Toyota’s Strategy and Initiatives in

Europe
1- What is competition like in the minicar segment of the European
automobile industry? What do we learn about the nature and strength
of the competitive pressures Toyota Motor Europe (TME) faces from
doing a five-forces analysis?

For Toyota Motor Europe (TME), locally designed cars and the availability of diesel
engines provided impressive oppurtunuties in the European Car Market; Sales grew by
almost ,50% from 2000 to 2005 and the operating profit increased nine-fold to $654
million in 2003. After plant openings in France, Turkey, Poland and the Czech Republic,
local production was expected to reach 60% in 2006 thanks to lowered exposure on the
exchange rates and import tariffs.
However in the minicar segment Toyota's Aygo minicar was to face the challenge
of finding 100,000 buyers annually . This segment was seen as a difficult market: low
prices meant low margins. Mercedes-Benz's "MCC smart" recorded losses of €4 billion
between 2000 and 2005. As shown on the following table ,Toyota Aygo ,Peugoet107 and
Citroen C1 ,as JV Partners , could only get % 6 of the Europen Minicar segment of app.1
Mio cars.

Brand, Model 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Name
Toyota Aygo 0 0 0 0 21,224
Peugeot 107 0 0 0 0 19,552
Citroen CI 0 0 0 0 17,73
BMW Mini 24,98 144,119 176,465 184,357 200,428
Chevrolet Matiz 0 0 0 22,066 53,247
Daewoo Matiz 91,476 72,232 59,176 36,528 1,879
Citroen Saxo 243,962 164,477 71,478 1,737 19
Fiat Panda 101,924 117,959 131,677 224,055 228,106
Hyundai Atos 60,606 40^30 19,679 37,186 37,45
Kia Picanto 0 0 0 58,135 83,076
MCC smart 115 120 123 152 125
Mercedes A- 165,915 151,646 132,911 125,95 172,539
Class
Opel/Vauxhall 86,236 79,218 74,518 55,237 37,143
Agila
Peugeot 106 109,244 67,764 38,656 1,919 11
Renault Twingo 168,358 143,441 116,472 85,58 76,853
VWFox 0 0 0 0 50,862

Five Force Analysis:

The Degree of Rivalry :

The intensity of rivalry is strong because of major players are dominant in the market by
nearly same technology and manufacturing processes, suppliers relationship and
distribution systems.The intensity of rivalry, which is the most obvious of the five forces
in an industry, helped Toyota to determine the value added to be accounted for in this
fierce competition. In terms of “value-added” in the car Industry ; manufacturing ,
purchasing and R&D accounted for around 70% and Marketing and Distribution 30%
.Competition , while important, was only one of several forces that determined the
industry attractiveness in Toyota case.The possible threat subsititude products in the
minicar segment cars of European Manufacturers and existing power of suppliers and
buyers in the market gave grounds to set up a JV for Toyota,Peugoet and Citroen Groups.

The Threat of Entry:

Both potential and existing competitors influenced average industry profitability. The
threat of new entrants is low due to huge capital and cutting-edge technology. Entrants
was usually based on the market entry barriers as such that EU Regulations obliged Car
Makers to improve reduction of carbon dioxide (C02) emissions to 140 grams per
kilometer by the year 2008by 2008. Thanks to high-tech Toyota Production System
,Toyota could easily eliminate the market barrier entrance.
Economies of scale: The benefits associated with bulk purchasing were advantageous.
Cost of entry: The investment into technology was shared by the JV Partners.
Distribution channels: Seperate distribution channels provided easy access for
competitors.
Cost advantages :Toyota was good at Manufacturing and technology while PSA was was
famouse for its cost management systems.

The Threat of Subsitutes:

Substitutes are moderately strong due to different and less-expensive transportation
facilities. As per the agreement between JV Partners , 93% parts commonality between
Toyota,Peugoet and Citroen brands provided cost advantageous in terms of
Suppliers,Transportation,Technical Support and resulted in positive price/performance
ratio in different types of products or services . The threat of substitution would also be
affected by switching costs – ie; the costs in areas such as retraining, retooling and
redesigning based on customers switches to a different type of product or service.

Buyer Power:
Buyers were weak due to low demand for non-consumer goods (automobile) and high
switching costs; moreover, buyers were not able to backward integrate.

