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On
Correct
Measure
of
Inflatione
174
(1)
ALCHIANAND KLEIN :
17 5
Oo n
WA-j
qA
(int) PA (i,t)
(2)
dt;
i=1
LqB
PAB---
(int) PB
(i,t) dt
EqA
X
o
i=l
(3)
_i= 1
,^oo n
}4/A
(i,t)pA
dt
(i,t)
-
where qB (i, t) representsthe (i, t) element in the minimumcost consumptionvector that yields the same condition A utility at the new conditionB pricevector. If
PAB is greater than one, the nominal money cost of condition A utility has increased;an inflation has occurred.
To emphasizethe intertemporalnatureof this price index and the fact that it does
not refer solely to the cost of the currentmoment's consumptionit could less mis3This model, like the standard microeconomic model under which the usual price indices are
derived, assumes the absence of all information or transaction costs and therefore lacks a
theoretical justification for the value of a price index. (Introduction of uncertainty by the use of
costlessly made contingency contracts (e.g., Arrow [4] ), where all transactors know the true
state of the world when it occurs, is also economically equivalent to a world of perfect information with no rationale for a price index.) We will here ignore this fundamental question and
concentrate solely on defining what is commonly considered to be a fixed welfare price index,
recognizing that the usefulness of this or any other index depends crucially on the particular
information and transaction costs assumed.
4But we cannot, with a fixed quantity weighted index say it has risen. The analysis is exactly
parallel, indeed is identical, to the standard price index theory where q is interpreted as current
services. See Allen [ 2, pp . 19 7-20 3 ] .
176
m
WA-E
oo
PA(]) QA(/)-j
j=l
qA (i,
i=1
t)PA(i,t) dt
_
(4)
where WAis the individual'scurrent nominal wealth and [QA(X)]is the current
sThe currentfuturespriceof the ith consumptionserviceat momentt, p (i l), is relatedto the
future (or forward)price currentlyanticipatedat moment t, f t), by an implicitmarketrate
of interest,r (i, t); p (i, t) = f
t)
t) If interestratesare assumednot to varyoverdifferent
consumptionserviceflows, equation(2) restatedin termsof forward,ratherthan futures,prices
is therefore:
(i,
(i, e-r(is
E
o
qA (i,t)tA(i,
t)
eJorA(t)
dt d
(2)'
i=l
vector of asset quantitiesthat would yield his intertemporalutility maximizingconsumptionservicestream, [qA (i, t)] . If assetsare standardizedin termsof their present and future service flows, the currentvector of asset prices, [PA(f)], can therefore be used as a proxy for currentfuturesprices,PA (i, t).
Whenrelativeprices change, one can, in principle,determinethe vector of assets,
[QB(X)], which will yield the minimumcost iso-utility consumptionservicestream
[qB (i, t)] at the new set of asset prices [PB(X)] andimplicit futuresprices PB(i, t ).
Currentasset prices can thereforebe used to construct our constant welfare price
index
m
j=l
m
SPA
(X)QA (j)
j=l
where WBis the nominalcost of the vector of assetsthat will yield a flow of present
and future consumptionservicesequal in utility to the initial conditionA consumption servicestream.
It is crucial to emphasizethat the vectors [QA (/)] and [QB (/)] must include all
assets-consumer and producer, durable and nondurable, tangible and intangible,
financialand nonfinancial,humanand nonhuman.All sourcesof present and future
consllmptionservicesmust be considered.The vectors do not represehtthe actual
assets held by the representativeindividual,but the asset combination that would
yield the individual'sdesired consumption service flows. An individualmay hold
some assets that yield the exact pattern of consumption service flows that he
demandsover time, e.g., a house that yields his presentand future desiredhousing
service flow. But, more generally, due to transaction costs individualswill hold
some assets not because they yield servicesthat coincide with their consumption
plans, but because they are an efficient form in which to hold wealth. The services
from these assets or the assets themselvesare later sold and exchanged for desired
consumptionservices.Humancapitalis the most obvious example.
Since our asset price index is not constructedon the basis of assetsactuallyowned
by an individualwe are therefore not measuringwhether the individualis better or
worse off after a change in prices, only whether he requiresmore or less money to
reach the sameutility level. We must distinguishbetween actualshifts in the budget
constraintwith correspondingwelfare changesand changesin our measureof inflation WBis comparedto WAto determinethe changein the individual'smoney cost
of a constant utility level. The individual'sactual nominalwealth under conditionB
must be comparedto WBto determineif he is better or worse off under the new set
of prices.An individual,for example,may own a coal mine not becausehe consumes
the coal yielded by the mine over time, but because the coal mine is an efficient
form in which to hold his wealth. He sells most of the coal for income to purchase
other consumption flows, and he intends to sell the mine and retireto an Hawaiian
resort in a few years. If under condition B the only change is an increasein the
price of coal, the individual'scurrentwealth will rise more than B/B;he is better
off while he experiences an inflation. Alternatively,if the price of Hawaiianland
increasesunder condition B, the individual'snominalwealth remainsunchanged(if
he did not own any of the land) while WBincreases;he is worse off and experiences
an inflation. Any combination of inflation or deflation and better off or worse off
is possible.
