TORTS AND DAMAGES

KATHRYN PINEDA DELA SERNA

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE WORD TORT?
The word tort is taken directly from the French and is a derivation of the Latin word
torquere meaning to twist.
HOW IS TORT DEFINED IN COMMON LAW?
In common law, tort is an unlawful violation of private right, not created by contract, and
which gives rise to an action for damages. It is an act or omission producing injury to another,
without any previous existing lawful relation of which said act or omission may be said to be a
natural outgrowth or incident.
It is a private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of contract, for which the court
will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages. It is a violation of a duty imposed by
general law or otherwise upon all persons occupying the relation to each other which is involved
in a given transaction. There must always be violation of some duty that must give rise y
operation of law and not by mere agreement of the parties.
A tort is a wrong independent of a contract, which arises from an act or omission of a
person which causes some injury or damage directly or indirectly to another person. It may either
be (1) a direct invasion of some legal right of the individual; (2) the infraction of some public
duty by which special damage accrues to the individual; (3) the violation of some private
obligation by which like damage accrues to the individual.
WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF TORTS IN COMMON LAW?
Tort in common law includes:
1. INTENTIONAL TORTS which include conduct where the actor desires to cause the
consequences of his act or believes the consequences are substantially certain to result from
it. It includes assault, battery, false imprisonment, defamation, invasion of privacy and
interference of property.
2. NEGLIGENCE involves voluntary acts or omissions which result in injury to others, without
intending to cause the same. The actor fails to exercise due care in performing such acts or
omissions.
3. STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT where the person is made liable independent of fault or negligence
upon submission of proof of certain facts.
WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF TORT?

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There are three most important elements of tort:

1. Right and duty;
2. Act or omission; and
3. Damage
WHAT IS QUASI-DELICT?
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
HOW IS TORT DISTINGUISHED FROM QUASI-DELICT?
Quasi-delict is what is known as TORT in Anglo-American law. Tort is broader than
the Spanish-Philippine concept of quasi-delict which is Roman in origin. Tort in AngloAmerican Law includes not only negligence but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault
and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. Quasi-delict, on the other hand, covers only acts or
omissions which cause damage to another because of fault or negligence, there being no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. This is referred to as non-contractual
negligence.
The concept of tort came to our legal system after the Philippines became a colony of the
United States of America as a result of the Treaty of Paris signed on December 10, 1898.
The Code commission deliberately used the term quasi-delicts to designate those
obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or criminal offenses, because
this term more nearly corresponds to the Roman law classification of obligations and is in
harmony with the nature of this kind of liability. It rejected to use the term Tort, which is
broader, because in the general plan of the Philippine legal system, intentional and malicious
acts, which certain exceptions, are governed by the Penal Code.
WHAT ARE THE SOURCES OF THE LAW ON TORTS AND DAMAGES?
The law on Torts and Damages is based on several articles spread in the New Civil Code
and special laws, particularly the following:
1. Chapter on Quasi-Delicts (Articles 2176 to 2194)
2. Chapter on Quasi-Contracts (Articles 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2150, 2151 and
2159)
3. Chapter on Human Relations (Articles 19 to 36)
4. Articles 1172 to 1174 of the New Civil Code which are made applicable to quasi-delicts
(See Article 2178)
5. Article 1723, New Civil Code (See Article 2192)
6. Article 309, New Civil Code (See Article 2219 [9])
7. Article 1314 NCC (Contractual Interference)

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8. Family Code of the Philippines

9. Articles 100 to 103 of the Revised Penal Code (see Article 2177, NCC)
10. Title XVIII (Damages) covering Articles 2195 to 2235, NCC.
11. Chapter on Nuisance (Articles 694 to 707, NCC)
12. Chapter III, Section 4 (Common Carriers) covering Articles 1755 to 1763, NCC
13. R.A. No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act)
14. Supreme Court decisions
15. American law and jurisprudence; and
16. Opinion of legal authors
WHAT ARE THE MAJOR PURPOSES OF TORT LAW?
The major purposes of tort law include the following:
1. To provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of parties who might otherwise take
the law into their own hands;
2. Deter wrongful conduct;
3. To encourage socially responsible behavior; and
4. To restore injured parties to their original condition, insofar as the law can do this, by
compensating them from their injury
WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF INTERESTS PROTECTED BY TORT LAWS UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE AND WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS WHICH PROTECT SUCH INTEREST?
INTEREST PROTECTED
Person
1. Freedom from contract and
movement
2. Freedom from distress
Dignity
1. Reputation
2. Privacy
3. Freedom from wrongful actions
Property
1. Real property
Economic/Pecuniary
1. Contracts
2. Freedom form deception

TORTS AND PROVISIONS INVOLVED

of

1. Physical Injuries (Art. 32), Quasi

Delict (Art. 2176)
2. Moral Damages (Arts. 2217-2220)
1. Defamation (Art. 33)
2. Violation of Privacy (Art. 26)
3. Malicious Prosecution (Arts. 20, 21)
1. Nuisance (Arts. 694-770), Quasi Delict
(Article 2176)
1. Interference with contractual rights
(Art. 1314)
2. Fraud (Art. 33

WHAT ARE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CULPA CONTRACTUAL, CULPA AQUILIANA AND
CULPA CRIMINAL?
CULPA CONTRACTUAL
CULPA AQUILIANA
CULPA CRIMINAL
There is a pre-existing There is no pre-existing There is nor pre-existing

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obligation (a contract, either

expressed or implied)
Preponderance of evidence is
required.
Defense of good father of a
family in the selection and
supervision of employees is
not a proper and complete
defense but this can mitigate
liability for damages
The existence of a contract
must be proven. If it is proven
and it is also proven that the
contract was not complied
with, it is presumed that the
debtor is at fault.
Negligence is only incidental
to the performance of an
existing obligation based on
contract.

obligation.

contractual obligation.

Preponderance of evidence is
needed.
Defense of a good father of a
family in the selection of the
employees is a proper defense
of the employer.

The crime must be proven

beyond reasonable doubt.
This defense cannot be
interposed. If the employee is
insolvent or incapable to pay
the civil aspect or liability, the
employer is subsidiarily liable

The fault or negligence of the The innocence of the accused

defendant must be proven.
is presumed until the contrary
is proven.

Negligence
is
direct, Negligence
is
direct,
substantive and independent.
substantive and independent.

HOW IS QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM DELICT OR CRIME?

BASIS
1. Legal basis of liability

2. Criminal intent

3. Nature of right violated

4. Liability for damages

5. Proofs needed
6. Sanction or penalty

QUASI-DELICT
There can be a quasi-delict as
long as there is fault or
negligence
resulting
in
damage or injury to another. It
is broader in scope than crime.
Criminal intent is no necessary
for quasi-delict to exist. Fault
or negligence without intent
will suffice.
Right violated is a private
right. Quasi-delict is a
wrongful act against a private
individual.
Every quasi-delict gives rise
to liability for damages.

DELICT OR CRIME
There can be no crime unless
there is a law punishing the
act.
Criminal intent is essential for
criminal liability to exist.
Right violated is a public one.
Crime is a wrong against the
State.

Some crimes (like contempt,

illegal possession of firearm)
do not give rise to liability for
damages.
Proof of the fault or The guilt of the accused must
negligence
requires
only be proved beyond reasonable
preponderance of evidence.
doubt.
Reparation or indemnification Punishment
is
either

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K. P. Dela Serna

of the injury or damage.

imprisonment, fine or both;

sometimes other accessory
penalties are imposed.

HOW IS QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM CULPA CONTRACTUAL?

BASIS
1. Nature of negligence

Quasi-Delict
Negligence
is
direct,
substantive and independent
(Rakes vs. Atlantic, 7 Phil.
395)

2. Defense of good father of a This is a complete and proper

family
defense insofar as parents,
guardians, employers are
concerned (Art. 2180, last
par.)
3. Presumption of negligence
There is no presumption of
negligence. The injured party
must prove the negligence of
the defendant (Cangco vs.
MRC,
38
Phil.
768).
Otherwise, the complaint of
injured
party
will
be
dismissed.

Culpa Contractual
Negligence
is
merely
incidental to the performance
of the contractual obligation.
There is a pre-existing contract
or obligation. (Rakes vs.
Atlantic, supra)
This is not a complete and
proper defense in the selection
and supervision of employees.
(Cangco vs. MRC, infra.)
There is presumption of
negligence as long as it can be
proved that there was breach
of the contract. The defendant
must prove that there was no
negligence in the carrying out
of the terms of the contract.
(Cangco vs. MRC, supra)

APPLICATION:
FACTS:
X, INC. PUBLIC UTILITY COMPANY
Y BUS DRIVER, RECKLESS DRIVING
Z PASSENGER INJURED
CAUSES OF ACTION:
1. Culpa contractual negligence based on contract
2. Culpa aquiliana negligence based on tort
3. Culpa criminal negligence based on a crime
CULPA CONTRACTUAL
In the contract of carriage of passengers, it is the obligation of the carrier to convey the
passengers safely to the point of destination. In case a passenger is not brought safely thereto,
there will be a breach of contract. Any case brought based on culpa contractual will be captioned

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Passenger Z vs. X, Inc because the contract is between them. The driver is not to be included
as a party to the action, because he is not a party to the contract. As to him, there is no privity.
CULPA AQUILIANA
Damage caused to another due to negligence. The case will be entitled Passenger Z vs.
X, Inc. and Driver Y (the defendants will be solidarily liable as joint-tortfeasors)
CULPA CRIMINAL
The drivers act may amount to a crime (physical injuries through reckless imprudence).
The case will be entitled People of the Philippines vs. Driver Y, and if the latter is convicted
but is insolvent, Passenger Z may pursue against X, Inc. to enforce the latters subsidiary
liability.
NATURE OF THE CASES:
The weakest cause of action is culpa aquiliana where the employer may raise the defense
of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver. Culpa criminal is a stronger cause
of action because as to the companys subsidiary liability the latters defense are limited,
however the quantum of evidence needed to convict the employee would have to be guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Culpa contractual (breach of contractual of carriage) is a stronger cause of action
because if death or injury occurs, the presumption of negligence automatically arises and the
common carrier can be held liable if he fails to prove the extra-ordinary diligence for the
duration of the carriage.
II. QUASI-DELICT UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
A. ARTICLE 2176
Article 2176 - Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

The article covers all wrongful acts or omissions as along as

1. They are not constitutive of breach of contract; and
2. They are not punishable as offenses.
WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT?
1. Act or omission;
2. Presence of fault or negligence
3. Damage suffered by the plaintiff;

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4. Causal connection between the fault or negligence and the damage

5. No pre-existing contractual relation
1. ACT OR OMISSION
WHAT IS ACT OR OMISSION?
When a person by reason of his act or omission causes damage or prejudice to another, a
juridical relation is created by virtue of which the injured person acquires a right to be
indemnified and the person causing the damage is charged with the corresponding duty of
repairing the damaged.
2. FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE
A. NEGLIGENCE
WHAT IS NEGLIGENCE?
Article 1173 of the New Civil Code explains negligence as follows
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances
of the persons, of the time and of the place.
XXX
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which I expected of a good father of a family shall be required.

The Supreme Court has defined negligence as the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury (United States vs. Arias,
23 Phil. 434; Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378)
WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF CARE OF DILIGENCE REQUIRED?
Based on the definition of Article 1173, the degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that
should be observed depends on the circumstance of a) persons, b) place, and c) time. That which
may be considered therefore as sufficient care and precaution in a set of circumstances, may be
insufficient in another set of circumstances that confront the same individual.
WHAT IS THE STANDARD OF CARE OR DILIGENCE REQUIRED?
The standard or degree of care or diligence that should be observed is that which is
expected of a good father of a family unless the law or stipulation of the parties requires another
standard of care.

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K. P. Dela Serna

The Supreme Court explained in Picart vs. Smith, infra that the standard of conduct used
in the Philippines is that of pater familias in Roman law or that what is referred to in Article
1173 of the NCC, in relation to Article 2178 as a good father of a family. What should be
determined in negligence cases is what is foreseeable to a good father of a family. A good father
of a family is likewise referred to as the reasonable man, a man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence, or ordinary reasonable prudent man.
WHAT
OF CARE?

ARE EXAMPLES OF PROVISIONS OF LAW THAT REQUIRES ANOTHER STANDARD

a. Article 1733 provides that common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence according to all circumstances of each case.
b. Article 1755 provides that common carrier is bound to carry the passenger safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, suing the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
c. Highest degree of diligence is required in practice of medicine [likened to the diligence
required of a common carrier] (Ramos vs. CA, August 11, 2002) Res ipsa loquitor
doctrine is applicable to practice of medicine.
CAN THERE BE A TORT IN MALPRACTICE IN LAW?
Yes, while lawyers are no required to exercise the extraordinary diligence of a common
carrier, they must exercise diligence not lesser than the diligence of a good father of a family in
handling of cases which they accepted from clients. (Ventilla vs. Centeno, 1 SCRA 215 1) In fact,
a lawyer commits the crime of betrayal of trust if he would maliciously breach his professional
duty, or is guilty of inexcusable negligence or ignorance to the prejudice of his client. (Article
209, RPC)
WHAT IS THE TEST OF DETERMINING NEGLIGENCE?
In Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809, the test of negligence is capsulized as follows
Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposed a duty on the actor to refrain from the course or take precaution
against its mischievous results, and failure to do so constitutes negligence.
WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE?
Actionable negligence may either be a) culpa contractual, b) culpa aquiliana, and c)
criminal negligence. Thus an action fro damages for the negligent acts of the defendant may be
based on contract, delict, or quasi-delict. The bases of liability are separate and distinct from
each other even if only one act or omission is involved.
WHAT IS THE COVERAGE OF NEGLIGENCE IN ARTICLE 2176?
1

A lawyer was made liable for nominal damages for failure to perfect an appeal.