Buyer power is one of the two horizontal forces that influence the appropriation of the
value created by an industry with reference too the diagram above. The most important
determinants of buyer power in Toyota case were the size and the composition of
customers. Generation Y was definitely attractive size wise, but reaching them would
require many changes to the existing ways of doing things for the Generation X. Given
the challenge of entering a new segment, there were different approaches for launching
the Aygo in Europe. These cars were to be demonstrated at many European car shows
and to be supported by marketing material and appropriate lounching approaches.
The buyers were to be informed about features of the new cars ,the technology
used,compliance to green rules,fuel savings, mobility concept such as special rates at
parking garages etc in order to attract them as potential buyer .This,of course,required
high marketing budget.

Supplier Power:
Suppliers were not seemed to be so strong as they were spread all over the world and
cannot easily forward integrate. Although TPCA was directly dealing with around 150 Tier-
1 suppliers who were the big suppliers at the top of the hierarchy ,many of them were the
Czech or Slovak subsidiaries of the big international suppliers. To realize the TPCA’s
objective to produce a minicar with 93% common parts between the Toyota, Peugeot and
Citroen cars, the JV required reliable Supplier network since high level of synergy was
expected. For Toyota, this was a completely new segment. Being the fact that Supplier
Power is a mirror image of the Buyer Power , analysis indicated that the market was
characterized by resonable supplier power and at the same time by low buyer power of
Generation Y.
Suppliers bargaining power existed in the following situations:
The switching costs are high from one ar to another(except in Sweden where leasingof
cars were favorible);
High power of brands (Fiat Panda,BMW Mini,Mercedes A..)

2- What are the terms of the strategic alliance between Toyota and
PSA? What is your evaluation of the structure of the deal between the
two companies?

The deal between Toyota and PSA was a stargetic alliance which was concluded as
follows:
-The factory was to be established in Kolin of Czech Republic.
-As per the deal two-thirds of the new factory costs were paid by PSA and the
development cost was shared .
-PSA would absorb 200,000 units annually and Toyota 100,000.
-Toyota would be responsible for running the factory (according to the Toyota Production
System [TPS]) and would be responsible for the development of the three vehicles to be
produced at the factory (including the Peugeot 107 and Citroen CI). This helped greatly to
build in the 93% parts commonality between the different brands.
-In return, PSA would handle all purchasing and supplier relations including their
selection.
- Each partner would also bring one engine to the venture with the right [size]
specification.
- Toyota would produce a 3-cylinder gasoline engine (also to be used in the bigger Toyota
Yaris model) and PSA would bring a 4-cylinder diesel engine (also used in the Peugeot
206, Citroen C2 and C3). Engines were among the most expensive components of a car,
averaging at around 32% of total vehicle cost.14
In my opinion both JV Partners gained mutual benefits from each other and created
synergy resulting effectiveness and productivity. Toyota was hoping to benefit from PSA's
experience with European suppliers.PSA enjoyed low manufacturing cost and effeciency
from the Factory operations.

3- Why did Toyota & PSA opt for a Minicar Joint Venture? Would either
be better off alone?

The objective was to produce a minicar with 93% common parts between the Toyota,
Peugeot and Citroen cars. For Toyota, this was a completely new segment.
Peugeot's aim was to produce the replacement model for Peugeot 106 and and Citroen
Group aimed to lounch a replacement model for Citroen Saxo. Peugeot 106 was on sale
between 1991 and 2004 and Citroen Saxo between 1997 and 2003.Both sold a total of
2.8 million units over that period. Until the Kolin factory opened in mid-2005, PSA did not
have a replacement for the Peugeot 106 and the Citroen Saxo.
Toyota’s objective was 15% share by 2010 globally and to realize this target ,continued
growth in Europe was essential. In 2005 Toyota sales in Europe reached 900.000 cars
,and Toyota announced its its sales goal as 1.2 million units annually in Europe by 2010 .
Toyota was known for its deciveness to achive its goals.That is why commitment to buy
from the TPCA Plant 100.000 Toyota minicars was made when the JV agreement to set
up Manufacturing facility was signed.Since the alliance was limited to manufacturing and
the sales and distribution channels were seperated ,both JV Partners kept their marketing
stragies as is,but cooperated to supply market with high demanded minicar models as
per the deal.
There was a need to cooperate and win synergy with each other rather than staying
alone in order to reduce cost from PSA viewpoint and increase sales turnover by
producing minicars from Toyata point of view.

4- What are the respective capabilities of Toyota and PSA? What does
PSA have that Toyota does not? What does Toyota have that PSA
needs?

