Command

Summary of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN

Nimitz Graybook
7 December 1941 31 August 1945

Volume 7 of 8

Running Estimate and Summary
maintained by CINCPAC staff
covering the period 1 July 1945 to 31 August 1945

The following document is a digitized representation of materials contained in Series I,
Subseries A (original copies), of Coll. 505, Papers of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN,
maintained by the Archives Branch of the Naval History and Heritage Command,
Washington, DC. The Command Summary, commonly referred to as the Graybook
contains the CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet) staffs running
estimate of the situation and summary of command decisions, as well as key dispatches
received or originated by CINCPAC headquarters.

The 8 volumes are paginated as follows:

Volume 1 (7 December 1941 to 31 August 1942): pages 1 - 861
Volume 2 (1 September 1942 to 31 December 1942): pages 862 1262
Volume 3 (1 January 1943 to 30 June 1943): pages 1263 1612
Volume 4 (1 July 1943 to 31 December 1943): pages 1613 1830
Volume 5 (1 January 1944 to 31 December 1944): pages 1831 2485
Volume 6 (1 January 1945 to 1 July 1945): pages 2486 3249
Volume 7 (1 July 1945 to 31 August 1945): pages 3250 3548
Volume 8 (Selected dispatches concerning the period 30 December 1941 30 April 1942
and pertaining to the Battle of Midway): pages are not sequentially numbered. Note:
Volume 8 contains dispatch copies, many of which were poorly reproduced at the time of
compilation. Some portions are illegible.

Digitization of the Nimitz Graybook was carried out in 2012 as a cooperative effort between
the Naval War College and the Naval History and Heritage Command. Digitization was
overseen by the Naval War College Library. Funding was provided by the Naval War College
Foundation, Newport, Rhode Island, with donations received from the Naval Order of the
United States and several individual Foundation members.

This PDF file contains a searchable text layer generated by OCR at the time of
digitization. The OCR text is uncorrected and cannot be relied upon as an accurate
transcript, but is included for whatever search utility it may provide. A future digital
edition may include a complete and accurate transcription.

Any previously classified content herein was reviewed and declassified appropriately at the
Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, in accordance with U.S. federal
declassification authority. This document is in the public domain.

United States Naval War College, Newport, RI
2013

GRAYBOOK SU&ARY

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DECLASSIFI .--:.

1 July: (Guam date)

f!ECl.ASSIFI0

GABILAN ( SS 252) tracked properly illuminated hospital ship approxi.matezy

300 miles southeast of TOKYO, suspected to be enroute to MARCUS or VvAKE .
For the third successive day there have been almost no plane sightings of
ships among south KORE-~ Islands.
Tvio more submarine contacts are reported; one by a merchantman southeast of
the MARIANAS near yesterday's FC contact, the other near PAP..ECE VELA by a PC escorting

a convoy.

TF 31 dissolved this date and all local defense functions assumed by Commander
RYUKYUS. TF 32 remains in the area as covering force. Composition 3 OBB, CA/CL and
escorting destroyers. CTF 32 has overall command of other 3rdFlt forces in the area,
including TF 39 (Mine Flotilla), TG 30.5 {Search and Recco. Group - FA~Y 1), and unit
of 30.9 (Logistics Support Group). TF 3B departed LSYTE today for exercises preparato~ to extended operations.
573 B-29s were over the Empi1e last night on bombing and mining missions.
159 aircraft struck KUMAMOTO, 136 aircraft hit SHTIIONOSEKI, 100 aircraft were over
UBE and 154 bombed KURE. One plane \vas lost en.route to the target, 6 of the crew
have been reported rescued. 21t B-29s mined the east entrance to the SHil!IONOSEKI
STRAITS; the NJJ'JAO and 1?USHIKI areas were also mined.

142 Mustangs attempted to strike the NAGOYA airfields. HliMI\MATSU was the only

field hit due to bad weather conditions over the other targets. 12 aircraft from the
srune group hit ~~!ASHI11W~ seaplane base destroying 1 hangar, 1 SCL, 4 SD; other light
vessels were damaged. 2 planes were lost, 1 pilot rescued.

In the RYUKYUS on the 1st 21 B-25s bombed CHIRl~ airfield in southern KYUSHU.
P-47 s on continuous CAP over KYUSHU destroyed 4 seaplanes and flamed 1 Betty. Neutralization raids were carried out against other islands in the RYUKYU chain.

7 P-47s escorted by 1 Privateer left 1 DD and.l meditun freighter burning in

HAJIGCHU''J BAY. 2 3000-ton freighters were damaged off the ST;'! coast of KYUSHU.
FAW 1 planes sank 2 small ships and da.r:rlaged 1 in the YELW,J SEA~

During June search plo.nes of the 7thFlt destroyed 161 ships totalling 30,320
tons and damaged 209 totalling 25,485 toris., In addition 9 enemy aircraft r;ere destroyed.
Enemy aircraft destroyed in the POA since 18 March (18 11ar. - 30 June, Incl)
total 4,941. 5 enemy planes destroyed by TG 99.2 since 1 July.
COUPHIBSPAC ZIJJ+-35 (pink) outlines tentative agreement with FE.AF and 5th AF
for e.t!lployment of l.1Iarine Air Warning Squadrons in OLYMPIC.
GlNCPAC ADV 010151 (pink) outlines action to be taken to alleviate critical

backlog of shipping at OKINA:'JA.,

010500 (::>ink) :recom11ends category of defense of HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
.
C01\tfH . 4:dSEAFRON
be reduced to Category of Defense A vrith modifications.
CIFCPOA ~JJV 010ti42 dir~cts thc.t C'rF 93 c~n~inue to have responsibility f~']/
neutralization of Jap islands ln the Central PacJ_flc.

,f;J.,

'

!f250
.

2 July (Guam date)

Commanding Officer of SPROSTON (DD 577) definitely claims sinking a midget
submarine on 28 J1me ~
MUR!lJI.Y (DD 576) is enroute to intercept and board Japanese hospital ship believed to be Tl\.K.J\.SAGO :0JA1l.U. This vessel may be headihg for :vAKE. Special air search
has also been initiated.
TF 38 is conducting

exercis~s

in PHILIPPINE SEA enroute to fueling rendezvous.

TIGRONE arrived at GUA1'. vdth 23 survivors transferred to her from three other
boats. Added to the record total of 28 survivors which she earlier picked up and tti.sembarked at IWO, this makes a total rescue of 51 fliers broueht in by one boat on one
patrol.
493 B-29s hit Empire industrial targets on 1 July. Fighter opposition was
nil to weak at all targets. At UBE fires were visible to 125 miles on withdrawal.
A 24 plane CAP maintained continuously over southern KYUSHU during daylight
on the 2nd shot dovm L~ Zekes and h Tonys.
FA1V' 1 planes off western K'rl.JSHU probably sank 1 S..f1.. S and 3 SD on the lst; on
the 2nd 1 SC was destroyed off KUNS_\N and 1 SD d.a.rnaged. In attacks near CHUSAN ISU...ND
7 P-47s escorted by a PB4Y-2 destroyed 1 SA, left 1 FTC burning and darn.aged 1 ene.nw
aircraft on the ground. From 25 June to 1 Juzy inclusive planes of FA:.l 1 sank 15,230
tons of enemy shipping and damaged 9, 510 tons. 11le cum.ulative totals are 137 ,ff75 tons
sunk, 138.L1-00 tons damaged, with 37 ene.rey aircraft destroyed and 26 ene.rey aircraft
damaged. During. the week 3 PB4Y-2s vdth crews were lost.
TAF planes_, in addition to KYUSHU and CHINA Coast attacks, continued hitt:ing
ISHIGjKI and KIKAI airfields. MAG-31 is now at CIIT , ru Field and MAG-JJ~o is at AWA.SE
Field, both on OKINAWA.
CirTCAFPAC 30lh..07 recommends to JCS continuation of existing Area Petroleum
Officers to control theater petrolewn requirements.
RICHA."IZDSON 012010 announces that effective 1 July ComGenPOA-ComGen Hawaiian
Department assumes the title ComGen.AFMid.PacJtt

CINCPAC ADV 020021 directs MURRAY (DD 576) to intercept and board hospital
ship suspected enroute to ~JAKE .
CINCPOA ADV 020255 (~ink) recorrm1ends ComPhibsPac and ComGen 6th Arrey be
charged jointly with embarkation of OLYMPIC lend forces.
CI ~TCFDA ADV 020908 (pink} expresses no objection to designation of 7th and
27th Divisions in OKINA~'lA as GHQ reserve for OLYHPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 020913 (pink) requests CINCAFPAC 1 s concurrence in proposal for

providing Port Director Units at all ports in KYUSHU.

~-

3 July (Guam date)

LAPON (ss 260) sighted a hospital ship headed for CHICHI

JilL~ on 2 July.

The evening of 2 July appro.xiraa.tely 275 miles NNV'J of WAKE a party from USS
liUERAY boarded the Jnp AH T.AKASAGO IJARU enroute to H..t\KE and finding no reason to
detain her directed her to contin11e her voyage.
The night of 3 July 484 B-29s
Photographs taken on the 2nd show the
areas which were attacked on the 29th
SASEBO 17.9% and SHll,{ONOSEKI 36%. In
re"Oorted is 1.755 square miles, which
gets. The assessment is not complete

hit TOKUSHD.t\, KOCHI, T.\K.l\.MATSU and HUf&JI.

following percentage destruction of built up
vdth incendiaries: MOJI 28.S%, NOBEOKA 36%,
the 4 targets here assessed, total destruction
is 28% of the total built-up areas in the tarbecause of smoke.

On 2 July 56 P-47 s protected 5 photo PB4Ys over KYUSHU, driving off 18 Oscars
after they had damaged 1 Liberator and v-rounded 2 crevnnen. The 24 plane F4U CAP was
over KYUSHU for 2 hours prior to noon, apparently, and not during all of daylight
as planned. On 3 July 26 P-4?s hit the Kanoya airfield control tower, strafing barracks and administration buildings, and firing 6 single-engine aircraft.

Off TSUSHIMA ISLl\.ND a FAW l Privateer destroyed l SD by bombing and strafing

on the 2nd. On the 3rd l SD was sunk NE of SiUSHU TO, and Ff.L'J lS planes probably
sank 1 and damaged 1 SD off ,HACHIJO JiliA.
In attacks on the 2nd against SAKISHIMA 1 TBM was shot dovm by MIYAKO AA. A
Dumbo picked up all members of the crew. On the 3rd 32 F4Us hit ISHIGAKI, exploding
1 single-engine enemy aircraft on the ground, and scoring a direct hit on a gun position.
MURRAY (DD 576) 031310 reports boarding the Jap AH
examination directing her to proceed on her voyage.

4 July

T~T\.~SAGO M1L'tU

and after
~

~lt t ;
(Guam date)

{)J

TF 38 is enroute to its first rendezvous, with task groups exerclslng independently. , Units of TG 30.8 departed MARIANAS enroute to rendezvous. TF 39 starts
S\V'eep of area "JUNEAun tomorrow. TF 32 and CVE of TG 32.1 are in support. British
oilers are enroute to their fueling rendezvous.

On the 4th, approximately S20 planes were over the E..rnoire on attack, escort,
mining and reconnaissance missions. This total includes about 500 B-29s at T.tlKPJ.1ATSU,
KOCHI, TOKUSHIM:A and Hil.f.EJI, 30 B"":'29s mining, 132 P-5ls over TOKYO airfields, 32
P-47 s to KYUSHU, 4B P-5ls scheduled for trrtJSHU, and 104 fighters scheduled to escort
photo planes over I~fUSHU (cor~irmation of last 2 missions have not been received).

Enemy aircraft opposition to the P-~1 strike was slight and only 1 Jap plane
was shot down. On the ground 8 enemy aircraft were destroyed, Lr. orobably destroyed
and 20 damaged.
On the 3rd 26 B-25s and 32 F4Us attacked CHIR.AN drome and dispersal areas .

48 P-5ls of the 5th AF sweot the western coast of KYUSHU, losing 1 pla'Yle.

North of the YAJ:JGTZE !L1VER mouth a convo;y of 2 large DD, 1 small DD,
1 TB was attacked on the L~th by 8 P-47s, 6 PBH c.nd 2 Privateers. Rocket
fir~d the small DD and strafino f i red 1 PC and dai aged 1 DD and the TB. PBlls
torpedoes from 4-5,000 yards at a ltitude of 100-150 feet, getting good runs,
hits.
- Cont i nued

FTC

2 PC, l
hits
fired 6
b{~.PP"'i
v L J. :::.

Jul~ (Guam date)

j.

(Cont 'd)

COl.r F"'""'Ui' 040540 recommends that all air-sea rescue services from OKINA:.fA
be operated by FEAF.
COMINCH & CNO 041350 (pink) requests review of requirements for artificial
harbors for CORONET
Fleet Admiral Nimitz returned to GUAM from the West Coast.

5 Jul.y (Guam date)

TAKi\.SAGO ::ARU departed ~\lL\.KE at 1600/5th and was intercepted 2~ hours later
and boarded by liURRAY (DD 576). HURRAY reported that the ship had 974 patients, all
bona fide. 490 were Navy, 4E34 .Army. 15~~ vvere tuberculosis, J.4 men were wounded, and
the rest were suffering fron serious malnutrition. Estimated 157; nould not survive
the voyage., 25% might be restored to duty in 60 days. Host certain no stores vrere
Destination believed. YOKASUKA. No aJJied personnel aboard. The ship was
landed.
directed to continue her voyage.
On the 4th 48 P-5ls of the 5th AF swept KYUSHU, meeting no interception but
some AA. 96 P-47s escorted 4 photo PB4Ys over KYUSHU through 8-10/10 clouds. There
Vias no interception. On the 5th 32 P-5ls of the 5th AF were over KYUSHU from 12001410, from 10,000 feet to the deck. 6 Georges intercepted, 4 of which were shot
dovm, with the remaining 2 probably destroyed. There were no P-51 losses.

21> B-29s laid 228 mines in the western entrance to SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, in
M:AIZURU and in Fill~AIOJJA H~m30R (NlN HONSHU).
103 P-5ls struck TOKYO airfields on the 5th. On the ground 5 enemy aircraft
were destroyed and 10 damaged. Hangars and installations were fired at SHIMODATE,
and small and nedium shipping targets were damaged south of TOKYO BAY. There was no
2 P-5ls were damaged by AA.
en~ air opposition.

3 pairs of Privateers roamed over southern and central KOREA, destroying or

damaging 5 bridges, blocking 4 tmmels, destroyed 2 and damaged h locomotives, damaged a power house, a radio station and 2 lighthouses. An FTD was sunk south of
FArJ 1 PBM:s sank 1 300-ton AK off the YLNGTZE and damaged a lighthouse
S.~ISHU TO.
and barracks vrith bombsa Off GOTO RETTO (western KYUSHU) 1 SD was sunk '1nd 1 damaged.
30 F4Us hit OKINO-ERABU and 24 F4Us :plus 18 TBMs hit Vlan Airfield at KI

. . now believed headed for YOKOSUKA. rather than HOKTf~_oo. Hovrever

TAG. SA.K ... lAllli
she started out on course 330_, ~Teed 15, and this course and s1eed was confirmed by
a :)lane sighting at noon yesterday_.
TF 39 the Mine Flotilla in area JUl:EAU, has been maintaining radio silence,
and has apnar~11.tly not been discovered>) TF 32 has deployed in a covering position
to the vrestward of OKIN".:\~'!A .. T:;' 38 will pc.ss south of rt!O tomorrow towards its fueling
rendezvous on the 8th uith TG 30 ., 8 .,
Sub sweep starts at 1900 tomorrow :)rj or to run-in.
- Continued -

AUGUST ( GCT)

24 0120

CINCPAC ADV HQ to CQM3RDFLT

Your 2ll415 desire anchorages be assigned to ships concerned as follows

unless there are compill.ing reasom to contra.I7. F 68 ICING GEORGE 5TH
F 69 DUKE OF YORK F 70 SOUTH DAKOTA F 71 MISSOORI F 72 IWO F 85

ANCON F 86 TETON. Other ships in anchorage F as desired avoiding

assignment in battleship column to an:y types except battleships. Advise.

24 0156

CD1CPAC ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC, CCH3RDLFT Info OOMINCH, CTF

COM7THFLT

38, CTF 39,

Nominate a carrier division consisting of 2 CV and 1 CVL for temporary

duty in 7th Fleet.
25 Ol45

CINCf!AC ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC. C01QRDFLT Info C9MINCH, CTF

COM 7th FLT, COMOARDIV-2

.3 8, OTF 39,

240156. Since BasiLe Post War Plan contemplates maintenance 1 carrier

division in Asiat.ic waters, duty may be of considerable duration.- It
is my present intention that division be conrnanded by Rear Admiral A C
Davis Com.CarDiv 5 with ships best prepared for extended service

l(r

24 lSll

CINCAFPAC to \YARCOS info CINCPAC ADVANCE, OOMGENCHINA.

ex 86421.

COMGENCHINA CFBX 5404 da.ted 21, CINCPAC 2l.OS1S to COMINCH and JD3' CX
33830 dated 15th are references. This radiogram answer .WX 50 one 81,
19th and \VX 53744, 24th.

Para. The guiding consideration in the utilization ot resources,

part;icularly ot amphibious shipping, for occupation operations along the
CHINA OOAS'l' mnst be that 1st priority is given to the occupation ot JAPAN
to the fullest extent of the resources required. KOREA has 2md priority.
It !! possibl.e that after the occupation starts a delay mq be permissible
atter the 1st Phase movEments, however, the present time planning should
be firm on sending the 2nd phase d.ivision,s with the possible exception ot
1 division 1n KOREA, which would give a total of J.6 divisions in JAPAN a.nd
2 in KOREA with a possibl.e availability of 1 division for another location
as indicated in my CX 338.30. CDICPAC representatives indicated that the
heavy availability of amphibious shipping by the 3oth of Sept,ember would
practic~ eliminate a.ey .problem ot priority since at that time there woul
be a 14 division lift available. On this basis and within the limitation
indicated in the lst paragraph the concern ot CINCAFPAC in his 21.0818 is
general:cy- concurred in.
Para. Since conference with representatives ot CINCPAC and COMGBNCHmA
information has been received that DARIE}l is now occupied by Russians. It
therefore appears that the marine contingent specified in CINCPAC 210818
would be a sufficient part#icipation of u.s. troops along the CHINA COAST.
CINCAFPAC agrees to the relief' otll Div of the 5thPhibCorps from JAPAN
about October 1. It will be replaced by l on the Philippine divisions it
practicable or by l being redeplqyed.
Para. The agreement indicated in para A of CFBX 5404 is believed to
interrupt the deployment into JAPAN to give priority to a movement into
CHINA untill5 phase 1 Divisions have been placed in JAPAN.

- continued-

3361

...

- continued -

24 1511 CINC.AFPAC to WARCOS into CINCPAC @VANCE, OOMGENCHINA ( Cont d)

Para. Regarding repatriation of J apa.nese to the main islands of

JAPAN, rate of increase and quGta allocations to all commanders JJlUq(;
necessari~ be determined by this ~_eadqua.rliers in the light or the
overall situation in the Far East existent at the time involved.
25 0608 SUPREME COJD!ANDER .FOR THE
COMGEN FEAF COMGm 8TH ARMY

CHINA PASS TO GENERALISSDIO

CG TH ARMY CG lOTH ARMY
CH.AMKETS COUGm XXIV CORPS, OOHPHIBSPAC, COM5THFL'l',
MILFORES, CG AFWESPAC, WARCOS.

PASS TO GEN

ex 36535.

Refer li13' Z529 too 210343, Z 531 too 210401, Z 532 too 210425 am CX
3565 too 220645 stating requirements SUpreme Commander for the Allied

Porrers for acceptiDg surrender of JAPAN. Due to typhoRic cenditions alJ.

dates specified herein for operations on the 26 Auguat and thereafter are
postponed 48 hours. New Schedule: Movements of advance party by air and
prel.imi.na.ry naval movements on 28th; air movements in force and nafil.
landings on .30th; SUrrender ceremony- on 2nd September; advance part;y
landing KANOYA .3rd September; landing in force KANOYA 4th September.

25 0907 CINCP.AC ADV to COl{[NCH. into 0mCAFPAC, CnJCPAC PEARL. COMGENPOA, OOMGmUBASTAF.

.c;.

In view of the tennination of 'the war with JAPAN,

ear~

demobilization

or Armed Forces ani prospective post war developnents of advanced bases

in the Pacific Area it is recmmended that JCS directive 823/5 dated 7
Octoier 1944 be revised and all logistic support for the strategic air
forces be made a responsibility of appropriate Arnr:3' agency.

25 ll.Ol CINCSWPA _to CINCPAC

APV

info WARQOS, COllZTHFLT.

ex .36614.

Coneur in proposal for the transfer of responsibill.ti senior naval

officer Southwest Pacific Area contained in COlllTHFLT 180140. Com Allied
Naval Forces will terminate when Southern command area. is transferred to
British now scheduled for 2 September 45. This answers your 22CI'/03.

25 1505 CmCAFPAC to CINCPAC/POA ADVANCE.

The rate and timing of repatriating Ja}Bnese from. any area. must of
necessity be determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
( z 572) since determination will be govemed. by conditions en sting in
JAPAN after occupation thereof the urgency or Japanese repatriation from
WAKE and MARCUS as incicated your 2.32217Z (GGT) must be govermd according:cy-. In artS' case it is deemed inadvisable to :initiate repatriation action

prior to .3 September.

AUGUST ( GCT)

3362

25 1457 THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS to mRDFLT (HALSEY) into
CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

ex .36686.

Reference your 240219Z ( GCT) it is not believed advisable for .3rdFlt

to undertake any unil.ateral action re assistanQe and evacuation of prison
ers of War TOKYO BAY AREA. Action being taken by this headquarters to
eff'eet coordination in this matter.

m into OINCPAC ADV. ACNB LAHD FORCE HQ MELBOURNE. APV

LAND FORCE HQ MORATAI, GOC 1ST AUSTRALIAN ARMY LCE, NOIC NmV GUINEA., NOIC
DARWIN, NOIC SYDNEY, RAFT RAD, GLORY, HART, SBNO 14ANUS, KANANG, CEF, FONA.P

2S 0210 CINCBW to CTF

,

ADMTI VA(Q).

At request of ACNB following forces have been allocated to cooperate

with Arlq Forces under direction of GOC 1~ Australian Arlq Group for tald.Dg
surrender ot RABAUL.
Para. Subject to conf'irmation of requirauent and to no unforseen
commitments the same force will be available for OCEAN and NAURU.
Para. lffective immediate:cy-, TG lll.S composed of GLORY, CAPlAIN
A.W. BUZZARD CTG, and 2 sloops selected from HART, ERNE, BLACK SWAN,
AMETHYST.

Para. HART report ships selected and. na.me of senior officer to CINC
info other addressees of this signal.
25 062S CTG lll.2 to CINC:ePF info CTF ll2, CTF ll.l. SACSEA, CINC EI. CINCPAO ADV
ADMIRALTY, JSM, SUPRFliE COMIB ALLIED PCWERS, GENERAL GAIRDNER, CTG m.3

erG lll.lt.

Intend to sail 'l'G lll.2 to arrive off HONGKONG daylight 28 August.

2. Endeavor 1fil1 be made to bri.Dg Japanese Naval. and Uilita17 repres~
tatives on board on 29 August and to enter HONGKONG barbour as soon as
arrangements have been made to preserve law and order.
3. Final surrender to take place on lst September subject to the surrender to the SUprane Conmander having been effected.
4. Intend Task Group Follows minesweepers into harbour whilst carriere

1.

provide air cover.

26 0901 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COll7THFLT

Your 250229. Contemplate use of ship with her Japmese crew and u.s.
Prize crew. Do not desire recondition her. Can she make trip to WAKE or
MARCUS and carey tall load passengers from there to JAPAN.
26 JA09 SCAP to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.
CREGO 10016.
Treaty terms provide tor disarming eJ181V forces yao.r 252202. This si
construed to include swords, pistols, dirks and so forth ot Japanese Offic
rs and men. At surrender ceremonies it is the policy to require Japanese
Officers to attend without arms thus avoiding the tender of these weapons
from the vanquished to the victors but as weapons they should form a
component part of the disarmament program.
AUGUST ( GCT)

33 63

'lllltP

26 Olll SOAP to .CG 10TH ARMY. CG USASTAF, US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW& WAR DEPT1
CG AFWESPAC, JAPANESE IMPERIAL GENERAL HEAOOUARTERS info CG -TH ARMY,
00 8TH ABllY, CG FEAF SOVIET HIGH COMMAND.
I

In carrying out the provisions ot paragraph 1, subpara (E), ttGeneral

Order Nwnber l., Military and Naval 11 , advance copy of which was handed your
representative in MANILA 20 August l.945, it is desired that seniro Japanese
Commanders and all ground, sea, air, and anxjl iary forces in certain areas
to~ surrender to designated representatives of the Commander in Chief,
United states ~ Forces, Pacific, subseque~ to General surrender of
Japanese Ar.med Forces at TOKYO, as follows:
A. In the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, to the Commanding General, United states
~ Forces Western Pacific, whose headqu.arters are at MANILA, at a time
and place designated by him. ( z-585).
B. In the RitJKYUS, to the Commanding General, Tenth United states
~, whose headquarter are at OKINAWA, at a time and place designated by
him.
c. In KOREA, south of ,3S..OO north latitude, to the Coumanding General
United states A.rtrrr Forces in KOREA (CoDIDanding General 24th United states
Corps), whose headqua.rters are at OKINAWA, soon move to KOREA, at a time
and place designated by him.
It is desired that the senior Japanese Commander in each of the above
areas make contact with the above dwsignated co.umander concerned by the
most expeditious means for preliminary instructions providing tor accompllsll
ment ot such surrenders on or im.ediate:cy- after 2 September 194.5.

26 04.34 CHIEF
Memo

SI~AL ~FFICER

GHQ AFPAC to CINCPAC ADV A'rl'N OOlllOOORE STONE.

994.

Represmative ot GHQ AFPAC (Lieutenant Colonel H. H. Schenck) will

board USS MISSOURI in TOKIO BAY to install and operate VHF radio telephone
and telegraPh equipnent and message center for CINCA.FPAC. Request name
of officer aboard I!SSOURI that Colonel Schenck should contact.

26 2008 WiRCOS to CDICAFPAC into USASTAF, CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

WARX

55352.

Designation of COMGEN lOTH ABllY to act !or CINCAFPAC in receipt ot

surrender in RYUKYUS per your ex ,36856 is not understood here in view
ot the provisions of paragraph 1 D, General Order Number 1, transmitted
to you in WARX 4996l. ot l.5 August and quoa.ted in your Z515 which direct
Japanese in RYUKIUS to surrender to CINCPAC. Advise.

AUGUST ( GCT)

33 64

25 1555

COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COM 12 & 13. CINCPAC PEARL HQ,
COMCRUPAC, OOMDESPAC. CINCLANT, ComESSEAFRON, COlLURLANT, COMAIRPAC,
COMBA.TRO!l 1 & 2, COMCRULANT, OOMDESLANT, COM ll.

In connection with selection ot ships for early return to tentative

ultimate post-war disposition of following units under your command is

furnished for planning purposes. Ships under construction or repair and

ships in Lant are not included. Refer lq'Dis 122358 for establishment
reserve Fleets. Schedule of build up of reserve Fleets novr in mail to

you.

1. Battleships Pacific Fleet.

A. Active. INDIANA (BB 58}. MASSACHUSETTS (BB 59). ALABAMA (BB 60)
IWOA (BB 61) Nm JERSEY BB 62. MISSOURI (BB 63). . Reserve Fleet.
COLORADO (BBI+5). M!BYLAND (BB 46) WEST VIRGINIA. (BB 4S).
C. Decommission . Pac West Coast. PENNSYLVANIA (BB38)
2. Battleships AtJ.a:rrt,ic Fleet.
A. Active. NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55). WASHINGroN (BB ;6). SOUTH DAKOTA
( BB 57) . WISOONSIN (BB 64)
.
B. Reserve Fl.eet. Nm'f MEXICO (BB 410) . IDAHO (BB 42). TENNESSEE (BB
43). CALIFORNIA (BB 44).
C. DecaiiDission in Lant. ARKANSAS (BB 33). NEW YORK (BB 34). TEXAS
(BB .35). NEVADA (BB ,36). JliSSISSIPPI (BB 41).
3. Carriers PaeFlt.
A. Active. BOXER (CV 2l). ANTIETAK (CV 36). SHANGRI LA. (CV 3$).
B. Reserve Fleet. mSEX (CV 9). YORKTCMN (CV 10). INTREPID (CV ll)
HILL (CV 17). BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31). INDEPmDENCE (CVL 22). BET.T.EA.U WO
( CVL 24) OONPENS ( CVL 25) SAN JACINTO ( CVL .30)
c. DecOIIIDi.ssion Pao West Coast. SARATOGA (CV .3).
4. Carriers La.rxl# F1t.
B. Reserve Fleet. FRANKLIN (CV 13). RANDOLPH (CV 1;). WASP (CV 18)
HANOOCK (CV 19). BENNINGTON (CV 20) MONTEREY (OVL 2lS). LANGLEY (CVL Z/)
CABOT ( CVL 28) BATTAN ( CVL 29)
C. Decanmission in taut. RANGER (CV 4). ENTERHUSE (CV 6).
;. Cruisers PacFlt.
A. Active. BALTIMORE (CA 68). BOSTON (CA 69). QUINCY (CA. 71). SAINT
PAUL ( CA 73). CHICAGO ( CA 1:36) PAS ADENA ( CL 6;). SPRINGFIELD ( CL 66)
TOPEKA (CL 67). VICKSBURG (CL 86). DULUTH (CL g"T). liiAMI (CL 89) ASTORIA
( CL 90). OELAHOYA CITY ( CL 91). TUSCON ( CL 98) AMSTERDAM ( CL lOJ.) WILKES
BARRE ( CL 103) ATLANTA ( CL 104). DAYTON ( CL 105)

B.Reserve Fleet. PITTSBURGH (CA. 72). SAN DIEGO (CL 5.3). SAN JUAN (CL
54) SANTA FE (CL 60) BIRMINGHAM (CL 62). MOBILE (CL 63). VINCENNES (CL 64)

BILOXI (CL 80) OAKLAND (CL 95). FLINT (CL 97) _,

6. Cruisers Lal:ltFlt.
A. Active. ALASKA (CB 1). GUAM (CB 2). COLUMBIA (CL SO) CLEVELAND (CL
55) MONTPEW:ER (CL 57) DENVER (CL 58).
B.RESERVE FIEEI'. CHESTER (CA Z/). rmv ORLEANS (CA 32) PORTlAND (CA 33)
MINNEAPOLIS ( CA 36) TUSCALOOSA {CA '51) .SAN FRANCISCO ( CA 38). WICHITA ( CA
45). NASHVILLE (CL 4.3). PHONIX (CL 46). BOISE (CL 47). sr LOUIS (CL 49)
LOUISVILLE ( CA 2S).

AUGUST (GCT)

33 65

- continued -

C. Decommission in Lant. DE:l'ROIT (CL 8). RICHMOND (CL 9). CONCORD

( CL 10) TRENTON ( CL 11) PENSACOLA ( CA 24) SALT LAKE CITY ( CA 25)
7. Destroyers PacFlt.
A. Active. DesRons 10, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 6;.
B. Reserve Fleet. DesRons 21, 45, 46 less DD 552. 47 less DD 555.

48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 less DD 586 and 481 plus DD 578, 595, 596.
c. Decommission in PacWest Coast. DD's 514, 552, 481, 586, 639, 714.

a. Destroyers Lant Flt.

A .Active. DesRons 50, 57, 66 less nD 714.
B. Reserve Fleet. DesRons 7, 12, 1.3, 14, 16, 19, 22, 2.3 less DD 5l4,

24, 25.

c.

Decommission Lant.

DesRons 2,

.3, 4, S, 6,

.31 DD

555.

26 2220 COJINORPAC to CDlCPAC ADV info COMSUBPAC CINCPAC PEARL COWERVPAC

COMAIRPAC, COJQRDPHIBFOR, OOM3RDFLT, CTF t S 9Q, 91, 92,42
Plan depart 30 and 31 August with forces present this area as indicated
D\f oporder 9-45 in mail today. Route through AMCHITKA pass via lat 49-ll
N long 17 .3-00 E and point BUGLE rendezvousing with minesweepers 30 miles
south point ARGOSY 0.300Z(GCT) 6th September. Will~ 6th and 7th conduct
minesweeping operations to clear channel eastem TSUGARU STRAIT to OJ.IINA'l'O
anchorage 7th, and it completed enter OMINA'l'O with Task Force 92 on 8th und~
air cover provided by Task Force 49 operating vicinity route po~t CAZETTE.

Zl 0711 CO}QRDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE into CINCAFPAC.

Contacted Japanese Destroyer HATUZAKURA otf o-sHIJlA 0800 this date
carrying nav&l emissaries, pilots, and interpreters.
Para. Took staf't Captains Y. Takasaki of YOKOSUKA ani I. otani from
naval head.qua.rters TOKYO plus 2 interpreters on board MISSOURI. Received
satisfactoey preliminary' information from naval emissaries and informed
them of the time schedule and requirements ot the occupation operations.
PreJ iminary arrangements satisfactoey and no untoward incidents. :Minesweeping by elements of Task Force 31 commencing this date.
Para. Intend SAN DIEGO and Destroyers anchor ott YOKOSUK.A 2S August
if sweeping operations far American Aerial. Mines satisfactory completed.
CTF .31 obtains .further complete information tram Ja}:Rnese naval emissaries

tomorrow.

Para. Further inteiXl moving heavy ships into TOKYO BAY 29 August if
minesweeping has progressed sa.tisfaetoriJ.1'. H-Hour set for 1000 I(-9)

:t

Dq ~ August

Para.

Will establish liaison with Ar.nv advance part,- by air from

COWPENS to ATSUGI a.tter advance part;y arrives.

Para.
dispatch.

Arrangements incident to your arrival covered by separate

3366

,.
27 2312 COMINCH AND ONO to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEARL, COMSOPAC.

War Department agrees maintain token garrisons your 240205 AITUTAKI and

P.ENRYHN pending completion state Department negotiations.

28 f1700 CDiCBPF to QINCAFPAC info ADMIRALTY, CTF lll, SACSEA, CTF

CnlCPAC ADV, RAFT, CTG m.2, CTG lll.3.

l'/

VA(Q), CINCEI,

After consultation with Major General Harrison of staff of SACSEA understand that your intention is that allied OOW and intemees CHINA, FORMOSA
and JAPAN~ in the first plaee be taken by USN transportation to
PHILIPPINES for rehabilitation prior to repatriation, and that CINC AFPAC

accepts responsibility for receiving them there.

Para. Propose that (A) CINC BRIT PAC FLT accepts responsibility for
conveying all allied row internees from HONGKONG to J.UNILA. (BM ER) SACSEA
arrange in conjunction with the INDIA government for the repatriation or
all INDIAN personnel from MANILA to INDIA.
Para. If para 2 (A) is agreed intend to start this movement as soon
as you can informme that POW and internes can be received at MANILA.

ex 10428.

The Japanese Imperial government has been intormed that:" The senior
. Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within
the ~AMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH moo-cHINA south of 16-00
north latitude, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLAND INDIES, Nm GUINEA, BISMARCKS,
and the SOWMONS, shall surrender to the Supreme Conmander Allied Powers,
south EAST ASIA command, and to the Commanding General, Australian Forces
as later designated"
Para. Ex:aet breakdCRm of responsibility with the areas listed for the
acceptance of turrender of Japanese Armed Forces located therein, was to
have been arranged between Mountbatten aDi the Australians. The Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers has chapged with preparation of the details
or execution based on the agreement made.
Para. Since only a partial agreement has been reached covering but a
portion of the areas listed and because timely prel:imina.ry arrangements must
be made for and within the entiBe area, the Japanese Imperial Government is
being informed that paragraph l(C) of General Order Number 1 has been
amended to read as follows: tt(l). The Senior Japanese Commander and all
ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA,
THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA SOUTH of 16-00 north latitude, MALAYA, SUMATRA,
JAVA, , LESSER SUNDAS {including BALI, LOMBOK and TIMOR), BOERCE, CERAM, AMBON
KAI, AROE, TANIBAR and islands in the ARAFURA SEA, CELEBES, M.AIMAHERA and
DUTCH NV GUINEA shall surrender to the SUpreme Allied Commander, south
east ASIA command." r(2). The Senior Japanese commanders and all groWld,
sea, air and auxiliary forces within BORNEO, BRITISH NEW GUINEA, the
BISMARCKS and the SOLOMONS shall surrender to the Commander in Chief,
Australian Mi.litary Force n ~

33 67

General Order Number 1, military and naval, is amended as .follOW's:

(Z 6Z7) para 1 delete subpara C of part 1 and substitute therefor the
following 2 subparas;
SUbPara 1. fiTbe senior Japanese commander and all ground, sea, air and
auxiliary forces within the ADAlWJ'S, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FR.mCH
INOO-CHINA south of 16 degrees north latitude, MALAYA, SUMA'mA, JAVA LESSER
SUNDAS {including BALI, LOMBOK, AND TIMOR), :OOEROE, CERMA, AJIBON, KAI, AROE,
'l'ANIMBAR, and islands in the ARAFURA SEA, CELEBES, HA.LMAHERAS, and DUTCH
NEW GUlllNEA, all surrender to the Supreme Allied Co.nmander, ASIA command"
SubPara 2. n'lbe Senior Japanese Comand.er and all ground, sea, air and
auxiliary forces within BORNEO, BRITISH NEN GUINEA, THE BISMARCKS and
SOWMONS, shall surrender to the Conmander in Chief, AUSTRALIAN Military
Foreesn. Para .2 from SubPara D part 1 delete "RYUKYUS'' Para .3 in SubPar&
E part 1 insert "RmKYUSrt preceding the phrase "and the Philippines" Para
4 in SubPara a of part 2 insert "Naval andn fol.law'ing the word "Landn.
Para 5 in part 12 delete the ]4th word ''Forces and substitute thereto
"Powers"
28 15.5.3 CINCAFPA.C to PRIM MINISTER AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, WARCOS, CINCPAC ADV, IBT
ADMIN KANDY, 1ST AUST CORPS, SEAC, ALLIED LAND FORCES, ALIJ:ED NAVAL FORCES,

ALLim AIR FORCES, 1ST AUST ARMY, LT OOVERNER NEI'HERLANDS INDIES (MELOOURNE)

ex 10599.

Following General Order Number 41, General Headquarters southwest Pacific Area dated 28 August 1945 is quoted for information and guidance:
"Para 1. In accord With instructions fran. the u.s. JCS, effective l200
I {-9), 2 September 1945:
A. The portion of the Southwest Pacific Area south o! the following
descri~d bOWldary, except as noted belOW', is transferred to British Empire
control: beginning on the coast of INDO-CHmA at 16-00 north; thence to
intersect at rrt-40 nortJl 11.6-00 east the boundary between the Philippine
Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of th
Philippines to 05..00 north l27..(YJ east; thence east to 05-00 north J.JQ-00
east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140-00 east; thence to
02-00 south 146-00 east; thence east to 02-20 south 159-00 east; thence
south.
B. The following cOJDDands stated in general orders 1, 18 Aprill942, ar
abolished: (l) Allied Land Forces, SNPA. (2) Allied Naval Forces, ~VPA. {3)
Allied Air Forces 1 SVIPA.
c. All Australian, Netherlands east indies and New Zealand land, sea
and air forces now under the control of the Commander in Chief SlvPA, except;
as hereinafter indicated, will pass to British Empire control.
Para. Pending availability of transportation to evacuate, of other
a.etion to dispose of, and in order to facilitate cOliJDtUl'rl,cations; bases,
airfields and other installations now occupied, with personnel and supplied
therein pertaining to the u.s., will remain under control of the Commander
in Chief, United states A:med Forces, Pacific, for 8lf13' installations,
supplies and personnel, and the conmander in Chief, u.s. Pacific Fleet, for
- continued -

33 68

(cont'd)
naval installations, supplies and personnel. The 2 last named commanders
will negotiate directzy with appropriate Australian and Netherlands East
Indies agencies for the expeditious evacuation ot areas so occupied.
Para. Present coordinating control over logistic arrangements and
present shipping services rendered by agencies of the SNPA will be passed
progressivel;y to agencies designated by the British :&llpire by direct negotation ani in such a manner as to facilitate continuity of operational.
procedure where required and in the interest of good administration.
Para. Kl.ements of forces and personnel of the Allied Powers indicated
in para 1 C above who are serving with u.s. forces or allied Headquarters
north of the boundary described in para 1 A will remain temporari:cy- on duty
therein until orderl;y relief may be made without detriment to good operatio
al procedure and administration.
2S 1823 CINCPAC ADV to SCAP info COMINCH, COMSOPAC, CINCBPF.

Your 2814ll. I have concurred in the occupation of OCEAN and NAURU

by British Commonwealth farces under the direction of CINCBPF. It should
be Ul)derstood that such forces are subject to coordination by CINCPACCINCPOA since these islands are within the Pacific Ocean Areas.
28 2.353 ADMIRALTY to CTG lll.2 info CINCBPF, CINC EAST niDIES. (INTERCEPT)
Part; 1 II13' 282359 REF am 1.300.32 Aug am 13004.2 Aug 1.31957 Aug not to CTG
lll.2. l. Following message from Gimson for Secretary ot State for Colonies carred by messenger to MACAO and tranamitted ty telegraph from H. M.
Consul. "Most immediate. Have sufficient staff' and complete SCLEMQ,A available to set up Civil Adminstration immediatel;y except patrol of nerr territories. For a short period without outside ASSQC DFCTS .A,q GRUDO !! i.I!.
as officer administrating the government. Request immediate advice situation at present quite. InNS QLTAL for incoming Allied commander to mecsm
me immediately on arrival. SUggest landing at or near Sta.nlyr Camp". 2.
Follwing reply sent by Secretary of state for Colonies. 11Your message has
been repeated to Rear Admiral <>arcourt who has been empcNtered irmnediately
on his arrival in HONGKONG to establish military administration by proclamation.

28 2359 ADMIRALTY to CTG lll.2 info CINCBPF, CINC EAST I~IES (INTERCEPT).

Part. 2 final Admiralty 282359 prec part 2.353. You should then at once
comply fully with his instructions. In the meantime warmly approve your
initiative and plans you have madett. 3. You should convey Secretary of
States message to Gimson in case he has not received repl,y via MACAO. 4.
Both above messages have been repeated to Ambassador CHUNKING.

29 OSll CINCFOA ADV to COMHAWSEARRON info cmCPAC PEARL.

In view of the changed status of the war with JAPAN it is desired that
you resubmit reconmendations for the reduction of forces within the Hawaiian Sea Frontier. This to supersede your serial 0003 of 29 J~ giving
consideration to recent directives affecting this 8ubject.
AUGUST (GCT)

33 69

.__
29 1431 CINCAFPAC to WAR DEPl', US MILITARY MISSION MOSCONM&HUNGKING CHINA, KAND!
CEYLON IB'l' ADMIN NET, US SOS OOWESPAC AREA (BRISB_, DECOMAF 20 (POA),
COMGEN 10.

From the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers subj eet is occupation
of the KANOYA AREA. (Z 645) revised dates for these operations are as fol~
lows: Advance party will land 3 September and main forces will land 4- Se.
1945. Desire that Japanese ship begiruling not later than 0600 hours, 3
September 1945, take station to meet u.s. Naval forces at 20 miles, bearing
Z70 degrees, from SATA-MISAKI, southern KYUSHU, and lead these forces into
KAGOSHILA..WAN. S pilots with interpreters will be available on Japanese
ship. These instructions supersede those contained in para 9 of document
4 of "RequirEments of the SUpreme Commander for the Allied Powers presented
to the Japanese representatives at Jlanila, Philippine Islands, 20 August
1945 11 Acknowledge.

Effective 0300 GCT 2nd September that portion ~ the Sv~A south of
the following line Indo China coast at 16-00N 116-00E thence along
AOUTHER international treaty limits of Philippine Archipelago to
05-00N 127-00E thence 05-00N 130-00E Equator 130-DOE Equator 140-00E
02-20S 146-00E and 02-20S 159-00E rever ts to British and Australian
control~
2. ACNB assumes naval responsibility for eastern portion
of this area to SEAC for THEL western portion. 3 ~ The boundary between
SEAC and the Australian area-is yet to be decided but for guidance the
initial Australian responsibility will be for Borneo and to the eastwards,
and the lesser areas to the eastwards of Jymbok. It is unlikely however
that the Australian army will engage in any operations in Dutch New
Guinea, Halmahera or Celebes (except Pinrane). 4. Until the control
of Shihsang is relaxed the present boundaries and ship lines established
for the control of shipping in the SWPA and adjacent comm&1ds remain
effective. Chop line between areas referred to in para 2 above will be
promulgated as required. FKVECAD all HMA ships under the control of
CINC SWPA revert to the control of ACNB but are to continue their present
assignments until directed otherwise by this authority. 6. Communication
plan as in my 371 and 471~

33 70

01 0151 GINCPAC AJJV 'lD COMSERVPAC, Cmt;Q_ENPOA ,IJOMA1:?2AC ,CGF'MFPAC INFO GOHGEI\J T!~J , CG
!L,WPOA.,ISCOM OIUNA~![A~ J;.S.COM IE SHDJI~,.:a._CTU 92 1J,..5,CINC.,POA ~gAHL 1 CINCAFPAC.
In order to aid in the alleviation of a critical backlog of shipping
now awaiting d..i.scha.rge at OKTI~NtJA the follovring action vrlll be taken imntedi.
~e~:
shipme11t
pone
post
will
Co.mrne:mders
Type
Navy
and
(A) ComGenPOA ComGenF1~!FPac
in
prescribed
facilities
the
establish
to
of all ma. terials not required
June)
100231
ADV
ciNCPAC
by
au.g;nented
(as
May
162139
dispatch
CINCPOA PE.-1\.RL
beail"'fields
of
case
the
in
or
191+5,
November
1
to arrive OKIHAWA after
coming operable after 1 Novernber, materials v~ll be shipped at a rate to

correspond with operational dates.