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K. P. Dela Serna

Article 2176, whenever it refers to fault or negligence, covers not only acts not
punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed (if the torfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary (Andamo vs. IAC, 191 SCRA 202).
WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEGLIGENCE?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Time
Place
Emergency
Gravity of harm to be avoided
Alternative cause of action
Social value or utility of activity
Person exposed to the risk

OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING NEGLIGENCE:

a. Violation of rules and statutes
b. Practice and custom
c. Compliance with rules and statutes
WHAT ARE THE DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE?
a. Ordinary negligence
b. Gross negligence
This is recognized in Article 2231 of the NCC which provides that in quasi-delicts
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence
Gross negligence is defined as want of even slight care of diligence. It is also
characterized as implying conscious indifference to consequence; pursuing a course of conduct
which would naturally and probably result to injury; utter disregard of consequences.
PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
a. Burden of proof
WHO HAS THE BUDEN TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE?
The plaintiff must prove the elements of a quasi-delict, the most important of which is the
element of fault or negligence attributable to the defendant. If this is not proven, the plaintiff
cannot recover damages from the defendant. It is even presumed that a person takes ordinary
care of his concerns. The quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence.

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K. P. Dela Serna

B.

PRESUMPTIONS
WHAT ARE THE PRESUMPTIONS UNDER THE CIVIL CODE ON NEGLIGENCE?

The Civil Code provides for the following cases when the existence of negligence is
presumed.
1. Article 2184. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice
within the next preceding two months.
2. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
3. Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the
defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons
or substances, such as firearm and poison, except when the possession or use
thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business.
4. Presumption of negligence may also arise because of certain contractual
relationship between the parties. Thus the Civil Code provides for a presumption
of negligence in case a passenger was injured in an accident involving his carrier.
(Article 1735)
C.

RES IPSA LOQUITOR.

WHAT IS RES IPSA LOQUITOR?

This is one of the rules relied upon in negligence cases the thing speaks for itself. Its
function is to aid the plaintiff in proving the elements of a negligence case by circumstantial
evidence.
In the case of Spouses Bernabe Africa and Soledad C. Africa vs. CALTEX (Phil.) Inc.,
G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 2 the Supreme Court applied the presumption of negligence
under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur Where the thing which caused the injury complained
of is shown to be under the management defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care.
B. FAULT
WHAT IS FAULT?
2

The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of
appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could
have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.

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K. P. Dela Serna

It is that condition where a person acts in a way or manner contrary to what normally
should have done. Fault is negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which
gives rise to a liability in torts or would, apart from this act, give rise to the defense of
contributory negligence
WHAT ARE THE TWO KINDS OF FAULT?
1. FAULT SUBSTANTIVE AND INDEPENDENT, which on account of its origin, gives rise to an
obligation between two persons not similarly bound by any obligation, or
2. AS IN INCIDENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF AN OBLIGATION WHICH ALREADY EXISTED ,
which cannot be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability
arising from the already existing obligation.
WHAT KIND OF FAULT IS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2176?
The fault referred to in Article 2176 is fault substantive and independent and which in
itself a source of obligation.
3. DAMAGE
WHAT IS DAMAGE?
Damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from injury. It differs from damages
which term refers to the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered (So Ping
Bun vs. CA, 314 SCRA 751)
4. CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE AND THE DAMAGE
WHAT IS CAUSAL CONNECTION?
The fault or negligence of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury of the
plaintiff. If the cause of the injury is due to the plaintiffs sole negligence, he cannot recover.
There must be clear evidence that the cause of the damage is the fault or negligence of the
defendant.
WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?
The proximate cause of injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.
More comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with the predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause

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which first acted, under such circumstance, that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment
of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Vda De
Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181; Teague vs., Fernandez, 51 SCRA 181).
5. NO PRE-EXISTING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
STATE THE GENERAL RULE AS TO CONTRACTUAL RELATION OF THE PARTIES.
If there is pre-existing contractual relation between the parties and the same is violated,
the proper cause of action is not anchored on quasi-delict but breach of contract or culpacontractual.
WHAT IS THE EXCEPTION TO THE ABOVE RULE?
However, there may be cases of contractual relations like a contract of carriage by
airplane where quasi-delict may arise when the contract was grossly violated (Air France vs.
Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 3). The tort liability here is not based on the contract of carriage but on
some other bases like deliberate and malicious violation of the contract.
In other words, the existence of contract does not bar the commission of a tort by one
against the other and the consequent recovery of damages. Where the act that breaks the contract
may also be a tort, the contractual relation of the parties does not bar the recovery of damages.
(Singson vs. Bank of P.I., 132 Phil. 597 4)
B. ARTICLE 2177
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the proceeding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF NEGLIGENCE MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 2177?

The Article distinguishes two kinds of negligence
1. Criminal negligence is a violation of criminal law

In Air France vs. Carrascoso, a passenger was ousted from his first class accommodation and was
compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment. He was allowed to recover damages from the carrier
notwithstanding the fact that the relation between the carrier and the passenger is contractual both in origin and
nature. The Supreme Court held that the act itself of breaking the contract creates a tort liability.
4
In Julian C. Singson and Ramona Del Castillo vs. BPI and Santiago Frezas, the bank clerk committed a
mistake that caused the freezing of the current account of Julian Singson. As a result, his checks were dishonored.
The bank apologized to Singson and restored the checking account. Nevertheless, Singson sued the bank for
damages. The bank interposed the defense that there could be no liability for negligence or quasi-delict on account
of the contractual relations between the bank and Singson, and that the error was immediately corrected. The
Supreme Court held that Singson can recover damages from the bank despite the existence of contractual relations
between the parties because the act itself that breaks the contract may also be a tort or quasi-delict.

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K. P. Dela Serna

2. Civil negligence it is a distinct and independent negligence which is culpa aquiliana or

quasi-delict of ancient origin, having always its own foundation, separate from criminal
negligence.
The article makes a distinction between a civil liability arising from a quasi-delict, and
civil liability arising from a crime, that is, if the act or omission is punishable by the Revised
Penal Code, or may create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
Code (Andamo vs. IAC, 191 SCRA 195).
WHAT

ARE THE MODES OF ENFORCING CIVIL LIABILITY DUE TO FAULT OR

NEGLIGENCE UNDER THE ARTICLE?

The injured party has the option

1. To pursue a criminal action which includes the claim for civil liability arising from the
crime based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or
2. To pursue an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 to 2194
of the New Civil Code (Elcano vs. Hill, 77 SCRA 98).
If the action is filed against the employer of the negligent employee, the offended party
may choose the remedy of primary liability allowed in Article 2180 or the subsidiary liability
under the Revised Penal Code. There is however, a limitation he cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission.
Application:
B, A FIVE YEAR-OLD-BOY, WAS RUN OVER BY A PASSENGER JEEPNEY RESULTING IN
HIS DEATH. O IS THE OWNER OF THE JEEPNEY. D IS THE DRIVER OF THE JEEPNEY.
THE PARENTS OF B WANT TO SUE. WHAT ARE THEIR OPTIONS?
1. They can sue D alone for homicide through reckless imprudence; or
2. They can sue Y for quasi-delict.
CAN D BE CONVICTED OF HOMICIDE THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND AT THE
SAME TIME, BE ORDERED TO INDEMNIFY THE PARENTS OF B?
Yes, because every person criminally liability is civilly liable.
WHAT PROOF IS NEEDED TO SECURE CONVICTION OF D?
The guilt of D should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
SUPPOSE THE GUILT OF D IS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND HE IS
ACQUITTED, CAN THE PARENTS OF B STILL SUE D FOR QUASI-DELICT?

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K. P. Dela Serna

Yes. The acquittal of D is not a bar to a subsequent civil action. This is so because the
evidence in the criminal case may not be sufficient for a conviction, but sufficient for a civil
liability, where mere preponderance of evidence is enough.
CAN THE PARENTS OF B SUE O AND Y FOR QUASI-DELICT?
Yes, but O can interpose the defense that he exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of D. If O proves this, he will be excused from civil liability.
SUPPOSE O

WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THE EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE

SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF D, CAN O STILL BE HELD LIABLE?

Yes, if it was proven for instance, that O was also in the jeepney at the time of accident,
and he could have, by use of diligence, prevented the misfortune, but he did not. (Vide first par,
Art. 2184)
IF D IS CONVICTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE AND A WRIT OF EXECUTION WAS ISSUED
AGAINST HIM WITH RESPECT TO THE CIVIL LIABILITY, BUT IT TURNED OUT THAT D IS
INSOLVENT, CAN THE WRIT OF EXECUTION BE ENFORCED AGAINST O?
Yes. The guilt of D is automatically the civil guilt of O, if D is insolvent. O is subsidiarily
liable as employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code and he cannot interpose the
defense that he exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver.
IF

THEY OPT TO SUE FOR QUASI-DELICT, WHAT PROOF IS NEEDED TO PROVE THEIR
CASE AGAINST D AND O?

The proof needed is a mere preponderance of evidence.

As against D, the parents of B should prove the fault or negligence of D. In other words,
the elements of quasi-delict should be proven. As against O, the parents of B should prove that O
has not exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of D.
HOW CAN O BE EXCUSED FROM LIABILITY?
O can be excused form liability provided he proves that he exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of D
CAN O STILL BE HELD LIABLE EVEN IF HE PROVES DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION
AND SUPERVISION OF D?
Yes, if it is proven that he was inside the jeepney at the time of accident, and he could
have, by use of diligence, prevented the misfortune, but which he did not exercise.
Procedural Aspect [Concurrence of Causes of Action and Remedies]

Page 15
K. P. Dela Serna

Enforcement of the civil liability arising from crime is governed by Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court effective December 1, 2000. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 5 provide as follows:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other that actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated
in a separate civil action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil action, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing
fees cased on the amounts alleged therein. If the amount are so alleged but any of these damages
are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
When the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced,
it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section
2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal action.
Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment
has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before
judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended
party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically

Page 16
K. P. Dela Serna

reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to crossexamine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided
jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist.
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Sec. 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. A final judgment rendered in a civil action
absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant
for the same act or omission subject of the civil action.

SIMPLIFICATION OF THE RULES

STATE THE RULE ON CONCURRENCE OF ACTION.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action.
STATE THE EXCEPTIONS.
The civil liability arising from the offense charged shall not be deemed instituted together
with the criminal action if:
1. The offended party waives the civil action; or
2. If the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; or
3. If the offended party institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
WHAT IS THE EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION?
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
PROVISO:
In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no

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K. P. Dela Serna

case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
Application:
AFTER A CRIMINAL ACTION HAS BEEN COMMENCED, IS IT STILL POSSIBLE THAT A
CIVIL ACTION CAN BE FILED BY THE INJURED PARTY?
Yes, if the case to be filed falls under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the New Civil
Code.
IF

THE CASE FALLS EITHER UNDER ANY OF THE SITUATIONS REFERRED TO IN SAID
ARTICLES AND THE CRIMINAL ACTION HAS ALREADY COMMENCED, WHEN SHALL THE CIVIL
ACTION BE FILED?

It may be filed during the pendency of the criminal case.

IF SAID CIVIL ACTION IS FILED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE CRIMINAL CASE, CAN
BOTH ACTIONS BE TRIED AND HEARD INDEPENDENTLY OF EACH OTHER?
Yes, by express provision of law which says that such civil action xxx shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Section 3, Rule 111)
WHAT HAPPENS IF A CIVIL ACTION IS NOT EXPRESSLY INSTITUTED?
The civil action shall be impliedly joined with the criminal action. This means that the
two actions are joined in one action as twins, and the civil action may be tried and prosecuted
with all the ancillary process provided by law.
WHAT HAPPENS IF THE TRIAL COURT CONVICTS THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME
CHARGED BUT FAILS TO DECIDE ON HIS CIVIL LIABILITY?
The civil liability may be imposed in a subsequent proceeding without transgressing the
prohibition against double jeopardy.
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED ON HIS CIVIL LIABILITY?
The acquittal of the accused in the criminal case will not necessarily exonerate him from
civil liability (Article 29 5).
5

ARTICLE 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In
the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.

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K. P. Dela Serna

The civil liability which may arise from culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict was never
intended by law to be merged in the criminal action. The criminal prosecution is not a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the civil rights.
To subordinate the civil action contemplated in Article 33 6 and 2177 to the result of the
criminal action would render meaningless the independent civil action and the injunction in
Article 31 7 that such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding.
WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS

TO THE RULE THAT THE JUDGMENT OF ACQUITAL DOES

NOT NECESSARILY EXTINGUISH THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED?

1.
2.
3.
4.

When it declares that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist;
when it declares that the accused is not the author of the crime;
when the judgment expressly declares that the liability is only civil in nature;
Where the civil liability is not derived or based on the criminal act of which the accused
was acquitted;
5. where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; and
6. where the civil action has prescribed.
IF

THERE IS NO SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION, WHAT SHOULD THE COURT TRYING THE
CRIMINAL CASE FIND OUT TO ENABLE IT TO DETERMINE FULLY THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE
OFFENDER?