In the five years up to 2005, PSA increased its European share from 12% to 14% in
2005 and remained Europe's second biggest manufacturer (after the VW Group). PSA
was praised for its good vehicle designs, diesel engines, clever advertising and excellent
cost position in manufacturing, but it was disappointed by the results of quality surveys.
Within the automotive industry, PSA was also known for thedeals with various JV’s; diesel
engines with Ford, gasoline engines with Renault and BMW, commercial trucks with Fiat
and SUVs with Mitsubishi.
In TPCA joint venture;thanks to its cost focus reputation ,PSA's capability was to manage
all purchasing functions including developing the local supply infrastructure, which
accounted for 80% of all parts purchased (by value and volume). PSA was involved also
in the manufacturing process.
Toyota is an excellent reference in the industry in the field of simplicity and economic
efficiency.Toyota is a relationship-oriented company in terms of relations with suppliers.
Toyota would be responsible for running the factory (according to the Toyota Production
System [TPS]) and would be responsible for the development of the three vehicles to be
produced at the factory (including the Peugeot 107 and Citroen CI). This helped greatly to
build in the 93% parts commonality between the different brands. Toyota was hoping to
benefit from PSA's experience with European suppliers. Each partner would also bring one
engine to the venture with the right [size] specification.

5- Why Kolin in the Czech Republic?

Kolin was only 60 km from the home town of Skoda Auto (member of the VW
Group) and close to many suppliers.In many ways, the Kolin plant was is a typical Toyota
factory. The principles of efficient production that Toyota has established over the years
are practiced in full at TPCA, including kaizen (continuous improvement), jidoka (fixing
problems right away, where they occur), and just-in-time delivery.
Much of this can be attributed to Satoshi Takae. Takae was a Toyota veteran who started
in Kolin as factory manager and was promoted to president of TPCA in 2005. His goal for
the factory was very clear: "To be the number one plant in Europe."

In order to realize this, he had to work together with not only his 30 expatriate colleagues
from Toyota, but also with nine permanent members of staff from PSA. For Takae, this
meant exposing the Toyota Way, the "mysterious" Toyota DNA to outsiders.
At the same time, this working arrangement implied transferring control of suppliers to
PSA.
Competent Leadership, engaged employees and reliance to the Toyota Production
system were a.o. the main determining criteria.
6- How does the alliance create value for each partner?

Major added-value was the fact that Toyota would benefit from PSA's experience
with European suppliers. Each partner would also bring one engine to the venture with
the right [size] specification. Toyota would produce a 3-cylinder gasoline engine (also to
be used in the bigger Toyota Yaris model) and PSA would bring a 4-cylinder diesel engine
(also used in the Peugeot 206, Citroen C2 and C3). Engines were among the most
expensive components of a car, averaging at around 32% of total vehicle cost.
PSA and Toyota gained added value from TPCA project based on the added value of 69%
from supply and assembly processes such as ; purchasing,production.research &
development and 31% from marketing and distribution processes mainly; sales and
marketing,price to the consumer.
Besides the competence,learning and manufacturing processes development cost was
shared by PSA and Toyota ; two-thirds and one-third of the new factory in Kolin by PSA
and Toyota respectively. PSA would buy 200,000 units annually and Toyota 100.000.
Toyota would be responsible for running the factory (according to the Toyota Production
System [TPS]) and would be responsible for the development of the three vehicles to be
produced at the factory (including the Peugeot 107 and Citroen CI).
This helped greatly to build in the 93% parts commonality between the different brands.
In return, PSA would handle all purchasing and supplier relations including their selection.

7- How do Toyota and PSA limit potential threats to the alliance –

specifically, adverse selection, moral hazard, and holdup?