194.5 of all materials
Nov.
1
after
until
shipment
postpone
(B) ComGnPOA will
airfields) essentially
than
(other
j_nstallations,
Army
ma.ke
to
required
not
(A).
see
airfields
For
1945.
November
1
by
operable
(C) Hut and prefab housing for all NCBs ~Engineer Aviation General Service
and Construction Battalions and Regiments will be cancelled. Sueh troops
will continue to use camp facilities initially 1.1p1provided.
Recommended changes to current OKINAJIVA echelon schedules to implement this
directive will be submit.t.ed , by action addees by 7 JlJ].y.
01 0500 COMHAWSEAFRON TO CINCPOA V.
ReUrDi.s 191335 June recorrunend category q.efense reduction HAW~UIP..N ISLP:NDS
from Fleet Opposed to Non Invasion ' ~1d from Categor,y Defense B to Catego11T
Defense A modified as follows: FTP 155 Chapter 5 Section 3 Para .Jl A e~i.nate
general measure number 5 and number 6 A B and c.
I

\, 02 0255 CINCPOA ADV TO CTI~Cli..FPAC ]]JFO COMJ'HIBSPAC,CI}~CPOA PEA.RL,CG6THAl1liT 2COM5THFLT

COMAIRPAC, COM:SERVJ?AC, QGFI~.AQ,,C.q~_,"'C,fl: YEN, C01IEIARIA.N~.,C.0!@.W1GILS ,COHSOPAC.
ComFhibsi)ac 190310 not to all or needed. Para.
Following clarification of responsibility proposed. Para.
Com...PhibsPac and CG 6th Arw.y to be jointly charged with responsibility for
planning embarkation of all OLY"ruWIC land based forces equipntent and initial
supplies whether loaded in assault or later echelons and whether to be nnder
~
control of CINCAFPAC or CINCPAC at the obJective.,.
Representatives of appropriate subordinate commanders can be made available
to them vrhen re(1uested to assist in planning.
In accordance vrith existing POA policy Com.PhibsPac to have overall responsibiLi.ty for loading the ships of the assault echelon conforming insofar
as possible to the desires of CG 6th Army.
ComPhibsPac and CG 6th Army will include in their overall loading plans ,
recom.rnendations to CINCPAC and CINCJl.FPAC as to responsibility for loading
all shipping exclusive of the a~sault echelon#
You~ concurrence or comment requested.
02 0908 CINCPOAAJ2..Y TO CIJ'T.9AFPAC ll~FO . CG TEN, CatAF~JID~C ( CO]!iG.ZNPOJ\) , C,INCPOA )?EARLcr
Your CX 2256 (DTG 010945)., No objection to designation of 7t-h and 27th

Divs in OKTIJAWA as GHQ reserve ;for OI.JD:lPIC provided that in the event .both

the 7th and 27th are committed in OLTI,fPIC another division arrives OK1NA1;VA
i1l.ot later t.han 1 January 1946 to support ga.rrison forces in emergency.

3371

I
0 2 0913 CINCPAC ADV TO

"'

CINC .~-WI)A C

INFO CINGPAC PElLRL:.. COl<ll-1 iiBSPAD,

COM:5THFLT~

Port Director Units f or OLD.fPIC to be established

as follows$ 1 unit of 25 officers in vicinity of mouth ot MANOSE RIVER. l
unit oflO officers at YMWL.'tWA at Western Entrance of KAGOSHil rA 7JAN. 1 unit
of 40 officers in vicinity of. T~lKUSA f or nav al base on eastern shore of
Kt-1GOSHD1A vLU'J . l tmit of 25 officers in .ARi iU\E ~TAN at S:HIBUSHI of P"'UKUSHD!A
GJ\INA (alternate location UCHI NOURA V1lAN ) 1 special unit of 20 officer~ for
Army port at KAC-OSHll.L.'t CITY to -oerform such strictly naval functions as piloting, assembly, routing, sailing and reporting of shipping and distribution
of charts and hydrographic inf ormation.
'5 ,s pecially e quipued LCI will house these units until provision established for them ashore. These units include intra harbor voice and visual
signalling equipment. Of these LCI 2 are being equipped at PE..!\RlJ and 3 a..re
CINC PAC is

eq~ipping

presently at O..INAWA.

Port Director persolmel will be assembled at PEARL. Commanding officers

these units on or before 1 August will be ordered report to ComPhibsPac for '
planning purposes. Other port director personnel vdll join their respective
LCI in time to mount to objective w~th major forces.
Complete Port Director Units 11rill report to Com.PhibsPac Vtr hen required
in time to accompany assault echelons and will later report to CG 6th Army
along with other units of PhibsPac as outlined in CINCAFPAC operations instruc~
tions No. 1.
Request your comments or concurrence.
04 1350 COMil\JCH &

C~!O

TO CINOPAC AJJV INFO CINCAFPAC.

Ref V~~ 25S59 detailed information mentioned consists of JPS 703/1 a

study of nroblem bearing no approval but which is being forwarded to you
for information. In view of experimental nature these installations. Theil...
doubtful effectiveness. The over-riding priorities necessary to their timely ,
construction with consequent impact o:q other essential ~preparations for
And the difficulties of deli very, I am of the opinion that plans
CORO!\~T.
for this operation should not der)end on the provisiorip of artificial harbors
unless they are an essential requisite f or success; Request you consult
. with CINC,;\FPAC on the matter and submit your views.

03 0515 COM3RDFLT TO CINCP.AC BOTH I l\iFO CTF 38.

Your 020152 intend carry out 10 July operation solely aga inst enemy
aircraft and air inst allat i ons :in accordance 1-ri.. th carefully laid plans
and elaborate bri ef ing c. On 16-17 July strikes v~d.ll undertake destruction
enemy men of war TOKYO BlLY Ar ea witn emphasis on N.A.GATO and destroyers
Now t ent a.tively planning destroy enemy men of war IruRE- KOBE Area subsequent
to 20 July replenishment9
03 1353

CINCAFP!~C TO OINCPOA PA.SSED BY

CINCPOA '=EARL TO CINCPOA ADV

If

Ref CINCPAC- CTIJCAFPAC agr eement, general principles of coordi nation of

f orce s dated. 16 7:!ay 1945 request 7th Air For ce be transferr ed t o command AFP::\.c
effective 6 July<~ Info here indicates f oll owing tmits now RYUKYUS : 49ll. Heavy
Bomb Grp, 41 J.!ediurn~ Bomb Grp_, 28 Photo Recon Sq. 1vith 319 Light Bomb Gr p no\"f
displacing and 11 Heavy Bomb Gr1) loaded and ready t o displ a ce ,. In addition
t o ~bove, 31B-, 413 e.nd 5U7 Fig1rt.el" GrouDs attached t o 7th AF now inst a lled.

337 2

\
0 5 1200 CGUSFCT TO CINCPOA VIA RlJO GUAlii,.

CFB 243<8

Co.riunents as requested in radio 030335 concerning OSS project in KORE.A

follow" It is hi ghly desira"bl e t hat i nt elligence be obtained concerning
Ja.p a.J.1E:1Se activities in KOREA.. This theater 'is Ul1dertak.ing a project to
obtain intelligence and has st ~rted to trajn agents for overland p~netration
of KOREA from CHINA o Due to tli.e ina ccessibility of thEf target area it is
estimated that the agents cannot be in position in KOREA for at least 2 months.
In view of this delay , CHINA Theater l.dloks vvi. th favor on the. su.bj ect proj.ect
which, it is assumed, can be initiated immediately.
Since the base area and the 2 radio listening stations will be outside
t his theater it is not considered desirable for 6hina. 'J.'~heater to sponsor the
project. However, any intelli.gence which is Qbta:tned front this project will
be of value to this headquarters.

06 0553 CTIJCPOA !lDV TO G01[GENA.A.FPOA, DEPCOH20'l'H .1\F I!WO GTIJCAFPAC_J3GviGENPOA,CTF 92, .

.Q1Q. 99.2.
CINCAF PAC 031353 request your comment and recmmnendation with particular
reference to units of 20th AF n011v j~ RYUKYUS . AsstlL~e 0000 I(-9) 15 July is
time of transfer.

06 0554 CINCFOA ADV TO CINCAFPAC JNFO CINCPOA PEA..BL.

Your 031353 first obtained from mY PEARL HQ. Concur in transfer not
later thc"tn 15 July. 1 ~Jill advise further after consultation rith DepCom20th..tJ..F
concerning units that command.

06 0822 CINCPAC ADV TO C01.illJCH INFO CINC.AFPAC, C,9T'.fl'JJIFLT

.

CINCAFPAC 051221. Concur in use of destroyers for FORT BAY~tL-r.m :}roject

until about 15 September when they must be withdravm for OLYMPIC.

07

131~ COMINCH \ND CNO TO CINCroA tJJV INFO . CINCPOA .PEARL, CINCPJ' P~1.C.

The British Chiefs of Staff have arranged for the dispatch of

2 assemblies of RJ.F airfield consit.ructton personnel and equipment to the
Pacific for eventual pr e:oa.rat3:.on of VIR facilities in RYUKYUB. It is my
understanding that this construction force vr:ill be pooled with out own an.d
employed wherever needed until required for RAF needs late in 1945.
.The 1st eonvoy lmown as SHIELD F'ORCE consists of $ ships (S ~tMJACK,
SLThH.Fli,IC _, S.AM.SE'I TE, SPJ.t11Y.PA.) SJl'MFEUGH, SA1fKEY, SAVtL}Ji!U, SAMBRE) containing
, 1
15' 000 tons c onstruction equipment and 1000 vehiclesu- The movement is 1ll1de:rway and ships will arrive canal zone in order named betv-reen 7 and 19 July
ll!IPRESS OF :'.JJSTRALIA containing 3100 construction and administrative nersonnel
arri ves Canal Zone about 19 July . The 2nd convoy krtown a s VACUUM: F'ORCE comnosed of simila r ships cargo e..nd :)ers onnel i s scheduled to sail from Un~"ted
Ki ngdom between 14 July and l August.
ld .r :,farsha.l Lloy d who is familia r with al l det ails of t hes e assemblies
is en r oute GUftJl f or consultati on. Follovring consultation with him request
1

you :

(1) Desi gnat e destination for SHIELD FOHCE o.rrange r outing and 1Jrovi de
such e scorts as may. be requir ed.
(B) Submit recommendation as to movement of VACUUM FORCE which ccm if
necessar,r be held in United Kingdom.
(C) !~.dvise contem~plated emnloyment these forc es ~

337 3

The follO'wing measures of reorganization of w:lits now in the 7thFJt a.re

_)ro 'Josed to be made a.t the times indicated in order to improve the sup})Ort
of CtYMPIC and subsequent o..xerations and facilitate Pacific Fleet administration. Your corurnent or concurrence is requested. Turner and Barbey have concurred.
A. About 1 October Com?thFlt relieved from duties in s:lPA and re?ort to
CINCPAC for duties in OLYMPIC.
B. About 1 October ComPhilSeaFron re.l)ort to CTI,JCPAC for duty as a Fleet
Task F'orce Co11mander under the operational control of CINCSlPA in command
of naval forces assigned for duty in Philippine Sea Frontier.
c. On 15 August ComServFo.r 7th Flt change title to ComServRon 7. ServRon 7
becomes unit of ServPac assigned to operational control of Com7thFlt
until 1 October and thereafter to operational control of ComPhilSeaFron
to render service to all Fleet units :in PHILIPFll!ES as required.
D. Effective 15 August all naval shore facilities including naval air bases
in 1.)HIUPPINES pass to command of ComPhilSeaFron.
E. Effective 15 .H.ugust 6om7thPhJ.bFor and staff detached 7thFlt report to
ComPhibsPac and assur~.1e status parallel to Com3rdPhibFor and Cont5thPhibFor.
F. Effective 15 Anooust all units ncm in 7thPhibl1'or pass to command of Co.mPhibsPac co.ubata..nt units to be reallocated to meet current reouirements
including those of H1i1Sea::?ron and other units to form a . subordinate command of the administrative comnand PhibsPac (with an organizational status
parallel to that of the SubCom at GUAM) for the purpose of rendering
service to all PnibsPac units in the PHILIPPIW~S.
G. About 1 October ComP~ir7thFlt change title to ConLtirPhilSeaFron.
H. About 1 October Fair:7ings 10 and 17 pass to operational control of ComPhilSeaFron throu&h ConvlirPhilSeaFron.
OS 0540 CIUCFOA ADV TO co;.:GENPOA,
Subrni t by letter yotu detailed reconunendations as to reductions in defense
measures to conserve Jersonnel and resources on the assumption that category
of defense of Hawaiian Area remains as at present but degree of .implementation
becomes discretionary 1rith CINCPOA.

CINCAFPAC, COL?7TIIFLT INFO Cll,iCPAC PEJ; l.L, COl.r.ATilPAC,

Determination of organization of naval shore based nnit~

Cir,rC~17PAC 060319.
OLYMPIC and .naval base development planning are being handicapped by discrepancies between CTITCAF:).t).C Operations Instruction No. 1 and the staff studies
with rega:;:d to the location of the naval air base. CII\CJU?PAC and CINCPAC staff
studies both sho:Jed developnent of e~d.stin.g Japanese naval air base KANOYA for
u.s. Fava.l ~lir Base. This arrangeJn.ent had the advantage of proxirrd.ty to !Javal
Base at TAKASU which 't'r .i.ll be the center of ma.j or naval activities and naval
cargo discharge.
If Naval Air Base Marine Air Bases and l1Iarine Divisions ouerating areas
are all to be v;est of' KAGOS}II:~.:: BAY it may be advisable to consider relocatip.g
Naval Base at Ki..GO~lHTI 'tA CITY and Ar:my _port facilities at ffAK\SU thus shortening overlc.,nd supnly lines for both services.
Your early comnent requested.

3374

08 1059 CINCAFPAC TO CINC ~J1\C ADV INFO 6TII A:.11iff

ex

'- _ /

240 2.

COMPHIBSPAC

Concur your 020913 relative Port Director Units for future onerations.

Request:

1-

2.

3.

That in addition to Port Director Units listed in reference consideration

be given to establishir.tg units at Yi1ITYAZAKI , ISHAG..U'"J: and KUSHIKIKO to aid
in the control a.11d routing of shil;ping.
That a.representative from Port Director's staff for SHIBUSHI, and for any
of the local ~_ties requested above at which you agree to establish Port
Director Units, confer vdth representatives of 6th Army and A.FW}!;SPAC earliest practicable date at headquro"""cers 6th Arrey for coordination of operating
procedures.
Designations and strengths of .:til Port Director Units vrhich vdll pass to
6th Army. control be furnished this haadquart.ers in order that they may
be included in the troop list for the operation.

09 0900 CINCPOi\,. AIJV TO CINCAF?AG I IJFO COM7THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC, COMllTCH & CNO.
As many LSTs as ;ossible are being allocated for OLYMPIC O.:;eration. 1\ny
assigned especially for corrlmunications or other special purposes must necessarily cause a corresponding reduction in assault lift. I11 view of need ex.Jressed by youf for LST COM7THFLT is directed by this letter to maJte irm:.lediately available to you for use as GHQ communication shi:.')s 2 I.ST from those
now IJIII!Qlii<}M assigned to his eomrnand and is further authorized to increase the
number to 3 if you so re(:uire. He .is also directed to send such assistance
as is needed for structural alterations and installation of your signal com.~unication equipment.
LS~s will continue as urdts of Pacific Fleet.

09 0057 CINCAFPAC 'l"O CINCPAC/CINCPOA PJ)V IEFO :AtlCOS.

ex 24142.

The follo;;ying refers to Joint stai'f study OLYMPIC, u.s. Facific Fleet
and fDA, lS June 1945: The statem.ent bottom of page 16 tt~Nhen the Commanding
General ExpeditionarJr Troops ( ComGen 6th Arrny) assumes com:&~nd of the grotmd
forces established ashore he will report to CIHCAFPAC vrho then a.sS'u.mes com.ma.nd
and responsibility for the campaign in JAPAN, is not concurred in. The responsibilities of CINCJi..F_-Ac are set forth in JGS 1331/3, particularly par~
l.B(l) ttis charged -rrl th the 'JrjJ11ai'Y responsibility of the conduct of the
operation 0Ll.1JJPIG including control, in case of exigencies, of the actual
amphibious asse.ult through the appropriate naval comD.l anderstt. I vlill accompa.rcy
the troops and vd.ll exercise at all times the cor:-mland responsibility directed,
as quoted above, by the JCS.

MyDis 300601. A rear acJmi..ral

.
will be designated by CDTCFAC ADV as Commandant l'J, val O;;era.ting Base . The Na.vo.l O';eratins -Base will e.nbrace all
naval end Marine n.ctivities on KYUSHU as indicated :i.n the follmd.ng sub paras:
( ~~.) Lion 9 will be utilized to establish the Nav.?.~ Ope!"evting Base facilities
at TAKASU.
(B) The 2 Cubs to be designat ed should be ordered to report to CG 6th 1\:rrrry

for further assi~urrent.

( l) L to 5thPhibCor:)s for enroloym.errG during the
vicinity of the nouth of t.he ::r ,.~'TC 0 -~ -~IV. .!J1 ..
- continued -

.? :'1 ;hibious

phase in the

3375

ETC~

co:rr 'D)

. (2) The other to .TI Corps for employmen.t during the a1nphibious -hase in
ARI.AKE :' 'ii.N. Both cubs will pass to control of the comn~andant LOB on
completion of the amphibious phase .
(C) The shore based facilities of the PT operating base at YPJ,IA.KAWA KO 1.1ill
be under the Conmandant NOB. The tenders ana boats will be under onerational control of Com7thFlt.
(D) The Naval Air Base vd.ll be commanded by a naval aviator r.rho in turn vdll
be nnder the Co1:1dt NOB. Corn.Ai.rPac requested to nominate the prospective
coi:UIJander KAIJOYA Naval Air Base.
(E) The lrarine Air Bases at &tiiJ:lt;..N TOJI1fB.ll11A and :.iA.TSUlJAGA will be corrunanded
by Marine aviators. During the complete assault phase while SUp)Ol~ing
V PhibCorps the Ilarine Air Base commanders will be under the Marine Tactical Air Co.mmander at each field. Upon completion of the conbat operations
of V PhibOorps "'vhe __arine Air Bases will pass to control of the Comdt NOB.
ComAirPa.c requested to nonrl.nate 3 Marine aviators for comraand of 3 ~farine
Airfields.
(F) (1) The naval consJcruction troops assigned' to construct i1Iarine airfields
lilnitial:cy- vTill be under the control of CG 6th Ar.nzy-t They will pg.ss
to the control 6>f Comdt NOB upon completion of airfield construction.
(2) 'f.ae 4 N'CBs 1.rith V FhibC0rps will remain under the control of the V
PhibCorps until viithdrawal from Kl'USHU at which time they vd.ll be
assigned to Cemdt HOB.
(3) All naval construction troGps othe:." than those mentioned in (1) and
(2) above vull be under the continuous control of the Comdt NOB.
(H) The Marine AllA Groups will be under control CG 6th Army. For purposes of
general adJnin:istration of the naval servic~ they rr.ill be under adnli..nistrative control of the Comdt NOB . Hovrever H.arine!II'M'E"tt ad.nrl..nistrative matters
will remain under normal lf.arCorps channels.
(I) The various naval COE'ilunication activities nill be assigned to the operational control of the respective officers in charge but uill be under
Condt NOB for type and administrative control.
Geographical locations listed above are subject to changes ',vhich may arise
from further stud.i..es.
.t

09 0907 CilJCFQA 1UJV TO CIEC1U~'PAC

ComServPac recon Jends that the location of the NOB be changed from vicinity

TAKA.SU as proposed by CII\CPCA serial 0005081 lS June to a location on a level

.. lain of the western side of K.AG00HTI.:ft. .. Al~ just north of Y/J.ts.G~ ~r. KO . The fol-

\.J

lmring advantages will be gained by a change o1 location:

(A) Construction time on waterfront facilities 1'dll be materially reduced since
only 4,000 't'Taterfront feet of sheet steel pilll ;dll be involved in lieu of
25,4DO ft.
(3) Dredging operations ~dll be reduced fran 2,3Z7 ,000 cu.yds. to c..pprox:i.rJ.ately
1,000,000 cu.yds. and the base can begin to function independent of dredging
o-oeracions.
(C) Pontoon requireuents v,rill be materially reduced.
(D) Considerable ro2.d construction and :blprove.:':lent 1\rill be eliminated clue to
flat area at the nevr location.
(::J;) Certain i'faterfront development is existing and can be utilized in lieu of
complete new cm1struction.
(P) Nevi location is adjacent to PT o 1erating base ~mel in the same general L?..nd
ri!Jea as all othel' naval .:1ctivities exce.pt those at A.tti lliE ~TAN Yrith resultant
possible consolida;cion of admini strative control.
(G) Anchora ge and ~liaterf:ront facilities vlill be ~n a 1~1ore )rot~cted lo?a.tion.
(H) Naval airfields c.?~n be constructed as convemently Hnd rapJ..dly as 1~he existi nr7 ... i elds at K:JTCYA ct:.1.n be len~hened ax1cl brought to .::n"oper g-rade.
3 37 6
- Continued o

09 0907 CINCPO.A ADV to

PEARLJ..

CirC~..F P!C ,CCJ~ :Z THPitC, IHl~'O

CONT t D)

(I) Ample flat and usabie area exi sts at t he nevJ loce.tion so that crovv-ded.
conditions need not be the consj_deration fo~ t he establishment of both
..
ba.se D.nd :naval a J..r
. I"' ac:t. .u:c1.es
.' .
. t enu
.,_
nB.:va.~1 O?erac::ng
as .m~. gh'
F _-c h ave prove d e:xJ...s~
at the fonner location.
(J) Since the construction tim.e is limited to 120 dBys . nl.a.Xi.rrru.m, a new location
vrhich requires :.e ss construction effort a pperu.. . s to be more practicable a.nd
feasible from the sta.nd:")oint of reduced shipping space required, possible reduction in forces involved and the consolid:ttion of all naval activities in
1 general land area.
The advantages to be gained in relocating the Naval Bc?.se and !Javal ..u..ir
facilities as recomm.ended by ComServPac from a base development point of view
are such tbat this plan appears desirable. Acceptance of this plan vdll alleviate discrepancies given in CINCPAC ADV_&NCE 000002. Request your views.
I

J.

10 0218 Cil\fCPOA ADV TO CINC.AFPAC I~\JFO DEPCOili20TN AF, COMINCH.

Your ex 24152 (090215) is welcome because it O~Jens the \'fay to an early

solution of the proglems concerned. The definite inf'ormation now available
as to the future organization of the Army Air Forces 'IIIill facilitate this
solution. I am in complete agreement that the system of coordination mQ.st
facilitate placing. the full force of all air povr'er on any objective "With
m.inimut!l restriction as to targets. I believe that this can best be achieved
along functional lines with little use of r~strictive boundaries. My conferences v.rith Gen. Giles indicate that he shares this belief. The coordination of the operations of the 2oth AF and of the aircraft under row control
has been achieved effectively by full exchange of informa:tion Td..th .max:ir.aum.
freedom of action as to targets.
It vdll undoubtedly become necessary in the future for fleet units including carriers to attack targets in the. INLAND SEA and to o~?erate not only in
the PHILIPPll'L~ SEA 1r est of' the 135th Meridi?.n but also in the E.AST CHINA SEA
later in the SEA 0~ J ..l.P.ltN and possible aLso in the YJIJ...~a; SEA. I must retain
complete freedom of action in such matters subject to the realities of the
strategic and tactical situations as they develop.
:nth reference to sub paragraphs A and C of your :.;lessage you nay be
assured that the inferences tddik which concern you are mistaken. I am opposed
to any restrictions VIhi ch delay or :iJn;Jede using any availa.ble weapon to
damage the enerrw1 i The text. concerned is part of a general concept and refers
only briefly to the salient features of t..he operations plc.nned. It does not
cover the full u s e of forces against targets of opport.unity (U1d may require
amplification in that respect.
Gen. Giles has . ~greed
.
to send Hajor General Kuter and I viill send l1ear
Admiral Sherman to meet with y our representative to clarify t hese matters at
AA!'J ILA at any t:Lrne convenient on or after 15 July. I consider re:')resentation
from the headqua..rters fu'my Air Forces inadvisable because it would in turn
necessitate re ~Jresent ation f rom t he headquarters of Cominch. I believe that
these 3 officers c::m very quickly evolve solutions vrhich 'rdll be mutually
agreeabl e to you to Spae.tz an d to me.
10 0238 QII;CFOA AJJV TO COT"..!URI~j\C INFQ _ FA~i 1, F~\H 18 AIRPACSUBCOMFOHD.
Re quirements f or 1+ Pr i vateer s quadrons for OLYHPIC a pproxima t ely D plus 45
t o 60 should be met by reduct :.ons elseriher e i n accor dance with foll mvi ng tentative deployment on 1 Jan uar y 1946 by squadrons . l~ HATSBPJ,JE 3 O!uN.A.-J.A. 5 I :. O
and 1~ :-.:11 t,~NJi.S including AJH s c:l.uadron 3 PhilSeaFron. Heath er aircraft are
included. Designation of spe cific squacb:ons can be def erred lU1til late lJovember,.

33 77

10 04.17 US ?1 AC TO CO~ ~GZH CHI IJ.n

ex

24399.
Reference is your CFBX 430. Concurrence in NO:"TH CHINA and KOH.EA operations of RYUKYUS based FE.A.F aircraft . Operations rill begin on or after 15
Ju:cy. Request 14th Al? k eep FEA.t7 and ;' dVon FEAP informed of hostile situation
and areas occupied by friendly forces in sub ject area a nd any other pertinent
matters . '?EI :?D JG Tiill be excluded f rom bo.;nbing attacks except in ca se of
military necessity as determined by this headquarters . FEAF will al"'range f or
attack of targets i n pro')()sed area vJith 14th lJ! and ':dll notify latter of
missions rior t o their disDatch and results thereof on canpletion of missions .
FE.P..F will be authori zed direct communic,s.tion with 14th AF for the coordination
of o -,erations in KCFEA and NO~~'lll CHINA, with your hea.dqu.arters and this headquarters as inforr&:.tion addressees Your comments or concurrence l'\3quested.

10 07 48 CIITCPOA AJJV TO

CO~ iGEJ:I

CHINA I NFO C01~7 .:IL?LT, CT:B' 32,, CO nrAVGR? CHI HA.

A cruiser al1d des(.royer task force has been formed whose tasks 1till include operations along the CHJlJA Coast . Request that y ou arrange t o have l
of Miles officers fa,'ll.i..liar w ith CHil'i.L\. situation nith yartic ular empha sis on
c oastal shipping and as l:Jc'UlY Chi:pese s peal{ing interp:reters as possible up to
9 report to senior naval officer at SM.~ for fUFther transfer t o j oin
Rear AdE~ral Low :in U. S. ship GUAM.

03 0335 CINCPOA Fl!:A-.11.1 TO CINCAFPAC , CO?IGEN CHINA INFO CllJCPOA ADV

Request your cornment and recommendations concerning NAPKO proj ect of

the Office of Strat gic Serv:i:ces transmitted to you by JCS memo of 18 Jnne.

11 OU-6 CI:t-JC PAC ADV HQ TO CO~ DJUDIV l6 , CTF 99 . COM3HDFLT I Nli'Q co;rnJCH , CINCPAC PE~,
CINCAFP1\C , CC~H'E lF , CrfF32 , CTF39 , CTG30 . 5, CTU32. 1 . 2 , 30. 9. 4; . COliGEN CHINA.
Hy OpPlan 4- L:-5 modified as follows:

(1) Add to task orga_nization: (N) Cruiser Task Force (TF 95) RAdm Low in

GU.Aiv~ (CBl) , CruDivs 12 and 16. Desron 24 less BACHE (DD 470) 1liULLANY( DD528)
plus ~JIJ..LARD K..:rrH (DD 775) J . C. OHEiJS (DD 776) iiA.SC>""'I (DD 778) .

( 2) .Add in subpara 3(a) to tasks of 3rdF'lt: Provide air cover for cruiser
task force as 1racticat)le froJn units i n the RYUKYUS area on reouest of CTF 95 .
(.3) Add in subpara 3(b) to takks of RYUKYUS forces: Provide air cover
for cruiser task force as practicable on request of CTF 95 .
(4) Add ne1T subiJara 3(N): Cruiser task f orce e..xercise control of the EAST
CHI E. SEA, interrupt enemy shi_p~.1ing al ong the CHINA Coast, mislead the enenw
as to our next a ssault objective by conducting repeated sweeps in the EAST
CHI NA SEA. :t.lake initial mveep f rom t h e vicinity of TUK YUEG rr~Ao (26- 22N J20- 30
E) nort lJT.;rard to about Lat 2B-4D N. Be pre:Jared to conduct further sweeps
when ordered. CTF 95 request air cover as required direct froa CTF 99 and
from naval air commanders concerned; Keep CINC?AC Culii3RD17LT and all interested
ai:r and naval comrtla.Ilds in HYUKYUS Area informed of movaments . Base at OKINit';A.
{5) Add to Jara L:.: Logistic support at KllJ.. J A available from ComSerlDiv
104 in HI 1 IDL.
11 0153 CINCFAC ftlJV TO CO. ~CRUDTV 16 I nfo CTI,JC!JAC 'E)JtL,COL1JJiiCH ,CO:ICHUDlVl2,CO:!DESJONffi,
C1f G 99 . l, CO:.I;311DFLT , CO'~SdfVHON lO,CTF' 32 ,CTF99 ,CG CHINA , co;:GEN FEJ\F
Form TF 95 RAclm LC10T i n GU1\H composed of GruDiv 16 CruDi v 12 DesHon 24 less
B.. CIE (DD La o) ulJLLil.;y (DD 528) ')lus :ILL_ JD 1~ .TH (DD 775) J . C. a L1~S (DD 776)
- ASS 1~~ ( vD 77 ~5 ) . When ~1FS about 1.3 July TF 95 proce ed f rom ~TE to :lYUKYU Area
UJ 011 completion fuelin~ ~)roc eed to execut e initial task assig.:1ed my llOJA6 .
U~)On COiu::>letion return to vi c inity of O~r iE.lfJA .
Arrange directly TJith ComServDiv lOlt- for logistic su~) Jor t.

337R

Destinations reconunended your 090L~43 July acceptable t3lCee~)t follo-rd.ng.,

Iou $how engineer power pl~:u1t r;taintenance deta.chraent foro S.UPAN in NoITember
whereas n0 such unit listed in CX 215.38 and must rnean eng:.neer refrigeration
ma:tntenance detachn ent due in November for which no destination given. Of 4
Engineer Dunrp rrruck Companies listed in CX 2153B already a.ccepted 2921 company
for OKIKA~'IA per your l4234S J\m_e leav:Lng l each for OKIN ~I!V.A., CAB.TJ and S.AIPAN
altho you list 2 for S""'J Plti',f. Likewise acceptable are destine.tions contained
in your 1003Lr.O asstt.1Li..ng 130 Engineer General Service Reg:in1ent t.o be the 1302
for TI~JIMi and. the 72 Finarace Disbursing Sf?ction to be the 272 for TINilU~.

Ur l0074S. ~ill selected Chinese ~ersonnel fill your interpreter require~:fe have no .llrnericans vdth qualifications. Desire to set up direct ra.dio
contact between Task ?orces and Hdqtrs ConltiavGrp CHINJ:J. Eastern Go:mn1:.1.11d. Short
title COMN1VCHEC. H.adio call t:1T 89. ComNavGHECKis located at KI~I:.NYAHG F~AST
CFENA Lat 27-23 Long llS-08 and has direct operational control of coastal
intelligence nets from SHANGHAI to fJiNATOW. l~lso operational control of 10000
u.s. Navy trained guerrillas. I BJn now temporarily at KIENYANG in wide svring
along coast available any~.rhere for conference. ~:-.rhen do you want ~ersonnel.
Suggest. CH1U'IGTING 25-4-5 118-23 as pick up field.

ments.

Cancel ,my, OpPlan 2-45.. CIY:fCPAC -271215 lfurch refers. (}l~LllEBREAK Opera.tion).

Request GG ~p Pac prepare and keep up to date plans for capture of ;vAJG5
by !,!arines supported by fast carrier task force. Assu.rne enemy g~rrison
now 2700 but deteriorating due to re , JeC~.ted attacks and lack of SU';p~i..es" Keep
CINCPAC advised your estir1ate troops required anc~ un:tts tentativel:sr ear-m..arked.
Initial report desired as to a.:rliest date considered feasible and troops
contempla;t~d for e:!t:)loy.rnent.
ISLiU~D

09 0215 CINCAFP.:\G TO

ex 2l,J 52.

CIUC: :. :~,C ;1DV INFO ~JAH.COS, CC~~GEN:ATI1.

The follCY.Jing refers to Joint Staff Study, u. s. PacFlt 8nd POA,. lS June
There a:re .a number of dl.fferences in concepts betvreen certain sections
of the n.bove document ond the Staff Study a,nd Instructions of CINCAFPi~C relating to the emplo~ent and coordina.tion of a.ir forces. Some of these have
been subjects of conferences and correspondence betv.reen our staff officers,
but definite conclusions have not been reached. On the last exchc<..nge, .your
representative indice.ted disagreement vrith certain features of air coordination
suggested by tlus hec,dquarlers and indicated that a.n alternate scheme would
be \3Ubmittecl~ This scheme has not yet been received. My general concept is
that a sif!rple system of coordination which t~'rill permit the full force of all
ai:r ;)ower . to bear on any objective vvit,h minintu.m restriction as t.o targets is
the correct system. E.xperience in the PHILIPPINES Ca.mp(;rl.gn indicated that 2
air forces could 01)erat.e in the same area 1rtithout interference providing each
was informed t h at t he oth~:3 r would be 'Jresent. The systE;3m that .1.r.y representatives have proposed follo,;;s this general 1ine of thought.
19L~5.

-Continued

3379

 A. Specificall.y , on page 7 of the document referred to above, there is a

strong i xn.pl i cation t hat you desire to i mpose restrictions on Arnw Jar Force
operations against shipping. I con sider that this restriction is unnecessary
and 1..U1desirable. In t h e scheme of air coordi nation :xr:pposed by this head.quarters, t he pr:i.mary t a r get f or Army Air Forces in the RYUKYUS was indicated
as the land area s, . and o~ the Navy Air Force in the RYUKTlJS the sea areas,
each being f1~ee by ~ coor dinat i on with ~ach other to operate in the }3rim.r'lcy
areas of the other. I do not agree that .A.rPJY .Air Forces can not ope :rate ~
against shipping .
B. On this same pa ge, you indi..cate that the .~u. :rrq Air Forc es opera:t:lng from
the lrruK'21. JS would be subject to sue!! measures of coo:r'Clination as you find
necessary for safety or operating effectiveness. There is a need for a
closer undersl:,a.nding on tlus subject. I have all.. eady agreed the;t the assign""~
ment of areas of air, surface al1d submarine activities is your responsibility.
It is e.iq::>eeted, however' that this be COOl"dinated vd.th my headquarters as has
been the .)ractice dul"iL"'lg the last year. As to the matter of traffic control,
it is probable that this control can b e handled localzy between air force
con1.manders in the Rl1JKY1JS vd.thout imposing undue restrictions. Eventually
the FEJlF "i7ill be the _p redominating air force and the comrnander should have a
voice in the coordination provisions ) resor:tbed. This rn.atter should be cla.rified .
c. On page S, the action of the Army Strategic ;U_r Force is confined to
the island of FI:ONS1iU. This is not believed to be in accordance vrith intentions.
Conferences 1i-Tith representatives of the Strategic ..lir Force have alreaey :indicated the intent of ~JL'lcing its fu~eight in the objective area for 10 days
revious to the OLYMPIC assault. A!oreover, there are targets aJ..ong the MANCHURI ~'\J:J mainland and selected targets in northern KYUSRU and SHIKOKU which
are included vrithin the anticipated objectives for the strategic .!lir
.
Force.
These targets are -Jrescribed by the Joint Chief's of Staff, but early decisions
as to coordinating provisions are necessar,y.
D. On pages 17, 34, and 27 a plan is indicated to turn over a yart of the
Marine air forces o~Jerat:lng in the objective area to the ?thFlt !or the purpose
of escort and protection of shipping to and f rom the objective area. This
plan diverges somewh.1.t
: from our a greement that ~farine air operating in the
objective area Vrould be under t he cont rol of, C!NCJ~PAC., Generally, it is bel:Leved thaJG this pl an is meritorious. However, since i t ha. s not ;)revious],y
been explored in conference, it is believed that it should be further e:x:amined
in its relationship to the general coordination of air in the objective area.
E. .Anne);:es 2 and .3 to Appendi x B eliverge fro1~1 sLnrl.lar concepts of the employment of air Yihich has been f avored by this hea dqua rters. These matters should
be a djust ed at t.he earliest nr actica.bl e date.
Par a. . Since t he above l)oints have mi3Xly r amifi cations, it is not believed
t hat they can be set tled sati sfactori ~y by r adio10- Moreover, the Strategic llir
Force has a n 1..m)or'l:;ant i nterest i n the ge ner a l air coordination. . A conference
at the ear liest practic able date i s suggest ed. rJ!ANI L1\ is ~)referred because
det ailed planrting i s novf goililg on h er e, but i f y ou ~.11--.efer otherwise , we vd.ll
conform. If this is agreeable t o you, I vdll arrange t o have the Army Air
Force s , '1\Ta.shington, or t he Army Strategic Air :'?or ce , send rErpr esent at i v es i.t."1
order tha,t final eo11c lusions on t hese mat te1~s c an be reached. For .rurposes
of planning, I sugge st that the conference be held about 20 tJu1y

ll

?, 1'.0 CO'''i!"li't:"'rl'
''t.n.'l
~'1 ~~ l!f
U':' t
,_.,..Lf.J.;

f"<!'P '"J"r''il"ilf~
r';-i;' F "'r~"
.CI'~~rr-s
,\rr''''A
'i
lV c
,_;r}~l)\;
_yl 111'~.U
.--- r-'ttJT110
-4.
.w 1 ~~J ~""ll.!
.... J.l C

fr"fl"\

AX 75775.

f1
.'!!ro- ."1.
jl
c \.,t.t
r~;f.'- ~i..iU
!\ 1\ 'ft't}Y\.~
\..J _1
- .1\TCl
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Viki

f'lG"'~O
V
J...: ._

CiQi,fl~T.I'
- .w'U

C'('~J
- ...l . ff',\'lf
;-~~ ?
~.

1. Ji.:;ffectiv e immediately upon ttansfer to YEiU7 of 0 1:Jcra,tional control of the

7th ltF and 20 !2 Ulri.ts in the '{Yill~YUS you :.~rill dire ct the operat ions of these
w..it s to extend the 9.ir offensive from bas es Yrith.in the RYUIITUS against KYUSHU,
SF!II{OI\.U and HON:3HU Nest Of 135-00 E t o:
..... Continu ed ....
Q

33 8

(f.. ) Neutralize and destroy hostile air forces v:herever they ri'.ay be found.
(B) Dest,roy air installations, grotmd forces :~nd defenses ~C~SJJND industrial
and ha.rbor installa:t.ions.
(C) Disrupt vrater lines of cornnlU11.icat5_on olld c lose crit5.ca.l point s on land
~
lines of colnrnunic ation. ~~
2. Upon estab]j_ shrnent of the 7th AF Hq in the l1.YUKYUS the ComGen ?th .AF will
take over operational control of the .301 Fighter rifing.
3. CG Advon FE.-tF w'ill im.mediate~y institute photographic missions _t)er instruc"""
tions given him by Com.B"'EA.t1' on 7 July and report to this headqUEirters when
he is ready to strike.
11

1425 CINCAFPAC TO CTNCPAC ADV IN:B"O COMii.AF,.

ex

24144. ,
Ur 060617. Relatin.g to placing lst

liar~lirWirig

under operational control of

7thli'lt to prepal~e for future operations is reference . Addendum 2 .iUlied Air

Force Opns Instructions 96 refers only to those 1st Ma.rl\irl'J'ing tmits based
units
.
control of lst Nar. \irWing
in SOLOMONS. July 15th da:te for asst.unption
in SOLOJl1fOJ:lS by RAAF corn.roand was agreed to by ComGen 1st Mar!ir~iing in con..:..
ference lilith e.ir officer co.mmanding Ril!W command and Coml\llied Air Forces,.
August 15 tentative date fo-r release of units of lst l';B.r.AirV'ling from operations was reconl!ilended by ComGenEII!AW based on directives to his headquarters
. for preparation for OL1'1viPIC, and consideration of tactical missions in the
SOLOHONS . Remainder of lst 11arAi~1ing is operating under 13th AF in direct
sup')Ort of opera:~i.ons in !illjD.lJJAO and covering lleet units in Lh!t!TE GULF
In view of above do you still. desire the F.MAW released inunediately to the
operatione.l 'Control of Com?thFlt to- :,)reJ?are for futu.re '01)eTa.tions.

of

:.w

llOlL.-6 .. To support initial svreep of TF 95 request heavy strikes on

enertw air bases and other .appropria:ce targets in SHI!. NGHAIArea and FORM~OSA
on date of sweep. CTF 95 advise ')redieted date a..nd confirm or correct V(hen
definite.,
, 12 0217

QJ~!CPAC

IillV TO CO!JITHCH & CiyO INFO CINCPAC F2:ARL EQ,

D:~PQOl!! ~AF .

Ur 071310 and 1Ll737. Ships of SHIELD Bnd VACUl.JlK force"S rrJ.ay be sailed
as scheduled. Unon arrival PANAMA propose they be sailed indep~ndently and
u.nescort"ed to ENIS1~TOK "~?rhere they will remain tu1til called fort~ard to HYUKYUS
in re g;u.l.:u~ echelon c onvoys as required. 'There is at present a very heavy
backlog of $}lipping at OKII'JAlP1A that will be gra.du.elly reduced. Select..ive unloading is nO!iv in effect and will be for some. time. It is expected but can
not be assured that ':Jerson..'1.el with their equipmer!.t vrill be discha. :ged farly
promptly.. No special priority can be granted the Br~itish ships. 1"bey wi.ll
be integrated into the immedia. te requirement~s of the HYlJ1CYUS .e.s a whole . Representatives of cr:,TCPOA British Adm:i.relty and 20th 1\.F are at present conferring
on OKJJ\fA~ fA as to the most effective manner for :httndling such integration.- ~Vill
advise you of' de.velopments. Also see my ll0834.

12 Olf-46 CINCPA.C ADV TO COMINCH..,

Reference-""nri"ssion of Capt Frankel CINCP~~c a}Y...,roves of aerological plans
submitted by Capt Orville and 1w.kes the follo'tir ing recornrnendations . (A) l~stab
lish a duplex radio telety;e circuit betwee:a GUt~:i a.nd a station to be located a
at KHABJ\J?.O'i!SK or hdqtrs Soviet Far East Comr:na,nd vJi-th tentative tre<nsmission
freouencies from GU4Jvi 7580 Kcs 10445 Kcs 17930 I(cs and transmission frequencies
fror~ KH.cWA.r'?:OilSK 7350 Kcs 10200 Kcs 18030 Kcs. (B) EstB.blish a simplex m1:U1t1Al.

- Continued -

3381

circuit connecting a station to be located at P'!::~ROPAVLOVSK vrith the station

at KIH13.'JLOVSK w"ith .frequencies to be designated by the Soviets. (C) Assemble
the com.rn.unic tion and aorologica.l material and personnel in the U. s. (D) In
the event 11egotiations completed prior assembly material contained in recommendation (A) initial establisbment of simpJkx manual circuit connecting GU U~1
.P.nd KII'i.BAr OVSK reco.:Jraended u.sing GUAl1 . traJ1S!~rl.tting frequencies.

Minutes of 21 June conference on signal (x'adio) i~te1ligence plan are

concurred in subject to following comments.
I ovement and establishment of radio intelligence units except vrhere already provided for in troop movement schedules 2..nd base development ..J . ans
are contingent upon:
Availg.bili"C.y of necessaX"~J shipping spa,ce .
1
2 . Ability of those responsible for base development in each area concerned to provide the sites facilities and services reouired for
~
operation ~nd m.o3.ntenance of these units.
B. Cie'Cuit referred to in subpa..ra lS B(l) as l'.:rnry ntlllitplex circtLi.t is the
Strategic .i.r Force au....r OKr"'AVlA multiplox telet;,...-1e circuit (using !Ia:vy
sup )lied multiplex) 1 channel of which has been allocated by S'trati\.il"For
f'or RI use .
c. Paras 10 & ll. Do not concur in plan for 2 ~\F direction finder stations
on already cvowded r.JO Jll.fii . 1 such station now O)era.ted there by 3th
radio sqdn mobile . Consider it could be made to serve both }i'EAF and 20th
AF . As alternative consider FEAF and 2oth AF could arrange for simiL..1.r
dual use of S'trat.Air POA station on GUAM.
l2 1000 CGUSFGT TO CGUS
CF3X

695.

F:~Ac, GGS.;:,_l, CGl?..:J 1.F

Irfft'O CIECPAC ADV, CGJ.l;.AF , CGADVZCl!

J~AF .