III. THE SYSTEMATIC BIAS OF CURRENT SERVICE FLOW PRICE INDICES
(for farm real estate and for most of the single-family house data) and on construction costs
(for commercial, industrial and residential structures and for producer and consumer durables).
Reliance on cost data limits our indexes solely to measures of new asset prices. Over long periods
this procedure may not yield biased price estimates of all existing assets but will most certainly
yield misleading current asset price measures in a short-run cyclical context when reproduction
costs are considerably more rigid than market prices. Grebler, Blank, and Winnick [ 17, appendix
C], for example, compare the market "prices" (i.e., owner estimates) of houses with the
construction costs for the 1890-1934 period and conclude that, although there is close conformity between the two series over decade-long periods, market prices fluctuate more widely than
construction costs and there are significant divergencies between the series over shorter periods
of several years.
Market transaction price data for used assets are available in trade publications and dealer
catalogues for cars, trucks, and farm equipment; and less complete price data possibly may be
collected by other trade associations.
l2It should be noted that although our discussion emphasizes that movements in asset and
service prices differ largely because of differing rates of adjustment to cyclical monetary disturbances there may also be a significant secular bias due to changing equilibrium real asset
yields. (The apparent increase in real rates of interest over the years is ignored in our discussion.)
serve Bank of St. Louis (the nominal corporateAaa bond yield minus the average
annual rate of change of the GNP deRatorover the previous24 months) rose about
one percentagepoint during the last half of 1969 and the Elrsthalf of 1970-from
2.3 per cent in June, 1969, to 3.3 percent in June, 1970.l3 This evidencesuggests
that asset prices declined relativeto Sow prices over the period and that movements
in the CPI severely underestimated the deRationaryeffects of the tight money
policy.
Another commonly employed index of inSation is the GNP deflator,which measuresthe price of currentoutput Sows. This price index includes the prices of newly
produced assets but does not include the prices of previously existing items of
wealth and thereforeis conceptuallydistinct from our iso-utility wealth price index.
Therefore,althoughit is useful for other purposes,a currentoutput price index also
provides a biased estimate of changes in the money cost of consumerutility. The
theoretical considerationsoutlined above with regardsto tlle bias in the movement
of the CPIcomparedto a wealth price index also suggesta similarsystematicbias in
the movement of the GNP deflator relative to a wealth price index. Prices of already produced assets will, we conjecture,generallybe more Rexible than pricesof
currentlyproducedgoods, which arebased on currentcosts tllat are often made less
flexible by long-termcontracts. And given the rigidity of currentproductioncosts
relativeto assetprices,a fall in the rate of growth of money decreasesthe profitability (and thereforethe rate) of new asset production.Concernduring 1969-70 about
the rigidityin the rateof rise of currentoutput flow pricesshould thereforebe based
on the evidence this gaveus on the extent of the recession,not on the extent of the
inflation.l4
ALCHIANAND KLEIN : 18 3
adjustment).
The introductionof a vectorof interestrates(to reflectrelativeprices
of currentservicesandwealth)in anincorrectlyspecifieddemandfor "real"money
may tlhenserveas a proxyfor the morecompletepriceof wealthdeflator.Thisimpliesthat use of the incompletecurrentoutputpriceindexas the pricedeflatorin
the demandfor moneyinduces,to someextent,the observedexistenceof a significantinterestrateeffect on the demandfor "real"cash balances. If a wealth
priceindexwereemployedinstead,interestrateswouldthen implicitlyenterin a
moregeneralway, while"the"observedinterestrateeffect wouldbe reducedand
possiblye}.iminated.17
The questionis essentiallyan empiricalone of whetherthe commonlyused
interestrateson financialassetsaresufficientto pickup thisshort-run
"liquidity"
effect of changesin moneyon the relativepricesof existingstocksandflows.The
significanceof the dividendyield in the demandfor money(cf. e.g., Hamburger
[18] may,in fact,be reflectingthe inabilityof the pricesof financialassetsto completelypick up this relativepricemovement.The dividendyield is statisticallysignificantin a quarterlydemandfor money regressionoverthe 1951-71period.18
Alog(Ml/P) = - .0011 + .3096 d\log(Y/P)- .0044 l\log rS - .0359 i\log rD
(4.66)
(0.78)
(2.87)
R2 = .295
D W = 1.06
SE -
.0058
(1.1)
R2 = .297
DW= 1.03
SE =
.0058
(2.1)
rS
R2 = .429
DW= 1.01
SE =
.0138
(2.1)t
Nearlyfifty yearsagoKeynesemphasized
the fundamental
policymistakesrisked
by the use of an inappropriate
priceindex.He claimed[22, pp. 249-25()] Churchhill returnedEnglandto the gold standardin 1925 at the prewarparityprimarily
l9Our hypothesis implies that cycle averagedata would reduce the statistical significance
even further.The annuallyaveragedregressionfor the dividendyield indicatesslightlybetter
results.