PEST analysis point of view JV Partners agreed to create synergy and to get
benefit from the alliance.On the one hand Europe 2nd bigger car maker PSA and on
the other hand Toyota . a global brand name in the Automotive sector signed an JV
Manufaturing agreement with clear responsibilities and focus on the selection of
appropriate market and segments.
A total of Euro 1.3 Billion investment requires to have well in advance information
about Political stability and government regulations about taxes and tariffs.
Establisment and maintenance of good relationship with the government and official
bodies is a must to ensure long-term profit as a result of the invested capital.
Economical factors are more related with automobile industry because of
consumers' purchasing power and per capital income in particular country related
with demand and supply. Moreover, the
Social factors influence consumers buying behavior and lifestyle.
Technological factors are the major factors for this industry as it is highly
depending on innovative technology and knowledge-based. Technological changes
have contributed much more on industry's growth.
Withregards to adverse selection , JV Partners have an equilibrium balanced
responsibilites as per the JV agreement where responsibilities and accountabilities
were clearly stipulated ;such as:
• PSA is responsible for all purchasing functions including developing the local
supply infrastructure and selection of Suppliers, which accounted for 80% of all
parts purchased (by value and volume).
• PSA was involved also in the manufacturing process.
• Toyota is responsible for running the factory (according to the Toyota Production
System [TPS]) and would be responsible for the development of the three vehicles
to be produced at the factory (including the Peugeot 107 and Citroen CI). This
helped greatly to build in the 93% parts commonality between the different
brands.
• Toyota expects to benefit from PSA's experience with European suppliers.
• Each partner would also bring one engine to the venture with the right [size]
specification.
Moral hazard is also a critical matter to be addressed by the JV Partners.Both parties
are aware of their competence and skills:Toyota has got a global brand name,
economies of scale, and highly skilled engineers and TPS technology.PSA is good at
vehicle designs, diesel engines, clever advertising and excellent cost position in
manufacturing.Both also know each others shortcomings:
Toyota has to depend on USA market for total sales and less market shares on other
markets.PSA has suffered from quality related aspects.
Related to Holdups , PSA and Toyota has to deal with cultural and language barriers
as there are three national cultures ;Japanese, French and Czech and two company
cultures with very different histories and production systems. Parties agreed on one
principle to which will override cultural difficulties:cost reduction will be the principle
to overcome language barriers.
TPCA had a systematic meeting structure in order to minimize miscommunications
and Managers at TPCA had to represent the interests of both TPCA and their employers.
• Daily Production Meeting : This meeting took place every morning at 8:30. At
this meeting, most managers were present in order to discuss quality,
absenteeism and announce major decisions.
• Project Leaders Meeting : Managers from both companies originally met on a
monthly basis and then only once a quarter. These meetings were attended by 10 to 20
managers from PSA and around 30 to 40 from Toyota.
• Steering Committee :TPCA's highest decision-making committee: Critical
decisions were discussed here. There were five members from each side including
Takae and Guibert. The meetings took place either at Toyota's HQ in Tokyo or PSA's
HQ in Paris. This committee met twice a year.
Within TPCA there were a few things that were off-limits to managers from the parent
companies, as they were protected by patents or seen as proprietary.

8- Will the alliance lead to a sustained competitive advantage? Why or

why not?

In early 2006 Aygo was doing extremely well on the forecasted resale values of
the major leasing companies. This limited the risk Toyota had to take when financing the
cars. The launch was widely seen as successful and Toyota won the coveted "best media
strategy award" in Germany. This was the trophy everyone wanted to have, but for man-
agers at Toyota in Europe in 2006, the question was, how to keep up the momentum?
The answer would be YES because of the fact that Eastern European automobile
market,being an emerging market, offers much room to grow as compared to countries
belonging to the European Union .On the otherhand ,due to the fact that much more
attention has been paid to the environment regulations in the coming years minicar
segmented cars with less CO2 emission rate per km would likely to be prefered by the
potential buyers.This would result in the increase of new car demand as older cars are
scrapped. As a result, Central and Eastern Europe will be vital for Toyota to provide
golden oppurtunuty to achieve its goal of selling 1.2 million units a year in Europe by
2010.
TPCA has established competitive advantage at its Kolin Production Center thorough
manufacturing operations that allowed the two global carmakers to combine their
knowledge of product design, styling, production and supplier relationships, while
learning from each other’s corporate cultures, technologies and processes, as there
seems to be very good teamwork and cooperation between Toyota and PSA. Toyota
learns from PSA mostly about purchasing issues, supplier relationships,both from a
European and a general point of view, and even about production methods and shift
management. On the other hand, PSA learns about Toyota’s management style and the
Toyota Way, and TPS and the production process.

