charter, Presidential Decree
No. 1112,[17] when it promulgated Resolution No. 2001-89 without the benefit of any public hearing. He also maintains that the TRB violated the
Constitution when it did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which Resolution No. 2001-89 was based. And lastly, he claims
that Section 3, Rule 10 of the TRB Rules of Procedure is not sanctioned by P.D. No. 1112.

Private respondent CITRA, in its comment[18] on Congressman Zialcitas petition, counters that: (1) the TRB has primary administrative
jurisdiction over all matters relating to toll rates; (2) prohibition is an inappropriate remedy because its function is to restrain acts about to be done
and not acts already accomplished; (3) Resolution No. 2001-89 was issued in accordance with law; (4) Section 3, Rule 10 of the TRB Rules is
constitutional; and (5) private respondent and the Republic of the Philippines would suffer more irreparable damages than petitioner.
The TRB, through the OSG, filed a separate comment[19] reiterating the same arguments raised by private respondent CITRA.
On January 11, 2002, this Court resolved to consolidate the instant petitions, G.R. No. 141949 and G.R. No. 151108.[20]
We rule for the respondents.
In assailing Resolution No. 2001-89, petitioners came to us via two unconventional remedies one is an urgent motion for a TRO to stop arbitrary
toll fee increases; and the other is a petition for prohibition. Unfortunately, both are procedurally impermissible.
I
Petitioner Paduas motion is a leap to a legal contest of different dimension. As previously stated, G.R. No. 141949 is a petition for mandamus
seeking to compel respondent Judge Ranada to issue a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 4,
1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13235. The issue therein is whether the application for a writ of execution should be by a mere motion or by an action
for revival of judgment. Thus, for petitioner Padua to suddenly interject in the same petition the issue of whether Resolution No. 2001-89 is valid
is to drag this Court to his web of legal convolution. Courts cannot, as a case progresses, resolve the intrinsic merit of every issue that comes
along its way, particularly those which bear no relevance to the resolution of the case.
Certainly, petitioner Paduas recourse in challenging the validity of TRB Resolution No. 2001-89 should have been to institute an action, separate
and independent from G.R. No. 141949.
II
The remedy of prohibition initiated by petitioner Zialcita in G.R. No. 151108 also suffers several infirmities. Initially, it violates the twin doctrine
of primary administrative jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
P.D. No. 1112 explicitly provides that "the decisions of the TRB on petitions for the increase of toll rate shall be appealable to the Office of the
President within ten (10) days from the promulgation thereof."[21] P.D. No. 1894 reiterates this instruction and further provides:
"SECTION 9. The GRANTEE shall have the right and authority to adjust any existing toll being charged the users of the Expressways under the
following guidelines:
xxx

xxx

c) Any interested Expressways user shall have the right to file, within a period of ninety (90) days after the date of publication of the adjusted toll
rate (s), a petition with the Toll Regulatory Board for a review of the adjusted toll rate (s); provided, however, that notwithstanding the filing of
such petition and the pendency of the resolution thereof, the adjusted toll shall be enforceable and collectible by the GRANTEE effective on the
first day of January in accordance with the immediately preceding paragraph.
xxx

xxx

e) Decisions of the Toll Regulatory Board on petitions for review of adjusted toll shall be appealable to the Office of the President within ten (10)
days from the promulgation thereof."
These same provisions are incorporated in the TRB Rules of Procedure, particularly in Section 6, Rule 5 and Section 1, Rule 12 thereof.[22]
Obviously, the laws and the TRB Rules of Procedure have provided the remedies of an interested Expressways user.[23] The initial proper
recourse is to file a petition for review of the adjusted toll rates with the TRB. The need for a prior resort to this body is with reason. The TRB, as
the agency assigned to supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities, has the necessary expertise, training and skills to
judiciously decide matters of this kind. As may be gleaned from the petition, the main thrust of petitioner Zialcitas argument is that the
provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant, oppressive, onerous and unconscionable. This is obviously a question of fact requiring knowledge
of the formula used and the factors considered in determining the assailed rates. Definitely, this task is within the province of the TRB.
We take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative
remedies. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review in
case of grave abuse of discretion, is indispensable. Between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend is to
refer it to the former."[24] In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[25] we ruled:
"x x x, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court."
Moreover, petitioner Zialcitas resort to prohibition is intrinsically inappropriate. It bears stressing that the office of this remedy is not to correct
errors of judgment but to prevent or restrain usurpation of jurisdiction or authority by inferior tribunals and to compel them to observe the
limitation of their jurisdictions. G.R. No. 151108, while designated as a petition for prohibition, has for its object the setting aside of Resolution
No. 2001-89 on the ground that it was issued without prior notice, hearing and publication and that the provisional toll rate adjustments are
exorbitant. This is not the proper subject of prohibition because as long as the inferior court, tribunal or board has jurisdiction over the person and
subject matter of the controversy, the writ will not lie to correct errors and irregularities in procedure, or to prevent an erroneous decision or an
enforcement of an erroneous judgment. And even in cases of encroachment, usurpation, and improper assumption of jurisdiction, the writ will not
issue where an adequate and applicable remedy by appeal, writ or error, certiorari, or other prescribed methods of review are available.[26] In this
case, petitioner Zialcita should have sought a review of the assailed Resolution before the TRB.

III
Even granting that petitioners recourse to the instant remedies is in order, still, we cannot rule in their favor.
For one, it is not true that the provisional toll rate adjustments were not published prior to its implementation on January 1, 2002. Records show
that they were published on December 17, 24 and 31, 2001[27] in three newspapers of general circulation, particularly the Philippine Star,
Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Manila Bulletin. Surely, such publications sufficiently complied with Section 5 of P.D. No. 1112 which
mandates that "no new rates shall be collected unless published in a newspaper of general publication at least once a week for three consecutive
weeks." At any rate, it must be pointed out that under Letter of Instruction No. 1334-A,[28] the TRB may grant and issue ex-parte to any
petitioner, without need of notice, publication or hearing, provisional authority to collect, pending hearing and decision on the merits of the
petition, the increase in rates prayed for or such lesser amount as the TRB may in its discretion provisionally grant. That LOI No. 1334-A has the
force and effect of law finds support in a catena of cases decreeing that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated,
issued, or done by the former President (Ferdinand E. Marcos) are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective,
unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President."[29] In
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[30] this Court held:
"The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect
of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744,
that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by
President Marcos, whose word was law during that time." (Emphasis supplied)
For another, it is not true that it was TRB Executive Director Dumlao, Jr. alone who issued Resolution No. 2001-89. The Resolution itself contains
the signature of the four TRB Directors, namely, Simeon A. Datumanong, Emmanuel P. Bonoan, Ruben S. Reinoso, Jr. and Mario K. Espinosa.
[31] Petitioner Padua would argue that while these Directors signed the Resolution, none of them personally attended the hearing. This argument
is misplaced. Under our jurisprudence, an administrative agency may employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to
receive evidence, conduct hearing and make reports, on the basis of which the agency shall render its decision. Such a procedure is a practical
necessity.[32] Thus, in Mollaneda vs. Umacob,[33] we ruled:
" x x x At any rate, it cannot be gainsaid that the term "administrative body or agency" includes the subordinate officials upon whose hand the
body or agency delegates a portion of its authority. Included therein are the hearing officers through whose eyes and ears the administrative body
or agency observes the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses and listens to their testimonies.
"It must be emphasized that the appointment of competent officers to hear and receive evidence is commonly resorted to by administrative bodies
or agencies in the interest of an orderly and efficient disposition of administrative cases. x x x
"x x x Corollarily, in a catena of cases, this Court laid down the cardinal requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, one of which
is that "the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate." Thus, it is logical to say that this mandate was rendered precisely to ensure that in cases where the
hearing or reception of evidence is assigned to a subordinate, the body or agency shall not merely rely on his recommendation but instead shall
personally weigh and assess the evidence which the said subordinate has gathered."
Be that as it may, we must stress that the TRBs authority to grant provisional toll rate adjustments does not require the conduct of a hearing.
Pertinent laws and jurisprudence support this conclusion.
It may be recalled that Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1112 creating the TRB on March 31, 1977. The end in view
was to authorize the collection of toll fees for the use of certain public improvements in order to attract private sector investment in the
government infrastructure projects. The TRB was tasked to supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities. One of its
powers is to "issue, modify and promulgate from time to time the rates of toll that will be charged the direct users of toll facilities and upon notice
and hearing, to approve or disapprove petitions for the increase thereof."[34]
To clarify the intent of P.D. No. 1112 as to the extent of the TRBs power,[35] Former President Marcos further issued LOI No. 1334-A expressly
allowing the TRB to grant ex-parte provisional or temporary increase in toll rates, thus:
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby direct, order and instruct the Toll Regulatory Board to grant and issue ex-parte to any petitioner, without need of notice,
publication or hearing, provisional authority to collect, pending hearing of and decision on the merits of such petition, the increase in rates prayed
for or such lesser amount as the Board may in its discretion provisionally grant, upon (a) a finding that the said petition is sufficient in form and
substance, (b) the submission of an affidavit by the petitioner showing that the increase in rates substantially conforms to the formula, if any
stipulated in the franchise or toll operation agreement/certificate of the petitioner and that failure to immediately impose and collect the increase
in rates would result in outright delay or stoppage of urgently needed improvements, expansion or repairs of toll facilities and/or in great
irreparable injury to the petitioner, and (c) the submission by the petitioner to the Board of a bond, in such amount and from such surety or
sureties and under such terms and conditions as the Board shall fix, to guarantee the refund of the increase in rates to the affected toll payers in
case it is finally determined, after notice and hearing, that the petitioner is not entitled, in whole or in part, to the same. Any provisional toll rate
increases shall be effective immediately upon approval without need of publication."
Thereafter, the TRB promulgated as part of its Rules of Procedure, the following provision:
"RULE 5
PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF TOLL RATE
"Section 2. Provisional Relief Upon initial findings of the Board that the Petition for the approval of initial toll rate or the petition for toll rate
adjustment is in accordance with Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 2, Section 2 of Rule 3 and Section 1 of Rule 4 hereof, the Board within a reasonable
time after the filing of the Petition, may in an en banc decision provisionally approve the initial toll rate or toll rate adjustment, without the
necessity of any notice and hearing."

From the foregoing, it is clear that a hearing is not necessary for the grant of provisional toll rate adjustment. The language of LOI No. 1334-A is
not susceptible of equivocation. It "directs, orders and instructs" the TRB to issue provisional toll rates adjustment ex-parte without the need of
notice, hearing and publication. All that is necessary is that it be issued upon (1) a finding that the main petition is sufficient in form and
substance; (2) the submission of an affidavit showing that the increase in rates substantially conforms to the formula, if any is stipulated in the
franchise or toll operation agreement, and that failure to immediately impose and collect the increase in rates would result in great irreparable
injury to the petitioner; and (3) the submission of a bond. Again, whether or not CITRA complied with these requirements is an issue that must be
addressed to the TRB.
The practice is not something peculiar. We have ruled in a number of cases that an administrative agency may be empowered to approve
provisionally, when demanded by urgent public need, rates of public utilities without a hearing. The reason is easily discerned from the fact that
provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final hearing.[36]
In Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board,[37] we ruled that while the ERB is not precluded from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional
authority which is of course, the better procedure however, it can not be stigmatized if it failed to conduct one. Citing Citizens Alliance for
Consumer Protection vs. Energy Regulatory Board,[38] this Court held:
In the light of Section 8 quoted above, public respondent Board need not even have conducted formal hearings in these cases prior to issuance of
its Order of 14 August 1987 granting a provisional increase of prices. The Board, upon its own discretion and on the basis of documents and
evidence submitted by private respondents, could have issued an order granting provisional relief immediately upon filing by private respondents
of their respective applications. In this respect, the Court considers the evidence presented by private respondents in support of their applications
-.i.e., evidence showing that importation costs of petroleum products had gone up; that the peso had depreciated in value; and that the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) had been depleted as substantial and hence constitutive of at least prima facie basis for issuance by the Board of a
provisional relief order granting an increase in the prices of petroleum products.
Anent petitioner Paduas contention that CITRA has no standing to apply for a toll fee increase, suffice it to say that CITRAs right stems from the
STOA which was entered into by no less than the Republic of the Philippines and by the PNCC. Section 7.04 of the STOA provides that the
Investor, CITRA, and/or the Operator, PNCC, shall be entitled to apply for and if warranted, to be granted an interim adjustment of toll rates in
case of force majeure and a significant currency valuation.[39] Now, unless set aside through proper action, the STOA has the force and effect of
law between the contracting parties, and is entitled to recognition by this Court. [40] On the same breath, we cannot sustain Paduas contention
that the term "Metro Manila Skyway" Project excludes the at-grade portions of the South Luzon Expressway considering that under the same
STOA the "Metro Manila Skyway" includes: "(a) the South Metro Manila Skyway, coupled with the rehabilitated at-grade portion of the South
Luzon Expressway, from Alabang to Quirino Avenue; (b) the Central Metro Manila Skyway, from Quirino Avenue to A. Bonifacio Avenue; x x
x."[41]
Petitioner Zialcita faults the TRB for not stating the facts and the law on which Resolution No. 2001-89 is based. Petitioner is wrong. Suffice it to
state that while Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based," this rule applies only to a decision of a court of justice, not TRB.[42]
At this point, let it be stressed that we are not passing upon the reasonableness of the provisional toll rate adjustments. As we have earlier
mentioned, this matter is best addressed to the TRB.
IV
In fine, as what we intimated in Philippine National Construction Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,[43] we commend petitioners for devoting their time
and effort on a matter so imbued with public interest as in this case. But we can do no better than to brush aside their chief objections to the
provisional toll rate adjustments, for a different approach would lead this Court astray into the field of factual conflict where its pronouncements
would not rest on solid grounds. Time and again, we have impressed that this Court is not a trier of facts, more so, in the consideration of an
extraordinary remedy of prohibition where only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is to be entertained.
And to accord the main petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 141949 the full deliberation it deserves, we deem it appropriate to discuss its merit on
another occasion. Anyway, G.R. No. 141949 was consolidated with G.R. No. 151108 only by reason of petitioner Paduas deviant motion
assailing Resolution 2001-89. As we have previously said, the main petition in G.R. No. 141949 presents an entirely different issue and is set on a
different factual landscape.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Paduas "Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining Order to Stop Arbitrary Toll Fee Increases" is DENIED and
petitioner Zialcitas "Petition for Prohibition" is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 131255 May 20, 1998

HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in his capacity as the Governor of the Province of Nueva Ecija,petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES, the DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, represented

by SECRETARY ROBERT Z. BARBERS and UNDERSECRETARY MANUEL R. SANCHEZ, MR. OSCAR C. TINIO, in his capacity
as Provincial Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija, and MR. LORETO P. PANGILINAN, MR. CRISPULO S. ESGUERRA, MS. SOLITA C.
SANTOS, MR. VICENTE C. PALILIO, and MR. NAPOLEON G. INTERIOR, in their capacity as Provincial Board Members of Nueva
Ecija, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from office of petitioner Eduardo Nonato Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva
Ecija. Private respondent Oscar C. Tinio is the Vice-Governor of said province while private respondents Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S.
Esguerra, Solita C. Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon Interior are members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997 charging petitioner
with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Private respondents alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they were at the session
hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall;
petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at them; close behind petitioner were several men with long
and short firearms who encircled the area. Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative
measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank; that
petitioner's acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan; that fortunately, no session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was held that
day for lack of quorum and the proposed legislative measure was not considered; that private respondents opposed the loan because the province
of Nueva Ecija had an unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million incurred without prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan;
that the provincial budget officer and treasurer had earlier disclosed that the province could not afford to contract another obligation; that
petitioner's act of barging in and intimidating private respondents was a serious insult to the integrity and independence of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan; and that the presence of his private army posed grave danger to private respondents' lives and safety. Private respondents prayed for
the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed loan
in light of the financial condition of the province, to wit:
In this regard, we respectfully request for the following assistance from your good office:
1. To immediately suspend Governor N. [sic] Joson considering the actual dangers that we are facing now, and provide adequate police
security detail for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Ecija. Should the evidence warrant after investigation, to order his removal
from office.
2. To conduct an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija by the auditors from the Commission on Audit Central
Office with adequate police security assistance. Should the evidence so warrant, to file necessary charges against responsible and
accountable officers.
3. To advise the Philippine National Bank to review the capability of the province of Nueva Ecija to secure more loans and the
feasibility of the same in the light of the present financial condition of the province. Or if said loan will be contrary to sound banking
practice, recommend its disapproval. 1
The letter-complaint was submitted with the joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez, two (2) employees of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan who witnessed the incident. The letter was endorsed by Congressmen Eleuterio Violago and Pacifico Fajardo of the
Second and Third Districts of Nueva Ecija, former Congressman Victorio Lorenzo of the Fourth District, and Mayor Placido Calma, President of
the Mayors' League of said province. 2
The President acted on the complaint by writing on its margin the following:
17 Sep 96
To: SILG info Exec. Sec. and Sec. of Justice:
1. Noted. There appears no justification for the use of force, intimidation or armed followers in the situation of 12 Sep at the Session
Hall. 2. Take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions. 3 BREAK NOT the PEACE.
FIDEL V. RAMOS
(Signed). 3
President Ramos noted that the situation of "12 Sep at the Session Hall," i.e., the refusal of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
approve the proposed loan, did not appear to justify "the use of force, intimidation or armed followers." He thus instructed the then Secretary of
the Interior and Local Governments (SILG) Robert Barbers to "[t]ake appropriate preemptive and investigative actions," but to "[b]reak not the
peace."
The letter-complaint together with the President's marginal notes were sent to Secretary Robert Z. Barbers on September 20, 1996. Acting upon
the instructions of the President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case against him 4 and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint
and its annexes. In the same notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit [his] verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion to dismiss,
together with such documentary evidence that [he] has in support thereof, within fifteen (15) days from receipt. 5
Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle
the controversy. The parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to maintain peace and order in the province while private
respondents promised to refrain from filing cases that would adversely affect their peaceful co-existence. 6
The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private respondents reiterated their letter-complaint. Petitioner was again ordered to
file his answer to the letter-complaint within fifteen days from receipt. Petitioner received a copy of this order on November 13, 1996. On the

same day, petitioner requested for an extension of thirty (30) days to submit his answer because he was "trying to secure the services of legal
counsel experienced in administrative law practice. 7 The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), acting through Director
Almario de los Santos, Officer-In-Charge of the Legal Service, granted the motion, with the thirty-day extension to be reckoned, however, from
November 13, 1996, i.e., the day petitioner received the order to answer. 8
In a letter dated December 9, 1996, petitioner moved for another extension of thirty (30) days to file his answer. He stated that he had already sent
letters to various law firms in Metro Manila but that he had not yet contracted their services; that the advent of the Christmas season kept him
busy with "numerous and inevitable official engagements." 9 The DILG granted the request for extension "for the last time up to January 13
only." 10
On January 7, 1997, petitioner requested for another extension of thirty (30) days to file his answer. According to him, the Christmas season kept
him very busy and preoccupied with his numerous official engagements; that the law firms he invited to handle his case have favorably replied
but that he needed time to confer with them personally; and that during this period, he, with the help of his friends, was exploring the possibility
of an amicable settlement of the case. 11 The DILG granted petitioner's request "for the last time" but gave him an extension of only ten (10) days
from January 13, 1997 to January 23, 1997. The DILG also informed him that his "failure to submit answer will be considered a waiver and that
the plaintiff [shall] be allowed to present his evidence ex parte." 12
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. He reiterated his prayer for an extension of thirty (30) days on the following grounds: (a) that he
was still in the process of choosing competent and experienced counsel; (b) that some law firms refused to accept his case because it was
perceived to be politically motivated; and (c) the multifarious activities, appointments and official functions of his office hindered his efforts to
secure
counsel
of
choice. 13
Three months later, on April 22, 1997, Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued an order declaring petitioner in
default and to have waived his right to present evidence. Private respondents were ordered to present their evidence ex-parte. The order reads as
follows:
ORDER
It appearing that respondent failed to submit his answer to the complaint despite the grant to him of three (3) extensions, such
unreasonable failure is deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence in his behalf pursuant to Section 4, Rule 4 of Administrative
Order No. 23 dated December 17, 1992, as amended.
Respondent is hereby declared in default, meanwhile, complainants are directed to present their evidenceex-parte. However,
considering the prohibition on the conduct of administrative investigation due to the forthcoming barangay elections, complainants will
be notified on the date after the barangay election for them to present their evidence.
SO ORDERED. 14
Two days later, on April 24, 1997, the law firm of Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion, representing petitioner, filed with the DILG an "Entry
of Appearance with Motion for Time to File Answer Ad Cautelam."
Petitioner received a copy of the order of default on May 2, 1997. Through counsel, he moved for reconsideration. On May 19, 1997,
Undersecretary Sanchez reconsidered the order of default in the interest of justice. He noted the appearance of petitioner's counsel and gave
petitioner "for the last time" fifteen (15) days from receipt to file his answer. 15
On June 23, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez issued an order stating that petitioner's counsel, whose office is in Manila, should have received a copy
of the May 19, 1997 order ten days after mailing on May 27, 1997. Since petitioner still failed to file his answer, he was deemed to have waived
his right to present evidence in his behalf. Undersecretary Sanchez reinstated the order of default and directed private respondents to present their
evidence ex-parte on July 15, 1997. 16
The following day, June 24, 1997, petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss." Petitioner alleged that the letter-complaint was not
verified on the day it was filed with the Office of the President; and that the DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require
him, to answer the complaint.
On July 4, 1997, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of June 23, 1997 reinstating the order of default.
Petitioner also prayed that the hearing on the merits of the case be held in abeyance until after the "Motion to Dismiss" shall have been resolved.
On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President,
placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him. 17
Secretary Barbers directed the Philippine National Police to assist in the implementation of the order of preventive suspension. In petitioner's
stead, Secretary Barbers designated Vice-Governor Oscar Tinio as Acting Governor until such time as petitioner's temporary legal incapacity shall
have ceased to exist. 18
Forthwith, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and
the order of default. 19
Meanwhile, the proceedings before the DILG continued. On August 20, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez issued an order denying petitioner's
"Motion to Dismiss" and " Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration." In the same order, he required the parties to submit their position papers
within an inextendible period of ten days from receipt after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution, to wit:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, both motions are denied. However, for this office to have a better appreciation of the issues raised in
the instant case, the parties, through their respective counsels are hereby directed to submit their position papers within a period of ten
(10) days from receipt hereof, which period is inextendible, after which the case is deemed submitted for resolution. 20

On August 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the DILG a "Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension." On September 10, 1997, petitioner
followed this with a "Motion to Lift Default Order and Admit Answer Ad Cautelam." 21 Attached to the motion was the "Answer Ad
Cautelam". 22 and sworn statements of his witnesses. On the other hand, complainants (private respondents herein) manifested that they were
submitting the case for decision based on the records, the complaint and affidavits of their witnesses. 23
In his Answer Ad Cautelam, petitioner alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, while he was at his district office in the town of Munoz,
he received a phone call from Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Jose del Mundo. Del Mundo, who belonged to petitioner's political party,
informed him that Vice-Governor Tinio was enraged at the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who were in petitioner's party because they
refused to place on the agenda the ratification of the proposed P150 million loan of the province. Petitioner repaired to the provincial capitol to
advise his party-mates on their problem and at the same time attend to his official functions. Upon arrival, he went to the Session Hall and asked
the members present where Vice-Governor Tinio was. However, without waiting for their reply, he left the Hall and proceeded to his office.
Petitioner claimed that there was nothing in his conduct that threatened the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or caused alarm to the
employees. He said that like Vice-Governor Tinio, he was always accompanied by his official security escorts whenever he reported for work. He
also alleged that the joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez was false. Escombien was purportedly not inside the session
hall during the incident but was at her desk at the office and could not in any way have seen petitioner in the hall. To attest to the truth of his
allegations, petitioner submitted three (3) joint affidavits two (2) affidavits executed by six (6) and ten (10) employees, respectively, of the
provincial government, and a third by four members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 24
On September 11, 1997, petitioner filed an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of August 20, 1997 denying his motion to dismiss.
The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" was rejected by Undersecretary Sanchez on October 8, 1997. Undesecretary Sanchez, however, granted
the "Motion to Lift Default Order and to Admit Answer Ad Cautelam" and admitted the "Answer Ad Cautelam" as petitioner's position paper
pursuant to the order of August 20, 1997. 25
On October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a "Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation." Petitioner prayed that a formal investigation of his case be
conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23; and that this be held at
the province of Nueva Ecija. 26 On October 29, 1997, petitioner submitted a "Manifestation and Motion" before the DILG reiterating his right to
a formal investigation.
In the meantime, on October 24, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition. 27
Hence this recourse.
The proceedings before the DILG continued however. In an order dated November 11, 1997, the DILG denied petitioner's "Motion to Conduct
Formal Investigation" declaring that the submission of position papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in
administrative proceedings. 28
A few days after filing the petition before this Court, petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Herein Incorporated Urgent Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction." Petitioner alleged that subsequent to the institution of this
petition, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments rendered a resolution on the case finding him guilty of the offenses charged. 29 His
finding was based on the position papers and affidavits of witnesses submitted by the parties. The DILG Secretary found the affidavits of
complainants' witnesses to be "more natural, reasonable and probable" than those of herein petitioner Joson's. 30
On January 8, 1998, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He
imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay, to wit:
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, respondent Nueva Ecija Governor Eduardo
Nonato Joson is hereby found guilty of the offenses charged and is meted the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six (6)
months without pay. 31
On January 14, 1998, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the order of the Executive Secretary.
On January 19, 1998, private respondents submitted a Manifestation informing this Court that the suspension of petitioner was implemented on
January 9, 1998; that on the same day, private respondent Oscar Tinio was installed as Acting Governor of the province; and that in view of these
events, the temporary restraining order had lost its purpose and effectivity and was fait accompli. 32 We noted this Manifestation.
In his petition, petitioner alleges that:
I THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE SHOULD
NOT BE STRICTLY APPLIED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AND CLEARLY PUNITIVE PROCEEDINGS IN
THE CASE AGAINST PETITIONER GOVERNOR EDNO JOSON;
II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE ALTER-EGO PRINCIPLE BECAUSE, CONTRARY TO
LAW, IT WAS THE SECRETARY OF THE DILG WHO WAS EXERCISING THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WHICH ARE
CLEARLY VESTED BY LAW ONLY UPON HIM OR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.
III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY DECLARED IN DEFAULT
WHEN HE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS INSTEAD OF AN ANSWER, AS DIRECTED BY THE DILG, BECAUSE A MOTION
TO DISMISS BASED ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS IS NOT A PROHIBITIVE [sic] PLEADING IN ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY CASES.
IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE IMPOSITION OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION AGAINST THE
PETITIONER WAS PROPER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO JOINDER OF ISSUES YET UPON ITS IMPOSITION AND THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF GUILT AGAINST PETITIONER. 33
In his "Motion for Leave to File Herein Incorporated Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of

Preliminary Injunction," petitioner also claims that:

I THE RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 8, 1998 AND THE MEMORANDA ISSUED PURSUANT THERETO (i.e., ANNEXES "C,"
"D," "E," "F," AND "G" HEREOF) WERE ISSUED WITH UNDUE HASTE, IN VIOLATION OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS
OF THE 1991 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 23, AND IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF
PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
II THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INVALID RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 8, 1998 (ANNEX "C" HEREOF) BY THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS ENTITLES PETITIONER TO THE IMMEDIATE ISSUANCE OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER/WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HEREIN PRAYED FOR. 34
We find merit in the petition.
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are governed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, and Administrative Order No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the Rules and Procedures
on the Investigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent
Component Cities, and Cities and Municipalities in Metropolitan Manila." 35 In all matters not provided in A.O. No. 23, the Rules of Court and
the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory character. 36
I
Section 60 of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the Local Government Code enumerates the grounds for which an elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended or removed from office. Section 60 reads:
Sec. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any
of the following grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlunsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
When an elective local official commits an act that falls under the grounds for disciplinary action, the administrative complaint against him must
be verified and filed with any of the following:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be
prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city
shall be filed before the Office of the President.
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may
be appealed to the Office of the President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
concerned whose decision shall be final and executory. 37
An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be verified and filed with the proper government office. A complaint against
an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of the President. A complaint against an elective municipal official must be
filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan while that of a barangay official must be filed before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan.
In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly
filed with the Office of the President. According to petitioner, however, the letter-complaint failed to conform with the formal requirements set by
the Code. He alleges that the complaint was not verified by private respondents and was not supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses
named therein; that private respondents later realized these defects and surreptitiously inserted the verification and sworn statement while the
complaint was still pending with the Office of the President. 38 To prove his allegations, petitioner submitted: (a) the sworn statement of private
respondent Solita C. Santos attesting to the alleged fact that after the letter-complaint was filed, Vice-Governor Tinio made her and the other
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan sign an additional page which he had later notarized; and (b) the fact that the verification of the lettercomplaint and the joint affidavit of the witnesses do not indicate the document, page or book number of the notarial register of the notary public
before whom they were made. 39
We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. The absence of the document, page or book number of the notarial register of the subscribing
officer is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim. The lack of these entries may constitute proof of neglect on the part of the subscribing officer in

complying with the requirements for notarization and proper verification. They may give grounds for the revocation of his notarial
commission. 40 But they do not indubitably prove that the verification was inserted or intercalated after the letter-complaint was filed with the
Office of the President.
Nor is the fact of intercalation sufficiently established by the affidavit of Solita C. Santos. Private respondent Santos was one of the signatories to
the letter-complaint. In her affidavit, she prayed that she be dropped as one of the complainants since she had just joined the political party of
petitioner Joson. She decided to reveal the intercalation because she was disillusioned with the "dirty tactics" of Vice-Governor Tinio to grab
power from petitioner Joson. 41 Private respondent Santos cannot in anyway be considered an unbiased witness. Her motive and change of heart
render her affidavit suspect.
Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter-complaint was unverified when submitted to the Office of the President, the defect was not fatal. The
requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when he acted on the complaint.
Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. 42 Verification is mainly intended to secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are
done in good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculation. 43 The lack of verification is a mere formal defect. 44 The court may order
the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with
the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served. 45
II
In his second assigned error, petitioner questions the jurisdiction and authority of the DILG Secretary over the case. He contends that under the
law, it is the Office of the President that has jurisdiction over the letter-complaint and that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the alter-ego
principle because the power to discipline elective local officials lies with the President, not with the DILG Secretary.
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the
Investigating Authority. This is explicit from A.O. No. 23, to wit:
Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly verified, against elective local officials mentioned in the preceding
Section shall be acted upon by the President. The President, who may act through the Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred
to as the Disciplining Authority.
Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is hereby designated as the Investigating Authority.
He may constitute an Investigating Committee in the Department of the Interior and Local Government for the purpose.
The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the service, constitute a Special Investigating Committee in lieu of the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government. 46
Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive
Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the
Disciplinary Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his power of general supervision
over local governments. Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component
cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 47
The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties." 48 If the
subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. 49 The President's power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that
subordinate officers act within the law. 50Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. 51 And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his
opinion the good of the public service so requires. 52 Thus:
Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the President to conduct an investigation of the nature involved in this proceeding,
and in view of the nature and character of the executive authority with which the President of the Philippines is invested, the
constitutional grant to him of power to exercise general supervision over all local governments and to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed must be construed to authorize him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner herein.
Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not withou t limitation, but it at least implies authority to
inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and
not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and
investigation. 53
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the
DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to
petitioner Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to
discipline. 54
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political
agency. Thus:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,

and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. 55
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President. 56 The power of control is provided in the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. 57
Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. 58 As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate
some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he acts personally. 59 The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the
President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority. 60
The procedure how the Disciplining and Investigating Authorities should exercise their powers is distinctly set forth in the Local Government
Code and A.O. No. 23. Section 62 of the Code provides:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. (a) Within seven (7) days after the administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the President or the
sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof, and commence investigation of the case within ten (10) days after receipt of such answer of the respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 5 61 of A.O. No. 23 provide:
Sec. 1. Commencement. Within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt of the answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the complaint
and answer, together with their attachments and other relevant papers, to the Investigating Authority who shall commence the
investigation of the case within ten (10) days from receipt of the same.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Evaluation. Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the complaint and answer, the Investigating Authority shall determine
whether there is a prima facie case to warrant the institution of formal administrative proceedings.
When an administrative complaint is therefore filed, the Disciplining Authority shall issue an order requiring the respondent to submit his verified
answer within fifteen (15) days from notice. Upon filing of the answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the case to the Investigating
Authority for investigation.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary usurped the power of the President when he required petitioner to answer the
complaint. Undisputably, the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the President but it was the DILG Secretary who ordered petitioner to
answer.
Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should have first required
petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority for further
proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a
preliminary assessment of the case. 62 The President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further investigation. The
judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
III
In his third assigned error, petitioner also claims that the DILG erred in declaring him in default for filing a motion to dismiss. He alleges that a
motion to dismiss is not a pleading prohibited by the law or the rules and therefore the DILG Secretary should have considered it and given him
time to file his answer.
It is true that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading prohibited under the Local Government Code of 1991 nor in A.O. No. 23. Petitioner, however,
was instructed not to file a motion to dismiss in the order to file answer. Thrice, he requested for extension of time to file his answer citing as
reasons the search for competent counsel and the demands of his official duties. And, thrice, his requests were granted. Even the order of default
was reconsidered and petitioners was given additional time to file answer. After al the requests and seven months later, he filed a motion to
dismiss!
Petitioner should know that the formal investigation of the case is required by law to be finished within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
time of formal notice to the respondent. The extensions petitioners requested consumed fifty-five (55) days of this period. 63 Petitioner, in fact,
filed his answer nine (9) months after the first notice. Indeed, this was more than sufficient time for petitioner to comply with the order to file
answer.
The speedy disposition of administrative complaints is required by public service. The efficiency of officials under investigation is impaired when
a case hangs over their heads. Officials deserve to be cleared expeditiously if they are innocent, also expeditiously if guilty, so that the business of
government will not be prejudiced. 64
IV
In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive
suspension during the investigation. Preventive suspension is authorized under Section 63 of the Local Government Code, viz:
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:

(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city;
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the
gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence; Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective
officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against
an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or
grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of
guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
Executive Secretary Torres, on behalf of the President, imposed preventive suspension on petitioner Joson after finding that:
xxx xxx xxx
DILG Secretary Robert Z. Barbers, in a memorandum for the President, dated 23 June 1997, recommends that respondent be placed
under preventive suspension considering that all the requisites to justify the same are present. He stated therein that:
"Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, that is, after respondent has
answered the complaint, when the evidence of guilt is strong and, given the gravity of the offense, there is a great
possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence (Sec. 3, Rule 6 of Administrative Order No. 23).
The failure of respondent to file his answer despite several opportunities given him is construed as a waiver of his
right to present evidence in his behalf (Sec. 4, Rule 4 of Administrative Order No. 23). The requisite of joinder of
issues is squarely met with respondent's waiver of right to submit his answer. The act of respondent in allegedly
barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutes
grave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive of the province is in a position to influence the
witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the province dictates that extreme precautionary
measures be taken."
Upon scrutiny of the records and the facts and circumstances attendant to this case, we concur with the findings of the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government and find merit in the aforesaid recommendation.
WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the Department of the Interior and Local Government, respondent EDUARDO N. JOSON,
Governor of Nueva Ecija, is hereby placed under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION FOR A PERIOD OF SIXTY (60) DAYS, effective 11
July 1997, pending investigation of the charges filed against him.
SO ORDERED. 65
Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied with. Petitioner's failure to
file his answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of his right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result
of this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined. The Executive Secretary also found that the evidence of petitioner Joson's guilt was
strong and that his continuance in office during the pendency of the case could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity
of the evidence against him.
V
We now come to the validity of the January 8, 1998 Resolution of the Executive Secretary finding petitioner guilty as charged and imposing on
him the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months from office without pay.
Petitioner claims that the suspension was made without formal investigation pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7 of A.O. No. 23. Petitioner filed a
"Motion To Conduct Formal Investigation" three months before the issuance of the order of suspension and this motion was denied by the DILG
for the following reasons:
On November 19, 1997, complainants, through counsel, filed a Manifestation calling our attention to the Decision dated October 24,
1997 of the Court of Appeals, Fifth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 44694, entitled "Eduardo Nonato Joson versus Executive Secretary
Ruben D. Torres, et. al." In the aforestated decision, the Court of Appeals resolved to sustain the authority of this Department to
investigate this administrative case and has likewise validated the order of default as well as the order of preventive suspension of the
respondent.
We offer no objection and concur with the assertion of respondent that he has the right for the conduct of formal investigation.
However, before there shall be a formal investigation, joinder of issues must already be present or respondent's answer has already been
filed. In the case at bar, the admission of respondent's answer after having been declared in default was conditioned on the fact of
submission of position papers by the parties, after which, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent, instead of
submitting his position paper filed his subject motion while complainants manifested to forego the submission of position paper and
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings on hand.
Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied (Concerned

Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502). The essence of due process is to be found
in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence one may have in support of one's defense (Tajonera v. Lamaroza, 110
SCRA 438). To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process (Juanita Y. Say, et. al; vs.
IAC, G.R. No. 73451). Thus, when respondent failed to submit his position paper as directed and insisted for the conduct of formal
investigation, he was not denied of his right of procedural process.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for the Conduct of Formal Investigation, for lack of merit, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 66
The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is erroneous. Petitioner's right to a formal investigation is spelled out in the
following provisions of A.O. No. 23, viz:
Sec. 3 Evaluation. Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the complaint and answer, the Investigating Authority shall determine
whether there is a prima facie case to warrant the institution of formal administrative proceedings.
Sec. 4. Dismissal motu proprio. If the Investigating Authority determines that there is no prima facie case to warrant the institution of
formal administrative proceedings, it shall, within the same period prescribed under the preceding Section, submit its recommendation
to the Disciplining Authority for the motu propriodismissal of the case, together with the recommended decision, resolution, and order.
Sec. 5. Preliminary conference. If the Investigating Authority determines that there is prima facie case to warrant the institution of
formal administrative proceedings, it shall, within the same period prescribed under the preceding Section, summon the parties to a
preliminary conference to consider the following:
a) whether the parties desire a formal investigation or are willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of
the evidence on record; and
b) If the parties desire a formal investigation, to consider the simplification of issues, the possibility of obtaining
stipulation or admission of facts and of documents, specifically affidavits and depositions, to avoid unnecessary
proof, the limitation of number of witnesses, and such other matters as may be aid the prompt disposition of the
case.
The Investigating Authority shall encourage the parties and their counsels to enter, at any stage of the proceedings, into amicable
settlement, compromise and arbitration, the terms and conditions of which shall be subject to the approval of the Disciplining Authority.
After the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall issue an order reciting the matters taken up thereon, including the
facts stipulated and the evidences marked, if any. Such order shall limit the issues for hearing to those not disposed of by agreement or
admission of the parties, and shall schedule the formal investigation within ten (10) days from its issuance, unless a later date is
mutually agreed in writing by the parties concerned. 67
The records show that on August 27, 1997, petitioner submitted his Answer Ad Cautelam where he disputed the truth of the allegations that he
barged into the session hall of the capitol and committed physical violence to harass the private respondents who were opposed to any move for
the province to contract a P150 million loan from PNB. In his Order of October 8, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez admitted petitioner's Answer Ad
Cautelambut treated it as a position paper. On October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation. Petitioner reiterated
this motion on October 29, 1997. Petitioner's motion was denied on November 11, 1997. Secretary Barbers found petitioner guilty as charged on
the basis of the parties' position papers. On January 8, 1998, Executive Secretary Torres adopted Secretary Barbers' findings and recommendations
and imposed on petitioner the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay.
The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides that at the
preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This
provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted. The records
show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As respondent, he is accorded several rights under the law, to wit:
Sec. 65. Rights of Respondent. The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by
counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documentary evidence in his favor through compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused. 68 These rights are essentially part of procedural due
process. 69 The local elective official has the (1) the right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence.
These rights are reiterated in the Rules Implementing the Local Government Code 70 and in A.O. No. 23. 71 Well to note, petitioner, formally
claimed his right to a formal investigation after his Answer Ad Cautelam has been admitted by Undersecretary Sanchez.
Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers. There is
nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases
against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the
parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing. 72 A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the
Investigating Authority to dispense with a hearing especially in cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in contrast but contradictory
to each other. These contradictions are best settled by allowing the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Position papers are oftentimes prepared with the assistance of lawyers and their artful preparation can make the discovery of truth difficult. The jurisprudence cited by the
DILG in its order denying petitioner's motion for a formal investigation applies to appointive officials and employees. Administrative disciplinary
proceedings against elective government officials are not exactly similar to those against appointive officials. In fact, the provisions that apply to
elective local officials are separate and distinct from appointive government officers and employees. This can be gleaned from the Local
Government Code itself.

In the Local Government Code, the entire Title II of Book I of the Code is devoted to elective officials. It provides for their qualifications and
election, 73 vacancies
and
succession, 74 local
legislation, 75 disciplinary
actions, 76 and recall. 77 Appointive officers and employees are covered in Title III of Book I of the Code entitled "Human Resources and
Development." All matters pertinent to human resources and development in local government units are regulated by "the civil service law and
such rules and regulations and other issuances promulgated thereto, unless otherwise provided in the Code." 78 The "investigation and
adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees as well as their suspension and removal" are "in
accordance with the civil service law and rules and other pertinent laws," the results of which "shall be reported to the Civil Service
Commission." 79
It is the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Book V on the Civil Service, that primarily governs appointive officials and employees. Their
qualifications are set forth in the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Code. The grounds for administrative disciplinary action in
Book V are much more in number and are specific than those enumerated in the Local Government Code against elective local officials. 80 The
disciplining authority in such actions is the Civil Service Commission. 81 although the Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities,
provinces, cities and municipalities are also given the power to investigate and decide disciplinary actions against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction. 82 When a complaint is filed and the respondent answers, he must "indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his
answer is not considered satisfactory."83 If the officer or employee elects a formal investigation, the direct evidence for the complainant and the
respondent "consist[s] of the sworn statement and documents submitted in support of the complaint and answer, as the case may be, without
prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence deemed necessary . . ., upon which the cross-examination by respondent and the complainant,
respectively, is based." 84 The investigation is conducted without adhering to the technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings." 85 Moreover,
the appointive official or employee may be removed or dismissed summarily if (1) the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2)
when the respondent is a recidivist; and (3) when the respondent is notoriously undesirable. 86
The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials are markedly different from appointive officials. 87 The rules
on the removal and suspension of elective local officials are more stringent. The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in
administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but not to those elected. An elective official, elected by popular vote,
is directly responsible to the community that elected him. The official has a definite term of office fixed by law which is relatively of short
duration. Suspension and removal from office definitely affects and shortens this term of office. When an elective official is suspended or
removed, the people are deprived of the services of the man they had elected. Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the
services of the elective official of their choice. 88 Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his rights
and the evidence against him strongly dictates their imposition.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of January 8, 1998 of the public respondent Executive Secretary is declared null and void and is set aside.
No Cost.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995

AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR.,respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive Service Board is challenged in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES)
Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President
for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. 1
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission 2 passed Resolution No. 93-4359, viz:
RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359
WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service
Commission, . . .;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that "The Civil Service Commission, as the
central personnel agency of the government, is mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progresiveness and courtesy in the civil service, . . .";
WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 grants the Commission the
power, among others, to administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels

and ranks in the Civil Service;

WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 Provides, among others, that The
Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examination, or based highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career
positions; and (3) security of tenure;
WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the administrative Code of 1987 provides that "The third level shall
cover Positions in the Career Executive Service";
WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative need to consolidate, integrate and unify the administration of all
levels of positions in the career service.
WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 confers on the
Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises.
WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that the Civil Service Commission shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy and the necessary implications thereof;
NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Civil Service Commission hereby resolves to streamline reorganize
and effect changes in its organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known
as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget,
properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive
Service.
The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV. In a letter to petitioner, dated
June 7, 1994, the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chief Presidential legal Counsel, stated:
xxx xxx xxx
On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 93-4359 which abolished the Career Executive
Service Board.
Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, including whether the Civil
Service Commission has authority to abolish the Career Executive Service Board. Because these issues remain unresolved,
the Office of the President has refrained from considering appointments of career service eligibles to career executive ranks.
xxx xxx xxx
You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate court to settle the legal issues arising from issuance by the Civil
Service Commission of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, for guidance of all concerned.
Thank You.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been
abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following
arguments:
A.
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT COMMISSION USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH THE
ISSUANCE OF CSC: RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;
B.
ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS
OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY, THROUGH THE
ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359.
Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed with the contentions of petitioner. Respondent Commission, however, chose to defend
its ground. It posited the following position:
ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC
I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC.
II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR APPOINTMENT TO A CESO RANK OF
PETITIONER EUGENIO WAS A VALID ACT OF THE CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEFECT.
III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE CESB IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAS
PREVIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CESO RANK FOUR (4) OFFICIALS SIMILARLY SITUATED AS SAID PETITIONER.
FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. ASSUMING THERE WAS NO QUORUM, IS
NOT THE FAULT OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF THE PRESIDENT WHO HAS
THE POWER TO APPOINT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CESB.

IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW (Sec. 12 (1), Title I,
Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of the 1987). THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD ALREADY BEEN
SETTLED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT DISMISSED THE PETITION FILED BY THE HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., RENATO V. DIAZ, AND MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R. NO. 114380. THE AFOREMENTIONED
PETITIONERS ALSO QUESTIONED THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB WITH THE COMMISSION.
We find merit in the petition. 3
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1,
1974 4 which adopted the Integrated Plan. Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan provides:
Article IV Career Executive Service
1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a continuing pool of well-selected and development oriented career
administrators who shall provide competent and faithful service.
2. A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in this Chapter as the Board, is created to serve as the governing body
of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall consist of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as presiding
officer, the Executive Secretary and the Commissioner of the Budget as ex-officio members and two other members from the
private sector and/or the academic community who are familiar with the principles and methods of personnel administration.
xxx xxx xxx
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection, classification, compensation and career
development of members of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall set up the organization and operation of the
service. (Emphasis supplied)
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream
of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public
Officers
and
Employees, 5 viz:
Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function. In
so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the legislature may
decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to
create and define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created,
or whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the
legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and
duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the office.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General
Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17
provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one Assistant
Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes
in the organization as the need arises.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which
enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission, viz:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The Commission shall have the following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive Director headed by an Executive Director, with a Deputy Executive Director shall implement
policies, standards, rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission; coordinate the programs of the offices of the
Commission and render periodic reports on their operations, and perform such other functions as may be assigned by the
Commission.
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2) members shall have the following functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman with legal advice and assistance; render counselling services;
undertake legal studies and researches; prepare opinions and ruling in the interpretation and application of the Civil Service
law, rules and regulations; prosecute violations of such law, rules and regulations; and represent the Commission before any
court or tribunal.
(4) The Office of Planning and Management shall formulate development plans, programs and projects; undertake research
and studies on the different aspects of public personnel management; administer management improvement programs; and
provide fiscal and budgetary services.
(5) The Central Administrative Office shall provide the Commission with personnel, financial, logistics and other basic
support services.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records shall formulate and implement policies, standards, rules and regulations

pertaining to personnel records maintenance, security, control and disposal; provide storage and extension services; and
provide and maintain library services.
(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation shall formulate and implement policies, standards, rules and
regulations relative to the administration of position classification and compensation.
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall provide leadership and assistance in developing and
implementing the overall Commission programs relating to recruitment, execution and placement, and formulate policies,
standards, rules and regulations for the proper implementation of the Commission's examination and placement programs.
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and assistance in the formulation and evaluation of
personnel systems and standards relative to performance appraisal, merit promotion, and employee incentive benefit and
awards.
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development shall provide leadership and assistance in the development and retention of
qualified and efficient work force in the Civil Service; formulate standards for training and staff development; administer
service-wide scholarship programs; develop training literature and materials; coordinate and integrate all training activities
and evaluate training programs.
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies, standards, rules and regulations for the effective
conduct or inspection and audit personnel and personnel management programs and the exercise of delegated authority;
provide technical and advisory services to Civil Service Regional Offices and government agencies in the implementation of
their personnel programs and evaluation systems.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in the development and implementation of
policies, standards, rules and regulations in the accreditation of employee associations or organizations and in the adjustment
and settlement of employee grievances and management of employee disputes.
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and implement policies, standards, rules and regulations governing
corporate officials and employees in the areas of recruitment, examination, placement, career development, merit and awards
systems, position classification and compensation, performing appraisal, employee welfare and benefit, discipline and other
aspects of personnel management on the basis of comparable industry practices.
(14) The Office of Retirement Administration shall be responsible for the enforcement of the constitutional and statutory
provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement of government officials
and employees.
(15) The Regional and Field Offices. The Commission shall have not less than thirteen (13) Regional offices each to be
headed by a Director, and such field offices as may be needed, each to be headed by an official with at least the rank of an
Assistant Director.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control
as enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively
attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is
expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook." 6The essential
autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not
made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one
functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain "policy and program coordination." This is clearly etched out in
Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with
or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system
of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent
provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of
the attached corporation or agency.
Respondent Commission also relies on the case of Datumanong, et al., vs. Civil Service Commission, G. R. No. 114380 where the petition
assailing the abolition of the CESB was dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice to state that the reliance is misplaced considering that the
cited case was dismissed for lack of standing of the petitioner, hence, the lack of cause of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 109406 September 11, 1998

REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, ROMEO T. ACOSTA, DINAH A. AGATI, RODRIGO AGIR JR., REY M. T. AGUINALDO, ELEAZAR S.
ALAIRA, MARCIAL C. AMARO JR., LEONOR M. ARZADON, MARLENE C. ARZAGA, MIGUEL G. BADION, NORMITA S.
BALLON, SOCORRO B. DEL MONTE, TEODORA B. CABRERA, ERLINDA CANTIL, ARIEL P. CATINDIG, MA. HAYLEY N.
CONCEPCION, MARY ANN C. CRUZ, MA. VICTORIA ASUMPTU P. DACANAY, FEBES M. DE LEON, LIBERTY M. DELIMA,
MARITESS I. ESCUBIO, RITA D. FLORELIZ, CARIDAD C. FRANCISCO, LEVI F. CABALFIN, FE GARRIDO, JULIE GOROSPE,
NELSON V. GOROSPE, IMELDA GUINTANGUIJO, NENITA GUTIERREZ, SALLY B. IMPERIAL, NERISSA B. JARABE, FE G.
LOO, MA. IRENE E. LORENZO, LORIDA D. MACARAAN, DANILO P. MANOLOTO, ADORACION M. MENDOZA, CECILIA
MENDOZA, EMMANUEL MIRAFLORES, LLARINA S. MOJICA, ZENAIDA B. MUNOZ, ALICIA S. NERY, NOEL O. PADILLA,
ERVY C. PASCUAL, MA. MADELINE R. PATAWARAN, CRISTINA B. PAULINO, IRENEO T. PEREZ, MA. EVELINA RASCO,
AUDREY T. ROSETE, LUMINADA C. ROTOL, FRANCISCO SANTOS, JR., JULIET U. TEXON, HELEN A. TOBIAS, LARRY
R.VILLAFLOR, RAYMOND R. VIRGINO, LILY YBAO, VICKY U. YLAGAN, NENITA R. ZABALA, CHARLIE U. AGATI, NOEL C.
AQUINO, ERLINDA P. AYAP, CONRADO A. BRAVANTE, JR., EMMA F. CABRERA, MAY R. CANLAS, SUSAN CASTILLA,
CORAZON B. CHECA, BLESILDA T. CORRO, EMMA DIEZ, MA. LOURDES G. FERRER, LILIHUA B. GARCIA, JESLINA B.
GOROSPE, MYRNA GUMANGAN, LERMA D. HONRADO, ISRAEL S. INOCENCIO, JONAS P. LEONES, AVEL A. MORADO,
JUANITA NACINO,GENEVIEVE AUSTRIA PADILLA, ALMA O. PELOBELLO, NELIA J. QUESADA, CRISTINA M. REGUNAY,
DEMILOUR B. REYES, MOLINA REYNALDO, GLENN ADONIS M. RICO, BELEN E. SOTALBO, ANDREA B. TALOSIG,
FLORDELIZA TENAZAS, MERLY B. TOMILLUSO, MA. ROSALINA VELASCO, NATIVIDAD YABES, PAULO F. ABESAMIS,
FELICITAS AREVALO, FORCIA B. ATOS, BELINDA I. DEANG, CONSUELO T. DUANO, ERNESTINA JOSE, GERARDO O.
MENDOZA, LUZVIMINDA P. MENDOZA, AMANTE S. PERALTA, YOLANDA M. TATANG, DOLORES M. ANGCO, MA. VENUS
BERONGOY, LYDIA M. BONA, MA. LOURDES CASAL, MABEL COLOMA, MARY JUNE D. DANDAN, ERLINDA O. DOMINGO,
JOSEPHINE P. EBORA, ELENA B. FERNANDEZ, EVANGELINE FERRER-LIMYOLO, AMPARO V. GEREZ, ZENAIDA V.
GUTIERREZ, MILAGROS C. IMBAO JULIE JALAAN, LETICIA A. LLAMERA, CAROLINA A. LOPEZ, MARIUS NORMAN
MACALALAD, ALICIA L. MALLILLIN, REMEDIOS L. MERCADO, DINA B. MONTEALEGRE, SUSAN MORTOS, JUANITO F.
MUNSAYAC, PAULA ONG, DALISAY PASCUAL, MA. ALMA M. PILIPINA, NICETA A. ROXAS, AMADOR ATENDIDO, LUZCELY
H. VEDAN, NELLY VILLARAMA, ESTALA S. AGUILES, JEAN F. ALLADO, YVONNE B. BALDADO, EUPREFIA BALDEMOR,
NICETAS B. BAUTISTA, ANTONIO BENITEZ, JANETTE BERNARDO, MARIA B. BONGCO, GREGORIO ALEXIS M. CAAYAO,
FREDESVINDA G. CASUNCAD, ROSA G. COPON, AMILYN DANTES, HERMINIA ECLEO, FILIPINA V. EDRALIN, ROSALINA
O. ENRIQUEZ, MARY FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA B. GIMENO LEONARDO C. HERNANDEZ, ERLINDA MENDOZA, AURORA V.
PIDO, FORTUNATA C. RAYOSO, MARIA V. RICAFORT, DORINA S. ROJAS, LEONITA R. SIBUNGA, ERNA D. SY, ALMEIDA J.
TAGALA, EDGARDO TUBANG, SOFIA VELACRUZ, EUGENE N. ANTOLIN, MA. ELVIRA P. JAVIER, LISETTE G. MONENO,
CLEOFE P. PATANAO, MARY JEAN V. REYES, SHIRLEY G. AQUINO, CHRISTY GEMPES, JOSE FEDERICO M. GEMDRANO,
JOSEPHINE G. RANCAP, JOSETTE B. SAN LUIS, MARINA A. BORRETA, CHERRY B. CID, OLIVIA P. JOVE, MA. TERESA M.
MARING, BETTY P. MOJICA, EDITHA T. MUNIELA, EMMANUEL T. PILAR, JOVITA C. ROBOSA, MA. NENA M.
VILLANUEVA, MARK A. ANTONIO, PRISCILLA G. BACENA, SUSAN C. BENOZA, RHODORA A. CALUNGCAGIN, ANA MARIA
M. CRISOSTOMO, ELENITO E. CUNANAN, ROMANA A. DE LEON, EDMUNDO B. FLORENDO, DANIEL GARCIA, AMELIN F.
MAGAT, PATRIA A. NULLAS, MYRNA S. TADENA, THELMA TOTANES, ALFONSO A. VERGARA, BELEN M. ANTIPORDA,
ROSALINA B. CARANDO, ESTELLA P. DE LEON, CRESENCIA I. OLIVAR, LOURIE A. OLIVERIO, TERESITA A. RAMOS,
ELISEO T. REYES, PUREZA T. SAYON, JOSEFINA B. TEJANA, VILLAROSA C. ABEN, JONATHAN ACABAL, POLICARPIO
ALCARAZ, TERESITA C. AMOG, GLORIA AROGANTE, EVENLYN BANDOLIN, GERRY BANDOLIN, ADOR BARROS, CELSO
L. BAUTISTA, FELICITAS S. BAUTISTA, CRISTNINA DE GUZMAN, ESTELA C. FACELO, RAMON FLORES, ANGELITO V.
FONTANILLA, GERMAN GALAOS, REMEDIOS S. GARCIA, MANNY G. GINGCO, VIRGILIO HALILI, ZENAIDA IBAY,
ERNESTO B. JARABE, OSCAR LEANO, TEODORA O. LEONCIO, CARMEN R. LUARCA, EMER REX MATIBAG, MARLYN R.
MENDOZA, BIBIANO C. MIRANDA, ROMERICO MA. T. MOLINA, ERLINDA C. PAYOTAS, GIANINA H. PUNZALAN,
CRISTINA H. REYES, PETER RAMIL REYES, RUTH JEAN B. SOLANO, WILFREDO C. TORREDONDO, NARCISO VILLAMOR,
ERLINDAS S. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR H. VILLAS, GUILLERMA B. ALCONIS, AGNES CAMPO, JOCELYN CLEMENTE, AMADO
B. ESPANOL, LEONILO G. GONZALES, FE A. MENDIZABAL, TERESITA MORANARTE, ERLINDA P. ROMULO, FLORA
TANGCO, HONARIO T. TORRENUEVA, WILMA YNGENTE, SUSANA N. ANTOLIN, JOEL U. BAUN, RHODORA C. BRUCAL,
CARMELITA G. CAYABAN, CARIDAD CLARIN, LIDINILA N. CONCEPCION, FARIDA F. FLAVIANO, TEODORA B.
MACARAYAN, HILARIA G. MAGCULANG, HERNAN MARILLA, MONINA R. MENDRES, HERMINA A. MOLINA, YOLANDA
GIGI H. MOLINA, RHODORA C. PADILLA, SANTIAGO PALACPAC, JR., ROMMEL PANGILINAN, DIANA JEAN N. PINAROC,
MELANIE C. REY, MERCY L. REYES, HELEN RUTH BRIONES TABION, MARIA AMELITA DJ ORTIZ TAMAYO, LEONIDES
VALER, NELIA F. VILLANUEVA, MA. CRISTINA F. ABAYA, MACARIO A. BASCON, NANCY ROSE CAUGMA, ELIGIO T.
ILDEFONSO, MA. DELIA P. MEIMBAN, ROMEO G. MENDIZABAL, MICHAEL LL. TADEO, JOSE HENRY M. TALABIS,
MELCHOR R. TARUC, PONCIANO M. ARANEZ, REMEDIOS A. ASUNCION, EDILBERTA BUENO, ELIZABETH F. CRUZ,
ARACELI V. ESPINO, RICARDO A. FIAN, LOURDES JM. FLORES, MA. ELIZABETH GALANG, JOSE C. MORALES, JR.,
JOSELITO R. OCHING, JANET REYES, BENITO C. SORIANO, MARCELO B. VALDERAMA, LINDBERG M.S. VALEROS,
SARITA RENDON VALEROS, STEPHEN E. ABELLA, MARIA FRANCIA ALFEREZ, FELY BALABBO, FE BOJOCAN, CARMELO
Z. CAUSAPIN, NIDA R. DEDEL, JOSEFINA S. DIMALANTA, MARIA TERESITA ESPINOL, BELEN FERNANDEZ, GERUNDO C.
FERNANDEZ, HELEN LEE D. JIMENEZ, JAKE MAKI, ROSITA M. PINIANO, CHITO REYES, EFREN F. REYES, EVELYN
REYES, ENRICO A.O. SANTOS, NELIE VALLANGCA, VALENTE VILLANUEVA, MANUEL D. ROJAS, PAULINA G. CASTRO,
FANCY M. LEONES, ZENAIDA R. OPENA, FRANCISCO B.A. SAAVEDRA, ARNOLD L. SINZACA, MANUEL P.S. SOLIS,
DEMETRIA STA. ANA, LALLY JEAN S. AGUILAR, ELENA D. APOLONIO, RODOLFO A. DE AUSEN, MARITES O. DELFIN,
EMMANUEL M. ESGUERRA, NELSON ITLIONG, ALBINO A. BELEN, ROBERTO E. BELEN, FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR.,
ANTONIO CENTENO, ERNESTO R. FRUTAS, JOSEFINA C. IGNACIO, PEDRITO N. KALALANG, BELLA P. MILLO, TIRSO P.
PARIAN, JR., CERLINO ALMENDAREZ, WILLIE V. AMBROCIO, MA. TERESA G. AQUINO, JUANITA BAUTISTA, CELODONIO
C. BERNABE, REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, ALICIA CASTILLO, ANITA D. ESPARES, JOEL FLORES, CITA G. GERADA,