alog (M1/P)= -.0129
(1.42)
DW=.871
SE = .0134
(1.1)'
ALCHIANAND KLEIN : 18 5
because Churchillwas "gravelymisled by his experts" who, by using the inappropriate but commonly employed wholesale price index, significantlyunderestimated
the extent of the necessarydeflation.
An analogous situation may exist today. Presently employed price indices are
impropermeasuresof the change in the money cost of an iso-utility consumption
package. Reliance on these biased numbers as an indicator or target of monetary
policy makes it difficult for the monetaryauthoritiesto know what they are doing,
let alone what they should be doing. And action on the basis of these numberscan
lead to inappropriatedecisions;policy changeswill often come too late and move
too far. Recent monetary policy provides an instructiveexample. The authorities'
preoccupationwith the movement of inappropriateflow prices indices to the almost complete exclusion of asset prices was partially responsiblefor a monetary
policy that was too easy for too long a period (1967-68) and then a policy that was
too tight for too long a period(1969) followed by a policy that was once againtoo
easy (1970-early 1971). A crude modification of the CPI, with say, an index of
stock prices would have provideda much more useful indicatorand targetfor price
level stability.22
Our discussion also helps explain the generalreluctanceof contractingpartiesto
adopt escalator clauses. If long-termcontracts were set in "real"terms, i.e., tied to
"the price level," economic uncertainty would seem to be decreased.23But "the
price level" must be made operational by a particular,arbitraryand incomplete,
price index. And the fact that price indices are not generally used in long-term
contracts (or a tabularstandardnot adopted) provides some evidence that the indices are poor measuresof "the price level." Only if the varianceof future anticipated price change is high will the use of, for example, a CPIprice escalatorclause
decreasethe anticipatedvarianceof the realpay off. This may explain the more frequent use of price escalatorsin foreign countries that have experiencedgreatprice
variabilityand the recent trend towardsincreaseduse of price escalatorsin the U.S.
(see [7]).
22Simons [32, p. 349], in discussingthe feasibilityof a monetarypolicy designedto stabilize
a price index, notes that the particularpriceindex chesen "mustbe highly sensitive;otherwise,
the administrative
authoritywould be compelledto postponeits actionsundulyaftersignificant
disturbances."
Realizationof our ignoranceabout movementsof the appropriateisoutilitypriceindex does
not necessarilyimply that we shouldadopt a monetaryrule. Discretionarymonetarypolicy can
still be basedon incomeand employmentstatistics,and, of course,the inappropriateflow price
indices could be used if we knew and took cognizanceof the differinglags of adjustmentof
prices to monetarydisturbances.In this context, our discussionmay supply some supportfor
those that believe that "money market conditions" (i.e., the behaviorof interest rates) is a
relevantshort-runindicatorof monetarypolicy. If the accelerationof the money supplyis not
considered,the inclusion of short-runinterest rate movementswith price movementsmay
provide a much less misleadingmonetary indicator than price movementsalone since price
anticipationsare probablyrelativelyrigid over the short term and thereforeshort-runchanges
in marketinterestrates will be relatedto short-runchangesin realratesand short-runchanges
in the relativepricesof assetsand currentflows.
23And a rationalefor administrativewage-price"jawboning,"that it is necessaryto convince
negotiatingpartiesthat the governmentintendsto reducethe futurerate of inflation,would be
eliminated.
186
188
: MONEY,CREDIT,AND BANKING
ALCHIANAND KLEIN : 18 9
combination of all of these forces? For business corporation stocks, the price
decrease reflects, at least in part) reduced or deferred outputs of future services.