As stated by Ichijo ‘it is crucial for the competitive advantage of a corporation operating
globally that knowledge created in a certain local unit is disseminated to other local units
effectively, efficiently, and fast’, since ‘sharing knowledge globally constitutes
competitive advantage of a corporation’
Finally, the lessons learned from the Toyota Way of global knowledge creation can
be summarized as the following propositions:
(1) as knowledge has become a critical source for competitive advantage, marketing –
and management in general – has to become knowledge-based;
(2) tacit knowledge needs to be leveraged both on a global and local level; tapping tacit
local knowledge, blending
and integrating it and finally applying it globally is a sine qua non for strategic knowledge
management;
(3) global as well as local knowledge creation have to be nurtured by a set of enabling
conditions;
(4) in the network economy of the 21st century, a decentralized global knowledge
creation strategy –involving customers, suppliers, other partners and even competitors –
is more effective than a centralized one;
(5) IJVs can be a useful vehicle not only for knowledge accessing and acquisition but also
for knowledge co-creation on the local and global level;
(6) a learn local, act global strategy is especially effective when entering new, emerging
markets and in collaborating with local agents like customers, suppliers, business
partners and even competitors;
(7) this strategy goes far beyond mere local customization and cross-country
collaboration; it is about a systematic and ontinuous way of leveraging local and global
knowledge and about co-creating new knowledge with a variety of local and global
partners (including competitors).

Toyota’s strategy of ‘Learn local and Act global’ will be the core competence and
sustainable competetive advantage for the achievement of Toyota’s 2010 objective.

9- Analyze the nature of competition in automobile industry in Turkey

using five-forces analysis (as of year 2009). What main trends are
identifiable in the business environment in general and in the car
market in particular in 2009?

Analysis of the competition in the automobile industry in Turkey in 2009:

Competetive rivalry is the most obvious of the five forces in this industry.The intensity of
competition has been very strong due to the fact that major players in the market are
dominant and that they use somewhat similar technology in their manufacturing
processes and also similar systems in their supplier relationship and distribution.Market
structure is carecterized as highly labor and capital intensive.Majority of cost elements for
manufacturing are Labor , Materials and Advertising.

SWOT analysis of the Turkish Automotive Industry from economical point of view are as
follows:

Strength

• Third major sector in Turkish manufacturing industry

• Leading private sector investor
• Driving force in manufacturing industry with its high value added
• A reliable source of tax revenue with its totally registered production

Human Knowledge

• High-skilled human resources both in production and management

 • Sustainable and improvable competitive workforce with low labor cost and culture
of productivity
• Accumulated technological know-how and rapidly growing investments in R&D
• Quality management systems
• Widespread distribution and marketing networks
• Integration with world automotive industry since 1990s

Geostrategic Importance

• The most developed automotive industry and a unique export and production base
in the region with close bilateral relations with EU, G8, Eurasia
• Export experience and strong export markets
• Easy access to potential emerging markets
• Unstable domestic market

Weaknesses

• Loss of quality and quantity in manpower as a result of the crises caused by the
weak economy of the country
• In adequate investments in the sector
• High costs of raw materials due to capacity utilization and production below
economies of scale
• High sales taxes and gasoline prices
• Lack of international strategy
• Excess capacity
• Insufficient export incentives

Business environment in general:

Today’s economic outlook for Turkey is deteriorating. GDP growth has been revised to
3.6% for 2008 (against 4.3% previously) and to 3.0% for 2009 (previously 4.0%). Turkey’s
unemployment rate rose to 9.4%. The slowdown in growth in 2007 (GDP growth of 4.5%)
and 1H08 was mainly due to the deceleration in domestic credit following the rise in
domestic interest rate (to dampen an acceleration ininflation).
External financing of the country’s large account deficit is becoming more challenging
given the decline in FDI inflows and the global financial turmoil. The macro environment
is more challenging for Turkish banks, because of weak economic growth and ongoing
financial market volatility. Turkish banks have become better capitalised (at 17.5% at
end-June 2008) and less reliant on wholesale funding (13%) since the 2001 crisis. We
believe the asset quality deterioration is the main risk for the sector.
The sector has experienced higher default rates in credit cards and consumer loans in
2007 and 1H08. Although most Turkish banks are expecting higher NPLs for year-end
2008 and 2009, we believe that the impact of a sharp deteriorating macro environment in
the loan asset quality is underestimated. We have to keep in mind that Turkish banks’
loan books remain untested through a full economic cycle and vulnerable to interest rate
hikes.