ROBERTO O. IGSOC, ANNALISA V. JAVIER, VICTORIA B. MALACAD, ANTONIO C. MANILA, EVELYN MENDEZ, LERMA M.
MENDOZA, EUFEMIA NUCUM, LEONVINA A. OLIVO, AMIE T. RABANG, LILIA J. RADA, DELAGIA D. ROBEL, DEGNISITA G.
SERRANO, PETRONIO TADIOSA, RODERICO A. TAN, CHARLITO VALDEZ, ALMA M. VAZQUEZ, PEDRO E. VICTORIA,
SERGIO ABUAN, RODOLFO ANGELES, MARTINIANO ROTOL, MERLIE T. CASIGAY, THELMA F. CHUSON, ENCARNACION
CONCEPCION, IMELDA CORTEZ, OBDULIA B. DORADO, EVELYN S. ESTRADA, MARIO S. FERNANDEZ, RUPERTO E.
GABUTAN, SONIA R. IGAYA, RAYMUNDA O. LABUGUEN, AUREA LACHICA, LINA M. MANALAYSAY, SALVADOR MANIOSO
BERLINA B. MANOSO, FLORANGEL MEDRANO, TERESITA S. MESTA, JOCELYN MONTILLANO, LUZ C. PERALTA, SOFIO
B. QUINTANA, YOLANDA B. QUINTANA, SANTOS RABARA, ROSALINO R. ROMUALDO, MARIFE RUBA, CRISTETTA
RULLODA, RHODORA SANTOS, VICTOR SEE, ELNORA G. TALEON, VIRGINIA V. TALEON, MELCHOR U. TAMAYO,
MILAGROS VALDEZ, MARITA WELGAS-BRIZ, VISITACION A. ZANO, ELVIRA D. AGPOON, VIRGINIA ANGELES,
ISABELITA V. AUSTRIA, ADELAIDA S. BALANZA, ORPHA B. BALILIA, FE T. CARPIO, LOIDA E. HUNAT, ROSEMARIE LABIS,
LUZ MARIA S. LANSIGAN, BONIFACIO RABANG, ANGELITA RECELI, BERTRAM SIGAION, SARAH F. TUBIG, MYRNA M.
VILORIA, LOURDES C. WAGAN, SILVERIA M. ANTOLIN, BONOFACIO ARCE, MARINA ASIAO, PERIGRINO S. BAGUNU,
ARISCALITA A. BAKER, MARIETTA L. BAL, NELY M. BUTIC, MOISES H. BUTIC, GLORIA S. CABATIC, GERARDO T.
CABREROS, BENJAMIN C. CARINO, ERASMO M. CORTADO, EVANGELINE J. DE LEON, EVARISTO C. EUSEBIO, EDEN M.
GAZAL, EVA M. JACA, VELERIANO V. LADIA, JR., NORMA CASUCOG, FELIX L. LECHONCITO, MA. DOLORES M.
LEGARDA, RODOLFO P. LIPAOPAO, JR., LETY A. LORENZO, MARLON C. MELCHOR, ELPIDIO M. MOLINYAWE, JUAN S.
ODANGA, SUEMELITO V. PAA, VENIA T. RAYALA, FLORDELINO M. REY, CARME T. ROSETE, CORAZON C. SALAMAT,
ANASTACIO B. SISON, VICENTA F. GAERLAN, JULIET G. TOLENTINO, GLORIA E. URBIZTONDO, ANDRA C. ABARQUEZ,
THELMA S. ALCARAZ, SALVE A. ASUNCION, ALLAN V. BARCENA, NERA S. BAYANI, NEMESIO GERONILLA, PIO P. BOTE.
DOLORES R. CATINDIG, CORWIN B. CECILLANO, ALEX Z. CHENG, GERTRUDEZ C. CORTEZ, ARNULFO A. ESCOBIDO,
EUEGENE V. ESTRADA, GENESIS J. FRANCISCO, VIVIEN O. GALEON, FLORDELIZA D. GARCIA, MITCHELLE A. LACHICA,
THELMA I. LAGMAN, MA. CAROLINA G. MELICOR, MA. MAGDALENA E. MORENO, FRANCIONIE G. NONO, BERNARDO
A. RESURRECCION, VILMA A. SABADO, ELVIRA G. SABANDO, ALEJANDRO R. SIBUCAO, JR., WILFREDO H. ZAPANTA,
HERMENIGILDO S. ALLASCO, REBECCA BURGOS, MARIEL D. GARCIA, BELINDA M. LEAL, AGAPITA MAGBOJOS, MA.
LOURDES VICTUELLES, CARMELITA ALMENDAREZ, PERLA ABELLA, ESMERALDA R. DE CLARO, LOURDES
DECAMORA, ROMUALDO DELA CRUZ, RUFINO DIAROG, HAYDEE LATTO, CARMEN MELCHOR, MERCEDES U. ULIBAS,
EMY R. ZAPANTA, NELDA C. ABLAN, VENERANDO R. ATUD, NESTOR A. BAMBALAN, PROCESO V. BAUTISTA, EMMA C.
CONCEPCION, JUAN G. DAYAG, ELISA Q. FARRO, EMILIE M. LICO, TEODORA B. PAJARILLAGA, CONSESA P. QUINONES,
VERONICA G. REY, TERESITA O. SERRANO, AVELINA VALDEZ, ELVIRA L. ADVINCULA, RENATO P. AGUILAR, ROSALINA
ALFORJA, LORENSO ALMENDAREZ, SATA H. ALTAP, JAIME AQUINO, DOMINICO ARROBAN, JR. OCTAVIUS L. ASPACIO,
MYRNA V. BERNABE, CRESENSIO R. CALDERON, JR., RUPITO C. CARACAS, PILAR F. CHUA, ENGRACIA M. CRUZ,
MANUEL CRUZ, AGUSTIN DELASAN, NATIVIDAD C. ESPIRITU, ROLANDO I ETEROSA, EDEN FABIAN, LILIA A. FILAMOR,
MIGUEL O. GAPAS, ODENCIO GARCIA, PIEDAD R. GARCIA, BIEN GUICO, PRESENTASION O. HAZAL, MARILYN B.
LAGADAY, LORENZO LAMENDAREZ, ALEJANDRINO MANAS, ROMEO L. MANOSO, MELINDA MARTINEZ, JOYBERT
MIJARES, WENCESLADA A. MIRAN, TEOFILO V. OBLENA, AMELIA C. OLIVERIA, SOCORRO C. PALENCIA, NELSON
PANGILINAN, FAUSTINO PASON, ELIAS PATAL, ANDRES PELA, AURORA V. PIOL, NOLI PRADO, ANITA C. RAMBAYON,
EVANGELINE E. RODRIGUES, ROSE R. SUNICO, JULIETA F. TABERNILLA, SALVACION B. VAZQUEZ, EMILY VERANO,
EDWIN VILLANUEVA, JOEL V. VILLAR, SATURNINA VITE, DON ABARRIENTOS, JOSENDEL O. AGRA, MARISTELA ARIEL,
JOHN B. ARROBANG, ALBERTO A. BANATAO, FEDERICO M. BARREDA, PAULO BERINA, RENATO M. BORJA, GENARO
BORQUIN, FLOR A. CABUNOG, ELIZABETH S. CALDERON, FRESCILLA N. CALIMAG, CRISTETA A. CASTRO, MA. ELENA
CONSTANTINO, MILA CORRE, RENATO D. CRUZ, JOSEFINA L. DE LEON, RHODORA R. DE VEYRA, CONSOLADORA A.
DIMARANAN, ERNESTO R. DIONISIO, ERNESTO S. DIONISIO, JR., LIGAYA B. DIONISIO, OSCAR EMBERGA, PEDO
FALLARIA. MA. LOURDES V. FELICITAS, GRISELDA V. GALEON, CRESENCIO MAXIMO GARCIA, MARY ANN GENEROSO,
WHYLEEN SM. GONZALES, ANGELINA C. GREGORIO, SALVADOR B. JANA JR., LYNETTE T. LAROYA, OFELIA G.
LIPORADA, GRACIANO MANUEL, BIBIANO H. MEJINO, THEODORE MORAL, ANTONIO P. MORENO, JR., ANICETO D.
ORDEN, IMELDA C. PANGGA, CONSOLACION PANGILINAN, ROSITA P. PARINA, ELPIDIO N. QUITERO, MYRNA RAMOS,
GLENDA B. REFIL, MA. TERESA REFORSADO, HEIDI D. REGALA, RUFINA R. REYES, SUSAN H. ROQUERO, AJIT RYE II,
LEO J. SAGUGUIT, MARINO K. SANTOS, LINA D. SEGUNIAL, ALBA SORIANO, JESSICA SORIANO, ROMEO B. TRONO,
ANGELITA T. VILORIA, TIRSO ABAD, FEDERICO ABILO, LOLITA L. ANOVA, OPRIASA ANTONIO, JERRY B. AQUINO,
RODERICK ARAO, RENATO ARROYO, RUBEN ASENSI, ERNESTO BALINGIT, ALBERTO A. BANATA, JOSEPHINE
BARRIENTOS, MARCELINO BERINA, WILFREDO BONILCA, ED C. BONILLA, FRANCISCO BRAZA, ANONINA S.
BRILLANTES, ROGELIO O. CADADAN, RENE CALICA, TERESITA CALUMA, EDGARDO CAPARAS, ALEX M. CARANDANG,
MIGNON C. CARLOS, CRISTETA CASTRO, MA. ERLINDA B. CAUSAY, REYNALDO M. CENTENO, DANILO CERVANTES,
ELEJIA R. CHARIE, CARMEN G. CLUTARIO, MANUEL F. CRUZ, DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, ABAS DE JESUS, ROMULO DEL
MUNDO, JUAN B. DESPABELADERO, GAVINO ESMERO, FIDEL C. ESTANISLAO, ROWEN A. EUSTAQUIO, CORAZON
FERNANDEZ, ALBERTINE FLORES, RIOLITA H. GALLEGO, MARCELINO GATCHALEAN, JIMMY GIDRAMA, RUFINO
GUTIERREZ, MERCEDITA S. HARING, MAY HARINGA, ROMEO P. IBARRIENTOS, BERLINO INFANTE, JOSELYN V. VILLA,
CATALINO LIMBO, ORIOSA LISING, BOYET F. LITA, ENRICO LIWANAG, ALTHEA O. LOTA, VINA P. MACATANGAY,
NORBERTO MADADO, FLORINIA NADADO, JAIME NADADO, CONNIE NAGAMOS, TESSIE NAGAMOS, AMALIA U. NELL,
EDILBERTO OROCAY, RESTITUTO P. PARDINAS, ROSITA P. PARINA, EUGENIO PATAG, FERMIN PAVIA, BERNARDO PENA,
JOSEMARIA P. PEREZ, ARMIDA D. PULLO, LAURO S. PUNZALAN, JUSTINA QUINORES, NANOY C. REANO, EDDIE REYES,
FRANCISCO ROMERO, SUSAN ROQUERO, WILFREDO RUZGAL, CONRADO SALAZAR, ODENCIA C. SALVADOR,
TEODORA B. SANDOVAL, RODANTE SANTIAGO, GLORIA SANTOS, JOSE C. SANTOS, FLORANTE P. SOMERA, MELISSA B.
STA CRUZ, JOSE TABIGAN, ANTONIO TALASTAS, DOMINGO G. TARNATE, JR., IGMEDIO TIONGSON, STEPHEN U.
TOLEDO, ROMEO UMAYAN, BENJAMIN URBANO, MALOU B. VERA, JERRY VISTO, AUGUSTO YUSON, JOSE S. AGUSTIN,
LEIS ALEJANDRO, EDWIN E. ALLADA, ROLANDO ANDRADE, LHITA CABUNGAN, LOUIE CATUDIO, REYNALDO M.
CENTENO, DIOSMEDADO T. COCAL, EVANGELINE I. CORCUERA, REMY D. CORTEZ, JONATHAN C. DANGA, FRED DE
CLARO, MAURO DE JESUS, EFREN DE JUCOS, GEORGE DE LEON, SHIRLEY DEPASUCAT, MARIA REYNA DONDAY, AURA

ALELI P. DUIROS, DIONICA DURANTE, MARCELO ENRIQUE, FERDINAND ESPIRITU, MIRASOL ESPIRITU, RUBY T.
FAMORCAN, JOSE C. FORTUNO, BEVERLY FRANCISCO, JOSE Z. GALLARDO, REYNALDO GANTONG, NILO GARCIA,
LONESTO GENOVEZA, FELIPE HERRERA, FELIPE G. ISIP, JR., RANDY C. MABANA, CESAR MACAALAY, ROGELIO
MANGILIT, EMILIO MANUEL, JOSE MARINAS, JAIME MATA, DANILO MIANO, JOVITO NAROG, FELISA A. NUESCA,
REYNALDO OLAHAY, ANSELMO PARANAS, JR., RESTITUTO P. PARDINAS, MARIAN G. PASCUAL, MARCELLANO P.
PEREZ, NEIL PIAMONTE, REYNALDO QUIROS, EFREN RAMOS, CARLOS RAMOS, MAMERTO RESURRECCION,
QUINONES RONILO, ARTURO C. SANTOS, M.C. SANVICTORES, ROMEO G. SUMULONG, AURELIO G. TAN, JUNIFER TAN,
TERESITA B. TOMAS, APOLLO URBANO, VICTORIA B. VALDEZ, CONCESA L. ALDAY, ELMER Y. CORPUZ, ANNIE L.
CORPUZ, ZENAIDA M. DE GUZMAN, MERLINDA V. DE JESUS, ISAURO R. DOROSAN, MA. ELENA D. EBONA, LETICIA C.
EUSEBIO, ALEJANDRO V. FERNANDEZ, EVITA B. GARABLIES, NELSON GARCIA, ROWENA M. HUISCA, JESSIE LADISLA,
JUVY P. LADISLA, RANDY LAGUNILLA, LANIE A. MABANA, SAMSON MACOB, ANTONIO MAMMAY, RICARDO
PALAGANAS, LUNINGNING C. PANGILINAN, VILMA PORCADELA, ROGELIO RONQUILLO, MA. VICTORIA P. SOMERA,
MIRASOL R. TUGADE, DOMINADOR ABAD, BRICCIO P. ABAN, KELVIN C. ABARRA, NESTOR ABENIS, SYLVIA C.
ABUNGAN, (ATTY.) ANSELMO ABUNGAN, ELENITA A. ACUNA, DANILO C. ADINA, PETRONIO C. AGUILA, SYLVIA S.
ALCANTARA, MARCELO ALILIO, ROMEO L. ALMEDA, NORBETO ALMERINO, LUISITO M. ALMOGELA, DAHLIA R.
ALMOSARA, JOEL P. ALMOSARA, CATER AMBROSIO, EDITHA A. AMISCARAY, MA. VICTORIA I. AMORES, LEONARDO
APIL, ANTONIO N. APOSTOL, JR., NENA T. AQUINO, PATRICIO M. ARAGON, JR., SYLVIA ARBOLEDA, JOSE P. ARZADON,
MARIO ASIS, ADELAIDA AUAYANG, MARIO A. AURELIO, ROBERTO M. AVELLANA, TERESITA J. AVENTURADO, EMOLYN
E. AZURIN, EDITHA BACHAR, GLORIA M. BACONG, GERONIMO BADULIS, JR., GLADIOLA M. BAGADIONG, AMELIA G.
BALAIS, FEDERICO A. BALANON, RODRIGO BALILLA, JOFFER L. BALLESTEROS, TERESITA P. BALMES, ANITA. BAURA,
CRISANTO A. BAURA, JR., SERVIN BAUTISTA, GABINO BELLEZA, FLORENCIA P. BENOSA, DANNY BERCHES, HERNANI
BERNAL, ELVIRA V. BERSABE, ISMAEL C. BOCO, MARCIAL BENJAMIN BUNGOLAN, FELY A. BOSTON, ANGEL A. BRAVO,
RAUL BRITANICO, LILITA G. BROCES, EDUARDO S. BUTIERREZ, JOSEFA C. CAABAY, MICHAEL B. CABALDA, SIROLAN
B. CABE, CESAR B. CABRERA, BENJAMIN S. CADAWAN, JR., VERONA J. CALAMANAN, ADELAIDA B. CALOOY, ROBERT F.
CALUGAY, JUANITO CALVEZ, NECITA M. CAMANGONAN, SATURNINO Y. CAMANGONAN, JUAN G. CANLAS, FRANCISCA
D. CANUEL, ARTURO D. CANUELA, EVELYN CANUELA, JESUS CANUELA, NELIA D. CANUELA, AVELINO C. CAPARAS,
RICARDO R. CARINGAL, MA. LOURDES CASIMIRO, ARCADIO I. CASIS, DANIEL C. CASIS, ELENA C. CASIS, ROBERTO S.
CASTILLO, FELIPE P. CASUNCAD, JUANITO A. CATOR, RENATO CATOR, JONAS R. CHECA, RENE A. CILINDRO, ELWIN B.
CINCO, ROSALINDA CIPRIANO, JOSE MARIE CLOMA, MARJORIE COLLADO, ELVETA C. COMSTI, ALLAN ANTONIO C.
CONDA, APOLONIO V. CRUZ, FE C. CRUZ, FLORDELIZA CRUZ, LEODEGARIO CUEVAS, OLIVER CUEVAS, REMEDIOS
CUEVAS, GLORIA T. DACANAY, MARIBEL DAMIAN, MARY ANNE C. DE CASTRO, CESAR S. DE CHAVEZ, ANICET F. DE
GUZMAN, AURELIO DE GUZMAN, JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, RUBY B. DE GUZMAN, BERNARD DE LARA, ALFONSO S. DE
LEON, DANILO DE LEON, RETITUTO C. DE LEON, EDWIN L. DEVERA, HAROLD T. DE VERA, CESAR M. DE VEYRA,
ANACLETO C. DEL MUNDO, ALFONSO P. DELA CRUZ, JR., EMERITA M. DELA CRUZ, HELEN T. DELA CRUZ, RIZALYN C.
DELA CRUZ, SERVILLANO R. DELA CRUZ, JOSE DELA FUENTE, WILFREDO C. DELA FUENTE, ARNOLD DELGADO,
JAIME DELOS REYES, MANUEL T. DEPANES, ANTONIO DEQUINA, ROLANDO D. DESTACAMENTO, MARIETA L. DETERA,
PRESENTACION C. DIEZ, RAUL S. DIMALANTA, WENCESLAO DIZON, EDWIN G. DOMINGO, MELANIO O. DONES, JR.,
ESTELITO DOROSAN, ISAURO DOROSAN, JR., CHARLIE M. DULAY, ESTEBAN DULAY, JR., SATURNINO DULAY, MA. AIDA
C. DUROY, RIZAL P. ECHECHE, GASPAR G. ESCOBAR, GASPAR T. ESCOBAR, ALICIA S. ESGUERRA, JACKSON I. ESPERO,
LILIA ESTOPAGE, DIGNA G. EVANGELISTA, REYNALDO FALLESGON, ROQUE M. FAMILARA, JERRY FARINAS, NIEVA
FARINAS, NARCELYN FELIPE, ERNESTO H. FELIX, MARIANNE V. FERNANDEZ, ALVIN LUCIO M. FERNANDO, ALFREDO
V. FERRER, NOEL V. FERRER, ELENA G. FETIZA, AUGUSTUS C. FLORES, SANTIAGO R. FRAGANTE, MA. LUISA
FRANCISCO, EDWARD FRANCO, HELENITA EVELYN FRANCO, NOE FREOLO, EDUARDO VICTORIO FREYRA, EDITHA P.
FRIGILLANA, TEOFILO D. FRONDA, ESTER M. FRONTERAS, HELENA GADDI, ROBERTO D. GADDI, FELISA C.
GALARAGA, ELLENGRACE R. GALISTE, RESTITUTO G. GALO, MAXIMO V. GARCIA, JAIME M. GATAN, MARIO
GUERRERO, ANTONIO GUINSING, JR., ANGELINA P. GUTIERREZ, AURELIO P. GUTIERREZ, HERMINIO O. GUTIERREZ,
NELIA C. HALCON, LOURDES V. HERNANDEZ, DIONISIO S. INCIONG, MARIO Z. JANDUMON, RICARTE JAVELOSA,
ADONIS S. JAVIER, ANGELO JAVIER, LOUELLA G. JIMENEZ, LYNDA JIMENEZ, NONITA JORDAN, ROLANDO
LACANDASO, ELIZABETH C. LACSAMANA, BERNARD LANUZA, PATRICIO B. LANUZA, SALVIO B. LASERNA, FLORINIO
B. LAZO, RODOLFO M. LEE, BEATRIZ D. LEGASPI, AMOR M. LIM, JAIME D. LOMABAO, REGINA LOPEZ, REBE M.
LOZANO, DANILO N. LUCAS, EDEL LUPOS, CESAR LUCERO, SL MIRA, PATERNO M. MABASA, RAMON V. MACABUHAY,
EDITA M. MACALALAD, DIGNA V. MACAPAGAL, LOUIE MADRID, POSALITO MAESTRO, ENRIQUE S. MAGLANQUE,
WENCESLAO MAGO, ERNESTO A. MALICAD, MA. SOCORRO A. MALLARE, CLARO JOSE C. MANIPON, ELEAZAR C.
MANDARING, ELVIRA MARANAN, GERARDO MARCIANO, SALVADOR MARTIN, ELENITA MARTINEZ, CRISOSTOMO V.
MASANGKAY, MAXIMO MATURAN, CONCHITA J. MEDINA, LAMBERTO R. MELAD, EDUARDO MELEGRITO. (ATTY.)
ADORACIO MENDOZA, ARLENE MENDOZA, BERNARDO N. MENDOZA, LUIS C. MENDOZA, TITA M. MENDOZA, GINA
MAY P. MERCADO, TERESITA L. MIDEL, JULIET M. MIGUEL, VIRGINIA B. MILANO, CONRADO MIRANDA, LIDA R.
MIRANDA, LEOCADIO MOLINA, ALEJANDRO M. MONTERO, JR., BENJAMIN J. MONZON, ELSA Y. MULA, PERFECTO
NACAR, JOEL A. NATIVIDAD, RUBEN C. NATIVIDAD, GLENN MARCELO C. NOBLE, NICASIO NOGUERAS, LIWAYWAY A.
NUNEZ, ESTELA V. OSORIO, ELIZA PABELICO, ERNANI BERNAL PADILLA, JESUS M. PADILLA, GERARD A. PANGILINAN,
OMLYMPIA V. PARFILES, ELMER PASCUA, ISABEL PASCUAL, MA. ISABEL M. PASCUAL, MELODIE PASCUAL, SALVADOR
L. PATA, PETRONILLA PAZ, JOSEFA B. PELIAS, NESTOR PENA, NESTOR PENA, ROLANDO PENA, RENE PERALTA, JOSUE
L. PEREZ, SIMEON T. PERMEJO, ALFREDO PERUCHO, REY V. PERUCHO, RENALDO J. POBLETE, RAMON D. QUEBRAL,
ROLENDO C. QUEMADO, EDNA V. RAGILES, ALVIN C. RAMOS, EMERITO RAMOS, MAMERTO RESUBAL, ANGELA P.
REVILLA, ALICE REYES, DAISY M. RICAFORT, WILFREDO RICAFORT, RAMONCITO L. RIVERA, REYNALDO RODELAS,
FLORO RODRIQUEZ, LILIAN A. ROLLAN, ROMUALDO AGUILOS, ANGELO A. ROMULO, JOSE N. RONAN, TOMOSHENKO
RONQUILO, NENITA A. ROQUE, BENJAMIN R. ROSALDO, FIDEL ROVIRA, LIBERTY RUBIN, LIBERTY L. RUBIN, MA.
SALLY P. SAGRAGAO, REINHOLD PERFECTO M. SALAS, VIRGILIO SALAS, ALEJANDRO B. SALONGA, EDWIN B.
SANTELICES, EMMANUEL A. SANTOS, FELIPE B. SANTOS, LETICIA C. SANTOS, ADRIANO R. SARIAN, MA. CORAZON E.