Fewer future cars will be produced or more will be deferred.The stockholdermay
think of anticipatedfuture money earnings;they have fallen not necessarilybecause
future i.e. forward,prices(not futures)are expected to fall but possibly becauseof
reducedanticipatedprofitability-much as if a tree would be expected to yield fewer
apples as less fertilizeris applied in the coming years with lower demarldexpected
for apples. If, however, all prices were expected to be lower in the futureSthe
reduced earningsreflected in lower present stock prices would be truly a reduced
price level of unchangedreal claims.We conjectureboth factorswere presentin the
stock price fall-a reduction in present prices of given future servicesand a reduction in the future anticipatedoutput and earningsrelativeto what it was before.29
In other words real future servicesare reduced and also the presentprice of a unit
of future servicehas decreased.It is the latter we want to measure.
We can attemr)t to approximatethe division of an asset price change into these
two components by estimating changes in real rates of interest. A rise in the real
rate would indicate a fall in future prices relative to current serviceprices. But we
observe only nominal interest rates, which reRect the anticipated future rate of
inflation. Marketestimates of changes in the currentlyexpected rate of change of
future prices can be obtained by examining the ratio of stock prices of net monetary neutral 1rms to bond prices.30Alternatively,we could examine the movement
of money interest rates relativeto forwardprice spreads,quoted on commodity exchanges. The usefulness of these suggestions for obtaining market measures of
anticipatedinflation can only be determinedby furtherempiricalwork.
The empiricalproblemsinvolaredare enormous.But whateverefforts may be made
in this direction and whatever the results,:we believe it is an error to assign all of
the change in common stock and other asset prices to changesin anticipatedfuture
service flows with no changein presentprices of such future flows. . . which is what
is implicitly done now in commonly used price indices that ignore asset prices.
It may be cheaper to make empirical judgments about quality and quantity
changes of current than for future service flows. But what has been added is
essentially a significantlylargernumberof items that shouldbe priced;and weights
for assets in the "typical' man's portfolio of possession of claims must be ascertained. This is not a new theoretical problem-it is an enlargementof an existing
task. And we believe that the marginalcost of improvinga price index along these
lines is less than the marginalgains of improvedmonetary and fiscal policy consequent to less misleadingindicatorsof inflation.
29These two Xctors are related. Since the prices of primaryfactors (especiallylabor) purchased by a firm are generallythe most rigid,an unexpecteddecreasein the prices of future
servicessold by the flrmwill reducefutureanticipatedearnings.
30Movementsin the stock price to bond price ratio will not, however, representsolely a
changingprice anticipationseffect. If the change in the anticipatedrate of changeof prices
alters the demand for and quantity of real cash balancesand hence the savingsfunction, real
interest rates will change.Stock prices of net monetaryneutralfirmswill thereforenot remain
unchangedbut will move in the same directionas the anticipatedrate of price changemovement.
23.
. A Treatiseon Money. Vol. I. London: Macmillan(1930). (1938 reprint).
24. Konus, A. A. "The Problem of the True Index of the Cost of Living,"Econometrica,7 (Jan. 1939), 10-29, (first publishedin Russianin 1924).
25. Kramer,G. H. "Short-TermFluctuationsin U.S. Voting Behavior,1896-1964,"
A mericanPoliticalScience Review, (March,1971), 131-43.
Economics and the Economics of Keynes: A
26. Leijonhufvud,A. On lU:eynesian
Study in Monetary Theorv.New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1968.
27. Meltzer,A. H. "The Demandfor Money:The Evidencefrom the Time Series,"
Journalof Political Economy (June, 1963), 219-246.
28. Mitchell, W. C. The Makingand Using of Index Numbers. 3d ed. Washington:
U.S. Bureauof LaborStatistics,Bulletinno. 656, 1938.
29. Pigou, A. C. The Economics of Welfare.4th ed. (1932), London, 1960.
30. Ruist, E. "Index Numbers: TheoreticalAspects," InternationalEncyclopedia
of the Social Science, 7, New York (1968), 154-159.
31. Samuelson, P. A. "The Evaluationof 'Social Income': CapitalFormation and
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1961.Pp.32-57.
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Congress,Joint Economic Committee, GovernmentPrice Statistics, part 1,
The Price Statistics of the Federal Government:Review, Appraisal and
:Recommendations,305-335.
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Statistics (February,1928), 40-52.
35. Thompson, T. D. and J. R. Pierce, "A Monthly Modelof the FinancialSector,"
presented at the Konstanzer Seminar on Monetary Theory and Policy,
Konstanz,WestGermany,June 1971.
36. Tobin, J. "Money, Capital, and Other Stores of Value," AmericanEconomic
Review, (May, 1961), 26-37.
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38. U. S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, GovernmentPrice Statistics, 2
parts.Washington:1961.