The court should find out if there is evidence to prove the civil liability of the offender,
and it should also determine who the heirs of the deceased are entitled to receive payment of the
indemnity in case of conviction. This is necessary to avoid payment to wrong persons.
WHAT SHOULD THE OFFENDED PARTY DO IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION (WHERE CIVIL
ACTION IS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED) TO ENABLE HIM TO RECOVER?
The offended party must present evidence in support of his claim for damages.
Otherwise, the court cannot award damages in the judgment of conviction.
SHOULD THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BE ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION?
Even without any allegation as to damages, the offender shall be liable for them if the
offended party was able to prove that he is entitled to damages. This is predicated on the
principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.

6
ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
7
ARTICLE 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter. acd

Page 19
K. P. Dela Serna

IF

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IS RENDERED AND THE ACCUSED DECIDES TO APPEAL

THE SAME TO SEEK A REVIEW OF HIS CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY, WHAT ARE THE
COURSES OF ACTION?

He may appeal both with respect to the judgment in the civil and criminal liability, or he
may appeal only with respect to the civil action or criminal action.
WHAT

DOES THE PHRASE IN NO CASE, HOWEVER, MAY THE OFFENDED PARTY

RECOVER DAMAGES TWICE FOR THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION CHARGED IN THE CRIMINAL
ACTION MEAN?

This means that if the plaintiff succeeded to recover damages from the defendant the
Civil Code, he can no longer recover damages for the same negligent act under the Revised
Penal Code. Conversely, if the offended party takes the option of merely filing a criminal case
and submits his damage claim for decision in the criminal action, and thereafter, he succeeded to
recover damages from the accused in the civil action, he can no longer recover damages from the
accused in a criminal action based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict.
IS RESERVATION REQUIRED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR THE FILING OF CIVIL ACTION
ARISING FROM QUASI-DELICT?
Under the 1964, 1985 and 1988 amendments of the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure,
it was required that the injured party must make a reservation in the criminal case for the filing of
a civil action based on quasi-delict. The failure to do so will result in the inclusion of the claim
for civil liability in the criminal case and bars any separate civil action based on the same act or
omission. (Vide: Hambon vs. CA, G.R. No. 122150, March 17, 2003)
However, under the 2000 amendments of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
reservation required before was deleted. (Vide: Section 3, Rule 111) The new amendment now
conforms to the express mandate of the New Civil Code that a quasi-delict may be prosecuted
separately and independently of the criminal case arising from the same act or omission, just like
the other independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 of the New Civil Code (Vide: Article
2177).
MORE DISCUSSION:
Article 2177 of the Civil Code makes a distinction between a civil liability arising from a
quasi-delict, and civil liability arising from a crime, that is, an act or omission may be punishable
by the Revised Penal Code, or may create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code. 8 Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for
damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence, and whenever Article
2176 refers to "fault or negligence", it covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
8

See: Andamo vs. IAC, 191 SCRA 195; Rafael Reyes Trucking Corp. vs. People, 329 SCRA 600

Page 20
K. P. Dela Serna

such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. 9 The Supreme Court in the case of Andamo vs. IAC, 191 SCRA 195 explained that:
According to the Report of the Code Commission, Article 2177 of the
Civil Code though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when
we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, (5 SCRA 468, 470-471), the Court declared

that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case
according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical
conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said
articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or
acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil
action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter."
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals (176 SCRA 591), this Court
held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the
Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of
course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from
which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the
criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
The Supreme Court has already laid a fundamental premise clearly enunciated as early as
the case of Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607 (1942), thus:
"A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and
the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa-extra-contractual. The same negligent
9

Virata vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. L-46179, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 472

Page 21
K. P. Dela Serna

act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to
choose which remedy to enforce."
The options of the plaintiffs (offended parties) therefore are: (1) To pursue a criminal
action which includes the claim for civil liability arising from the crime based on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code; or (2) To pursue an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under
Articles 2176 to 2194 of the New Civil Code. 10
As it is quite apparent that the plaintiffs had predicated their present claim for damages
on quasi-delict, they are not barred from proceeding with this independent civil suit. The
institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on
quasi-delict. 11 And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently and
regardless of the result of the criminal case, 12 except that the plaintiffs cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or commission of the defendant. 13 The civil action referred to in Sections
3(a) and (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the institution of
the criminal action, is that arising from delict, and not the civil action based on quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana. 14
The civil liability which may arise from culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict was never
intended by law to be merged in the criminal action. The criminal prosecution is not a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the civil rights. 15 To subordinate the civil action contemplated
in Article 33 and 2177 to the result of the criminal action would render meaningless the
independent civil action and the injunction in Article 31 that such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceeding. 16
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed
separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal
action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the
Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the
criminal action. 17
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first
a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and
the other a civil case for quasi-delict without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The
10

Elcano vs. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; ce Haulers Copr. Vs. CA, 338 SCRA 572; Virata vs. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472
Capuno vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 13 SCRA 658 (1965).
12
Chan vs. Yatco, 103 Phil. 1126 (1958).
13
Article 2177, Civil Code.
14
Felix Lanuzo vs. Sy Bon Ping and Salvador Mendoza, G.R. No. L-53064, September 25, 1980.
15
BLTB vs. CA, 64 SCRA 427
16
Azucena vs. Potenciano, 115 Phil 465. See also: Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095; Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.
vs. Gamboa, 101 Phil. 1219; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8; Standard Vacuum Oil Vo. Vs. tan, 107 Phil. 109;
Pacholo vs. Yumangday, 108 Phil. 238; Calo vs. Peggy, 103 Phil. 1112.
17
Avelino Casupanan and Roberto Capitulo vs. Mario Llavore Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002.
11

Page 22
K. P. Dela Serna

two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or
prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only
limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant. 18
In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 147703, April
14, 2004, the Supreme Court explained the concept of independent civil action in this wise:
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."
xxx
xxx
xxx" Only the civil liability of the accused arising
from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. xxx xxx xxx It is clear
that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions
and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil
actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain
"separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the
same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission: 1.
The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be
reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising
from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action. 3. The
only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the
same act or omission. What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is
the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto),
but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In
fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may subject to the
control of the prosecutor still intervene in the criminal action, in order to
protect the remaining civil interest therein. This discussion is completely in
accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that "[e]very person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
C. ARTICLE 2178
ART. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasidelict.
ART. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of
obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances.
18

Ibid.

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K. P. Dela Serna

ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances
of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
Articles 1171 and 2201, par. 2, shall apply.
ART. 1174. Except in case expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though
foreseen, were inevitable.
ART. 2201. Par. 2. x x x In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the
obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.

Article 1172 provides that one incurs a responsibility for being negligent in the
performance of every obligation.
WHAT ARE THE TWO KINDS OF NEGLIGENCE MENTIONED BY ARTICLE 1172?
1. When an obligor does not observe diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, time and place,
there is fault or negligence; and
2. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible
for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the performance of the
obligation. (Article 1173 in relation to Article 2201, last paragraph)
Application:
A.) A took an ABC bus bound for Butuan City. In Gingoog City, said bus collided with
an XYZ Liner. A was hurt.
1. WHAT CASE CAN A FILE AGAINST ABC?
This is a case of contractual negligence or culpa contractual. A may file a
civil case against ABC because there is a contract of carriage between him and
ABC.
2. WHAT

IS THE EFFECT IF ABC PROVES THAT IT EXERCISED DILIGENCE IN THE

SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS DRIVER?

Even if ABC proves that it exercised diligence in the selection and

supervision of its driver, ABC is still liable. That defense is not a proper and
complete defense in culpa contractual. However, the diligence of ABC makes it a
debtor in good faith, and the damages would be mitigated (Cangco vs. MRL co.,
38 Phil. 769).

Page 24
K. P. Dela Serna

3. IS ABC

LIABLE IF IT TURNED OUT THAT

THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT?

HAS NOT YET PAID HIS FARE AT

Yes. This is a case of culpa contractual and for as long as A was able to
prove that he was a passenger of the bus at the time of the accident and that he
failed to reach his destination safely, there is already a breach of the contract of
carriage.
4. IS ABC

LIABLE IF IT TURNED OUT THAT

IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE SAID ACCIDENT?

HAS JUST BOARDED THE BUS

Yes, for the same reason.

B.) A took an ABC bus bound for Davao City. To avoid a head on collision with an
XYZ Liner, ABCs driver swerved to the right causing it to hit a sari-sari store. A
was hurt. X and Y who were taking snacks in the sari-sari store were also hit and
they died.
1. IS ABC LIABLE TO A FOR DAMAGES?
For as long as A can prove that he was a passenger of ABC at the time of
the accident and that he failed to reach his destination safely, ABC is liable. If
ABC wants to escape liability, it should prove that its driver was really careful
and extraordinary diligent.
2. IN THIS CASE, IS ABC PRESUMED NEGLIGENT?
As a rule, a common carrier is presumed negligent in case of death or
physical injuries to passengers unless it proves the exercise of extraordinary
diligence.
3. CAN X AND Y FILE A CASE OF CULPA CONTRACTUAL AGAINST ABC?
No. This is now a case of culpa aquiliana which can be filed both against
the driver and ABC. X and Y have the burden of proving that the driver was
negligent and that ABC did not exercise diligence in the selection and supervision
of its driver.
If ABC is able to prove that it exercised diligence and supervision in the
selection and supervision of its driver, it will be exempt from liability. This is a
proper defense in culpa aquiliana.
If X and Y fail to prove the negligence of the driver, then there is no culpa
aquiliana. The reason for this is because fault or negligence is an essential
element of a quasi-delict, and if this is not proved, then there is no quasi-delict.

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K. P. Dela Serna

C.) CAN THE PARTIES STIPULATE REGARDING FUTURE NEGLIGENCE?

Simple negligence may in certain cases be excused or mitigated but gross
negligence can never be excused in advance because this is contrary to public policy.
1. A

SHIPPED ITS GOODS TO A VESSEL OWNED BY XYZ, INC. THERE APPEARS A

PROVISION IN THE BILL OF LADING WHICH STATES THAT NO MATTER HOW
NEGLIGENT IS SAID VESSEL, XYZ, INC., SHALL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
DAMAGES CAUSED TO THE GOODS. A SIGNED THE BILL OF LADING. IS SAID
STIPULATION VALID?

It is void, for being contrary to public policy.

2. SAME PARTIES BUT THE PROVISION IN THE BILL OF LADING IS DIFFERENT.
THIS TIME, THE PROVISION STATES THAT NO MATTER HOW NEGLIGENT IS
SAID VESSEL, XYZ, INC., SHALL BE LIABLE ONLY FOR P300.OO, REGARDLESS
OF THE VALUE OF THE GOODS. IS THE STIPULATION VALID?
It is also void. This kind of stipulation is, in effect, allowing XYZ, Inc., to
be negligent knowing that its liability will be limited to P300.00, regardless of the
amount of the goods.
3. SAME PARTIES BUT THE PROVISION OF THE BILL OF LADING STATES THAT THE
XYZ, INC.S LIABILITY IS LIMITED TO P300. 00, NO MATTER HOW NEGLIGENT
IT IS, UNLESS A DECLARES A HIGHER VALUE AND PAYS A HIGHER COST OF
FREIGHT. IS THE STIPULATION VALID?
This time the stipulation is valid because the parties made an honest
definition of their respective obligations and liabilities.
D. ARTICLE 2179
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

WHAT ARE THE SITUATIONS COVERED BY THE ARTICLE 2179?

1. Plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury he
cannot recover damages. (Taylor vs. Meralco, 16 Phil. 8)
2. Plaintiffs own negligence is only contributory; and the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury is defendants lack of due care plaintiff can recover damages but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded (Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359).

Page 26
K. P. Dela Serna

WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?

A proximate cause is that adequate and efficient cause which in the natural order of
events, and under the particular circumstances surrounding the case would naturally produce the
event.
In Vda de Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil.181 and Teague vs. Fernandez, 51 SCRA 181, 19
the proximate cause was defined as the proximate legal cause, acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with the predecessor, the final
event to the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable circumstance, that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.
PROXIMATE CAUSE DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER TERMS

1. HOW

IS PROXIMATE CAUSE DISTINGUISHED FROM IMMEDIATE CAUSE OR NEAREST

CAUSE?

The proximate cause is not necessarily the immediate cause; it is not necessarily
the nearest time, distance or space. As distinguished from immeditate or nearest cause,
proximate cause is not necessarily the last link in the chain of events but that which is the
procuring efficient and predominant cause. The requirement is that the act was the
proximate cause, not implying, however, the nearest in point of time or relation, but
rather the efficient cause, which may be the most remote of an operative chain. It must be
that which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere pre-existing
condition upon which the effective cause operates, and must have been adequate to
produce the resultant damage with out the intervention of an independent cause (The
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company vs. The Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R.
No. L-4195, February 18, 1908).
2. HOW IS PROXIMATE CAUSE DISTINGUISHED FROM PRIOR AND REMOTE CAUSE?
A remote cause is that cause which some independent force merely took
advantage of to accomplish something not the natural effect thereof.
A prior and remote cause can not be made the basis of an action, if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which
the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and
the injury, a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for such condition of occasion. If no damage
existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
19

See also: PCIB vs. CA, 350 SCRA 464.