SERVANDO, RODOLFO SESPENE, FERNANDO G. SOJANA, EXPIDITO SORIA, NORMA G. SORIANO, RONALD G. STO.
TOMAS, LUCIO R. SUYAT, JOYCELYN F. TAAL, BARBARA BABSI I. TABACO, DELIA S. TALITE, ANUNSACION E. TAN,
MARIETTA N. TAN, HERMINIO G. TAQUIQUI, EDGARDO L. TOLENTINO, MARCELINA M. TONDO, ANIANO D. TORRES,
SALVADOR D. TORRES, BEATRIZ L. TRINIDAD, RICARDO P. UGALE, ALICIA S. UMEREZ, VIRGILIO B. URBANO,
JOSEPHINE R. UYACO, RIZALINO N. UYACO, LOYOLA M. VALDEZ, JEFFREY VAZQUEZ, RODOLFO L. VELASCO, JR.,
JOSELITO G. VELASQUEZ, EVELYN A. VIDAD, VICTORINO M. VILLAGRACIA, ARIEL VILLANUEVA, CLARISSA G.
VILLANUEVA, JOCELYN C. VILLANUEVA, WILFREDO VILLANUEVA, RICARDO VILLARBA, TITO S. VILLARIN,
CARMELITA B. YALONG, ROBERTO A. YAZON, LUCILLE V. ABAD, SILVESTRE L. ABAYA, ELIGIO L. ABRIGANA,
ANGELINA O. ABRIL, LORENA AFRICA, INOCENCIO A. AGRON, CRISTINA P. AGUILAR, ARLEAN L. ALAMARES,
ADORACION L. ALEJANDRINO, RUTH B. ALICER, ROSALINA V. ALMONEDA, ALFREDO ALVAREZ, ISABEL M.
AMISCARAY, OSROXSON L. AMPARO, ANGEL B. ANDEN, CAROLINA M. ANORES, THELMA P. ARTIFICIO, ANTONIO A.
ASADA, JR., MA. LUZ M. ASCANO, APOLINAR B. ASENCION, EDWIN AZANON, ERLINDA M. BAGUE, ANGELINA R.
BALAGTAS, RENATO T. BANAGA, VALENTIN BARCENAL, ADELAIDA C. BARRIDA, BENJAMIN P. BATOLINA, MARCELO
BAUTISTA, SIMPLICIO BAYRON, CORAZON C. BERNIDO, GLENDA P. BILOG, ALAN M. BORRAS, TERESA L. BORRAS,
EVANGELISTA BORROMEO, BEVERLY R. BRIONES, NESTOR J. BUGADISAN, ADELINA DM. BULOS, SYLVIA S. BUSINE,
EVANGELINE M. CABATUANDO, EDUARDO T. CABILDO, ELIZABETH P. CABILDO, EMMANUEL P. CAJIPE, JOSE N.
CALAYCAY, VIRGINIA S. CALIX, LOPITO CALUAG, EMMA L. CANCINO, ESPERANZA I. CANCIO, BUENAVENTURA E.
CANSINO, PERCIDITA T. CANSINO, GRACE M. CARLOS, PATRICIA ANDREA V. CARRILLO, SOLEDAD S. CASTANEDA,
MARILYN K. CASTILLO, JEAN M. CASYAO, JUSTINA S. CERBOLLES, MARIA LUCIA C. COBAR, AVELINO COLOMA, ANA
ELENA L. CONJARES, ALVARO CORDERO, ESTRELLA B. CORTEZ, DANILO A. CUYCO, RUBEN DACOCO, ROSITA R.
DAROY, DENIA A. DATO-ON, PABLO DE CASTRO, MARIO M. DE GUZMAN, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, AZUCENA C. DE
VERA, CECILIA M. DE VERA, LOUIE A. DE VERA, NATHANIEL B. DE VERA, SALVACION O. DEAN, SOLIDAD Z. DEL
CASTILLO, ADELAIDA Q. DEL ROSARIO, ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, FE M. DELA CRUZ, IMELDA S. DELFIN, DANILO D.
DIAZ, FE R. DISCAYA, EMERANCIANA B. DURAN, JAVIER M. EDUARDO, ELIXA ENRIQUEZ, SOFRONIO ENRIQUEZ, LUZ V.
ESGUERRA, JAIME B. ESTEBAN, MERIAM F. FABRIGAS, LOURDES G. FERNANDEZ, LOURDES R. FONTANILLA, ROBERTO
FONTANILLA, REY M. GABRIEL, RICARDO L. GALLARDO, CORAZON M. GARCIA, NARDO Q. GARCIA, TEOFILO Y.
GARCIA, TEOFILO Y. GARCIA, IRENEO GERILLA, NOEL B. GERILLA, ALFONSO GRAFIA, JUANA S. GREGORIO,
LEONARDO G. GUMASING, LUZVIMINDA M. IGNACIO, RESTITUTO B. ILAGAN, ABELARDO A. INOVERO, DOMINGO P.
JACINTO, REYNALDO P. JACINTO, GLENDA S. JAVIER, GLORIA JIMENEZ, REYNALDO S. JIMENEZ, JESULITO B. JUNIO,
JULIETA JUSON, JOCELYN S. LAGARDE, ALICIA F. LAGUNZAD, LUNINGNING M. LANSANGAN, LUVIMINA G. LANUZA,
AVELINA G. LAPADE, DOLORES M. LAZO, RHODORA LEONIN, TEOFILO V. LEONIN, JR., LEONARDO S. LEOPANDO,
LAURA F. LEYVA, CRISANTO LIMEN, ROEL LOTERINA, PABLITO MAAT, RUBY LIZA J. MAGLALANG, WILFEREDO
MAGSAMBOL, HILARION E. MAMARIL, MILA A. MANALO, BENJAMIN F. MANDINGUIADO, AURELIO MANINGAS,
ANGELES MARCELO, EDITHA A. MARCELO, VERONICA J. MARCELO, RONNIE MARCOS, REYNALDO R. MARIANO,
JOHNNY R. MARIN, BENEDICTO E. MARISFOSQUE, JOHN M. MARQUEZ, ALEJANDRO J. MATEO, JOHNYLEN V.
MELENDEZ, JORGE MENDOZA, JULIETA C. MENDOZA, LUCY MENDOZA, QUIRINO M. MENDOZA, MYLENE M. MOLO,
NELIA M. MONTILLA, DEMETRIO A. MOOG, ERLINDA NATERA, JOSEFINA G. NATERA, NICANOR P. NICOLAS, CARL M.
NOHAY, VIDAL T. OLANDA, JOSEFINA J. OMANDAM, CELIA M. OPRENARIO, NORMA L. PABLO, LAMBERTO E. PALAD,
FRANCISCO A. PANCHO, ROMEO PARADERO, VANGELINE K. PARAMI, RENATO H. PECHO, REYNALDO V. PEDREGOSA,
CECILIA T. PEREZ, MARY AGNES PEREZ, CHRISTINA A. PETRACHE, FEDERICO L. PINEDA, JR., LAURA R. PINEDA,
MYRNA E. PIQUERO, EDGARDO E. POBLETE, DIOSDADO A. QUIAMBAO, BERNARDINO H. QUIZON, BOGAR G. RACHO,
MANNY G. RAMA, ANGELITO F. RAMOS, AURORA D. RAPADAS, ANTONIO E. REFRE, ROSALINO B. REJAS, ESTRELLA D.
RELUNIA, EDILBERTO A. REMENTILLA, SOTERO RESILVA, ROLANDO Y. REYES, GERARDO M. ROBLES, MARISSA
ROBLES, CRISPINA M. ROSALES, BERNADETTE C. SABLAN, CESAR M. SALABIT, MA. TERESITA A. SALABIT, ARTURO F.
SALIH, VIRGILIO R. SANTIAGO, FLORA L. SANTOS, GABRIEL SANTOS, JR., IBARRA S. SANTOS, JULIETA E. SEGUIS,
ROSALIE SEMANA, ELVIRA SOMBRION, RODRIGO TABIOS, ESTELLITA U. TABORA, ANGILEO P. TAGUIBAO, CARLITO G.
TAMBOOM, MERRIAN DC. TANGONAN, RICARDO TEMPLONUEVO, ANTONIO E. TIONG, MITOS M. TOLENTINO, LUZ G.
USMAN, FLORANTE M. VALDERAMA, BALDOMERO VALENZUELA, ANA MARIA S. VELUZ, ERNESTO S. VENTURA,
CRISOL P. VILLANUEVA, PORTIA T. VILLEGAS, ARMINDA F. VINAS, MAGNO B. YOSHISAKI, MA. TERESA YULONAZAREA, BRAHIM T. ABAS, RAUL G. ABIQUE, LEZA A. ACORDA, ADELIA F. AGUILAR, REYNALDO P. ALLANCES,
BERNADETTE M. ANGCO, CLARISSA C. ARIDA, LEONITA D. BAETIONG, EDNA R. BARLIS, SONIA R. BARLIS, BERNA A.
BONDOC, NANETTE BORJA, CORAZON S. BUSTAMANTE, VICTORIA ORMIN R. CABRAL, WILLIE A. CANDELARIO,
ARLINA G.A. CANTADA, ARACELI CANTRE, JERRY CAPULONG, JEANNIE C. CASAURAN, REBERTO CO, EMERLINDA N.
DACARA, TERESITA T. DAVID, ELENIDA DEL ROSARIO, MANUEL DELA CRUZ, VICENTE DIAZ LERMA DIMAYUGA,
BERNARDITA M. DUNGO, ANTONIO P. FAJARDO, CHARLES C. FORONDA, AURORA V. GALVEZ, DAVINA CLEOFE
GONZALES, NICK D. GUILLERMO, REBECCA P. GUITERREZ, JOSEFINA P. HIPOLITO, EVELYN R. INCIONG,
IMMACULADA F. LA ROSA, ANABELLA C. LABORTE, NAPOLEON R. LAPUZ, AMY LECCIONES, SAMUEL LIBOON, DEAN R.
LOPEZ, MYLEEN Z. LUZ, MERLINA G. MABUTOL, ALBERT A. MAGALANG, ROMANA B. MAGAT, VICTORIA MALIHAN,
JAIME MALLARE, REMY MAMON, ELVIRA T. MANALO, ANDRES G. MANUELE, EVALINDA MERCADO, MA. GERARDA
MERILO, FATIMA MOLINA, JOSEPHINE L. MONILLA, EDWIN ROMEL N. NAVALUNA, PERSEVERANDA-FE OTICO, FELIX
A PASCUA, JR., MARINELA T. PASCUA, ALBERTO C. PECHO, TERESITA PERALTA, ELVIRA D. PIMENTEL, CRISTINA S.
PIZARRO, ISAGANI R. POTES, HARRY R. QUIAOIT, LINDA A. QUIOCSON, SOLON C. RATIVO, MARCELINO R. RIVERA,
JANE G. RODRIGO, DAMIAN P. RUBIO, ESPERANZA A. SAJUL, ELVIRA L. SALVANI, MARICHU SANTIBANEZ, VIRGILIO G.
SANTOS, GERI GERONIMO R. SANEZ, REBECCA E. SARACHO, MA. CECILIA B. STA. INES, PEDE SUMILDE, JESSIE
TANOLA, ROMEO T. TARRAY, DOLORES F. TOLENTINO, GRACIOLO DS. TORRE, EDGARDO TORRES, ENRICA I.
TUMBAGAHAN, MA. LOURDES P. VARGAS, RENATO VENGCO, GRACE L. ALMERO, JUANITA P. ARSOLON, LETECIA M.
CENDANA, ELIZABETH A. CHUA, MABEL C. CRISPARIL, MANUEL T. ESCASURA, JUANITA G. FERNANDEZ, VIRGILIO O.
FERRER, DELIA P. GEDALA, LAURO M. HERMOSURA, NATIVIDAD V. IGAYA, ROSABEL T. JOSUE, EVELYN V. LLAMAS,
ANNIE LOMIBAO, ARLINE LUNA, BRILLA P. MALAMUG, ADELINDA L. MANALILI, ROMUALDO S. MERCENE, JANET

MIRANDA, LYDIA NUQUE, FRUCTUOSA R. OBAY, CATALINA G. PRESTOZA, ROLANDO P. RANES, JULIETA RIVERA,
LOURDES T. SELLEZA, JESUSA A. VELASCO, YOLANDA A. VERDIJO, JOSE VIDAL, FLORA ABADIN, ROMMEL D. ABAN,
ALLEN M. ABLANG, NORMA N. AGIR, RODRIGO AGIR III, MARDONIO M. ALCANTARA, ROSALINDA ANGER, DANILO T.
ANONUEVA, REMEDIOS M. ANONUEVO, BONIFACIO APOLONIO, MARIO G. AQUINO, MA. CHONA ARISTOTELES, DICK G.
BACUNO, NILDA C. BALAMONG, ARTHUR M. BALATBAT, FLORANTE G. BONGALON, CEPRIANA S. BORJA, CRISANTO
BRUSAS, RUFINO M. BUSTAMANTE, MELICITA CAPULONG, AMADEO G. CARDINO, BONIFACIO CARLING, LULU C.
CORALES, JIMMY J. CRISOLOGO, CELIA J. CRUZ, NOEL C. CRUZ, NORBERTO G. CRUZ, AMBROSIO DAGUPAN, MA.
THERESA M. DATU, JAIAME C. DE GUZMAN, ROLAND A. DE JESUS, MONA LISA F. DE OCAMPO, SONIA C.
DIMACULANGAN, LAUREANA C. ESTOROQUE, PABLITO ESTOROQUE, JR., MARIO M. ESTRELLA, ANGEL FERNANDEZ,
ZENAIDA P. FERNANDEZ, EVELYN C. FLORES, VERONICA T. GARCIA, JOSE M. GATONGAY, ARIEL A. HIMOC, BONNIE P.
LISING, LOTA S. LIZARDA, RUFINA LOPEZ, EDGARDO K. MAGNO, RODELIO M. MALICAD, ZENAIDA MALLETE,
MARILYN V. MANGEURRA, CONSTANCIO MARIROSQUI, HIDELISA P. MARQUEZ, ROSARIO J. MENDOZA, ELISA N.
MOLA, NILO A. NERA, JUSTO NEYRA, JR., ANACLETA P. NILLO, RIBOMAJAL A. OBA, RODOLFO N. ORTIZ MARITES O.
PADOR, MA. VICTORIA P. PAELMO, MA. JANET PASCUA, ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO, ESTELITO PENA, JOSIE S. PEREZ,
ZENAIDA T. RABAYA, JOSEFINA D. RAMOS, JENNIE P. SALVADOR, RODOLFO S. SANTOS, LORETA C. TABAS, RAMONITO
TALABUCON, PATRICIA N. TALAMISAN, JULIE N. TANGUILIG, NUNILON R. TANGUILIG, DOMINGA D. TOLENTINO,
CLYDIE TORRES, ABRAHAM R. VILLANUEVA, AGNES VINUMA, LUZ ANACTA, EDUARDO BALLESTEROS, RUBY
BAUTISTA, ELIZALDE BERANIA, CHARLITA BONGALON, ESTER CADANO, ALMA CRISTINA COLLADO, EVELINDA
CORONEL, BRIGIDA CORPUS, HILARIA DEZA, LUCIA DIAGCO, CRISTINA ESGUERRA, EDNA ESQUILLO, RHODORA
ESTRELLA, CECILLA FRANCISCO, EMELLINA GAMBA, MARCELA GARCIA, DIVINA GATMAITAN, ASUNCION GERVACIO,
MA. ASUNCION LAQUINDANUM, LYLEEN LIBAN, ZAIDA LIBAN, BERNANDINO MANOSO, MARITESS PABLO, ANITA
PANER, EDERLINA RABE, JOSE RABE, ROSALIA REBULLANTE, ROBERTO SABELLA, JUDITH SADALIA, CIELITA
SARMIENTO, LUTHER VILLAMIN, ANITA A. AALA, MARILOU L. ABARRO, PORFIRIO L. ALCACHUPAS, ISABEL V.
ARANZAZU, ROSIE L. ARENAS, CLARO S. ASTOVEZA, SUSAN C. BONDOC, DOMINGO BRAVO, MARIANITO Z. CAJUCOM,
SOFIA T. CAMPOS, SONI G. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. COMIE, ADELINA G. CORTIGUERRA, VIRGINIA DE SAGUN, DANIEL
DELOS SANTOS, NIDA C. DILAN, SELFA C. FERNANDEZ, LIGAYA G. GARCIA, MARLYN A. GARCIA, SONIA B. IBANEZ,
BONIFACIO S. LABANGCO, SR., JEAN LADIA PERLA G. LORENZO, VIRGINIA B. LUNA, EDNA C. MABULAY, MARILI T.
MALASAGA, MELE T. MALASAGA, MA. TERESA E. MAPILI, DAVID P. MARIANO, FRISCA P. MAYAMAYA, MARLENE S.
MELARPIS, ROLAND P. MENDOZA, VENER C. MERANA, LAMBERTA N. MERENA, FELISA G. NARCIDA, NORMA M.
NORIEL, FRANCISCO PANGAN, APOLONIO C. SALANGA, JR., CARLOS E. SANCHEZ, SOFREMEO F. SANTIAGO, JR., LUISA
L. SANTOS, SOFIA S. SOLACITO, GENOFREDO S. SOLMARIN, VIOLETA G. SORIANO, JUAN STA. ANA, SANNY B. SULIBA,
CARMELITA P. TAMARGO, ANTONIO P. TULLAS, JR., VIOLETA A. VELA, CHONA C. ZAMORA, MA. THERESA P.
EMPAYNADO, MABEL GRASPARIL, EDMUND RAUL KAABAY, JR., MAGIN LABANGUIS, REY B. SELLEZA, PERCIVAL
VALDEZ, NORMA C. VASQUEZ, JUDY ABLAN, MARIBEL M. ALCANTARA, ANGELITA C. AUKAY, MARLENE M. BADILLA,
DOMINADOR L. BIGSOT, ABRAHAM D. CABALSE, EUFRECINA T. EUSEBIO, MARLON Q. GA, JOCELYN P. ILUSTRE,
PERCIDA G. NORTON, GODOFREDO RAMONES, ELISEO A. VILLASTIQUI, ELY R YRA, VIRGINIA D. CADAVIS,
CONSOLACION CAYABYAB, PATROCINIA A. DIMAGUILA, JOLIZA O. ENCISA, LUCILA M. FELIX, SALVACION T.
GALLEGO, ELVIRA GEALON, WILMA T. LAGRIMAS, REMEDIOS B. LIBERATO, JAIME MADAMBA, BERNICE R.
MANALATA, VILMA S. PALMES, EMPERATRIZ R. PIOQUID, LIGAYA R. SAMSON, ROSALIE M. SANCHEZ, MARCEBENI D.
TALABUCON, LILIA C. TAMAYO, MERCELINA A. TUBALLA, ELDA Y. ZURBITO, ROWENA ANDAYA, JACINTA B.
ANONUEVO, BEATRIZ N. BELEN, TERENCIO CADUYAC, RAMON C. DELA FUENTA, MIGUEL C. FERNANDEZ, DOLOR
MORADA, CLEMENCIO C. PAJARILLO, ELENILA PASCUAL, TERESITA ADA, MARIO AQUINO, ROLANO BAGUNU,
MARGIE I. BALLESTEROS, ROMULOS BELTRAN, ANTONIO CORIA, EDWIN DELA CRUZ, YOLANDA DELA CRUZ,
ERLINDA ESTRELLA, AURELIO GUERRERO, MANUEL H. HIZOLA, RUBEN A. MAGTIBAY, NICOLAS MASANGKAY,
FRACTUOSA R. OBAY, LIGAYA PASCUAL, NECETE PASTORFIDE, TRANQUILINO PUNZALAN, MYRNA P. SUNIO,
ARMANDO VILLAFLOR, MARIANO VILLANUEVA, REMEDIOS ANONUEVO, RIBOMAPIL CLOA, MARINA COLLANTES,
ERLINDA DIMAPAWI, HEDELISA MARQUEZ, MA. VICTORIA PAELMO, ILUMINADA SABORRIDO, DOMINGA D.
TOLENTINO, MA. VICTORIA ABRERA, ALFREDO AGACETA, JR., WILFREDO ANONUEVO VERGILIO, BAGTAS, ROBERTO
BERNAL, LORETO BOQUIREN, RAMIR BUIZA, CELSO BULADO, NOEL CASTELO, WILLIAM DELA CRUZ, GRACIA DIAZ,
ROBERT ENCISO, ANTONIO FAJARDO, ROMEO GIANA, JOYCELYN GOCO, JOSE GONZALES, TEMOTEO IDEA, EMMIE
IGNACIO, MA. VICTORIA LANDICHO, MARCIANO MANIEGO, CECILIA MERCADO, REGULO QUEJADA, ARNEL ROMERO,
MANUEL SABATER, NELIA SANTOS, AMELIA DULCE SUPETRAN, ERNESTO J. ANDRES, LIBRADO S. GESALTA, LORNA
JEAN H. PALAD, PABLO SALIGAN, ZENY DE GUZMAN, LORETO GALLER, EMMALYN C. TRIA, SEVILIO D. DAVID,
PASENCIA A. VOTACION, LEONIDO J. AMANTE, ALMA M. SACOPLA, MARIETA CABREROS, EUGENIO O. DIAZ, JR.,
GUENDOLYN C. BAMBALAN, GUYETO CABADING, MA. THERESA ENRIQUEZ, MA. VICTORIA V. DE CASTRO, BENJAMIN
DEVERA, JAIME OBAR, RAUL VARELA, STEPHEN C ACEBEDO, ELEUTERIO AGBAY, ALMA G. ALMONEDA, ANTONIO S.
ARELLANO, FILIPINAS G. ATACADOR, MARIA M. ATIENZA, MAGAMPON Q. BABISTA, HERMINILDA S. BALDEMOR,
ANGELITA I. BALIGAD, EDUARDO J. BANAWA, CARLOS P. BASILIO, ALEJANDRO T. BATUHAN, ROLANDO BELANO,
MARIVIC BERNARDO, ADALIA A. BISCOCHO, NATIVIDAD B. BITOON, VICTORIA P. BORAC, M. BURCE JR., YOLANDA M.
BUSTAMANTE, PACITA C. CABANSAG, GEMMA P. CAGUA, EDITHA T. CAPISTRANO, LOPE O. CARIO JR., EDUARDO M.
CARPIO, EDUARDO CAVIZO, ROSALINA C. CERNADILLA, ERNESTO C. CORPUZ JR., RENAN M. CRUZADO, CRISTINA T.
DE MESA, DANIEL C. DIAZ, DIOSDADO DOCTOR, ADELAIDA C. DUAD, INOCENCIA A. DUMLAO, JAIME D. DYSUNANGCO,
BENJAMIN A. EMANUEL, MARIO EPAN, JR., VIRGINIA G. ESCOBAR, JOSEFINA P. ESPERAS, ERLYN C. EZPELETA, ARNEL
F. FERAREZA, AMELIA A. FINO, DOMINGO FRANCISCO, TIMOTEO GAMIT, CRISTETA GARCIA, MILAGROS GERONIMO,
GINALYN GONZALES, QUINCHITA J. GRICALDA, RAFAEL JARILLA, JR., VALE JOSE EXEQUIEL, JR., LUZ P. LAGUNERA,
ROGELIO M. LAPUS, RODOLFO A. LOPEZ, PATRICIA MALIHAN, GLORIA MANALANSAN, EVANGELINE MARCELINO,
JOYCE J. MARCIANO, ELIZABETH Y. MATIBAG, CESAR D. MOMERACION, SALVACION R. NOVINO, MARTINO B. OSITE,
ELIZABETH PACUBAS, SATURNINO S. PACUBAS, JR., SERAPIO S. PAHIGDANA, LEMELIE PASCUA, ALMA A. PASCUAL,
ARNOLD T. PASIA, JAIME PEDROCHE, MARILOU L. PERALTA, HOMOBNUS PIDO II, ALFREDO G. PUNO, MARIVIC S.