'rhis Hea.dqur.rters concurs in p:ciori ty of targets recomrnended in TopSec

CAKX 15388 ref !.r ~IJ..)A secret rdo 23484 please confirm last city nc.med in 23484
as it nas .barbled in transit. Ref yom" top sec CX 24399 in vievJ of status of
PZI.?IITG as a Chinese Kational Shrl:ne vre must insist that any contemplated
bombing attacks on tl1is city be cleared thru ChiP.a Theater . FUrther we desire
to reemphasize the necessity for precision bonbing of targets in ~ny Chinese
city. Area bombings of c rowded Chinese cities in occu_, ied arc,a s of CH:UL.
would result in more deaths and hardship among friendly Chinese thc-tn among
Japs 5

Arey has not o,greed to my proposn.l that the e:d.sting arrangement a.t
OKIEAJ A sho~:ld be contint-ed in effect. Hy modified )roposal is contained in
c,l"~.graphs 2 to 6 and enclosure of JCS JJ..~06/2 Tihich e.re quoted herewith for
..
your inform.ation .~nd conr :ent.
As stated in JCS JJJ-06/1, cr ~:Cil.F";)AC and the Conrru.U1der in Chief
HParct 2..
US Padific Fleet (CI HC_) ~:.c) have nade a Joint Logistic Plan for the 01~YMPIC
Ooere.tion in -rhich have been integrated carefully the .Elt3.tters of :riorities
of be:--.se development, alloc:1tion of ro j ects and the nove!n.ent of sup )lies into
the a.rea, e. nd have set u 1 service .::orces fo "' their im_le~nentation. CIPCP__c
h as been cha ged 1J ith the res )Onsibility for ba se devcloiJment on OKIN .. / L. 11J.1is
res?:Jonsibility hRs causea h ira to ;?.llot Fmch of the HavDJ~ Construction Engineer:
t-..hcse develo 'ments
to Ar r.1.v develonments. Undoubtedly -\;i1en e:,, nd i f control of
.,_
'l
)...
.
'
""
'cl
is passed to the :_nly Lo will cont Lnue t o .?J.lo-t a s may oe Jract.~cao e ur1:t:cs
~

Continued -

3382

of t h ese c onstru ct i on battalions t o the me et ing of lr rny requirements. If

t his cont:Col of develo Jment 6i' Arrny fac ::.liti es i s . to be transferred a s recommen ded it is n-cr tuKlersLanding t hat the control of the development of ' rnzyfields both f or t he Ar :Jy Strategic !..ir ? orce a nd t he Far Eastern Air ?orce
;;rill be incl uded in the trazlSfer.
npara. 3.
Both during OIJTilPIC c-:.nd in the cont inuin~:; future OKIN.:~lA VIill be
a ~)riraary nava l base 2n control of a vital sea area and a.n. air base. During
OLY'l.IEPIC and ; erha:)S for a short :Jeriod thereafter in.portant facilities and
developments are required for use by the .Arm~)T forces
invasion.
HPara 4.
As ste:ted in JCS J1J..06/l I 2.Jn doubtful as to the wisdom of disturbing this agreed organiza tion w'hich is noYl at 1rork a nd ~;regressing vvell. However if the Chief of Staff US Arrny has strong convictions that more effective
progress in the L)rosecution of OI,Y1il'IO uill be effected by the transfer to
CINCAFPAC of the responsibility for the development of faci]j_ties considered
essential f or l1is OIJerations ahd full control thereof including the logistics
involved i acquiesce. This transfer of control .to CIN'CAFPAC to include full
responsibility for ru1d control of development of all A~ installations and
projects in the ~-~YUKYUS (including those for the .llrmy strategic .Air Force)
movement of Army Stll)plies into the area and such harbor and unloading i'a.cilities therefor as shall be mytually agreed to by the 2 commanders concerned.
npara 5
In view of the fact that the defense 0of the HYUIITLJS is pr:Lrn.aJ.---ily
integrated to the general naval defense of the sea areas of the Pacific
Ocean Areas that the defense is primarily air. and naval in nature and according to agreed plan is being implemented by prepondera.n.tly naval air and naval
surface forces res_Ponsibility for the defense of the RYUKYUS should rema.in
~.nth the Comm.e,nder in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINGPOA.) as is the case
with ever-y- other position in the POA.. Such f rmy fotces as may be required in
the defense of the H.YO'KYUS from time to time should be assigned by GIHCAL?FAC
to the operatio1~il control of CINCPOA.
HPara 6.
Accordingly I propose dispatching the attached message (Enclosure
follo~Is. ldessage to the CinC US ArhlY Forces Pacific and CinC of Pacific Fleet.
Para 1. CI NCPAC in consult<.;.t ion with GIEG ..\F .?AC :Till arrange to transfer
to the latter at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 August
responsibility f or and control~ of c.ll Arroy ru.1.d .Arnw Air ~i'orce (including
Army Strategic Air Force) installations and develo) ment projects :Ln the
RYU:KYUS the movement of i\..rmy troops and supplies into _the area and such
harbor and . unloading facilities t :1erefor e,.s shall be .mutually agreed to
bet1:ie~n them. Control of all US fu."nry forces loca:'ced in the RYUKYUS includ-ing t h e lOth ..' rrey- will pass to CI NCAJ.i'7AC except as indicated in the last
paragraph belovT.
Para 2. Siclilar~ CINCPAC will retain responsibility for and control of
all naval an d n&.val air insta l lations and developc1ent projects in the
~lYUKYUS. 'l11e movenent of nava l forces and supplies into the area, and
harbor and unloading fa ciliti es th~refor as shall be mutually agreed to
betvJ-een them.. Control of all US naval forces in the R.YUKYUS vd.ll be vested in CINCPAC.,
Para 3. 'lne def ense of the RYUKYUS Area a.nd its milita ry gove rnment vd.ll
rernain a resy onsibi li ty of CI:NCPOA in a ccordance vrith existing directives.
For t his purpose CIIICAFPAC 1Hil l a ssign t o t he oper a tioncl control of
CTI!CPAC such US ll.:rrrry Force s as may be required f rom t :ilne to tirae. End
of Enclosure).un

of

12 1015 CGUSFCT r20 .QJ!JCP ~ IH~..C IiJiC CGSOSCT , Cat:U::U0FCT , CGJ.4.\F ,-JA.I1COS.
CFBX 689.
Preparation f or FORT BAYAHD is subject. You.r remar k s and recornmende.tions are recru.ested on the follovfing:
A- CHIHA The::.ter ' s -r cs_:;onsibilities in conV(J'{J ope_ation .
- Continued -

33 83

 _c.

l2 1015 CGUSFCT TO CINCPAC CINCAFPAC INFO CGSOSCT ,CGREUSFCT, CGJJt.AF, WARCOS

{CONT t D)

13o:t~S'Jt1NF

B-N&val harbor facill.tiezy~quired at FORT BAYARD and availability thereof

to ClllC. PAC reference $\;OJ U S including movement to FORT BAYARD.

c-Nature and extent of command an~ liaison required between forces or CINCPAC
and CINCAFPAC and CHINA '!'heater involved in FORT BAYARD operatica. It a
conterence is believed necessary' on the above, let us lmow.

l2

~59

9INCAFPAC TO CINCPAC ADV DEPOOlW' 20.

ex

24942. JCS radiogram WX 29914 dated lOth approves plan PASTEL as amended.
CINCAFPAC 's detailed implementation plan requires final coordination prior
to completion. Invitation extended deception representative your headquarters to donterence here 17th JulT with CHINA Theater and CINCAFPAC repre.s entatives for that purpose. Advise.
ll 21.35 q<J4INCH

AND

CNO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO C0!7THFL'l'.

Snbmit by dis}8tch your cohcrete proposals tor reorganizatiO,D of naval.

forces SIP subject to following considerations.
(A) Reorganization of Service Foree 7thFlt should be accomplished earliest
practicable and is not contingent upon departure ot CaJQthFlt for JAPAB.
(B) Naval bases in the PHILIPPINES will pass to jurisdiction of 8canander
Fbilippine Sea Frontier.
(C) Upon the l'eoftF'i zation of Service Force 7thFJ.t am establisbmeut; of
Service Squadron 7, Cogpander US naval forces AUSTRALIA-N'!J/ GtJINEA will
be established. !tds cODDand will function under 80DQthFlt un:til CINCSWPA
relinquishes area responsibility to British at which time CaDdr Daval.
facilities will report to CINCPOA direct.
(D) Concurrent~ with change in area responsibilit7 or sooner i f you so desire
the ADUIRALTY ISLANDS should pass to CINCPOA ttu.-isdicticn and represent&-:
tions will be made to the JCS dependent upon your e<mlllents.
(E) llaintain in PHILIPPINE Area naval force sufficient to coutain Japanese
force rendning in SINGAPCilE Area.

l3 073lllACARBf

TO CINCFOA ADV, CG CHDlA. CX>MAAF INFO CTF 95~

2Sl9
CINCPOA ADV HQ 1101.5.3 giving composition of TF 95 and ildtial movemerd;s,
11.014.6 giving initial. missica TF 95 azxtll2.336 requesting strikes on enemy
air bases and other appropriate targets are references
Candr Allied Air Forces will:
(l) Subject to concurrence ComGen CHINA Theater strike airfields and other
appropriate targets with heaviest strikes within capabilities in the
SHANGHAI area. and FORMOSA on date of initial. sweep of TF 95.
(2) Inform. CINCPOA ADV HQ and C'l'F 95 of strike interdis earliest possible."
Para. CINCPOA ADV HQ iequ.ested to motity tlais ~rs with into to AAF
and ADV HQ FEAF OKINAWA date or intial sweep.
Request concurrence CG CHINA Theater on strikes SHANGHAI area with into
to above addees.

dt

lJ 0749 Q!NCPAC ADV '1'0 g<>!IDICH.

Your ll2159 I am concerned at the degree to which the processes ot
reorganization and changes involved in arrr new conmand arrangements ror 3 3 8 4
OKINAWA will absorb effort and create confusion during the critical 3 and
-;
one halt months rE~Dajning before the OLIMP!C aasaul.t. During this all too
brief period a stupendous base developneut task is to be accOmplished. The
latest reports show that this task is well in hand. Construction is accelerating and during the lst lO dqs of J1icy' approximate:cy- .350,000 tons of cargo

e,.+.. rd

l3 U/49 CINCPAG. ADV TO COMINQH

( CON!'INUED)

wre unloaded.
Ccmnenting on the specific proPo&al.s of JCS

that:

U06/2

I wish to point Ol1t

ot paragraph 2 "lie w1ll continue te allot as ma_y be

practicable units of these construction battaliOD.S to the meeting of
A.1:tq requirements" is undesirable. Actua.J.:cy-, al.though 4 and J/4 coDatructicn BD.s are now working on A.r.ar3' airfields in order to get them
activatecl prompt:cy- for tactical reasons, current plans call tor gradnall7
tranaterring these battalions to naval and to general isl.and develo}JIIm'tj
The excess ot naval engineering effort over naval requirements w:Ul ap.
proximate requirements of and should be used on projects ot coauon nece&.
sit7.and. defense which will be naval responsibilities under JOS 1406/2"
It would be better if no cCIIIIIIitment were made on the JOS leTel concerning
use of NCBs on A.r.ar3' projects.
(B) As of 7 Juq Zl and l/2 BCBs are present of which 15 and 3/4 (incluctina
S and 1/2 regular Bns, 6 stevedore :sns, .2 Pontoon Bns and 1 Truck Bn)
were on general island developact, 3 on Daval base conatructicm., 4 aDd l/2
em naval and llarl.ne airfields and 4 and l/4 on Arl1lr airfields. Of 32
Arttv Eng:t neer Brls }lNsent 13 were assigned to general isla.Dd develo~
and 19 to Ariq airfields. The catego17 ot "general island develo~t"
which includes work on roads, waterfront, water supp]T, tuel s;ystema,
cargo discharge aDd supp~ dumps and which now absorbs 28 and 3/4 out of
59 and 1/2 Bns will decrease iD relatiw priorit7. llaD7 of the COJIIII)D
projects be allocated to either A.r.ar3' or Nav. H~ever to avoid iapeding the whole effort presetdi engineering plans JDI18t remain virtual.q
unchanged . and the separaticm or service responsibilities sst take place
alolrq and c~. It w:Ul probab]T be necesaarr to continue supervision of CCIIID.OD projects by COJDlen 10 for a considerable period. RecQIment addition to paragraph .3 ot the directive of a sentence approximate]T
as follows. 0 'lbe Commanding General l.Ot;h Arlq aiMl his Headquarters aDd
also the present Island Cmunander OKINAWA will continue to act for Cllln>AC
as at present in connection with defense and dn'el.opaeuts of CaDIDOD
necessit7 untU released under arrangements mutuall.T agre~ble to Cili:Al'PAC
(A) The assUrance

amd CINCPAC"

aa D. heart7 agreement with paragraJits .3 atd 5 at JCS 1406/2 as drafted

b7 70U It is 1118' intenticm to use OKINAWA as a base not o~ tor OLDIPIC
and CORO!lft but also tor extending control by' the Pacific Fleet iaitial.:q
over Uhe EAST CHINA SEA and as rapid:q as possible OV'er the YELLCW SEA
and the SEA OF JAPAN. The Naval Operating Baae at OKINAWA is vital. to the
readiness of the neet for effective support; o! OLDIP.IC;'\
(C)

l3

cY/5~

CIHCPAC ADV TO COMINUJj INFO COKZTHFLT ,CINQAFPAC,qOMPHILSEAFROH,CINCPAC fflAll!t

OOMSERVPAC.
.
. Your 112.l.35 not to all adclees. Following recomendations are submitted.
See rq 080,301 and Com'lthFlt ~14.

(A) On 15 Augwst ComServFor'7thFlt change titl.e to CanServRon 7. ServRon 7 be-

come \Ulit of Serv'Pac assigned to operational control of CQB'7thFlt to render service to all fleet units in RIILIPP.INESj
(B) Ettective 15 August establish C<Dnander U S Naval Forces AUSTRALIA NEJJ
GUINEA to function under Caa7thFlt until COOSWPA rel:.t.Dquishea area respcxl8ibilit7 to British at which time C<Ddr US Naval Forces AusrRA.I..IA.-m:W
GUINEA report. to CINCPAC direct.
(C) Ettective 15 August pass to comma.nd ot ComPhil.Sea.Fron all naval shore

facilities including Naval Air Bases in the PHILIPPINES and to CanNavFor

AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA all US naval and naval air tacUities in SWPA outside
PHILIPPINES except KANUS.
33 85
- Continu.ed -

. l3 0751 CINCPAO ADV TO OOMINCH INFO C<JlZTHFLT, CINOAFPAC. COMPHILSEAFRON 1El'C.(C<:mD)

I

(D) EtfectiTe em or betore establishment of NBW BRITISH command area transfer

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS to the Pacific Ocean Areas.
(E) Etfectin l5 Au.gust CCIJi7thRlibFor with flagship aDd statf detached 7thl'lt
report to ComadbsPac. other UDits JlClr in 7thfbibFor pass to CC!IDIMJid ot
ComadbsPac bombatant units to be reallocated to meet current operational
requirements and. ather units to forma subordinate command ot AdComEhtbsPac
to render service to all PhibsPac units in the miUPP.J:BS.
(F) When na British cOJIIIWld area is formed all British ~val forces rea:i.rd.Dg
in Pacific '!'heater pass to command of CINC BPF . .
(G) On 1 October CailthFlt pass to CamFidl.SeaFra operational control of all
units then under his command except. those otherwise assigned by CINCP.AC
to meet OLDIPIC requirements. At this time Air7thFlt change ruuae to Air
Fhil.SeaFron and pass to operational control CanFhil.SeaFron.
(H) On 1 October Com.Ph1l.SeaFron report to CINCPAC for duty as a fleet task
force cc:amander under the operational control of CIR::SWPA in comand of
naval forces assiped by' CINCPAC tor dutT within PHILIPPINE Sea Frontier.
These foreee to he sufficient to contain Japanese naval forces in SINGAP9RE
Area.

l3 08;1 OINCAFPAC TO CDJCPAC A,pV INFO COJffl'HFLT. CG AFWESPA.C,CG6T!W14I.CCJ4SERVPAQ,

CINCPAC

~ARt,

ax 25216.

Cite :your 0909fn Location of Naval Base north ot YAllAGAWA , KO

T.AKASU concurred in. Artq plans no facilities in this area.
!his also answers JOUr 080802Z.
instead

ot at

lJ 0901 5m!CPAC JJ>V TO CQWNCB

CTF 3S, DCBO.

& CNO

INFO

CCJlAIRPAC,CIN'CPOA PEjRL.COJQRDFLT .OOM5:f1Gt .

Concur in princ:lple with 7our 091.314 except consider l Februa17 and l November 1.946 to be more appropriate dates. 'l'o assist in planning the changeonr

in carrier air group ccmp1aaents the .tollCMimg rec0111D8ndati0118 are sul:ID:itteda

(A) Changeover to .36 VB CVLGs be made as soon as practieabl.e. CVIG1 s tor
CVL-48 Class be 24 VF and 24 VBF
(B) No model. distinction betiween VF and VBF and all. smgl.e-seaters on aDT l.
carrier to be same model. VF and VBF in ~VBG s and CVG' s to be about ha.l.l
and hilt.
(C) Increase VF(P) in CVG's frcm 2 to 4.
(D) No change in night groups or units.
(E) CVEGt s aad MCVGt s l8 VBF and 12 VSB.
(F) standard and spotting CompRons 20 VF and 9 VSB as soon as practicable.~
AS/I CompRons 12 VF am 1; VSB.
strongl;r recQDIDlend careful anaqsis VF requirements contained in above caaents
before Cutting back VF production.

1.3 10.3.3 RICHARDSON TO CINCPAC ADV. CG CPBC.

RJ

65600.

Inasmuch as

arrr dcmnvrard

revision of categoey of defense would release,

~, disproportionate to
the resulting l.oss of efficiency and security, it is recoliiD8nded that no c
change be made in the present modification of category of defense B. This
answers y-our radios 191.3.35 June 'l'QPLSETO DKE 2359 J~ also.

tor other use, Arm3' personnel in limited rmmbers

' 3386

{\

13 1309 CINCAFPAC ,'1'0 CDlCPOA 4DV. CG US ARMY STRAT AF (WASH) INFO VIAR.COS. QGFEAF,
CG AAF 20, DEPOOJl AAF 20.

ex 25301.

In view of WAROOS .30889 ot 12th, not to all, conference propoeeci tor this
headquarters 20 Juq ia our C.I 24785 for coordination of air operations is
now suggested for l August in order that General Spaatz ComGen u.s. Artq
strategic Air Force can be present. , Action addees please conc't.lr 'or camnent
With into to all.

lJ ]Jll. 9INCAFPAQ TO CINCPAC @V INFO CQYA..Al

ox 25302.
Concur in your l2f:ll2 reference maintaining axistiDg arrangements on

operational control ot FYAW and .. discussion ot ntAW preparati<m for Mure

operations at UANILA Coil.terence

13132) RUNNER TO

OOU~PAg' (PASSED TO OINQPAC ADV FOR

IBfp).

RUNNER 3rd li>re into area between 39-ll and 39-20. J4ade zig zag search
, up coast passing within l mile ot l. SAKE, 0 SAKI, SANGAN SHllll and OHAKO SAKI.
Also east west searches on Lat lines 39-101 l4 and J.a. Tanker and escorts
seen hugging beach.- Anti submarine vessels traversed area treell' Gear
work:illg pertect:cy-. Consider this survey shows definite absence of defensive
minefields offshore this area. lO d.qs practice has made evaluati011 of ccotacts less ditficult. Resurveyed vicinit;y of 36-Y! 140-50 today' approaching
fran direction of shore. !his revealed that the v.icinity is defiD:it~ clsar.'
Complete report on sOuthem ARWESLCNQJ'NDW WX 08001, 65775, 2 AUC 2.3 IVPP
OK"TRA ,36-40N l41-20E
09 1M2 COMGEN AIR . TO CG FEAF

Wmx29026.

INFO

CGMFPOA (BOI'B HQ)

AdDdDiatration of Air Force UDits ia ~AIIAI AREA is subject. Do nat;

tbiDk the creation o:t another numbered Air Force tor tbia.~purpoae is duirabl.e
at this time Retmad. CX 2.3l.68 dated 4 J~ l945i l possibilit;y is by the 5th
and ]3th AF absorbing the coabat UDita aDd eerrtce elements of the 7th Ar
ud using the Hdqtrs 7th AF to adm.inj ster the J.rwT air units not in FEAF
and proposed USASTAF in the HAWAIIAN AREA. This plan is now Within the capabilities o! the theater and appears to be the simplest solution. I~lana
and couments desired.
lO

0450

AIR
soss.In furtherance of the p10posal
which I

CG AAFPOA TO CG FEAF INFO CG

discussed with you. and General

KacArthur in IIAHILA. regarding the establisbraent of a DQIJiberecl air torce in
HAWAII I have dispatched a message to Gen Richat'd. . with into copies to 10'0.
and General Arnold (see 19' 10102'1 Ju.:cy-) This message contained the proposal
on which I intended to request Admiral Nimitz concurrence of July llth aDd
on wlich Gen. Richardson might commemt. In vi of the into contained in
WARX 29026, date time grOttp 09lM2 J'licy1 addressed to yoa, I feel that I
must now su.spend &'f1l' presentation ot the mambered Air Force proposal to
Admiral Nimitz., The 7th. AF is nor~ yours. General Arnold. s message appears
to coneur im. the basic idea of establishing a DQIJibered Air Force in HAWAII.
D:Ltticult.y arises on:cy- in the clisignation o:r a numbered Air Force Hdqtre to
do the job.' I will be ver.r much interested in receiving a copy ef your rep:cy-

to General .ArDoU.'

3387

12 2019 WARCOS TO ~INCAFPAC INFO CG USA.FMIDPAC. DEPOOMAf20 (PASSED 'fO CINCPOA AD!)
,AL"5t>

F~5$ed.

t:>l

tz.oM.vW-C.I:-l

..

13t9H-I

WARX .30889.
Conference proposes tor 20 Jul;r in Va:nila, reference your ex 243..52 and
CX 247851 at which United states strategic Air Force iD Pacific should be
represented, is subject.
Para. In view ot the importance of the United states An!;" strategic
Air Forces to be established as in WARI 304.38, Cau.GenAir is very desirowl
of having General Spaatz represent him persODal.J.T at the conf'erence in
llanila.
Para .Since General Spaats can not be present in llanil& \llll;U 1 August
would it materia.l.J.T interfere with your pJaming to postpone the conference
from 20

,--.

Juq

to 1 August.

12 2215 CCKGENFEAF SGD KmNEI

A

to

CO:U:GENAAFPOA.

759.3.3.

Refer~ce your Top Secret message 5053 loth: Following is message s a

General Arnold under date ot 11th Jul3:
"Reference 70ur W.X: 29026 9th recommend atfmi n:i stration ot Air Force
units in Hawaii b7 the 7th Fie):lter Wing now there, this wing slight:ll'
augmented is capable ot handling the Arlq Air part or the defense tor that
Area. i'bis augmentation can be taken .traa 1 o.t the fighter wings now set
up on the redeployment schedule. 7th. Air Force, augmented by' redepl0f8d
UDits, plJv's an essential part in the plans tor both OLYKPIC and CORONET.
If this headquart;era is abolished or detached it will be necessary to create
another head.quarters ot similar eize to handle the air units assigned to
the suceeasi~ areas and missions now set up tor the 7th Air Force."

12

00]4 C~f'!iPT tg CINCAFPAC infg ADQQMPHIMPAC 1 CTF 72 1 CTf 76 1 CINCPAC ADV

HQ, COKPHIBSPAC.

The following CCIDI!lents on Cirlcpoa ADV 080,301 are based upon certain
assumptions which han nat; been discussed in the preposed reorganization
of units na~r in the 7th Fleet. Prior to separation from StiPA proTision
should be made regarding the dnties ot COJJi7thFleet# as CIIF.
2. Provision should be made tor corxtrol of naval bases in MANUS, NEW'
GUmEA and AUSTRALIA and a command designated to be responsible tor their
.
roll up.
.3 Pro'fision should be made for the Operational CODtro1 Of submarines
SWPA. SUbject to the above. Concur with A B C E F G aad H Also concur
im principle with D except that date of tra.nS.ter should be not before 1
September and preferable later. N subject. It is suggested that
urmecessary reorganization can be avoided, with the last possibility ot
contusion during the critical period of mounting our forces or the OLDPIC
operation, i t the transfer of naval shore facilities from control ot
ComServ 7th neet to Com PSF is delayed u:ntil after 1 October. Exact date
to be determined later. On that date Com 7th Fleet reports to Cincpac
for duties in OLDIPIC and CPSF will have control of naval shore facilities
through ComSeron 7.
1.3 l.941 WARCOS to GINCAFPAC into CGUSAFMIDPAC, DEPCOMAF
CINCPOA ADV.

X),

COMINCH PASSED TO

3388

WI

13 21.05 CQM3RDFLT to. CTF 'II, CTF 3$. COMBATRON 2. C<JmATDIV Z :ipfo COMINOH. CINCPAC
BOTH HQ, COUSUBPAO. AIL FLAG OFFICERS 3RD FLT. CTF
COMF AIHmlG 18, COMGEN 2lb'1' BOJ&JlK)}l.

9J 1 CQFEAF, COM MARIANA,

This is annex A-1 to nv Op-Plan 9-45. Kovement and attack schedule

subsequent \o 21 Juq. See ~q 2'6l2Z1 June.
Para. Completion replenishment at 1600 2l ~fl Task Force .38 proceed
via direct route to point click to arrive 1200 23 u:q. Thence proceed
to launching position vicinity la.t .31-30 Long l35-00 to arrive 0430 24
J~. Conduct sustained strikes against combatant naval strength KURE,
sweep MIHO, strike air and. air installatiou KURE-KOBE area. At dusk
commence diversion retiranerrt; toward OKINAWA then proceed to launching
position vicinity lat .32-00 Long l36-J.O to arrive 0430 25 Juq. Jlake
ststained strikes against naval caabatant; strength KURE-KOBE area, sweep
MAIZURU1 ~trike air and air installations KOBE-NAGOYA area. At dusk
proceed to fueling rendezvous Lat 28-00 lDng JJS-00 to arrive CT/00 26
Ju:Qr.
Para. Fuel and replenish uutil 1200 Ju.l.T when proceed to launching
position vicinity Lat .3.3-00 Long 138-30 to arrive 0400 28 J~ strike air
and air installations in TOKYo-NAGOYA area. At d.uak retire to southward
until time to arrin launching position vici!rl:t;y Lat .33-30 Long 138-30 at
0400 .30 Juq. Continue strikes as for 28 J~.
P

Para. Task UDit 34.8.1 be prepared bombard HAKAMATSU area of HONSHU

at aboUt 2.300 28 ~ or about 1200 30 Juq as specific~ directed later

rejoiniDg Task Force .38 on completion. ADino al.lowance 30 rounds 8 and 16
inch HC per gun. C'l'F .38 provide night fighters or CAP tor Task Unit 34.S.J.
as required.
Para. Completion strikes .30 Ju:cy- Task Force 38 proceed to fueling
rendezvous Lat. 28-00 Long ]38-00 to arrive 1200 31 Jul1'.
Para. Com.tuel 1200 l August Task Force .38 preceecl to launching position
Ticinity Lat. 3~-40 1.3.3-30 to arrive 0430 2 August. Conduct sustained
strikes against shipping SASE'BO, sweep FUSAN shipping, strike air and a.ir
installations northern KYiJSRU-KURE area. At dusk proceed via Lat. Z7-S5
IAmg l37-40 and Lat. 28-35 Long. ~; to fueling remezvou Lat .3,3.30
Long 147..00 to arrive 0500 ; August.
Para. Compfuel S August proceed .via point CHARM to launching point
vicinity point LIFE or via points CHARM and SCIENCE to launching point
vicinity point CAZETTE as later directed accordance later instructions
launch air strikes against air and air installations in TOKIO PLAINS area
vicinity LIFE or against same targets north HONSHtJ-HOKKAIBO f'rom T.i.cinitJ'
GAZE'rl'E comm.ciDg dawn 7 August. Retire east at suck and retum at da1m
to contuue strikes from. same position on S August.
Para. Task Unit 34,.8.2 be prepared bombard HONSHU or HOKKAIDO targets
on 7 or 8 August as later directed. CTF 38 furnish CAP for Task Unit
34.8.2 as required.
Para. Task Force 37 be prepared operate in conjunction with Task Force
38 in accordaace this schedule as practicable. Also be prepared tor separate
operations 011 north HONsmJ-HOIK.AIDO targets during this period. llov'emeut; and
attack schedule for Taak Force 37 by separate annex later.
Para. Present intention return Task Forces to bases upon completion
ot strikes 8 AugUst.
Para. All of above schedule subject to chatlge due to weather and
tactical deve1opments.
Para. All positions nort,h and east and times I ( -9).

33 89

l3 21.45 CO!QRDFLT TO-- CINCPAC ADV INFO CG2l.BWCOM,COJmARIANAS.CTG99.2.CGlO.COJlAIR IWO,

COMFEAF,OTF93.CTf38,CTF~.ALL TGC TF -38.
.
-.

Request you institute following coordination plan connection Annex Al JV

OpPl.an 9-45. Jfy 132105. Throughout period .cmcerned colltinuation maxilDQII practicable etrort of air forces against the Fm.pire. Speci.tical.:cy' request following: By OKINAWA Air. On 24 & 25 JuJ max:i.mum effort KIUSHU fields striking
fie~ds northem KYUSHU all possible. 28 Jul3 strike northem KYUSHU and
sweep KURE area fields. Repeat on .30 Juq major concentratitG on KURE area.
1 A~t maxil'JIIlll effort northern KYUSHU fields. 2 August southern KIUSHU

fields.

BT Task Force 93: on 24 & 25 July maximum effort; NAGOYA area airfields.
28 a.nd 30 JtLcy" .maximum effort KOBE Area airfields. l August and 2 August
maxi mum effort KOBE-NAGOYA airfields.
21 BomCaa: Continuation basic stategic plan best request foll<M'ing eceptiona it at varian8e with such plan. 2lv-25 Ju:cy- attack air facilities
TOKYO PLAINS area. 1 or 2 August TOKYO-NAGOYA area air f'acilitiee.

In setting up coordination request strikes on the areas assigned to

OKDWf! and. lWO air be b7 groups staggered throughout the days in questica
to keep eneav air constant~ occupied and thus reduce air retaliaticm pc.Jtential
Unforeseen delqs may preclude adhering aactq to schedule in which ease

CINCPAQ is requ.est;ed i t practicable to adjust coordination accordinH to

accomplish the ettect herein outlined.

14 0255 CINCPAC ADV TO CIN04FPAC

J1.r pl.aJming start })ave been giving cmside:rable atteaticn to compliame
JCS WARX 17064 (142.307 June). It would be extremeq helpful it l. or more ot

rour

planners cou1d visit GUAM about 20 Ju:Qr !or a briet ccoterence concera-

ing occupation plans and ineidental.J3 orient 1118' planners connection your
CORONET concepts as they now stand.

14 0256 CINCPAC AJ!JV TO CINC4FPAC

IHFO<DIINCH, CG US.ASTAf DEPQOM USASl'Af.
;
Your 1.31.309.

Dela\r untill.

August of conference concern:irlg air coo:rdi.Da-

tion ~IC first requested by your dispatch CX 24152 of 9 Jul:T is agreeable

to me. Request information as tG whether you now propose a conference CD
the statf level between planning representatives of CINCAFPAC , CINCPAC and.
C(J(G.EN USASTAF or a conference between the Commanders themselves.

14 0901 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCAFPAC .DEPCCJ420. CTF93 Into CGFEAF ,CINCPOA PEARL. COK3RDFLT
CTF 3S, CTF

37

132145. Will appreciate your cooperation in coordinated air strikes at

places and times desired by C~rdFlt 132145 insofar as practicable. "4 '
Request you in:f'orm. this Hq and info addees of your intent am firm plans

3390

l4

21.33 C(J.{GENF\IFPAC to CIMCPAC ADV HQ into CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COM 3RD FLEET,
COM 5TH PHIBFOR, COMGEN SERVCOMD F.MFPAC, COMGEN 5THPHIBCORPS, COOGm

4TH MARDIV.

int regt. as ground force required to

Consider 1 MarDiv (reinf) less
accomplish your 110832. 4th MarDiv nominated. Earliest date to eGIIID8DCe
moutl"Ging from MAUl 15 September with target date pending on rehearsal
requirements naval forces to be employed. Reinforcing UDits nominated and
presenli location as follows: Sth and lOth Amt#racs bns. MAUl. 1 Co 1st
Armd Amph .Bn. SAIPAN. 4th Am]:il Trk Co and 1 Prov Amph Trk Co. JWJI.

1 baab disposal plat. GUAM. Vll()-4. MAUl. lst' rocket; det. llAUI. 1
ProT hea'1' morliar co. MAUl. _ 4.3rd NCB. MAUl. This Will require folldld.Dg
substitutions be made for units nCIIf scheduled tor emplQ1DLent with VAC.
4th and 9th ADrt;rae Bns at GUAM substituted for Sth and lOth Amf:,rac Bns.

1 NOB to be assigned to 2nd lrarDiv at SAIPAN to be su.bstituted for 43rd

NCB. Earl.1' approval desired. aboYe tentatiw t!'QOp list in order that
changes indicated in unit assignments to VAC mq be effected at earliest
practicable date. Contemplated that no garrison forces are provided fraa
above assault force.

l5

(Yf28

CINCPAC ADV to COgDFLEET info CTF

.38

Insure that CTF .38 Op-Order 2-45 modified to contom. with objectives
y-our 0.30SlS and rq ll2.33S to the end that eDell\1 com'batant vesael.s raaa 1 ni ng
TOKYO BAY are destroy'8d

lS

f1720 OINCFOA ADV HQ to CINCAFPAC into COMINCH.

RDIITZ TO MACARTHUR INFO KING.

It is not quite 2 months since our conference in MANILA at which we
2S423 DTG UD72~ and as I thowzht
discussed... th!A~Ub..1eeta covered bJr :r~

ex

arr:Lvect a:" wuu.er~andlllgS wM.Ch, a:L'tllougll they- reprei8ll'tea conceasloDi ~Cit

were te serve as the basis tor eur preparations tor OLDIPIC
both
ted time aTailable. Pursu.a.nt to those understandings I haw
in the
released to you all the major combat elements ot the Arlq then under lilT
control except the bea4quartera l.Otb Arsrq, headquarters 24th Corps, the
7th and the 27th Inta.nlir.r Divisions and various attached units all of
which are still engaged in mopping up operations on OIURAWA but all of
which are b)r a greement or by accepted plans available to y-ou for OLDIPIC

sitt!t

or CORONET as y-ou desire.

Para. It is trae that relativel~' tew serrlce.. ~troops have been. rel.eased
to you but that is because as was well knolfm t~ existed in the Pacific
Ocean-Areas a shortage of Arlq Service Troops for Arlq purposes which bas
been part~ but onq part:cy- aUeViated. by- the use of naval. personnel to
fill Arlq deficiencies.
Para. My" 080.301 Jul;r asked y-our comuent or concurrence on matters
which pert;ained. to the internal organization or the 7th Fleet and spec1ca.].4r left under your operational control the naval. forces assigned. to
your area. Similar reorganizations have been mad.e within the ArlriT forces
in the Pacitic Ocean Areas without reference to me.
Para. I will be glad to confer with you again in. connection with these
pr0blems at any time that you can arrange to be qr guest at Guam for tbat
purpose. current operations will require uq presence here tor a considerable
period.

3391

..

l2 1145 CGUSFCT to WARCOS info GGREUSFCT. CGSOSCT, CGUSFIBT, CINCPAC, CINCAFPAC,

COMG.t!NAAFR>A.

FBI 717.
1. Utiilisation ot FORT BAYARD is subject. Reference t4'ad WARX 22283,
b.ARI 25857 and WAU Zl72 (last 2 radios were not sent to all and are
not required to understand this :radio). China theater has completed
the stuey of materiel and personnel refl0"1N8S required by CinNA theater
tor this project and available to CHINA theater and DIDIA BURMA theater.
2. The results of this stucb" are as tol.l..ows: A. FORT BAYARD will be used
by CHINA theater as an auxll1ar.r temporarr sapp:cy- base w.i.tJl a11 air and
auxiliary ground line of communication forward to support CARB)NAOO
modified. Target date tor 2nd report area is 15 Augus1; 1945. B. The
capacity of the port area is to be 5 liberty ships or their equival.Slt
Type cargo delivered forward initial.l1' will be ~:Qr
per month.
drummed oil. D. Personnel requirements in FORT BAYARD area estimated
as 4300 of which CHINA theater can supp];r S06, INDIA BURMA theater can
supp] the equivalent o 3147. The shortage is 647 made up ot 1
militar;r police CQilp&n1' to and. E 15-37 less .1 traffic platoon, strengt;h

c.

w-m less 1 .
operating platoon, strength 108; Ordnance mam comparq to and E 9-lZ/1
streDgth -ll6; 1 Quartermaster based depot compazv to aDd E 10-367,
strength 76 and 1 port canpa117 to and E 50..177, and 1 Headquarters and
Headquarters detachment port battalion to and E 55-116. CHINA theater
is prepared to accept the cost ot transporting persoDnel plus certa:in
equipment frau DIDIA BURll.A theater to CHINA thea~er and to improvise
initia.l:Qr to cover the above shortages. However, CHINA theater JIIUSt
request that the most; expeditious action be taken to meet the 647
shortage listed above. E. The material loading on the 1st 5 ships 1.8
aatisfactory to CHINA theater as specified in WARX 2SS06 with the
addition of T/E equipnent for 1 port COlllpai\V' anc1 30 dqs B rations for
5,000 men. The. loading schedule tor the tollorl up shipping will be
forwarded to ,-ou as soon as possible. In gceral it will cover ma.i.ntenanee requirements of u.s .. forces in port; area including AV Gas tor
transports and fighter squadrons and cargo to be forwarded which we will
now examine in closer detail. r. The initial destination of the 1st 5
124; Quartermaster petroleum. supJ>l compall1' to and E

ships should be determined b7 CDCAFPAC CHIRA theater recamnends KANILA

time WEICHCJN TAO is a questionable venture and will require
diversion frQD. FORT BAYARD. The information of this area and FORT
BAYARD REQUESTED has been forwarded b7 separate radio.

.3. At this

4. Concur that LUZON air route appears inadvisable at this time it !a-

cUities now allocated to om:NA thea\er must be used. A detailed stuq

this will be continued here. CHINA theater has just seen WARX 29fT/2
answers required will be sent later.

ot
-'-"

16

0141 CINCroA ADVANCE to OOMINCH. ClNCAFPAC, COMGENPOA, COUGENAIR into OOMGENUSA'l'F,

CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

Cinepoa concurs in Richard.son t s RJ 65765 DTG 150946.

16 0247 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ into CG 6TH ARMY. CCU5THPHIB, COY.SERVPAC.

ex

2~864

Refers to your 090610 not to all.. Your assumption. that functions

performed by' naval garrison beach parties will be performed by similar~,
- coutinued -

3392

._,
CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV info CG 6TH ARMY, OOM5THPHIB, OOMSERVPAC

(Cont'gl

Antr
,.-::.

units for KOSID:KI RErTO, southeast KIUSHU and east KYUSHU Jam1ngs is
not correct. . In addition to 4 naval garrison beach part.ies desired b7 Sth
amphibious Corps, 6th ~ c!esires 1 eacll naval garrison beach part;7 for
operational attaebm.ent to each of 8 engineer shore battalions scheduled tor
employment. Further desire 3 battalion headquarters attached to Supervise

these beach parties.

16 Cf'/27 OOMGEN USASTAF to CD'CAFPAC into COMGEN A.FMIDPAC. CDiCPOA BOTH HQ, COllGD'

AIR

OCtlGm USASTF

ADMili

0261 l.ook at CDCPAC ADV 1.20814 GCT JlLcy'. Requirement giv beJ.c. is
based on tollolring asswaptions: A. 1'hia headquartiers responsible all USASi'F
construction in liARIANAS and RYUKYUS; B. withdranl of all constructioa
assistance on .USASi'F airfields such as naval construction battali0118J c.
WithdraJral ot all USAS!AF tmits from cmstruction other than VIR and allied:
.t'lmctions; D. USASTAF caa obtain support frail a theater tor engineer urdts
other thaD those applied by' Arm:~' Air Forces, ie, spare parts companies,

heav

shop companies, dump tru.cks companies and ordanee medium. maintename

companies. E. 'ftle following Ellgineer aviation troops now in this theater

or cCiaitted clan 4 Hq and Hq companies regiments, 34 battalions, 2 depot

canpanies 1 4 maintenance canpanies, 3 topograpldcal compani ea, 1 air force
Hq C<llpaD1' and 3 uliilities companies will be retained by' USASTAF as long as
required.. F. ~enance will be performed in areas to rear ot UARIANAS by
adesigna.ted ai.r force. ; utilities companies and 1 separate COIIlpaZV" ncar
assigned in such areas. Presuming above asaaptions correct, USASTAF will
require 1 engineer counand, aviation, 6 Hq and Hq canpanies reg:l.m.ents, 36
battalions, 2 Depot companies, 6 liaintmance companies, 3 topographical
companies, 1 air force Hq compai\T, 1 topographical battalion and 3 utilities
companies in addition to units . reterred to iD D above from a theater. 'Ibis
creates a shortage of ~ engineer ccanand aviation, 2 Hq and Hq canpanies
regiments, 2 maillteDanCe companies, and 1 topographicak battalion between
units required and units on hand or committed USASTAF. It is understood
it the strategic situation remains st;abilized. as far&$ VLR requirements
are co.ncem.ed that as construction is completed a progr-easin release of
aviation engineer units will be made to a number required for maillteunce
purposes OllJ.T.
16 0249 CitTCAFPAC to CQMGENFEAF info CINCPOA BOTH HQ 1 DEPCO}QF 20 1 OOM:3RDFLEl,
CTF

ex

93

GTF 38, CTF

,37.

2586;

In support of operations 3rd Fleet as outlined im his Amlex lA operations

Plaa 9-45 (.3rd Fleet Radio 1.32105 with info 1'~EAF) desire comGenFEAF in
.
coordination With other RYOXYUS based air forces support operations . to the
manumm ex.ten:t practica.b~e With. strikes in the KYUSHU-KURE area on schec:luls
as indicated. in COmmander 3RD Fleets 132145 (into to FEA.F). Schedule of
strikes to be flexibl.e and to be adjusted to conform to ~ change in pl.aDs
of CoJJ~Dander 3rd Fleet due to untorseen cielqs. Desire you submit earliest
,-aar schedu:Led pl.an for support irlcluding estimated strilci.Dg force and targets
with informatiom to aclees in CINCPOA ADV 140901..

33 93

16 0830 COMGENAF 20 TO USASTAF GUAM info CINCFOA ADV, C01QRDFLEE1', COMGENAIR.

AIDCO 1304.
SUbject operations in coordination 3rd Fleet. Convnents on Com3rdFleets
132l45Z (GCT) follows as requested by your 15004;z. Presume air facilities
means airdrome instal.lations. Attack against Slleh instal.lations at variance
with basic strategic plan. ~ VLR primarr targets principaJ.:cy- aircraft
production instal.lations are located TOKYO..NAGOIA area. Intentions are to
strike our primary targets during the period 24. Jticy" - 2 Augllst; when weather
forecast indicates reasonable chance visual bombing. Otherwise incendiary
destruction of urban industrial. areas will be continued.
\

16 2>13 COJQRDFLEET to CINCPAC ADV BQ info CTF 38.

Your 150728 acknowledged.

c.rF .38 will complJ'.

lJt. QJ2.3i QDOP.AC ADV to CINCAFPAC into COMINCH.

Having in mind the desirability of continued supervision of developaezdi
of OKINAWA by' ComGeni'EN for our mutual advantage and of having at OKINAWA
during the OLDIPIC assault and aruv officer of STmiELLS standing and in
vi also of your OOR(J{ET plans tor the 10th ~ and use of divisions as
OLDlPIC reserves I request your comment or concurrence on the fol.l.Oifing
proposals in connection with the release to :rou of the a:rnv units concerned.
The Headquarters 10th ~to report to y-ou nCM' tor CORONET planning and
l
B

to be released from JJtV operational control. abCN.t 1 DeceJd;)er.

The Headquarters 24th Corps

to

be released to you now.

The 7th am 27th Divisions to be released to you about 1 October.

17 f1'/l7 CINCAFPAC to QINCPAO ADV into WARCOS, OG USATAF, DEPCOM USASTAF.

ox

'2167
Your l402S6Z, August, 1 conference coordination of Air. Staff conf'erence
was intended, hOifever Army Air Forces wish ComUSASTAF to attend. No
objection attendance commanders. Final decisions will of course reJiain
with CINCPAC, CINCAFPAC and. UOMUSASTAF.

17 1725 COMFEAF to CG ADVON FEAF into CmCAFPAC. CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COllSTRATAIR,
COlQRDFLEET, CTF 38, CTF

ll

AX 77476

CDJCAFPAC OX 25865 orders that Far East Air Forces, in support of Com,3rd.Fleet operations outlined in his radio 1.32105 and ill coordination with
other RYUKYUS based air f'orces, conduct air attacks to max:Jnmm exteut
practicable in the KYUSHU-KURE area. Schedule or these air attacks will be
as oul:;lined in Com3rdFleet 132145 and will be flexible to conform. to &1'.\Y
change in plans of Com3rdFleet due to unf'orseen delays.
Para. Ad.von FEAF missions current:cy ordered comp:Q" with this directive.
Advon FEA.F will annOUDCe his air iutent dai~ with information to CmCAFPAC,
CINCPOA !EARL, CINCFO.A. ADV, COMSTRATAIR, COM,3RDFLT, CTF 38 and CTF 'J7.
Para. CINCPOA ADV is requested herewith to direct that radios containing
information on fleet operations plans and fleet movenents include CG ADVON
FEAF as into adee. Copies of references above being forwarded CG ADVON FEAF
by specia.l safehand courier Ju4' 18.

'3394

IJII!II
j

18 0651 giNCPOA A.DV to QINCAfPAQ into 5el'HAIRFORCE, FEAfa Com>HI~SPAC. COMSERJPM

COMSER!lTHFL~, CINOfflA
COMGEN2NDMAftA!~W

PURL*

COJAAIRPAC a COMGENAIREMFfAC, COI4GEN1S'.Q!Al!1

Following Marine Air Units will COillprise the 1st Uarine Air Wing for
OLYMPIC Wing HedRon-l, Wing Seron- 1.1 lla.rine Air Groups 12, 14, 33,
61 as preserxtl.T orguizM . Marine Air ()roup 32 censistin g ot HedRon
32, Seron .32, VllSB-241., VMSB-343, VMTB-]J4. lla.ri.ne Air Grou:p-24 consisting e Hedroa-24 , Seron-24, VIF(H)-54 11 VMF(B)-533. Bedron-62 with air

Warning Squadrons, 3,4,9,12 aDd GCI units :L throqb. S inclusive attaehecl.

AWS .3 and AWS 4 are light weigb.t units. v.MD-254.- Colonel Roberts USMC
on statt C.omGenAirFMFPac arrives MANILA on 19th with detailed iogistic
intormatic m.
18 U103 ClNCPAQ APV to COllZ'fHFLT. - COMPHIBSPAC intq COMSQVPAC. QJ;MCPA(i
COMSER!'lTHFLEJil, COMSERVBON 10.

PJARL,

CDCAFPAC l62lll. Paragraph 8 reads 11petrolewn logistics required

b7 7th Attack Force afioat tlaat assemble in tbe MANILA area for the
oLiiiPIC operation will D8 provided by' ComServ'ltbFleet and will be
"
slated by CIHCPA.C.rt
decision to reorganiz e
confirms
all
to
not
ll21.35
CominCh
Para.
It appears to CINCPAC
7.
servron
establish
and
Fleet
7th
force
service
petroleum logistics
to
respeet
with
bilities
respensi
's
'7
BervRon
that
and 7th attack force
3rd.
as
insofar
icientical
be
will
area
UARILA.
in the
.
all.
to
ot
n
130751
rq
also
See
.
concerned
are
Para. Request J'OV joint recemmen datiou as to changes in CINCAFPAC s
l.62lll neceseary iu l.ight of COJIINCH ll2lJ5 and rq 130751 which Colilthnt furnish to ComPhibsPac.
18 1200 JOINT CHIEFS

OF

STAFF . to CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA into AGWAR_, NAVI DEP.A.Imm:NT.

Victory 65 BG ~. The p rovision of a .harbor of refuge for "tbe

protectio n of Lighterag e and small craft construct ed or block. ships which
would satisfy )"our primar.r ,concern as outlined in CX-24937 is within our

means and can 'be providecl OA time.

Para. ExpansiGn of. the project to include Caissons for the protectio n
of ocean-goi ng vessels requires overridin g priority ewer other major war
programs with possibili ty that tftis might interfere with other programs

more essential to the success orthe operation .

Para. Nav Department has acivised that its towing facilitie s are
being augmented by lO A!A' s ud. 45 Liberty ship towing installat ions.
!herefore believe towing or s'teel eaissons and black ships e an be undertaken withe\xt serious detriment. to CINCAFPAC t S and CINCPAC 'S tating
programs fran west and gult eoaets to forward areas. Navy Department will
select towing units With regard to suitabili ty for ready ships which latter
mq be large~ ua self propelled.
Para. Navy Department states tb.at given priority caissons can 'be
constru.et e4 a.md delivered to theater on time. A.bilitl to assemble at site
must be cemsiderecl.
Para. In view of the impact on other programs and requireme nts and
the necessitr of having reasonabl ;r fi:rm asnrance that if' tne caisseu
are ecmstra.,t ed they will be used CDICAFPACs recommendation is reqaestecl
- coDtinued -

3395

- continue d 18 1200 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAJi'F to CINCAFPAC, CINCFOA info AGWAR, NAVI

DEPART. (Qsmttd)

as a matter of urgency as to whether the Joint Chiefs of starr shall

provide only a harbor of refuge for small cra.t't construc ted wholl1' of
constru ction and delivery block ships or whether they shall proceed with the
1
of the arJ.ific ial barber as defined in CINCAFPAC S CX-249'37 which includes
the provisio n of Caissons capable of shelteri ng cargo shipping~ on the
understa nding that addresSe es are w.l.lling to accept possible impact on
towing and other program s. Further request CINCPOA'S ccmnent.s on naval
phases of project both towing and siting.
18 2252 CINCPAC ADV to CINCAFPAC into COMPHIBSPAC. COM5THFLEET, CINCR>A PEARL.

In the ICEBERG operatio n unexpec ted delays occured in the earl;r

establis hment of adequate air warning faciliti es in the out~ position s
which necessi tated reliance tor air warDing on vulnerab le surface craft
with resultan t loss in men and ships. It is of mutual and paramom t iDporlance that air warning units that are to go into out~ position s for
OLYMPIC be so l.oaded and echelcmed that their efficien t f\mction ing is
assured at the earlies t possible time at the outset of the operatio n to
give the maxinnuu protecti on to the amphibio us effort. Informa tion as to
your plans for the ear:cy- activati on or air warning units on out:cying
position s will be apprecia ted.
19 0455 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CG 6TH

ex

ARMf.