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K. P. Dela Serna

operation the circumstances which results in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such act or condition is the proximate cause.
3. HOW IS PROXIMATE CAUSE DISTINGUISHED FROM CONCURRENT CAUSES?
The proximate cause is not necessarily the sole cause of the accident. The
defendant is still liable in case there are concurrent causes brought about by acts or
omissions of third persons. Thus, the primary cause remains the proximate cause even if
there is an intervening cause which merely cooperated with the primary cause and which
did not break the chain of causation.
WHAT ARE THE TESTS OF PROXIMATE CAUSE?
A. CAUSE-IN-FACT TEST
In determining the proximate cause of the injury, it is first necessary to determine if the
defendants negligence was the cause-in-fact of the damage to the plaintiff. If the defendants
negligence was not a cause-in-fact, the inquiry stops; but if it is a cause-in-fact, the inquiry shifts
to the question of limit of liability of the defendant. The latter determination of the extent of
liability involves a question of policy. In other words, the question of proximate cause does not
only involve cause and effect analysis. It also involves policy considerations that limit the
liability of the defendants in negligence cases. The mere fact that the negligence of the defendant
is a factor in bringing about the injury does not necessarily means that he shall be liable.
WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF CAUSE-IN-FACT TESTS?
1. SINE QUA NON TEST (BUT FOR TEST) this is a question of causal connection. Where the
defendants own conduct will not be considered as proximate cause of the event if the
event just the same would have occurred without it. Simply stated, defendants conduct is
the cause in fact of the injury under the but for test if the damage would not have
resulted had there been no negligence on the part of the defendant. Conversely,
defendants negligent conduct is not the cause in fact of the plaintiffs damage if the
accident could not have been avoided in the absence thereof.
2. SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST makes the negligent conduct the cause in fact of the
damage if it was a substantial factor in producing the injuries. This test is especially
important where there are concurrent causes. Here, the issues are not factual but
conceptual.
3. NESS TEST A condition may still be considered a cause where it is shown to be a
necessary element in just one of several co-present sets each independently sufficient for
the effect.
4. POLICY TESTS
WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF POLICY TESTS?
1. FORESIGHT PERSPECTIVE

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K. P. Dela Serna

It is a test that determines whether the chain of events that in fact occurred was
sufficiently foreseeable, natural or probable at the outset for the defendant to be held
liable.
WHAT

ARE THE TESTS TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE DEFENDANTS LIABILITY

FOR NEGLIGENCE UNDER THIS TEST?

1)

FORSEEABILITY TEST where the particular harm was reasonably foreseeable

at the time of the defendants misconduct, his act or omission is the legal
cause thereof. The defendant is not liable for unforeseeable consequences of
his act. The liability is limited within the risk created by the defendants
negligence act.

2)

NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE TEST where the defendants

liability is recognized only if the harm or injury suffered is the natural and
probable consequence of his act or omission complained of.

2. DIRECTNESS PERSPECTIVE
It does not require that the injury is within the foreseeable risk created by the defendant.
This second approach starts with the injury and works towards the wrongful action of the
defendant, seeking to determine whether any act of a third party or the plaintiff, or any event,
severed the causal connection between the harm and the defendants wrongful conduct. Here, the
question is only whether, when all the evidence is in, it is permissible to say that the defendant
did it, that is, brought about the plaintiffs harm.
WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF TESTS UNDER THE DIRECTNESS PERSPECTIVE?
1)

2)
3)
4)

NATURAL AND ORDINARY OR DIRECT CONSEQUENCE TEST makes the

defendant liable for damages which are beyond the risk. Direct consequences
are those that follow in the sequence from the effect of the defendants act
upon condition existing and forces already in operation at the time, without
the intervention of any external forces, which come into active operation later.
Hindsight test
Orbit of risk test
Substantial factor test

DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CAUSE AND CONDITION.

A distinction is made between the active cause of the harm or injury and the existing
conditions upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive (not
active) static condition, which made the damage possible, he is not liable.
Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the
existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive

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K. P. Dela Serna

static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far
as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an
important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces
and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other
active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises
creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark
ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and
since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape
responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static
will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to
another who falls into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional
mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has
any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the
defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But
even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important,
but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause" (Phoenix Construction vs.
IAC, G.R. No. L-65295, March 10, 1987).
WHAT IS EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE?
It is one that destroys the causal connection between the negligent act and injury and
thereby negatives liability. An intervening cause will not be regarded as the proximate cause and
the first cause as too remote, where the chain of events is so broken that they become
independent and the result cannot be said to be the consequence of the primary cause. However,
a cause is not an intervening cause if it is already in operation at the time the negligent act is
committed.
WHAT ARE FORESEEABLE INTERVENING CAUSES?
If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard
against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. Thus one who sets a fire may
be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later will spread it
beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The
person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee
the risk of fire from some independent source. . . . In all of these cases there is an intervening
cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result, and in each case the
defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk (Phoenix
Construction vs. IAC, supra).
IS
CAUSE?

A FORESEEABLE INTERVENING CAUSE CONSIDERED A SUFFICIENT INTERVENING

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K. P. Dela Serna

A foreseeable intervening cause however, cannot be considered sufficient intervening

cause. If the intervening cause is foreseeable, the defendant may still be considered negligent
because of the failure to guard against it.
Also, the intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve
a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately
cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting injury (Spouses Bernabe Africa vs.
Caltex, supra).
APPLICATION
X

AND Y, PASSENGERS OF JAM LINER, INC., HAD A HEATED ALTERCATION INSIDE

THE BUS RESULTING IN A FIST FIGHT. IN THE PROCESS, X THREW A SOLID PUNCH AGAINST Y
AND AS A RESULT, Y FELL ON THE DRIVERS SCAT. THE DRIVER LOST CONTROL OF THE
WHEEL AND THE BUS HIT AN ELECTRIC POST. WHAT IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
ACCIDENT?

Here, the proximate cause is the fist fight between X and Y.

A WAS ON HIS WAY HOME, AFTER A SHOT OR TWO OF LIQUOR IN A BIRTHDAY PARTY.
HIS WAY HOME AFTER CROSSING AN INTERSECTION, HIS CAR HEADLIGHTS SUDDENLY
FAILED. HE SWITCHED HIS HEADLIGHTS TO BRIGHT, AND THEN AND THERE, HE SAW A
DUMP TRUCK WHICH IS ABOUT 2 METERS AWAY FROM HIS CAR. A TRIED TO AVOID A
COLLISION BY SWERVING HIS CAR TO THE LEFT BUT TO NO AVAIL. HIS CAR SMASHED INTO
THE DUMP TRUCK. WHO IS NEGLIGENT AND WHO IS THE IMMEDIATE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE INJURY? (PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS. IAC, G.R. NO. 65295, MARCH 10,
ON

1987)
Both were negligent but the immediate and proximate cause of the accident and of As
injuries was the wrongful and negligent manner in which the truck was parked or the truck
drivers lack of due care.
The collision of As car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence
of the truck drivers negligence. The negligence of the truck driver, far from being a passive and
static condition was an indispensable and efficient cause. The accident would not have occurred
were it not for the fact that it was parked askew and without warning lights and reflector devices.
The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for
anyone driving, and for having created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible.
As negligence, although later in point of time than the truck drivers negligence, is
merely contributory and the damages therefore that he will recover is subject to mitigation by the
courts, in accordance with Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

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K. P. Dela Serna

On the issue of damages In a suit for damages arising from a quasi-delict, where the
plaintiffs negligence was contributory, the demands of substantial justice may be satisfied by
allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio.
Based on this, the following were awarded:
1. 20% of the damages awarded by the appellate court shall be borne by the plaintiff;
2. 80% shall be paid by the driver and his employer who shall be solidarily liable to A; and
3. The award of exemplary damages shall be borne exclusively by the defendant Phoenix.
WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE?
Contributory negligence has been defined as the act or omission amounting to want of
ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendants
negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed
an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to
health and body (Mao-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. CA, 189 SCRA 93; MMTC vs. CA, August
1, 2002).
ARE CHILDREN BELOW 9 YEARS CAPABLE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE?
No, a child under 9 years of age is conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matte of law.
In our jurisdiction, a person under 9 years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted
without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over 9 and
under 15 years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence
may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either
criminal or civil, a child under 9 years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be
incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in the case of a child over 9 but under 15 years of age is a rebuttable one, under our
law. The rule therefore, is that a child under 9 years of age must be conclusively presumed
incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. (Jarco Marketing Corp. vs. CA, 321
SCRA 377)
WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF PLAINTIFFS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE?
If the proximate cause of the injury is the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, there
can be no recovery for damages (Taylor vs. Meralco, 16 Phil. 8)
A plaintiff is barred from recovering the damages for loss or injury caused by the
negligence of defendant only when plaintiffs negligence is the sole legal cause of the damage,

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K. P. Dela Serna

or the negligence of the plaintiff and some person or persons other that the defendant or
defendants was the sole cause of the damage.
If the plaintiff and the defendant are both at fault, the former may recover, but the amount
of his recovery may only be such proportion of the entire damage plaintiff sustained as the
defendants negligence bears to the combined negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
For example, when it is found that the plaintiffs negligence is at least equal to that of the
defendant, the amount awarded to the plaintiff should be reduced by one-half from what it
otherwise would have been entitled.
If the proximate cause of the injuries is still the negligence of the defendant, despite the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff, the latter can still recover damages from the former.
However, damages will be reduced due to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff (Rakes vs.
Atlantic, supra.)
This is apportionment of liability also known as the DOCTRINE OF COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE. Under said doctrine, the negligence of both the plaintiff and of the defendant are
compared for the purpose of reaching an equitable apportionment of their respective liabilities
for the damage caused and suffered by the plaintiff.
Contributory negligence in common carriers does not bar recovery of damages if the
proximate cause of the death of the passenger is the negligence of the common carrier
Art. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar
recovery of damages fro the death or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is
the negligence of the common carrier, but the amount of damages shall be
equitably reduced.

CAN THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE APPLY IN CRIMINAL CASES?

The principle of contributory negligence cannot be sued as defense in criminal cases
through reckless imprudence because one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the
effects of his own negligence. It may, however, mitigate the civil liability of the defendant but
cannot affect his criminal liability.
IS THE PRINCIPLE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE APPLICABLE TO ACTIONS INVOLVING
BREACH OF CONTRACT?
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only for actions of quasi-delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person
where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created
by the law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is
the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate
the relation thus created.
E. ARTICLE 2180

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K. P. Dela Serna

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed
or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
P.D. 603, ARTICLE 58. Torts Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code.

WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF VICARIOUS LIABLITY OR IMPUTED LIABLITY?

The article provides that one is not only liable for his own quasi-delictual acts but also
for those persons for whom he is responsible under the law.
WHAT IS THE BASIS OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY?
The basis of vicarious liability under Article 2180 is not respondeat superior, which
under American jurisprudence means that the negligence of the servant is conclusively the
negligence of the master. Rather, the basis of Article 2180 is the principle of pater familias. The
reason for the masters liability is negligence in the supervision of his subordinates. The
master, however, in pater familias under Article 2180 will be freed from liability if he can
prove that he had observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
IS THE ACTUAL TORTFEASOR (MINOR, WARD, EMPLOYEE, SPECIAL AGENT, PUPIL,
STUDENT OR APPRENTICE) EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY?
No, they are not exempt from personal responsibility. They may be sued and made liable
alone as when the person responsible for them or the vicarious obligor proves that he exercised
the diligence required of a good father of a family or when the minor or insane person has no

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K. P. Dela Serna

parents or guardians. In the latter instance, they are answerable with their own property (Article
2182).
WHAT IS THE DEFENSE AGAINST VICARIOUS LIABILITY?
The responsibility imposed by Article 2180 is not based on respondeat superior. It arises
by virtue of a legal presumption of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible for the
tortious conduct if another. Such presumption is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure, and may
be rebutted by showing that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage (last par.), which in the case of employers, means due diligence in the selection
and supervision of employees.
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OR A FAMILY?
The phrase may be equated with ORDINARY CARE or that diligence which an average or a
reasonably prudent person exercises over his own affairs. This standard of care is also referred to
as that a man of ordinary prudence, or a man using ordinary care and skill.
WHAT

PROVISION OF LAW GOVERNS THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER

FOR THE CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE OF HIS EMPLOYEE?

The vicarious liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of his employee is
governed by Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The conviction of the employee for criminal
negligence conclusively binds the employer who is automatically made subsidiarily liable, to
answer for the damages awarded. The defense that the employer exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee is not available under said article.
Since the employers civil liability is subsidiary, and not direct, his responsibility will
arise only if the employee cannot or is unable to pay the indemnity awarded. Furthermore, his
liability cannot be more than that of the employee. The employer stands in the position of a
guarantor. The injured party, however, can sue both at the same time, although he has a choice of
remedy either under the Revised Penal Code or under Article 2180.
LIABILITY OF FATHER/MOTHER
WHAT IS THE REASON OF THE LAW IN MAKING THEM LIABLE?
It is a necessary consequence of the parents authority they exercise over their children.
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES TO HOLD THE PARENTS LIABLE UNDER ARTICLE 2180?
1. The child is below 21 years;
2. The child committed a tortious act to the damage and prejudice of another person; and
3. The child lives in the company of the parent concerned whether single or married.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FATHER AND MOTHER?

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K. P. Dela Serna

Their responsibility is not simultaneous, but alternative, the father being primarily
responsible, and the mother answering only in case of death or incapacity.
PD 603, ARTICLE 201. Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. The civil liability for
acts committed by a youthful offender shall devolve upon the offender's father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, upon the mother, or in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian.
Civil liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender.

However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative
qualification (Libi vs. IAC, 214 SCRA 16 [1992]). In other words, both parents are primarily
liable for the damages caused by their child.
The liability is primary and not subsidiary.
WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF THE PARENTS LIABILITY?
Parents liability extends to intentional crimes committed by their minor children.
Revised Penal Code, ARTICLE 101.
Rules regarding civil liability in certain
cases. The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of
article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12, the civil liability for acts
committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one
over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon
those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority,
legal guardianship, or control or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with
the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for whose benefit
the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may
have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which
each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when
the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and,
in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their
agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using
violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such
persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property
exempt from execution.