QUIDES, MYRNA QUIPIT, PAULINO R. RECONDO, NELLIE REGINIO, JOSE V. REYES, CHERRY B. RIVERA, SUSANA T.
ROBOSA, YOLANDA RODRIGUEZ, DIANA A. ROMERO, REY S. ROSALES, LUCIO G. SANTIAGO, JOBINO S. SEVALLA,
ULYSSES J. SIGATON, SUSAN T. SOLOMON, LUZVIMINDA B. TABLATE, ROWENA R. TESTON, ERLINDA TOLENTINO,
JOSEFINA G. URRUTIA, LILIBETH L. VELOSO, OSCAR VENTURA, JOSE VICTORIA, JR., ARNOLD N. VILLADOS, NOE L.
ZETA, EUGENIO ESGUERRA, ERNESTO ESPIRITU, DANIEL GARAS, MA. LEONORA PADILLA, MAXIMIANO RAMOS,
VILLELA REYNALDO, ANGELICA SAJONA, ROSARIO SANTOS, ANGELITA L. CRUZ, EDWIN A. LLAGAS, LUCILA SEVILLA,
MERCEDES D. AGALOOS, VICENTA V. AONUEVO, DALISAY S. AVELLANA, GERAROO BERNAL, LILIBETH L.
CANDONITA, FLORNIDO P. CASTRO, WILFREDO CINCO, LINO N. DIMAPILIS, TITA P. DUEAS, WILFREDO C. ECAMINO,
MYRNA D. HABAGA, MARY JUNE F. MAYCA, NENITA G. MONTOYA, EDITHA N. RECTRA, RICHARD G. SANDI, ROBERTO
D. SHEAN, JUSTINA Q. UMALI, VIOLETA B. VALERO, TELESFORO R. VILLAMAR, DANILO N. VILLANUEVA, EUGENIO U.
VILLANUEVA, EFREN R. WAKA, MARIO W. ALBAN, EFREN ANONUEVO, VICENTA V. ANONUEVO, ROSALINDA C. ANGEL,
VIOLETA A. BUAGAN, ELENITA D. CABUEOS, FLORIAN S. CANTOS, LOPE M. CARIO, SR., ROLANDO G. CLEMENTE,
AREJOLA P. CORAZON, ANTONIO D. CORIA, VIRGINIA I. DELOS SANTOS, LILY S. DEROCA ERLINDA A. DIMAPAWI,
RANDOLPH DISCIPULO, TITA P. DUEAS, ERMIE B. DAGDAGAN, CORAZON Y. FERNANDEZ, NIDA G. GUARINO, GLENN
HERALDO, ESTELA B. HERMOSURA, ADORACION U. HERNANDEZ, GONZALO IMPERIAL, DOLORES B. LA GUARDIA,
PERCIVAL LADUB, AGNES H. LAGON, TERESA M. MAALAC, ISAGANI V. MANALILI, CONSTANCIO F. MARISFOSQUI,
VIRGINIA A. MELCHOR, RONALDO J. MIRANDA, FRANCIS M. MIRTO, EDWIN M. MOJARES, ELISA D. MOLA, BENJAMIN
MORTOS, CLEMENCIO A. PAJARILLO, LAURO J. PANERIO, ELENITA G. PASCUAL, EXZER R. RABANG, EMILIO RAMOS,
VICENTE A. REGODON, ANDREA H. REYES, MA. CORAZON V. STA. ANA, ZENAIDA P. STO. DOMINGO, ILUMINADA S.
TALABUCON, ANNIE E. TANTOY, MARLOU D. VAQUILAR, NOEL B. VELASQUEZ, NANCY V. VILLAPANDO, ELISA B.
VILLAR, BELOISIE M. ALMAZAN, GLADYS B. BOQUIREN, ELIZABETH CARIO, LIZ CARPIO, LORMELYN E. CLAUDIO,
JOSE CORTEZ, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, NORBERTO A. DEL ROSARIO, VILMA C. ELPA, OTTO E. ESPILOY, ALLAN L.
LEUTERIO, EMMANUELITA D. MENDOZA, NICANOR E. MENDOZA, CONCEPCION C. OCAMPO, CARMELITA M. PASSE,
JOSE SALVADOR PASSE JR., MORENO M. PENALBA, ELVIRA P. PIMENTEL, VIRGINIA V. QUIMO, NAP ROQUE, CESAR S.
SIADOR, JR., ILUMINADA SORIA JULITO G. TANGALIN, GREGORIO A. TOMILLOSO, FELICISIMO I. VICENCIO, RICARDO
D. VICENTINO, RODOLFO ARELLANO, MYRNA R. CORTEZ, EMMA N. CRUZ, CONCEPCIO C. CUNANAN, NELSON
ITLIONG, RESTITUTO S. MAGPANTAY, CATHERINE F. MANALANSAN, HENRY B. MANDOCDOC, ISIDORO MONTOYA, JR.,
ANDREA A. RAMOS, ARSENIA E. SAN DIEGO, VILMA SANTIAGO, PETRA T. TABUCOL, BRIGIDA T. TACUBOY, MARILOU A.
TIBOR, CORAZON R. VALDEZ, NESTOR U. VENTURILLO, MARILYN ACOB, EMMA AGOT, DENCIO R. DADIS, MA. AVA
DATA, NORLIE N. DAVID, IRENE S. DELA CRUZ, NESTOR T. GUERREN, GUILLERMA LACUMBAY, ANNA LEAH
MELEGRITO, EDITO MISTA, BELEN C. NUNEZ, ESTELA B. SARMIENTO, FRANCISCO TY, CYNTHIA L. AUSTRIA, CORITA
M. BARTOLO, AMELIA L. FLORES, PRISCILA M. MOLINA, CORAZON P. PEREZ, MANOLITA L. VELASCO, ANTONIO E.
VELOIRA, OFELIA B. VELOIRA, MEMORY FABIAN, ROSARIO MENESES, JULIANA M. ABEN, REMEDIOS F. BONIFACIO,
MA. THERESA M. ENRIQUEZ, OFELIA B. MENDOZA, LILY T. REYES, NARCISA B. SESE, MA. THERESA M. VILLARUEL,
JOHN R. ALMAZAN, DOLORES C. VELASQUEZ, ALFREDO FERRER, ADGARDO CORPUZ, ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ,
CONSOLACION B. CACULITAN, NORA Y. CALIJA, YVONNE V. CARABEO, AIDA C. CORPUZ, ROSA P. DORAD0, MINDA C.
DUAD, CECILIA B. HIWATIG, RITA ORISTINA V. LAPUS, CASILDA C. MAROHOM. CLEMENCIA A. MARQUEZ, MAXIMA
MATIBAG, EMELITA R. MENDOZA, CRISNATA S. MONTRESCLAROS, TERESITA L. OBIAS, CHONA R. PASTORFIDE,
MERLY H. PATUNGAN, ALNA U. PINEDA, ANGELITO T. PINEDA, VILMA G. QUIAMBAO, ESTELITA T. RAGASA,
LUZVIMINDA L. RAMOS, NERISSA B. RAPANUT, CARMENCITA S. SANCHEZ, ELSA M. SIGUE. ROWENA L. TEJADA,
MYRNA M. TORREGOZA, LERMA AQUINO, CORNELIA M. ARANETA, FERDINAND BANGCUA, REYNALDO BARBADILLO,
ALFREDO A. CLAVERIA, DAN JORGE CRUZ, ERLINDA O. DAQUIGAN, REBECCA C. DE VERA, ERLINDA B. DIZON,
MARILYN P. ESTADILLA, CATALINA G. GARINGARAO, MYRNA MALINAO, SILVESTRE C. MANGAWANG, FLORENCIO C.
NAVALED, NOEL D. OBRA, NELIO T. PAGLINAWAN, ANA MARIE PASCUAL, ARTURO R. PRENDOL, OTELLA O. SANCHEZ,
REYNALDO TEJADA, CRISANTO BADENHOP, JEAN C. BORROMEO, ANA MARIA C. BUESING, MARIA TERESA CHAVEZ,
GIL F. FERAREZA, MARITES L. GALVEZ, MIGUEL B. JIMENEZ, JR., RODANTE JOCSON, MICHAEL A. JOSE, ARNEL H. LUZ,
ARNEL C. MATREO, EDUARDA P. MERCADO, BENEDICTO P. MURILLO, MINDA A. OSORIO, GLEN Q. PASTORFIDE,
ISMAEL S. RUIZ, FE B. SENDIN, HENRY P. SORIANO, JOYCE SORIANO, FLORENCE V. VELASQUEZ, PRUDENCIO M.
VENTURA, ROY ALAN D. VIANZON, LORETO H. VILLAS, JR., CELESARIA C. ZACARIAS, GEORGE P. ABAYA, ELIZABETH
E. AMOR, LORNA ASIS, IMELDA J. BALLON, LILIA M. BALTAZAR, AURORA I. BELEN, ELSA B. BURGOS, CORAZON D.
CALAMNO, FLORENCIO L. CARANDANG, CYNTHIA V. CARPIO, ADAMELIA DE ONON, AMPARO L. DE RAMA, LUVIMIN L.
DELA CRUZ, VIOLETA R. GARCIA, PERLA P. MUOZ, PAULINA D. PAGUINTO, JOEL PAJARILLO, ENCARMILA
PANGANIBAN, ERLINDA M. PARRENO, MA. SALVACION M. PEREZ, ALBINA L. PINEDA, RAYMOND SANTIAGO, BRIGIDO
G. SISON, REMEGIO SULLEZA, TRAZION E. TUSCANO, MYRA B. VILLANUEVA, HENRY ABONETALLA, MARILYN
BABAAN, ELISA A. BERE, JUANITO J. BOLISAY, NORMA S. CABALLA, ELMER CALLOPE, ELPIDIO T. DE LARA, AGNES G.
DE LEON, GERARDO R. ESPIRITU, ONOFRE P. LAXAMANA, ANSELMO LEGASPI, CONSUELO MAGAYANES, DELEON L.
MAROHOM, MARIO MELGAR, CHOLITA R. ORTEGA MODESTA S. PADUADA, PATRIA C. PATRICIO, LORETA N. RAMIREZ,
TERESITA C. SAN JUAN, FELICISIMA SUMAGUE, SOLAIMAN TAWA, VICTOR TOLENTINO, ANGELITO U. VALENZUELA,
DIOSDADO VELARDE, ROBERTO M. BASCO, JESUS B. CRUZ, JR., JOSEPHINE ESTRADA, LUCIA L. ESTRADA, LIGAYA C.
EULOGIO, LEONARD FALLER, DANILO J. GALAGNARA, MA. LOURDES P. GOROBIA, JUAN ILARDE, ISMAEL R. JOSE,
RICARDO P. MACALINO, JR., ROPERTO MANALO, VIOLETA A. MARIANO, NOBLEZA C. MERINO, PILAR C. MIGALANG,
ALEJANDRO S. MINGOY, DANILO D. PONZALAN, SERGIO TAMAYO, VIRGILIO V. URGEL, GLORIA VILLAMAR, JULIETA
ACHICO, FREDDIE P. AGAZETA, PEDRO AGONIAS, ALBERTO G. ALBERTO, CRISTINA ALTOAR, SALVADOR BACANI,
LEONIDA BALINGAW, IMELDA BAUZON, VIRGILIO BELGIRA, GAUDENCIA CABACUNGAN, LEONORA DAVID, VIRGILIO
D. ESTRADA, CORSINO GLORY, PRECIOSO A. LABUGUEN, BENJAMIN LACESTE, ROSITA MACARANAS, FELIX
MAURILLO, JOVENCIO PERALTA, RUBEN R. PRENDOL, CORNELIO RETUTA, JERRY RETUTA BENEDICTO P. RIVERA,
CORNELIO TABLANTE, LEONILA VERGARA LAMBERTO VILLAFUERTE, OFELIA B. AYSON, EDITA M. BALANZA,
ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, OFELIA L. BUENO, CARMELITA G. CAJIPO, TERESITA C. CANLAS, ROMEO C. ESTEBAL, IBANA
FALLAR, ANASTACIO M. FLORES JR., DEMOSTHENES GOTHIS, MENCHELITA M. GUCILA, EDMUNDO C. LAGRIMA,

ALLAN C. LEONCIO, MARVIN M. MORALES, DIGNA Z. OBSTACULO CORNELIO O. PERALTA, CARLITO B. POMBO,
MARIETA R. RED, TRINIDAD A. TALARO, ADELA T. TONGCO, REGINA B.VILLADOS, JESSICA R. ALMAZAN, PERFECTO U.
ALMAZAN, BERARDO BADERE, GENOVEVA A. BIGORNIA, NATIVIDAD J. BOCAL, LORNA CABADING, EFREN E.
CAWALING, AVELINA T. DURAN, ROMEO A. FELIPE, CORAZON GARAPAN, ANITA B. IBARDOLASA, MARCIAL M.
JACOBIA. JOSE V. JARTEL, PIDO LOUISA, BASILIO H. MORENO, CARONIA L. MURCIA, NONILA T. OMANA, AIDA P.
PANGANIBAN, SUSAN CULANE PAZ, ANITA Q. PEREYRA, MAMERTO C. PESTON JR., ROLANDO S. RABE, VILMA
SANSORONA, VICTOR TOLENTINO, LUZVIMINDA O. YAGYA, JULIET S. AYENTO, DIGNO D. AYSON, NORENA R. CIASICO,
JOVENCIA L. FERNANDEZ, EMILIANO P. KEMPIS, EUFROCINA B. QUIJANO, SIXTO E. TOLENTINO JR., AMPARO P.
ABAYA, CR1STINA M. ARINGO, LEONILO WILLOU M. BERANO, JOEY B. CASTILLO, BERNARDO CLARION, MATIAS V.
CRUZ, ERLINDA O. DELGACO, ERLINDA B. DIZON, SENECIO D. FESTIN, FLORENTINA C. VALENCIA, SARAH ABUNGAN,
JUPITER C. ALMAZAN, OFELIA BIRON, MAMERTO C. BOLIVAR, BIENVENIDO R. CINCO, METEDIO ESTRADA JR.,
GINALYN GONZALES, ANTONIO M. LACHICA, NEMESIO RABAJANTE, NELZON TENIOSO, HERMENEGILDO URRUTIA,
JR., VIOLETA C. VALDEZ, CRISANTO VAQUILAR, JOFRE B. ALTAREJOS, EDGARDO L. BALDEDARA, RAUL SAUDE G.
BECARES, RAMON R. BOADO, MELCHOR R. BORLON, GEMMA CARINO, GEORGE M. CARPIO, CARMELITA S. CUNANAN,
ONESIMO A. DE CASTRO, PURIFICACION R. DE GUZMAN, LEOPOLDO S. J. DE JESUS, JOCELYN R. DELA CRUZ,
DOMINGO U. ESGUERRA, VIRGINIA R. ESTRELLA, OFELIA A. HERNANDEZ, TRINIDAD JAVIER, EUGENIA L. LAGMAY,
ANGELITA B. LIBIRAN, ARSENIO R. LIBIRAN, CARLOS M. LOPE, RODOLFO A. LOPEZ, CELSO MAALIW, ROMUALDO E.
MENDOZA, CRISPULO A. OCAMPO, ANGELITA OLOG, EVANGELINE O. OPO, MAXIMO L. PEREZ, JOSE PONPONILLA,
SIXTO P. RIVAS, LYDIA C. OMERO, CATALINA F. SIGATON, JESUS S. VIJIGA, MYRA K. VILLAPANDO, GALICANO I. NER,
OSCAR R. LAVIN, ESTEBAN S. CARAG, GRACE M. VILLACRUSIS, JULIETA C. BONDAD, NILDA S. LINING, LUCY GRACE C.
BURGOS, MARIFE CHARO N. DOMINGO, MA. VICTORIA P. DA ROZA, NILDA CATALAN, RAUL T. ORTEGA, EWARDO R.
JOSON, PRUDENCIO M. DELA CRUZ, FRANCISCO L. CONDE, ARNEL M. ZURITA, EDISON A. CALAOUR, VICTOR C.
CANTOR, CARMELITA M. QUIRINO, AMBROSIO ESTABILLO, ESPERANZA B. DALUSON, ALBERTO M. MADRILEJOS,
ROLANDO C. MANALO, RODOLFO R. RANGES, PHILIP A. PICHAY, REYNALDO C. ALAMPAY, RENE E. FAJARDO, CELSO A.
AGUILAR, REMEDIOS E. ABING, JOSEFINA M. GAWARAN, FRANCISCO S. PANGANIBAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and HON.
CARLITO R. ALETA, in his capacity as the Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, respondents.
G.R. No. 110642 September 11, 1998
BERNARDO BALGOS, NICOMEDES C. AGBADA, EUFRONIO R. ALANO JR., ERNIE S. ALINO, CORNELIO A. ARTIENDA.
CARY L. ASANA, TRANQUILINO ATIENZA, JR., JONATHAN A. AZUCENA, ROY M. BARCERO, CLARITA S. BELONIO,
WILFREDO E. CABEZON, CANDIDO A. CABRIDO, JR., AMELITA B. CALER, DAREF MARCELINO M. CANET, RONALD
CANTONG, ALEJANDRO J. CATIPAY, JR., HERMINIA COLAR, ELIZABETH A. DAYTO, SALOME G. DE JESUS, JOSEFINA
ESTRADA, AURORA M. FIGUEROA, MA. ANGELITA A. GADDI, RIO L. GULAPO, MA. THERESA M. GUMABON, ANTONIO A.
GUNAY, GERARD HURTADO, ARIEL ILAGAN, WILMAR L. INFANTE, FLORECER M. LEACHON, ANNA MA. VICTORIA
LELINA, LIZA NONETTE A. MAIBO, EUGENIO P. MANUEL, EDUARDO A. MENGUITO, ERIC AGAPITO NATIVIDAD,
LEONIDES N. NAVEA, MA. PERPETUA OCAMPO, REDENTOR B. PACANO, ALMOND C. PALABRICA, ELMER T. PASCUA,
CRISTY CRISTETA A. RAMOS, HENRY B. RELLOSA, ROWENA M. RODANILLA, JOSEPH SALVADOR, CARMELLE
GEORGINA SIENA, CRECENCIANO I SUAN, CESAR TAN, CECILIA T. VARGAS, GIL NOEL VILLANUEVA, ANALYN S. VISTA,
BENITO YU, JR., EDUARDO AKIATE, EARTHA G. ALINO, TERESITA ANASTACIO, JOSELITO O. AVERION, ELINO BAGOSO,
FERDINAND B. BARBERO, ELSA J. BAUTISTA ELMER CALDERON, FRANCIS CAMELLO, RENE CANARES, RODELIO B.
CARATING, JULIETA S. CONSTANTINO, EASTER LIZA CUETO, NANCY V. CUETO, MARIFE DELOS REYES, JERWYN L
DEMETRIO, EDUARDO DIOKNO, MARGARET T. ESTANISLAO, MA. ARLENE M. EVANGELISTA, SALVADOR A. FABULA,
IRENE P. GERPACIO, ALMA GONZALES, RICHMOND GONZALES, BENIE E. ILAGAN, OSCAR JALALON, JOSEFINA JONAS,
ELEANOR M. LIGANOR, FLORDELIZA MALLARI, ROSARIO MAACAP, JOSE A. MANANGHAYA, JULIET R. MANGUERRA
GLENN A. MANILA, ANGELITA C. MARCIA, CECILIA MARQUESES, GINA MARZAN, RICHARD M. MOJICA, JOSEFINA
MORALES, SANTIAGO MOSQUEDA, MELCHITO B. NOCEDA, SEGUNDO, PACARDO, SONNY PACUNLA, ALEXANDER
PANO, MA. ENQUITA PANOTES, ROMMEL M. PARCASIO, IAN A. PEDALIZO, ROSANA PERMALINO, EVELYN PITOGO,
LOLITA POLIQUIT, LOURDES REGALA, MARIBEL REYES, JOVETTE TENORIO, HIDALGO TOLENTINO, LUISITO
TRINIDAD, MA. BLANCA A. VALDEAVILLA, EDGARDO YBURAN, ROWENA ABELLANA, ARTURO ACOBA, PALMAREN
AGACIA, FLORENTINO AGUSTIN, JAIME ALAN, EDUARDO ALBERTO, MACARIO ANACAN, HENRY APOLINARES,
EVELYN AUSAN, REBECCA BACUS, MARYLOU BARATANG, LORENZO BERMILLO, LIGAYA BOBIS, MA. TERESA
BOLOFER, ERNESTO BRAMPIO, FLORA CABLIN, HENRY CACAYAN, LILIA CALICA, MA. ANA CASUPANG, CHARITO
CAUTON, ARMELYN Y. CLEMENTE, ROOSBELT CREENCIA, FRANCISCO CRUZ, MARCELO DAYO, MARITES DE LEON,
JANE DELA CRUZ, EDGARDO DELOS SANTOS, IMELDA DELOS SANTOS, RODEL DELOS SANTOS, ELISA DIZON, SUSAN
DUMOT, JOVEN ESPINELI, LEANDRO EVANGELISTA, EVANGELINE FERRER, NESTOR FRANCISCO, CESARIO GEMINO,
LAURO G. HERNANDEZ, RACHEL HILARIO, MIGUEL IRACTA, OBEN LABONETE, JAIME LADANGA, ISIDRO LEGAN,
ELMIE MADRIAGA, DIOSDADO MANALUS, OSCAR MANOIS, CRISTINA MEDRANO, LILIAN MILLAN, GLICERIO
MONTALLA, MADELEINE NAVARCE, MA. ANA ORQUIZA, PINKY PADILLA, LUZ BRENDA PAGLINAWAN, PURISIMA
PAJARO, JOSEPHINE PASION, JOCELYN RAMOS, DOMINGO RODULFO, DELIA SADIASA, VIRGINIA SALILI, GETULIO
SAN JUAN, FLORFINA SANCHEZ, LEOLITA SIASI, GLORIA TEJADA FRANCIS TORRES, ERNESTO VALMEO, WILFREDO
VELASCO, EPIFANIA VILLA JUAN, RAFAEL ACENA ELMER ADRAQUE, EDITHA AIZON, RIZALDY ALBERTO, RAMON
ALOBBA, ALAN ANIDA, BERTOLIO ARELLANO, VERONICA AVILA, MAY BABARAN, JOAQUIN BANZALI, MARILYN
CAACO, ROSE NELIE CABATLAO, JUANITA CALONGE, NILDA CAPANPANGAN, CECILIA CAPUNO, TRINIDAD CARLOS,
SALVACION CAS, AMADO CREUS, PEDRO DAILEG, VIRGINIA DAILEG, NELITA DE GUZMAN, ROWENA DE GUZMAN,
ALMA ARRO DEL ROSARIO, AMELYN ANG, BERNADETTE ESPINOSA, ESTRELITA FIDER, REYNALDO GABALLO, NOEMI
GABATO, ELMER GABAYA, MARIBELLE GAON, LILIA GONZALES, CARISA GOSO, ROMEO HERNANDEZ, MYRNA
JOVELLANA, RONALDO LIM, GREGORIO LLANES, ROBERTO MABUTI, DANILO MACANSANTOS, CRISOSTOMO

MAMORBOR, MA. CONCEPCION MANZO, ROBERT MARGES, ANDRE JOHN MARTINEZ, EUFRONIO MOJICA, HENRY
MOJICA, LILIAN MONJE, MA. RAYSOLYN NATIVIDAD, LAMBERTO NERI, NICANDRO OBEDENCIO, LISETTE ORENSE,
LEA PARDE, JEFFREY PAYNOR, EVA PUGAY, GODOFREDO RAMOS, CRISPINA RAYO, CECILIA RITO, SALVACION RITUAL,
CRISTINA SANGALANG, ELVIRA SEGOVIA, RENE STA. MARIA, GENOVEVA TULLAO, GLORIA URRIZA, RESTITUTO
VEJERANO, RAUL VILLACORTE, ZENYBEL VILLEGAS, ZARAH YAP, PHILIP YASAY, TRINIDAD ACERON, FLORENTINO C.
AGUSTIN, CRISOSTOMO ANGUE, CESAR ATIENZA, CARLOTA AUSTRIA, JOVITA AUSTRIA, VICTORIA BAHALLA, ALLAN
BATUSBATUSAN, ALTAIR BAUTISTA, SONNY BILBAO, GINA BRUGADA, AMELIA CABRERA, FRANCIA CAMUA, RENATO
CARRASCAL, RUSELL CASTRO, EDUARDO CAUSAREN, NELSON CONCEPCION, MYRNA CORILLA, ROSALIA FLORA
COSTALES, NELSON CUSTODIO, DENNIS DE GUZMAN, EUFRACIO DE LUNA, LUCIANA DELA CRUZ, JR., VENER DILIG,
YOLANDA DINO, REMEGIO DIWA, EDWIN DOGOMEO, MANUEL ELLANO, MITHI ENCIO, REYNALDO ESPINO, DAVID
ESPIRITU, EMILIANA GAMIT, ENRICO HERNANDEZ, DORIS JAVATE, ALICIA JIMENEZ, ELEAZAR LOPEZ, MA. SUSANA
MARIANO, RONALDO MARAVILLA, PETER MAURICIO, ANITA OBRERO, ARLENE OLEA, ROEL PARDE, MELCHOR
PEREZ, ROGER PRINCIPE, PRIMA PUJANTE, LILIA RAFAEL, AMELIA RALA ANTONIO RIVERA, LIWAYWAY RONSARIO,
ERLINDA SALCEDO, OFELIA SANGALANG LUZVIMINDA SANTOS, EDESIA SEVILLEJA, NANETTE SUSA, NEIL
VALENTON, FILIPINA VENTIGAN, MA. IDA VILLARALVO, ADELINE ABANCE, RAUL ACOSTA, MA. CECILIA ADAOAG,
GLEN BABANTUGAN, REMIGIO BACUS, PANTALEON BADION, JIMMY BAJADO, ARTHUR BARAOIDAN, JULIE
CABALLERO, FRANCISCO CADAJAS, EDITHA CASIBANG, NORMAN CONDE, MENA CREUS, MARY CRUZ, MACARIO DE
GUZMAN, LUPO DE LUNA, RODOLFO DOMINGO, EMILIA EVANGELISTA, REYNALDO FAUSTINO, ALICIA DELA CRUZ
FERNANDEZ, IAN FEROLINO, GIL GALAN, ANALIZA GARIBAY, JESUS GARRIDO, FLORENCIO GATCHALIAN, CONSORIO
GERONES, VERONICA GULAFO, ALMA HERMINIA, PAUL RODERICK HOFELINA, IDA JACA, ENRIQUE JACSON,
NENEVEH LAPUZ, ROLANDO LEAL, MILLER MANILA, DESALE MANZANO, ROLANDO MARAON, MARIANO MARIANO,
RODELIO MENORIA ROMEO MERIDA, JOSEFINA MONJARDIN, NILO PARDE, EMMANUEL PASCO, NONITA QUITO, GLEN
RANCE, BONIFACIO RENOBLAS, JESUS REYES, JOSE REYES, RIZAL REYLES, JUAN ROQUE, NENITA SALGADO,
GAUDENCIO SALONGA GALLARDO TOLENTINO, ALBERTO TRINIDAD, MA. FELISA VARGAS, ROGELIO VAZQUEZ,
WILLIAM VEJERANO, ELIZABETH VILLANUEVA VIRGINIA VILLARUEL, SERGIO YEBAN, EVELYN M. ALONSO, MIE
ARCA, ARTHUR BARAOIDAN, CATHERINE BATUSBATUSAN, IRENEA CARANDANG, LOURDES CARLENGGA, MA. ANNA F.
CASUPANG, ROSALIA FLORA O. COSTALES, ELSA DIZON, HENRY ESPINELI, JOVEN ESPINELI, RICHARD FELIX, MA.
CRISTINA M. FERNANDEZ, RENATO C. FERNANDO, LYDIA A. FULGOSINO, RENATO GONZALES, BONIFACIO JOGNO,
OSCAR MANAOIS, JULITA MOJICA, ANGELINA MOYA, LUISITO NACO, MA. ANA ORQUIZA, SUSAN PRIANES, EDMOND
PRINCIPE, TERESA A. RAMOS, ROBERTO REYES, MARTINET ROBLE, GRETA SALVIEJO, PEPITO SAMSON, SALVADOR
SOLIVEN, JOSE F. SUMINISTRADO, ADELINA TRINIDAD, LUCITO AMISCARAY, FRANK JAIME AQUINO, MARIO BAISA,
ALTAIR BAUTISTA, TEODORO R. BERSABE, MODESTO L. BORJA (DR.), EUGENIA A. BRIONES, CONRADO S. COMIA,
BLESILDA C. CONCEPCION, NELSON CUSTODIO, DENNIS A. DE GUZMAN, EUFRACIO V. DE LUNA, LUCIANO DELA CRUZ,
JR., REYNALDO ESPINO, DAVID F. ESPIRITU, EDUARDO FERUELO, JORGE Y. LILLO RONALDO I. MARAVILLA,
CONRADO A. MERCADO, LEILANI G. NAGA, NOE NAMBATAC, LARRY P. PINERA, BENEDICTO M. QUITAIN, ERIBERTO L.
RODRIGUEZ, FEDERICO SABADO, JR., OSCAR C. SALONGA, OSCAR C. SANGANBAYAN, FERIOLA M. SERRANO, ANDRES
P. SEVILLEJA, FELICIDAD T. ZAMORA, ARIEL ARENAS, LOUIE CRISMO, ALBERTO DE GUZMAN, GIDEON DE LUNA,
JUNIBERT DE SAGUN, ANGELICA ECITO, CLARON ESPESO, PORFERIO ESPINA, LEVIN GABUTAN, NORMAN GALLEMIT,
DIOSDADO JOSE, ANSELMA JUNIO, MILA LAGRIMAS, NOEMI LASPINAS, SINFROSA PASCUA, RENATO POLIDO, ROMY
RAGMA, ROEL REYES, MARIBEL SANTOS, EVELYN SERISOLA RAIDA V. ALEGRE, MINDA A. AMON, GREGORIO P.
ANTOLIN, JR., LUZ B. ARVIZO, ANDRES F. BAES, JR., ALEJANDRO R. BALOLOY, BERNARDO B. BAYANGOS, NORA S.
BOQUIREN, ELMER B. BORRE, EDUARDO A. BRION, JAIME C. CABANDE, DELIA A. CALIXTO, REYNALDO N.
CONCEPCION, FARLEY O. CONDE, BIENVENIDO L DE GUZMAN, CONRADO C. DE JESUS, CORAZON T. DE JESUS,
JOSEFINA G. DILOY, ASUNCION A. DIMAGUILA, ONOFRE DOLAR, JR., SERGIO S. ENRIQUEZ, CORAZON P. ESPINO,
SILVINO M. FELLO, COLITA J. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO G. GOLDING, RENATO G. GONZALES, ELIZABETH M.
HERNANDO, LILIAN T. HURTADO, GLORIA C. MACASAET, ERIC N. MARASIGAN, MARINA P. MARGES, NORMA M.
MAURICIO, GINA P. NILO, JANET G. OPERARIO, JULIANA J. ORDOA, BERNARDO B. PASCUA, ELIODORA D. RAMOS,
EVELYN C. RAMOS, PERFECTO O. REYES, VICENTE V. ROBLES, FLORENCIO A. ROJALES, CORAZON B. ROSALES,
TEOTIMO L. ROTERSOS, ELIZABETH C. SADORRA, FE D. SALIWAN, MOISES T. SANCHEZ, ESTER S. SANTOS, RUFINO L.
SANTOS, EMILIANO M. SIBOLBORO, BAYANI V. VILLANUEVA, ERNESTO G. ALMENDRAL, TERESITA AVISO, CLARITA
BACATIO, ALFONSO G. BAUTISTA, NARDA A. BLASCO, LUNINGNING J. BONDOC, JOSE B. BURA, ODON CAPANGPANGAN,
VIRGILIO A. CASTAEDA, MARIO B. COLLADO, ARSENIO L. CALONGE, LUISITO F. COSTELO, OSCAR F. COSTELO, NILO
A. CRUCENA, ARTURO A. DAYOT, SUNNY A. DE GUZMAN, WILFREDO B. DELA CRUZ, JULIETA G. ESPENELI, CECILIA C.
ESTRADA, PERFECTO P. EVANGELISTA, MAGDALENA Q. FAVIS, CRISTINA M. FERNANDEZ, RENE D. FERNANDEZ,
LOURDES S. GALANTA, RAYMUNDO G. GALANTA, REDENTOR S. GATUS, JOSE G. GERPACIO, ARNULFO B. GESITE,
CLEOFE C. GONZALES, BELLA V. HERNANDO, CARMELITA B. INCILLO, LIGAYA H. ISON, AIDA T. LATOZA, DEOGRACIAS
R. MAGTALAS, FLORENCIO G. MANANGHAYA, MAMERTO F. MARTINEZ, NESTOR T. MERJILLA, ALENJANDRO G.
MICOSA, PABLO M. MONTALLA, EDGAR P. NATIVIDAD, QUERUBIN A. NAVERO, HENRY E. NOCEDA, NOEMI M. PASCUAL,
BERNA G. PASTOR, MADONNA H. PEALBA, CRISTY C. PERLADO, DOMINCIANO D. RAMOS, JR., LEO RETAMAR,
TERESITA V. RETAMAR, ANDRES ARIEL B. REYES, JOSE D. RONDAL, MILAGROS F. ROSALES, OSCAR C. SALONGA, EDNA
L. SAMAR, ANTONIO SAN ANDRES, MANUEL S. SANDOVAL, SHIRLEY A. SANTOS, MANUEL S. STA. ANA, NESTOR M.
TICSON, LORENZO M. TOMAS, REYNALDO R. VILLANUEVA, MARIO E. VINLUAN, LOLITA C. AGUSTIN, CRISOSTOMO B.
ALCALDE, DIGNA R. ALLAG, MERLYNA F. ATIL, ELISA AYO, JULITA M. AYUYAO, VICTORCITO V. BABIERRA, AMELIA A.
BANGALAN, ELVIRA M. BAUTISTA, ERLINDA D. BAUTISTA, CELSO R. BERSABE, APOLINARIO P. CARANDANG, VIOLETA
E. CASTAEDA, JOSEFINA L. CREENCIA, ROGELIO CREENCIA, ESPERANZA V. DACANAY, LEONARDO M. DE LEON,
LEONORA P. DE LEON, LUCIANO C. DELA CRUZ, AURORA B. DELOS SANTOS, ROMEO P. DELOS SANTOS, DAISY T.
ELICANO, MARCIANA B. ENRIQUEZ, NATIVIDAD P. ESCOBAR, VIRGINCITO G. ESTOCONING, REDEMCION B. GRIFAL,
CELIA C. GROSPE, LORNA L. GULAFO, VIRGINIA S. HIIARIO, ARNIE C. ILAN, ELISA N. LADANGA IGMIDIO B. LAPIS,
ULYSIS M. LATOZA, BEATRIZ C. MAGNO, JOSE D. MANGUERRA, MA. TERESA T. MANUEL, SERAFIN B. MATAWARAN