CG PEAF, OOMPHIBSPAC.

26663.

Objectiv e area designa ted in para .3x(4) AFPAC operatio ns instruct ions
number l dated 20 June is subject. AFPAC, FEAF and COMPHIBSPAC are in
agreeme nt in changing delinea tion of objectiv e area to that area south
of 32-30N which is enclosed by arc of circle havin~ radius of 120 nautica l
miles with center at SATA III SAKI ('31..00 N ]JQ-4.0 EJ. Purpose to allow
more water area for forces of COMPHIBSPAC. Request comments or concurre nce.

Into ships hereby detached 3rd Fleet and assigned to CTF 94 :tor
tempora ry operatio nal. control for employment as ASH Task Group.
Para. CTG 32.1 detach SALAMAUA, CTG 3Q.S DEri'ACH DE'S and sail to
rendezvo us as directed by CTF 94.

19 0647 CINCPOA ADV to ClllCAFPAC inf'o COMGJmroA, CINCPO.l PEARL.

CINCPOA coast artiller y unit requirements are now 1 Bn at -PEI.ELIU and
1 Grp Hq and .3 Bns at OKINAWA. All other coast artiller y units COMGENroA

Dispatch 160213 are availab le now for release to you. Advise disposi tion
desired. Upon depa.rt'l re these units present stations operatio nal control.
passes to you.
Para. By 1 August the coast artiller y units at OKINAWA will pass to
your operatio nal contro~ therefor e no action will be taken by CmCPOA on
request for convers ion of 1 CA Bn at OKINAWA to FA containe d COMGENroA
160213.

339

111!

19 0611 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS, CINCPAC, :into COMPHIBSPAC, CG 6THARMY. CG 8TH

ARMY

ex 26685.

Armored divisions for employment in CORONET will not be available for

dispatch from the United states until November or DecEinber. If staged
through PHILIPPINES, arriVing in December or January, respectively, o~
ver:r limited period can be allowed for shakedown and mounting out on or
about 20 Janua.ry. War Department has agreed to shipnent direct to objective
area in sea-trains or other means provided armored divisions can be handled
at destination as required (W 16507 1 13 June).
Para. The following reinforcing units should aCCanpatV" armored
divisions in assault shipping; 2 battalions 155 Gun (SP) 1 2 engineer caabat
battalions, 2 Treadwq Bridge companies, 2 Ordanance Bn companies (Tank),
2 Ordnance Ammunition companies, 2 Quartermaster Gas SUppq companies,
2 Quartermaster truck companies (Aug), 1 Headquarters and Headquarters
Detachment, Quartermaster Battalion (Mobile) 1 1 Quartermaster 'l'ruck
COlDP8l\Y, petroleum (Equipped under Column 2 B). L Corps headquarters
should be alerted to accompany this shipnent in the event that a definite
requirement is established therefor.
. Para. Prel.im:l..nary investigation here indicates feasibility of rel.easing from OLYMPIC 90 LST .fA!! at XRAY plus 35 and 12 APA, and 6 AKA at XRAY
plus ;o for dispatch to west coast to lift 2 armored divisions, reinforced,
direct to CORONET objective area to arrive not later than Y Plus 5.
Para. Request CINCPAC concurrence in utilization of assault shipping
as proposed herein with infomation copy direct to War Department.
Para. Request War Department confirmation of availability of units
listed Qove and apprOYal of assault loading and proposed movement of
2 armored divisions, reintorced, as indicated, from west coast direct to
,
objective area.
Para. Movement of these units by amphibious illt as priority would:
Insure ample time tor preparation prior to entry into combat.
, _A
Relieve congestion in staging area and ports, and
B-'
Effect appreciable reduction in Back-Log o.t shipping.
C
Para. Earl;r rep~ appreciated.

19 lll7 CINCAFPAC to CINCPOA ADVANCE into WARCOS.

ex 2h793.

No further action being taken, reference your 170523 (GCT) relative

to tactical units on OKINAWA, in view of recent directive of the Joint
Chief of staf'f.

19 142.3 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. CD'CPAD .ADVANCE. info Bl}Jk
PEARL, BPNL CINCPAC.

...

ex

26866

This replies to radio Joint Chiefs of stat 1812$0. The recommended

a.rtifieal harbor will be used for the operation as planned and the possible
impact of its provision on towing and other programs has been ful.ly
considered and is accepted. It is recommended that Joint Chief of staff
aul#horize construction and delivery artificial harbor as defined in CX
24937 which includes caissons capable of sheltering cargo shipping.

3397

19 0533 CINC.AFPAC to CINCFOA ADV info WARCOS (FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF ST.Affl, COOTHFLT.

ex 26668.

I have just concluded a series of conferences in an endeavor to

aceonunodate the transfer of the 7th Fleet as proposed in your 080301 and
the transfer of MANUS as proposed in your 130751. This modifies 1'!\V
OX 25993 originated l6ll21. I believe that this can now be accomplished
as you desire subject to the comments of Com7thFleet 120014 and to the overall approval of features which involve the AUSTRALIAN and Dt1l'CH governments. It is ~ understanding that these features will of necessity have
to be arranged by the Joint Chiefs of' starr.

17 0550 GOMPHIBSPAC to QDICPAP ADV info '@CWPHIBSPAC BCII'H. CINCPAC P&ARL HQ.
CINCAFPAC, CG 6tH ARMY, CG 2ND, .)Jm, 5'.t'H MARDIVS, CGFMl'PAC. CG5THPHIBCORf1
.
COM3Rt)6 _. S'fH, m PHIBbl()R, COUPHIBGRPS ll., 12, 13 l4.
. Following requested training schedule modifies my 09091;. 202220
and Z7o635 all of June and has been approved in part; by you. Request
ove~ approval.
A. Philippines 12 ISTS 10 LSM and TransRon 16 now being employed on
continuous bases. . Approved by your 190122 of May and 220818 of June.
B. An additional TransDiv is required in PHILIPPINE area for period ot
1 month commencing 25 Juzy for training additional ROTS not included
in original tentative t .r aining schedule. Requested by CINCAFPAC.
Action not known.
C. TransRon 15 (less BERRIEN, BLADEN, BARROW, LACERTA, MULPHEN) .20 LST
and 10 LSM to arrive PHILIPPINES 30 days prior to loading. Requested
by COMOOBSPAC 090915 of June approval not received.
D.

E.

F.
G.

20

GUAM .3RD MARDIV TransDiv

Approved by your 200724.

37, 10 LST, lD LSM available 21 August.

SAIPAN 2ND MARDIV 4 APAsincluding a division flagship of TransRon

12, 10 I.ST and 10 LSM available 8 September. Requested by Com5thPhib
140021.
OAHU 5TH MARDIV 4 APAS including a division flagship of TransRon 24,
6 LST and 12 LSM available 26 August. Requested by Oom5thPhib 140021.
OAHU 98TH DIVISION ConTransRon 22 in WESTMORELAND. KARNES. BOTTINEAU.
BOWIE, KINGSBURY. ALAMANCE. SAPHiO. 10 LST and lD LSM available 1
August. Approved by your 092.316.

EC.M HOLDERS into COMFAIJMNG 18, COMSUBPAC, CINCPA.q

COMGEN 'l':m, COMGEN FEAF ADVON, COMF AI:mflNG 1.
COMMARIANAS,
HQ,
ADV

1.337 COM)RPFLT to 3RP FLT

It is rq intent to tighten blockade and keep pressure on the enemy

by throwing light force sweeps against EMPIRE coast and ~utl;ring islands
at every opportunity. Objectives denial of coastal sea. lanes to. enem~
destruction shipping and bombardment of shore targets. These raJ.ds will

u~ be ordered suddenl;r.
. Para. Keep currently familiar with locations within operational
range with emphasis on enetey" coastal. shipping refuges. EneJey" mine fields.
And coastal targets euch a.s harbor facilities, railroad bridges, yards
and tunnel.s. Radar and radio stati ons, shore batteries, factories~ town~

3398 .

._
20 1819 cogrnCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ info COOTHF LT. CINCABPAC. COMSOBPAC,
.
CDICPAC PEARL HQ, OOMSERVPAC.
1

Your 130751. Items A B .c E G and H are approved. Item D is under

under advisement and
consideration. Item F and future of CNAF
dependent on ac~ion by JCS on proposal to reorganize SWPAC area. Make
nomination to me for Rear Admiral to command u. s. Naval forces
AUSTRALIA, NEW GUINEA. What are your plans for Task Force 71.

are

19 lll9 GINCAFPAC to WARCOS,(FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAF!t), GINCPAC ADV HQ.

ex

26794.

Will be glad to welcome Bri.ti sh Corps Commander and accanpa.nying

officers. SUggest their arrival earliest date and i t practicable b.1 1
August. Reference Joint Chiefs of staff V 66 BG l45, 18th. CINCPAC
requested to comment or concur directly to Joint Chiefs of staff,
information to CINCAFPAC.

19 2'327 CDICPAC ADV to COMINCH into CINCAFPAC, GINCPAC P.I:WIL HQ.

I concur in CINCAFPAC 19lll9 to WARCUS concerning arrival British
Corps Commander and accompa.nr.i.ng officers.
20 f1710 OOMGENCHINA to CINC,.I\FPAC, CINCroA info WARCQS, OOMGENAF 10, COMG&WSOBCHJ.NA,
COMGENUSF~HINA,

COMGENIATACT.

CFBX ll69.
Agree that meeting between representatives from Headquarters CHINA
THEATER, Headquarters CINCAFPAC a.nd Headquarters CINCPOA at GUAM as

suggested in radio 140304 is higbl desirable. .

Para. A study and assessment of resources and requirements of CHINA
THEATER is being made now. This study will be completed about the end
.of July. If you agree it is recommended that conference be held on or
about 31 Jlicy. Composition o CHINA THEATER party will be furnished later.
Present plans are to leave on or about 30 Juzy. SUggest that CHINA THEATERS
officers return via .MANILA to insure coordination of operations.
Para. Captain Painter has arrived and is providing very valuable
assistance in both our future and operational planning.
Para. For Ma.cArthurs request clearance for 1 C 54 aircraft through your
area on or about 31 July. If you eel ti.at a meeting between CHINA THEATER
officers returning from GUAM and your people would be 'Hneficial they will
retum via MANILA for a brief conference.
~AR(ACTION) PASS TO NAVY FOR ACTION info
CINCAFPAC FOR MACARTHUR, CINCPOA FOR NIMITZ, VICTORY 12S BG 198.

20 1100 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF tq

Construction and provision of an artificial harbor to m.eet the

strategic requirements set forth in CINCAFPAC CX 24937 of 12 Jul.1" is
approved by the Joint Chiefs of sta!f'. The construction and establishment
of this .artificial harbor is charged to the Navy. The Navy will proceed
with this project with priority above all Military and Naval programs
except manhattan project and will be assisted by appropriate agencies
of the War Department as necessary. Appropriate action by the Joint
&ogistical Committee and Joint Military Transportation committee is
directed.

3399

,.

20 llOS JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF .to CINCAFPAC FOR MACARTHUR info CINCPAC FOR NIMITZ.
AG!IYAR, NAVY, NAVY DEPARTMENT VIA AG.fVAR VICTORY l29 BG 192

With regard to ~our C 26799, direct- in Victory 73 perl;ained only

to the R!UKYUS. This does not preclude the. transfer o! responsibilitie s
pertaining to USSI'AF units elsewhere in the Pacific by mutual agreement;
as provided in WAR 6Z773 of 3 April.
20 2208 WARCOS to CINCAFPAC, COMG:EN USFCT info CINCPOA ADV HQ.

WARX 35530.
For operation and maintenance of LCM 1 s for FORT BAYARD PROJECT
CINCAFPAC is requested to (see Navy Ra.d 1921.33) arrange loading and onward shipping of personnel with equipment to destination. Possible use
ot naval escort carft for this should be examined. For information 4th
and 5th ships depart NEW <ELEANS POE 16th and 2J.st Juzy res~tive:cy.
Para. New subject. CHINA THEATER should arrange to fumish tents
fuel and necessar,r logistic support to these navy personnel on arrival.
Believe it proper that navy personnel used in port operations not be
charged against existing navy troop ceiling.
Para. New subject. To facilitate detailed arrangements for these
operations, it appears desiravle for CHINA HQ to establish liaision in
cmCAFPAC headquarters. CHINA'S CFBX 689 J~ 12 refers. WD has not
received into copies of inter theater cables ( CFBX 689) which announce
decisions reference split of responsibilitie s for the operation. It
is requested that War be included as info addressee on all inter theater
cables reference decisions for implementation of this operation.

21 0229 CJNCPAC ADV to COMAIRPAC SUBCOMFWD into COMAIRPAC, COM3RDFI.EEn', CTF 3S.

From Sept 20 to Oct 10 3 u.s. Groups containing 9 CV, 5 CVL, 5 BB, 19

Cruisers will base ENIWETOK. 2 u. s. Groups containing 6 CV, 2 CVL, 4 BB
12 Cruisers will base LEYTE. Af."ter October 10 for indefinite period
proportions will be apprmximately reversed. In addition 5 British CV
and 3 CVL will base ENIWETOK.
Para. These estimates are for planning purposes only. They- mq
change radica.l.:cy' at a.ey time before or during forthcoming operations.
Composition of Groupsas to identity of specific. ships can not be provided
at this time.
21 0645 CnlCPAC ADV HQ to UOMSUBPAC info ADCOMMINPAC, COMDJPAC, COMPHIBSPAC,
COM5THFLT, UINCPAC PEARL HQ, JICroA.
Plans for minefield investigation proposedin your .181445 are approved
subject to following qualification of last sentence. Mine detection
subs will in emergency be considered available for offensive missions,
air sea ~escue duties or reconnaissance if necessity arises. ComnPae
arrange direct with ComSubsPac for conference i f desired.

21 1808 CONCPAC ADV HQ to OOM7THFLEET into CINCAFPAC.

lly 130751 COl!INCH 201819. Request implementation items approved

obtaining concurrence or CINCAFPAC where appropriate.
Para. Request your comment on future submarine requirements SWPA.

3400

20 2209 WARCOS to AFPAC info MID PAC, CINCPAC - CG AFMIDPAC PASSED TO CINCPAC

~OTH

HQ.

-WARX 35531.
Repeated to all addressees. Reference 26685 of 19 J~ 1945. It is
suggested here to place Lieutenant General Alvan c. Gillem who now commands
the 13th Corps Headquarters in charge of this .force upon completion of the
scheduled amphibious training of the units you have indicated you desire.
This is proposed in order to carry out what is considered are your desires.
It is assumed that other reinforcing units for this corps headquarters will
be furnished there by you i f you intend to use this corps in the role or an
Armored Corps. Gillem's Corps is an infantry corps but be happens to be 1
of our best Armored Commanders also. Furnishing reinforcing units requires
minor changes to present redeployment schedule in order to meet target date
,
as follows:
A. 1 field artillery battalion (155 Millimeter Gun) (selt propelled) will
be indirectly redeployed instead of directl;r redeployed in 9th month.
B. 2 Engineer combat battalions will be indirect]3 redeployed instead ot
directly redeployed in loth month.
c. Indirect shipment remainder reinforcing units will be delayed in order
to marry up with this force.
Para. Upon receipt GINCPAC concurrence concerning assault shipping and

your comment or concurrence to the above proposal, the necessary implementation here will be accomplished. An ear~ rep~ woul.d be helpful.
21 2250 COMGENUSASTAF to CINCR:>A ADV HQ info WARCOS, COMGENMJt, CINCOOA PEARL,
COMAF a>, CTF 58, COM3RDFLT, CTF 57, COMGENFEAF, COMMARIANAS, CTG 93./t.

0549

Request USAST~ message 1 no 0313 dated 171643 GCT sent to your headquarters be withdrawn and destroyed and the follONing substitute therefore:
All fighters assigned to USASTAF will be withdrawn fran their primary
mission of escort and given the mission of counter air force operations
of destroying the Japanese air force both in the air and on the ground1
attacking airfields and airfield installations, on the dates and a.t the
places requested by Com3rdF1eet during the execution OpPlan 9-45. The VLR
forces will be employed against major air targets such as aircraft engineer
plants, propellor plants, and other major industrial areas in the general
area and on the :ikK dates requested by Com.3rdF1eet. Your headquaretBs will
be current:cy- infonned. as to the names of the places and dates of attack.

22f1731 COMFE.Af to CINCAFPAC info CINCroA ADV, L"TF 95 1 COMGEN JJJV ECH FEAF, COMGEN
CHINA, CTF 32.
AX 7792JJ
Reference is urad CX 25198 which directed FEA.F to conduct strikes on
ene~ air bases and other appropriate targets, to assist TF 95. Also reference CINCPOA JJJV llOJ.53, 110146 and 1123.36 and CTF 95 radio 120822.
19 Ju]Jr 45 this hed received info copy of CTF 95 radio 182218/Z which first
info that CTF .95 sweep intent for 18 J~ was not conducted a.s scheduled.
Assistance requested in CmCPOA ADV 112336 and directed by urad CX 25198 was
conducted as outlined in Myra.d AX 77215 to provide direct assistance for
TF 95 sweep scheduled daylight 18 July. Current operational plans, including assistance for 3rd Fleet (See my rad AX 77476, 17 Jucy) preclu~es
furnishing aqy .further direct assistance in general target area for TF 95
(This is BIFODE; cancel and file 211050 GR 289 and cancel 211827 GR 59)

3401

20 1303 COMINCH AND CNO Q.OMINCH HQ info \JINCPOA BOTH HQ:;COMINCH & CNO PASSED TO
CINCPOA BOTH HQ,

VICTORY 135.
CINC.AFPAC CXB-24957 and JCS 20~8 refer. I desire a TG charged with
the construction and establishment of the artificial harbor project be set
up in the immediate future, initia.ll.;r directly under COMINCH AND CNO, later
to pass to CIOOPAC. This group to be commanded by a young Read Admiral or
a Commodore especially fitted to give energetic direction. Nominations
b:r my headquarters are desired. The sta.f"f, which initially need not be
large, should include civi1 engineers and 1 or 2 officers.
22 0410 CINCPAC ADV to COM5THFLEET, CO:MPHIBSPAC, COMSERVPAC info COMSERVRON 10.

COMffiiBSPACS 190220. CINCPAC intends that Commodore Hartley in his

capacity as COMSERVDIV 10.3 command the units of SERVRON 10 at the objective
in OLD!PIC. These units will initially be largely those for repair and
salvage. COMSERVDIV 10.3 will be under the operational control of COMFHIBSPAC. Captain Curtis will be assigned to the staff of COMSERVDIV as chief
salvage officer.

22 CY7l9 CINCPOA ADV to CINCAFPAC info COMINCH, COORDFI.EH,T, COM5THFIEET.

Operations instructions number 96 issued by Hdqters Allied Air Forces
SWPA dated 12 Jul.;r with distribution to officers under m:r cammand are
objectionable to me in the following respects:
A. They give orders applicable to "All Forces" concerning air sea. rescue
within the Pacific Ocean Areas.
B. They undertake to prescribe prima.ry air attack areas and to issue
orders in connection theravith which affect ,the operations of the
Pacific Fleet while operating within the Pacific Ocean Areas.
Para. It is requested that the Commanding General Allied Air Forces
&IPA be directed to refrain from issuing orders which directly or by
implication attempt to control the operations of the United states Pacific
Fleet or to make area assignments within the Pacific Ocean Areas.

22 CJ742 CINCPOA ADV to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC PEARL. COMSERVPAC. COMPHIBSPAC,

COM7THF:r.EE:I', COM5THFIEEI', COMSERON lO, COMSERV'ZTHFLEET.
Refer paragraph 8 CINCAFPAC 162lll and J1J3' 200709. CINCPAC approves
procedure COMSERVFOR 7TH F~~ (SEIVRON 7) provide petroleum logistics
for OLD.!PIC amphibious forces assembling in the MANILA AREA. These requirements to be slated by CINCAFPAC. In addition SERVRON 7 should
similarly provide for all other naval forces in the MANILA AREA. Accordingly request deletion of "7th attack Force Anoatrr and substitution
"Pacific Fleet Units."

-\.._/

22 OS39 CINCPAC ADV to COMJRDFLEEr, COM.7THFLEET, CCW.mPAC, COMGENFMFPAC. COM5THFLT,

COMffiiBSPAQ. COMSERVPAC info COMGEN 6THARMY, COM)RDPHIBFOR, COMGEN5THPfiiBCORPS, CINCPOA PEARL. CCM5THPHIBFOR. CWG:ENAIRfMFPAC. COMINCH AND CNO,
CQM7THPHIBFOR, COMGENSERVCOMDFMFPAC, MARCORPS, COMGENAAFroA, CINCAFPAC,
COMGENroA, CTF 96, CTF 99.
Mydis 090901 modified as follavs:

- continued -

3402

,.

- continued -

22 08.39 CINCPAC ADV to COM3RDFLEEr, COM.7THFLEET 1 COMAmPAC, COMGENFMFPAC, COM5THFLI,

COMPHIBSPAC, COMSERVPAC info COMG.EN 6TH ARMY, COM3RDHIIBFOR. COMGEN5THPHIBCORPS, GINCPOA PEARL, COM2THPHIBFOR, COMGENAIRFMFPAC, COMINCH AND CNO
COM7THPHIBFOR, COMGENSERVCOMDFMFPAC, MARCOPS, COMGENAAFPOA, CINCAFPAC,
COMGENPOA. CTF 96, CTF 99. (Cont 'd)
1.

2.

3.

The site present:cy selected for the NOB is at TARA-MISAKI in

KAGOSHIMA BAY
The site present~ selected for the Navai Air Base is at MINATO.
Insert as paragraph (G): The naval hospitals and naval ammunition
Depot will be under the Commandant NOB.
'~

lo>.

22 1040 01-NCFOA ADV to COMGEN USASTAF inf'o COM3RDFLEET.

Concur your 22C1715. (Ref: .3rd Fleet Coordination.)

22 1149 CINCPAD ADV to COMBATRON 1. COMCRUDIV 16 1 COMINPAC. COM.IAIRVqNG 1, COMSERVDIV 104, COMNAVFOR RYUKYUS info COMINCH, CINCPAC PEARL, CINCAFPAC,
COMGEWEAF, COMGENFEAFADVON, CTF 99 1 COMGm CHINA, COM3RDFLT, COM5THl4'LT,
COMSERON 10,

My OpPlan 4-45 will be modified as follows:

(1) Add to Task organization: (N) (TF 95) V.Adm. Oldendorf. With forces
assigned.

,,

(2) Change Tasks of .3rd Fleet to read: Attack Japanese naval and air
forces; shipping, ship,yards, and coastal objectives. Protect sea
and air communicationa along the central Pacif'ie axis.
(3) Modify SubPara .3(N) to read: Maintain control of the EAST CHDlA SEA
and its westem approaches. Interdict to limit of vapabillties the
movement of hostile naval forces and shipping in the YEILOV SEA,
TSUSHIMA STRAITS and the southem part of the SEA OF JAPAN. Protect
friendly shipping. Cover and defend our positions in the RYUKYUS.
Provide air-sea rescue services. SUpport operations or other forces.
Conduct minesweeping as directed by CINCPAC.
(4) Add to SubPara 3(X)6: CTF 95 area of military responsibility is that
part of the conibat area west of the 135th meridian except that the
3rd neet will enter therein in execution of its assigned tasks upon
giving prior notification to forces concerned.
(5) Add new SUbPara 3(X)8: For purposes of coordination direct conmunications between CTF 95 or his subordinate commanders and the cOJllooo.
manders of other forces is authorized as at present.
( 6) This dispatch is effective 250200 at which time rr.ry dispatch 110146
is cancelled.
22 ll50 CINCPAC ADV to COM3RDFLEET, CUMBATRON 1, CTF 95, CTF 39, CTG 99.1. CTG
3u.S. CTG 30,9 info COMINCH, CTF 99, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC. COMSERVPAC,
COMVVESCARFOR, CINCAFPAC, COMGENFEAF, CUMGmFEAF ADVON, COMSERVRON 10 .
Effective 250200 GCT forces assigned to operational control Cam3rdFlt
will comprise those units nQPf assigned to 1"1'-.37, TF-38, 'J.lG-30.6, TG-30.8,
TG-30.9 less TU-30.9. Forces assigned to operational control CTF 95
(V Adm Oldendorf) will comprise those units now assigned to TF-32, TF-39
TF-95, TG-99.l, .TG 30.5, TU 30.9.4 plus such other combatant ships now

- continued -

3403

- continued -

in LEYTE which were formerl;r assigned to Com3rdFl.t and which are not
included in the forces listed.

Para.. For the information of both conrnanders the KASAAN BAY and
SALAMAMU ASW groups are assigned to CTF 94. .

Para. Rotation of CVE to 'I'G-30.8 or to TU-32.1.2 may be arranged

directly byCTG-32.1.
Para. This reassignment does not affedt assignments to Com3rdFlt
contained. in li\f 220259 and 220612. Assignment of additional ships or
transfers between 3rd Fleet and TF 95 will be controlled by CJNCPAC.
Cam3rdFlt make recommendations when and as necessar,y.
22

1915 COMINCH AND CNO to C'INCPAC APV HQ

COFS ARMY.

info CnTCPAC PEARL HQ, CINCAFPAC.

CG MF,
.

Refer WARX 3.3621 to COMGEN FEAF held by 20 AF GUAM and OAHU. For
JAVAllJJI project in support of OLIMPIC COMGEN AAF has requested assistance
from Navy. It is indicated that your approval will be sought on basis
project will be under canmand FEAF and CINCAFPAC and be self supporting at
BUNKHOUsE and all support operated by OSS personnel to be shipped via
MANILA.. If you approve operation it appearswasteful to ship special
facilities for single operation if availablea&BUNKHO~E for temporar,y use~
This applies pa.rliicula.r]3 to LCM, automotive equipment, shops and housing.
Para. Operation is set out in separate message. Facilities requested
are l LCM(3) and following functional components less personnel: 1 A-3,
1 D-12, l E-ll, 1 G-8, l ~l2A
Para. Extensive work on boats required in secluded place for security
reasons. Advise whether you can provide all or part of facilities on .
tanporary basis.
22 1921 COMINCH AND CNO to C!NCP@ ADVA,NCE info CmCAFPAC, CINCPAC PEARt. CG AAF,
COFS ARMY.

Project 11V 221915 is to destroy '=>HIMONOSEKI TUUNELS with 6 drone S5 f'ooi

aircraft rescue bOats and involves installing JAP SEA truck and luggar .
disguise which is prefabicated ready to ship. OSS expects to request ISCOM
to assign midget .sup-Base on MOTOBU PENINStJLA. If J ap Marine raiJJray at
base can be used, estimated installation time with facilities requested :in
l week per boat. 6 Spare boats and disguise kits being provided.
23 0903 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMIN PAC into COMPHIBSPAC, COM3,RDFLEF11', COMBATRON l,

ADCOMINPAC, CINCPAC

PEARI.~

Hg.

Upon completion sweeping area JUNEAU continue minesweeping operations

in EAST CHINA SEA using those minesweepers which have arrived most recent4'
in canbat area. By use of rotational plan of overhaul and rehabilitation
it is expected that sweeping will eontineu indefinitely. Minefield north
of area JUNEAU and field in vicinity of SHANGHAI-CHOSEN are desired swept

as early as practicable and prior to OLYMPIC.

Your 220S37 refers.

34 04

JULY (GCT)
~

0317

CINCPAC ADV HQ to CDJCAFPAC Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMGEN 10, COMDT NOB
OKINAWA, COMINCH

TOP SECRET. Memorandum for record dated 23 July signed by Major General
Chamberlin and Rear Admiral Sherman approved by CINCPAC. On receipt CINCAFPAC
concurrence I will direct Com.Gen 10 with U S Army Forces in the RYUKYUS
report to CDICAFPAC effective 1200 I ( -9) .31 J'licy' which was earliest date
acceptable to your representative and other Army conferees.
2.3 ]J2l

COMGENCHINA to CINCPOA ADV HQ Info CINCAFPAC, COMGENPOA, COMGENAIR, COMGEN

.AAF 10, COMGENSOSCHINA, COMGEN CCC CHINA, COMGENTACTCT, WARCOS
TOP SECRET. CFBX 1480

Due to staff conference at Manila. 1 August conference at GUAM has been

pospponed until at'ter 4 August. Message GUAM 202351Z ( GCT) refers. Present~
plan to leave CHUNGKING 4 August will arrive GUAM late 5 August or ear:cy6 August. Party expected to number about 15 officers and men (including
General Sim.psons party) Request information as to whether this will be
satisfactory. Names of p:!rsons composing party will be forwarded later. New
Subject: (For WARCOS) Eminently satisfactory is Colonel L. J. Lincoln's
presence at this conference He can return with CHINA Theater party.
23 2105

CNO to CINCPOA ADV HQ Info CINCPOA PEARL HQ

TOP SECRET. Mapping and photography of JAPAN JCS 756/2 revised by JIC 153/12
is subject your 181208 of May. JIC 153/20 has been approved and is being
forwarded you by air mail. Recommendations of OAHU mapping conference 25-29
M~ were approvec;l and reassignment of responsibilitie s for mapping photograph~'
of Japanewe areas to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC mutually with assistance of USASTAF
are to be accomplished in accordance with conference aggeements.

24 01 40

COMPHIBSPAC to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC/POA ADV HQ

TOP SECRET. In preparation for OLY.MPIC it is cmsidered most important that

ships assemble early for indoctrination and training. The rlarge numbers invo1ed and the oompleJI organization plus fact that present duties of PhibsPac
does not permit tactical training require this receive special attention.
It is recommended that main elements of the advance and amphibious forces my
serial OOOZ79 of 18 July assemble by 10 September as follows: At LEYTE Gunfire
and Covering Force, Escort Carrier Force, Western Attack Force, South Attack
Force, 3rd Attack r'orce. At MANILA 7th Attack Force. In MARIANAS and HAWAII
5th Attack Force. At LEYTE and in HAWAli Reserve Force.
Para. Assemb:i.y date of 10 September is approximatel\}r 10 days in advance of
dates set forth in Joint staff study. Submit that comp1axities of training,
loading, rehearsals, movements to loading, rehearsal,a.nd objective areas,
to gether with necessar.y upkeep and logistics require a longer period than
at present allowed. If you concur in proposed plan request you subnd.t to
CINCPAC for approval.
/

34 0

.,.
24 0636

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMINCH

TOP SECRET. Request by air mail copy JCS 659/3 of 24 March 1944 and by
dispatch information as to aqy JCS decision which places on area commander
responsibility over and authority to coordinate sea air ~escue within his

area.

24 0844

CINCPAC ADV Hg to COM2RDFLT, COM7'l,HFLT, COMAIRPAC, COM5THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC,

COMSERVPAC, COMGENFlviFPAC Info COMINCH & CNO, MARCORPS, CINCAFPAC, COMGEN6THARMY,
CTF 96, CTF 99, CINCPOA PEARL, COMGENPOA, COM3RDPHlBFOR, COM5THPHIBFOR, COMGEN
2THPHIBCORPS, COM7THPHIBFOR, CQ\[GENAIR FOR MID PAC, COMGEN AIFPOA, COMBEN

SERVCOMDFMFPAC

TOP SECRET. Para (B) bydis 090001 modified to extend that the OTJB at MANOSE
RIVE (or such other place on the West Coast a.s m.a.y be selected) will remain
in support of V Phib Corps as long as needed by the Corps. On or before
withdrawal of the V Phib Corps from KYUSHU this CUB will pass to control of
Commandant .NOB.

24 1349

CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC AJJV HQ Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COJ\lSEliVPAC, COMPHIBSPAC,

COM7THr' LT, COM5THFLT, COMS,t!;RON 10, COMSERY'tl'HFLT

CX 28065 'rOP SECRET. Concur in change oo.tlined your 220742Z (GCT) Ju:cy in
reply to our 162lll. Servon 7 will provide for all naval forces that assemble

in the MANILA area. Request Servon 7 be advised of substation additional

requirements for inclusion in AFP:AC slates.

24 0325

COMBATRON-l to COMESCAR. USS TENNESSEE, COM FAW-1. COMCRUDIV-16. COMINEPAC,

COMSERVDIV 104, COMNAVFOR RYUKYUS lnfo ALL TF, TG COMS PAC, COM3RD & 5THFLTS,
COMGENFEAFADV, cmCPAC BOTH HQ, CINCAFPAC, COMGENFEAF, COMGEN CHINA, COMINCH,
COMFHILSEAFRON.

Organization TF 95. 95.1 TENNESSEE force lt'lagship Captain Heffernan.

95.2 EASY striking Group RAdm Lowe. 95.3 Heavy strild.ng Group V.Adm Uldendorf.
95.4 Mine Group RAdm Sharp. 95.5 Base Covering Group R.Aclm Cobbs. 95.6
OKINAWA Logistic Group Oomdr Ueliher. 95.7 Philippine training Group, R.Adm.
McCormick. 95.8 ESCOVFOR R.Adm Durgin. 95.9 F'leet Air Wing 1, R.Adm f!RRY.

This dispatch effective 250200 GCT.

24 0850

(jC.t-2ET

GINCPAC ADVANCE to OOJJ:lBATRON l, info CRUDIVS 16, COMlNCH. Oo,.,

otV

0E.5 P97C.h'}

G-RG"Etv

If.~ $o

CTF 95 230415. When RFS direct R.Adm LoN with the same force as in preceding operation proceed to conduct shipping sweep in area west of Long125-00E
between Lat. 3Q-OON and 32-30 N. Avoid mine restricted area. in .OHANGHAI-G.tiUSAN
area. Keep Com31'Cl.r'lt, COMGENFE.~, COMGENCHINA and CTF 99 informed of' movements
this force.

23 1226

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC PEARL, COM7THFLT, COMSERVPAC.

Request your comments on COMSERVPACS 210215. CINCPAC cons~ders. a

total of 4 strips on 2 or 3 fields required to support lst Marme Air WJ.ng.

34 06

24 1722 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COM7THFLT, CINCAFPAC, COMSERVPAC,
CINCPAC PEARL HQ. CO:MSUBPAC.

Referring to item H your 130751 and my 201819 the requirement s of my

181305 September 1944 and myser 001a7 of 12. January 1944 for maintenance
of definite numbers cruisers, destroyers and submarines in 7th Fleet
hereby cancelled.

24 1824 NONE GIVEN to CINCAfPAC, QINCPAC. COMGEN USATAfPAC into-non!

V-273.

As a basis of discussion with the Soviet General staff on the subject

Joint Chiefs of staff have made the following proposal inconnectio n
the
of
with u.s. Naval and Air Operations when and if RUSSIA enters the war
against JAPAN:
A. u.s. Naval surface forces may operate without restriction in the
seas of JAPAN and OKHOTSK.
B. u.s. SUbmarines may operate without restriction s in the SEAS OF JAPAN
and OKHOTSK south and east of a line connecting following points:
coast of KOREA at latitude 38 north thence to latitude liJ north
longitude 135 east thence to latitude 45-45 north longitude 140 east
thence east along that latitude.
c. u.s. Air Forces will operate without restriction south and east ofat
a line connecting following points: CAPE IDPATKA-west to a point
latitude 51-10 longitude 147 degrees-then ce to point latitude 45-45
longitude 144-20 thence to point latitude 45-45 longitude 139-30 thence
to point latitude 41-20 longitude 133-20 - thence westward to SEISHIN
KOREAN-thence north to railroad at KOREAN border-then ce westward
along railroad to YUNGKI and CHANGCHUN-thence along the river to
LIAOYUAN KAILU and CHIHFENG-thence along the railroad through TOLUN,
PAOCHANG, WANCHUAN, TOTUNG, FENGC~, TSINING to D'l:EJ:SUI-thence
northwest to the border of outer MONGOUA.
D. The location of taese lines may be changed from time to tinie by
mutual agreement as deemed necessar.y or desirable.
Para. u.s. Submarines and air operations north and west of these
lines will be coordinated with the RUSSIANS and similarly their submarine
and air operations south and east of these lines will be coordinated
with u.s.
Para. Your comment is requested to arrive terminal by 260600Z (GCT).
NOTE (On Originator) - call sign JEBG (The station from which this

dispatch was received) has been used on dispatches originated

by COMINCH AND CNO and JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF - Location is
POTSDAM, GERMANY.

-----.

25 0905 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMBATRON 1 info COMINCH, COMNORPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ,
COMCRUDIV 5. COMCRUPAC, CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LATE CITY.

CRUDIV 5 will be assigned north pacific force in near future.

paration ships for this service is to be initiated imrned.iatel;y.

Pre-

25 0425 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMHIIBSPAC info COM5THFLEET.

Your 240650 seaplane operations during OLYMPIC will be conducted
in KOSHIKI and ARIAKE WAN AREAS as determined by COM5THFLEET. Concur
in desirability of establishinent of tender based seaplane operating area
adjacent to other naval activities. Final determination of site upon
recommendations of commanders concerned.
25 0904 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCAFPAC, COMGEN USASTAF.
Your 241824 (V 273). Strongl;y urge that decision be reached as to
areas in which Pacific Fleet will control and be responsible for safety
of shipping (including such part of the sea route from the United states
to Russia. through the SEA of OKHOTSK as ma.:r be a u.s. Pacific Fleet
responsibility) and that RUSSIAN submarines be excluded fran that area.
Difficulties of communications, language and unaccustomed recognition
procedures ma.kt it extremely inadvisable permit RUSSIAN submarines
operate in areas where United states ships and aircraft are escorting
shipping.
Para. The boundary proposed for United states submarines is satisfactory.
Para. It is recommended that since the ports railroads and rivers
listed in paragraph C of V 273 as the Air Force boundary are themselves
centers of target concentrations they be assigned de.f'inite~ to the
United ~~ates or RUSSIA in all cases.
25 09\fl CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM5THFLEEr info COM7THFI.EET, COMFHIBSPAC, CINCPAC PEARL

cmcAFPAC Aro, GOMSERVPAC.

Your 240358 and 222354. It is expected that COMSERVDIV 103, Como.
Hartley will be responsible for other logistic aCtivities in the objective area as well as for repairs and salvage as indicated in 11\r
Captain Curtis will be assigned to his staff. He will be
220~10.
assigned the C.A.MI'BELL ( CGC-AGC) as flagship and wi.th adequate assistants
to permit him to discharge these duties. It is expected that he will
remain in the area as COMSERVDIV 103. As such he wi:Q. be under the operational control of COM7THFLEET after departureof COM5THFLEET.- The
Army sub Area petroleum officer may accompany Comm.odore Hartley or Admiral
Turner as arranged by the latter. The assignment of the SPl!llCER (CGC)
and INGHAM ( CGC) will.{?~ determined later.

25 1009 CINCAFPAC to

WARCOS info CINCPAC, COMGEN USASTAF.

CREGO. 28231.

Concur with Joint Chiefs of .& taff V-Zl3 24th.

25 1011 GINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS, CINCPAC PEARL, GOMGEN 10,
ISCOM OK~NAWA, COMGENAFMIDPAC, GOMG.ENAF'' fESPAC.

CX-28232.

Reference memorandum for record, dated 23 July 1945, relating to ~

RYUKYUS, signed by Major General Chamberlin and Rear Admiral Sherman,
approved by CINCAFPAC with the word "Administrative" changed to "0perati0naln on page 2, para 3A(l)(A)l. CINCPAC ADV in his 240317/z (GCT) has

approved memorandum.

340e

25 1431 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS, USASTAF, CINCPAC PEARL, CO:MGENAAFroA, AFMIDPAC, COMGEtN'fl'1Af:.

Cx-28307.

Subject is JAVPJff.AN project reference ~JX .3.3621 and COMINCH 221915/Z

( GCT) and 221921/Z Request your concurren ce in proposed operation al
project now assigned to FEAF for execution . Target date later to be
determine d will precede OLYMPIC target date.
12

2336 WARCOS to CINCAFPAC info COMGENAFMIDPAC - COMGENAFMIDPAC PASSED TO

CINCFOA OOTH HEADQUARTERS.

WARX 31108.
A study is now undergoin g priority considera tion wherein ATC
facilitie s (Aircraft crews and maintenan ce personnel ) of the Atlantic
be moved to Pacific beginning in .August.
Para. New grand totals 4 engine transport aircraft to be in the Pacific 'lll'l.der this study will be: 373 in Augu.~st, 375 in September , 399 in .
October, 45.3 in November, 5'51 in December, 600 in January-, 655 in February,
707 in March.
Para. 2 plans being considere d. Plan 1 is to base majority of
ATC HAWAII With personnel fed to that point by water transport ation. Plan
2 is through movement by air from West Coast. Ultimate destinati on to be
PHILIPPINES, LE.'YTE or MANILA or both.
Para. Shipping implicati ons and canpariso n of net Pacific gain
against new Atlantic loss will be resolved here.
Para. Needed l'dthout delay is estimate of theaters ability to:
Para. A. Receive via air total 7600 personnel in August, 18000 in Sept,
20000 in October, 39000 in November, 46000 in December, 55000 in
January, 61000 in February, and 670CJO in Marcp.
Para. B. Provide holding area in Hawaiian. departmen t to accommodate 12500.
Para. c. Provide aceomoda tions for greatly increased permanent personnel
at HICKAM. (Assuming plan l above is accepted)
Para. D. Provide tenn:i.aal facilitie s in PHILIPPINES and assume f'ull
responsib ility for passenger s upon .landing, to .include necessar.y
groUnd transport ation.
Para. E. Provide storage and disbursin g facilitie s for ATC total POL
requireme nts of 41000 short tons in August building up to ll5000
in March.
Para. F. Provide service forces to support such increase.
Para. Directly related and in amplifica tion this problem is radio
DTG lll817 of 11 J~ 45 (dispatch ed via Navy channels) .
Para. For COMGENMIDPAC only. This is ATC augmentat ion message to
be brought to attention of Colonel Hobson, OPD, now TD in Pacific which
was subject of earlier cOmmunication. Hobson to extend TD .M Hawaii and
arrange T\V.Xwith vYD for further details of neeessar.y . Extreme size of
backlog on West Coast forseen between nON and !larch 1946 is causing
great concern here.

25 2104 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCIAC ADVANCE HQTRS.

Ur 2406,36. Copies of JCS 659/1 and 659/3 being forwarded airmail.
No subsequen t JCS action modifies paragraph x 3 of 659/1 which states
"operatio nal control of Air Sea Rescue activitie s and facilitie s is a
responsi bility of theater or area commanders".

34 09

25 .2256 COMGiNUSASTAF to JEBG(POTSDAM, GERMANY) info CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC.

Concur with Joint Chiefs of Staff V-Zt3, 20-4th. Recanmend that
targets ~ along outlined air boundar, be assigned to either RUSSIANS
or United states.
26 0149 CINCFOA ADVANCE to COMGEN TEN info COMINCH AND CNO, CINCAFPAC, CTF 95 1
COMGENAFMIDPAC, CO:MDT NOB OKINAWA, COMGENAFWESPAC, COM3RDFLT, ISCOM
OKINAWA, COMGEN USAST AF, COM5THFLT, COOTHFLT.

Effective 1200 I (-9) 31 Jul.Jr report to CINCAFPAC with all United

states Arley" Forces under your command. At that time control of' United
States held positions in the RYUKYUS will be governed by JCS 181409 Ju.:cyand menorandum for record dated 23rd JW as approved by CINCPAC 2laD317
and CINCAFPAC CX 28232 (DTG 2510ll).
26 0150 ClliCPAC ADVANCE to CDJCAFPAC info COMGEN TEN, ISCOM OIQ:NAWA, COMGENAFMIDPAC

COMGENAFWESPAC, HQUSSOS SWPA.

Your 250847 concur. Copies of memorandum distributed to naval

service will have change incorporated.
26 1225 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMNORPAC, CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

TOP SECRET. Cominch & CNO 251750 request your comment and recommenas suggestions as to how CINCFOA should exercise control.
Expedite reply.
da.t~ons

26 1514 BIS~ ~ ~fRlTY CONTROL (MARSHALL), CINCAFPAC, Info CINCPJ.C ADV

HQ,MiliENUSF'C~

TOP SECRET. WARX 38701

Following for yow infonna.tion in jlmplementat~on piailriing PASTEL. (A) Chinese underground SHANGHAI presently

under United States control. Includes important emplo,yers and labo~

steamer lines, street railw~s, harbor activities, public utilities
plus 15,000 coastal pirates. {B) ComNavGroup CHINA on 14 Jul. proposed
beginning training within 6 weeks 150U key SHANGHAI persormel for
intelligence sabotage Jap installations and protection of port against
Jap sabotage. (C) CO:MINCH concurring directs ComNavGroup CHINA that it
be "accomplished at expense of your other obligations unless it has
sufficient importance to ComGen USFCT .to carry increase in theater
ceilings on persormel and freight in order to meet a target date for
completion, which date is a matter for his decision" Evaluation
follows. (A) Sequence of' actions if taken and date set by ComGen
USFCT will bear on enemy estimate PASTEL. (B) Assistance provided by
cn~c~,PA0 or CINCPAC to above projects will accelerate and augment
appearance your GIQilT.MAVTS SHANGHAI area in accordance PASTEL. (C)
M~ be possible to relate pirate activities to those of TF 95 in operations EAST CHINA SEA. Radio traffic between GUAM and HOCHWAN could
support. this relation. (D) If attention SHANGHAI area maintained or
exaggerated after X-55 per PASTEL special means implementation by Joint
Security Control must be coordinated appropriate~$

34 10

- continued -

for u. s. aircraft to attack targets or make reconnaissance flights north

of the boundar--J' line coordination would be effected by local liaison and
within 24 hours after application. It was further agreed that P9Sition
of the line would be reconsidered if communications proved too slow to
effect prompt coordination.
Para 4th Question- Does the Soviet High Command agree to the proposal
for the immediate establishment of operational coordinatio.n and liaison
as proposed by the u. s. Chiefs of Staff in the letter sent by the Commanding General, u. s. Military Mission, to General Antonov on 5 JuJ.y 1945?
Para 4th Answer- The Soviet Command agrees that beginning with Millta.ry
Operations of the Soviet Union against JAPAN, to0establish liaison groups
between the American and Soviet commanders in the Far East. To accomplish
this liaison it is suggested that there be Soviet Joint Chiefs of staff '
liaison groups with General MacArthur, with Admiral Nimitz, and in addition
in Washington, to have a Soviet Military Mission.
Para. American Liaison Groups will be located w-lth the Soviet High
Commander in the FAR EAST, MARSHALL VASSILIEVSKI, in KHABAROVSK, and with
the Commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yema.shev in VALADIVosroK.
Para. The Soviet Command is ready to accept the Radio-Teletype equipment for installation at the indicated points.
Para Action- Agreed with the understanding that Liaison would be
effected by the commanders in the field without reference to WASHINGTON
and

MOSCOW.