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K. P. Dela Serna

WHAT
ARTICLE?

IS THE MEANING OF MINORITY IN PARAGRAPHS

AND

OF THE

Minors in the said article refer to those who are below twenty-one and not to
those below 18 years. The law reducing the majority from 21 to 18 years did not amend
these paragraphs. Article 236 of the Family Code as amended by R.A. No. 6809 provides

ARTICLE 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and
property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the
exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty one.
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of
parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty one years of age mentioned in the
second and third paragraph of 2180 of the Civil Code (R.A. No. 6809).

ARE PARENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR MINOR ADOPTED CHILDREN/ ILLEGITIMATE

CHILDREN?
Judicially adopted children are considered legitimate children of their adopting
parents (Section 17, R.A. No. 8552, Domestic Adoption Act of 1988), thus the adopters
are civilly liable for their tortious and criminal acts if the children live with them and are
below 21 years.
If the child is illegitimate and acknowledged by the father and lives with the
latter, the father shall be responsible. However, an illegitimate child who is not
recognized by the putative father but is under the custody and supervision of the mother,
it is the latter who is vicariously liable.
HOW CAN THE PARENTS AVOID CIVIL LIABLITY?
By pleading and proving the defense that there was no fault or negligence on their
part.
SHOULD

THE MOTHER BE IMPLEADED AS CO-DEFENDANT OF HER HUSBAND FOR THE

NEGLIGENT ACTS OR OMISSION OF THEIR CHILD?

No. The mother is liable only if the father is dead or incapacitated.

IS THE FATHER LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE CRIME OF HIS MINOR SON WHO IS
ALREADY MARRIED BUT LIVING WITH AND RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM HIM?
Yes. The marriage of a minor child, while still a minor, does not relieve the parents of the
duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the
same manner that the parents are answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their
consent (Elcano vs. Hill, 77 SCRAS 100).

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K. P. Dela Serna

2) LIABILITY OF GUARDIANS
The vicarious liability of the guardians with respect to their wards is governed by the
same rule as in the liability of parents with respect to their children below twenty-one and who
live with them.
In guardianship, however, the ward may be an adult or of age, like an incompetent or
incapacitated adult. The age limit of being below 21 years does not apply. What is important is
that the guardianship is subsisting.
If the ward has two (2) guardians, one over his person and the other over his property,
only the former shall be liable because he is under obligation to supervise the personal acts of the
ward.
WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF RESPONISBILITY OF GUARDIANS?
The responsibility of guardians extends to incapacitated persons even if they are already
of age. Section 2 of Rule 92 uses the word incompetent. It includes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction

Hospitalized lepers
Prodigals
Deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write
Those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals
Persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other
similar cases, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property.
The guardians stand in loco parentis
ARE GUARDIANS DE FACTO RESPONSIBLE?

If a person is not legally appointed as guardian, the de facto guardian would generally not
be responsible, because of the absence of one of the bases for the responsibility, namely, the duty
to take care of the ward. But if the injury caused is the result of bad education or training by the
guardian de facto, the latter should be held liable. It is but just that the law should be applied by
analogy. This is to compel them to exercise control and supervision over the orphans whom they
voluntary assumed the duties of parenthood.
3) LIABILITY

OF OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENT OR ENTERPRISE AND

EMPLOYERS

ARE MANAGERS OF A CORPORATION INCLUDED WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TERMS

OWNERS AND MANAGERS?

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K. P. Dela Serna

The terms owners and managers (par. 4) and employer (par. 5) do not include the
manager of a corporation. The term manager (director in the Spanish version) is used in the
sense of employer. Thus, a mere manager, who does not own the business is not to be
considered an employer because he is just an employee. However, a manager who is not an
owner but who assumes the responsibility if supervision over the employees of the owner may be
held liable for the acts of the employees.
The existence of employer-employee relationship must be established by the plaintiff in
a satisfactory manner. It cannot be presumed.
One who hires an independent contractor but controls the latters work us responsible
also for his negligence. Also, negligence of a professor is negligence of the school.
WHAT ARE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PARS. 4 AND 5?
A. Article 2180 has a separate provisions for owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise (par. 4) and employers (par. 5). Both are employers, however, it is not
necessary that the employer under the 5 th paragraph be engaged in any business or
industry.
B. Both are made liable for damages if they are caused by their employees acting in their
service or on the occasion of their functions, or acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks at the time of the commission of the tortious act or negligence.
C. The 4th paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of
the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the 5 th paragraph encompasses
negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task whether or not
the employer is engaged in an business or industry . The latter is an expansion of the
former in both employer coverage and acts included.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER?
The liability of the employer is primary and solidary with the employee although the
former can recover from the latter whatever it pays to the plaintiff (Article 2180)
The responsibility of the owner and manager is only with respect to damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, and not with
respect to acts of strangers who committed unauthorized acts and in doing so, caused damages to
others. The same thing is true with respect to the employer in relation to the unauthorized acts of
strangers.
WHAT
PAR. 4?

ARE THE REQUISITES IN ORDER THAT AN EMPLOYER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER

1. The employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another;

2. The service is to be rendered in accordance with the orders which the employer has the
authority to give at all times;
3. The illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted
to him; and at the time the employee was performing his functions.

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K. P. Dela Serna

PAR.

WHAT
5?

ARE THE REQUISITES IN ORDER THAT AN EMPLOYER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER

1. The act was committed by employees and household helpers (including family cooks,
gardeners, yayas, servants, etc.);
2. The said act was committed while they were acting within their assigned tasks;
3. Damage was caused as a result of said act.
WHAT

IS THE PRESUMPTION CREATED BY LAW IF AN INJURY OR DAMAGE IS CAUSED

BY AN EMPLOYEE? HOW CAN THE EMPLOYER REBUT THIS PRESUMPTION?

If an injury or damage is caused by an employee, it is presumed that the employer (pars.

4 and 5) was negligent either in the selection of the employee or in his supervision over him, or
both. The employer can overcome the presumption by a clear showing that in the selection and
supervision he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage (last
par.) Allegations of negligence against the employee and that of employer-employee relations in
the complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Article 2180.
Note that to be exempt from liability, the employer must establish that he exercised due
care not only in the selection but also in the supervision of the employee.
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PRIMARY LIABILITY AND SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY
EMPLOYERS. WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS ON REMEDIES OF THE INJURED PARTY?

OF

The injured party has two (2) options in pursuing the civil liability of the employer for the
acts of his employee:
A. If he chooses to file a civil action for damages based on quasi-delict under article 2180
and succeeds in proving the negligence of the employee, the liability of the employer is
primary, direct and solidary. It is not conditioned on the insolvency of the employee.
The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance
of their duties is primary, that is, the injured party may recover from the employers
directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees.
B. If he chooses to file a criminal case against the offender and the offender was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the civil liability of the employer is subsidiary. The
employer cannot use as a defense the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family.
The judgment in the criminal action pronouncing the employee to be also civilly liable is
conclusive on the employer not only as to the actuality of that liability but also as to the
amount.

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K. P. Dela Serna

Once there is conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code, is subsidiarily liable, if it be shown that the commission
thereof was in the discharge of the duties of the employee. And a previous dismissal of an
action based on culpa aquiliana could not be a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary
liability required by said Article 102 of the Penal Code.
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES SO THAT THE SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER
MAY BE ENFORCED?
To enforce the employers subsidiary liability, there must be adequate evidence
establishing that:
1.
2.
3.
4.

He is indeed the employer of the convict;

He is engage in some kind of industry;
The crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of his duties; and
Execution against the employee is unsatisfied.

The employer who is made liable may seek reimbursement from his employee for the
amount he paid to the offended party for the satisfaction of the claim.
4) STATES IMPUTED LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF ITS SPECIAL AGENTS
WHAT ARE THE TWO ACTS OF THE STATE THAT MAY GIVE RISE TO LIABILITY?
The state may act as:
1. A government entity (public aspect) exercising governmental functions, where it is liable
for the acts of its special agents. Here, the state is engaged in public or government
functions, through its special agent; or
2. In a corporate capacity (private or business aspect), as when it engages in some private
enterprises, where it may be held liable just as any other employer for the acts of its
employees.
WHAT IS A SPECIAL AGENT?
By special agent is meant one specifically commissioned to carry out the acts complained
of outside of such agents regular duties. He is one who receives definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official.
HOW IS A SPECIAL AGENT DISTINGUISHED FROM AN OFFICIAL WITH SPECIFIC DUTY
OR DUTIES TO PERFORM?
Under the meaning of paragraph 6 of Article 2180, the word official comprises all
officials and employees of the government who exercise duties of their respective public offices.
All others who are acting by commission of the government belong to the class of special agents,
whether individual or juridical bodies.

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K. P. Dela Serna

In qualifying the special agent with the adjective special, the Civil Code aimed at
distinguishing it from the regular or ordinary agent of government, which refers to all officers
and employees in public service.
WHEN IS THE STATE LIABLE AS AN ORDINARY EMPLOYER?
1. When the state is engaged in private business or enterprise;
2. If the special agent is not a public official and is commissioned to perform nongovernmental functions;
3. If the special agent appointed by the state is assigned to perform acts for private and
business interests of the state.
WHEN IS THE STATE RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS SPECIAL AGENT?
Under Article 2180 (par. 6), the state has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done
through special agent if:
1. The states agent is a public official, who must not only be especially commissioned to do
a particular task but such task must be foreign to said officials usual governmental
functions.
2. The state commissioned a private individual to perform a special governmental task
(Fontanilla vs. Maliamen).
WHEN IS THE PUBLIC OFFICER OR OFFICIAL PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR HIS ACTS?
Since the state authorizes only legal acts by its officers, the state shall not be liable and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such
acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the state within the rule of immunity of
the state from suit for:
1. Unauthorized acts of government officials or officers;
2. Acts of a public officer that goes beyond the scope of his duty particularly when acting
tortiously;
3. Tortious acts committed by the public officers unrelated to his special assignment;
4. Acts performed by an official upon whom previously devolved the duty of doing the act
performed;
5. Acts performed in the discharge of the official duties of a public officer.
5) LIABILITY OF TEACHERS OR HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF ARTS AND TRADES
WHAT IS THE BASIS OF LIABILITY OF TEACHERS OR HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS?
The teachers and heads mentioned in paragraph 7 of Article 2180 stand, to a certain
extent, in loco parentis to their pupils and students.

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K. P. Dela Serna

Where the parent places a child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter
together with the school head (and the school itself for the fault of the teacher and head), not the
parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under their custody, for the
very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the authority and supervision of the
teacher while the child is under instructions.
WHAT DOES THE PHRASE AS LONG AS THEY REMAIN IN THEIR CUSTODY MEAN?
The phrase was held to contemplate a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher such that the control and influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass
from the father to the teacher, and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil (Mercado
vs. CA, 108 Phil. 414).
This interpretation was abandoned in Palisoc vs. Brillantes, 41 SCRA 557[1971], where
the Supreme Court ruled that the phrase means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its head and teacher exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are in the
school including recess time. There is nothing in the law which requires that for such liability to
attach, the pupl or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school.
The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control
and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or
has already ended (Amadora vs. CA, 160 SCRA 315). Under Article 218 of the Family Code,
custody extends to activities even outside the premises as long as they are authorized activities.
It is not necessary that at the time of the injury the teacher be physically present and at
the position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but it
refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of
such influence.
IS THE SCHOOL LIABLE IF THE STUDENT IS OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE?
A student over 21 years of age, by enrolling and attending a school, places himself under
the custodial supervision and disciplinary authority of the school authorities, which is the basis
of the latters correlative responsibility for his torts, committed while under such authority.
Thus, unlike the parent, who will be liable only if the child is still a minor, the teacher is
held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the age of the
student. Article 2180 treats the parents more favorably than the teacher.
However, the teachers control is not as plenary as when the student is a minor; but the
circumstances can only affect the degree of the responsibility but cannot negate the existence
thereof. It is only a factor to be appreciated in determining whether or not the defendant has
exercised due diligence in endeavoring to prevent the injury, as prescribed in the last paragraph
of Article 2180 (Palisoc vs. Brillantes, supra).
UNDER THE FAMILY CODE, WHAT IS THE RULE WITH RESPECT TO MINORS?

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K. P. Dela Serna

ARTICLE 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)
ARTICLE 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding
Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental
authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if
it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
cda
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

These two provisions control with respect to pupils and students or apprentices
who are minors. The basis of liability is the SPECIAL parental authority and responsibility
assumed over the minor for whose acts or omissions those given such authority and
responsibility are principally and solidarily liable for damages, with the parents, judicial
guardians, or the persons exercising substitute parental authority being subsidiarily liable. 20
DOES THE LIABILITY EXTEND TO NON-ACADEMIC SCHOOLS?
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic
schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is
expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the
nature of the school where he is teaching (Amadora vs CA).
However, where the law is academic rather than vocational or technical in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the pupil or student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such pupil or student, following the first part of paragraph 7 of Article 2180. This is the general
rule. In the case of establishments for arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall
be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature; in which
case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
WHAT IS THE STATUS OF WORKING SCHOLARS?

20

ARTICLE 216 (Family Code).