CONRADO A. MERCADO, RAFAEL A. MONTE, VENERANDO F. NABOA, CLEOTILDE M. NICOLAS, ELSIE V. OBRERO,
MAXIMINA OMANITO, EMILIO M. OSALVO, JOEY V. PADILLA, MARCELINA J. PALIS, REYNALDO G. PALIS, PERLA
PANGANIBAN, WILLIE C. PERLATA, IRENEO B. RAMAT, PERLITA M. RAMOS, EDGARDO R. REYES, JOSEPH B. ROJALES,
LEOGARDA T. RUBITE, JACQUELINE A SABINO, ANITA M. SALANDANAN, MEDARDO P. SALVADOR, WILFREDO B.
SANIDAD, IMELDA E. SANTOS, LEONARDO A. SEMANA, CARLOS P. SERRANO, FLORENCIO C. STA MARIA, RAMON P.
ULIBAS, GAVINO ISAGANI P. URRIZA, PETRONILLA T. VALENZUELA, SALVADOR F. VILLAREY, AMY O. YAMBOT, FELIX
N. ALBANO, RICARDO C. ALEGRID, ARIEL G. ALMEDA, JULITA V. AONUEVO, ULDARICO A. ANDAL, JAIME S. ANTONIO,
REYNALDO P. BAJAR, BERNARDO D. BALGOS, JOSELITO N. BANGAWAN, LEOVIGILIO R. BANTIQUE, ELVIRA M.
BAUTISTA, ERNESTO BELO, LUZ C. CABAMONGAN, ANDRES B. CALIMUTAN, MARCELO S. CRISOSTOMO, AGNEZ CRUZ,
BERNARDINA I. DAGUIO, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, MARCELINO P. DE LEON, CARMEN P. DEL ROSARIO, EDIZA A. DIAZ,
TEODORICO C. ERNI, JULIANA M. FAJARDO, TEORODICO M. FAJARDO, LEOVENILDA A. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN M.
GALLARITA, CONSTANCIA R. GANTIOQUI, EUGENIA G. GARCIA JOSE G. HAPAN, NORA B. INCIONG, LALAINE JAVINEZ,
GERMAN M. JONAS, BELTHA B. LANDICHO, ERLINDA LOVERIZA, CLARITA J. MAESTRADO, JOSELITO MAGNO,
EDUARDO B. MALAPITAN, EDUARDO A. MANZANO, NAPTHALI Q. MAYUGA, REMEDIOS B. MILLER, AMELIA R.
MORENO, PONCIANO L. MURILLO, JOSEPHINE L. NANA, ISABEL D. NASIS, MERCEDES V. OCAMPO, GODOFREDO R.
ODEJAR, TERESITA OLMELLA, GERMAN L. OMAA, CECILIA B. ORLANES, BELINA P. PAJARITO, LUCINDA S. PANGCO,
JAIME PASCUAL, TERESITA S. PERLADO, VILMA M. QUIMSON, CESAR H. RAMOS, ROMEO L. SACDALAN, CRISTINA M.
SANDOVAL, TERESITA S. SANDOVAL, FELICIANA A. SANTIAGO, LORNA F. SANTOS, LUZDIVINA R. SISON, CRESENCIO O.
SOLANO, NELSON B. STA. CLARA, ANSELMA B. STA. CLARA, ANSELMA B. TAJON, FE P. VADIL, ARTHUR O. ACHA,
DANILO E. ADRIATICO, MERLYN ALDABA, ARNALDO B. ALVAREZ, REYNALDA T. AMADA, NELSON ANGELES,
FRANCISCO A. BAYALAS, TEODORO R. BERSABE, ELSA C. BORJA, MODESTO L. BORJA, EDUARDO O. BREGANZA,
EUGENIA A. BRIONES, EDMUNDO P. BUSTILLO, RENATO S. CABRERA, MARINA N. CAMACHO, OSCAR O. CARPIO,
BLESILDA C. CONCEPCION, SAMUEL M. CONTRERAS, CORAZON J. CORPUZ, YOLANDA S. COSTELO, RAMON S.
ENRIQUEZ, MERCEDES S. FERNANDO, JOSE ANTONIO GUATLO, MARUJA JARABEJO, RAUL M. LAURENA, TERESITA D.
LIZARDO, RODOLFO L. LUCAS, CESAR M. MAGADIA, RICARTE A. MELCHOR, JOSIE P. MERCADO, LEILANI G. NAGA,
AURORA N. NOROMBABA, WILMA G. NOTA, REYNALDO O. PEREGRINO, SALVACION L. PLANAS, ROGELIO L. PUMARAS,
NARCISA D. RAMIS, ROSEMELINDA R. REFORMA, ROBERTO R. REYES, LOLITA M. RONDON, SONIA M. SALGUERO,
NORBERTO SALILI, NATIVIDAD M. SALONGA, ROSEMARIE C. SISON, VICTOR J. VILLANUEVA, ARMANDO ARCAMO,
BELINDA CABALLA, TERESITA DIVAD, PEPITO ESPENILLI, BERCELIZA FAJARDO, NELIA GULAPO, CHRISTINE
MANAGBANAG, REYNALDO MANAGBANAG, LUIS MENDOZA, OSCAR OSTING, EDGARDO REYES, DINO VELASQUEZ,
MA. CECILIA O. DELA PEA, ILUMINADA POJAS, NORA ABAYA, MARIETTA S. ABCEJO, VICTORIA E. ABELLA, FILOMENA
L. ABEN, MA. VICTORIA D. ABESAMIS, NITA D. ABID, VERONICA ABIERO, RONELLO ABILA, DANILO ABON, EVA ABON,
EVA FE J. ABRAHAM, EDGAR A. ABRIOL, RUBY I. ABRIOL, REMEDIOS ACASIO, ROMEO L. ACEDO, RIZALINA M. ACORDA
SUSAN B. AGAPITO, RODOLFO T. AGONCILLO, MARGARITA N. AGOOT, MARIA H. AGOOT, ELIZABETH AGPAOA,
AVELINO AGUINALDO, JOSE R. AJON, LOURDES ALAG, LUZVIMINDA ALBAO, LUCITA ALEGRE, EXPEDITA S. ALEJON,
MELENIDA ALMAZAN, MANUEL T. ALMOGUERRA, CAROLINA J. ALVIAR, ELVIRA D. AMA, JOHN AMARRA, BENEDICTO
ARABIT, AURORA M. ANCHETA, RAYMUNDO ANDAY, ERIC J. ANONAS, ROSEMARIE N. ANTEGRO, CARMENCITA APELO
(DR.), ESTER AQUINO, ALEX AQUITAA, EDUARDO ARCA, NANCY I. ARCANGEL, CRISPINO ARIAS, GAUDENCIO ARIAS,
ESTHERLINA D. ARIFALO, ALICIA C. ARJONA-LAYSON, RODRIGO L. ARMENIO, ABELARDO E. ARNAO, ROSALINDA M.
ARVESU, JOSEPHINE B. ASAS, MA. WYNNE A. ASTUDILLO, VICTOR C. ATIENZA, DAVID AVANTE, LUISITO AVANTE, ANITA
C. AVILLA, HERNANDO F. AVILLA EUSTAQUIO AWTTAN, ERNESTO BACOLOR, EFREN BACONAWA, MYRNA D.
BALDECAAS, JUANA BALOTRO, LORY C. BANGALISAN, GERMELINA T. BAOY, ELVIRA BARREDA, DOLORES BAUTISTA,
NIEVES V. BAUTISTA, RENATO BAUTISTA, MELINDA A. BAYOT, EDNA T. BEGINO, BELLA C. BELOY, CAROLYN C.
BENIGNO, CALIXTA C. BERBA, JOSE C. BERNAL, LILIA B. BERNAL, CALIXTO BERNARDO, DANTE C. BERNARDO,
ERNESTO BERNARDO, RENATO BERNARDO, MELENCIO BERNARDO, ONOFRE S. BONIGFACIO, JOCELYN B. BOREJON,
EDWARD S. BRIONES, ROSALINDA R. BUADO, ERNESTO BUENAFLOR, FELIX BUTUHAN, CECILLO CABUANG, GILDA
CABUANG, WILFREDO CABUANG, ROLANDO A. CAMBA, RONNIE CAPILI, AURORA CAPIRAL, MARILOU CAPUNO,
LEONCIO CARAAN, ESTELITA R. CARANDANG, REMIA B. CARPIO, EDUARDO CASTELLANO, LOLITA A. CASTILLO,
BELLA U. CATACUTAN, CARINA P. CATIMBANG, MAURO CAYETA, CRISANTO P. CEREZO, FELICIANO CONCEPCION,
VIVIAN D. CONCEPCION, RODANTE CONSTANTE, ADELA B. CONTRERAS, JOSEFINA A. CONTRERAS, ANAMARIE P.
CORONEL, CRISOSTOMO A. CORTEZ, ERLINDA CORTEZ JOSEPH ALAN D. COSTALES, ROSARIO M. COSTALES, RUBINA
O. CRESENCIO, ANTONIO CRISTOBAL, BALGAMEL C. CROOC, VIRGINIA CRUZ, LEONILO A. DABBAY, ROGELIO V.
DACULLA, AZUCENA DAMANG, LINO I. DANTE, ERLINDA N. DAUZ, KAREN ROSE C. DAZO, DOLORES T. DE GUZMAN,
MARISSA DE GUZMAN, MYRILOU DE DUZMAN, NATALIA C. DE GUZMAN, REDEDIOS DE JESUS, EMELINA C. DE LEON,
ANGELES DE MAYO, VICTORIA B. DEL PRADO, CESAR M. DELA CRUZ, ESTENELY M. DELA CRUZ, JOSE K. S. DELA
CRUZ, NICANOR S. DELA CRUZ, EDUARDO DELA TORNE, REYNALDO DELOS SANTOS, VERONICA DELOS SANTOS,
EVELYN DELOS TRINOS, GLICERIA DERROTA GERMAN DIAZ, AUGUSTO DIMAMENT, MEDIATRIX DIRECTO, ROMULO
S. DIRECTO, JR., STELLA DOCENA, RODOLFO DOMDOM, JACQUELINE DONESA, ALFREDO DUCUSIN, PETRONILO B.
DUMANGAS, LORNA D. EBIO, GILBERT R. EGAA, ROBERT EGAA, ROMULO ELAMPARO, MARLENE ENRIQUEZ,
NICERATA ERMITA, LOURDES R. ERSANDO, HERMINIO ESCALONA, NESTOR B. ESCANDOR, PEDRO ESCREZA,
MARILOU B. ESCUREL, TERESITA G. ESPOCIA, MARINA M. ESTACIO, NANETHA ESTANTE, ELSIE ESTOPACE, MALANIE
M. ESTOLE, RODOLFO C. ESTRELLA, RICA EVASCO, LIWANAG C. FELICIANO, EDNA A. FELIPE, EVA FEMENTIRA,
BERNARDINO FERIDO, JR., PURIFICACION C. FERRER, FRANCISCO FETALBERO, LUCIA FLORES, MA. GRACIA D.
FLORES, NILO FRANCISCO (DR.), ZENAIDA F. FRANCISCO, MANOLITA Z. GAERLAN, EDITHA S. GOLLA, ANTONIO A.
GANNABAN, CARLOS GARCIA, CORAZON A. GARCIA, JULIE G. GARCIA, LIZA S. GAYAS, EVAN R. GERONIMO,
BONIFACIO GODOY, ARLENE GONZALES, HILDENCE B. GONZALES, ILUMINADA B. GONZALES, GRACE L. GUILLERMO,
BENJAMIN C. GUTIERREZ, RODOLFO GUTIERREZ, ALEJANDRINO HADUCA, MARILYN P. HERNANDEZ, NILDA
HERNANDEZ, FREDERICO HIFE, ERQUITA HORCA, LORETO HUMARANG, REBECCA M. IBAROLA, MELINDA O.
IGNACIO, FRANCIA ILAO, AURORA C. INDICO, DIANA INOCENCIO, ALICIA M. IRANGA, DEOGRACIAS JAVIER, NELLY A.

JIAO, CHARITO GIMENO, DIDETTE M. JOCO, LOLITA JUNIO, LEWELLIE R. KAMPITAN, ESTRELLITA KARGANILLA,
GREGORIO LACSA, JR., ANTONIO LANDRITO, LETICIA R. LANDRITO, ANDRES LANGIT, MAXIMA R. LAPUZ, ANICIA
LAUREL, FLORENCIA B. LAURENCIANO, MARCELINO E. LEGASPI, MARIO T. LEGASPI, FIDEL LIBAO, IMELDA
LIBERATO, ANITA LIBRADO, LILIA G. LIWANAG, EDEN P. LLANES, ANTONIO C. LOPEZ, CERELINO LOPEZ, EMELINA A.
LOPEZ, VIRGILIO LORENZO, FLORO MAGO, JR., ZENAIDA MADERA, MELCHOR MAGNAYE, ARLENE B. MAGPANTAY,
FERMINA MAGPANTAY, MAGNO MALABANAN, PABLO B. MALABANAN, LUISA MALALOAN, MERCIA MALLARI,
RICARDO MALLARI, RONALDO MALLARI, RUSTICO MALLARI, ANGELI, MALONZO, PEDRO M. MANAIG, FLORITA S.
MANGABAT, NEMESIA C. MANGABAT, MANOLITO M. AVANTE, BERNARDO S. MANUEL, CECILIA MANUEL, ROBERTO
MANUEL, CLARIBEL MANZANO, PABLO MARASIGAN, PEAFRANCIA H. MARASIGAN, RHODORA MARASIGAN,
ANNABELLE F. MARBELLA, FLORENCIO MARCIAL, HERMINIO D. MARCIAL. RICARDO F. MARERO, JUANITO R.
MARTIN, JR., BALTAZAR MATEO, ROSALINDA P. MATEO, ESTELA MAYO, SOCORRO G. MERCADO, AVELINO G.
MILLORA, APOLINAR MIMIS, NORMA MIMIS, AL MINAO, CONSUELO MIRANDA, LEONARDO MIRANDA, REBECCA R.
MIRANDA, LILIA B. MOSLARES, MARLYN MULATO, MA. VICTORIA L. MUNN SHA KHATA, LEONCIA N. NABONG, AMELIA
A. NACIONAL, FLORENCIO R. NAGAO, JOEY N. NAPIZA, MARION NAPIZA, ZENAIDA NATIVIDAD, ABELO NAVARRO,
NICETAS S. NICOLAS, VICENTE M. NIM, JUAN NIOLAR, LYDIA E. NONES, MARILOU W. NUESTRO, CLEOTILDE D.
OLAYRES, SUSAN R. OLID, AMELITA A. OLIVAS, BIENVENIDO L. OPEA, FRANCISCA S. ORELLANO, CONSTANCIA
ORLANDA, GUELLERMO ORTICIO, BONIFACIO ORTILLANO, ANGEL PABLO, EDUARDO PABLO, GENEROSO PACLITA,
RAYMUNDO PADILLA, NANIE L. PALABAY, ANGELINA N. PALOS, ALAN B. PANCHO, MELITA PANCHO, ESTRELLA C.
PANGANIBAN, GINA C. PANGANIBAN, LERMA V. PANGANIBAN, PEDRO A. PANGANIBAN, RITO PARTOSA, CYNTHIA
PASADILLA, PRISCILLA E. PASCUA, JOCELYN C. PASCUAL, REBECCA PASCUAL, FLORENCIO PASTULERO, GERMAN
PATNONGON, VENANCIO PATRICIO, CARLEEN R. PERALTA, MARITON T. PEREZ, IMELDA D. PILLAS, RICARDO B. PINAYAN, JUDITH A. PLATERO, EMILY J. POLON, BILLYADONA B. PONCE, RAUL R. PONSECA, RAMY PRADO, BERNADEL M.
PRIVADO, FERNANDO S. PRONUEVO, CARMELITA C. PUTOLINO, NORA QUINTOS, EDNA D. RAGUINDIN, JULIAN D.
RAGUINDIN, ANACLETA G. RAMILO, FRUTO RAMOS, JULIETA RAMOS, ROMEO R. RAMOS, SABINA RAYMUNDO, FE
BIEN R. REALON, ALFREDO RECTRA, IRENEO REGIDOR, RACHEL C. REGIDOR, ALICE REYES, ELIZABETH L. REYES,
FLORDELIZA REYES, DOLORES E. RICAFRANCA, MANUEL RICARDO, ROBERTA L. RIGUER, GRETEL F. RIVERA, EFREN
ROBLES, PROCESO RODRIGUEZ, REMEDIOS F. RONATO, EDEN ROSON, LEOPOLDO U. ROXAS, MOISES SADURAL, SR.,
MOISES A. SADURAL, JR., VALENTIN SADURAL, JOSEFINA A. SAGUN, RUBY F. SAHAGUN, MAURA M. SALIBA, GERLIE
SALVA, LEONCIO SALUDARES, AVELINA M. SAMIANO, REYNALDO A. SAMIANO, JAIME G. SAN PABLO, VERONIDIA G.
SAN PABLO, BARTOLOME SANCHEZ, JOSEPHINE L. SANDOVAL, EDA SANOPO, ELIZA C. SANTIAGO, JOEL G. SANTIAGO,
TIMOTEO SANTIAGO, CONCEPCION W. SANTOS, FELIXBERTO SANTOS, JR., JOSEFINA C. SANTOS, MARCELINO
SANTOS, RODOLFO SANTOS CESARIO SANTOSAN, JUMELLE G SARABIA, JOSEPHINE SARMIENTO, OFELIA
SARMIENTO, AURORA C. SAVELLANO, SALLY SERRANO, RODOLFO R. SIBALUCA, MARINA SILVESTRE, BASILISA C.
SISON, EDUARDO N. SISON, SYLVANA R. SISON, ESTER SOBREMONTE, JAIME SOBREMONTE, ALFREDO SORIANO, JR.,
JULIA PAULA M. SORIANO, CARMEN STA. AGATA, DOMINGA SUBA, TETERIO SUER, JEROME SUPLIDO, LINA A.
TABUAR, FERMIN TACAZON, LORENZO TALATALA, ADORA V. TAN, NELCY L. TAEDO, MILAGROSA T. TANALGO,
ALBERTO C. TANCHANCO, MELECIO TARIFE, ROSARIO K. TATLONGHARI, RUFINA B. TAYAG, HERMINIA A. TECSON,
PAPA TENGCO, LOURDES L. TEVES, CRESENCIANA R. TIMBOL, NOLI N. TIONG, VIRGINIA B. TIONG, LILIA TIONGSON,
MA. ASUNCION N. TIONGSON, JOSEPHINE TOLENTINO, BENJAMIN TORRENTE, OSCAR TORRES, SONIA M. TRINIDAD,
RIZALINA TROPA, CRISTINA TUAZON, HOMER E. TUAZON, RICARDO TUBUNGBAMA, HYDEE N. TUYAY, MERCY
URRUTIA, LARNE VALCARCEL, EMILIANO B. VALDEZ, JR., REMEDIOS S. VALDEZ, JOSIE VARGAS, FELINO VELASQUEZ
(DR.), PEDRO A. VELASQUEZ, RAFAEL A. VELEZ, SYLVIA I. VERGARA, BLESILDA VERIN, ADRIANO VICTORIO, JR.,
DOMINADO VICTORIO, EMILY E. VICTORIO, GLORIA VIDA, LOURDES M. VILLAFLOR, ALBERTO A. VILLAFLORES,
LEONIDO Z. VILLAFLORES, ALICE VILLALOBOS, CATHERINE P. VILLANUEVA, EDWIN G. VILLANUEVA, TERESITA S.
VILLARIAZA, FREDERICO G. VILLARTA, EDGAR VINCULADO, ZENAIDA C. VINCULADO, EDITHA VITALICIA, AVELINO
C. VIVO, ARLENE V. VYTIACO, MILAGROS WABE, RODOLFO WENCESLAO A. WONOSUWAN, HERMINIA V. YALUNG,
LAARNI ZAMORA, MARY ANN R. ZEPEDA, FERNANDO SQ, LATI M. SIRIOS, JOEL BOREJON, CONCHITA PUBLICO,
AGRIPINA BRIONES, MILTON SACRO, LOLITA RAZON, CONSOLACION GUERRA, ANDRES ARAO, MARCELINO JUSTO,
ROSALES REGINIO, PEDRO RUBALA, BENJO BONIFACIO, ANGEL MATEO, EDUARDO QUE MODESTA M. ANDAYA,
ANTONIETTA M. APALISOK, VIENNA E. BELTRAN, LORENZO N. BRIANA, CRISELDA L. CASTILLO, JUANITO B. CHAN, JR.,
ORLANDO S. CUYUGAN, ZORAIDA F. DE GUZMAN, VITO F. DEL FIERRO, JR., RELITA A. ROSA, HERMINIA S. DELOS
REYES, BEATRIZ C. DIZON, SUSAN A. FORONDA, MARY ANN P. FRANCO, ROMULO M. GARCIA. JOVITA M. GONZALES,
REBECCA O. JOSE, MARCIA B. LANUZA, ALBERTO G. LEGASPI, ANGELINA A. MABUNGA, CONSUELO B. MANGUBAT,
ILUMINADA G. MAPAYE, AMELIA V. MARCELO, GLENDA S. MARQUEZ, LOURDES IRENE N. MIOZA, EULOGIO M.
MONTEALTO, MARIO P. MUECO, LUCILDA L. PADAUAN, EDGARDO V. SAN JUAN, MA. FATIMA S. SENGCO, CAROLYN O.
TABANGCURA, MARIETA U. TIBAYAN, MARIETA E. TUGADE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GODOFREDO N. ALCASID, JR., in this official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Soils and Water Management. HON.
ROMEO N. ALCASID, in hit official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, and HON. PEDRO O. OCAMPO, in his
official capacity as the Executive Director of the Livestock Development Council, respondents.
G.R. No. 111494 September 11, 1998
DIONELO D. IBABAO, ELVIRA F. SIMON, AURORA M. CRISTOBAL ONOFRE T. SUBA, NELITA DIAZ, ERNESTO NUVAL,
ENRIQUE LACSA, SABINA DIAZ, MAGTANGGOL SANTIAGO, VALENTIN TANZUACO, ANGELITO TABORA, LOIDA
CAINGLIT, ALBERTO SANTIAGO III, HOSPICIO C. MAHILUM, FRANCISCO SANTOS, JR., PABLO RABINO, LORETO
GANIR, MODESTO DAYON, GLICERIA TUAZON, HONOLITA ALMONTE, RAQUEL RAMOS, ADORACION C. JASTILLANA,
RICARDO ESGUERRA, JONATHAN DICKSON, ROBERTO TIONGSON, BIENVENIDO RICAFRENTE, ALFREDO TAYAG,
ROLANDO CAJANDING, AMELITO GOLLOSO, REYNALDO RONQUILLO, LEONCIO LEGASPI, REYNALDO DELA CRUZ,
NICANOR LLAMAS, MARIANO ODHOY, LORETO GANIR, TERESITA MALLA, ORBETA GUERRERO, HILARION LAGUA,