Para 5th Question- it is assumed that, after D-Day, Soviet or u. s.

air and naval craft in emergencies will have access to the nearest Soviet
or u. s. ports : . . or airfields where they may obtain repairs, servicing,
medical care and otherwise be assisted in making a speedy return to combat.
Although in extreme emergency the nearest friendly :facility would be sought,
it is considered desirable to designate certain ports, airfields or areas
where ma.Xi.rnum facilities would be available. Will the Soviet Government
designate such ports, airfields or areas furnishing information neeessar.y
for proper location, identification and approach together with information
on regognition signals, co.,ridors of approach and exit for general use in
aqy emergency, landing or coastal approach? The United States is prepared
to take corresponding action in the case of Soviet Aircraft;
Para 5th Answer- The Soviet Command agrees to select ports and
airfields for ships and planes in need of repairs and to make available, as
tar as possible, repair facilities and medical assistance to the personne1
of the above mentioned ships and planes.
'
Para. Fo;- the purpose we can designate:
SubPara tAJ Naval ports: in the Japanese SEA, port NAHODKA (American
Strati); in the OKHarSK and BERING SEA REGIONS..NIKOLAEVSK, on the
AMUR, and PETROPAVLOVSK, on KAMCHATKA.
SubPara. (b) Ail"fields: in the region of VLADIVOSTOK, in th~ region of
ALEXANDROVSK on SAKHALIN ISLAND and in the region of PEI'ROPAvtoVSK on
KAMCHATKA.
Para Action - Agreed vrlth the understanding that the method of' identification of damaged aircraft arriving at Soviet fields would be established by the Commanders in the Field
. 26 1559 COMGENAIR(POTSDAM) to COMGEN USASTAF info CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, AG!lAR FOR
CASAffi.

3411

- continued -

26 1559 COMGNAIR(rorSDtU0 to COMwEN USA$TAF info CINQAFPAC, CIDJCPAQ, AGWAR FQR

CASAIR.

Victory 343 BG 400

In connection with planning for program in event of a Japanese.
cpaitulatioh it is planned to implement ful~ the B-29 program as now
scheduled, the units to be deployed as early as practicable. You should
prepare for rearrangement of the deploymeht so as to deploy the 4D B-29
groups in OKINAWA, PHILIPPINES, MARIANAS and for 2 groups in the AlEUTIANS.

26 1951 CNO to COllifi'..SSEP.FRON info COMNORPAC, COM 13. COM 17, CDTCPAC BarH Hg.
Desire that you expedite lend lease transfer preparation of vessels
scheduled for MILEPOST and that you sail them to cold bq as early as
practicable maintaining satisfactory standards as regards readiness for
transfer. Advise COMINCH and CNO and info addressees of revised estimated
date arrival COLD BAY all ships which have nat yet departed SEATTLE.
Action being taken to advance date of arrival SEATTLE remaining vessels
not yet available to you.
26 2020 CO!.UNCH to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC PEARL, CINCLANT, COM 13. COMWESSEA-

FRON, COMNORPAC, COM NAVDET FT RANDALL, COMPASEAFRON,

Expedite movement and delivery vessels scheduled for transfer under

MILEroST anticipating arrival and transfer dates a.s much as practicable.
Advise interested adees new arrival dates when lmown.

Zl 0019 CINCPOA PEARL to OINCroA ADVANCE.

It __i~- the opi:Qioo. of cQrolilllllica.tion officers her..e_ thatpnorthero HONSHU
and HOKKAIDO are mc.Luded in the directed beam of OWl SA! IAN- station. The
propsed station if placed in ATTU would be no closer to the population
center of objective area than is OWI SAIPAN. Interrogation of FWS has so
far failed to indicate any general lmowledge of operation of propaganda
stations of OWI. RfB has been unable to detect aQY difference between
the OWI and OSS programs except the pretense of OSS that it comes from
a Japanese source. Control of the station could be exercised only by
assignment of FWB indoctrinated control .officer with freedom of communicatiol
with CINCFOA staff. Conclude that station is unessential and reconunend
that it not be authorized. This refers to your 261225.
27 0250 CINCPOA ADVANCE to UOMINCH, UNO,

CINCAFPAC,

CINCPAC has no techincal data in c~nnaction with the JAVA1~ project.

However from his general lmowledge and based on Pacific Fleet experience
with similar projects he i s doubtful of the value of the project when
measured in terms of the naval support eventuall required to place the
boats in the desired location . CINCPAC requests as complete information
as possible on this project and especi~ as to naval personnel ships or
boats t hat mc;w be r equired and how i t is proposed to move t he boats from
OKINAWA to destination.
Para. If it is decided to carry out the projee~ i t is recommended that
CINCAFPAC assign a site on "OKINAWA and provide the resources r equired.
CINCPAC will provide such material as they Army cannot provide to the extent
to which such mat er ial is available from naval sources and excess to project
of higher pr ior i t y .

3412

27 0253 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINC ..I\FPAC, COMGENFOA, CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

In order to facilitate econoliW' in use of personnel and resources and in

vi en vastly improved strategic situation it is recommended that the category
of defense in the main islands of the Hawaiian Group be reduced to catogory
A and that in. view of his continuing responsibilitie s as area comm.a.nder
CINCroA be authorized to determine the degree of implementation required
with respect to fighter protection, anti-aircraft readiness, mobile combat
troops and harbor defenses.
Para. It is also pertinent at this time to consider the necessity for
retention of the powers conilerred on the Military Commander of the Territory
of Hawaii by executive order 94S9 of 24 October 1944. Lieut. General
Richardson COMGEl\JFOA considers that they should be retained. Having overall responsibility for the security and safety of the territory of Hawaii
as well as other pa.:rts of the Pacific Ocean Areas, I feel that the state
of the war is now such that continuation of the powers vested in Military
authority by that order is no longer justified and according recommend

that it be suspended or revoked.

Zl 0800 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC info COM7THFLT, CINCAFPJ\.C, COMGENTACHCHINA. COMGENSOSCHINA. WARCOS.

CFBX 1003.

For planning purposes prel.iminary to impending visit CHDrA THEATER party

the following is offered for your consideration and comment.
1. The purpose of the FORT BAYARD operation is to open a sea sup~ route
to a temporary base in CHINA, augmenting hump tonnage, to assist in
supporting further operations to the maximum extent possible.
2. The FORT BAYARD area has the fl.UlCtions of furnishing a port for unloading and airstrips for distributing car o. Intelligence information
at hand and a study of aerial photo raphy indicates that these facilities are neither ideal. nor immediatel;y" available. The airstrip will nee(
matting and possibly rebuilding of subgrade, the beaches in the river
are wide mud banks drying at low tide and ship berths appear desirable
to handle the required tonnage, the hydrography is far from ideal and
pilots may be required for river navigation, present indications appear
to dictate a limited draft of ships to 19 feet although the lst 3 ships
are loaded to 22 feet and must cross the bar at high tide. FORT BAYARD
as a port, despite difficulties, is most desirable as a step toward
~ _ J..' o t) , ~ roe 1 N c,.
later operations.
3. As an alternate operation, or as preliminar,y phase of opening FORT
BAYARD, WEIRHOW ISLAND PRN(l090 ~HSDM$BA@X PURl'~P !NflW3Q'BlW'f'JNG
considered. This island is now in c hinese hands and the abandoned runstrip appears easy to reconstruct and lengthen. The harbor appears
suitable to anchor AKs ful.J.y loaded. The sandy beach in the harbor
appears useable for all types of landing craft at all tides.
4. Aircover entirely adequate for either operation will be furnished .f'rom
a field now in our hands at PAKHOI ( 109..04 21-29) Preliminary plans
envisage using 4 P-3S planes giving continuous convoy cover 100 miles
west of the 114 meridian. If convoy arrives at 114 meridian at night
fall this should provide daylight cover west of the l.l.4.

3413

- continued 27 0800 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC info COOTHFLEET, CINCAFPAC, COMGENTACHINA, COMGENSOSCHINA, WARCOS.

5. There is reported a considerable number of enemy troops in INDO CHINA

and YO HAINAN ISLAND with minor en~ naval installations. In order

to interdict the movement, of these troops by water and to protect
t~ port area it is believed that a squadron of PT boats would be
extremely valuable.
6. The plan involving use _, of the island could be }Jllt into effect almost
immediately, after bo't:.P PAKHOI am WEICHCii are in our comtrol. ~
resistance may delq occupation o! LUICHOW PENINSULA and it is desirable
that time be allowed in the FORT BAYARD OPERATION after occupation to
SUl'V'ey the river, install navigational aids and unloading facilities
before AKS are called up. Our thought is that WEICHCNi would be used
to accept shipping if LUICHOW is not secured by 20 August and shift
thereafter made as soon as possible to liORT BAYARD.
7. Fo,r the ViEICHCW operation it is assumed that tbe convoys would proceed
south g HA.INAN ISLAND. J.ntelligence sources do not i.Ddicate that there
are 1Lil1" minetields in TONKING GULA, however HAINAH STRAIT was onee
reportedly mined. The inines in this strait are reported to have broken
loose and carried into TONKIN GULF. There has been :no friendly mining
since May 1944 at which time HAIPHONG HARBOR area bad 90 day mines laid
by the 14th Air Foree.
8. Bequest your consideration to furnishging a naval command to assist in
the operation and to be responsible for the following:
A. To provide required surface convoy protection and. minesweeping.
B. Assume the responsibility of channel and harbor surveying, installing navigational aids and piloting to anchorage area.
,.c,,_ 410 ,N'""'
1
c. The
insl:A11s.tion
a.nd ODe~ ion
w~nrot.flM.iOD
facilitieS
am:b ....
"H~kl)o~ ~"'""'..:f~{fnR-'rf:.tr" o i"DilrL ft.:;5,!~~~,,.. t..- H19A.t3"~ Po?i1~e.

D.
E.

9.

aJ.r 1 ail l.-aJ..rC.Lcw. lol '~

Qi

.11~..:-&'-" ~

I) vr

E y.. c. L

'N"" tJo,,.J

D I r4 C-

Furnishing qualified ~~oiJiett and equipnent for .functioning of

port director in the harbor including maintenance of all landing

and other craft.

Provide the 1:1ecessar.y coiDIJl8,rl and auxiliar.y units including housekeeping with 30 days consuma.bles for naval personnel in the area
and shipping to move personnel and equipnent supplies by the Navy.
F. F\mctioDal. components a.s outlmed in our CFB lOCf/ (Top secret not
to alll including 1 stevedore company and 1 water front engl.neer
company. These units plus pontoon cells for 2 ship berths are
considered necessary. Naval engl.aeers requested could ,install.
docks a.rxi erect the other naval facilities outlined.
G. CHINA THEA'i'ER will assume responsibility for supp]Jr of all class 1,
3, and conmn ~age amn01nition supplies tor ~VAl;.~rsonnel.
H. llaterial and logtstical. support; required for PtJj:l: o'perations would
be responsibility of the naval command.

Requested are your comments on the above prior to the depart,ure of CHINA
THEATER representatives for conference at your headquarters. This is
a planning message only and is not a request or requisition for
assignment of naval resources.

3414

27 2lll COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Refer CINCPAC/POA serial 000576 of 20 Ju.l.;y' Para 3. COMDICH approves.
Equipment aqd communication personnel less senior officer of each unit
to be assembled seattle DYMJSR report COMINCH temporary duty. Movement
designator already assigned .[1!! will be promulgated 9M normal. manner.
Order of priority movement personnel as follows. , Radio Techincians.
Interpreters. Aerological Techinicans. Radiomen. Aerological personnel.
Target date all personnel and material 25 August. CNO will assemble RUSSIAN
speaking laiason teams Washington prior Target Date. Soviets have agreed
in principle establishment facilities and are ready to accept material n~.
Items still undertermined are frequencies and detailed arrangement as to
entr.r u.s. personnel. Unless otherwise advised assume you will direct
COMSERVPAC provide all communication equipment and communication personnel.
F'or info COMSERVPAC all equipment destined for KHABAROVSK to have shippil:Jp;
designated "MOKO" for PE'l'ROPAVLOVSK "TEAM 11 for VLADIVOSTOK "KURT 11
MACARTHUR

Victoey 371 BG 429

At terminal the Jo~t Chiefs of staff put to the RUSSIANS 5 questions
which are listed below With the RUSSIAN answers and the action of the u.s.
and RUSSIAN Chiefs of staff thereon. The agreements are to became effective
upon Soviet entry into the war. Preliminary arrangements in regard to the
subject matter of the 5 items may be made now.
Para. 1st Question -has the Soviet High Command received any instructions regarding the proposal to establish u.s. weather liaison groups in
PETROPAVLOVSK and KHABAROVSK as presented to GENERALISSniDS STALIN by
President Truman on 23 July 1945.
Para. 1st Answer - The Soviet Canmand agrees to establish in PE!'ROPAVLOVSK and KHABAROVSK radio stations for transmitting weather data in
accordance with the request made in a letter from President Truman delivered on 2.3 Ju~ 1945. The Soviet Command is ready' to accept and use the
Radio stations and equipnent proposed in that letter for the above purpose.
Para. As regards the personnel for maintaining and operating the
stations, we consider it wiser to use Soviet personnel which already has a
great deal of experience in working with America& Radio Stations.
Para. In addition to these 2 stations we shall increase the network
of local stations in order to give better information on weather.
Para action - Agreed as above emcept that the radio stations to be
established in PETROPAVI.DVSK and KHABAROVSK are to be manned by U. S.
Personnel.
Para 2nd Question - u. s._Naval surface forces will operate without
restriction in the seas of OKHOTSK and JAPAN. u. s. Submarine forces
will operate without restriction in the SEAS OF OKHOTSK and JAPAN, south and
east of a line established by connecting and following points: coast of
KOREA at 38-00 North, thence to 40-00 north 135-00 east, thence to 45-45
north 140-00 east, thence along the parallel of 45-45 north. This boundary
will be subject to .Later change as the situation may require. u. s.
~ubmarine operations north and west of this botmdary and Soviet operations
south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the
Soviet General t>taff have any suggestions regarding furlher coordination
of Naval operations?
Para 2nd Answer- separate zones of Naval and Air operations are to be

3415

- contine.ed F TO CINCAFPAC MACARTHUR

CINCPAC

USSTAFPAC

set up for the u. s. and the USSR in the SEA OF JAPAN. The boundary
between these zones will be along the lines connecting CAPE BOLTINA on the
coast of KOREA to point 40-00 north 135-00 east to point 45-45 north l4Q-OO
east; thence along the parallel 45-45 north to the line connecting CAPE
CRILLON (KONOO) ( on the southem tip of southern SAKH.ALIN) with CAPE SOYA
MISSAKI ( SOYASAKI) ( on the northern tip of HOKKAIDO)
Para. The ..: USSR naval and air forces will operate north of this line.
u.s. Naval and air forces will operate to the south of this line. This
line shall be the limiting line of operations for surface and submarine
craft and .for aviation.
Para. .Dependi.n,g upon circumstances in the future, this boundary line
mq be subJect to cfiange.
Para. u. s. Naval and air operations north of this bounda.;-y line and
Soviet Naval and air operations south of this boundary line will be subject
to coordination.
Para. In the SEA OF OKHOTSK there shall be a zone of mutual operations
for the naval and air forces of the u. s. and the Soviet Union. Operations
in the OKHOTSK SEA will take place in accordance with mutual agreements.
Para. In the BERING SEA there shall be a zone of mutual. operations
of our Pacific Fleet and aviation and the United States Fleet and aviation
bounded on the north, east and south by a line going from CAPE DEZHNEV to
DIOMEDE ISLAND and thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of
the USSR and the u. s. to parallel 51-30 north and thence through 50..35 nortll
157-00 east; thence to 49-50mnorth 156-20 east and thence along the parallel
49-50 north to the 4th KURILE STRAIT.
Para. The remainder of the BERING SEA as well as bordering regions
of the Pacific Ocean shal.l be the zone of operations of the u. s. Fleet.
Para. Action- Agreed with the understanding thatoperations by u. s.
and Soviet Naval and air forces in the SEA OF OKHOTSK and the BERING SEA
would be coordinated by mutual understanding and cooperation.
Para .3rd Question- u. s .Air Forces will operate without restriction
south and east of the following line: CAPE LOPATKA, west to point at 51-10
north 147-00 east, thence to point at 45-45 north, 144-20 east, thence to
point at 45-45 north 139-30 east, thence to point at 41-20 north 13.3-20
east, thence westward to SEISHIN, KOREA, thence north to railroad at KOREAN BORDER
thence westward along railroad to YUNGKI and CHANGCHUM, thence along the
river to LIAYUAN, KAGLU and CHINNENG, thence along the railroad through
TOLUN, PAOCHANGE, WANCHUAN, TATUNG, FENGCHEN, TSINING to KWEISUI, thence
northwest to the border of outer MONGOLIA. This boundary will be subj eat
to later change as the situation may require. u. s. Air operations north
and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this
boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General staff
have any suggestions regarding further coordination of air operations?
Para .3rd ; Answer- The boundary line between operational zones of the
u. s. and Soviet Air Forces in KOREA and MANCHURIA shall be as follows:
CAPE BOLTINA, CHANGCHUN, LIAOYUAN, KAILU, CHIHNENG, PEKING, TATUNG and
thence along the southem boundary of IDNER MONGOLIA.
Para. u. s. aviation will operate south of this line including all the
above named points. USSR aviation will operate north of this line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. u. s. air
operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line
must be coordinated.
Para Action - Agreed with the understanding that when necessar,y for

3418

..

28 0108 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC, COM3RDFLT, COMNORPAC, CGMSERVPAC, g;to COMINCH

CO~JESSEAFRON, CO:MPHIBSPAC, CINCAFPAC, COMCARDIV 23, COMCARDIV 2
.

Be prepared initiate operations under concept 11f3' serial 0005067 of 26

Copy will be delivered CCilCARDIVS 23 and 26 at ENIWE'l'OK.

1iay on short notice.

28 0457 CINCAFPAC to COMGENAFMIDPAC info WARCOS, CINCPOA ADVANCE HQ.

ex 28945

Bequest that you rxpress direct to the Chief of Staff w:i. th information
copy here your views regarding Hawaiian Defense matters that were raised
in CINCPOA advance dispatch 270253.

25 0740 COMPHI.BSPAC to COM5THli'LT info CINCPAC, CINCAFPAC, CG 6THAHMY. COM 3BD. 5TH,
7TH PHIBFO&S, COMPHIBGRPS 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9. 11. 12, 13,

1ft

Enclosure (A) 1Jf3' seria.p 000279 of 18 July. The task of ca~uring outlying islands to south and southwest of lrnJSHU for establishment of air
waming and fighter direction stations is now assigned to the westera attack
force mounting the 40th Iarantr.r Division, in addition to p:reviousl.7 assigned
tukB. The Southem Attack Force mounting the 158th BOT is assigned the
tasks of l.a.Dd:ing on and securing northem TENEGA SHIMA i f ordered and of
reinforcing jlements of the 6th Arsq ashore as directed. In order to avoid
contusion with the term "Follow-Up Ecbelon" which the Arsq desires used in
place of "Garrison Echelon", the follow-up force (TF 49) is renamed the
reinforcement force. In para 11 the reserve force is erroniously' termed
.
the reserve attack force.

28 0812 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CO:U:GENCHINA into COMINCJI, cmCAFPAC, COJllTHFLT.

~e difficulties inconnection with the FORT BAYARD operation outlined ill
your 270800 appear to be greater than were originally envisaged to a degree
which promts me to invite attention to the last sentence of '11fT 1.30228 June.
From. the information now presented it appears that the WEICHOW Al'roject would
be a preitdmi naey to the FORT BAYARD project and that the total resources
involwd would be greater than could be spared without tmdue detriment to
OLDPIC. It would probably be infeasible to abandon WEICHC1N until long
after FORT BAYABD is occupied. However, I will of course, be glad to leam
more about the project and make this co.mment before our pending conference o
only because you so request.
Para.. Although a techincal factor which can be adjusted it should be
noted that while FORT BAYARD borders on the Pacific Ocean areas WEICHOW
ISLAND and the TONG KING GULF are in the southwest pacific area.

28 0849 CINCAFPAC to iVARCOS info CINCPOA ADVANCE, COMGENAFMIDPAC.

ex

29008.
I recommend most strongly the abolltion within the u. s. sectors of the
Pacific theater of the area. boundaries. They have long ceased to sef'v'e aJV"
useful purpose and now seriously complicate the proper strategical and tactical handling of forces in this single theater of operations. They have
long been ignored as delimiting anything beyond an academic exercise of ove:l'all authority and represent the complete opposite to the serivee unification.
of command which has now become the operational bailie in the theater.
CINCPOA ADVANCE 270253 refers.

3417.

111!

2S 08.35 COMPHIBSPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE into CINCPAC PEARL. COMGENA.FlADPAC. CO:MAF?l.ES.

PAC. COKGEID.O. CINCA.FPAC, COliDRS PHIB GRfS 9. 13, ll. 14. COM5THFLEET,
COliDRS 3, 5, and 7TH PHIBS, C01t7M'LT, COllG:ENPOA.
Your 112.340 not to all. CINCA.FPAC, COJDEN6THARIIY aad COMPHIBSPAC agree
on responsibility for loading OLII4PIC forces as follows. COilGEN6THA.m4Y has
overall responsibility for loading from SWPA all &rii\V' troops plus those nav
and marine troops who wi~ be under 6th A.:mf3' control at objective. CINCPAC
has overall responsibility for loading all navr and marine troops from POA
plus those navy and marine troops .from ~A who wiJiL be under CINCPAC control
at objective. COJilENAFJdiDPAC bas responsibility tor loading all &J.lQ' troops
from POA exclusive of RIUKIUS and willload as arranged with COJDEN6'l'RARYI.
COJIGENlOTHARMY has respoDSibUity for loading all ~troops both grounci
and air from RYUKIUS and will. load ae arranged with COKGEN6THARMY and COllGENFEAF. CINCAFPAC is amending OLIMPIC operations instnctions to include
COl4GENl.OtH ARilY responsibility and ameming CO:UGEHAFJ[[])PAC responsibilit7
as indicated herein. COMPHIBSPAC has responsibility in loading all assault
shipping insofar as safe ani proper deliver of all assault forces to
objective beaches is concerned. Joint planning by COMPHIBSPAC and COllGEN6tH AHilY for loading assault forees progressing ve17 aatisiactoril.7. This
despatc~ baa been agreed to by all concerned. Speed letter in amplification
tollon.
28 09.30 CCltPHIBSPAC to COl!PHIBSGPS 9.8.13.11.!:;7, 5.4, 3. C0115THPHIB.zwaTHPHIB,
COliBATBOll 1. CCitESCARFOR. COll3RDPHIB __:__~ ADC014PHIBSPAC, CIN~fPOA BOTH HQ.
COJ45TH.FLT COlliNPAC~
I

Subject is assemb:cy tor OLYMPIC. COJ.IPHIBSPAC 240140. COllSTHFLT 250245

CINCPAC 2.6CY/40. Not to all or needed. CINCPAC has approTed to the extent
of operationally practicable, the following plan for assembly except that no
prior coanittments of ships will be altered to meet assembly' dates: A.
Jlajor units gunfire and covering force assemble LEITE 10 Sept;. B. ESCARFOR
LEITE 15 Sept. c. .3rd Westem, and Soutbem Attack Forces LEITE 10 AWRH.
E. 5th Attack Force llarianas, Hawaii and l4anil.& l.O Sept. F. Beserve force
LEITE and HAWAII 10 Sept.
Para. Ships having prior cODBDitments which will delq th will job
their respective forces as soon alter assembly dates as practicable.
Para. Upon asaembq ship movements will be controlled by res,ective
force commanders subject to general instractions from higher au.thorit7.
Para. Initial logistics indoctrination and training should be stressed
in early employment of forces.
Para.. It should be understood that PHIBr'OR commanders are responsible
for assembly and training of ships.

28 0917 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CClUNCH AND ONO info CINOPOA PEARL, COMNORPAC.
Northem HONSHU and HOKKAIDO are within directed beam of 0WI SAIPAN

station. Proposed station in ALEUTIANS would be no closer to population

center of objective area than is SAIPAN. Your 251750. Anticipate increased
communication activity ALEUTIAN and consequent need for present and possibl7
additional facilities there. For these reasons plus uncertainly as to how
Bll>ADAXE/PASTEL could be supported thereby consider establisbment OSS/OWI
broadcast from ALEUTIANS undesirable.

3418

._
29 0209 CINCBP.F to

C~CPAD

ADV HQ.

For BPFLO. It is intended to discuss the followiag subjects at GUAM

.
during visit of Commander in Chief.
1
in tactical cooperation
group
a
Para. 1. The inclusion of CVL S as

with

cvs.

Para. 2. How British Task Groups will be required to operate in

October onwards including the scale of effort.
Para. 3 Long tem requirements of British Task Groupe.
Para. 4. Facilities at ENIWETOK as a result of report, fran TINE
CINCPAC ADV HQ 070415 refers.
Para. 5. Routing polic7. 19" 200819 refers.
Para. 6. Belief for late eommander GOVJrfT your 2.30915 refers.

29 0525 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COJISERVPAC. C014NORPAC, COJl MARIANAS info COlmE&SEAFBOH,

/
COlWICH, CINCPAC PEABL. COI43RDt'LEET, COMAIRPAC. . .
.

Take appropriate action accordance COMINCH AND CNO 272W. passed you
separatel1" keeping CINCPAC advised.. COMSERVPAC request from CNO such
personnel and material required and not present~ available for this
utilization. CNO hereb7 requested adTise CINCPAC of all action taken to
implement.

30 0237

C07'l'HF~

to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

SHERMAN TO llCOJ:a((S ONLY.

Cordially received. Had long and Tel7 amicable conference with Genere.l
MacArthur. He accedes to naval features and to naval and air shaw of force
as soon as fighting stops. He considers it unwise to risk landing marines
or seizing airfields until troops arrive in strength. He had the Joint
Chiefs of Staff message but did not consider it a directi"fe and has asked
for one.
Para. Unless I receive other instructions I wiJ.l adjust plans to make
all early landings contingent operations with timing to be deteDDined
later and will if requested make 3 MarDivs available to Army for JAPAN because it appears impossible for A:rnry to move sufficient divisions rapidly
without some marines.
Para. 'the foregoing concessions will permit reaching an agreement
unless unforseen demands are made. His plans are being made and ours will
be expanded to cover KOREA and CHINA insofar as troop allocations are
concerned.

30 1306 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM7THFLEET.

MCMORRIS TO SHERMAN ONLY.
Do not concur that landing of marines or occupying airfields .rnuat be
deferred until troops land in strength. No commitment of that nature is
to be made _as such action is likely to be necessary in order to exercise
essential control. The naval officer on the spot must be ftee to act
expeditiously to cope with any existing situation. Trust your skill and
judgement to avoid this question becoming an issue in current discussions.

Para.. 2nd Para your 300237 not entirely clear. It is interpreted to

mean that landing operations by naval forces will be contingent upon the
situation which exists when naval forces arrive in Japanese ports and

3419

- continued -

30 1306 CINCPAC

ADVANCE to COMZTHFLEET ( Cont 'd)

MCMORRIS TO SHEIWAN (Cont 1 d)

developuent s which immediately follow with the tim$ of a:ny such landing
if made to be determined by events as they unfold. If this intrpretatio n
is correct then concur otherwise need amPlificati on.
Para. In view prospeetive requirement s for marines elsewhere it
appears here that no more should be committed in JAPAN proper than is
essential for early stages of occupation. Some will doubtless be reYou are authorized to make up to 3 divisions available
qui~d :..initial.l.y.
for early and rapid movement into JAPAN, i f your discussions there
.
indicate advisabilit y of so doing.
giving
directives
Para. Having in mind that JCS may issue subsequent
CINCPAC a .free hand. until CINCAFPAC arrives in JAPAN with his forces &n1'
agreements or understandi ng you make should carry a proviso for revision
of any part that might prove to be inconsisten t with any later directiTe
issued by JCS.
31 0900 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS, COYINCH, CINCAFPAC, COit]THFLT, .
COWENCHINATACT, COWENCCCCT, COllGERSOS.
CFBX 2231

Difficultie s in connection with operations against LIUCHCNV PENINSULA

is subject your 281202Z GU.AJt refers. Difficultie s of FORT BAYARD operation
are no more serious than initially envisaged. Our CFBX 1803 was for
planni.ng purposes and information only. ihe operation will be rmderlaken
with resources available or being made available to this theater. This
headquarter s i f fully in sympathy with presently projected strategy- and
will not expect equipnent or resources which would in 8Jl1' way jeopradize
OLD.IPIC.
Para. WEICHCW ISLAND is an alterna.te operation. It will only be
undertaken if Japa prove unexpectedl y stubbom in BAYARD ABEA and it
becomes apparent that as a result there will be a protracted delay in
securing that port. This headquarter s aincereJ.t appreciates your
interest in theaters operations.

30 2029

COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Project as outlined in your 120446 has been apprond by Soviets and

action initiated. CNO will provide all material and personnel required
for the establishme nt of the SIBERIAN facilities. Additions to ~
revisions or this project brought about by CINCPAC/POA serial 0005762
of 20 July and ~ 272lll have not yet been submitted to Soviets and are
to be considered separately. Advise COMSERVPAC to take no furt,her action.
31 0810 CINCPOA ADVANCE to BOliSER'IPAC info CINCPAC PEARL HQ.
Comply with directive to COJISERVPAC in last sentence CO:MINCH
302029 passed you separately. See CINCPAC 120446 passed you.

3420

~:L;:.~~ (GOT)

31 1509 CINC/Ui-.PAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE into COUGEN FEAF ADVON, COMGEN FEAF.

ex

~9846.

Not specitieal.ly included in Marine Air Units available operational

control CIHCAFPAC (reference memorandum for record GUAM conference 21-2.3
July) is headquarters 2 Marine Air Wing which nonnally' control as integrated
force all RYOKYUS Marine Air Defense units. Without above Headquarters
.these units would operate directly under headquarters 7th Air Force OKDlAWA.
Your intentions regarding operational control headquarters 2nd lfarine Air
Wing requested. Pending instructions COA.F 7 exercises operational control
lAarine Air Defense units through 2 nd Marine Air Wing Headquarters.

01 1.310 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPA.C ADVANCE HQ.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed in principle that that part
of the southwest pacific area lfing south of the boundar.y described bel~
shall pass from u.s. to British Command as soon as possible. The British
Chiefs of Staff' have undertaken to obtain the agreements of the Australian,
.New Zealand and Dutch governments to these propos!Us and to investigate
and report the earliest practieable date on which the transfer can be
effected. "Beginning on the eoast of INDO CHINA at 16 degrees north;
thence to intersect at 07-40 north latitude 116-00 east longitude, the
boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British
North BORNEO; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to
latitude 05...00 north longitude 127..00 e$-st; thence east to 05..00 nort;b
1.30.00 east; thence south to the equator; thenee east to 14D-OO east;
thence generally southeast to 02-20 south 146-00 east; thence east to
02-20 south 159-oo east; thenee south". , What are your views concerning
the disposition of EMIRAU which lies north of this British area of
responsibility.
02 0311 CINCAFPAC to CmCPAC ADVANCE HQ info CO:MGENUSASTAF, WA.RCOS, COMGENFEAF.

ex 3014.;.

Agreements for coordination of air operations, signed by Sherman,

Chamberlin/and Lindsay, dated l August 1945, approved with following
change in sub paragraphs 1 A and B, X Ray miaus 7 should beXBa.y minus
Copies for local distribution will be changed.

s.

02 0547 COM'ZTHFLT to COMSUBS TI'f!FLT. COMPHILSEAFRON info ComNCH AND CNO,

CINCPAC BOTH B.Q, ALL .TFC AND TQC 7Tffit'LEET.
Effective 15 August 1945 COMSUBS 7THFLEET will direct Commander Sublfarines Advance Base: A. Navy 3002. And Navy recuperation Camp. Navy
3002. To report to COMPHILSEAFRON for matters pertaining to defense.

Maintenance and construction. The operational and a.dm.inistrati'le control

will remain with Commander Submarines 7th F.Leet. The intent of this
direetive is to establish a command relationship between COMPHILSEAFRON
and COHSUBS 7THFLEET analagous to that outlined in general order number 21.

AUGUST

342}_

02 0710 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMSERVPAC, COMG:ENPOA, COMGENFMFPAC info CINCAFPAC,

COMGEN lOTH ARMY, COlliM.ARIANAS, CINCPOA PEARL HQ.
Cancel CINCPOA PEARL ll0l49
Para. 1. Former ICERBEG reserve now redesignated 11farianas OLIMPIC
reserve. Action addressees will reconstitute this reserve by 15 October
with s~ items and quanti ties as original.l.;r prescribed for ICEBEIG and
wUl. maintain same at prescribed levels until ordered discontinued by
CINCFOA. Effective 15 October and weekly thereafter action addressees
will notify CDlCPOA info COMMARIANAS of any existing deficiencies and
estimated date of replenishment. Negative reports are desired.
Para. 2. COMPHIBSPAC or COMGEN 6TH ARl4Y will forward all requests
for supplies from the Mananas OLYMPIC reserve direct to CO:uMARIANAS
for release. COMMARIANAS will coordinate shipnents. Action adees or
their designated representatives will make available for shipment those
supplies requested which are in the Marianas OLYMPIC reserve.
Part. 3. Emergency supplies for the RYUKIUS or other areas will be
filled from regular stocks of normal. supply agencies. Marianas OLD4PIC
reserve shall not be considered a source of such emergenc.y supply unless
replenishment of the reserve can be effected by 15 October. COlla:Efi POA
200425 not to or needed by all refers.
02 10 36 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMJRDFLT. CTF 94, CTF 95,
COMFAI~fiNG 18. COMGEN USASTAF.

niu:o

CTF 38. COMFAIW!I!G 1

'

A .s pecial operation will be conducted by the 509th Bomb Group on

or 5 August at a time to be announced later. .No ship or aircraft of the

Pacific Fleet will come within 50 miles of NAUASAKI, KOKUltA, or HIROSHDIA

fran 4 hours before to 6 hours after the announced time. Acknowledge.

02 1429 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

CINC;BPF 290254 and 290209. Am 1 correct in assuming that all combat
units of British Pacific Fleet will be at my disposal during OLIUPIC
including preparator.y phases. If so assume you will have no objections
to proposals of reference. In view early arrival CINCBPF in GU.tW for
discussions various matters request reply your earliest convenience.

31 1338 ClliCPOA ADVANCE to COMGENPOA info C:rnCPOA PEA.'1.1 HQ.

In accordance with para 3 of recommendations made b.y representatives
of CINCAFPAC, COMGEN20THAF and CINCPOA at the inter-theater mapping conference held at Pearl 25-29 May which has subsequently been approved by
all commanders of theatres involved and the JCS it is requested that
operational direction of the 64th and 3oth Engineer Topographic Battalions
and attached units be returned to CINCPOA on or about 31 Ju~. Outstanding requisitions fran AFPAC will be completed on the terms of present
arra:ngements.

3422

31 0756 COM7THFLT to COMSERTITHFLT, C<l.w:R7THFLT info C~IO, COMINCH, CINCPAC/POA

BOTH HQ, ClliCAFPAC, COMSERVPAC, ALL TF AND TG C<E>RS 7THFLmET!' & CSVNPSF.,
Effective 15 August -1945 there is hereby establiShed under Commander
7th Fleet the command U. -s. Naval forces AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA. TF 70.
Which will include all u.s. Naval Bases and shore facilities and Naval
Air and Seaplane bases in Sw.VPA outside the Philippines except, MANUS. The
name of the Commander u.s. Navy for AUSTRALIA-NEVf GUINEA, CTF 79, and the
location of his headquarters will be announced.
Para. CW.SERV'?THFLT and COMA.m7THFLT respectively will direct the
commanders of all u.s. Naval Shore, air and seaplane facilities within the
Area delineated to report to Com u.s. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEW' GUINEA for
operational and administrative control. Units decommissioned but not
yet moved forward are to be included.
Para. Com U.s. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEJN GUINEA will be responsible for:
A. Logistic support as practicable for Pac Fleet and allied Nav~
Forces, 'Wlits in his area.
B. Expeditious roll up and staging of u.s. Naval personnel and equipnent
scheduled for forward movement
c. Orderly transfer of excess material and of facilities or equipment
d~ authorized to be taken o~r by other allied services.
Para. COMSERV7TH as CON~ERON 7 will continue to provide logistic
support for u.s. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEVi GUINEA and to schedule and provide
shipping for roll up. New Subject. COMSERVFOR 7THFLT, COMSERON 7, will
retain responsibility for operation. Administration and defense of MANUS
pending further decision on Para D of CINCPAC 130751 not to or needed by
all.
31 1349 COMGENATit. to -CINCPAC ADVANCE, DEPCOM 20TH AF info GHQ SWPA.

WARX 41360.

In connection with terminaJ. VIC'fORY 34.3 of 26 July, the following

information received from ALASKA DEPARTMENT is submitted for your info:
A year round port operation at AMCHITKA practicable and adequate. B. Capacity avgas AMCHITKA 1,510,000 gallson existing. c. Capacity hardstands
total 150 ver,y heavy bomber AMCHITKA, length of longest runway 10,000 feet,
2 additional runways 5,000 feet each. D. Available for ver,y heav,y bomber
deployment is tenthousing. some prefabricated tent frames and necessary
tentage are available. Material for mobilization type construction is
available in theatre but additional labor will be required.
Para. In event it becomes necessary to deploy a very heavy bomber
force in Norlh Pacific Area, it is believed that AMCHITKA is the most
suitable location. COMGEN ALASKAN DEPAR'I'MENT is being advised of the
contemplated strength and campositmon of force for planning purposes.

31 1351 CINCPAC ADVAN'CE to COMGENFMFPAC info MARCORPS, CINCPAC PEARL.

UrDis 280ll9 not to all or needed. Target date for the next major
operation for which the 3rd Phib Corps is scheduled is 1 lviarch and readiness datefor this operation m.a;r be set by FMF PAC according:cy- however due
to the general world situayion with which you are familiar and in order
to take advantage of a surrender or collapse of the Japanese Empire ~!F
units should be prepared for occupation duty which might well include
active combat with readiness dates as f91lows:
(l) 5th PHIBCORPS units ready now. t2) 4th MarDiv reinforced ready by
1 s ept. (3) 3d PHIBCORPS units (less 4thMarDiv) by 1 October.

34 2 3

JULY - AUGUST ( GCT)

30 1523 CINBPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH AND CNO ADMIN info COMSUBPAC.

Your 201819. Am redvcing u.s. Sub~es 7th Fleet to 2 squadrons
totalling 24 submarines. Plan further reduction to 1 squadron after
British Command area is formed provided ene~ cruisers SINGAPORE are
immobilized at that time. Estimate life guard requireroonts onl;y after
1 September 1945.

30 2320 RICHARDSON to WARCOS info CINCAFPAC - AFMIDPAC PASSES TO CTIICPAC BOTH HQ.
RJ 67045 ..

Here reference is made to CINCAFPAC radio CX 28945 dated 2$ Jlicy 1945.

to COMGENAFMIDPAC with info to WARCOS and CINCPOA advance. The subject
matters under discussion are indicated in CINCPOA dispatch 2702532 ( GCT)
July 1945 to COMINCH. At this point it is especially desirable to invite
attention to .the fact that CINCPOA dispatch referred to abovetrea.ts and
relates 2 distinct subjects which actually are unrelated, namely: (l) the
category of defense for the Hawaiian Group, which is prescribed by the
JCS; and (2) executive .o rder No. 9W39 of the 24th of October 1944, prescribe~
by the President directing the secretary of War to appoint the Commanding
General, Pacific Ocean Areas Milita.J:Y commander for the territory of IWV'AII.
Para. I will expre'ss nw views on these 2 subjects in 2 parts in the
order listed.
Para. Part 1. Category of defense period under present directives of
the JCS HAWAII is under category of defense nBn modified, which provides
for fighter protection, consisting of a Group of day fighters of 3 sqs and
2 night fighter flights; 5 battalions of guna (anti-aircraft); 5 battalions
of anti-aircraft artillery automatic weapons; 1 battalion and 1/2 of searchlights; complete early-warning radar coarage and integrated air warning
service. These defenses in general are located around the critical areas
of PEARL HARBOR, HONULULU, and principal air fields. They have been
detennined by the best local military opinion to be the minimum necessary
to provide adequate4' against the eventuality of a suicide attack by the
Japanese. Compared vdth the overwhelming resources in aircraft and antiaircraft at the disposal of the American Anny, these defensive forces
are small indeed and they represent the minimum insurance that the
Unfted states Arrrry charged with the grave responsibility of defending
HA1VAII should provide to protect the vital installations of HONOLULU and
especially PE.ARL HARBOR. To reduce them in order, as ClliCPOA recommends
"to facilitate economy in use of personnel and resources, etcn is un. justifiable just so long as there is any possibility of a sneak raid and
it is particularly unwarranted in view of our ample resources in aircraft
and antiaircraft. Any economy of personnel or resources so effected would
be extremely small compared with the over all strength of the Army. The
reduction could only- be justified if the Anrry was in dire need of units
of the character employed in the defense, which of course is not the case.
Para. It is true that the strategic position of the u.s. forces in
the Pacific is much more favorable at this time than at any time since
the War began and that the likelihood of the J apa.nese attacking HAWAII is
remote. To date, however, I have received no o:ficial conuntmication from.
CINCPOA-CINCPAC notifying me of the comptete destruction of the aircraft
carriers ana aircraft carrier escorts of the Japanese Navy, which con- .
stitute the main potential threat to any attack on these islands, either by
aircraft of a single carrier or of a group of carriers, and I therefore can
not assume the impossibility of a sneak suicide raid. Furthermore, it is
- continued -

3424

- continued -

30 2320 RICHARDSON to WARCOS info CINCAFPAC - ft..F1JITDPAC PASSES TO CINCPAC BOTH HQ,
pertinent to observe that the 1\merican people have invested in this war
billions of dollars, several of which are represented by extensive vital
installations in HAWAII, notabzy PEARL HARBOR, and the people would be in
-no mood to condone a failure to provide adequate defenses should a Japanese
suicide attack occur, especia.lly in view of the prodigality of troops a.rx:l
reso~es provided by congress.
Para, I can not give nw consent to the reduction proposed by OINCPAC
BOTH for reasons of prudence and caution, and because the onus would be on
the u.s, .A.:t"nzy" and on the local Commanding General should the risk be
accepted of having inadequate defense forces in the event of an air suicide
attack by the Japanese.
Para. Therefore, I recommend that there be no change in the present
category of .defense of the Hawaiian Group, namely category "Bn as now
modified.~aragraph

Para. Part 2. Presidential executive order number 9489, 24 October

1944. The recommendation by CINCPAC in his radio Z70253Z ( GCT) that the

said order be suspended or revoked is based on the following 2 grounds:

(A) that its provisions affect his overall responsibility for the security
and safety of the territory of Hawaii as well as other parts of the Pacific
Ocean Areas; and (B) that the state of war is now such that continuation
of the powers vested in Military authority by that order is no longer
justified. These contentions will be answered seriatim.
Para.. (A) CDJCPAC'S authority and responsibilities as theater commander
stem from directives. of the JCS and therefore his responsibilities must be
interpreted in the light of these directives. There is an apparent misunderstanding on CmCPAC'S part that his directives in some way impose
upon him responsibilities connected with the executive order. I know of
no directive from the J CS or from any other authority that relates my
responsibilities unde ithe executive order to CINCPAC'S responsibilities
as charged to him by extant joint Chiefs of Staff DIRECTIVES.
Para. Executive order 949S replaced certain security measures that
were exercised by me as Military Governor under martial law and which were
felt to be necessary for the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands.
At this point it should be emphasized that Presidential Ex:ecuti ve Order is
not concerned with military operations against the enemy but deals with
the control of civilians in u.s. Territory. It places in the hands of
the Military Commander means whereby he .rney secure these islands against
espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage that might be practiced by
civilians in our own territory. The authority for the exercise of these
povters stems from the President to the Secretary of War, who was directed
by the President to delegate this authority to me, the commanding General
.A.:t"nzy" Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas and to appoint me Militar,y Commander
of HAWAII. This authority does not stem from the JCS and therefore must
legally be interpreted as a separate authority because w)tere I challenge
in the courts by a citizen or alienfor a.Dy act of mine committed under
this authority I could not plead as a defense that I acted uhdP.r the
authority of CINCPAG-CINCPOA exercising unity i:m of command under joint
Chiefs of staff directives. As an illustration of the misunderstanding
referred to supra, CD!CPAC-CINCPOA invoked this executive order as 1
reason for not releasing my headquarters to the control of CINCAFPAC in the
implementation of JCS directive 1259/4 of April. In his dispatch 260229 G
GCT April 1945 he states Pursuant to the terms of executive order 94$9
- continued -

3425

- continued -

30 2320 RICHARDSON to WARCOS info

Cll~CAFPAC

- AFMID PASSES TO CINCPAC BOTH HQ

.issued by the President, COMGENPOA is designated as the Military Commander

for the Territory of HAWAII and has. responsibilitie s, powers 1 and authority
which makt it necessary that in this capacity COMGENPOA eontinue in his
pres_e nt relationship with CINCPOA in view of CINCPOA responsibilitie s vvith
respect to the Hawaiian Arean but for reasons stated above I am unable to
recognize that CINCPAC legally has jurisdiction over me under this order.
Therefore, CDJCPAC'S contention. that the provisions of the Executive Order
affect his overall responsibility for the security and sa.f'ety of the
Territory of HAWAII as well as other pa:rts of the Pa.cif'ic Ocean Areas is
untenable insofar as it applies to the executive order.
Para. Turning now to CINCPAC' S 2nd contention, that the state of war
is now such that the continuation of the powers vested in military authority
by the E:.x:ecutive order is no longer justified, and his further statement
that "Lieutenant General Richardson, COMGENPOA, considers that they should
be retainedf1 rrr:J cOmments are as follows:
Para. It is twe that the present writing I consider that the powers
of that orEier should be retained, although CINCP.A.C has never invited my
recommendations or discussed the subject with me. The reasons for the
retention of the executive order are abvioUs from a study of the security
_
orders issued under its authority
Para. At the present time there are 6 essential security orders in
existence covering the following subjects: They are necessarybecause of
the large allen population in HAWAII.
Para. 1. Conduct of enem;r aliens and prohibition against their possessing firearms, sho~-wave radio, etc; 2. Instructions to civilians covering
vehicular traffic, ~eating of congested areas and use of lights in the
_
event of air raids, air raid alarms, etc;
Para.. .3. Designation of restricted areas requiring identification passes
for entry such as harbor areas and certain vital. installations and the
handling of explosives in these areas;
Para . 4. Travel control of civilians necessitated by the linrl.ted amount
of joint shipping in Pacific Ocean Areas; priorities are established for
necessary surface and air eivilia.n travel;
Para. 5. Mail and cable and radio censorship and control o short wa:
radio.
Para. 6. The cargo and passenger control which coordinates commerciaJ.
use of harbors and harbor equipment with the needs of the military.
Para. In addition, executive order 9498 is the only authority for the
evacuation of American citizens deemed dangerous to the u.s. Since the
effective date of the order, 24 October 1944, 6 citizens of Japanese
ancestry have been evacuated from the territory to TULE LAKE segregation
center CALIFORl\l'IA. In testimony before a hearing board these persons
openly confessed their loyalty to JAPAN expressmng a desire that JAPAN win
the war. Some of them rei'used when drafted to _serve in the Army of the
u.s. Therefore, it is believed, still other Japanese of TFDPRLEHUECNSYASE
the community.
Para. Minimum use is being made of the authority contained in the
said executive order and the security orders which I have issued pursuant
to it are revi~T~d periodically with the view to rescinding any regua.a.tion _
not necessary to the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands. For
example, a. month ago I dispensed with the Curfew and presently study is
being given to relaxing civilian censorship.
- continued -

3426

- continued PAC

30 2320 RICHARDSON to -WARCOS info_CINGAFPAC-AFMID/PASSES to CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Para. My policy has been and will continue to be the rescission of
all restritive security orders just as soon as the need for them disappears.
Para. In view of the above it is recommended that the executive order
be kept in effect and, to summarize, that the status of both the categpr,r
of defense and of the executive order remain for the present undisturbed.
03 02ll CINCPOA ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC.