In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following
persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: cd i
(1)
The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2)
The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3)
The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order
of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)

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K. P. Dela Serna

Section 14, Rule X (PD 442) provides: There is no employer-employee relationship

between students on one hand, and schools, colleges or universities on the other, where students
work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of charge provided the students are
given real opportunity, including such facilities as may be reasonable, necessary to finish their
chosen courses under said arrangement.
F. OTHER PROVISIONS ON VICARIOUS LIABILITY
WHAT IS THE RIGHT OF THE PERSONS ENUMERATED IN
THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THEIR DEPENDENTS OR EMPLOYEES?

ARTICLE 2180 WHO PAID FOR

ARTICLE 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees
may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)

The phrase dependents or employees in Article 2181 should be construed to include all
persons for whom another is liable under Article 2180.
WHAT IS THE RULE IF THE TORTFEASOR IS A MINOR OR INSANE PERSON WITHOUT A
PARENT OR GUARDIAN?
ARTICLE 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or
guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action
against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)

G. STRICT LIABILITY
WHAT IS STRICT LIABILITY?
Strict liability is defined as liability without fault. A case is one of strict liability
when neither care nor negligence, neither good faith nor bad faith, neither knowledge or
ignorance will save the defendant.
WHEN IS THERE STRICT LIABILITY UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
There is strict liability if one is made liable independent of fault, negligence or
intent after establishing certain facts specified by law. Strict liability tort can be
committed even if reasonable care was exercised and regardless of the state of mind of
the actor at that time.
WHAT ARE THE INSTANCES UNDER THE
LIABILITY?
1.
2.
3.
4.

CIVIL CODE

WHERE THERE IS STRICT

Liability of possessors of animals (Article 2183);

Liability for falling objects (Article 2193);
Liability of employers (Article 1171);
Liability of manufacturers and processors (Article 2187)

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K. P. Dela Serna

5. Liability for nuisance (To be discussed separately)

A. LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS OF ANIMALS
ARTICLE 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible
for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in
case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
(1905)

WHY IS ARTICLE 2183 AN INSTANCE OF STRICT LIABILITY?

The language of Article 2183 reveals an evident intent to make the possessor or
whoever makes use of the animal, liable independent of fault.
Additionally, the owner or possessor of the animal is liable even if the damage
was caused by the animal through the fault of third persons. There is also liability even in
a case in which it could not be avoided because the animal is not in his possession for
having escaped or gone astray, and for this reason, it does not admit in this class of
damages, unlike in damages caused by a person other than the one responsible, evidence
of diligence of a good father of a family.
WHO IS MADE LIABLE UNDER ARTICLE 2183?
Liability is imposed only on the possessor or user of the animal, since he is the
one who has custody and control, he is, therefore in a position to prevent the animal from
causing damage. The law used the word possessor instead of owner. Thus, if the animal,
like a horse or carabao was borrowed by someone for his own use, the latter alone, should
be held liable for the damage caused while the animal was under his control.
WHAT IS THE RATIONALE BEHIND ARTICLE 2183?
The obligation imposed by Article 2183 is based on natural equity and on the
principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or
service must answer for the damage which may be caused by such animals, even if such
damage was not due to their fault or negligence.
WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO ARTICLE 2183?
1. When the damage was caused by force majeure;
2. When the damage is caused by the person who suffered the damage;
3. If the acts of a third person cannot be foreseen or prevented, then the situation is
similar to a force majeure and the possessor is not liable.
WHAT ARE THE ANIMALS COVERED UNDER ARTICLE 2183?
Article 2183 makes no distinction as to what kind of animal is used or possessed.
Hence, it may be construed as applicable generally to all animals, whether domestic,

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K. P. Dela Serna

domesticated, or wild. It would seem that birds are covered since they can also cause
damage.
B.

LIABILITY FOR FALLING OBJECTS

ARTICLE 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for
damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910a)

WHY IS THERE STRICT LIABILITY IN ARTICLE 2193?

It is evident in Article 2193 that the liability is absolute. It does not indicate a
presumption or admit proof of care.
Unlike Article 2183, the provision does not exempt cases involving force
majeure.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 2193?
The nature of the liability of the head of the family is both absolute and exclusive.
It is absolute in the sense that as long as he is head of the family that lives in the building
or part thereof like a rented room, he is liable even if he is not present at the time of the
incident. It is exclusive in the sense that it is only the head of the family who is made
liable.
WHAT ARE THE PURPOSES OF THE ABSOLUTENESS OF THE ARTICLE?
The obvious purposes of the law in making it absolute are:
a) To compel the head of the family to see to it that no dangerous things are placed on
the window sills and other parts of their dwelling place which may be thrown or fall
by accident;
b) To compel him to supervise the members of the family or guests from doing acts or
activities which may result in the throwing or falling of things from their house or
place of dwelling;
c) To relieve the victim of the difficult burden of identifying the persons who caused the
throwing or falling of the injurious thing.
WHAT DOES THE TERM HEAD OF THE FAMILY INCLUDE?
The head of the family is usually the father; in his absence, the mother. A single
person may also be the head of the family if he is the one supporting his family which
may include as members, adopted children, unemployed parents, brothers and sisters.
The term head of the family is not limited to the owner of the building and it
may even include the lessee thereof (Dingcong vs. Kanaan, 72 Phil. 14).

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K. P. Dela Serna

WHAT

IS THE REMEDY OF THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY WHO MAY HAVE BEEN
OBLIGED TO PAY INDEMNITY TO THE INJURED PARTY?

The head of the family who may have been obliged to pay indemnity to the
injured party may recover from the person responsible for the damage. Their liability is
solidary (Article 2194).
D. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS (ARTICLE 1711)
ARTICLE 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for
the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event
may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose
out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee
contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the
employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or
drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care
contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.

WHY IS THERE STRICT LIABILITY IN ARTICLE 1711?

The language of the provision indicates that the same is strict liability because
liability exists even if the cause if purely accidental.
It should be noted, however, that if the death or injury is due to the negligence of
a fellow-worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If
a fellow-workers intentional or malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the
employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not
exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiffs fellow-worker
(Article 1712).
E. LIABILITY OF MANUFATURERS AND PROCESSORS (ARTICLE 2187)
ARTICLE 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and
similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances
used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)

WHY IS THERE STRICT LIABILITY IN ARTICLE 2187?

There is strict liability in Article 2187 because it imposes liability for death or
injury without fault or negligence on the part of the manufacturers and processors and
without privity of contract between them and the consumers.
The principle of strict liability in tort means that proof of negligence is not
necessary. It applies even if the defendant manufacturer or processor has exercised all
the possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the burdens of such accidental
deaths or injuries resulting from defective products intended for public consumption

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K. P. Dela Serna

be placed upon those who market them, and can be treated as cost of production
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.
WOULD THE PRESENCE OF CONTRACT BETWEEN THE MANUFACTURER OR
PROCESSOR AND THE PLAINTIFF PRECLUDE THE LATTER FROM FILING OF A DAMAGE
SUIT?
If there is a contractual relation between the parties, the plaintiff us not precluded
from filing a suit based on the breach of warranty whether express or implied. The
principle of strict liability still applies. The consumers cause of action does not depend
upon the validity of his contract with the person from whom he acquires the product, and
it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the seller
and the immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product into the
consumers hands.
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR STRICT LIABILITY UNDER THIS ARTICLE?
To establish the liability of manufacturers or processors under the Article, the
following requisites must be established:
a) The defendant is the manufacturer or processor of foodstuff, drinks, toilet
articles and similar goods involved;
b) The defendant used noxious or harmful substances in the manufacture or
processing of the foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods;
c) Plaintiff used or consumed such product unaware of the injurious
condition of the product;
d) Plaintiffs injury or death was caused by the product used or consumed;
e) The forms or kinds of damages suffered and the amount thereof.
The plaintiff has the burden of proof that at the time the product left the hands of
the defendant, the product was in a defective or injurious condition. Otherwise, his case
will fall.
WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS ON REMEDIES OF THE PLAINTIFF?
The plaintiff has four (4) options if he desires to pursue a complaint against the
manufacturer or processor under Article 2187. He may base his complaint on the:
a)
b)
c)
d)

Theory of strict liability in torts;

Fault or negligence;
Breach of warranty; or
Crime anchored on violation of the Foods and Drugs Act
wherein the enforcement of which is the doctrine of absolute
criminal liability may be applied (People vs. Siy Cong Bien, 30
Phil. 577).

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K. P. Dela Serna

F. OTHER PROVISIONS
1. LIABILITY OF OWNER IN MOTOR VEHICLE MISHAPS (ARTICLE
2184); PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE (ARTICLE 2185); AND
BOND REQUIRED BY MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERS (ARTICLE
2186)
ARTICLE 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating
traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. cd i
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)
ARTICLE 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n)
ARTICLE 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a
bond executed by a government-controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages to third persons.
The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent public official. (n)

WHO ARE THE OWNERS GOVERNED BY THE ARTICLE?

Article 2184 refers to owners of vehicles who are not included in the terms of
Article 2180 as owners of an establishment or enterprise (De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 4 SCRA 517). It is intended to cover only owners of motor vehicles
for private use. It is generally not applicable to motor vehicles for public use and
convenience because the operator thereof, usually a corporation, cannot, in the very
nature of things, be in the motor vehicle at the time of mishap. However, if the manager
of the bus company was in the bus at the time of the mishap, Article 2184 may be applied
by analogy (Corpus vs. Paje, 28 SCRA 1062).
WHEN IS ARTICLE 2184 APPLICABLE?
Article 2184 applies if the owner was in the vehicle at the time of the mishap;
otherwise, the provisions of Article 2180 would be applicable (par. 2) where the owner
even if he was not in the vehicle would be liable unless he exercised due diligence to
prevent the damage.
If the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner of that car, who was
present, is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of
due diligence. Negligence under Article 2184 is, to a certain degree, necessarily
subjective (Caedo vs. Yu Khe Tai, 26 Phil. 410). The owner should not be held liable for
the negligence of a competent driver, if by the sudden act of negligence, the owner could
not have a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance (Chapman vs.
Underwood, 27 Phil. 374; Johnson vs. David, 5 Phil. 663).
WHAT IS THE RATIONALE BEHIND ARTICLES 2184 TO 2186?

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K. P. Dela Serna

The rationale for the inclusion of Articles 2184 to 2186 is to cope with the
alarming increase of vehicular mishaps.
IS THERE A PRESUMPTION THAT A DRIVER WAS NEGLIGENT?
There is no presumption that a driver was negligent unless he has been found
guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within two months
next preceding the mishap (Article 2184, par. 2), or was violating any traffic violation at
the time of the motor vehicle mishap (Article 2185).
WHAT
ARTICLE?

IS THE TEST OF NEGLIGENCE OF THE CAR OWNER UNDER THE

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or
proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before
he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his negligence, within the meaning of Article
2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should
do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another.
Where the law require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of
professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies have real need of
drivers services, would be effectively prescribed (Caedo vs. Yu Khe Tai, supra.).
2. DEATH RESULTING FROM POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS
WEAPONS OR SUBSTANCES (ARTICLE 2188)
ARTICLE 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if
the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and
poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n)

When death or injury results from the defendants possession of dangerous

weapon or substances, there is a rebuttable presumption that he is negligent. The burden
of evidence is on him to establish that he was not negligent at all. The presumption
prevails if he fails to overcome it by clear strong and convincing evidence.
When the possession or use of the weapon or substances is indispensable in the
defendants occupation or business, no presumption arises. The plaintiff has the burden of
proving defendants negligence.
3. DEFECTIVE

CONDITIONS OF THE ROADS, STREETS, BRIDGES,

PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND OTHER PUBLIC WORKS (ARTICLE

2189)
ARTICLE 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of,
or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)

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K. P. Dela Serna

WHO ARE MADE LIABLE FOR DEFECTIVE CONDITION OF ROADS, ETC?

Article 2189 does not require the defective roads, streets, etc. to belong to the
province, city or municipality for liability to attach. It only requires that either control or
supervision is exercised over the road, street, etc. (Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171
SCRA 382).
4. LIABILITY

OF PROPRIETOR OF A BUILDING OR STRUCTURE

DUE TO ITS COLLAPSE (ARTICLE 2190); OTHER LIABILITIES
(ARTICLES 2191 & 2192)

ARTICLE 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting
from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907) aisa dc
ARTICLE 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
(1)
By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and
the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2)
By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3)
By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force
majeure;
(4)
By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed
without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
ARTICLE 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any
defect in the construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only
against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein
fixed. (1909)

Article 2190 supplements Article 482 which provides:

ARTICLE 482. If a building, wall, column, or any other construction is in danger of falling, the
owner shall be obliged to demolish it or to execute the necessary work in order to prevent it from falling.
If the proprietor does not comply with this obligation, the administrative authorities may order the
demolition of the structure at the expense of the owner, or take measures to insure public safety. (389a)
acd

WHAT ARE THE LIABILITIES OF PROPRIETORS OF BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES

DUE TO ITS COLLAPSE?
1. Where the damage is caused by the total or partial collapse of a building or
other structure, the proprietor or owner is prima facie deemed negligent
and is made liable, if it should be due to lack of necessary repairs, because
it is his duty to maintain his property in goods condition at all times to
avoid causing injury or damage to another person or property. To relieve
himself from liability, he must prove that the property was in a goods state
of repair or that the collapse was due to a defect in its construction in
which case the engineer or architect and/or contractor may be held
responsible for the damage (See Article 1723).