Business environment,specifically in automobile industry, is not much different

from the global trends. Like in many countries, the car manufacturing industry has been
significantly affected by the global financial crises. In March 2009, Turkey's Automotive
Industry Association (OSD) reported that the automotive production fell by 63% on year
in the first two months of 2009, as exports dropped by 61.6% in the same period.
With a cluster of car-makers and parts suppliers, the Turkish automotive sector - with a
production of 1,147,110 motor vehicles, ranking as the 6th largest producer in Europe
(behind the United Kingdom and above Italy) and the 15th largest producer in the world -
had become an integral part of the global network of production bases, exporting over
USD 22,944,000,000 worth of motor vehicles and components in 2008.
Production,Domestic Retail Sales, Domestic Factory Sales and Export activities –although
supported by Tax Incentives through March-September 2009 period-showed decline in
terms of sales volume and production quantities as compared to 2008 as follows:

Production
The recessionary conditions, which penetrated the market 13 month ago, continue within
context of manufacturing in automotive sector although the pace of contraction has
eased. According OSD figures, the total automotive production -excluding tractors- reads
as 615,995 units, which highlights 36% annual decline in the first nine month of 2009.
Automotive production exhibited a m-o-m hike of 74%
in September 2009 because of the the higher demand before the expiration of tax-
incentive and also the base effect (factory maintenance in the previous month).
Oyak Renault sustained its leadership in total production league with 198K units of
manufacturing. Tofaş and Ford Otosan were the companies, who we accustomed to see
as 2nd and 3rd, respectively.

Domestic Retail Sales

Retail sales have boomed in September before the expiration of the PCT incentive as end
of the month. Domestic retail sales mounted by 125% to 83,385 units in September
compared to August, which is the highest monthly figure since December 2007. Jazzy
September-only figures led passenger car and LCV sales to bid up by 7% y-o-y totally in
the first nine months of 2009 whereas where HCV sales, the less incentive-affected
segment, continued to exhibit a contraction, which narrowed by 46% y-o-y.
Volkswagen continued to manage retail sales team with 26,804 units of imported
passenger cars and LCVs in toto, who is followed closely by Ford with the 25,106 units of
sale. Renault, the accustomed leader in imported LCV sales sold 8,798 units.

Domestic Factory Sales

In parallel with the retail sales figures above, total domestic wholesales swelled by 108%
m-o-m, again mainly due to the dying of the tax incentive at the end of September. On
monthly basis, main contributors to the hike were passenger car and LCV, which felt the
positive impact of the incentive most. On the other hand, surprisingly high demand in the
corresponding month was not enough to sustain a growth for nine months period.
Tofaş continued to be top-notch in domestic wholesale figures, in which the company sold
64,586 units in 9M09, who was followed by Oyak-Renault and Ford Otosan.

Exports
Total automotive exports waned by 44% in the first nine months of 2009, where 435,303
units were exported.Exports rose by 76% in September compared to a month ago just
because of the low exports in August due to factory maintenance. C However
ap acity
dimuniton
continues
Com p
on
anies
yo-m basis.
O wn
Motor
ership
vehicle exports
Partner
retreated
Prod u
by
ct
11%Ve
compared
hicle/Y
ear to the same
month
TOFAŞ of last year. JV FIAT 400.000
Oyak-Renault
O.RENAULT sustainedJVits leadership
RENas
AUan
LT automotive exporter also in 360the
.000 first nine
TOYOTA FDI TOYO TA P.Cars 150.000
months
HYUNDA of
IASSA2009
N by exporting
JV 156,927
HYUunits,
ND AI who was pursued by Tofaş 100.000Ford Otosan
and
H
O N
D A FDI H
O N
D A 50.000
P.CarsTotal 1.060.000
FOR DO T OSAN JV Motor F
Vehicle
ORD Manufacturers 2008 295.000
HYU ND AIASSAN JV HYUND AI 25.000
KAR SA N Local PEUG EOT 25.000
B.M.C. Local Local 22.000
OTO YO L JV IV
E CO 18.000
M.BEN ZT ÜRK JV M.BEN Z CV 13.000
ANA DO LUISUZU JV ISUZU 13.000
TEM SA Local Local 11.000
ASK AM Local Local 9.000
OTO KA R Local LANDR OVER 8.000
M.A.N. FDI MA N 4.000
CVTotal 443.000
Total 1.503.000
The chief problems facing the Turkish automotive industry are the availability of capital
and external demand. A slowdown in foreign financing is weighing on demand conditions
through externally-driven output projects. This is also depressing the domestic credit
market, with the rising cost of banks' external borrowing affecting consumer loans.

BURCU SELCAN
108604034