PABLO ABAD, ALBERTO LAPERAL JR., CLARITA ULANDAY, TERESITA LOPEZ, CRSENCIA MALONZO, NATIVIDAD
LAGUA, JERICARDO MONDRAGON, FILOMENA GANTE, JESUSA WAJI, LEONORA SIGNE, MARILOU ROSANA, JOSEFINA
FRANCISCO, MARIA AFRICA MENDIORO, SEVERO BALANE, JR., TEODORO JOCSON, MARISSA ALBALADEJO, FLORA
CASEM, MILAGROS FLORADA, TOMASA CARANDANG, MERLY REPANI, SUSAN GARCIA, BENJAMIN NUNEZ, ANA MARIE
ARENAS, ROMUALDO POL, JULITA LAVARO, HERMINIO MAHILUM, AMIANA ABELLA, ADELAIDA ALCISTO, RIZALINA
M. LEGASTO, MILAGROS LEDESMA, LORNA P. ANACLETO, AUGUSTO T. REGIO, CYNTHIA P. ISAAC, FELIPE ALBANO,
ROSALINDA Q. DE LA CRUZ, MITZI C. FERNANDEZ, RUSSEL DIAZ VALENTINO MACASAET, SALVADOR DELFINO,
MAXIMO ESGUERRA, JR., JUNELITA PACIO, ERNESTO TUZON, VIOLA MARIANO, LUTGARDA SEBASTIAN, MARCO
PEREZ, ISABELO MACABUGAO, FRANCISCO FABRO, ERLINDA CLAVO, DOMINGO JOCSON, ENECITAS TABORADA,
LUISA TUASON, ROSALIO BAZ, JR., LUZVIMINDA SALDUA, TEODORA OAMINAL, LEONOR BRINGAS, DAISY LADRA,
MERCEDES SANGREO, ZENAIDA MUNON, ANTONIO AMURAO, PERCIVAL ECITO, SYLVIA MON, LOURDES MANGASI,
BENIGNO MAGNO, ZOILO AQUINO, ROSARIE ARREZA, PILAR FONTELAR, FLOR ABELLA, MERCEDITA BANTAYA,
PACIENCIA FIGUEROA, HILDA BALLO, MAURICIO BALLO, RODOLFO C. PINTO, CESAR GUERRERO, VIRGINIA DE LOS
SANTOS, ALICE CORDERO, MYRNA ABILAR, ROSA BASSIG, ADORACION OBINQUE, AMELITA MAGBAGO, MACARIA
ANDRADE, CONSUELO BALTAZAR, ELIZABETH VIANA, ROSARIO RAGAZA, JOSEFINO MONDRAGON, CONRADO GANIR,
FILIPINA GOJAR, EMILIA BARRAMEDA, CIRILA LEYVA, FREDA ROXAS, CORAZON DE LA CRUZ, ROSITA CALVELO,
ROSARIO LIZARDO, CRISTINA NUQUI, FELICISIMA MAXINO, JACINTO ARUCAN, JR., LORETA DE GUZMAN, LEONORA
DE LEON, LYDIA AGUILING, DALISAY MONEDA, LOURDES LIZA, PAZ LADERAS, EFREN LUNA, EVELYN CABUS, ESTER
CONCEPCION, ARIEL BAUTISTA, FRANCIA AMAQUI, FRANCISCA BIANES, PAZ LUCERO, ERLINDA ESPINOSA, TERESITA
CATACUTAN, REGINO OGSIMER, ESTRELLA ORENSE, MARYLOU VILLAREAL, ALMA DICKSON, NATIVIDAD RAZO,
ALICIA SUALOG, ERLINDA ARALAR, REDENTOR GATUS, FORTUNATO CABEZAS, CECILIA REYES, AURORA REYES,
BARTOLOME, SANTIAGO, JESUS DELA TORRE, CONSOLACION SEVILLA, HENRY LUGAYAN, ANGELES GALERA,
REUBEN A. GANADEN, JULITA ABULON, LINA SANTOS, GLORIA C. BERGADO, ANSELMA S. LEGASPI, LEONORA RIVER,
EDITHA MALOLOS, JESUS SANCHEZ, ALBERTO MOLERO, DOMINGO TUAZON, JR., SOFIA S. BASA, SUSANA EDIC,
FELIPE ELEDA, ARMANDO LANDAYAN, RICARDO MAR, JR., AUGUSTO SANTOS, ARSENIA AREVALO, ERLINDA ABUEVA,
VIRGILIO SANTOS, GAUDENCIO BADIOLA, JR., MODESTA ANGELES, RENATO GUTIERREZ, LUCERNA ICAPIN,
MARLENE CALANGIAN, NEMENCIO AREVALO, NENITA DE GUZMAN, LOURDES PALO, MANUEL CABRERA. BENJAMIN
MAGAT, ERNESTO REYES, EUGENE SANGALANG, ARMANDO ALCAZAR, JOSELITO MAGHIRANG, ROMEO DIETA,
ROFER ESQUIRRES, DONATO ALMARINEZ, MELITA CONSULTA, RENATO VILLAFRANCA, LEONCIO ALVAREZ, MANUEL
SOTOMAYOR, LEOVELITO CATALLA, APOLINARIO GICOS, FLORIDA ARBOLEDA, ROMEO PORNOBI, CANDIDO
SOTOMAYOR, GREGORIO BARRION, CARMELA EUBION, DANILO NAGPALA, ANGELITO VALDEZ, LEONARDO SAN
JUAN, CLAUDIO RESMA, CESAR GALERA. DANTE AMURAO, FLORDELIZA DE JESUS, EULENIA FERNANDO, BENEVERT
FERNANDO, AQUILINO RONQUILLO, MONA NARVAZ, VIVIAN NEBRES, ALBERTO NUNEZ, MARINA DUMOL, ARCADIO
ISON, NORMA BORJA, REYMUNDO NEBRES, ALEX MOLE, NALDA TANADA, ARMANDO VILLANUEVA, NIDA BALANE,
ROSALIND SANTOS, NITA MITRA MEDRANO, ELIZABETH BAUN, ALFREDO VILLATUYA, ROY GARCIA, AVELINA
BIERNES, RODOLFO ASIS, ARTEMIO GINES, AURITA CASTILLO, HOMERTO RIOMALOS, ALICIA DELOS SANTOS, GRACE
DE VEYRA, SALUD R. GANADEN, LOLITA SUIZO, ERLINDA PICHAY, NELIA TIEL, DORIS FRIAS, JOSIE SAN PEDRO,
JOHNNY ICONAR, AURORA ROCABO, ALICIA BORROMEO, RAMIR MASAYDA, JUANITA AMURAO, BELINDA SAN DIEGO,
SIMEONA REGIDOR, JOSEFINA GENESERA, PATRICIA AQUINO, EDWYN ALESNA, HECTOR BAUN, DANILO LUCERO,
PURITA DELA PENA, FELIONOR ELESERIO, AUGUSTO HERNANDEZ, LINA ZULUETA, PHOEBE LAQUINDANUM, ELMER
ALBA, MYRNA RAMOS, EFIPANIO ABAYA, LUZVIMINDA MATIGNAS, GUILLERMO AQUINO, JR., RICARDO VERSOZA,
NELSON FRANCISCO, EDUARDO BUTAC, ADORADO CAINGLIT, ROLANDO SIKAT, THELMO MAGSUMBOL ELOISA UZON,
JUSTONATO PENIANO, PEDRO NATIVIDAD, DOMINGO ASUNCION, NARCISO GARCIA, RESTITUTO SANCHEZ HELEN
IBARRA, ALFREDO DUCANTE, ARMANDO MARTINEZ, GLORIA PASCO, EMMA MARFORI, RICARDO MENDOZA,
ANTONIO MORALES, EDUARDO TOLENTINO, TITO DELA CRUZ, REGINALD GONZALES, JOSE PACLIBARE, JOSELITO
SONGA, VIRGILIO LEOPANDO, LEVITA ZAPANTA, FELIPA LOPEZ, ELPIDIO MENDOZA, EDMUNDO EDROSO, DOMINGO
CATALLA, VERGEL BIADO, DIEGO BUTAC, PROSPERO PASTORAL, CESAR AMINES, REGINO OPORTO, JR., ARMANDO
LAGUIDAO, REYGALDINE RAMIREZ, SEVERINO ESCOBAR, JR., BERNABE GONZALES, MAXIMO GATDULA, ALEMAR
SABATIN, BONIFACIO GANDULLAS, MARCELINO TACADAO, SEVERINO BARICANOSA, PACIFICO FRANCISCO,
EDUARDO SALCEDO, RODOLFO SINGH, FLORENCIO SERANILLO, ELPIDIO MACABALOS, FEDERICO TRINIDAD, JOSE
LACTAO, JULITA FADRIGUELA, PERFECTO GUERRERO, JR., EDITHO DEMDAM, ROMEO B. DE SAGUN, VIOLETA
RAMOS, VIRGINIA LOPEZ, CARMENCITA TOCINO, SALVADOR NIERRAS, MARILYN BERNALDO, CELIA BUSQUE, JOSE
CALDERON, AMADO ANONUEVO, LEODEGARIO CAWALING, CELSO IGANCIO, MARCIAL CAGUICLA, CRISPIN DELA
CRUZ, GIL FERRER, FARIDA BATOLOS, MARGIE KILAKIL, EMMA BOROMEO, HERMINIO LEYVA ROGELIO BERNABE,
OSCAR BANDIOLA, MELCHOR TAYAMEN, RUBEN REYES, ANGELITA SALGUET, JOEDOCIEL DANTING, ALMA
MENDOZA, RENATO MENDOZA, FRANK QUIMSON, EVELYN ZAFRA, MELITONA PENADA, BENICIO SINGQUENCO,
NICANOR CRISOSTOMO, ROSEBELLA JUMARAN, ABNER BUENAVENTURA, ADELAIDA PALMA, MARCELO VALDEZ,
LILIBETH AFAN, JOSE NAVIDAD, JUANITO BACANI, ROGELIO LONGALONG, GLICERIO SANTOS, AMOR SANTOS, FE DE
JESUS, JAIME DE JESUS, JOSE VICTORIO, ENRIQUE MARQUEZ, EDMUNDO GADUANG, WESLEY ROSARIO, ROLANDO
MIRANDA, WILHELMINA NATIVIDAD, JOSE NATIVIDAD, GUILLERMO OQUENDO, CLETO RAFER, JR., LEDA G. HANDOG,
CORAZON MANUBAY, ELADIO GONZALES, JOY DELA CRUZ, ADAN DIAMANTE, ELADIO VILLAMATER, GLORIA
MATIAS, VIRGINIA S. LUYUN, FIDELITO CALUPIG, RODOLFO JEREMIAS, JOSEPH BANDALA, CONCEPCION JUICO,
PRISCILLA ANGELES, ALFREDO SANTOS, JR., PROCOPIO MACOLOR, AURELIA RABARA, DANILO SINGQUENCO,
HARRIETO CAMARINES, NAMNAMA JAVELLOSA, AMELIA S. MAALA, RAFAEL RAMISCAL, FRANCISCO TABORDA,
CATALINO REYES, NELSON CALVELO, JOHN TABAY, BENJAMIN PINEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, In His Capacity As Secretary Of The Department Of Agriculture and HON. GUILLERMO R.
MORALES, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Fisheries, and Aquatic Resources, respondents.

G.R. No. 112056 September 11, 1998

JUVY CLAVEL P. GACULA, ANDY R. RIVERA, LORENZO T. SUBARIA, LEO J. BERNAL, CYNTHIA L. DE VEAS, AVELINA L.
DIOCES, FE Y. FELICIANO, THELMA A. GECOLEA, RODOLFO R. PANGAN, MAURA JASMIN A. REYES, PENNY MARIE G.
TAN, TERESITA V. CHAN, NENA A. INOCENCIO, PELAGIA O. ABAYA, FELIX P. BERNARDINO, MA. LUISA M. CALDITO,
EDGARDO F. DE JESUS, PARALUMAN T. DELA PAZ, RENATO F. GILERA, LEOVIGILDO G. MALZAN, CLARITA O. OLANO,
HERNAN Z. PEREZ, MILAGROS S. PILAPIL, GAUDENCIO L. RAMOS, JR., ADORACION J. SANTIAGO, ANDREA O. TAMINA,
TRINIDAD N. TOLENTINO, CARMELITA F. ZAFRA, CARMELO P. ABADILLA, EMMA L. LOGRONIO, CARMELITA B.
AGPOON, ANTONIO G. ARIZALA, DOHME C. ARPON, RENATO A. BACLAGAN, MANOLITO A. CUETO, REYNALDO G.
CUSTODIO, ROBLETO M. GULOY, OLIMPIO P. MARIBAO, JR., MANUEL V. MIRANDA, JOSE RANADA, JR., JESUS R.
REVIDAD, REX P. SEVILLA, FEDERICO D. SORIANO, BENEDICTO L. STA. ANA, DANIEL S. TOLENTINO, WILFREDO G.
VILLANUEVA, GUILLERMO O. BALURAN, JOSE G. BATTUNG, MANOLITO J. BERNAL, DELFIN R. BRAVO, PATRICK V.
CALDITO, DANILO L. CATIPUNAN, ANTONIO G. COSTOSA, ROLANDO S. EBERO, BENITO W. GONZAGA, DIVINA S.
LEANO, FREDDIE D. LESTINO, RAUL A. LLAANZANA, JUANITO M. MANSANADEZ, IMELDA M. MIRANDA, ROGELIO J.
ORDONEZ, ESTEBAN M. PAREDES, ROMEO S. CARDOSO, ROBERTO E. CASAYURAN, RAQUEL V. CATIPUNAN, MARCIANO
F. CRUZ, JULIEN C. DE TORRES, RAYMUNDO N. GABAY, CRISANTA B. MALICDEM, GLENADO A. MIJARES, EDA R.
NOCON, ERNESTO Q. OBRIQUE, ROMEO D. SISNERO, ANGELITO C. TALAGON, SOLEDAD S. CRUZ, JOSELITA G. ENCISO,
JOSE CARMELO N. LEANO, ROMEO S. SILORIO, EDGARDO L. VIBAR, LOURDES F. ELARDE, ANGELINA E. RACHO,
ROMILDA DE ASIS, GLYCIDAS P. INIGO, CONCHITA M. LACEDA, AUREA M. LUCAS, JOSE ROLANDO J. MANLULU,
SERGIO R. MANRIQUE, ELVIRA G. NAZARET, JOSELINE P. NIWANE, LYDIA J. RUIZ, ALFREDO M. TORRES, CESAR A.
AQUINO, MANUEL P. BALATINSAYO, MONETTE B. CADIANG, RODRIGO O. ESTAMO, ADELAIDA Y. FERRER, EDNA L.
LOGRONIO, LEONARDO B. PONFERRADA, SUSANA M. SANTOS, CONCHITINA Y. SEVILLA, LIBERTY Z. VALLESTERO,
LERMA G. VILLANUEVA, ESPERANZA J. MERCADO, MA. BESSIE P. DIAMANTE, ROSARIO G. MAYRINA, MAXIMINA C.
SABINORIO, YOLANDA G. ZALDUA, MA. VICTORIA B. ANGELES, NOLASCO K. BALIBALOS, EDNA C. BAYUGA,
MANUELITO C. BONGABONG, GINA B. CRISOSTOMO, TERESITA N. CUNANAN, FILIPINA G. DE MESA, LOIDA M. GARCIA,
GODREY T. GOLLAYAN, CYNTHIA B. LAGASCA, DIEMMA C. MUNDO, LEONOR S. PALMA, DELFIN V. PILLE, PATRICIO G.
REYES, JR., LOIDA M. VILLANUEVA, EVA G. ZOSA, FELY C. ARANO, RUEL E. BADINAS, IMELDA F. BARRACA, HELEN
GRACE N. CRUZ, ERNESTO P. GIMAS, ALEX D. GUARDIAN, BEHILDA L. HEZETA, JOCELYN D. NAGUIT, EDMUNDO A.
NUEVO, SOLOMON F. PAZ, LOURDES C. BALING, EMPERATRIZ N. NEPOMUCENO, ROSAL C. GUARDIAN, REMEDIOS A.
ANCHETA, ROSEMARIE L. BOBIER, MA. ALICIA BONOAN, GEMMA V. BORJA. ANELY BURGO, FINARDO G. CABILAO,
ROSALIE F. DOBLES, EDNA E. FRANCISCO, ANGELINA V. OPLEDA, MARITES K. RANESES, LIBERTY D. RESTAN,
ANNABEL ARRIETA, OSCAR B. BALAYAN, THELMA BALAYAN, JESUSA A. CABILAO, ELISEO C. COPIAN, FERNANDO C.
DELA CRUZ, JESUS S. FAR, JOSE G. FUERTES, HANNIBAL A. GALANG, RICARDO M. GALING II, ARNEL B. GARCIA, IRISH
B. MANJARES, MARITESS M. MARISTELA, SYLVIA S. RED, ARLENE M. REYES, DELILAH H. SAMSON, FARAH D. SELGA,
ERNESTINA Z. SOLLOSO, HELEN URBANO, MARIVIC L. UY, OLIVIA A. UY, ROMEO S. ZAFRA, CECILIA G. ALEMAN,
JULIETA A. ALFEREZ, PERPETUA BALIBALOS, MARILOU C. BANCUD, ARABECQUE T. BATILONG, PORFIRIO R.
BATUYONG, TONI BINALLA, AIDA E. BORINES, ELISIA D. CLAVANO, ESTER R. EGAMINO, RAMIL R. EGAMINO, MARIAN
L. LOFRANCO FLORESA T. MARANAN, CYMBELINE S. MARTINEZ, LORELIE A. SUELO, MARLYN B. AMIGO, LINA A.
ARANETA, JOSEPHINE G. BANAAG, ROWENA CABANERO, IRENE O. DE OCAMPO, LEAH C. EDADES, FILOMENA LA
CORTE, MILAGROS P. ORTICIO, MERLINDA C. SABIO, ADANIA SAKALURAN, PRISCILA M. YBERA, DELIA G. CORPUZ,
PILAR B. MUSCAT, LIGAYA M. ORGANO, BARBARA LUZ R. PEREZ, NIMFA MARIA C. VIDAR, CRISTINO G. BABIDA,
NENITA G. CRUZ, MERLITA B. CRUZADO, AMELITA O. DABBAN, EMMA C. DERICO, EMMANUEL M. LASAC, ARACELI V.
MALABANAN, MA. TERESA T. MONTALBO, LOLITA R. NOBIO, GUILLERMO A. PINGOL, JR., JUDITH R. VILLEGAS,
CONSOLACION O. DELA CRUZ, ROSALINA J. DITAN, CARMEN I. MONARES, DOMINGO O. JAVIER, JESUS B. REMEGIO,
MARILOU S. REMEGIO, ELSA L. MAGAT, RICARDO P. MASINSIN, SANDRA B. PANAHON, MARIETTA T.
FLOTILDES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON, in her capacity as the Secretery of the Dept. of Social Welfare and Development, respondent.
G.R. No. 119597 September 11, 1998
ASSOCIATION OF DEDICATED EMPLOYEES OF THE PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (ADEPT),petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), respondent.

PURISIMA, J.:
These are cases for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality and validity of Administrative Order Nos. 29 and 268 on
various grounds.
The facts in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are undisputed, to wit:
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year
1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292 1 ("EO 292"), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V 2 of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos ("President Ramos") issued Administrative
Order No. 29 ("AO 29") authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of
P1,000.00 3 and reiterating the prohibition 4 under Section 7 5 of Administrative Order No. 268 ("AO 268"), enjoining the grant of
productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed "[a]ll departments, offices and
agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1 hereof
[are hereby directed] to immediately cause the return/refund of the excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days

after the issuance of this Order." In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned, who
are the herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged
overpayments. To prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come
before this Court to seek relief.
In G.R. No. 119597, the facts are different but the petition poses a common issue with the other consolidated cases. The petitioner,
Association of Dedicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority ("ADEPT"), is an association of employees of the Philippine
Tourism Authority ("PTA") who were granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6971
("RA 6971"), otherwise known as the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus was, however, disallowed by the Corporate
Auditor on the ground that it was "prohibited under Administrative Order No. 29 dated January 19, 1993." 6 The disallowance of the
bonus in question was finally brought on appeal to the Commission an Audit (COA) which denied the appeal in its Decision 7 of March 6,
1995, ratiocinating, thus:
. . . Firstly, the provisions of RA #6971 insofar as the coverage is concerned refer to business
enterprises including government owned and/or controlled corporations performing proprietary
functions.
Sec. 1a of the Supplemental Rules Implementing RA #6971 classified such coverage as:
All business enterprises, with or without existing duly certified labor
organizations, including government owned and/or controlled corporations
performing proprietary functions which are established solely for business or
profit and accordingly excluding those created, maintained or acquired in
pursuance of a policy of the State enunciated in the Constitution, or by law and
those whose officers and employess are covered by the Civil Service. (emphasis
supplied)
The PTrA is a GOCC created in pursuance of a policy of the State, Section 9 of
Presidential Decree No. 189 states that "To implement the policies and
program of the Department (Dept. of Tourism), there is hereby created a
Philippine Tourism Authority, . . ." Likewise, Section 21 of the same decree
provides that "All officials and employees of the Authority, . . ., shall be subject
to Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and the coverage of the Wage and
Position Classification Office.
Furthermore, although Supplemental Rules and Regulations implementing
R.A. #6971 was issued only on December 27, 1991, the law itself is clear that it
pertains to private business enterprises whose employees are covered by the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as mentioned in the following provisions:
Sec. 5. Labor Management Committee. . . . that at the reguest of any party to
the negotiation, the National Wages and Productivity Commission of the
Department of Labor and Employment shall provide the necessary
studies, . . . .
Sec. 8. Notification. A business enterprise which adopts a productivity
incentive program shall submit copies of the same to the National Wages and
Productivity Commission and to the Bureau of Internal Revenue for their
information and record.
Sec. 9. Disputes and Grievances. Whenever disputes, grievances, or other
matters arise from the interpretation or implementation of the productivity
incentive program, . . . may seek the assistance of the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment for such
purpose. . . .
Therefore, considering the foregoing, the PTrA is within the "exclusion" provision of the
Implementing Rules of RA #6971 and so, it (PTrA) does not fall within its coverage as being
entitled to, the productivity incentive bonus under RA #6971.
Secondly, Administrative Order No. 29 which is the basis for the grant of the productivity
incentive bonus/benefits for CY 1992 also explessly provides "prohibiting payments of similar
benefits in future years unless duly authorized by the President."
Thirdly, the disallowance of the Auditor, PTrA has already been resolved when this Commission
circularized thru COA Memorandum #92-758 dated April 3, 1992 the Supplemental to Rules
implementing RA 6971 otherwise known as the "Productivity Incentives Act of 1990." . . .
Lastly, considering the title of RA #6971, i.e. "An Act to encourage productivity and maintain
industrial peace by providing incentives to both labor and capital", and its implementing rules
and regulations prepared by the Department of Labor and Employment and the Department of
Finance, this Office concludes that said law/regulation pertains to agencies in the private sector
whose employees are covered by the Labor Code.

With the denial of its appeal, petitioner found its way here via the petition in G.R. No. 119597, to seek relief from the aforesaid
decision of COA.
We will first resolve the issue on the applicability of RA 6971 to petitioner ADEPT in G.R. No. 119597 before passing upon the
constitutionality or validity of Administrative Orders 29 and 268.
Sec. 3 of RA 6971, reads:
Sec. 3. Coverage. This Act shall apply to all business enterprises with or without existing and duly
recognized or certified labor organizations, includinggovernment-owned and controlled
corporations performing proprietary functions. It shall cover all employees and workers including
casual, regular, supervisory and managerial employees. (emphasis ours)
Pursuant to Section 10 8 of RA 6971, the Secretary of Labor and Secretary of Finance issued Supplemental Rules to Implement
the said law, as follows:
Sec. 1. Paragraph (a) Section 1, Rule II of the Rules Implementing RA 6971, shall be amended
to read as follows:
Coverage. These Rules shall apply to:
(a) All business enterprises with or without existing duly certified labor organizations, including
government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions which are
established solely for business or profit or gain and accordingly excluding those created, maintained
or acquired in pursuance of a policy of the state, enunciated in the Constitution or by law, and those
whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service. (emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner contends that the PTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation performing proprietary function, and therefore the
Secretary of Labor and Employment and Secretary of Finance exceeded their authority in issuing the aforestated Supplemental Rules
Implementing RA 6971.
Government-owned and controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary functions or both, depending on the purpose
for which they have been created. If the purpose, is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is
proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the
function is governmental. 9 Powers classified as "proprietary" are those intended for private advantage and benefit. 10
The PTA was established by Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 564 ("PD 564").
Its general purposes 11 are:
1. To implement the policies and programs of the Department of Tourism
("Department");
2. To develop tourist zones;
3. To assist private enterprises in undertaking tourism projects;
4. To operate and maintain tourist facilities;
5. To assure rand availability for private investors in hotels and other tourist
facilities;
6. To coordinate all tourism project plans and operations.
Its specific functions and powers 12 are:
1. Planning and development of tourism projects
a. To assist the Department make a comprehensive survey
of the physical and natural tourism resources of the
Philippines; to establish the order of priority for
development of said areas; to recommend to the President
the proclamation of a tourist zone; and to define and fix the
boundaries of the zone;
b. To formulate a development plan for each zone;
c. To submit to the President through the National
Economic and Development Athority for review and
approval all development plans before the same are
enforced or implemented;
d. To submit to the President an Annual Progress Report;
e. To assist the Department to determine the additional
capacity requirements for various tourist facilities and
services; to prepare a ten-year Tourism Priorities Plan; to

update annually the ten year Tourism Priorities Plan.

f. To gather, collate and analyze statistical data and other
pertinent information for the effective implementation of
PD 564.
2. Acquisition and disposition of lands and other assets for tourist zone
purposes
a. To acquire possession and ownership of all lands
transferred to it from other government corporations and
institutions and any land having tourism potential and
earmarked in the Tourism Priorities Plans for intensive
development into a tourist zone or as a part thereof, subject
to the approval of the President.
b. To acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by
condemnation proceedings any private land within and
without the tourist zones for any of the following reasons:
(a) consolidation of lands for tourist zone development
purposes, (b) prevention of land speculation in areas
declared as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right of way to
the zones, (d) protection of water shed areas and natural
assets with tourism value, and (e) for any other purpose
expressly authorized under PD 564.
c. For the purpose of providing land acquisition assistance
to registered tourism enterprises, to sell, subdivide, resell,
lease, sublease, rent out, or otherwise, to said registered
tourism enterprises under sufficiently soft terms for use
specifically in the development of hotels, recreational
facilities, and other tourist services.
d. To develop and/or subdivide any land in its name or
undertake condominium projects thereon, and sell
subdivision lots or condominium units to private persons
for investment purposes.
e. To take over or transfer to a registered tourism
enterprise in accordance with law any lease on foreshore
areas within a tourist zone or adjacent thereto, in cases said
areas are not being utilized in accordance with the PTA's
approved zone development plan and wherein the lessee
concerned does not agree to conform accordingly.
f. To arrange for the reclamation of any land adjacent to or
adjoining a tourist zone in coordination with appropriate
government agencies.
3. Infrastructure development for tourist zone purposes
a. To contract, supervise and pay for infrastructure works
and civil works within a tourist zone owned and operated
by the PTA.
b. To coordinate with appropriate government agencies the
development of infrastructure requirements supporting a
tourist zone.
c. To take water from any public stream, river, creek, lake,
spring, or waterfall and to alter, straighten, obstruct or
increase the flow of water in streams.
4. Zone adminstration and control
a. To formulate and implement zoning regulations.
b. To determine and regulate the enterprises to be
established within a tourist zone.
c. To ensure, through the proper authorities concerned, the
ecological preservation, maintenance and/or rehabilitation
of the common and the public areas within a tourist zone
and the environment thereof.
d. To identify and recommend to the President the

preservation and/or restoration of national monuments or

preserves; to arrange for the preservation and/or
restoration of the same with appropriate government
agencies or with the private sector or with the owners
themselves of said tourist attractions; and to identify and
recommend to the appropriate authorities concerned the
declaration of tourist areas and attractions as national
monuments and preserves.
5. Project and investment promotions
a. To identify, develop, invest in, own, manage and operate
such projects as it may deem to be vital for recreation and
rest but not sufficiently attractive economically for private
investment.
b. To construct hotel buildings and other tourist facilities
within a tourist zone and in turn lease such facilities to
registered tourism enterprises for operation, management
and maintenance.
c. To organize, finance, invest in, manage and operate
wholly-owned subsidiary corporations.
6. Direct assistance to registered enterprises
a. To administer the tax and other incentives granted to
registered enterprises.
b. To evaluate, approve and register or reject any and all
tourism projects or enterprises established within the
tourist zones.
c. To grant medium and long-term loans and/or re-lend any
funds borrowed for the purpose to duly qualified registered
tourism enterprises.
d. To guarantee local and foreign borrowings of registered
enterprises.
e. To provide equity investments in the form of cash and/or
land.
f. To extend technical, management and financial assistance
to tourism projects.
g. To identify, contact and assist in negotiations of suitable
partners for both local and foreign investors interested in
investment or participation in the tourism industry.
h. To assist registered enterprises and prospective investors
to have their papers processed with dispatch by
government offices.
7. Other powers and functions
a. To engage or retain the services of financial,
management, legal, technical, and/or project consultants
from the private or government sector.
b. To have the power to succeed by its corparate name.
c. To adopt, alter, and use a corporate seal.
d. To sue and be sued under its corporate name.
e. To enter into any contracts of any kind and description.
f. To own or possess personal and/or real property.
g. To make, adopt and enforce rules and regulations to
execute its powers, duties and functions.
h. To purchase, hold, and alienate shares of stock or bonds
of any corporation.
i. To collect fees or charges as may be imposed under PD
564.

j. To contract indebtedness and issue bonds.

k. To fix and collect rentals for the lease, use or occupancy
of lands, buildings, or other property owned or
administered by PTA.
l. To do any and all acts and things necessary to carry out
the purposes for which the PTA is created.
Categorited in light of the foregoing provisions of law in point, PTA's governmental functions include the first, third, fourth, and sixth of
the aforesaid general purposes. The second 13 and fifth general purposes fall under its proprietary functions.
With respect to PTA's specific functions and powers, the first and fourth are governmental in nature while the specific functions and
powers are proprietary in character. The second, third, sixth, and seventh specific functions and powers can be considered partlygovernmental and partly-proprietary, considering that 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 3(a), 6(c), 6(d), 6(e), 7(h), 7(j), and 7(k) are proprietary
functions while 2(f), 3(b), 3(c), 6(a), 6(b), 6(f), 6(g), 6(h), 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), 7(f), 7(g), and 7(l) are governmental functions. The specific
functions and powers treated in 7(e) and 7(i) may be classified either as propietary or governmental, depending on the circumstances
under which they are exercised or performed.
The aforecited powers and functions of PTA are predominantly governmental, principally geared towards the development and
promotion of tourism in the scenic Philippine archipelago. But it is irrefutable that PTA.also performs proprietary functions, as envisaged
by its charter.
Reliance on the above analysis of the functions and powers of PTA does not suffice for the determination of whether or not it is within the
coverage of RA 6971. For us to resolve the issues raised here solely on the basis of the classification of PTA's powers and functions may
lead to the rendition of judgment repugnant to the legislative intent and to established doctrines, as well, such as on the prohibition
against government workers to strike. 14 Under RA 6971, the workers have the right to strike.
To ascertain whether PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971, there is need to find out the legislative intent, and to refer to other provisions of
RA 6971 and other pertinent laws, that may aid the Court in ruling on the right or officials and employees of PTA to receive bonuses
under RA 8971.
Petitioner cites an entry in the journal of the House of Representatives to buttress its submission that PTA is within the coverage of RA
6971, to wit:
Chairman Veloso: The intent of including government-owned and controlled corporations within
the coverage of the Act is the recognition of the principle that when government goes into business,
it (divests) itself of its immunity from suit and goes down to the level of ordinary private
enterprises and subjects itself to the ordinary laws of the land just like ordinary private
enterprises. Now, when people work therefore in government-owned or controlled corporations, it
is as if they are also, just like in the private sector, entitled to all the benefits of all laws that apply
to workers in the private sector. In my view, even including the right to organize, bargain. . . .
VELOSO (Bicameral Conference Committee on Labor and Employment, pp. 15-16)
After a careful study, the Court is of the view, and go holds, that contrary to petitioner's interpretation, the government-owned and
controlled corporations Mr. Chairman Veloso had in mind were government-owned and controlled corporations incorporated under the
general corporation law. This is so because only workers in private corporations and government-owned and controlled corporations,
incorporated under the general corporation law, have the right to bargain (collectively). Those in government corporations with special
charter, which are subject to Civil Service Laws, have no right to bargain (collectively), except where the terms and conditions of
employment are not fixed by law 15. Their rights and duties are not comparable with those in the private sector.
Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers
cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions
from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial
peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and
their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of
wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government
employment however, it is the legisleture and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements. (Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment,
124 SCRA 1) (emphasis ours)
Government corporations may be created by special charters or by incorporation under the general corporation law. Those created by
special charters are governed by the Civil Service Law while those incorporated under the general corporation law are governed by the
Labor Code. 16
The legislative intent to place only government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions under the coverage
of RA 6971 is gleanable from the other provisions of the law. For instance, section 2 17 of said law envisions "industrial peace and
harmony" and "to provide corresponding incentives to both labor and capital;" section 4 18 refers to "representatives of labor and
management," section 5 19 mentions of "collective bargaining agent(s) of the bargaining unit(s);" section 6 20 relates to "existing
collective bargaining agreements," and "labor and management;" section 7 21 speaks of "strike or lockout;" and section 9 22 purports to
"seek the assistance of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment" and "include the

name(s) of the voluntary arbitrators or panel of voluntary arbitrator." All the aforecited provisions of law apply only to private
corporations and government-owned and controlled corporations organized under the general corporation law. Only they have collective
bargaining agents, collective bargaining units, collective bargaining agreements, and the right to strike or lockout.
To repeat, employees of government corporations created by special charters have neither the right to strike nor the right to bargain
collectively, as defined in the Labor Code. The case of Social Security System Employees Associalion indicates the following remedy of
government workers not allowed to strike or bargain collectively, to wit:
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those
which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to
the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil
service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in
the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands, (supra, footnote 14, p.
698; emphasis ours)
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of
the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 23 The
provisions of RA 6971, taken together, reveal the legislative intent to include only government-owned and controlled corporations
performing proprietary functions within its coverage.
Every statute must be construed harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 24 We note Section 1,
Rule X of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, which reads:
Sec. 1. Each department or agency of government, whether national or local, including bureaus
and agencies, state colleges and universities, and government owned and controlled corporations
with original charters, shall establish its own Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and
Incentives Award System in accordance with these Rules and shall submit the same to the
Commission for approval. (emphasis ours)
It is thus evident that PTA, being a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter subject to Civil Service
Law, Rules and Regulations, 25 is already within the scope of an incentives award systern under Section 1, Rule X of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing EO 292 issued by the Civil Service Commission ("Commission"). Since government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters do have an incentive award system, Congress enacted a law that would address
the same concern of officials and employees of government-owned and controlled corporations incorporated under the general
corporation law.
All things studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court finds no reversible error in the finding by respondent Commission that
PTA is not within the purview of RA 6971. As regards the promulgation of implementing rules and regulations, it bears stressing that the
"power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in
the legislative enactment." 26 In the case under scrutiny, the Supplementary Rules Implementing RA 6971 issued by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment and the Secretary of Finance accord with the intendment and provisions of RA 6971. Consequently, not being
covered by RA 6971, AO 29 applies to the petitioner.
We now tackle the common issue posited by the consolidated petitions on the constitutionality of AO 29 and AO 268.
Petitioners contend and argue, that:
I. AO 29 AND AO 268 ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF EO 292
AND, HENCE, NULL AND VOID.
II. AO 29 AND AO 268 UNLAWFULLY USURP THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY GRANTED SOLELY TO THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION.
III. THE FORCED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
OBLIGAITION.