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K. P. Dela Serna

2. The fact that the property is leased or in usufruct will not exempt the
owner from liability for his duty to make necessary repairs remains
although the property is legally in the possession and control of another.
Under the law, the lessee or the usufructuary is obliged to notify or advise
the owner of the need for urgent or extraordinary repairs (Article 593,
1663). The failure of the lessee or usufructuary to give notice will entitle
the owner to reimbursement, for the damages he may have been required
to pay third parties injured by the collapse of the property.
WHAT IS THE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE UNDER ARTICLE 2191?
If any of the four (4) enumerated events occurred, the proprietor of the machinery,
not necessarily of the owner of the tenement where it is located, is presumed negligent.
He has to overcome the presumption with sufficient evidence to avoid responsibility.
WHO

IS LIABLE IF THE DAMAGE SHOULD BE THE RESULT OF ANY DEFECT IN

THE CONSTRUCTION?

If the building or structure referred to in Articles 2190 and 2191 were constructed
with substantial defects which defects are the cause of the damage or injury, the injured
party may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with
Article 1723 which provides that:
ARTICLE 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a
building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should
collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The
contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of
defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any
violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be
solidarily liable with the contractor. cda
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action
by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)

5. SOLIDARY LIABILITY FOR QUASI DELICT (ARTICLE 2194)

ARTICLE 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is
solidary. (n) aisa dc

NUISANCE
ARTICLE 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

Annoys or offends the senses; or
Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or

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K. P. Dela Serna

(5)

Hinders or impairs the use of property.

ARTICLE 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon
individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition. cda
ARTICLE 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance
in that property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as the one who created
it.
ARTICLE 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover
damages for its past existence.
ARTICLE 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.
ARTICLE 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
(1)
(2)
(3)

A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or

A civil action; or acd
Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
ARTICLE 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a public
nuisance are availed of.
ARTICLE 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such action
shall be commenced by the city or municipal mayor.
ARTICLE 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial
proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.
ARTICLE 703. A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is specially
injurious to himself.
ARTICLE 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by
removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the
peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:
(1)
That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;
(2)
That such demand has been rejected;
(3)
That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the local
police; and cda
(4)
That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.
ARTICLE 705. The remedies against a private nuisance are:
(1)
(2)

A civil action; or
Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

ARTICLE 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by
destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary
injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a private
person be followed.
ARTICLE 707. A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for
damages:
(1)
(2)

If he causes unnecessary injury; or

If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.

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K. P. Dela Serna

HUMAN RELATIONS (INTENTIONAL TORTS)

DEFINE HUMAN RELATIONS.
It is the interaction or interrelation of one person to another person or persons and vice
versa, in accordance with mores, habits, customs, and public policy not contrary to laws. It refers
to the rules needed to govern the interrelationships of human beings in a society for the purpose
of maintaining social order
It is based on the old adage or golden rule: Do not do unto others, what others dont do
unto you, and the Latin maxim: Sic uture tu ut alterium non laedas (So use your property as
not to injure others.
1. CATCH ALL PROVISIONS
ARE THE ARTICLES COVERED IN THE CATCH-ALL PROVISIONS ON
RELATIONS?
WHAT

HUMAN

1. Article 19: Every must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
2. Article 20: Every person, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latte for the same.
3. Article 21: Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES/DISTINCTIONS OF THE THREE ARTICLES?
1. Article 19 declares a principle of law and Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions, while
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not
especially provide for their own sanction;
2. There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, that is, the act must be intentional,
however, Article 20 does not distinguish, in that the act may be done either willfully or
negligently;
3. Under any of the three articles, an act which causes injury to another may be made the
basis for an award of damages;
4. Under Article 21, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; in Article
21, the act is contrary to law. Under Article 21, the act is done willfully, in Article 20, the
act is done either willfully or negligently.
ARTICLE 19

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K. P. Dela Serna

Article 19 is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. The law

recognizes the norms of human on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct
set forth in Article 19 must be observed.
The article sets standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights
but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are: a) to act with justice, b) to give
everyone his due; and c) to observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19 rejects the classical and traditional theory that he who uses a right injures no
one.
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Article 19 is intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide
specifically in statutory law.
Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the regulation of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order. It does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action
for damages under either Articles 20 and 21 would be proper [(Globe Mackay vs/ CA, 176 SCRA
778 (1989).]
WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF AN ABUSE OF RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19?
1. Exercise of a right which is objective and apparently legal;
2. Damage or injury to an interest not specifically protected by a legal precept; and
3. Immorality or anti-social character of the damage or injury manifested either
subjectively, i.e., when the right is exercised with the intent to injure or simply without
legal or legitimate purpose.
WHAT ARE THE EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS?
1. Those in favor of third persons who acted in good faith; and
2. Those arising from the concurrence or conflict with the tight of others.
Exercise of right. The exercise of rights must be done within certain limits.
The limitations in the exercise of a right are classified into:
a. Intrinsic limitations that which emanate from the right itself, that is, from its nature
and purpose.
b. Extrinsic limitations which are the following:

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K. P. Dela Serna

3. Those derived from the nature of the right itself

4. Limitations arising from good faith; and
5. Limitations imposed by the economic and social ends for the right which require the
holder of the right to exercise it in accordance with the end for which it was granted or
created.
IN WHAT ARTICLES IS
ELABORATED?
1.
2.
3.
4.

ACTING

WITH JUSTICE AND GIVING ANOTHER HIS DUE

Article 20 indemnification of another due to illegal acts

Article 21 indemnification due to immoral acts
Article 24 unfair competition
Article 22 unjust enrichment
IN

WHAT ARTICLE IS

OBSERVANCE

OF HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH

ELABORATED?

1. Article 26 respect for the personality and dignity of others

2. Article 25 restraint of due extravagance
3. Article 31 et seq. independent civil actions
ARTICLE 20
WHAT IS BEING PUNISHED UNDER ARTICLE 20?
This article punishes illegal acts whether done willfully or negligently. The article is
broad enough to cover all legal (not moral) wrongs in violation of law, whether willfully or
negligently. Thus, in the law of torts or quasi-delict Whoever by act or omission causes
damages to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
(Article 2176) It embraces the Spanish-Philippine concept of quasi-delict which is based on
negligence and the tort in Anglo-Amercian jurisprudence which is based on malice.
This article serves as a sanction to all violations of right which cause damage to another
irrespective of whether the particular law that is violated provides for damages or not. The rule in
Article 20 compliments the principle of abuse of rights enumerated in Article 19.
The conduct may be both a crime and a quasi-delict. Any person who willfully or
negligently causes damage to another in his person, his property, or in any right shall be obliged
to indemnify the latter. A felony may be committed by means of deceit or by means of fault or
negligence (Article 3, Revised Penal Code). If the fault or negligence does not constitute a penal
offense, the actor is liable only for quasi-delict under Article 2176. In either case, it is essential
that the act is voluntary for the obligation to indemnify to arise.
ARTICLE 21

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K. P. Dela Serna

Article 21 seeks to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so may victims
of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury.
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus.
WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF ACTS CONTRA BONUS?
1. There is an act which is legal;
2. But which is contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy; and
3. It is done with intent to injure
Under this article, damages are recoverable even though no positive law was violated.
Article 21 presupposes losses or injuries material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a
result of the violation. Thus, the complaint must asks for damages.
EXAMPLES OF ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES:
1. Breach of promise to marry
As a general rule, breach of promise to marry by itself is not actionable. However, it
becomes actionable if there are additional circumstances which make it fall within the purview of
Articles 19, 20, 21 or 2176 of the Civil Code. In such cases, there is another act independent of
the breach of promise to marry which gives rise to liability.
These include cases where:
1. If the breach of promise to marry is accompanied by a tortuous act
2. If the breach of promise to marry is accompanied by a quasi-contract as when
on the strength of the promise to marry, money or property is given. An action
will lie to recover such money or property
3. If the breach of promise to marry constitutes an abuse of right.
4. There was financial damage;
5. Social humiliation was caused to one of the parties; and
6. Where there was moral seduction
2. Seduction and sexual assault
Seduction, by itself, without breach of promise to marry is an act which is contrary to
morals, good custom and public policy. The defendant is liable if he employed deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence in successfully having sexual intercourse with
another.
The defendant would be liable for all forms of sexual assault. These include the crimes
defined under the Revised Penal Code as rape, acts of lasciviousness and seduction.
3. Desertion by a spouse

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K. P. Dela Serna

A spouse has a legal obligation to live with his or her spouse. If a spouse does not
perform his or her duty to the other, he may be held liable for damages for such omission
because the same is contrary to law, morals and good customs.
4. Trespass and deprivation of property
Trespass to real property is a tort that is committed when a person unlawfully invades the
real property of another. The Revised Penal Code punishes different forms of trespass. On the
other hand, the Civil Code provides that damages may be awarded to the real owner if he
suffered such damages because he was deprived of possession of his property by a possessor in
bad faith or by a person who does not have any right whatsoever over the property. (Article 451)
Anybody who builds, plants or sows on the land of another knowing full well that there is a
defect in his title is liable for damages.
Liability for damages under the provisions of the revised Penal Code and the Civil Code
requires intent or bad faith.
With respect to personal property, the commission of the crimes of theft or robbery is
obviously trespass. In the field of tort, however, trespass extends to all cases where a person is
deprived of his personal property even in the absence of criminal liability.
5. Disconnection of electricity or gas service
A usual form of deprivation of access to property is the unjustified disconnection of
electricity service. The right to disconnect and deprive the customer of electricity should be
exercised in accordance with law and rules.
6. Abortion and wrongful death
7. Illegal dismissal
The exercise of the right to terminate must be consistent with the general principles
provided for under Articles 19 and 21. If there is non-compliance with the said articles, the
employer may be held liable for damages.
8. Malicious prosecution
A tort action for malicious prosecution has been defined as An action for damages
brought by one against another whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal
proceedings has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of
such prosecution, suit or proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.
The statutory bases of the action are not only Articles 19, 20 and 21 but also Articles 26,
32, 33 35, 2217 and 2219(8) of the Civil Code.
WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION?

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K. P. Dela Serna

a. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the
prosecutor,
b. That the action was finally terminated with an acquittal;
c. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
d. The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice.
IN

ORDER FOR THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION SUIT TO PROSPER, WHAT MUST THE
PLAINTIFF PROVE?

a. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the
prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal;
b. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
c. That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or
sinister motive. (Lao v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58 [1991]; Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation v. Koh, 4 SCRA 535 [1962]; Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 32
Phil. 363 [1915])
The foregoing requisites are necessary safeguards to preserve a person's right to litigate
which may otherwise be emasculated by the undue filing of malicious prosecution cases. Thus,
as further held in the aforecited case of Buchanan v. Viuda. de Esteban, supra: "Malice is
essential to the maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution and not merely to the
recovery of exemplary damages. But malice alone does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution, where probable cause is shown, even where it appears that the suit was brought for
the mere purpose of vexing, harassing and injuring his adversary. In other words malice and
want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify the action." (see also Rehabilitation
Finance Corp. v. Koh, supra)
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime (or in this case, the wrongdoing) for which he was
prosecuted. (See Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, supra).
The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously
instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only
in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. (Id.)
9. Public humiliation
Example: slapping in public

4. Action In rem Verso and Liability Without Fault

Action in rem verso

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K. P. Dela Serna

Article 22: Every person who through an act or performance by another, or by

any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just cause or legal ground, shall return the same to him
This article is designated as action in rem verso.
What are the requisites of action in rem verso?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

One party must be enriched and the other made poorer;

There must be a causal relation between the two;
The enrichment must not be justifiable;
There must be no other way to recover; and
The indemnity can not extend the loss of enrichment whichever is less

LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT

Article 23: Even when an ac or event causing damage to anothers property was not due
to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the
act or event was benefited.
Unless there is a duty to indemnify, unjust enrichment will occur.
The concept of liability without fault is introduced in this article. It is based on equity.

5. Human Dignity
TORTS
MIND

THAT INVOLVE THE

RIGHT

OF A

PERSON

TO

DIGNITY, PRIVACY

AND

PEACE

OF

Article 26 Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace if
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and other similar acts, though they may
not constitute a criminal offense shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPAL RIGHTS PROTECTED UNDER THIS ARTICLE?

a.
b.
c.
d.

right to personal dignity;

right to personal security;
right to family relations;
right to social intercourse;

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K. P. Dela Serna

e. right to privacy and

f. right to peace of mind
WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN THIS ARTICLE?
a. An action for damages
b. An action for prevention
c. Any other relief

A civil action may be instituted even if no crime is involved, and moral damages
may be obtained

Scope:

a. Prying into the privacy of anothers residence includes by implication respect for
anothers name, picture, or personality except insofar as is needed for publication of
information and pictures of legitimate news value.
b. Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another includes
alienation of the affection of the husband or the wife.
c. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends includes gossiping, and
reliance on hearsay.
d. Vexing or humiliating includes criticism of ones health or features without justifiable
legal cause.

6. Public Officers
TORTS COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS UNDER HUMAN RELATIONS
Article 27 Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action
for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR ACTION UNDER THIS ARTICLE?
a. That the defendant be a public official charged with the performance of official
duties;
b. That there be a violation of an official duty in favor of an individual;
c. That there be willfulness or negligence in the violation of such official duty;
d. That there be an injury to the individual

7. Unfair Competition
Article 28 Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or
in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination, or any other unjust,

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K. P. Dela Serna

oppressive or high handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby
suffer damage.
WHEN IS THERE UNFAIR COMPETITION?
Unfair competition consists in employing deception or any other means contrary to good
faith by which any person shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or
his business, or services to those of the one having established goodwill, or committing any acts
calculated to produce such result.
WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION?
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

Agricultural enterprises
Commercial enterprises
Industrial enterprises
Labor

b. Examples
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.