Relaxation of air attacks on FORMOSAN airfields and installations gives

the enemy opportunity for rehabilitation and restoration of his air strength
and supplies threat. There is some evidence that this is now being accomplishetl. Re~uest you continue neutralization of FORMOSA in order to
protect our communication lines to the PHEIPPINES, to sai'ebuard our forces
and installations on OKINAWA from air attack by FORMOSA based planes and
in order to deny the enemy the use of gasoline and other supplies remaining

in FORMOSA.

03 0429

CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC AJJV HQ, CG USASTAF GUAM

TOP SECRET. CX 20410

To make the phraseology identical in , each subparagraph of paragraph
1 B staff Conference 1 August signed by Sherman-Chamberlin-Lindsay suggest
paragraph 3 in parenthesis read "The 5th Fleet Will assume primary
responsibility for air defense in the objective area but will take such
action etc u. Request concurrence.
02 1745 WARCOS to CINCAFPAC - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.
YU.R 4Z740
Navy has raised the point of the necessity for the early installation
of shore based radar for ear~ warning and fighter direction purposes
during OLYMPIC. They emphasize the extreme importance of early establishment of land based air warning ~d fighter direction facilities in order
to minimize losses in an operation where frequent and sustained suicide
attacks by the enemy may be expteiied. The foregoing points were raised
in connection with a discussion between war and navy department; staff
officers and are furnished for your information.

03 0154 CDTCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMGENUSASTAF, COMGENFEAF, WARCOS,

COMINCH.

Reference agreements for coordination of air operations dated 1 Augast

1945 signed by Sherman, Chamberlain and Lindsay approved after changing
XRay' minus 7 to XRay minus 8 in subparagraphs lA and B. Copies in
local distribution will be changed.
04 0024 CINCPAC ~IDV ANCE HQ to CINCl~FPAC info COMGEN USAST AF

It appears to CINCPAC that the change proposed in your 030429 would

effect a considerable change in the repponsibilities of FEAF and 5th Fleet
within the objective area- As it now reads subpara l(B)(3) states the
employment of 5th Fleet aircraft but recognized the planned volume and

3427

- continued 04 0024 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info CQ\.1GEN USASTAF.

weight of FEAF air effort within the objective area as worked out between
FEAF and COMPHIBSPAC. As proposed the change would release FEAF from
responsi bilities within the objective area vrltich it should share in order
to give the troops and ships the max:i.mum cover and support. According ly
request te.xt stand as now drafted.

04 0109 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS info CG6THARMY, COMGENFEAF, COMPHIBSPAC, CINCPAC ADV

ex

30632.
Refers to your W 4Z140 not to all MFLJKOPNG of navy emphasis of
importanc e for early installat ion of shore based radar for early warning
and fighter direction purposes in OLYMPIC. Plans include establishm ents
for such purposes on 6 outlying islands to south and southwest of
oQjective area. on XRccy- minus 3. With no satisfacto ry outlying Ground
Locations to the east and southeast coverage in that direction will be
provided by naval ships radar screen until ground instaJJ.at ions are established at corps beachhead s on XRay plus 2. CINCPAC has been requested
to comment on the above by our 200503 of July not to WARCOS.
04 0353 COMGENUSASTAF to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMGENAlR, COMGENFE.AF.
1253.
Approve air coordinat ion agreement of 1 August 45 signed by Sherman,
CHamberla in and Lindsay together with changes proposed by CINCAFPAC and
CINCPAC in their dispatche s: CINCPAC 030154, CINCAFPAC 030429 ~GCT).
Local copies will be changed.
04 f1747 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEET info CINCAFPAC, COMINCH.
Your 040351. In view CINCAFPAC 040403 desire you concentra te your
next effort against ene.Iey" air forces in north HONSHU and HOKKAIDO
instead of TOKYO area. All available intelligen ce data will be furnished
in separate despatch.
04 0841 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINC;WPAC.
Request that agreement s made for OIK.MPIC apply also the CORONET
concernin g long lines as well as internal wire installati ons at naval
establishm ents.
04 1011 COM3RDFLEET to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info CTF 38, CTF 37
Your 040747 wilco. Planning strike S August. (referenc e strike
against ene~ air forces in north HONSHU and HOKKAIDO _instead TOKYO AREA).

342 8

04 1451 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COMGENUSASTAF.

ex

30858
Refreence your 040024Z, in the agreements of 16 Ma;r 1945 we agreed
that all air forces in the objective area during the ~phibious phase
would operate tmder your control. Responsibility for the air missions
in that area necessari4r goes with control. The agreement also contemplated that FEAF would be employed. The objective area and arrangJBments
therefor are now being coordinated in the detailed planning conference
:in progress. CX .30410 was not intended to impl3" a withdrawal or lessening
of FEAF air effort in the objective area or to release FEAF from responsibilities within the objective area which it is expected to share in
heavy volume, but to obti.:in assurance that the 5th Fleet would be prima.ri]
responsible for the mission of air defense or CAP in that area as FEAF
and the 3RD FLEET are in other defined areas. Request that my suggestion
'
in ex 30410 be reconsidered.
04 194.3 COMGENAIR to CJNCPAC ADVANCE info CINCARPAC.

.J

WARX 44043.
Here is further technical data and information requested on J AV.AM.AN
PROJECT in your Z70250. J AVN!!AN PROJECT involves the employment of
80-5 foot rescue boats each carrying 50000 pounds of explosives. These
boat a are carefully disguised as J ap luggers and sea trucks and are
remotely controlled by radio, radar and television fran aircraft having
a control range o 55 to 80 miles. The cruising range of loaded boat is
800 to 1200 miles. For this operation 6 disguised ARB boats will be
employed. 4 will be loaded missiles and 2 will be escorts and will
proceed from BU1~HOUSE to destination under own power. Skeleton crews
leave missiles between 10 and 20 miles from target and trill return to
BUNKHOUSE by 2 escorting ARB boats. 4 Millile ARB boats are then directed
to target by radio control and television from B-17 control planes. VVhen
disguised Milliles enter magnetic field of tunnel, M.A.D. equipment on
boat by telemetering records on television screens in B-17 and operator
by remote detonation SCUTTLES boat over target. No personnel required
from CINCPOA. All personnel, for project alreaqy on detached service
to CTI{CAFPAC. Present plans, because of disguise fact~r of this CM OHK
JNPPD FPRQTION, do not contemplate use of naval escort ships 16r naval
escort aircraft. 2 disguised ARB boats will serve a.s surface escorts
and plans call for FEAF to provide air cover for control planes and ARB
Missiles. state of development of this equipment and technique has, as
result of m~y tests g;gainst simula.ted targets, been determined to be
completely operational and practical.

05 0100 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM MARIANAS.

Inaugurate appropriate air search and provide naval surface unit for
possible interception enemy 1UffiCUS bound units in connection CINCPOA

PEARL 041956.

IIJIJII!!)
04 2320 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMGENUSASTAF.
After thorough consideration of your '041451 GCT and all the associated
questions believe that the phraseology of the agreement of 1 Augast 1945
is preferable to the change proposed by your CX 30410. If the language
lV"ere to be changed it would be necessary to redraft the paragraph considerably to bring out the f~ot that FEAF and also USASTAF must share in the
responsibility for providing in the objective area the full weight of air
effort required for air defense a.nd for support of the troops and ships
therein. I believe it better to ' let\ the draft stand as 1st approved by
your 0203ll and my 030154 and let the details with~ objective area. be
developed in the further planning between FEAF, PHIBSPAC and USASTAF.
05 07 51 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEJi~T info CINCAFPAC, OOMGENUSASTAF, COMGENFEAi.
Your 042125. Consider it unnecessary to make special request on FE!F
and USASTAF in vievr nature their routine operations at this time. Their
strikes are made as often as practicable and cover wide areas FEAF,
USASTJ\F and TF 38 operations are all mutua.lly supporting as now planned.
05 0754 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC, COM?THFLT,

COMPHIBSP~C.

CINCAFPAC has requested that the USS TACLOBAN (EX-TULSA) be made

available pri.marily to copy na.vy conmunications of interest to CINCAFPAC
and transmit same to CINCAFPAC headquarters on shore in objective area.
TACLOBAN is hereby made available for this duty and during the OLYMPIC
operation will. be assigned to COM5THFLEET for operational control. Since
TACLOBAN has previously performed same duty for CTIJCAFPAC no additional
installations will be ma.de. '
05 0755 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC info COM5THFLT, COM3RDFLT, CAPSCF, COMNOB
OKINAWA, COM NABS OKINAWA.
Replacement carrier aircraft must be available at OKINAWA during
OLYMPIC to meet needs of the fleet. Existing directives which require
the buildup to 500 pool aircraft as rapidly after 1 November as is
feasible are confirmed.
05 0845 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV ~o WA.11,COS 2 . COM~, CINCPAC PEARL, AFMIDPAC,
US!STAF, COMGE!,NFEAF, J?.QJiOVAN 0.!:

ex 30940.

Para. l. Reference row CX 28307 CINCPAC ADV~TCE 270250 GOT and COMINCH
281625 GCT. Proposed to destroy KA'MMON TUNNEL in SHDA:ONOSEKI STRAITS.
4 air rescue boats of S5 foot length disguised as enenw craft and loaded
with 25 tons high explosive each are sailed into west entrance of STRArrs.
Boats are fitted vr.ith remote control, radar and television devices and self
destructive elements and are controlled from aircraft at a .m.aximum range
of 100 miles. Boats are directed to target located by magnetie indicator
and scuttled. Main charges are detonated by time delay and counter rnining.
Pa:rt. 2. All necessary operational equipment. and personnel has been
assigned FEAF. FEA.F will recover personnel after boats are abandoned by
their crews. A heavy bombing attack in the area will cove!:' the operation.

34 30

- continu ed AFMIDPAC
05 OS45 CINCAYPAC to CINCPAC ADVP.NCE info WARCOS, COMGENAIR, CINCPAC PEARL,
d)
t
DONOVAN OSSF. ( Corit
USAST AF', COMGENFE..

I\F;

No navy person nel, ships or aircra ft will be reqtrl,r ed.

ted
~ Para. Part 3. Referen ce COMINGH 221915 GCT projee t will be expedi
months
3
exceed
to
and shippin g conserv ed if you can furnish for not
effecti ve 1 Septem ber the follow ing functio nal components less person nel:
1 A-3, 1 G-S, 1 E-ll, 1 D-10, 2 N-18, 1 P-12A, 1 C-8. It is desired to le.
establi sh the projec t and above facilit ies in a navy base area if possib
Para. Part 4. Reques t your concurr ence in the operati on and indica tion
of extent above logisti cs suppor t you can furnish . Separa te radio follows
with code name for operati on.
06 0719 CINCi4.FPAC to CINCPAC ADVJU\JCE HQ.

c .31175.

Action being taken . Referen ce your 0302ll reques ting continu ation
of neutra lizatio n of FORMOSA.
06 0819 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH AND CNO.

Your 011310 . EMIRAU ISLAND is now in use as a base .for Marine Air
- Group 61. However it was agreed at M!l\JILA confere nce 30 July - 1 August
that all units of lst l!ar Air ~Jifing will be concen trated in souther n
be ..
PHILIPPINES as soon as possib le. After this is done recommend EMIRAU
our
by
release d to British as it will not be needed in the near future
operati ng units and may be of use to British in connec tion with their
moppin g up of RABAUL and K!VIENG. Furthe r recommend retenti on flRight
later time.
to Use~ if needed at

04 0403 CINCAFPAG to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info CG FEAF, COM3RDFLT.

ex

30653.
strong indicat ions that Japs iQtend an airborn e operati on agains t
OKIN.AWA area after 9 August . Troop Carrie rs are geing concen trated in
northe ast HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, both beyond operati ng radius of FEAF at
OKINAWA. Sugges t if practic able that 3rd Fleet during ~e.sent operati ons
in EMPIRE waters strike the concen tration s in northe ast HONSHU and
HOK~AIOO.

07 0.331 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH

CINCPAC PEARL.

& CNO info CO:MNORPAC, COMCRIJPAC, CCMSERVPAC,

Your 061.648 recommend CONCORD and RICHMOND remain on presen t duty

until ice closes traffic into AMUR RIVER about 1 Octobe r then proceed
CANAL ZONE.

AUGUST (GCT)

3431

'llfi!II!T)
07 0330 CINCPAC ADV to COMGENCHINA CijUNGKING info CO~GENTACTCT, CumTGKING,'
COMGENAAFCT KUNMING, COMGENSOSCT CHUN&KING, 001J!GENCCCT KlJNlUNG, GINCAEPAC
FERN 5.

Para. 1. Formal p~sentation of JEMEDAR made at 1000, 6 August.

CINCPAC and key starr attended. Afternoon devoted to discussion of
availability of persoru1el and supplies. Everyone must cooperative and
int~ntion solving all difficulties.
Para. 2. Admiral Sherman feels that JCS must issue a. directive to
establish responsibilities among 3 theaters if operation is to be carried
out on time. He feels CHINA should handle land matters and GUAM or JlANTI.A
handle the naval responsibilities.
Para. 3. Lino0ln says that War Department is also interested in cutting
red tape with this operation and to tha.t end S & P produced a draft directive. No action has been taken due to absence of key people at POTSDAM.
Para. 4. All timin-g is based <;>n securing target area by 15 August.
7th Fleet questions whether cha.lmel will be secured from ground attack
(coastal or field batteries) in time to set up the initial convoys about
20 August. Conference working on assumption that convoys can safely pass
into channel on or about 20 August.
Para. 5. Tentative ETD GUAM night of 7 August

07 0553 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH 1 CINCAFPAC, COMGENCHINA info

CO!VT.SERVPAC, CINCPAC P:BtARL liQ, OOMSERY7THFLT,

GOM7THFLE..~,
COMWi~SCAROLI!~S, WARCOS.

The representatives of COMGENCHINA now at GUA..'M inform me that it is

eonf'idently expected that the Chinese A:rm:f will oeeupy FORT BAYARD on 15
Augst. Although numerous explorat"o ry dispatche,s have been ax:ehanged definite action does not appear to have been taken to ensure the operation
of the port and the unloading of the supplies available. In my opinion the
advantages to be gained by such action and the obvious .d isadvantages of
failing to deliver effectively even token supplies to the Chinese when they
first take useful seaport are controlling and justify the minor diversion
of naval resottrces involved.
Para. 2. In view of the short time remaining earliest conaurrence in
the following is requested.
Para. 3. A. Com?thFlt load in 7 LSTS the following naval advance base
personnel and material, prepare them for shipment- to FORT BAYARD as soon
as possible and advise readiness date. Listed by component designation number of personnel- mea.surera.ent tons. AJ-43-200. Bl-Zl-100. B2B-29-210.
B3-18-200. B4-10..;500. B5A-6-50. B5B-2S-28., B7-21-l02. Bl0-0-100. 03-10-40
. CB-8-23. 09-9-34. Hl4C-0-15.3. Dl0-2~835. D22-6-9. E9-l8-225. G?-68-431.
J2-4-27. One quarter Fl-300-1500. One quarter Pl-300-2500. PB-0-1500.
Pl2A-l-30. Pl2C-l-.30. 21\IlA-50-940. Total 983 personnel 9767 measurement
tons.
B. Rear Admiral E. Buelonaster proceed via air and break flag in
SPENCER( COO) or INGHAM (CGC) as commander South China Naval Force (TF 93)
which w.ill consist of 1 CGO-l~YMS-1PCE(R)-6PGM-2I. CS(L) designated by Com
7thFlt plus 2 CVE-6DE-71ST--1AOG-1AGS desigpated by CINCPAC. CTF 93 prepare the forces assigned -for movement to FORT BAYARD when a.ndas requested

AUGUST (GCT)

3432

- continued -

CJ7

055J

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMI NCH, CI,NCAF PAC, COMGENCHINA info COMJTHFLEET

COMSERVP.{\C, CINCPAC PEARL HQ , COMSERV7THFLT, COMU;\IESCAROLINES,, WARCOS.
by COMGENCHINA and develop naval base facilities at FORT BAYARD. The
Escort Carriers with 2 destroyer escorts will be released to CINCPAC after
arrival. of the lst AK convoy at FORT BAYARD.
e. On arrival in FORT BAYARD CTF 93 and forces under hsi colllnW.nd will

and support the forces of the CHINA THEATER..

D. CINCPAC replace as prompt~ as possible such naval advance base
components supplied by the 7th Fleet as need to be replaced.
E. LSTs. to be used only for the initial lift. Other naval craft to
be released as required by CINCPAC if necessary to avoid interference with
cov~r

OLYMPIC.

07 0717 CINCPOA ADVi\NCE HQ to COMGENCHINA, CHUNGKING.

GENERAL CARAWAY SENDS: .
CINCPOA is sending despatch tod~ to CNO, CINCAFPAC, COMGE!'l'CIIDTA
concerning JEMEDAR operation. Components listed therein cover naval
requirements for operation of port. In addition it establishes small naval

surface force to provide protection for port and convoys thereto. This
message is FERN 6.
Para. 2. In opinion of CHINA party proposal if approved furnishes
minimum requirements for operation in time to meet target dates.
Para. 3. Recormnend that CHINA THEATER make request that War Department
take necess~ action in conjunction with Nav,r Department to obt_a in
approval and :implementation of CINCPAC'S proposed action.
Para. 4. AdmiraJ. Sherman and CINCPAC' S staff state that the diversions
of components and ships to JIDJ!EDAR will not interfere with MACA.R.THUR'S
logistic support of OKINMVA forces. They further state that personnel and
shipping vmich are necessary to OLYMPIC committed to support of CHINA Ina3'
be withdrawn for period of that operation, to be replaced or retumed
CHINA after.
Para. 5. Admiral Sherman indicates naval tm.its operating port insta1lations being placed under Flag Officer because that furnishes most
convenient means of adrn.i.'listration and control. He indicates that CINCPAC
may consider dividing forces into 2 parts, placing port installations
under CHINA at later date. It appears that CHINA theater should insist
on operational control now of naval shore installations at port with
administrative control remaining under Admiral Buckmaster since these
installati ons will be supporting CHI NA and not be for support of naval
forces.

07 0824 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMSERVP!C info CI NCPOA PEARL, CNO, COME>ERON 10.
Refer to your 262225 of July. Due to importance of subject operation
consider floating st orage too great r i sk. Request contained your 262225
floating storage OLYMPIC is disapproved.
07 .0833 CINCPAC ADV.t\NCE t o CINCAFPAC i nfo COMINCH,

CN~ .

Reference your 251431 July and 050845 Aug. Fea si bi lity and desi~4 3 ~
u
abilit y of J AVJ!lt'\N are believed to be matters for det erminat i on by
o
t
e
abl
avail
resources
from
CINCAFPAC and COMIFEAF. Navy can furnish
COMNOB OKINAWA such assistance and materials in E-ll component as are
peculiar to PT boats plus 1 LCM ~ Suggest that all other mat er ials refer red
to in COMINCH .221915 be supplies from stocks available t o COMGENlO co~g:~~V

08 0500 CGUSFCT to CINCAFPAC, WA.RCOS info CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ, COM7THFLT.

3010.
Concur rence with plan outline d by Advance HeadqU arters CINCPAC in Top
Secret GU~~ 070553 of 7 August is express ed by Commanding Genera l China
Theate r.
Para. To CINCAFPAC. Reques t your concurr ence in propose d arrange ment.
Para. To WARCOS. Reques t action in conjtm ction Wash. Navy Departm ent
to obtain JCS approv al and urgent liaplem entatio n of action propose d by
CTIJCPAC to make timely provisi on for operati on of port at JE!\W)AR and a
.
small naval surface force to protec t port and convoys proceed ing thereto
of
ation
continu
Reques t that directi ve be issued includi ng provisi on for
cooper ative action essent ial to continu ed use of JEMADAR port until subunction becomes availab le, all withou t detrime nt to OLD.A:PIC, and that
command arrange ment include operat ional contro l by Commanding Genera l
CHINA THEATER over shore install ations , since these will be serving this
'
theate r.
Para. Every effort being made to insure occupa tion of FORT BAYARD
.
by 15 August and securit y of area includi ng local approac hes by 20 August
0$ 0522 CINCPAC .IDVANCE HQ to COM3RDFLT.

Your 000309 approve d. Assume you will take maximum advanta ge of any
improve ment in weathe r to expand coverag e over assigne d area. With em.
phasis on destruc tion KATA.J.JA force. Interes ted commands will be advised
(Aro),
08 1540 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC PEARL, COMSEitVPAC
A.
OKINAW
GHQ SUB A.R.EA PETROLEUM OFFICER, ASCOMI

Concur propose d amendments your top secret 040939 .

CJ7 1505

HQ.
ALUSNA MOSCOW to COMINCH AND CNO - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE
Vice Admira l Gavrilo v head of Rec.i::.Navy Co.mnn.mications today presen ted
Navy's desires for commu nication set up for use of their operati onal
liaison groups 4th questio n Victory 351 refers. They desire 2 circui ts
between VLADIVOSTOCK and WASHINGTON 1 being the circui t VLADIVOSTOK MOSCOW
r!ASHINGTON as now establi shed. A 2nd to be a direct circui t between
VLADIVOSTOK and V:ASHINGTON. For this . circuit they propose to use 1
station at VL~~IVOSTOK of about 10 Kilowa tt power man~al operati on using
interna tional code. This station has previou sly establi shed commun cations
with HONOLULU on 13635 KC between 0300 and 0400 GMT. See rrry 241410 OCT
and related dispatc hes. They desire the use this frequen cy and time for
cies
1 schedu le but reques t our recomrn endation regardi ng additio nal frequen
ng
receivi
and
and schedu les. They believe 6 periods per day for sending
will be adequa te. The call sign SAB is propose d for TJJ.~SHINGTON and G.AL
for VLADIVOSTOK. They sedire our recoiD[ne ndation s and sugges tions regard
Th~
tests.
of
ing this circui t bef ore establi shing definit e prograrn
desire to establi sh 1 ci rcuit f or our ovr.n use betwee n VLADIVOSTOK and
GUAM 24 hour service is desired and the follmri ng wave lengths and

AUGUST

34 34

AUGUST ( GCT)

,........
- continued -

07 1505 ALUSNA MOSCOW to COMINCH AND CNO

- COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC .IDVANCE HQ.

schedules are proposed between 2100 GMT and 0900 GMT basic wave length
14480 KC standby 16240 KC. Between 0900 GMT and 2100 G!IT basic wave
length 7990 KC standby 9125 KC. SUggested call signs are VLADIVOSTOK KBN
GUAM: ZTK. Soviet will use ovm station at VLADIVOSTOK but desire U.s.
furnish facilities at GUJIM. They are sending a communication team of 1
officer 4 radio operators and 3 coders to GUAM as part of liaison group.
Following is over a.nd above any stations or facilities which United states
. may desire to establish at VLADIVOSTOK for own use. New Subject. At a
meeting ~th SLAVIN todczy regarding weather facilities, see my 040820, he
stated that questions concerning this project were under study but that
no answers were ready at this time.
08 2227 OINCPAC ADVi\NCE to COMNORPAC info CTF 49, COM3RDFLT.
Present task force l~9 vTill pass to your operational control upon
departure ENT~ 1TETOK. Consider it desirable that you arrange coordinated
air attack and surface bombardment against a.rlobjective in the KURILES as
soon as forces can be assembled and also make sweeps against en~ shipping
which may appear.
OS 2028 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNCRPAC info COMINCH, CINCAFPAC, CGUSFCT, ALL TF
COMDRS PAC FLT, OOM3RDLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT.

North Pacific Force with forces currently assigned plus Cru.Div 5,

CarDivs 23, 26 and DesRon 45 as separately reconstituted for this purpose
assigned follO"wing additional tasks.
Establish and maintain control of a line of communications from the
ALEUTIANS across the SEA OF OKHOTSK.
Neutralize Japanese bases threatening this line of communications.
Provide protection for convoys against hostile air surface arid
submarine attacks between the ALEUTIANS and escort turn around points
in the SEA OF OKHOTSK.
Para. This modifies my OpPlan 4-45.
09 0050 CllJCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info COMSUBPAC.

There are u.s. submarines in the SEA OF JP..PAN north of the boundary
established in VICTORY 371. Request action to ensure that they not be
attacked. Orders have been issued for them to move scuth of the boundary.
line.
Para. In view lack of recognition signals propose to keep Pacific
Fleet submarines outside HMutual" zones until liaison becomes effective
except for the SEA OF OKHOTSK south of 47th parallel whic~ must be used
by submarines in passage.
Para. Request use of TARTJL~Y STRAIT be obtained for entr.y and exit
of submarines as soon as posSible.
09 0129 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CTF 37, CTF 38.

AUGUST.

Your 082226 intend continue present attacks on loth fuel 11th strike
12 and 13th. W
ill advise later as to Task Force 37 ability to participate
after lOth. Det8ils of plans by separate dispatch.

343 5

09 0216 CINCPA.e ADVANCE to COl/INAVGR CHINA info eOMGEN CHINA THEATER, COMINCH.
CTG 95.2 080733 passed separatel y. I request that requests for support
of the activitie s of u. s .. :forces in CHINA by units of the Pacific Fleet
ge addressed to CINCPAC whenever time permits and normally through the
Comdg General u.s. Forces in CHINA . Departure from proper channelS in
matters of this nature will inevitabl y lead to confusion and 'misunders tand.in
and \"rill not be conducive to the most efficient use of the resources which
can be made available to ~upport the CHINA THEAT.ER.
09 0503 eiNC ..\F'PAC to WJlttCOS, CG USFCT info CINCPAC 1\..DVANCE, COM?THFLT.

ex

31S9S.
Reference vV:X: 45950 and CFBX 3010. Concur in CINCPAC ADVANCE 070553Z
(GCT) relating to Naval planning for FORT BAYARD except OPS PCE (R) is
not available . All PCE' S this area have been converted to co.rmnunications
ships and are plarmed for use in our coming operation s.
1

09 0816

ClNG~AC

ADVANCE to CTF 95 info C01QRDFLT, CTG 95.2.

Detach CruDiv 16 when RFS and direct ComDruDiv 16 with his division
proceed LEYTE reporting on arrival to COM3RDFLT for duty. eruniv 16 will
be available for inclusion in TF 3S for operati9n s scheduled commence late
August.
09 1403

eiNCS~lPA

to COMAAP info eiNCPAC ADVANCE, CG USASTAF 2 COMANF.

ex 32046.
Bounda:cy line connectin g the following points delimits air and Naval
operating areas for u.s. and USSR air and naval forces: point at intersecti ot:
of 45-45 north latitude and line joing CAP CRILLON (KONDO) (southern tip of
SAKHALKN) and CAPE SOYA MISSft.KI (SOYASAKI) (Northern tip of HOKKAIOO), west
to point at 45-45 north lqtitude 140-00 east longitude , point at 40-00 norbh
latitude ~35-00 east longitude , CAPE BOLTIN (11USU KUTCHI) on KOREM~ COAST,
eHANGCHUN, LIAIYU~J., KATI,U, CHIHFblJG, PEKING, TATUNG, southern boundary of
IN~TER MONGOLIA. All points inclusive to US Forces. RUSSI,.W naval and air
forces will operate north of the boundary line and u.s. naval and air forces
will openate south of the boundary line. Air forces of this command will
operate north of the bounda.ry line and in the SEA OF OKHOTSK only on
specific authority from this headquart ers. Reference our ex 26304 designating area of operation s for FEAF in north CHINA arxl KOREA, FEAF will operate
north or west of line indicated in reference only on authority of this
headquar ters. Clearance is being reque~ted of commanding general. USFCT
for operation s of FEAF . :in area included between the line: 'MUSU KUTCHI,
MUKDEN, PEKLTIJG and the line: Cl\P BOLTINA (1WSU KUTeHI) CHANGCHUN, LIAOYUAN,
KAILU, CHIHFT:!J'NG, PEKING.

343h

AUGUST (GCT)

09 0957

AT..,USNA MOSCOW to COMINCH

.AND CNO - COMINCH

PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Answering your 011400 Red Navy submits following. They estir.aa.te convoys
can be initiated within 5 to 10 daS after beginning of hostilities and
consider that it will be necessar,y to despatch from 3 to 4 convoys of
from J2 to 15 vessels per convoy per .month but add that convoys can begin
as soon as the u.s. Navy has laid down the necessary operating arrangern.ent s
in the region around the southern portion of KAMCHATKA and in OKHOTSK SEA.
Their plan submitted for your consideratio n calls for u.s. convoying of
Soviet merchant and mile post vessels to PETROPAVLOVSK except they desire
such milepost vessels a.s are properzy equipped and trained to be used as
escorts with convoys to PETROPAVLOSK . Despatch of these convoys to be
entirely as decided by u.s. Naval authorities . Convoys for NIKOLAEVSK
will be made up at PETROPAVLOVSK. Responsibil ity for maintaining line of
. communicati on$ between PETROPAVLOVSK and NIKOLAEVSK will be a mutual
responsibil ity of u.s. Na1rJ and Soviet .Pacific Fleet but they state they
desire U.s. Navy to have control and responsibil ity of convoys until they
arrive at NIKOLAEVSK. The composition of the escort vessels and the convoy
coinmander to be assigned by U.s. N'avf. Red Navy will furnish supplementa ry
escort strength but is not able now to state numbers or types. Despatch
of convoys to NIKOLAEVSK to be a .matter of agreement between their Paicife
Fleet and the convoy commander. They assume that the escort arriving at
NIKOLAEVSK will pick up return convoy with PETROPAVLOVSK at 1st destination .
Despatch of this return convoy to be a L'latter of agreement between their
Pacific Fleet and convoy commander. LikeVv"ise despatch of convoys from
PETROPAVLOVSK to UNITED STATES to be a. matter of agreement between convoy
commander and commander PETROPAVLOVSK Naval Base but UNITED STATES to have
entire responsibil ity and control M these convoys_ They desire that the
same system. that was used v.rith convoy movements from the UNITED STATES and
ENGLAND to northern pos:ts of the USSR be established . They will take the
necessary steps to insure that Soviet submarines will be excluded from
areas where. convoys are operatin_g and an anchorage will be arranged at
PETROP.AVLOVSK for escorts and attending auxiliaries . Soviet vessels in
BERJ~G SEA between 50-53 north and 57-30 north and east of 166-00 east
have been directed to proceed to u.s. Ports. Vessels in allied ports will
be instructed as to their future movements by Soviet Convoy Officer.
New Subject: They request initial numbers of liaison group for VT..JADIVOSTOK
be held to lowest possible .minimum. because of lack of accommodati ons there .
They vrould also li.lce to be informed of number of u.s. submarines operating
in SEA OF JAP~~~. The naval section of the Soviet liaison group at GUA}!
will consist of 4 officers and 7 enlisted men. They were advised that
this group could progably be flO"wn to GU~t\M in u.s. plane which brought
in u.s. Liaison G-roup on assumption this group will be flown in. Request
confirmatio n. They are greatly interested in matter of recognition
between surface craft and aircraft and between surface and aircraft and
will submit their ideas shortly
09 1540 ALUSNA MOSCOW to CINCPAC . ADVANCE info COMINCH.
vVhile delivering substance of your 090050 to Red Navy was advised that
an American submarine was observed at 1410 on August Sth about 52 miles
south of CAPE G~ROV and at 1540 on same date Soviet airplace observed
fragments of a Merchantman which ha.d been sUnk in the region where the sub
had been seen. Presence of U.s. Subs within this area complicates

AUGUST

3437

- e ontinued 09 1540 .uLUSNA MOSCOW to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMINCH (Cont t d).

commencement of their naval activity and they desire to be informed when

all submarines have left their zone. They will ta.'k:e such action as they
can to assure tha~ submarines are not attacked. With reference to passage
of TARTARY STRlU:T they promise ear]Jr reply~

09 2115 COM3RDFLT to

CINCPAC info GTF

38, CTF 37.

For stri..lces after August llth fueling intend to be prepared to shift

full wei~t of attack to TOKYO AREA if my assigned primary northern targets
are inaccessible or if fields now under attack are no longer good targets.
09 2202 COMINCH AND GNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMNORPAC,. ALUSNA MO~

to you. Comment on donvoy and

With , respect Sf recognition s,rstems

Refer AI.USNA l~OSCOW 090957 being passed

escort control proposals therein.

CNO 091415 refers.

10 OBll CINCPAC ADVANCE to COlffi1JCH info COMNORPAC, ALUSNA MOSCOW.

Your 092202. .ALUSNA MOSCOW 090957.
conc.ept my Joint Staff Dtudy KEELBLOGKS

Recormnend convoy system follo\Y"

4 of 26 Ma,y 1945.

Para. Specifically recommend that (A)AChop line as suggested in study

be established within the SEA OF OKHOTSK east of which the UNITED STATES
have complete responsibility for air and surface protection of convoys and
east of which no Russian SUbrDari.Des operate. West of the Chop line the
reverse situation should exist. (B) Convoys assemble at ADAK and routed
direct through the . IillRILES via ONNEKOTAN, SHASUKOTr or lliTJSHIRU STRAITS
to Russian ports or direct to PETROPAVLOSK. Minim:um traffic between
PETROPAVLOSK and ports to westward. (C) :Minimum use of PETROPAVLOSK. No
u.s. Naval shore establishments in Russian ports except for communications
and liaison. (D) Dispatch of westbound convoys to be controlled by
COMNORPAC and east.bound convoys by Russian Naval Command. Direct coordination and consultation between CO:MNORPAC and appropriate Russian naval
commander required.
10

1609 CINCPAC

to COM3RDFLT info COMINCH, CTF 38, CINCAFPAC, OOMNORPAC,

COM7THFLT, COM5THFI{f.
ADVt~l\l"CE

The text of my Joint Staff study CAMPUS dated 9 August insofar as

naval landing force operations are concerned nov; reads as follows. "At
each principal anchorage occupied an operational airfield will if practiable be occupied to facilitate communications and airborne troop landings
and for eventual development for .n aval purposes. The timing of this
'occupation will be such as to support the landing of troops in strength
but rn.ay be adjusted by the local naval cormnander as necessary to meet the
requirements of the situation as i t develops after the arrival of naval
forces in Japanese ports. Key positions on shore in the vicinity of the
anchorages occupied m~ be occupied if such action becomes necessar,y to
,
insure the safety of naval f orces".
Para. If time permits desire advance notification of any landing force -:J
operations under naval command.

v
AUGUST

343 8

10 1614 CINCPAC ADVANCE to ALFDA info COMINCH.

The public announcement by the Japanese of counter proposals for the
termination of the war must not be permitted to affect vigilance against
Japanese attacks. Neither the Japanese nor fJ.lied Forces have stopped
fighting. Take precautions against treachery even if local or general
surrender should be suddenly annmmced. Maintain all current reconnaissance and patrols. Offensive action shall be contined unless otherwise
specifically directed.
02 0912 CINCPAC ADVAI'JCE to COMGENUSASTAF info COMGEN20THAF.
Desire that any mines laid in SASEBO, NAGASAKI, KOBE, OSAKA, NAGOYA,
TOKYO, all other southern and eastern HONSHU ports, and all INLAND SEA e..reas
other than eastern approach to SHTI,!ONSEKI STRAITS and other than INLAND
SEA area between 133-00E and 134-45E be sterilized .by 1 December 1945.
Also request that the number of mines planted in INLAND SEA area between
133-00E and 134-45E that will not be sterilized by 1 December 1945 be
held to a mdr.OJaum. Sterilizing times for other targets indicated in
COMGEN21BOMCOHS 300035 June and COMAF 20 t s 2907 Lr,.O July as agreed to by rey020256 July.
10 1407 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC lillV AtJCE HO.

c 32375.

Tentative troop lists for BLACKLIST are approaching completion in

current conferences with 6th, 8th and lOth .t\rmy commanders and with FEAF.
Request that representatives of the Amphibious Forces \v.hich you intend to
designate to work with each -~ Contraander be instructed to contact ~
Commanders for detailed planning. Headquarters 6th Army now San Fernando,
Pampang, Headquarters Sth Army now LEYTE; headquarters lOth ..tu-rrry now
OKINAYA. Arrey" connnanders will be responsible for the loading out of FSAF
elements.
10 1507 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC PEARL, CG V WJ.AR AMPHIB CORPS,
COMAF 13, COMGEN FEAF

ex

'

32403.
FEAF has assigned 13th tir Force mission of support 5th Amphibious
Corps during OLYJ!PIC. Propose authorizing direct liaison between representatives 13th Air Force and 5th Marine Amphibious Corps on matters pertaining operational coordination and utilization aircraft warning control
groups in direct support Marine OLYMPIC operations. Involves sending aircraft and liaison personnel to HAWAUN required for liaison purposes. Your
comments requested.
10 2314 CINCPAG ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC info CO:MGEI\JFEAF, COM;\Fl3, COMGEN5THPHIBCO..ID:.
Your 101507 concur subject to tte comment that the 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing is planned to be furnishe d as a component of the w..its of the Fleet
Marine Force which may parti cipate i n OLYMPIC. As far as practicable
Marine Ground Forces . should b e supported by Marine Aviation and Ground Air
Liaison with Fleet Marine Force should be carried on by Marines.

3439

...

10 2000 COMINCH AND CNO to C[l'ICP.A.C BOTH HQ, COMEASTFRON, COMNESSEAF:RON, COMGULFSEA.
FRON info . SECNAV
,
,
In order to conform with War Department policy ;for public relations and
censorship purposes concerning military use of ATOMIC energy and ATOMIC
bomb war Department policy is quoted belo\l}r for guidance. Doubtful matters
should be submitted to Navy Department puginfo for clearance War Department
or u.s. Office of Censorship representatives. n1. Censors mtzy" pass material
dealing 'Ttvith ATOM BOMB and :military use of ATOMIC energy "t-rlthin bounds of
official releases only. 2. Indu.stries universities, individuals etc may be .
identified with the overall development in general terms but may not
elaborate on their technical contributions. 3. Historical information of
non-military nature concerning ATOMIC energy provided technical informa.tion
on ATOMIC research after January 1940 is not revealed. Censors should stop
for security reasons following infonnation. 1. References to specific
processes forn!lllae and mechanics of operation. 2. Stocks location of stocks
procurement of stocks and stocks consumption. It may be said that ura:nilron.
is used. 3. Quality and quantity of production of active materials for ATOM
bombs. 4. Physics characteristics and future military improvements or
developments of ATOMIC energy- or AT01liC BOMB. 5. Descriptions or pictures
of bomb and nature of its action other than comparative explosives equivalents such as equal to- 20,000 tons of TI-lT or 2000 times more powerful
than any bomb yet used. 6. Techniques of operational use of the bomb.
7. Information as to relative importance of the various methods or plants
or of their relative functions or effihcencies. General references may be
made to these installations only plants adjacent to OAK RIDGE, TENNEsSEE
and RICHMON.p, WASHINGTON and the laboratory near SA.NTE FE, NEN MEXICO.''
10 2315 CINCPAC _.IDVANCE to JCS info CINCPAC PEl~.HL, Cil'JCAFPAC, _CG USFCT.

Subject is l'TAPKO PROJECT which involves introduction of OSS personnel

into KOREA by submarine and establishment of 2 radio listerung posts at
forward bases to receive information.
Para. Objectives are (A) to organize intelligence net\~ork in KOREA;
(B) assist in rescue of d~rr.ned aviators;(C) provi~e base for further pen
etration of JAPAN proper by clandestine agents; (D) organize resistence,
sabotage and guerrilla activities. Principal value may lie in (D).
Para.. Comments on CINCAFPAC and CG USFCT on t:b..is project are contained
in their 15lll9 July and 051200 July respectively both of which have been
passed to JCS for information.
Para. CINCPAC does not favor project at this time but is prepared to
furnish submarine to transport personnel if required.
10 2317 CTNCPA.G ADVANCH; to CONfPHIBSPAC .. .COM3RDPHIBFOR, COM5THPHIBFOR,
info .C011{INCH, C,IN.9:j!:,PAG, CO:M7TH~ T, COM5THFLT, COMGE11'6THA!.1MY,

COMGEN 8, CINCt<\C PEAHL HQ.

My Joint, Staff study CA![PUS provide~ th3.t the planning and execution of
the occupation of J APJ\.N by u. s. P..rmy Fo:rces will be coordinated with CINC11-FPAC.. COMPHIBSPAC will control the amphibious movement and debarkation of
the occupation forces through the various amphibious force and group commanders. An amphibious force comma nder will be designated to operate in
close coordination with each Army Commander and to conduct the movement to
t he objective of the forces assigned each Army. COM3RDPHIBFOR will move

344 0

- continued COM:5THPHIBFOR, COM?THPHIBFOR,

COMGEN6THA.t!?.MY, COMGEN 10

the Sth .4;rmy, COM5THPHIBFOR the 6th Army and COM7THPHIBFOR the lOth Ju-royn .
Para. Amphibious force commanders concerned establish planning liaison
immediately with Army Commanders. Headquarters 6th Army now San Fernando.
Headquarters 8th Arrey now Leyte. Headquarters loth Army now Okinawa.
ll 0217 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCAFPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT,
CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMNORPAC, USS SOUTH DAKOTA.
In the event of a Japanese surrender it is my present intention to
continue to exercise my command from my headquarters atGUAM except when
my presence is required elsewhere for particUlar purposes. Admiral Halsey
will remain in JJITSSOtr:r-tr. Admiral Spruance vdll break his flag in NE'V
JERSEY. SOUTH DAKOTA lAJill remain in company with Admiral Halsey and will
be prepared to serve as my flagship when required. I expect to move
between GUAM and SOUTH DAKOTA by seaplane when necessary.
11 OS29 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CJNCAFPAC info COM5THFLT, COMINPAC.

Due to quantities of United States pressure type mines laid in KOBEOSAKA AREA specifically in the OSAKA WAN it appears impracticable to
operate in that area until sterilizers render the mines inoperative in
February 1946. KURE appears to be preferable as a base from which to
control -INLAND SEA. This affects CAMPUS and BLACKLIST to a controlling
degree.
ll 1215 C01:IGENCHINA to CINCPAC info CINCAFPAC, COMGENSOSCHINA, COMGENTACT

CHTI~TA,

WARCOS.

CFBX 4309.
Regardless of Japanese surrender request a~l material, shipping and
personnel designated for FORT BAYARD at GUAM conference be considered as
firm agreements. All material, shipping and personnel agreed upon are
required by CHINA THEATER whether port is established at BAY.A.RD, KO~iVLOON
or elsewhere.
12

0244. CINCPAC

ADVA.I~CE to COM5THFLT info COM3RDFLT, COMP~IBSPAC, COM..lSTCARTFPAC,

C01!2NDCARTFPAC 2 CASCU PHIBSPAC.

Refer to CASCU top secret serial 00015 dated ll July and COM5THFLT 2nd
endorsement serial 000155 of 7 August thereto subject dusk and dawn fighter
patrols.
Para. It is considered infeasible to accomplish the training of fleet
pilots on any such scale as visualized. Commanders of fast carrier task
forces should take such measures as are practicable to insure that VF pilotf
flying dusk CAP'S are capable of landing on board parent carriers after dar1
Para. The maintenance of the day C.ttP after sunset is within the
operationa~ control of appropriate commanders and should be so ordered if
req_uired.
AUGUST

3441

J2 0807 CINCPAC .ADVANCE HQ to COH5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMINCH, CINCAFPAC, COM3RDFLT,

COMNORPAC.

For occupation planning am modifying concept my Joint Staff study

with respect to areas of responsibilities of action adees. COM5THFLEEI'
will command naval occupation western HONSHU, SHIKOKU and KYUSHU and
will control I1~tUID SEA, southern half of SEA OF JAPAN, and waters east
of line from $outhern tip of KOREA at 1Z7-00 east south to 32-00 north lZl00 east southwest to 26-30 north 123-00 east thence south to 20-00 north.
This will give COM7THFLEET responsibility for planning and conducting
operations from LUI CHOW PENINSULA along CHINA COAST, in YANGTSE RIVER,
and in YELLOW SEA. It will more nearly conform to boundaries between
zones of action of 6th and lOth armies. Request your comment .
COJ.!GEN3RDPHIBCOR.
..
ll 0858 CINCPAC .ADVANCE to COHGENFMFPAC info FMFPAC REP MA11.I.t\.NAS,

Alert 1 RCT From 6th MarDiv for immediate occupation duty if required.
Unit should be completely equipped and ready for active combat operations .
5 units of fire and 30 days rupply to accompany. If anployed this RCT
vdll be withdra-vm later for subsequent employment with parent division.
Advise unit designated earliest.
11 1344 ALUSNA MOSCOW to CTIJCPAC l'J)VANCE info COMINCH AND CNO .

Soviets consider that entry and exit of u.s. submarines through TARTARY
STRAIT can be arranged for on] after exchange of liaison groups between
Soviet and United States Pacific Fleets and after a s,ystem of recognition
on which they are presently engaged has been worked out. Cincpac 090050
refers.
12 0111 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

Request e~rly action on my 070553 since the operations involved will

be required to support operations directed by WrtRX 47513 (JCS 102217) even
if Japanese surrender.
J2 0112 CINCPAC PJJV.ANCE .to CO:M?THFLT.

CINCAFPACS 090503 indicates that 3 patrol craft escort (rescue) have

been converted into communication ships. It is noted that they were not
included in your l2Jlt-06 or 300821 as available for OLY1EPIC. Please
furnish me complete data on status these craft including date authority
and extent of their conversion, present employment, source and service
ovrnership of additional equipment.
Para. ill ships of the Pacific Fleet which participate in CAMPUS
will be assigned by me to an appropriate Task Organization.
AUGUST

3442

12 1202 CTIJCBPF to GTF 112 i:nfo VA( Q}, RA(D }, AC 1.

Further to rrw 120226... i have n ow b een instructed by GTF lll to prepare
a plan to move 3 small com.posi te groups vdth air and logistic support to

HONG KONG, SHANGHAI and perhaps STI\JGAFORE..

Para 2. T.o achieve this all Cruisers and majority of destroyers of _

TG 37.3 may be required to augment. TG 111.2 and these ships 'Will require
replenishment as far as possible at MliNUS o
Para 3. Further signal will be made when situation has been appreciated
and instructions of HM: Governm.ent which are expected have been received.
Para 4. MJJLT\!WXIKE (A) Requirements of CTG 38.5 should continue to have'
1st priority. Some reduction M,!. his JULYR. requireme~ts w.ay prove possible
if situation clears quickly.
(B) Units of Fleet Train and Escorts which are operationa.lly
useful should not come south of ];iAJ:.ffiS.
.
(C) Movements of CVE' S to AUSTRALI.A should continue as previously arra..n ged.

12 15Z7 CINCAFPAC to COM3RDPHIB, C,GlS.!ARMY, COM1THPHIB, CQM5THPHIB, WARCOS, COMPHIBSPAG, _USASTAF, CG 6TH ARMY, F.MFPAC, CG STHAR1VIY, CG lOTH ARMY, .ASCOM 2
pG AFWESPAC, COMGENFE.!U' ~ i\FMIDPAC, CINCPAC ADV11P'CE H~.

ex 33017.