REFUND OF INCENTIVE PAY IS AN

IMPAIRMENT
OF
A
CONTRACTUAL

IV. ASSUMING, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT ONLY, THAT THE

GRANT OF PRODUCTIVITY INCENTIVE BENEFITS WAS INVALID,
THE SAME SHOULD BE THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICIALS
DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE THEREFOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SECTION 9 OF AO 268.
Issued by the then President Corazon Aquino ("President Aquino") on July 25, 1987 in the exercise ol her legislative powers under the
1987 Constitution, 27 EO 292, or the Administrative Code or 1987, provided for the following incentive award system:
Sec. 31. Career and Personnel Development Plans. Each department or agency shall prepare a
career and personnel development plan which shall be integrated into a national plan by the
Commission. Such career and personnel development plans which shall include provisions on
merit promotions, performance evaluation, in-service training, including overseas and local
schorlarship and training grants, job rotation, suggestions and incentive award systems, and such
other provisions for employees' health, welfare, counseling, recreation and similar services.

Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award Syatem. There shall be established a
government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards system which shall be administered
under such rules, regulations, and standards as maybe promulgated by the Commssion.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the
President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary
expensesd involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the
government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal
efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or
who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or
in relations to, their official employment.
Sec. 36. Personnel Relations. (1) It shall be the concern of the Commission to provide leadership
and assistance in developing employee relations programs in the department or agencies.
(2) Every Secretary or head of agency shall take all proper steps toward the creation of an
atmosphere conducive to good supervisor-employee relations and the improvement of employee
morale.
Pursuant to the provision of Section 12(2), 28 Chapter 3, Book V or EO 292, the commission adopted and prescribed the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 which, among others, provide:
Sec. 1. Each department or agency of government, whether national or local, including bureaus
and agencies, state colleges and universities, and government owned and controlled corporations
with original charters, shall establish its own Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and
Incentives Award System in accordance with these Rules and shall submit the same to the
Commission for approval.
Sec. 2. The System is designed to encourage creativity, innovativeness, efficiency, integrity and
productivity in the public service by recognizing and rewarding officials and employees,
individually or in groups, for their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishments, and other
personal efforts which contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement in government
operations, or for other extraordinary acts of services in the public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The incentive awards shall consist of, though not limited to, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Productivity Incentive which shall be given to an employee or group of employees who has
exceeded their targets or has incurred incremental improvement over existing targets.
On February 21, 1992, President Aquino issued AO 268 which granted "each official and employee of the government the productivity
incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of his one (1) month basic salary but in no case shall such
amount be less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00)," 29 for those who have rendered at least one year of service as of December 31,
1991. 30Said AO carried the prohibition, provided in Section 7 thereof, which reads:
Sec. 7. The productivity incentive benefits herein authorized shall be granted only for Calendar
Year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including the governing boards of governmentowned or -controlled corporations and financial institutions, are hereby strictly prohibited from
authorizing/granting productivity incentive benefits or other allowances of similar nature for
Calendar Year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being
undertaken by the Office of the President in coordination with the Civil Service Commission and
the Department of Budget and Management on the matter.
The formulation of the necessary implementing guidelines for Executive Order No. 486 dated 8
November 1991 establishing a performance-based incentive system for government-owned or
-controlled corporations shall likewise be included in the comprehensive study referred to in the
preceding paragraph.
On January 19, 1993, President Ramos issued AO 29 which granted productivity incentive benefits to government employees in the
maximum amount of P1,000.00 31 for the calendar year 1992 but reiterated the proscription under Section 7 of AO 268, thus:
Sec. 2. The prohibition prescribed under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 268 is hereby
reiterated. Accordingly, all heads of government offices/agencies, including government-owned
and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards are hereby enjoined
and prohibited from authorizing/granting Productivity Incentive Benefits or any and all similar
forms of allowances/benefits without prior approval and authorization via Administrative Order
by the Office of the President. Henceforth, anyone found violating any of the mandates in this
Order, including all officials/employees and the COA Auditor-in-Charge of such government
office/agency found to have taken part thereof, shall be accordingly and severely dealt with in
accordance with the applicable provisions of existing penal laws.
Consequently, all administrative authorizations to grant any form of allowances/benefits and all

forms of additional compensation usually paid outside of the prescribed basic salary under R.A.
No. 6758, the Salary Standardization Law, that are inconsistent with the legislated policy on the
matter or are not covered by any legislative action are hereby revoked.
The implementation of Executive Order No. 486 dated November 8, 1991, as amended by
Executive Order No. 518 dated May 29, 1992, is hereby deferred until a more comprehensive and
equitable scheme for the grant of the benefits that can be applied government-wide is formulated
by the Department of Budget and Management.
Petitioners theorize that AO 29 and AO 268 violate EO 292 and since the latter is a law, it prevails over executive issuances. Petitioners
likewise assert that AO 29 and AO 268 encroach upon the constitutional authority of the Civil Service Commission to adopt measures to
strengthen the merit and rewards system and to promulgate rules, regulations and standards governing the incentive awards system of
the civil service.
The Court is not impressed with petitioners' submission. AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over
the executive departments.
In establishing a Civil Service Commission, the 1987 Constitution delineated its function, as follows:
The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish
a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize
a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on its personnel programs. (Section 3, Article IX, B, 1987 Constitution)
The Commission handles personnel matters of the government. As the central personnel agency of the Government, it is tasked
to formulate and establish a system of incentives and rewards for officials and employees in the public sector, alike.
The functions of the Commission have been decentralized to the different departments, offices, and agencies of the government
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. The State shall insure and promote the Constitutional mandate
that appointment in the Civil Service shall be made only according to merit and fitness; that the
Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government shall establish a
career service, adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and
courtesy in the civil service, strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management
climate conducive to public accountability; that public office is a public trust and public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people; and that personnel functions shall be
decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to the departments, offices and agencies where
such functions can be effectively performed. (Section 1, Chapter I, Subtitle A, Title I, EO 292)
(emphasis ours)
Specifically, implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System has been decentralized to the President
or to the head of each department of agency
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. There shall be established a
government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards system which shall be administered
under such rules, regulations, and standards as maybe promulgated by the Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the
President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary
expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the
government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal
efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations or
who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or
in relation to, their official employment. (EO 292) (emphasis ours)
The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power
includes the control executive departments
The president shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully execute. (Section 17, Article VII, 1987 Constitution)
Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."32 It has been held that "[t]he President can, by virtue of his
power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision, of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices under him. He can exercise this power motu proprio without need of any appeal from any party." 33
When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting
incentive benefits without prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the President was
just exercising his power of control over executive departments. This is decisively clear from the WHEREAS CLAUSES of AO 268 and
AO 29, to wit:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 268

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, the Productivity incentive benefits granted by the different agencies are of varying
amounts, causing dissension/demoralization on the part of those who had received less and those
who have not yet received any such benefit, thereby defeating the purpose for which the same
should be granted; and
WHEREAS, there exists the need to regulate the grant of the productivity incentive benefits or
other similar allowances in conformity with the policy on standardization of compensation
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758;
xxx xxx xxx
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 29
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS the faithful implementation of statutes, including the Administrative Code of 1987
and all laws governing all forms of additional compensation and personnel benefits is a
Constitutional prerogative vested in the President of the Philippines under Section 17, Article VII
of the, 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, the Constitutional prerogetive includes the determination of the rates, the timing and
schedule of payment, and final authority to commit limited resources of government for the
payment of personnel incentives, cash awards, productivity bonus, and other forms of additional
compensation and fringe benefits;
WHEREAS, some government agencies have overlooked said Constitutional prerogative and have
unilaterally granted to their respective officials and employees incentive awards;
WHEREAS, the Offioe of the President issued Administrative Order No. 268, dated February 21,
1992, strictly prohibiting the grant of Productivity Incentive Bonus or other allowances of similar
nature for Calender Year 1992 and future years pending the issuance of the requisite authorization
by the President;
WHEREAS, notwithstanding said prohibition some government offices/agencies and governmentowned and/or controlled corporations and financial institutions have granted productivity
incentive benefits in varying nomenclature and amounts without the proper
authorization/coordination with the Office of the President;
WHEREAS, the unilateral and uncoordinated grant of productivity incentive benefits gave rise to
discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel who have
received less or have not received at all such benefits;
xxx xxx xxx
The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent
discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of
government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The President was only exercising his power of control by
modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the
Office of the President, thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. In the view of the President,
respondents did a mistake which had to be corrected. In so acting, the President exercised a constitutionally-protected
prerogative
The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all
executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the
power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally he controls
and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the
action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President
cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. (Lacson-Magallanes Co.,
Inc. v. Pao, 21 SCRA 898)
Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the Commission on Civil Service to grant benefits to
government personnel. AO 29 and AO 268 did not revoke the privilege of employees to receive incentive benefits. The same merely
regulated the grant and amount thereof.
Sound management and effective utilization of financial resources of government are basically executive functions, 34 not the
Commission's. Implicit is this recognition in EO 292, which states:
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. There shall be established a
government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards system which shall be administered
under such rules, regulations, and standards as maybe promulgated by the Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations and standards promulgeted by the Commission, the
President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary
expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the

government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal
efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or
who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or
in relation to their official employment. (Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V) (emphasis ours)
Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or agency who is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in
the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government." It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the
amount of the incentives. Such function belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter ego.
Anent petitioners' contention that the forcible refund of incentive benefits is an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation,
suffice it to state that "[n]ot all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be
made between its sovereign and proprietary acts (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)." 35 The acts involved in this case are
governmental. Besides, the Court is in agreement with the Solicitor General that the incentive pay or benefit is in the nature of a bonus
which is not a demandable or enforceable obligation.
It is understood that the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, and Office of the
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy, are not covered by the amount fixed by the President. As explained in Bengzon vs. Drilon (208
SCRA 133):
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with
the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy,
assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law
for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100
typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to
Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty
and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence
and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions
and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the
express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system
is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We
now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless
provision.
Untenable is petitioners' contention that the herein respondents be held personally liable for the refund in question. Absent a showing of
bad faith or malice, public officers are not personally liable for damage resulting from the performance of official duties. 36
Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official duties. 37Absent any showing of bad faith or
malice, there is likewise a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. 38
In upholding the constitutionality of AO 268 and AO 29, the Court reiterates the well-entrenched doctrine that "in interpreting statutes,
that which will avoid a finding of unconstitutionality is to be preferred." 39
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the
year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts
and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts
given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are hereby DIMISSED, and as above ratiocinated, further
deductions from the salaries and allowances of petitioners are hereby ENJOINED.
In G.R. No. 119597, the assailed Decision of respondent Commission on Audit is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 1997

ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR CAR, Represented by his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A.
Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T. CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating
Committee, created by DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private Respondent, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until
President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's
death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with
the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989, 1 charged Lumiqued with malversation through
falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding
gasoline receipts. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00
for a single vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent
added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of
gasoline he claimed everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, 2 private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit
(COA) rules and regulations, alleging that during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made unliquidated
cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government "by deliberately concealing his unliquidated
cash advances through the falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on 'Cash advances of other officials' under code 8-70-600 of
accounting rules."
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989, 3 charged Lumiqued with oppression and harassment. According to private respondent,
her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting
Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued.
The order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial
Prosecutor Felix Cabading as members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to
submit their report and recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992.
Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent motion to defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private
respondent's complaints. The committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension.
In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992, 4 Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were filed against him to extort money from innocent
public servants like him, and were initiated by private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno
Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private respondent's execution of an affidavit of desistance. 5
Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters. He submitted, however, that such consumption was warranted
as it was the aggregate consumption of the five service vehicles issued under his name and intended for the use of the Office of the Regional
Director of the DAR. He added that the receipts which were issued beyond his region were made in the course of his travels to Ifugao Province,
the DAR Central Office in Diliman, Quezon City, and Laguna, where he attended a seminar. Because these receipts were merely turned over to
him by drivers for reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of auditors and accountants to determine whether they were falsified. He
affixed his signature on the receipts only to signify that the same were validly issued by the establishments concerned in order that official
transactions of the DAR-CAR could be carried out.
Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva
Vizcaya on their way to Ifugao when their service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help of the owner of a
vulcanizing shop who readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop issued its own receipt so that they could
reimburse the cost of the gasoline. Domingo Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated June
25, 1990. 6 With respect to the accusation that he sought reimbursement in the amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted
that the amount was actually only P6.60. Any error committed in posting the amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his personal
error or accountability.
To refute private respondent's allegation that he violated COA rules and regulations in incurring unliquidated cash advances in the amount of
P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a certification 7 of DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no outstanding cash
advances on record as of December 31, 1989.
In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended that private respondent was not terminated from the
service but was merely relieved of her duties due to her prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent filed the required
applications for leave of absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the service necessitated disapproval of her application for leave of
absence. He allegedly rejected her second application for leave of absence in view of her failure to file the same immediately with the head office

or upon her return to work. He also asserted that no medical certificate supported her application for leave of absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent was corrupt and dishonest because a COA examination revealed that
her cash accountabilities from June 22 to November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private respondent immediately returned the
amount on January 18, 1990, the day following the completion of the cash examination, Lumiqued asserted that she should be relieved from her
duties and assigned to jobs that would not require handling of cash and money matters.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing
date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither
Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, 8 alleging that he suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion
was
forwarded
to
the
Office
of
the
State
Prosecutor
apparently
because
the investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7, 1992, 9 State Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:
The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was discharged from the Sacred Heart Hospital on July 17, 1992, the
date of the hearing, which date was upon the request of respondent (Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that respondent
advised the Investigating committee of his confinement and inability to attend despite his discharge, either by himself or thru
counsel. The records likewise do not show that efforts were exerted to notify the Committee of respondent's condition on any
reasonable date after July 17, 1992. It is herein noted that as early as June 23, 1992, respondent was already being assisted by
counsel.
Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted reveal(s) the sufficiency, completeness and thoroughness of the
counter-affidavit together with the documentary evidence annexed thereto, such that a judicious determination of the case
based on the pleadings submitted is already possible.
Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as far back as November 16, 1989 yet, justice can not be delayed
much longer.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated July 31, 1992, 10finding Lumiqued liable for all the
charges against him. It made the following findings:
After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, this committee finds the evidence submitted by
the complainant sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the reimbursement of his gasoline expenses
were falsified is clearly established by the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of the duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the
certifications issued by the different gasoline stations where the respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes "G-1" to "G-15"
show that the actual average purchase made by the respondent is about 8.46 liters only at a purchase price of P50.00, in
contrast to the receipts used by the respondent which reflects an average of 108.45 liters at a purchase price of P550.00. Here,
the greed of the respondent is made manifest by his act of claiming reimbursements of more than 10 times the value of what
he actually spends. While only 15 of the gasoline receipts were ascertained to have been falsified, the motive, the pattern and
the scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the government has, nevertheless, been established.
That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. In fact, he had in effect admitted that he
had been claiming for the payment of an average consumption of 108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by
the 4 vehicles issued to his office. Besides he also admitted having signed the receipts.
Respondent's act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of money by falsifying receipts constitutes not only
Dishonesty of a high degree but also a criminal offense for Malversation through Falsification of Official Documents.
This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the year 1989 which is in
violation of established office and auditing rules. His cash advances totaling to about P116,000.00 were properly
documented. The requests for obligation of allotments and the vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him. The
mere certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete evidences
(sic).
On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondent's act in relieving the complainant of her
functions as a Regional Cashier on December 1, 1989 was an act of harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two
weeks after the complainant filed charges against her (sic). The recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on
Audit came only on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after the respondent's order relieving the complainant was issued.
His act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a complaint she filed constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part
of the respondent who is a head of office.
The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no help to the respondent. In fact, this only show(s) that he is
capable of giving bribes if only to have the cases against him dismissed. He could not have given a certain Benigno Aquino
III the sum of P10,000.00 for any other purpose.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate criminal charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel
V. Ramos dated October 22, 1992. He added that the filing of the affidavit of desistance 11 would not prevent the issuance of a resolution on the
matter considering that what was at stake was not only "the violation of complainant's (herein private respondent's) personal rights" but also "the
competence and fitness of the respondent (Lumiqued) to remain in public office." He opined that, in fact, the evidence on record could call for "a

punitive action against the respondent on the initiative of the DAR."

On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of "the findings of the Committee" with the DOJ. 12 Undersecretary Ramon
S. Esguerra indorsed the motion to the investigating committee. 13 In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member investigating committee
informed Undersecretary Esguerra that the committee "had no more authority to act on the same (motion for reconsideration) considering that the
matter has already been forwarded to the Office of the President" and that their authority under Department Order No. 145 ceased when they
transmitted
their
report
to
the
DOJ. 14 Concurring with this view, Undersecretary Esguerra informed Lumiqued that the investigating committee could no longer act on his
motion for reconsideration. He added that the motion was also prematurely filed because the Office of the President (OP) had yet to act on
Secretary Drilon's recommendation. 15
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No. 52), 16finding Lumiqued administratively
liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other
benefits. Thus:
That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers and that the auditor and accountant of the DAR-CAR should
be the ones to be held liable is untenable. The receipts in question were signed by respondent for the purpose of attesting that
those receipts were validly issued by the commercial establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the official
business for which it was intended.
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the drivers employed by the DAR-CAR as respondent would want
us to do.
The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well as that of incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not
satisfactorily established.
In a "petition for appeal" 17 addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his
former position "with all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and regulations." This petition was basically premised on the
affidavit dated May 27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having authored the
falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to petitioner Lumiqued's being an "honest man" who had no "premonition" that the receipts he
(Dwight) turned over to him were "altered." 18
Treating the "petition for appeal" as a motion for reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the constitutional right to
counsel during the hearing. 19 On May 19, 1994, 20 however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28,
1994, 21 Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of
Secretary Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the "payment of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued
by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994." 22
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that
his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel . They assert that the committee should
have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible,
the committee should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of
counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. 23 It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an
accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any
crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of
determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The order issued by Acting Secretary of
Justice Montenegro states thus:
In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, a Committee to conduct the formal
investigation of the administrative complaint for oppression, dishonesty, disgraceful and immoral conduct, being notoriously
undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional
Director, Department of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera Autonomous Region, is hereby created . . . 24
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal prosecution. This was even made more
pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for malversation through
falsification of public documents in its report and recommendation.
Petitioners' misconception on the nature of the investigation 25 conducted against Lumiqued appears to have been engendered by the fact that the
DOJ conducted it. While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall "administer the criminal justice system in accordance
with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional
system, 26 conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function. By its power to "perform such other functions as may be provided by
law,"27 prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly, the investigating committee created by Department
Order No. 145 was duty-bound to conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing
laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's

capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. 28 In an administrative
proceeding such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This
is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 29(otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39,
paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 30 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued 31 clearly show that he
was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself . Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers
and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
Furthermore, petitioners' reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of the Civil Service Commission on the Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of
Administrative Investigation stating that a respondent in an administrative complaint must be "informed of his right to the assistance of a counsel
of his choice," 32 is inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is applicable only to cases brought before the Civil Service
Commission. 33 Secondly, said resolution, which is dated January 25, 1994, took effect fifteen days following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, 34 much later than the July 1992 hearings of the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145. Thirdly, the
same committee was not remiss in the matter of reminding Lumiqued of his right to counsel. Thus, at the July 3, 1992, hearing, Lumiqued was
repeatedly appraised of his option to secure the services of counsel:
RSP EXEVEA:
This is an administrative case against Director Lumiqued. Director Lumiqued is present. The
complainant is present, Janet Obar-Zamudio. Complainant has just been furnished with a copy of the
counter-affidavit of the respondent. Do you have a counsel, Director?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
I did not bring anybody, Sir, because when I went to see him, he told me, Sir, that he has already set a
hearing, morning and afternoon today.
RSP EXEVEA:
So, we will proceed with the hearing even without your counsel? You are willing to proceed with the
hearing even without your counsel?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Yes, I am confident. . .
CP BALAJADIA:
You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
That is my concern. 35 (Emphasis supplied)
In the course of private respondent's damaging testimony, the investigating committee once again reminded Lumiqued of his need for a counsel.
Thus:
CP BALAJADIA:
Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really wish to go through with this even without your counsel?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
A. I think so, Sir.
CP BALAJADIA:
Let us make it of record that we have been warning you to proceed with the assistance of counsel but
you said that you can take care of yourself so we have no other alternative but to proceed . 36 (Emphasis
supplied).
Thereafter, the following colloquies transpired:
CP BALAJADIA:
We will suspend in the meantime that we are waiting for the supplemental affidavit you are going to
present to us. Do you have any request from the panel of investigators, Director Lumiqued?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I was not able to bring a lawyer since the lawyer I requested to assist me and was the one who prepared
my counter-affidavit is already engaged for a hearing and according to him he is engaged for the whole
month of July.
RSP EXEVEA:
We cannot wait . . .
CP BALAJADIA:

Why don't you engage the services of another counsel. The charges against you are quite serious. We are
not saying you are guilty already. We are just apprehensive that you will go through this investigation
without a counsel. We would like you to be protected legally in the course of this investigation. Why
don't you get the services of another counsel. There are plenty here in Baguio . . .
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I will try to see, Sir . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Please select your date now, we are only given one month to finish the investigation, Director Lumiqued.
RSP EXEVEA:
We will not entertain any postponement. With or without counsel, we will proceed.
CP BALAJADIA:
Madam Witness, will you please submit the document which we asked for and Director Lumiqued, if
you have other witnesses, please bring them but reduce their testimonies in affidavit form so that we can
expedite with the proceedings. 37
At the hearing scheduled for July 10, 1992, Lumiqued still did not avail of the services of counsel. Pertinent excerpts from said hearing follow:
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
I notice also Mr. Chairman that the respondent is not being represented by a counsel. The last time he
was asked to invite his lawyer in this investigation. May we know if he has a lawyer to represent him in
this investigation?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
There is none Sir because when I went to my lawyer, he told me that he had set a case also at 9:30 in the
other court and he told me if there is a possibility of having this case postponed anytime next week,
probably Wednesday so we will have good time (sic) of presenting the affidavit.
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
Are you moving for a postponement Director? May I throw this to the panel. The charges in this case are
quite serious and he should be given a chance to the assistance of a counsel/lawyer.
RSP EXEVEA:
And is (sic) appearing that the supplemental-affidavit has been furnished him only now and this has
several documents attached to it so I think we could grant him one last postponement considering that he
has already asked for an extension.
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Furthermore Sir, I am now being bothered by my heart ailment. 38
The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when Lumiqued was released from the hospital. Prior to said date, however, Lumiqued did not
inform the committee of his confinement. Consequently because the hearing could not push through on said date, and Lumiqued had already
submitted his counter-affidavit, the committee decided to wind up the proceedings. This did not mean, however, that Lumiqued was short-changed
in his right to due process.
Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the government, graduated from the University of the Philippines
(Los Baos) with the degree of Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent
training seminars both here and abroad. 39 Hence, he could have defended himself if need be, without the help of counsel, if truth were on his
side. This, apparently, was the thought he entertained during the hearings he was able to attend. In his statement, "That is my concern," one could
detect that it had been uttered testily, if not exasperatedly, because of the doubt or skepticism implicit in the question, "You are confident that you
will be able to represent yourself?" despite his having positively asserted earlier, "Yes, I am confident." He was obviously convinced that he could
ably represent himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding him that he could avail himself of counsel and as often receiving the reply that he is
confident of his ability to defend himself, the investigating committee could not do more. One can lead a horse to water but cannot make him
drink.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. In Nera v. Auditor General, 40 the Court
said:
. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by
counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers; while
desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the
participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he
cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. 41 An actual

hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. 42 As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course;
he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. 43 Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. 44 Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted
by the committee. 45
The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. 46 In the early case of Cornejo v.Gabriel and Provincial Board
of
Rizal 47 the Court held that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law for it is a public
trust or agency. This jurisprudential pronouncement has been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI, Section 1, on accountability of
public officers, as follows:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
When the dispute concerns one's constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited
sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is
the countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency. 48 In this case, it has been clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.
The committee's findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above,
fraught with procedural mischief. Its conclusions were founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is
the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such
evidence
is
not
overwhelming
or
preponderant. 49 The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 50
Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the committee's recommendation of dismissal may not in any way be deemed
tainted with arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity.
Strong evidence is not necessary to rebut that presumption, 51 which petitioners have not successfully disputed in the instant case.
Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of the same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it "cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the government service." The instant petition, which is aimed
primarily at the "payment of retirement benefits and other benefits," plus back wages from the time of Lumiqued's dismissal until his demise,
must, therefore, fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of the
President is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.