Strike prematurely declared

Strike for trivial, unjust or unreasonable cause
Strike carried out thru force, intimidation or other unlawful means
Strike in order to circumvent valid obligations entered into a collective
bargaining contracts
Cut-throat competition
The making of false statement in the course of trade to discredit the goods,
business or services of another
The making of goods so as to deceive purchasers
Selling of goods above the maximum prices set by the state

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF UNFAIR COMPETITION?

1. That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the
goods of another manufacturer or dealer;
2. That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods
themselves, or in the (2) wrapping of their packages, or in the
(3) device or words therein, or in (4) any other feature of their
appearance;
3. That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives
other persons a chance or opportunity to do the same with a
like purpose;
4. That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a
competition.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF A COMPLAINT FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION?

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K. P. Dela Serna

It is basically a suit for injunction and damages.

e. Civil Action After Acquittal In a Criminal Case

Article 29 When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same
act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages
in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text
of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
WHAT ARE THE REASONS OF THE PROVISION IN ALLOWING THE FILING OF A CIVIL
ACTION FOR DAMAGES EVEN THOUGH THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN ACQUITTED ON REASONABLE
DOUBT?
a. The reason is found in Article 2177 which states that responsibility for fault or
negligence is entirely separate and distinct form the civil liability arising form
negligence under the penal code but the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
b. Also, under the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable is also civilly
liable (Article 100). The two liabilities are separate and distinct form each
other; the criminal aspect affects social order; the civil, private rights. One is
for the punishment or correction of the offender, while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party.
WHAT ARE THE INSTANCES WHERE NO CIVIL ACTION MAY BE INSTITUTED?
(a) When the accused is acquitted on the ground that he did not commit
the act, or
(b) That no crime was committed, or
(c) Because he is justified or exempt from criminal liability,
Reason: Because the acquittal on these grounds constitutes res
adjudication.

When such civil action is instituted, only a preponderance of evidence is required.

However, to protect persons form harassment, the provision authorizes the
defendant t file a motion in court requiring the plaintiff to file a bond to answer
for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

Note that Article 29 does no speak of an independent civil action.

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K. P. Dela Serna

f. Institution of Civil Action for Damages

Arising out of a Criminal Offense before a Criminal
Action is Instituted for the Criminal Offense
Article 30 When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising
from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the
civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained
of.

If however, a criminal action is instituted while the civil action is pending, the civil
action will be suspended until final judgment in the criminal case has been rendered.

As in Article 29, this article does not speak of an independent civil action.

g. Torts with Independent Civil Actions.

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS?
Article 31 When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the later.
WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 31?
This article refers to a civil action based not on the act or omission charged as a felony in
a criminal case, but to one based on an obligation arising from other sources, such as law or
contract (Example: Breach of contract of carriage. Reason: The civil action based on contractual
liability of a common carrier is distinct from the criminal action instituted against the carrier or
its employee based on the latters negligence).

Meaning of independent civil actions An independent civil action is one that is

brought distinctly and separately from a criminal case allowed for considerations
of public policy, because the proof needed for civil cases is less than that required
for criminal cases; but with the injunction in general that success in financially
recovering in one case should prevent a recovery of damages in the other.

Note that the bringing of the independent civil action is permissive, not
compulsory

WHAT ARE THE INSTANCES OF INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS?

(a) Article 21 Acts contra bonus mores
(b) Article 32 breach of constitutional and other rights

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K. P. Dela Serna

(c) Article 33 Defamation, fraud, physical injuries

(d) Article 34 Refusal or failure of city or municipal police to give
protection
(e) Article 2177 Quasi-delict
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL IN THE CIVIL CASE?
The dismissal of the civil action cannot constitute a bar to the criminal suit for the two
actins are entirely distinct from each other, and may therefore be litigated independently.
PROSECUTION
PROCEDURE]

OF INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

[RULE 111, RULES

OF

CRIMINAL

What are the general rules in institution of criminal and civil actions?

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless :
(1) the offended party waives the civil action,
(2) reserves the right to institute it separately or
(3) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
[The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall
be made before the prosecution starts presenting evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation. Section 1, Rule 111]

When the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation if the criminal and civil action.

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the
criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted,
the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment
on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the
criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the
civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated
with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. [Section 2, Ibid.]

WHAT ARE THE RULES ON INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS?

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K. P. Dela Serna

In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. [Section 3, Ibid.]

The independent civil actions contemplated in the present Rule 111

include quasi-delicts provided for in Article 2176, in addition to Articles
32, 33 and 34. It is necessary, however, that the civil liability under the
said articles arise from the same act or omission of the accused. Further,
a reservation of the right to institute these separate actions are impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the former are waived or filed
ahead of the criminal action.

Where an independent civil action is permitted, the result of the criminal

action, whether of acquittal or conviction is entirely irrelevant to the civil
action. Thus under Article 31 of the Civil Code, the civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal action regardless of the result of the
latter.

Prior to the case of Roa vs. De la Cruz (101 Phil. 8), it was held that where
the law authorizes a separate and independent civil action, there was no
need for making a reservation, however, in subsequent cases, the Supreme
Court has decided that reservation is needed because of the specific
provision of Section 3, Rule 111 requiring such reservation to be made
even where the law provides for independent civil actions.

What are the kinds of independent civil actions?

a. Article 21 [Supra]
b. Article 32 Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendants act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other
relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution,
and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral and exemplary damages.

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K. P. Dela Serna

Where a public officer is charged with violation of any of the basic rights of an
individual provided for in this article, it is deemed that the action is against him in
his private capacity and not a suit against the state which requires its consent.

c. Article 33 In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

This article speaks of independent civil action in cases of:

defamation, libel or slander or intriguing against honor
fraud, including estafa and swindling, and
physical injuries, including attempted and frustrated homicide so long
as there was injury.

d. Article 34 When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render
aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer
shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily
responsible therefore. The civil action recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

The liability of the city or municipality being subsidiary can only be enforced
when the guilty officer is insolvent. However, it can not be avoided by proving
that the city or municipality has exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its policemen. This defense, allowed under Article 2180, in favor
of employers for the fault or negligence of their employees, is available only to
private employers; it would be available to the city or municipality if the function
involved is a corporate function, but not when, as contemplated by the present
article, it is a governmental function.

e. Article 2177 Responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising form negligence under the penal code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

DAMAGES

WHAT ARE THE DAMAGES THAT MAY BE AWARDED?

Under Article 2197, damages may be:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Actual or compensatory;
Moral;
Nominal;
Temperate or moderate;

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K. P. Dela Serna

5. Liquidated; or
6. Exemplary or corrective.
WHAT DAMAGES MAY BE RECOVERED IN CASE OF DEATH OF A PASSENGER?
When death occurs, the following items of damages may be recovered:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

An indemnity for the death of the victim;

An indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased;
Moral damages;
Attorneys fee and expenses of litigation;
Interest in proper cases (Brinas vs. People, 125 SCRA 687).
IN

FIXING A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES FOR DEATH OF A PASSENGER THAN

THAT PROVIDED BY LAW WHAT MAY THE COURTS CONSIDER?

Article 2206 applies in case of death caused by breach of contract by the common carrier
(Article 1764). It fixes the minimum indemnity for death at P____ which the courts may increase
according to circumstances. It is in fixing a greater amount of indemnity that courts may consider
the financial capacity of the common carrier, along with such other factors as:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter;

Pecuniary loss to the plaintiff or beneficiary;
Loss of support;
Loss of service;
Loss of society;
Mental suffering of beneficiaries; and
Medical and funeral expenses (Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Legaspi, 12
SCRA 592).

In awarding compensatory damages, the age of the plaintiff, his expected life span, and
his earning capacity within that life span must be taken into consideration. Thus, the fact that the
plaintiff was only in his twenties, when through the negligence of the defendant, he lost the use
of his limbs, being condemned for the remainder of his life to be a paralytic, in effect leading a
maimed, well-nigh useless existence, were taken into account in fixing compensatory damages
(Marchan vs. Mendoza, 24 SCRA 889).
HOW MAY LIFE EXPECTANCY OF A PERSON BE DETERMINED FOR PUPROSES OF FIXING
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES THAT MAY BE RECOVERED?
In determining the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed
and the rate which the losses sustained by said heirs should be fixed, the following formula was
adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actual Combined Experience
Table of Mortality:
2/3 x (80 age of the decedent) = life expectancy.

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K. P. Dela Serna

Thus, the life expectancy of the passenger who died when he was over 29 years of age (or
around 30 for purposes of computation) was placed at 33 1/3 years, following the foregoing
formula (Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 514). And where the passenger
was 37 years old when he died, he had a life expectancy of 28 2/3 more years (Fortune Express,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119756, March 18, 1999).
In the computation of the damages to be awarded, it should be life expectancy of the
passenger who died and not the life expectancy of the beneficiary which should be considered
(Philippine Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 110).
ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Actual damages are adequate compensation for pecuniary loss suffered and proved. It
includes attorneys fees.
ARTICLE 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
ARTICLE 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but
also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106)
ARTICLE 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good
faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which
the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a)
ARTICLE 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have
been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. cdasia
ARTICLE 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family
to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.
ARTICLE 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
ARTICLE 2205. Damages may be recovered:
(1)
(2)

For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury;
For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.

ARTICLE 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1)
The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be
paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of his death;

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K. P. Dela Serna

(2)
If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is
not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support
from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3)
The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. cdtai
ARTICLE 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the
insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance
company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the
contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party
shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.
ARTICLE 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1)
When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2)
When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest; casia
(3)
In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4)
In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5)
Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid,
just and demandable claim;
(6)
In actions for legal support;
(7)
In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8)
In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9)
In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10)
When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11)
In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
ARTICLE 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in
delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest
agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108) casia
ARTICLE 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach
of contract.
ARTICLE 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be
adjudicated in the discretion of the court.
ARTICLE 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the
obligation may be silent upon this point. (1109a)
ARTICLE 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
ARTICLE 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that
he may recover.
ARTICLE 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the
damages under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances:
cdtai
(1)

That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract;

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K. P. Dela Serna

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract;
In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel;
That the loss would have resulted in any event;
That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury.

OTHER KINDS OF DAMAGES

ARTICLE 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated or exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is
left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case. cda

MORAL DAMAGES
ARTICLE 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act or omission.
ARTICLE 2218. In the adjudication of moral damages, the sentimental value of property, real or personal,
may be considered.
ARTICLE 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
Adultery or concubinage;
Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
Illegal search;
Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
Malicious prosecution;
Acts mentioned in article 309;
Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. casia

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also
recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of
this article, in the order named.
ARTICLE 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

AS A GENERAL RULE, MAY MORAL DAMAGES BE RECOVERED IN BREACH OF

CONTRACT OF TRANSPORTATION?
Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of contract
of transportation in view of the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220. The said provisions limited
the award of moral damages to those enumerated therein and analogous cases. A breach of
contract cannot be considered included in the descriptive term analogous cases used in Article
2219, not only because Article 2220 specifically provided for damages that are caused by

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K. P. Dela Serna

contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi delict in Article 2176 expressly excludes
the cases where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties (Verzosa vs.
Baytan, 107 Phil. 1010; Martinez vs. Gonzales, 6 SCRA 331).
WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE FOREGOING RULE WHEN MORAL DAMAGES MAY
BE RECOVERED IN BREACH OF CONTRACT OF TRANSPORTATION?
Moral damages may be recovered in an action for breach of contract of transportation in
the following cases:
1. When the mishap results in the death of a passenger (M. Ruiz Highway Transit, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 11 SCRA 98);
2. Where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if death does not
result (Rex Taxicab Co., Inc. vs. Bautista, L-15392, September 30, 1960; Singson vs.
Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 149).
Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive or ill-will. Self
enrichment or fraternal interest, and not personal ill-will, may have been the motive, but it is
malice nevertheless which may be the ground for awarding moral damages for breach of contract
of carriage (Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431). The bad faith referred to
may be bad faith in the securing and in the execution of the contract and in the enforcement of its
terms or any other kind of deceit which may have been used by the carrier (Tamayo vs. Aquino,
L-12634 and 12720, may 29, 1959).
MAY

MORAL DAMAGES BE GRANTED IN CASE OF BREACH OF CONTRACT OF

TRANSPORTATION WHICH MERELY CAUSES PHYSICAL INJURIES TO PASSENGERS?

In case of breach of contract of carriage resulting only to physical injuries of passengers,

moral damages are not recoverable (Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Cornista, 11 SCRA 182), unless
the carrier acted fraudulently or with malice or in bad faith (Roque vs. Buan, 21 SCRA 651;
Bulante vs. Chu Liante, 23 SCRA 604).
NOMINAL DAMAGES
Nominal damages are awarded not to compensate but to vindicate a right of the plaintiff
that has been violated by the defendant. Temperate damages, on the other hand, refers to
pecuniary loss suffered but cannot be proven with certainty.
ARTICLE 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. cd
ARTICLE 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source
enumerated in article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded.
ARTICLE 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right
involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns. cdtai

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K. P. Dela Serna

TEMPERATE OR MODERATE DAMAGES

ARTICLE 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
ARTICLE 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
ARTICLE 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case
of breach thereof. aisa dc
ARTICLE 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably
reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
ARTICLE 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated
by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of damages, and not the
stipulation.

EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES

ARTICLE 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
ARTICLE 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct
from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
ARTICLE 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
ARTICLE 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
ARTICLE 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide
whether or not they should be adjudicated. cdt
ARTICLE 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although
no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court
may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that
he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated
damages. cdtai
ARTICLE 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null and
void.

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