BLACKLIST Play~ 3rd Edition, dated S August, is hereby amended to

designa.te the 20-4t,h Corps as occupation force, KOREA. the 20-4th Corps
w:i.ll assume respons:lbilitie s assigned loth Army fu KOREA, functioning as
a Task Force directly under this headquarters. Responsibilities of the
lOth Army in the RYUKYUS and for mounting out troops for BLACKLIST remain
unchanged.
Para. Tenta.ti ve troop list for BLACKLIST distributed 12 August as
inclosure to letter this headquarters file AG 322 (ll .ttugust 1945) GC (not
to all or needed) is amended as follows: on page 1 substitute the words
"Part 1: 2hth Corpsrr,. for the words 11 Pa~ 1: lOth U.~. Army*' Delete the
following units from Part 1: Headquarters and Headquarters Company lOth
Army, 519 ~Military Police Battalion (Army), 85 signal operations battalion
to headquarters and Headquarters company ASCO]! 10 is designated headquarters
and Headquarters company 24.
Para. The lOth Army will reinforce headquarters, 24th Corps with ,
commissioned and enlisted personnel, and such other appropriate resources
as may be available, to enable _the 24th Corps to perform its assigned
area command and roilita~ government functions.
12 214S COMINCH ! ND CNO to ClNCPAC ADVANCE info COMGEN CHit.fA, COS USA.

Assembly of personnel and material and arrangements for s..hipping your

070553 are approved f or employment on CHI NA COAST .in accordance with JCS
d:i.rective

AUGUST ( GCT)

to

be i ss ued when desi n ation determined.,

3443
,

AUGUS 'I, ( GCT)

14 0629 CINCP}ill ADVAlJCE to COMS~VPAC, COMAffiPA, COMGENfl.ilFPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT
Q.OJ~1PHIBSPAC, ,C9M7THFLT .i.t'..fo COlNCH, . CNO, MARCORPB,, COMNORPAC, Cll~C.:\FPAC,
C..OMGEN6THARMY, COMGJi:NPOA, . COMGEN,5THPliiBCORPS, COMGE)JSERVCOMDF1fFPAC, CINCPOA

PEARl,, COM;2RDPHIBFOR, COM5THP1LTBFOR, . COM.7THPHIBFOR, CTF 9_6, COM lfARIAN;.\S

COMGEN2NDMARAIRl~!ING, PMFPAOREP MARIJi.N ~13-:l-COMGEN!IHFMFPAC.

WARNING ORDER. Be prepared to execute operation C.A1!PUS on short notice

in accordance CIHCPOA Joint Staff Study serial 0005103 August -~ Troop
list will be in accordance CINCPAC 100904, 12o623, 120624. 5thPhibCorps
should be ordered to report to COMGEN6THA.RM.Y" for pla.tLrri.ng.
Para" Lt. Col. B. J. Truitt, USMC is designated as Ma:rAirBase
co.rnrn.ander YOKOSUKA. Col. B. L. Smith, USM.CR is designated as MarAirBase
commander SASEBO-NAGASP.EI and should be ordered to report to COMGEN2ND
at earliest for teansfer with gro\Uld ech ]l.:i.G 22. COMAL'U?AC .
.
I!lA.R. \..T.Rr'TING
nominate Mar off at earliest for duty as ComMarAirBase KURE. Capt. G. J.
Dufek, USN is designated a.s CO!v1NAVAIRBASE OMINATO. He ~hould be ordered
to report for transportation to CO of ACORN to be designated for this NAB.

14 0819 CINCRAC ADVANCE to CTIJCAFPAC info COM7THFLT, COMPHILSEAFRON, COMINCH.

Since COM7THFLT vd11 be required to operate as a. Task Fleet Commander
out side the south,trest Pacific area in connection \Ad.th occupation operations
at an earlier date than contemplated for OLYMPIC, it is desirable that he
pass to COMPHILSEI\FRON at tne earliest possible date all his remaining
fU-'1ctions as senior Naval Commander in the S!NPA originally planned for
1 October accordance paragraph G of my 130751 approved by COMINCH 201819
and placed in effect by n~ 211808. Request your earlY- concurrence.
, Para. Suggest COrt7THFLEET and COMPHILSEAFRON confer and advise r.o.e abd
1
Cll{CAFPAC earliest practicable date for transfer.

14 0829 CINC BPF .to CTF 112, info ,OTG .J-11.2) CTG 38.5 2 CINCPAC P..DV.ANCE.
Admiralty have now stated intention of sending BI;itish Naval Force to

HON&KONG subject to arrangements with u.s. Chiefs of Staff.

Para 2. Force will be drawn from TG lll.2.
Para 3. Provision of oilf;}rs is essential to this move even at some
expense of TG 38.5
Para 4. Consider foJ~owing moves will provide rnaxinu.:lrn flexibility
(A) S.AN iUtffiRDSIO and SA~J J..DOLPHO to refill at ULITHI (B) WAVE EMPEROR
and SAN A:MA.OO after refitting at ENT:NETOK to proceed to ULITHI.
Para 5. CTF 112 (A) report inenntions to CINC BPF and CTG 38.5 (B)
make direct arrangements with C~NCPAC ADVANCE and SOMSERVIDN 10 regarding
.
ULITHI.

14 1455 CINCAFPAC to CJJ\TCPAC.

33551.

Further to conference of ll August v;ith your representative (Admiral

Sherman) a vessel capable of sustained sptaed 17 knots is being loaded
MANILA with materials and personnel necessary f or construction of bulk
aviation gasoline facilities TOh.'YO to go forward from OKD\JAI.VA 1st Navy
echelon. Inasmuch as water capacity this vessel is limited it is requested
that navy facilities for watering at both OKINAWA and objective area be
made availab .. e The name of vessel vrill be given in a separate radio.
Advise if watering f,acilitie s for approximately 600 perso~el will be
,AUGUST (GCT).

availc.ble..

344 4

llt- 2318 JlARSHALL to

~VEDEUEYER,

JlACAHTHUR info NIMITZ.

W.ARX 49578.
For your information with reference to ~fAR 49042, the British Chiefs
of Staff now inform the u.s. Chiefs of Staff that they have issued instructions to Admiral Fraser concerning acceptance of surrender of Japanese
.
at HONGKONG.
Para. In another paper the British asked the concurrence or comment
.of the u.s. Chiefs of staff on instructions already sent to Mountbatten
on which, in view of the time factor, the British are going ahead with
all preparations. These instructions in summar.y are that, after acceptance of Japanese surrender, main tasks will be:
A. Reoccupation of keyareas of occupied territory and surrender and
disarmatnent of J aps.
B. Release of British and Allied prisoners of war.
c. Protection of British interests in CHINA.
D. Participation in the occupation of JAPAN.
Para. Assumptions on policy are:
A. Parts of Soutmrest Pacific will pass to British and Australian
command on cease fire.
B. Highly important British accept HONGKONG surrender and show
British flat at main Chinese ports.
c. British take part in Japanese occupation with British CorMnonwealth force in which Great Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand and
probab~ Canada will each be represented by a Brigade Group supported
by an air component.
Para. .:~ountbatten has been asked to submit plins for operations in
order of priority:
A. Complete occupation of BUR?lA., reopen MALACCA STRAITS, and occupy
SINGA.l?ORE and key: areas of MALAYA.
B. Reestablish a British garrison in HONGKONG using initially British
Pacific Fleet and an Australian force from BORNEO. These to be released
as soon as possible with Brigade and tactical air force from S~AC.
c. SmE~ll forces ~or certain Chinese ports.
D. Occuuation of J PMI.
E. Dispatch of force to S UGON. l\rrangements b'jing made to ship
French forces and civil affairs personnel as a follow up. Hountbatten r s
forces should not occuJy more of INOO CHINA than necessa~J to assure the
control of headquarters of the Japanese southern armies.
F. Dispatch forces to JAVA as soon as possible to accept surrender
there. Arrangements are being made to ship Dutch security forces.
G. SUJI.i.4.TRA is in lovrer priority than JAVA.
Para. Australian forces are being asked to take initial responsibility
for BOH.NEO Bn:d enemy occupied territories in the east. At later date
Mountbatten must be prepared to provide the ustra.lians a small proportion
of force and some merchant shipping.
H. Mm.u1tbatten should appreciate that many of these arrangements are
subject to agreement of Governments, vrhich the British are novr undertakin..g.
Para. This ends sur~~ry of orders issued by British Chiefs of staff
to Mountbatten.
Para. Request Wedemeyer r s and Macluthttr s exped _tious conunents on
the foregoing.
Para. This message passed to Nimitz at req.uest of Havy Department.
A

AUGUST (GCT}

3445

15 0216 CIN~C ADV.\NCE to COHINCH.

At 142130 Halsey acknowledged receipt of orders to suspend air
attack operations. The initial attack was already undervray when I
received your directive to suspend the operations.
15 0305 CINCAFPAC to CG 6THAR.MY, CG 8TH ~RMY, CG lOTHAm<,IT, CG XXIV CORPS, COHGEN
FEAF, CG .A.FWESP. C, ADl':IDPAC, info CTNCPAC .ADVANCE, COMPHIJlSPAC, C01QRDFLT,
COM5'rHFLT, C01Jl7THFLT, COM3RDPHIBFOR, COM7THPHIBFOR, CG FMFPAC, CG USA.STAF,
WAILCOS, OOM5THPHIBFOR, CG lsT .a.P~.

ex

33638.
Follows warning order for execution of BLACKLIST operation. Action
adees will immediately initiate the execution of operations to occupy
JAPAN and KOREA as outlined in BLACKLIST. COMGEN 6TH and 8TH l\.rmies and
24th Corps will expedite arrangements respectively with Commanders 5!-h,
3rd, and 7th AmrJhibious Forces and air Task Force Commanders. Operations
instructions number 4 directing preparations for the occupation of JAP~I
and KOREA being issued this date. B Day the effective date of 01 number
4 is 15 August 1945. Operation :MAJESTIC suspended indefinitely. Warning
Orders for execution of B 60 will follow. No actual landing in JAPAN or
KOREA will be made prior to a date to be announced later.
15 0245 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC PJJVAl'ICE, CG 6TH .L\RMY, CG 8TH AR1,1Y, CG lOTH ARMY,
CG XXIV CORPS, A.FWESPAC, AFJMIDPAC, COMPHTBSPAC.

ex

33634.
Priorities for allocation of seaborne troop lift for phase 1 BLACKLIST
are as follows: 1st, for 8th Army, 3 and 1/3 reenforced r\.r.my Divisions
plus headquarters and supporting troop~ as follOiiV's: G.HQ AFPAC, Bth Army,
11 Corps, 14 Corps, destination TOKYO. 2nd, for 6th Army, 1 reinforced
Marine Division of the 5th Amphibious Corps,- plus available elements of
5th Arl\,.Dhibious Corps Headquarters botp from M.-ffiiANAS; destination SASEBQNAGASAKI. 3rd, for 6th lrrrrry, 2 Reinforced !u-my Divisions plus 6th Arnw
and 1 Cvrps Headquarters and supporting troops, destination OSAKA. 4th, f
for 24 Corps, 2 Reinforced Army Divisions plus 24 Corps Headquarters and
corps troops, destination KIEJO. 5th, for 8th Army, 1 reinforced .~
Division plus 9th Corps Headquarters and supporting troops, destination
OMINATO. 6th, for 6th lu:my, 1 Marine Division plus remainder of 5th
Amphibious Corps Headquarters and supporting troops from HAWAII, destination SASEBO-N\GASA.KI. 7th, for 6th Army, 1 Reinforced .trnw Division from
HAWAII, destination OS.\KA. 8th, for 6th Army, 1 reinforced Marine Divison
from Marianas, destina:~ion SASEBO-NAGAS.A.KI. 9th, for 6th Arrey, 1 Reinforced
ft.rnry division, destination OSAKA. lOth, for 8th 1\rrrry, 1 and 1/3 reinforced
Army Divisions, destination 01UNATO.
Para. :Jhere more than 1 Division is allocated for initial movement
to a given objective, the movement may, at the discretion of the -A.rmy or
Corps Commander concerned, (6th Army, 8th Army or 2 SXLKUKTitS) and as
arranged with the corresponding naval task force commander, be conducted
by reinforced division rather than by.slinultaneous movement of the entire
allocation.
Para. The follmdng paragraph for CINCPAC only: this message confirms
priorities handed Admiral Sherman at 1.1anila 13 August on BLACKLIST priorties and troo1) lift estimates. The esti.rru-1te for the troous involved in tihe
AUGUST ( GCT) initial movement to the TOKYO area should read upersonnel, 151 allocaj(i on 0
of shi pping should be obtained from the Army Comr.n.ander concernedn.
j 4 4 r-

15

1333

Cil\fC.AJ?PAC to INARCOS FOR JCS info CI:NCPAC 1IDVANCJ&, CO]~GEN US FORCES CHINA.

CX

33830- This radio in4 parts.

Para. 1.

Present

plarm~d

BLACKLIST contemplates employment, JAPAN

19 Divisions, KOREA 3 Divisions, Philippine Garrison 2 Divisions, reference

WX 49334. It is considered that forces and shipping allocate for JAPAN
proper must rem8.in available pending determination of conditions after
initial landings vrhich will be made by 14 Divisions.
Para 2. By confining KO.REAN occupation to KEIJO JtREA and reducing
initial ent:cy to the initlal division only, a division. with shipping can
be made available for DJ.l.RIEN at a relatively early date. Eventua.l
accomplishment of occupation mission in the United States zone of KOREA
will require commitment of an additional A.xnry division not now allocated
if DA..t.t:?.I.E:N is occupied.
Para 3. Occupation of SH.Al'JGHAI by 2 <livisions of' the 3rd Phib Corps
is proposed by CINCP.~..c in conjunction with COMGEN CHINA 1'1Then shipping
becomes available, this can be accomplished if no unexpected requirements
arise -in JAPAN proper . or KOREA.
It is recornrnended that any occupations on the CHINA COAST
~ara. 4.
by United States forces further to those cited above be placed in a .
contingent category dependent upon the development of the situation in
higher priority areas and availability of resources.

to COM3RDFLT,

15 0206 CINCPAO ADVJLI\JCE

5THPHIBCORPS info

COM5THFT~T, COikif5THPr[.[BFOR, COThfNORPAC, COMGEN

Cll~CAFPAC.

Para 1. CINCJ.FPAC staff study BLii,CKLIST mailed today. Following

changes made -since publication.
A. 24th Corps designated as occupation force, KOREA. 24th Corps
will assume responsibilities assigned lOth Army in KOREA, functioning
as a Task Force directly under CINC AFPAC. lOth t~.rmy responsibility in the
RYU1ITUS and for mounting out troops for BLACKLIST remain liDChanged.
B. In B 2 the 5th Phib Corps is substituted for the l Corps in the
SASEBO-NAGASiiKI 1lliEA. The 1 Corps, reinforced with the 9Sth Division
will be employed f'or B 10 in the OSAKA AREA.
c. Z7 Division is removed from 24 Corps and will be employed in B 60.
Z7 Division replaces 98 division within the 14 Corps. 3S Division remains

in AFPAC reserve.
D. 96 Division is included in 24 Corps replac:ing Z7 DiVision.
E.. Delete all references to occupation of any part of K.lll'tAFUTO. Such

operations will not be conducted.

Para 2. Foregoing changes also apply to applicalbe parts of my Joint

Staff Study C.l\M:PUS

3447

COMINCJi f:u~ GJ:.!O ,AND CHIEF' OF .S~,yy US .A.Rtvf:{ to ,CTI\IC,P...Fl?AC 1 C.l.f!Q?AC ADVA~JGE
info U. S .. MILIT@Y MISSION ThfOSQ.QY!.

15 2127

With Japanese capitulation previous arrangements for liaison. groups

J'irmy and Navy at KHABAHOVSK and VLADIVOSTOK appear to be subject to modi-

fication. In this connection it is suggested that a Cruiser or other

suitable vessel be provided for the use of li..rrrw and Navy liaison representatives to deal. with the Russian Cornrnand in whatever ASIATIC FDRT
appears desirable such as DAIREN. The sending of a Cruiser for this
liaison pu~ose should be considered in coru1ection with previous directive
regarding the occupation of DAIHEN by United States forces . (For Deane
reference to visits to or occupation of DAIREN is not to be communicated
,
to the Soviets at this time).
Para 2. Taking foregoing into consideration information desired from
MacArthur and Nimitz as to what changes if any they desire as regards
present arrangements for liaison groups at KH.WAROVSK and VLADIVOSIDK
inforrn.ing .m:i;.1itacy mission MOSCOW at same time .
Para J . In connection with above CINCPAC is advised that a group visa
for Navy liaison group has not as yet been received but Rear Admiral Settle
with 8 additional Naval officers and 6 enlisted mEn are proceeding by
air to GUAM from Washington evening 16 August to report to him for further
assignment in connection with this duty. .
CNS SAlUR to COM'7THl~LT info .COUSERVPAC, COMSE~Y: ,7TM, CINCPAC BOTH H2.

16 0433

~My

serial 0002 of 1 3 August Re: FORT BAYARD operation. Have assigned

6 officers from NABU 13 including Commander John Harold Sedtz USNR 86937

to this operation. Latter assigned ac~ing Commanding Officer of NABU

pending confirmation or designation of another by higher authority. Essential to have an organized NABU to avoid confusion. New Subject.
Have not yet arrived but are
D~signation of 7 LST s reoeived this date .
expected tomorrow. Unless othe~rise directed will begin loading upon .
arrival. At moment appears that 3 additional 1ST ' s w-ill be required
but will advise of additional shipping requirements later. Personnel
from GROPAC PEARL not arrived. Request sl1ipping designator.

16 07'24

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COl:,UNCH AND CNO info WARCOS 1 CINCAF'Pt:i.C ..

In vi~r of current developments believe it better to cancel exchange
of Flag Officers on basis originally planned. Your 152127. The presence
o!.' a. Russian Liaison Group at .my headquarters vvould have many disadvantages

Para. In lievv
CINCPAC break his
and later to such
Para. Propose

thereof propose that Rear Admiral Settle report to

flag in a cruiser and proceed initially to VLADIVOST{)K
othel"' port as may be desirable.
to use LOUISVILLE escorted by a destroyerl i f :y-ou concur.

16 1141 C;l:NCAFPAG. to COl\ITNCH & GUO WARCOS, invo US

CIJ~JG?AC, USASTAF

~JITL.ITARY MIS~ION

MOSCOW,

340S7.

AUGUST ( GC1

ReUrad 1521272 the mission assigned to the Ue~S Military liaison group
which has been organized .for station in KHABAFOVSK was to effect operatio-nal coordination and liaison with the Red Army in connection with Milita:cy
oper_a tions against J . ~AN. So far as this command ~s concerned. direct
liaison in no longer necessary- query shall the proJect be contmued.
)

34 4 R

16 0809

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC.

Your 141507. CX 33547 My 150846 also refers. Naval tacilities

required to be furnished i n each occupationa l area as follows:
A. .Entire naval base at YOKOSUKA vdth all present facilities and
living quar t .ers for a pproximatel y ?600 Navy and 5lJ-00 4th Marine RCT.
250 acres minimum space. YOKOSUKA Naval air base with living quarters
for '-1!)00 Navy personnel. Recreation area S AG.Alt~li BEACH with 1 mile of
beach and 50 acres for athletic fields. 50 trucks at least 1 1/2 tons.
25 passenger vehicles.
B. OMi l\JATO. Entire naval base at O:MINATO with all present facilities.
KABA.Y,:!JviA airfield with living quarters for 3000 personnel. 50 truck not
less than l 1/2 ton. 10 passenger ears. Clearance al-l highwa;rs between
.
port and airfield.
C. HIROSHIMA airf'ield with living qua.rt.ers for 3500. Pier and landing
facilities as close as possible to airfield with 10 acres cleared for
sorting a rea in rear. 50 trucks not less than 1 1/2 ton. 10 passenger
vehicles. Clearance all highways between port and airfi eld.
D. SASEBO. Enti:ee naval ba se at SASEBO rd th all present faeilities.
OMUHA seapl ane base and airfield with all adjacent unloading facilities.
Living quarters for 4000. 50 trucks not less than 1 1/2 ton. 10 passenger
vehicles.
E. All existing wire conununicati ons systems between and in subject airfields and adjacent naval bases or ports. l'J .l existing radio station
installation s at these naval bases or ports and ai~fields and all co~
munication facilities for port control to be left intact.
F. Airfields to be complete with all existing facilities. Runways
taxiways and adjacent areas cleared of debris and ready" for operation.
G. J:I.J.a.val bases to be complete with piers workshops, drydocks, hospitals
and equipment cleared of debris and ready for operation.
H. Faciliti es at airfields and bases to include adequate electric power
water and seqage disposal.
Para. Various additional f acilitie s may be required and will be
requested as t he situat ion dev~ lops.

14 1101 CINCAFPAC to CI}rCP!C ,~.ltDV,. FMFPAG, 7vA.RCOS, COMGENlJHill.MY, COMGEN$TH..I\RJA;Y,

COMGENlOTHARlviT ., ASCOM 1, COMGENAFV\fESPAC,. COMGEI\fFEAF, AFMIDP'1.\TI, COMPHIBSP/\0

COiviGENlstA..li.MY, C QMGE!I~ SAS TAE.

ex 33452.

BLACKLI ST plan, edition number 3, this headquarter s dated 8 August 45

is amended as follovrs:
A. I n. B2 t he 5th J\mphibious Corps is substituted for the 1 Corps in
t h e SASEBO- N'AGASAKI AREA. The 1 Corps, reiri.for'led "<v1ith the 98 divisi on.,
will b e employ ed f or B-10 in t he OS!IYA J.REA.
B. The 27 Division is r emov e d from. 24 Cor ps and will be employed in
B-60. The Zl division replaces the 98 division within the 14 Cor ps .. The
38 Division reJI'!l3..ins in AFPAC reserve .
C, The 96 division is included in the 2L,.. Cor ps r eplac ing the 27 Div.
D. Delete all references to operations for the oecupa.tion of any part
of KARAFUTU ~~ S~ch operations vrill not be conducted.
AUGUST (GC~)

3449

15 0529

CINCAFPAC to CINGPAC ADV, COMGENCHINA, W&~COS 2 SAQ~A, CC'MGEtJUSASTAF, IVIIL

':MISSION MOSCOVJ'.

ex

33657-

Pursu~t to directive from the P~esident of the United States and in

accordance with agreement araong the governments . of the United states,
Chinese republic, United Kingdo, and Union of Socialist Republics I have
been designated as the _Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces to accept,
coordinate and carry into effect the Japanese surrender. I assume command
accordingly. . The channel of comrnunica.tions -vti:ch the Japanese Imperial
Government and Japan_.ese Imperail Headquarter s will be through this

headquarter s, 1~a.c.A.rthur.

16 0045

JOINT CHIEFS OF srAFF to CIJ\1CPAC @V info Cl}JCAFPAC, BRITISH ADMTY DELEG.

WARX 501g2.
You

\~ll

release to the full control of Admiral Fraser such parts of

the British Pacific Fleet as he requests.

16 0250

CINCFOA ft.DVANCE ~o CINCAFPAC info COMINCH, JVM1COS. ,

Your CX 338:31. Will send Rear Admiral S[lerrn.an to represent me at

Manila do.ring meeting with trapanese representat ives 17 August.

Pava. The presence of a liaison group to represent me at your headl!JUarters in the TOKYO AREA will be very advantageou s and I propose to
send a group headed by a Flag Officer with comnru.nicati on and intelligenc e
personnel as required. Will advise shortly as to personality .

15 1442 COMGENCHINA to WA_FWOS Info COMINCH, CDJCAFPAC, CTNCPAC, COMGENIB

In view of final decision that immediate
requirement s of China Theater for U S troops to occupy key positions

TOP SECRET.

CFBX 4740

cannot be furnished, determined measures must be taken to retain control

of the situation here. Refer. WAR 49574~ First: It is urgently requested that no aircraft be removed from the India-China Wing, ATC,
see WAR 4994'3. The present instruction s issued General 'funner in
personal ATC message from Washington have caused him to take the measure
of alerting 50 C-54' s he removal of which from. the Hump is costing
China Theater 12000 tons per. month and this loss in the absence of
immediate U S occupation forces on the CHINA COAST is jeopardizin g
the nmv mission of the China Theater VJARX 47593. Chinese troops are
being alterted for move to secure the most critical areashm~ever their
arrival will be a roattel. . of weeks or months if airlift is not employed.

Adequate forces to insure security of these key areas cannot be moved

in time unless all presently assigned aircraft are available to lift

the troops and to bring fuel into CHINA.. 2nd: It is urgently requested
that additional assistance be given by .making Avi gas available at the
airfields in vicinity of NANKING a.nd in t he rri ENTSIN-PEIPI I'JG area for
the .movem.ent of occupationa l .Chilaese f orces., It is sugge~rted that U S
Na~ convoy shipment o:f aviga.sa
Para. Utilizing vessels set u.p for J F~lEDAR should :meet our emergency
requirement s for t he Nt11'IKING area , provided we can expect contir ued
shipments, means which can be nw.de ava ilable plus personnel and equipment

3450

15

~+2

16 1940

----(con tinued) ----

previou sly allocate d by CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC a.nd WAR for JEMEDAii should
enable us to handle' this operatio n. H.euqest ~hat all resource s allocate d
for JE11EDAB. be diverted to NAl'{KING.
Para. In addition request the 7 LST' s origina lly earmarke d for
naval pre-conv oy in Jl&MJ:!;DAR be retained after off loading at NANKING
with addition of any others 11\fhich can be made ava:Llab le for lift of druramed
a vi gas from OKINAWA to TIENTSIN.
Para. 3rd: The allocati on of LCI craft for coastal or river movement intra CHINA would D.ateria l increase our capabil ities for the ":1ovement
of forces into the vital areas. It j,s recommended that Task Force 93
be augmente d by a minimum oi' ~ LCI for this purpose .
Para. The urgency and importan ce of the above must not be underestimate d. There are reports that fighting is already in progress between
Central Government and Communist Troops in the TSTI~GTAO area and elsewhe re,
with the Communists attempti ng to seize all key towns and airfield s in
northea st CHINA. Each dey 1 s delay in placing a major force in the
conflic t
crit~cal areas i~creases the probabi lity of widespre ad civil
CHTifA as
within
and ~eopardizes our 1st task of securing the key areas
stated in WAR 49574.
COMINCii AND CNO OHIEF Oi;i#STA.FF to MIJJUS MOSCOW - COMINCH PJ\.SSES TO CI:t{CPAC.

CINCAFPAC.

My 152127 and MIUfiS MOSCOW ]JfX 25322 since arrangem ents with Soviets for
exchang ing Army, Navy liaison groups KHlillARAVO$K and VLADIVOSTOK and U. S.
Headqua rters were to effect war operatio nal coordin ation we now propose to
cancel these liaison mission s.
Para 2. In order to provide for contact ~1.ith the_Sov iet Pacific Naval
headqua rters we propose to send a Cruiser and 1 or 2 Destroy ers initiall y
to VLADIVOSTOK and. later to such other ports as may be desirab le.
Para 3. Obtain Soviet concurre nce on above and advise originat ors
and info addresse es. Upon receipt of Soviet concurre nce regardin g visit
to VLJ\DIVOSTOK CINCPAC make detailed arrangements and notifica tion direct

through ALUSNA MOSCOW keeping CO:MINCH advised.

Para 4. If, the need should arise for addj_tion a.l liaison in connecti on
vdth coordin ation ofPOSC surrende r activiti es proposa ls therefo r will be
furnishe d at a. later"Ciate.

17 0615

COMGEN CHTIIJA to WE.COS....info CINCA.FPAC, CINGP4Q.

CFBX 41370.

Referenc e paragrap h A of 4th documen t 11 General Order Number 1 M..i.litar y

and Navalu (VVAR L,E672 as amended by subseque nt message s) request that
the term 11 M.:!~.I'JCHURIAn be defined. Chinese authori ties state that the
term. UivfAJ\ICH011IAn includes only 3 province s, namely, LIAONING, K!\RIN and
However sine e the Japanese created the puppet governm ent of
HE!LUNGKIAI~G.
:M;tl\JCHUKUO they have irleluded the province of JE:HOL which the Chinese govern,..
ment conside rs to be an integra l part of CHINA and not a part of MANCI-TIJRIA.
rrhe Chinese state that I.4JiCHHRIA as a geograp hical term definete ly does
not include JEHOL and they feel it to be vitally importan t tha:t JEHOL be
express ly excluded from the term rtMANGHURIAH as used in the surrend er
Request that this matte~ be clarifie d and if possible that
doeu~ents~
JEHOL be definite ly eiooluded from M.A)JCHUHIA as used in General Order No. 1.

Request prompt informa tion as to action taken.

AUGUST .{ C-!JTf

3451

16 0944 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to NIMITZ AND WEDEUE!ER info MACARTHUR.

wx 50181.

This message refers to Wedemeyers 4352, MacArthurs 33449 and W

49334 and Cincpacs 120242.

Priority' tar areas to be eecupied as given in WX 47945 and 48004
will not be changed at this time. However, it is desired that everr
etton be made to expedite the mwement ot u. s. Forces into key ports
on the CHINA COAST. The Joint Chiefs ot statf recognize that the
attitude
Homeland
into the
re~ to

of the Japanese adm1n:Jatration and armed forces in the Jap

and the subsequent; size and speed of movement of u. s. Forces
Japanese Homeland rem:Jns to be determined. In if"~ a
493341 it is requested that consideration be given to proceedilag
with arrangeD1811ts on a basis that in addition to KEIJO or another
KOREAN port, DAIREN i t not alreac\Y occupied by the Russians, a CHINA
COAST port will be mtered prior to comad:t.nt ot forces tor 2nd
priority objectives in JAPAN PROF!:R as set forth in BLACKLIST .plan ,
dated 25 J-u:q. 'l'hia suggesticm is mad~ with the thought that it ~~~q
be practicabl.e to set up arrangements so that farces intended tor ports
around the YELWW SEA can, up to their actual landing, still be shifted
to the Japanese Homeland if the developing situation so indicates.
On the matter of a specific port or ports on the CHINA COAST, this is
lett tor the time being to COIIID&llders concerned. Wedemeyer should obtain
views ot the Generalissimo on the port to be selected, it , &1\1 one can
be entered in the near future. For your information, state Department
considers the occupation ot 'l'S!NGTAO or TAKU should take priority over
SHANGHAI. In light of the foregoing am in answering 49334, and this message, request that, after consulting Wedemeyer, MacArthur and Nimitz
furnish their best estimate o time schedule on a port in KOREA, DAIREN
and a CHINA PORT. In you(time schedule there should be included alternate
portis to be occupied by the fQrces set up should DAIREN and/or KEIJO
have been previous]T occupied. by the Soviets.
,

AUGUST ( GCT)

3452

AUGUST (GCT)

.17 0906 CINCPAC ADVJJ\TCE to COMJlA:ARI;UIJAS 2 ' coM:Nl"JlRQ.J~I~S ..info COM3RnFLT, COM5THFLT,
COMAIRPAC, COMINCH, CINCl:AC P_E.:lRL 2 CINCl\fPAC.
A

Make plans and preparations to receive the surrender of all Japanese

forces remaining in the BONINS, .MARIA.I\JAS, C,AROLIN1~ and 1~L~HSHA.LLS . For
these purposes the co~d - areas sho~rn in Appendix 1 to Annex B of my
OpPlan 12-45 are applicalil , -. Advise means required to irn.plem.ent plans .
Para. Plans should include provision for concentre.ting prisoners in
the larger islands or Atolls and for their repatriation when circumstances
and shipping perr.ait subject to arrangements between CINCi.\FPAC and CINCPi\.C .,
Para. Mru(e prelimina~J plans for activating naval airfields on WLtKE
and MARCUS for use of ~7ATS and other transient aircraft .
17 1045 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVAJIJCE HQ.

C-.34353.

From Sherman. Have passed JGS WX 501$1 to CO:MPHIBSPAC and asked him.
to submit to you and CINC.AFPAC his best estimates of timing llllder the
pres:ent priorities and possible alterna.tives to permit earlier movements
to CHINA.
Para Estimates by Wilkinson contemplates arrivals TOKYO as follows:
B plus 16, lith Corps Hdqtrs, 1st Cav Div and lJ2 RCT. B plus 20 2 Americal
B plus 29 43 inf Div and 14th Corps Hdqtrs. Assuming use of same ships
the 9th Corps Hdqtrs and 1 Div would arrive OMINA.TO B plus 40 . 2nd Div
OMINATOat B plus 47.
Para. 6th Army est:ima:bes 1st arrivals as: 5th 1\[arDiv B plus 31. 98th
B plus 41. 3rd B plus 47. 27th B plus 57.
Para. . CINCAFPAC has asked COIJGEN CHTIIJA to send representative here.
Para. Perhpas Carter can produce a helpful estimate from his own

records.

l8 OSlO COMGEmJSAS'I'AF to GINCPOA ADVANCE info ,CINCAFPAC, COMGENAIR, COMAF 20;

COMAF B, COMMAHI ANAS.
s

2346.

Ftlrlher reference CINCPOA ADVANCE Top Sec message date time group
160SOSZ August and our number 2229 date time group 176131Z, your attention
is invited to the fact that prior to the termination of hostilities war
department policy prescr-l'Qed that USASTAF construction be in accordance
with .minimum war operational requirements. As a result, much of the construction that n~v exists is not desirable for either permanent or Semiperraanent use. In view o! either the permanent or semi-permanent nature
that many USASTJlF installations may have, USASTAF desire to reserve the
right to review current const-ruction projects in light of post V-J day
requirements and to propose construction that mey be either of a permanent
or semi-permanent nature as well as projects in categories you list. You
are advised of USASTAF APOS position in this matter inasmuch as your
policy makes no provision for future war department approval of post-war
projects.

AUGUsrr (Gq,~

3453

19 002,3 WJL11.COS to

CINC.~FPAC,

CHUNGKING CHINA THEATER

HQ USAF, CBI IWN DEUII, DEPCOM 20AF GUA!J:.

H1~

info GINCPOA ADVANCE Hq.

lN.A..tL\ 511t.Sl.
In reply to a message from the Prime Minister, the President has ansv;ered as follows: "From the u.s . standpoint there is no objection to the
surrender of HONGKONG being accepted by a Bri:tish Officer provided Military
coordination is effected beforehand by the British with the Generalissimo
on operational matters connected with assistance and support through that
area to Chinese and ,Mnerican forces who nwy still be eitrier engaged against
the enemy or involved in securing surrender of Japanese forces in the
hinterland_. General MacArthur will be instructed to arrange for the
surrender of HONGKONG to the British Commander whenever the above coordination is effected.

Para. The Secretary of State informed T. V. Soo~ here this morning

of thus contemplated action statihg that it did not ~ any wa;y represent
u.s .. views regarding the future status of HONGKQNG.

19 0219 COM3IIDFLT to COMG:E.:NSTHA..B.MY info CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC ADV, C.TF 31, COMGEN4THM.AR.
HALSEY .TO EICHELBERGER.

. ~UGUST (GCT2.

Predicated on assn.lllption fleet arrives SAGAMI WAN 23rd, airborne landing llth AB division takes place 25th, and troops Vtdll initially occupy
only ATSUGI-YOKOStnV\ and area to southward I have formulated 2 alternate
plans (plan 1) 4th Marines a.nd Fleet Marine landing force under B. G. Clement
land at SHINJIKU. L~th Uarines spearheaded by ta..nks ma.ke 2 prong simultaneou~
advance on YOKOSUKA airbase and YOKOSUK..~ naval ba.se. Fleet Marines protect
rear and flanks. Ship fire support in both SAGAMI WAN and TOKYO BAY. Plan
2 forces land at YOKOSUKA air base and envelope YOKOSUKA naval base from
rear by land.
Para. Both plans contemplate landings on same day as airborne landings
with H hour for naval landings approx.:i..mately sa. rne
. as time designated for
airborne landings or as you may direct. Plan 1 preferred as it avoids
exposing transports to treachery in very restricted waters. Both plans
perm:i:t subsequent isolating and disarming enemy forces on peninsula south
of KOKOSUKA-SHINJIKU line after fleet landing forces take over security
duty at YOKOSUKA air and ~~val bases. .
Para.. Nav;;I landing forces Cofll:prise l~th Marines a_nd 1$00 (3 battalions)
:marines from the fleet under Clement, a reserve force of 1200 (3 battalions) ,
u.s. bluejackets and 1 ba.t~alion (400 men) from British F:iheet for secutiy
duty. ffi~ additional reserve of 5 battalions (2000 men) of u.s. bluejackets
. can be mustered but with inferior equipment.
Para. In order to c~Jsta~lize details of my plans request follov;ing
infoiYnation earliest (A) on what air field or fields will 11th .~ divlsion
land (B) is my plan 1 agreeable to you (C) vfha;t if any support of airborne
operation do you require from 3rd fleet air surface or ground forces (D)
do you wish to designate I1 hour for .my forces ol" will you be satisfied with
iny intent to time it Tf>rith initial airborne landings (E) a~e you agreeable
.to my normal amphibious organization ( CTF 31 R Adm Badger Commander attack
Force) Brig Gen Clement Commander Landing Force) under which Clement is
COMGEN <?.shore until notified that he is relived by the officer you designatej
Para. With the answers to the :or~going I can meet any time table 1Nith
72 hours notice in adv:ance of earLi..est scheduled date of. ai:rborRe Je,.r;.ding.
j

4'Jq,

19 2113 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to M~\CARTHUR, 'NED~Th""'YER info NIMI'rZ, \f'IHEELER, SPAI,TZ
BRITISH JOINT ST11.FF MI.SSION.

WAllX 51776.
Concerning WA.."RX 51481, Niac.Arthur will arrange for the surrender of
HONGKONG to a British Commander as soon as the militartJ coordination with
the Generaliss~no on operational matters indicated by the President is
effected by the British. VIedemeyer will keep MacArthur informed of the
progress of these arrangements with the vi~v to expeditious action.
lS 2313 WAHCOS to CJJ!QAfPAC . Info H~ US}li7 BI, HQ USP..Ji'CT, CINCPOA ADVANCE.

VLARX 51397.
state Department requests you be informed that the President has now
decided that, in addition to representatives of the u.s., Great Britian,
China, and the Soviet Union, representatives of Australia, Canada, France,
Ne~tr Zealand and thy Netherlands will be invited to be present at. the
acceptance of the Japanese surrender. Reference is WARX .500~.3 . Communications have gone to those goverrunents asking them to name representatives
and to communicate, if possible, directly 1~ri th you on deta:ils, including
arrangements for attendance.
Para. State Department requests appropriate instructions be issued to
you to provide for the presence of these representatives . The foregoing
is for your info1~~tion and guidance.
19 0909 SUPREME COll:L~.ANDER FOR ALLIED POHER.S to CINCPAC 'illVANCE, COMGEN CHINA
( GSNERALISSDK)), GH'", .AUSTRALI.Al'J MILITARY FORCES {GENL BLA1.tiEY) :: CHIEF, U. s .
KILITARY MISSION, MOSCOW ,CIIJC SOVIET FORCES, F.AR EA.ST CG 29TH CORPS, CG
3TH AI1J,lY, -CG b~H:~~J~CSEA info WARCOS (~c's), CG 10TflA.R.l1Y: 24TH CORPS, USJ(S~~~
CG AF 'tll}~SPAC.

\J

X 2515 .

Herewith for information are official teA~s of 3 basic documents sover.ning general surrender of Japanese and Japanese controlled anned for ces which
are being handed by me to Japanese representatives at my headquarters 20
August 1945 for compliance as indicated. (A) proclamation by the Emperor
of JAPAN. n Accepting the terms set forth in declaration by the heads of
the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China on July 26
1945 at POTSDAM and subseQuently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Repuglics, I_have commanded the Japanese Imperial Government and the
Jauanese Imperial General Headquarters to sign on my behalf the instrument
of surrender presented by the Supreme Commander for the Ulied Powers and
to issue general orders to the militar.y ru1d naval forces in accordance with
the direction of the Supreme Commander for the j\J .lied Powers. I command
all my people fortmvith to cease host illties, to lay dcwm their arms and
faithfully to carry out all the provisions of the instrument of surrender
and the general orders issued by the Japanese J..rnper-lal General Headquarters
hereunder 11
Be II Instrument of surrenderu. We, acting by command of and on behalf
of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese C':10vernment and the Japanese I-mperial
General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions in the declaration issued
gy the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great
Britain 26 July 19l~5 at POT.SDAM, and subsequently adhered to by the Union
of the Soviet Socialist Republics, vrhich 4 powers are hereafter referred to

345 .5

as the Ulied Powers

- continued -

- continued V'i e hereby proclaim the unconditional .surrender to the .Allied Powers
of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese ._IU'med
Forces and all Armed Force~ under Japanese control wherever situated~
Para.. We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the
Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith, to pre~erve and save from
da.mage all sb.ips, aircrafts, and milita!"iJ and civil properly and to compl.y
vd th all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Comrr.ander for the
Allied Powers ~v by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.
Para We li19reby eommand the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to
issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japa.nese Forces and all forces
under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally than.selves and all forces under their control.
Para. We hereby comrna.nd all civil, military a.nd naval officials to
obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the
Supreme Cormnander for the Allied POW'er.s to be proper and to effectuate tbis
surrender and issued by him or under his authority and vre direct all such
officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their noncombatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or ooder his authority.
Para 6. vJe hereby undevtake for the Era.peror, the Japanese Government
and their successors to carry out the provisions of the POTSDAM declaration
in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be
required by the Supreme Commanders for the Allied Powers or by aey other
designated representatives of the Allied Povrers for the purpose of giving
effect to that declaration.
Para 7. lie ,._ereby command the Japanese Imperia~ Government and the
Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of 11Tar and civilian interne-e s now un~er Japanese control and to provide
for their protection, care, maintenance and immecli.ate transportation to
places as directed.
Pa.ra 8., . The authority of the Er..o.peror and the Japanese Government to
rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers who will taJ~e such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these
tBrms of surrender.
Para. Signed at blank at blank on the blank day of blank, 1945 Blank
by command in behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government.
Bla.nlf by comrn..md and in behalf of the Ja.panese Imperial General Headquarters.
Para. Accepted at, blank at blank on the blank day of b!arut 1945, for
the United States, Hepbulic of China, United Kingdom~ and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republica, and in the interest of the other United Nations at
war with Japan. Blank Sup:rem.e Comrnander for the Allied Powevs. Blank
United States repres~nta.tive. Blank Republic of China representative. Blank
Uni_ted Kingdom representative. Bla~lk Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
representativen .,
C. General orde!' nwn.ber 1, military and naval., trThe Imperial General
Headquarters by direct.ion of the Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender of
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese Armed Forces
by the Emperor, hereb7 orders all of it.s comman ders in Japan and abroad
to cause the Japanese Armed forces and Janc11ese controlled forces U..t'lder
cease hostilities at onc~;t to la.y down their arms, to rema.ir
their comraand
in their present locations and to snrrender Ul'lconditionally to comrnanders
acting on behalf of the United St ates, The Republic of China, the Un:tted
Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union 9f Soviet ' Socialist H.epublics
as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Co.mmandeJ
for the . Allied Povrers,. JJnmediate contact will be T!l.ade with the indicate
comrnanders, or their designated rerJresentati ves, subject to any changes i
Para~

to

- continued -

3456

- continued -

detail presceibed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their
instructions will be complet~ly and immediately carrier out (A) the Senior
.J apanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within
CHINA, _ (excluding M_lliCHUPJA)., F0~1M:OSA and FRENCH INOO-CHIRA nort}?. of 16-00
north shall surrender to Generalissimo CHIANG KAI-SHEK. (B) The Senior
_
Japanese col'Ilf!l8ilders and all ground, sea, and av..2dliar;J forces within
. M,c\I'TCHURIA, KOREA north of .38-00 north and KlffiAli'UTO shall surrender to the
Comraander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.
Para. (C) The senior Japanese comrCk"31lders and all ground, sea., air and
aux.i..lia.ry forces within the AND.AMANS, NICOBARS, BtJRMA, THAILAND, FRENCH
INDO-CHINA SOUTH of 16-00 north, 1L4LAYA, BORNEO, l\fETiiE:HL~NDS Il\TDT2S, Nl?liV'
GUINEA, BISlvL\RKS, and the SOLOMONS, shall stlri'ender (to the SUpreme Commander
South East ASia Cornn18.11d or the commanding gen.eral Australian Forces-the
exact breakdovvn bet'ween Mountbat ten and the Australians to be arranged
between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers. (D) The ~enior Japanese Commanders
all ground, sea, air and aw.i.lia.:ry forces in the Ja.pa.nese llfandated Islands,
RYUKYUS, BONIHS, and other Pacific islands shall surrender to the Corro.nander
in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Para. (E) To the Lmperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders,
and all ground, sea, air and amd..liary forces in the ma:in islands of JAPAN,
minor islands adjacent thereto, KOREA south of 38-00 north and the Philippines shall surrender to the Corruncwder in Chief, Ut).ited States Arnw Forces
in the Pacific.
Para. (F) The/ above indicated comrruanders are the only representatives
Povlfers empowered to accetp surrender, and all surrenders of
.
of the . Ulied
Japanese forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.
Para. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its
commanders in J APAIT and abroad to disarm completely all forces of JAPAN or
under Japanese control, wherever they may be situated, and to deliver intact
and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such tiLne and
at such places as may be prescribed by the .Allied comman(\ers indicated above.
Para. Pending further instructions, the Japanese police force in the
main isl8.nds of Japan V'Jill be exempt from this disarmament provlsion. The
police force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for
the preservation of law and order. The strength and anns of such a police

force will be prescribed~

Para 2. The Japanese Imperial Genera~ Headquarters ahall furnish to
the Supreme. Comrnander for the Allied Povrers, within (time limit) of receipt
of this order, complete information vr.ith respect to J/\.PAN and all areas

under Japanese control, as fq_Uows:

shOt~~Ting locations and
uni..ts
antiaircraft
and
land~
all
of
A. Lists
strengths in officers and men.
B Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and llivil, g..i.vlng complete
information as to the number, type, location 7 and condition of such aircraft.
c. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, surface
and submarine and/ auxiLiary naval craft in or out of com."nission and under
construction giving their position, condition and movement.
D., Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of
over 100 tons (Gross), in and out of commission and under construction, including merchant ships .onm.rly belonging to eny of the United Nations which .
are n01H in Japanese hands, giving their position, condition and movement.
E.., Complete and detailed in~ormation, accompanied by maps sho.l<ling
., locations a~d layouts of all mines, minefields, and other obstacles to

and

..... continued -

3457

- continued movement by land, sea or air, a nd t he safety lenes in connection trterennh.

F. Locations and descriptions of all mil:itar;y"'" installations and est.a.blishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, antiaircraft defenses, ports
and _naval bases, storage depot,s, perm.a.nent ~.nd ter!lport::try land and coast
,
forticiations; fortresses and other fortified areas.
G. Locations ' of all carnps and other Places of detention of United

Nations prisioners of war and civilian internees.

Para 34t' Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will
insure that all Japanese w.ilita!"'J, naval and civilian aircraft remain on
the ground, on the water, or aboard ship, until further notification of the
disposition to be made of them.
Para 4. Japru1ese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels of
all types will be maintained without damage and vvill undertake no movement
pending instructions from the Supreme Comma.nder for the 1Ulied Povfers .
Vessels at sea will immedia:cely render harmless and .throvv overboard explosives of all types. Vessels not a-t sea will immediately remove explosives
of all types to safe storage ashore.
Para 5. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled military and civil
authorities will insure that =
A. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by
land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to instructions
of the 6upreme Cornraander for the PJJied Powers.
B. All aids to navigation be reestablished at once.
c. All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pendin accorrL.;.ulishment of above.
ara 6. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and e ivi
authorities will. hold intact and i~ good condition pending further instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:
A. ..ill arms, awn.unition, explosives, rnilita~J equipment, stores and
supplies, and other imrement s of war of all kinds and all other war material
.
(except as specifically prescribed in section 4 of this order).
B. All land, vrater and air transportation and communication facilities
and equipment.
C. All military installati-ons and establishments, including airfields,
seaplane bases, antiaircraft defense, ports ruid naval bases, storage depots,
permanent abd temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other
fortified areas, together With plans a.nd drawings of all such fortifications
installations and establishments.
D. All factories, pl.a.n:ts, shops, res~arch instititions, laboratories,
testing stat~ons, technical data, patents, plans dra.vdngs and iriventions
designed or intended to produ.ce or to facilitate the productions or use of
all implements of war a.nd other material and property used by or intended
_
for use by military or part.
Para. Yilitary organization in connection with its operations.
Para 7. The Japanese Imperial Headquarters 1rd ll furnish to the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Pawers, within (time limit) of receipt of
this order; complete lists of all the items specified in paragraphs A, B,
and D of section 6 above, indicating the nu.rnbeis, typ es and ;:Locations of

each.

Para 8. The manufacttJ.re and distribution of all arms, amn:runition a_n.d

implements of war vrill cease forthwith.
- continued -

345R

.... continued -

19 lOL1,7

Para 9. With respect to United Nations prisoners , of war and civilian

internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-co ntrolled authorities :
A. The safety and Well-being of all Un:J.ted Nations prisoners of war
and civilian internees will be scrupulousl y preserved, to inc;:Lude the
administrat ive and $Upply service essential to provide adequate food, shelter
,
clothing, and medical care until such re~ponsibility is undertaken by the
Powers.
Allied
the
Supreme Commander for
B. Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners
of war~ and civilian internees together with its equipment, stores, recortls,
arms, and amnmn cion will be delivered immediately to the Command of the
senior officer or designated representat ive of the prisoners of war and
civilian internees.
c. As directed by the Supreme Comr.a...'Ulder for the Allied Powers, prisoners
of war and civilian internees 'i'rill be transported to places of safety where
they can be accepted by allied authorities .
D. The Japanese imperial General Hea.dquart.e:rs will furnish to the
Supreme Commander for :bhe Allied Powers, V\.r:ithin (time limit) of the receipt
of this order, complete lists of all United Nations prisoners of war'" and
civilian internees~ indicating ,their locations LTXIBXEA. P~l Japanese and
J apanese-con :brolled mil:i.tary and e i vil authorities shall aid and assist
the occupa.tion of Japan and Japanese controlled areas by forces of the
J!J.lied Powers.
Para 11. The Japanese Im.perlal General Headquarter s and appropriate
Japanese officials shall be prepared, on instruction s !rom Allied occupation
coroo~nders, to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of the
Ja9anese civilian population.
Para 12. This and all subsequent. instruction s issued by the Supreme
Commander for the JUlied Fortres of otu1.er iUlied rn_i..litary aut.horities will be
scrupulousl y and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japa.n~se-controlled military
and civil officials and private persons. "!llY delay or failure to comply
with bb,e provisions of this on subsequent orders, and any action which the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers deternunes to be detrimental to the
Allied Powers, w~iJ..l incur drastic and slurun.ary punishment at the hands of
Allied Military a.uthori ties and the Japanese Government.
SUPR~J;J\,JE COM.MANDRB. FOR THE !LLIEQ POV'iERS to ..llCDEA, __C-DC AUSrfRA).:J:lll:I }.ITLIT.A.tW
FORCEE; (DELIVER GEtxJElliili BL..~lJ?.Y IN MA.NILALinfo ~y~~cosQQl c:Il\TCPAC ADVANCE.

z 517.

It is anticipat,ed that the actual surxender in TOKYO vtill take place

11
2$ August.. Instruclf:'~ions received by this headquarle!' s direct that: The
forces
senior Japanese conmlaXlders and all ground, sea, air and aUY..ilia.ry
within the A.ND.ll"MANS, NICOB,.Jl'R.S, BUHM.;\,. THA.II.u\ND, FRJ!HCH INDO-CHINA south .of
16 degrees north latitude, MAL.A.YA, BORNEO, NETHERL:\.NDS INDIES, NEW GUINEA,
BISitt\.r1KS, and the SOIDMONS, shall surrender to the Supreme t~llied. Commander,
southeast ASIA corillnand or the Comnanding General, Australian Forces - the
exact breakdown bet1veen Mountaatten and the AustraJ.ia.ns to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Stl!!U'eme
Goltllt!8nder for the JUlied Powersrr~ '
Para, Action addressess are requested to arrange between them the
areas within which they vdll resrectively receive the surrender of Japanese
forces and advise at earliest.

3459

S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SEH

CINCPAC AND CINCPOA

INCOMING

~E

FlAlN

~RD!~~

AND NAVAL~ IS AMENDEI? A~ FR~LOW_ s; {Z627 }

SUBPARAGRAPH {C uF PART 1 AND \)UBol ~ TUTE THERF- f-P:1
FOLLOW ING 2 SUBPARAGRAPHS; 1ST SUBPARAGRAPH) "THE SENIOR

NUI:JBER

f i\Hi\~.,H APH :l
-~\E

ROUT~ ~JE

;;,..M1LITARV

DtLt. l t.

e oMMANDER AND ALL GROUNll

<JAPt~NESE

SEA

A~R

AND AUX f L ~ AR\' FORCES

PJiTH:r~ THr::: Ar1DAMA N8 NICOBARS BU~MA fHAlLAND~ FRENCH INDO- CH tNJ\

SOUTH OF ~1 6-Y.J r~ O RTA lATITUDE: MALAYA, SUMATHA~ JAVA . LESHER SUNl:& t~

.I

"

(INCLUDING BALI 1 LOMBOKA CERAM 1 AMBONA KAlA AROE, TA N~ MBAR, AND

!SLANDS ~ ~ THE RRAFURA ~EA CELEBES NAL~AMERAS AND DUTCH NE W
,;

.,

GUiNEAt~ SjAJ....L SURRENDER TO,THE SUPR~ME AlLIED c0Mr:iJ\NDERt AS ti A

COMM!H~D " X ~2ND SUBPARAGRAPH) ."THE SEN I OR JAPANESE COMMANDER AN.J)

ALL 3R0UND& oEA AIR AND AUXIl!ARYFORCES -WITHtN BOR NEO BR IT NEW

~t l i4i:ft~ 7, THE B I S~ARCf<S AND SOLOMONS j SHALL SURRENDER T0 fHE COtHJJA.f-;1;":' ~

~ N~(}H! EF COA 1-\lJSTRAL I AN MILt TA.RY FORCES~~ X PARAGHAPH 2 FROM SUBlr

JJ.CRYPTO-GROUP
\

Adm

t.~

I.

NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERV1

CINCPAC AND CINCPOA

(:' Af{:tGFL~Pl--.\ .D PAl1T :t DELETE nR. YUf\YUS" X PARAGRAPH :) IN SUBPARAGRi\PH

E PidtT ~L iNSEI1T HftYU~<YUSa THE PHRASE nAND THE PHILIPPINES" X ?i\ f-U\ GH /~ PF 4 i rJ SU 8 PAR f\ GH APH A 0F PAR T 2 I NS ERT n NAVAL AiJ D RPT !l H
f'.lC THE WORD 11 LAf'JDn X PARAGRAPH 5 IN PAHT 2 DELCTE THE :t4TH
Jffr) Hf[JflCE sn AND SUBSTITUTE l:1!Bf.C rrpoWERS"
ILLO~'J

J.

(ADD!T; OtJAL ADDEES FROrJ REJ~DDRESS)

fNFJ TO: COM7THFLT

COi,rl 5THFL T
COL1NORP /\C
GOM3flDFL T

(ORIGINATOR)

(DATE TIME GROUP)

Pf A!N

(CLASSIFICATION)

(PAGE)

3461

19 1615 SUPREME COM1A1UIDER fPR Till:!~ iU..LIED P01;JERS_ to CINCl~AC ifDV ~ CONIGENCHINA USASTAF
~Q..~NESPAC, JCS, C,_GlOTHI\.HMY, OOC AUSTRALii~JJ MILlTARY FORCES ( GE~fEHAL BLl\VlEY)
GHIEl<' US MILITll.:tY MISSTON MOSCOW ( CINQ. SOVlgf FOHGES .F !ill EAST .info GG
~ORPS, CG 6TH ARl\TY,. SACSEA,, WAil:COS (JC,S)

e-m-

X 2520.

My Z-515, da~e.time group 190909 GCT, (Z 520) paragraph n(c)n, General

Order number 1 m.l.l~tary and naval n, sub-paragraph (B) is hereby arn.anded to
read 11 'f.a? S?nior Japanese_ Co~anders and all ground, sea, air and au.x_i_lia.ry
forces WJ...thJ.n MANCHtJRIA; KORJ:i.;.~.. north of 38-00 north latitude KA.RtU~'UTO
and the KURILE ISLJ~J<IDS' shall surrender to the Commander in Chlef of soviet
Forces in the Far East n. Reference 1Jt!a.shin-gton Radiogram WX 51396 (not to
all nor needed).
20

2137

JOINT CHIEFS O:t STAFF. to DEANE info NTIITZ, HACAliTHUR, SPA..i\TZ.

WARX 52004.

The follovring with .reference to your M 25339 is for your information.

Para. Ther~ will be a large number of u. s. aircraft operating over
and i..YJ:to J 1\PAN, particulax'ly in the next months. These include the occupational air forces, transport runs into and from JJ'~. .Piu'T and KOREA, and naval
air operations. A transport route from the 1U..~EUTIANS probably VJ"ill be
inaugurated. U. s. Naval and merchant vessels will operate throughout the
north Pacific and the SEA OF J .AEA.N. The requirement for the best possible
weather service over JAPAN and adjacent areas in the .north Pacific 1rill
therefore be intensified as a result of the Japanese capitulation and the
weather centrals will be needed.

Para. As for the liaison groups, it is recognized that "some means

of liaison will be necessar.y to handle the details of post hostilities
problems you mention. However, the great bul."k of these vr.i.ll concern the
coordination of movement of ships and aircraft into a port or areas irr~edi-
ately adjacen-t, to a port. It is considered that this liaison can most
expeditiously be handled by a liaison group aboard ship, 1~rhich will permit
the liaison group to be present on the spot required and not be immobilized
at a place where it may not be needed. In this connection it is believed
that the great bull< of the new problems which will arise as the resut.t of
the Japanese capitulation -vdll, on the soviet side, require resolution in
M.OSCOW rather than by commanders in the field.
Para. Since the Soviets have alre~dy been infonned of the decision on
this matter and the weather personnel a,nd equipment is now en route, it is
considered no action should be taken to justify this decision to the Sovi~ts
at tfuis time unle~s they raise the question.,

21 0813 CINCPAC ADV.lU~CE to COMINCH info CINCfo~PAC, COMGEN CHINA, COl\((THFLT.

A conference took place at Manila 19 August between representatives

CINCPAC, COM7THFLT and COflGEl'J CHINA. The follovring concept of operations
was concurred in by COM711iFLT, by COMGE!~CHINA.' S representative and by the
headquarters of CINCA.FPAC on the staff level. It is recommended for
approf"al aB the basis for intetim operations and for ftuther planning.
TP..is constitutes my com.ment on COMGENCHINA 1 S CFBX

50181.

- continued -

4740

CFBX

4906

and JCS

3462

AUGUST ( G<IT)

continued -

21 0818 CINCPAC ADVJll 'JCE to COM:INCH ~o C IN9,.AF:AC~ COMGENCHI NA, COMJTHFI,T (Cont '_d)

Para. It a:ppear.s t hat 30 September is the ear]j,_~st realistic p;Lanning

date for landing marines on CHI !'\TA COAST without undue interference ~rl.th
occupat i on J APAN and KOREli ..
Para. Concept of operations:
A.
Establish north CHINA naval force under COk'7THFLT in SH.AN'TUNGCHINNANGTAO area as soon as possible to consi st of 2 battle cruisers,. 4
heavy cruisers, l CarDiv and accoMp~ing destroyers. This torce would
control YEL~W SEA and GULF OF CHIHLI and also support occupation of KOP~A.
B.
Establish YiiNGTSE patrol U..'rlder COM7THFL'r with 2 light cruisers
_destroyers and sr0.all types as CHINA THEATER forces reach Y.f.U\JGTSE and status
of minesweping permits.
C.
Establish south CHINA patnol under C0ful7THFLT vdth gunboats and
destroyers escorts as soon as CHINA THEATER forces take a port . Troops
available are the 3rd Phib Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops, the lst
MarDiv and the 6th 1KarDiv less l regiment. In vievf of prospect demobilization requirements it is not advisable to commit the l+th MarDiv which
would make a total of 6 lt[arine Divisions :in J APAN and CHDJ.A. CINCAFP.\CS
representative indicated that. a MarDiv from the 5th PhibCorps could be
released from J :'l Pl.IJ'J when relieved in October by the S6th or 87th Inf Div.
This 1farDiv could reinforce the 3rd PhibCorps.
Para. Inf-o rmation from. COMGENCHINA indicates that unless unfavorable
developments occur divisions of the Chinese combat corrrrnsnd controlled by
American officers vri.ll 'IY.r late September be in control of SHJ.J\iGHAI, NANKING
and CA.I\fTO.N and that no other troops vd.ll be needed in SHANGHAI to make
naval operatio~s feasible in the YANGTSE RIVM.:R.
D.
Operate temp~rari~ in 7th F~aet ap oroximate~ 72 landing craft
infantry for use as coastal and river transport and gunboats ..
E..
Divert supplies intended previously for FORT BAYARD to such
port as COMGEIJCHI NA may designate. 7/e~TS/N 7-AkO a.u.d/~
F.
P repare for occup ation ~HINGH.i1.NGTAO a.nd TSI NGTAO or, alternately
1 when forc es are ready, occupation of
if C1i_;rrL,RIU..t CHI NAsituation required,
SHANGH..t\I area.
to SACSEA GOC AUSTRP1.LIJ~T MTLITA3.Y
CI NAP.ltC )\DVtl}JC~~ HQ.

z 534.

Refe r enc e i s made to 111y Z5l? of 19 August.

voi ded and the f ol1ovvi ng sub sti tuted theref or:

Desire t hat mes sa ge be

11 I t i s ant :t cipated that
t he actual surrender i n TOKYO i~ ll t ake place 31 August~t. Instructi ons
recei v ed by this he adquarters direct t hat: uThe s enior Japanese commanders
and all ground, s ea, air and au..:"ti.liary forces v<Jit hi n the lti'<TDANL'\NS, NICOBlL'qS
BUB1'11A, THJ,~LAHD , Ft'b~ITCH JJrOO- CHINA, sourrH OF 16-00 north, MAJ..~AYA, BOi1.NEO,
I{:.trfHEPJ.,ANDS INDIES, NE'J!J GUINEA, BISMARCKS, And the SOIDMONS, shall surre..tuie:x
to t he Suprer11e tllied Cort.ltl1ander, southeast ASIA corill1l:Cmd, and t o t he Com
manding General, Australian Forces, as. latel" desi gnat ed''
Action addressees are requested to arrane;e betwe en themselv es t he area s
within wttic h they will respectively receive the surrender of Japanese
for ces and advise this headquar~ers at earliest .

3463

21 0517

CINC.AFPAC to COM3HDFLT Ini'o C__GBTH ..lffi1'11Y, CTI\JGPAC iillV Hq, CG FE.4F 2 CG liTH

AIRBOHNE

CX 35347.

190219.

From CG Sth Army to Com3rdFlt.

In vievr of the fact

Heference your radio dispatched

that HAYA.tVJ.!, ZUSHI and KPJ.!IAKURA have been

ss.lected as the headquarters area of the Supreme Allied Cormnander, and

advice given the Japanese emrnissaries that the initial landings would be
in restricted areas, it is considered advisable to put into effect the
general provision of your Plan 2, nth not to exceed vmat is normally
considered to be a regimental combat team, of 3 battalions of infant~J
and 1 b~ttalion of supporting artillery, initial~. Additional troops
to be landed as required.. Landing force as limited o,bove is acceptable.
Brigadier General Clement will report by radio upon my assumption of command about 1200 I (-9) 28 August. His force wiLl land in the vlcinity
of YOKOSUKA and occupy the general area: URAGA-KUBIHI-FUNAKOSHI-YOKOSUKA,
all inclusive. Commanding General lith Airborne Division is charged with
coordinatj_on of boundaries. .~i.rfield for lith ~rborne and H Hour will
be designated by SCAP. Employm.ent of elements of the 3rd Fleet air and
naval gunfire support nill be arranged directly vrith eomrnand_ing General
11th . ,. i_rborne Di v:i.sion at OKINA\'TA. Recommend liaison officers be dispatched by air to Headquarters lhlth Airborne Divisi n to coordinate
details. Essential ')ersonnel to furnish comnrunications to be supplied
by AFPAC Jasco unit at OKINA"CJA. The emissaries were directed to have the
area evacuated of Japanese troops but we must be alert to guard against
surprise.

21 0755
CFBX 5409 Your to;_Jsec radio ~ 515 assigning areas of r esponsibility for accepting surrenG.er Ja;A.qnese omitted ~reference to the
PESC!illORES IJ . .:'UfDS. ~Ye are assuming that subject area is including in
CHil,:A Theater's a:rea of responsibility mn absence of instructions to the
contrary.
TOP SECHET.

22 0915

CINCAFPAC to COMGEN

CIITI~A

info CINCPAC lillV Hq

TOP SECR ~T. 35704.

Your CFB 5250 dated 20th and CFBX 4906. dated 17th
are references. This heaC:o.uarters has made no estimate of nor received
requests for United . tates -Imny service troops in support of the : ':arine
fo~ces indiacted by CIECPAC a s available for CI-r'~ NA coast operations, other
thal'l those previously alloca.ted for the FOHT BAYARD operation.
1vailabilit;y
can be determ.ined only after complete requirement is knovvn. Generally
S )eaking mar1.y types of service units are now short of requirements for
occuoation &tiPAN and KOI-?EA and qup.Jorting bases. ITo understood is requirement for air forces. Rq;:LEAGER indicates e.vailc.bility of ~ rarine aircraft
vling.. Port oersonne l provided by CINCAFPAC for F01{t: BAYARD project are
novlf"loadm:tig and will proceed in accordance "cvith CINCPA.C instrucVi.ons ..
1

Pare.. For CI!'TCP ~,c on~y, CGT 1GENCHIN.1 CFB 5250 dated 20th is being repeated
to you for infor.rnation :~n accordance -vrit h this dj_spatch.
21 1220

COMGE.N CEI!\!A to .'~JA?COb Info CINC_\17 PAq 1 CINCPOA , COYTGErlp3rr, COJ GENAAACHTIIA,
COJ'G~osCl{IEA , COh{G'1~NCQ9.9Jt)JJA
TOP

S~illi'l,.

CFBX 5404

.?~PW~fJ~~!'Yr AT'~VJDS

of CHI11A Theater, General

Carawa~r

3464

.__,
AUGUST ( GCT)

),

21 1220

(continued)
and Captain Paint.er, USN proceeded to MANIU~, 18 August nursuru.1.t to a
m~ssage requesting conferences among representatives of CINCPAC, CINCAFPAC,
and CONfGENCHINA Message CX 34316 refers. Discussions dealt with availability of occupG.tion forces for CHINA and vrith problems of logistic support and personnel lift. The foD_ovdng subjects were discussed on a
planning level only and agreements reached on tr12.t level as indicated
below:

Para A. The gu~stion of priorities for o9cupational forces. It was

agreed that the lst priority m:ust remain JAPAN and TCOR.EA. It was
tentatively indicated that forces would :'Jrobably be moved into key pomnts
on CHirTA coast after 10 divisions had reached JAPAN and 2 divisons had
been put a.Br1ore in KOREA lst 2 divisions therefore could J.and in CHINA
approximately 30 Sept ember.

Para B. Naval assistance for CHINA.. Preliminary examination and planning

are under ~,r9-y covering Qperations of 7th Fleet under Adrniral Kinkaid to
support CHINA Theater forces and to control coastal waters. As presently
planned 3 naval forces would be established to include: A SOUTH CHINA
Naval Force basing general in the C.!UlTON area; A NORTH CHINA Task Force
in TSINGTAO-CI-LEFCO-CHIN~V'li.NGTA area, and . a Y.l\.NGTZE patrol for operations
in the YANGTZE. The not firm and is subject to approval by CLTIJCAFFAC,
CONGENCHIN"A and CHO; \IASHINGTON.
Para C. United States forces for occupation il"l ney areas on CHINA .Q~.
As previously agreed bet-ween CINCPAC, CINC.AF'PAC and COI-,IGEHCHINA Lr
Marine divisions (less 1 regimentatieomisq team) ~.rill be available for
occupation of key points on the Chinese coast wit!! a possibili.. ty of
later getting a 3rd Marine division if it can be replaced by 1 of the
US \l"'rrrJ divisons present~ly enroute from United States

Far a D. ~urnishing of tran!Jportation f9.r. movement of Chinese forces to

key occuoationa.l areas. As previously agreed 11Xf.'t for 2 Uarine di vi. sons
initially allotted to the occupation of CHTI~JA Theater areas can be turned
over to CHII.lA. Theater for movement of forces thereafter (about 15 October).
In addition, an exploratory eY..amination is being undertaken to determine
\lrhether aporoximately 50 la.nc.ti.ng craft infantry can be furnished for uae .
in moving the Chinese troops along the '1 est, Y 'l.NG'fZE and .BLE Rivers/Ivgr
coastal movement. CINCPAC has stated that this type craft is not suitable
for large scale movement of US forces into JAPAN and KOI1EA.
Para E.. Convoy to open port and fur:nish sup;Jlies t:o .cHINA. It was agreed
that the convoy of the -lst 5 ships plus the additional equipment and
. personnel furnished by CINCP ~C and CINCAFPAC would be rnn into the SHANGHAI
NANKING iffiEA as soon as SHANGHAI and NANKING are secured (estimated about
15 Se}Jtember) It was further agreed that the 1st convoy could go into
].\TANKING if necessa,ry to facilitate distibution of gasoline and other
critical supplies,.. Thereafter the ::nain port would be established at
SHJU\]'GHAI. ~rhe lOVirer YfiJJGTZE must be swept YFC mines prior to the bringing
of the convoy into CHINA.
Para F. EYacuation of U,.S. and Allied Personnel Liberated in ASI G.. Dis-cussion on staff level in CINCi1.FP!~C indicates that shipping could possibly
be made available by the IOXBKPHHE recovered personnel could be assembled

- continued -

3465

continue d and transpo rted to a port area and meanwhi le cn~JCPAC is exa.I11J..nJ..ng the
availab ility of evacuati on and hospita l ships and Nl{fS aircraft for rapid
movement of recovere d personn el to OKIN.A.1rV.A or the M.ARIJ\.N.AS for processL n.g
and necessa ry hospita lization prior to their being placed in the norm.:tl
evacuati on pipeling via the Pacific, the United States.
Para G. Japanese disarmed and civilian Eersonn el in CHIN A. Prel:i.nl.inary
discussi ons t-'rere held with represe ntatives of CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC on
prioriti es for evacuati on of Japanese disarmed personn el from CHII\fA to the
Japanese main islands and it was agreed that earJ,y evacuati on of all
Japanese rnilitary and civilian ,person nel from CHI~JA was mandato ry to
prevent serious w...rest in CHil\TA a..nd the possibi lity of large groups of
Japanese becorrdng establis hed in Chinese Comml.Ultes.
Para. Informa tion rdll be furnishe d Cif,JCAFPAC when firm request for
naval assistan ce are forvrarde d through ~far Departm ent for processi ng as
per instruct ions in WAil<\ 51172. IJ.'hat is all.

ER
21 2230 JOINT CHIEFS 01<" STfoJi'F TO MACARfHUR info J\TJl!ITZ, WHEELER, SPA..4.TZ, TNEDEJ!JkEY
WA11X 52674. United States Pol..i.cy Reurad C 34637 follows:
Para. HThe 4 Allied Powers are bound by the POTSD"~~ ultimatu m to
permit the ret,urn of Japanese military forces, afte~rthey are complet ely
disa:rrned , to their homes. Pending such return, which of necessit y depends
on the availab ility of transpo rtation, this personn el may be used for such
purpose s and subject .to such conditio ns and directiv es as may be prescrib ed
BHPXYE nationa l Commanders authoriz ed to receive he surrende r. Surrend er
Jaoanese soldiers should be consider ed as disarmed persorul el and not necesa
rily as prisone rs of' war.
Para.. Until the JapaJ1es e .lu-med Forces are secured., discussi on and
commitm ents concerni ng treatmen t of Japanese disro'"med forces during the
period between their surrende r and their return to their homes should be
held to the essenti al rninimu. . u
Para. Desire you inform 1tountba tten of above suggesti ng that he ney
vt.ish to ado}Jt a sirnilar noJJ_cy referenc e the STL F this personn el.

21 .2327 COM3RDFLT to CTn 30..J.::, CTG ;;o.2t C:CG 20.9, 30t.5, 2Q.~....t5::l..Jld~F 31
25 2 27 :t 38, . COHl~q.Arl.TA~I'\':fOR, _Q.Q}QPI-IJ.B info COIJGJ~N20TEAIRF'~AlCJ:i~, COl~I\,.IRPAC

SUBCOlfF'<'D, COl.fSERVPAC, CONIINCT:T, CINCBPF, . COM5THFLT, COMSUBPAC, CON))l;'ffiGIL,S,

crrG 94.1,. _CTF 95, CTG 95.~9, c~~F 99, COMSERON 10, SOP s:~RON 10 ULITIII,
, COMCOMPHIB.SP~Lc, 3HDFLT, COJ.~GEii8THARMY, CINCP '~G BO~rH H'": ' _COEGEN US..-..S.T.AF
...
ADVON
AF
COFHENFE
EAF,
COr.lQ-ElTr
AC,
,Cf:NC.~~P
LT,
COll>?THF
1.fh.
~~ARI .~.NAS, C011AI"1P1

v
/

Here is COM3RDFIEET OpPlan 11-45.

A. Task Group 30.tl Fleet Flagship Group Captain Murrey.
B.~: Task Group 30.2 British Biagship Group Captain Nicholl .
C. Task Group 30.5 Air Search and reconn. Group Captain GrD.nt.
D. Task Group 30.6 Allied P01N rescue group Commodore Simpson. ,
E.. . Task Group 30.8 Logistic Support Group RAdm Beary.
F. Task Group 30.9 ENI\ ~ ETOK service group Commodore Acuff.
G. Task Force 31 YOKOSUKA occupati on force RAdm Badger.
H. Task Force 32 31"d Amphibiou s Force VAdm Vfmlkinso n ...
H Sub 1 and H Sub 2 Task Forces 33 and 34 respecti vely con:mlal"lders
a:nd forces as ass.i gned by CTF 32.
H Stili 3 ann Task Force 36 landing forceJvfa jor General (as specifie

ed for each landing) -

- continue d -

3466

continu ed -

I . Task Force 35 suppor t force RAdm Jones.,

J . Task Force 37 British Suppor t force VAdm Rawling s RN .
d by
K. Task Force 3S 2nd Carrie r Task Force VAdm McCain until relive
VAdm Towers.
1. Task Force 39 lst Carrie r Task Force VAdm Sherman .
and 36 as
UP~ts for all groups and forces less task forces, 33, 34
Units assig.
h
dispatc
by
cation
modifi
latex'
to
t.
subjec
d
curren tly assigne
ned Task Forces 3), 34 arrl 36 as directe d by CTF 32.
Para. Japan ~s surrend ered. Inforna tion of TOKYO BAY A..ttEA and enemy
forces b~r mail and separa te disr:a tch . Army forces have seized ATSUGI
airfiel d and CINCitFPAC Advanc e Headqu arters are establi shed there . CTF
are
31 forces hold YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE and airfiel dq and 3rel Fleet forces
ing
dispose d in the TOKYO BAY- SAGAMI WAN lUIE:-A. 3rd Fleet Air is patroll
by our
HONSHU and the TOKYO B/<.Y &rcEA. KANOYA airfiel d KYUSHU is held
OpPlan 12-45
CINCP~~
occrrpa tion forces . TI1is OpPle.n st~ns from CINCPAC M~D
ions
operat
which
and covers landing of Sth Arn:zy- units in TOI\.'YO BAY ~tEA
coinci-d e with executi on of CINCJl.L'?PAC B-20 operati en.
Para . This Fleet, while continu ing mission s assigne d in my OpPlan
ns as arrange d
.Ef1ill 45, vdll la.nd 4nd firmly establi sh ashore at locatioand
assist the ft..:t'nzy"
Army
with CThiCAFPAC designa ted elemen ts of the 8th u.s.
ry, polirnilita.
e
exercis
in enforci ng surrend er terms in order to gain and
.
tical and econow ic contro l of the Japane se Rmpire

Para. Task .Groups 30 . 1, 30.2, 3o.5, 3016, 30. 8 and 30 . 9 Task Forces
ing
31" 35, 37, 3S continu e mission s assigne d by rny OpPlan 10- 45 . Follow
8
.
30
Group
Task
E
ed.
additio nal nrission s herevd th assigne d as indicat
BAY
provide logisti c suppor t for 3rd Amphib ious Forces at sea and in T0~0
Forces
ious
.Arn.phib
3rd
t
AREA . G, I , J Task Forces , 31, 35, and 37 sUDpor

and
as specifi ed in Annex B this OpPlan . H Task Force .32 T-ransp ort, land
elel'.REA
B/lY
TOKYO
the
of
s
establi sh firmly ashore in designa ted section
t
ments of the U,. S. 8th Army.. K, L Task Forces 38, 39 cover a.Dd suppor
,
OpPlan.
this
D
3rd Amphib ious Forces as specifi ed in At~..nex
SubPara Xl SubPar s Xl and X3 nw Opplan 19- 45 apply.
X2 3rdPhib will land lith Corps headqu arters, 1st cavalry
Div and 112 RCY OIBR DL KSGT YOKOHAiviA and YOKOSUKA about
31 August, knerica n r!iv- over beaches at SAGAMI KAWA- E:No .
SHJ]!IA about 6 Septera. ber and 43rd Div over YOKOH.~JiA~
YOI\OSUf>..A docks 13 Septem ber. iul dates subjec t to later
delay.
X 3 Annexes A E G H ~ and J my opla.n l0-L~5 apply to this plan.
X4 Annex B specia l instruc tions to Task Forces .Annex D air
plan 1~riJ~ be is.sued by separa te dispatc h.
X5 This plan will be placed in effect by dispa:t. ch.
.
Para.. Logist ics in acco:rd ance logisti cs plan Annex ~ nw opla...fl 10-lJ:.5
and
32
CTF
vlit~
10-45
oplEn
my
F
Para. Conun.aJl.d locatio ns as in annex
F'orce
CTF 39 added as It:ajor subord inate commands. Cor'&na.nder 3:rd Arnphibiotis
io .s
Operat
lous
Am"?hi1Y
the
of
cornrnand
in
is
or his delega ted group conlJnander
of
command
time:;
which
at
ashore
shed
until the landing force is establi
in
forces ashore passes to the landing force cor.arnan der . Commu nication s
1-45.
Oplan
my
H
Annex
and
12-45
OpPlan
accorda nce with Pac 70-B CINCPAC
Comrna..nder 3rd Fleet in l:ITSSOURI in TOKYO B\Y a

- continu ed ...

3461

AUGUST ( GCT)

24 0120

CINCPAC ADV HQ to CQM3RDFLT

Your 2ll415 desire anchorages be assigned to ships concerned as follows

unless there are compill.ing reasom to contra.I7. F 68 ICING GEORGE 5TH
F 69 DUKE OF YORK F 70 SOUTH DAKOTA F 71 MISSOORI F 72 IWO F 85

ANCON F 86 TETON. Other ships in anchorage F as desired avoiding

assignment in battleship column to an:y types except battleships. Advise.

24 0156

CD1CPAC ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC, CCH3RDLFT Info OOMINCH, CTF

COM7THFLT

38, CTF 39,

Nominate a carrier division consisting of 2 CV and 1 CVL for temporary

duty in 7th Fleet.
25 Ol45

CINCf!AC ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC. C01QRDFLT Info C9MINCH, CTF

COM 7th FLT, COMOARDIV-2

.3 8, OTF 39,

240156. Since BasiLe Post War Plan contemplates maintenance 1 carrier

division in Asiat.ic waters, duty may be of considerable duration.- It
is my present intention that division be conrnanded by Rear Admiral A C
Davis Com.CarDiv 5 with ships best prepared for extended service

l(r

24 lSll

CINCAFPAC to \YARCOS info CINCPAC ADVANCE, OOMGENCHINA.

ex 86421.

COMGENCHINA CFBX 5404 da.ted 21, CINCPAC 2l.OS1S to COMINCH and JD3' CX
33830 dated 15th are references. This radiogram answer .WX 50 one 81,
19th and \VX 53744, 24th.

Para. The guiding consideration in the utilization ot resources,

part;icularly ot amphibious shipping, for occupation operations along the
CHINA OOAS'l' mnst be that 1st priority is given to the occupation ot JAPAN
to the fullest extent of the resources required. KOREA has 2md priority.
It !! possibl.e that after the occupation starts a delay mq be permissible
atter the 1st Phase movEments, however, the present time planning should
be firm on sending the 2nd phase d.ivision,s with the possible exception ot
1 division 1n KOREA, which would give a total of J.6 divisions in JAPAN a.nd
2 in KOREA with a possibl.e availability of 1 division for another location
as indicated in my CX 338.30. CDICPAC representatives indicated that the
heavy availability of amphibious shipping by the 3oth of Sept,ember would
practic~ eliminate a.ey .problem ot priority since at that time there woul
be a 14 division lift available. On this basis and within the limitation
indicated in the lst paragraph the concern ot CINCAFPAC in his 21.0818 is
general:cy- concurred in.
Para. Since conference with representatives ot CINCPAC and COMGBNCHmA
information has been received that DARIE}l is now occupied by Russians. It
therefore appears that the marine contingent specified in CINCPAC 210818
would be a sufficient part#icipation of u.s. troops along the CHINA COAST.
CINCAFPAC agrees to the relief' otll Div of the 5thPhibCorps from JAPAN
about October 1. It will be replaced by l on the Philippine divisions it
practicable or by l being redeplqyed.
Para. The agreement indicated in para A of CFBX 5404 is believed to
interrupt the deployment into JAPAN to give priority to a movement into
CHINA untill5 phase 1 Divisions have been placed in JAPAN.

- continued-

3361

...

- continued -

24 1511 CINC.AFPAC to WARCOS into CINCPAC @VANCE, OOMGENCHINA ( Cont d)

Para. Regarding repatriation of J apa.nese to the main islands of

JAPAN, rate of increase and quGta allocations to all commanders JJlUq(;
necessari~ be determined by this ~_eadqua.rliers in the light or the
overall situation in the Far East existent at the time involved.
25 0608 SUPREME COJD!ANDER .FOR THE
COMGEN FEAF COMGm 8TH ARMY

CHINA PASS TO GENERALISSDIO

CG TH ARMY CG lOTH ARMY
CH.AMKETS COUGm XXIV CORPS, OOHPHIBSPAC, COM5THFL'l',
MILFORES, CG AFWESPAC, WARCOS.

PASS TO GEN

ex 36535.

Refer li13' Z529 too 210343, Z 531 too 210401, Z 532 too 210425 am CX
3565 too 220645 stating requirements SUpreme Commander for the Allied

Porrers for acceptiDg surrender of JAPAN. Due to typhoRic cenditions alJ.

dates specified herein for operations on the 26 Auguat and thereafter are
postponed 48 hours. New Schedule: Movements of advance party by air and
prel.imi.na.ry naval movements on 28th; air movements in force and nafil.
landings on .30th; SUrrender ceremony- on 2nd September; advance part;y
landing KANOYA .3rd September; landing in force KANOYA 4th September.

25 0907 CINCP.AC ADV to COl{[NCH. into 0mCAFPAC, CnJCPAC PEARL. COMGENPOA, OOMGmUBASTAF.

.c;.

In view of the tennination of 'the war with JAPAN,

ear~

demobilization

or Armed Forces ani prospective post war developnents of advanced bases

in the Pacific Area it is recmmended that JCS directive 823/5 dated 7
Octoier 1944 be revised and all logistic support for the strategic air
forces be made a responsibility of appropriate Arnr:3' agency.

25 ll.Ol CINCSWPA _to CINCPAC

APV

info WARQOS, COllZTHFLT.

ex .36614.

Coneur in proposal for the transfer of responsibill.ti senior naval

officer Southwest Pacific Area contained in COlllTHFLT 180140. Com Allied
Naval Forces will terminate when Southern command area. is transferred to
British now scheduled for 2 September 45. This answers your 22CI'/03.

25 1505 CmCAFPAC to CINCPAC/POA ADVANCE.

The rate and timing of repatriating Ja}Bnese from. any area. must of
necessity be determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
( z 572) since determination will be govemed. by conditions en sting in
JAPAN after occupation thereof the urgency or Japanese repatriation from
WAKE and MARCUS as incicated your 2.32217Z (GGT) must be govermd according:cy-. In artS' case it is deemed inadvisable to :initiate repatriation action

prior to .3 September.

AUGUST ( GCT)

3362

25 1457 THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS to mRDFLT (HALSEY) into
CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

ex .36686.

Reference your 240219Z ( GCT) it is not believed advisable for .3rdFlt

to undertake any unil.ateral action re assistanQe and evacuation of prison
ers of War TOKYO BAY AREA. Action being taken by this headquarters to
eff'eet coordination in this matter.

m into OINCPAC ADV. ACNB LAHD FORCE HQ MELBOURNE. APV

LAND FORCE HQ MORATAI, GOC 1ST AUSTRALIAN ARMY LCE, NOIC NmV GUINEA., NOIC
DARWIN, NOIC SYDNEY, RAFT RAD, GLORY, HART, SBNO 14ANUS, KANANG, CEF, FONA.P

2S 0210 CINCBW to CTF

,

ADMTI VA(Q).

At request of ACNB following forces have been allocated to cooperate

with Arlq Forces under direction of GOC 1~ Australian Arlq Group for tald.Dg
surrender ot RABAUL.
Para. Subject to conf'irmation of requirauent and to no unforseen
commitments the same force will be available for OCEAN and NAURU.
Para. lffective immediate:cy-, TG lll.S composed of GLORY, CAPlAIN
A.W. BUZZARD CTG, and 2 sloops selected from HART, ERNE, BLACK SWAN,
AMETHYST.

Para. HART report ships selected and. na.me of senior officer to CINC
info other addressees of this signal.
25 062S CTG lll.2 to CINC:ePF info CTF ll2, CTF ll.l. SACSEA, CINC EI. CINCPAO ADV
ADMIRALTY, JSM, SUPRFliE COMIB ALLIED PCWERS, GENERAL GAIRDNER, CTG m.3

erG lll.lt.

Intend to sail 'l'G lll.2 to arrive off HONGKONG daylight 28 August.

2. Endeavor 1fil1 be made to bri.Dg Japanese Naval. and Uilita17 repres~
tatives on board on 29 August and to enter HONGKONG barbour as soon as
arrangements have been made to preserve law and order.
3. Final surrender to take place on lst September subject to the surrender to the SUprane Conmander having been effected.
4. Intend Task Group Follows minesweepers into harbour whilst carriere

1.

provide air cover.

26 0901 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COll7THFLT

Your 250229. Contemplate use of ship with her Japmese crew and u.s.
Prize crew. Do not desire recondition her. Can she make trip to WAKE or
MARCUS and carey tall load passengers from there to JAPAN.
26 JA09 SCAP to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.
CREGO 10016.
Treaty terms provide tor disarming eJ181V forces yao.r 252202. This si
construed to include swords, pistols, dirks and so forth ot Japanese Offic
rs and men. At surrender ceremonies it is the policy to require Japanese
Officers to attend without arms thus avoiding the tender of these weapons
from the vanquished to the victors but as weapons they should form a
component part of the disarmament program.
AUGUST ( GCT)

33 63

'lllltP

26 Olll SOAP to .CG 10TH ARMY. CG USASTAF, US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW& WAR DEPT1
CG AFWESPAC, JAPANESE IMPERIAL GENERAL HEAOOUARTERS info CG -TH ARMY,
00 8TH ABllY, CG FEAF SOVIET HIGH COMMAND.
I

In carrying out the provisions ot paragraph 1, subpara (E), ttGeneral

Order Nwnber l., Military and Naval 11 , advance copy of which was handed your
representative in MANILA 20 August l.945, it is desired that seniro Japanese
Commanders and all ground, sea, air, and anxjl iary forces in certain areas
to~ surrender to designated representatives of the Commander in Chief,
United states ~ Forces, Pacific, subseque~ to General surrender of
Japanese Ar.med Forces at TOKYO, as follows:
A. In the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, to the Commanding General, United states
~ Forces Western Pacific, whose headqu.arters are at MANILA, at a time
and place designated by him. ( z-585).
B. In the RitJKYUS, to the Commanding General, Tenth United states
~, whose headquarter are at OKINAWA, at a time and place designated by
him.
c. In KOREA, south of ,3S..OO north latitude, to the Coumanding General
United states A.rtrrr Forces in KOREA (CoDIDanding General 24th United states
Corps), whose headqua.rters are at OKINAWA, soon move to KOREA, at a time
and place designated by him.
It is desired that the senior Japanese Commander in each of the above
areas make contact with the above dwsignated co.umander concerned by the
most expeditious means for preliminary instructions providing tor accompllsll
ment ot such surrenders on or im.ediate:cy- after 2 September 194.5.

26 04.34 CHIEF
Memo

SI~AL ~FFICER

GHQ AFPAC to CINCPAC ADV A'rl'N OOlllOOORE STONE.

994.

Represmative ot GHQ AFPAC (Lieutenant Colonel H. H. Schenck) will

board USS MISSOURI in TOKIO BAY to install and operate VHF radio telephone
and telegraPh equipnent and message center for CINCA.FPAC. Request name
of officer aboard I!SSOURI that Colonel Schenck should contact.

26 2008 WiRCOS to CDICAFPAC into USASTAF, CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

WARX

55352.

Designation of COMGEN lOTH ABllY to act !or CINCAFPAC in receipt ot

surrender in RYUKYUS per your ex ,36856 is not understood here in view
ot the provisions of paragraph 1 D, General Order Number 1, transmitted
to you in WARX 4996l. ot l.5 August and quoa.ted in your Z515 which direct
Japanese in RYUKIUS to surrender to CINCPAC. Advise.

AUGUST ( GCT)

33 64

25 1555

COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COM 12 & 13. CINCPAC PEARL HQ,
COMCRUPAC, OOMDESPAC. CINCLANT, ComESSEAFRON, COlLURLANT, COMAIRPAC,
COMBA.TRO!l 1 & 2, COMCRULANT, OOMDESLANT, COM ll.

In connection with selection ot ships for early return to tentative

ultimate post-war disposition of following units under your command is

furnished for planning purposes. Ships under construction or repair and

ships in Lant are not included. Refer lq'Dis 122358 for establishment
reserve Fleets. Schedule of build up of reserve Fleets novr in mail to

you.

1. Battleships Pacific Fleet.

A. Active. INDIANA (BB 58}. MASSACHUSETTS (BB 59). ALABAMA (BB 60)
IWOA (BB 61) Nm JERSEY BB 62. MISSOURI (BB 63). . Reserve Fleet.
COLORADO (BBI+5). M!BYLAND (BB 46) WEST VIRGINIA. (BB 4S).
C. Decommission . Pac West Coast. PENNSYLVANIA (BB38)
2. Battleships AtJ.a:rrt,ic Fleet.
A. Active. NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55). WASHINGroN (BB ;6). SOUTH DAKOTA
( BB 57) . WISOONSIN (BB 64)
.
B. Reserve Fl.eet. Nm'f MEXICO (BB 410) . IDAHO (BB 42). TENNESSEE (BB
43). CALIFORNIA (BB 44).
C. DecaiiDission in Lant. ARKANSAS (BB 33). NEW YORK (BB 34). TEXAS
(BB .35). NEVADA (BB ,36). JliSSISSIPPI (BB 41).
3. Carriers PaeFlt.
A. Active. BOXER (CV 2l). ANTIETAK (CV 36). SHANGRI LA. (CV 3$).
B. Reserve Fleet. mSEX (CV 9). YORKTCMN (CV 10). INTREPID (CV ll)
HILL (CV 17). BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31). INDEPmDENCE (CVL 22). BET.T.EA.U WO
( CVL 24) OONPENS ( CVL 25) SAN JACINTO ( CVL .30)
c. DecOIIIDi.ssion Pao West Coast. SARATOGA (CV .3).
4. Carriers La.rxl# F1t.
B. Reserve Fleet. FRANKLIN (CV 13). RANDOLPH (CV 1;). WASP (CV 18)
HANOOCK (CV 19). BENNINGTON (CV 20) MONTEREY (OVL 2lS). LANGLEY (CVL Z/)
CABOT ( CVL 28) BATTAN ( CVL 29)
C. Decanmission in taut. RANGER (CV 4). ENTERHUSE (CV 6).
;. Cruisers PacFlt.
A. Active. BALTIMORE (CA 68). BOSTON (CA 69). QUINCY (CA. 71). SAINT
PAUL ( CA 73). CHICAGO ( CA 1:36) PAS ADENA ( CL 6;). SPRINGFIELD ( CL 66)
TOPEKA (CL 67). VICKSBURG (CL 86). DULUTH (CL g"T). liiAMI (CL 89) ASTORIA
( CL 90). OELAHOYA CITY ( CL 91). TUSCON ( CL 98) AMSTERDAM ( CL lOJ.) WILKES
BARRE ( CL 103) ATLANTA ( CL 104). DAYTON ( CL 105)

B.Reserve Fleet. PITTSBURGH (CA. 72). SAN DIEGO (CL 5.3). SAN JUAN (CL
54) SANTA FE (CL 60) BIRMINGHAM (CL 62). MOBILE (CL 63). VINCENNES (CL 64)

BILOXI (CL 80) OAKLAND (CL 95). FLINT (CL 97) _,

6. Cruisers Lal:ltFlt.
A. Active. ALASKA (CB 1). GUAM (CB 2). COLUMBIA (CL SO) CLEVELAND (CL
55) MONTPEW:ER (CL 57) DENVER (CL 58).
B.RESERVE FIEEI'. CHESTER (CA Z/). rmv ORLEANS (CA 32) PORTlAND (CA 33)
MINNEAPOLIS ( CA 36) TUSCALOOSA {CA '51) .SAN FRANCISCO ( CA 38). WICHITA ( CA
45). NASHVILLE (CL 4.3). PHONIX (CL 46). BOISE (CL 47). sr LOUIS (CL 49)
LOUISVILLE ( CA 2S).

AUGUST (GCT)

33 65

- continued -

C. Decommission in Lant. DE:l'ROIT (CL 8). RICHMOND (CL 9). CONCORD

( CL 10) TRENTON ( CL 11) PENSACOLA ( CA 24) SALT LAKE CITY ( CA 25)
7. Destroyers PacFlt.
A. Active. DesRons 10, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 6;.
B. Reserve Fleet. DesRons 21, 45, 46 less DD 552. 47 less DD 555.

48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 less DD 586 and 481 plus DD 578, 595, 596.
c. Decommission in PacWest Coast. DD's 514, 552, 481, 586, 639, 714.

a. Destroyers Lant Flt.

A .Active. DesRons 50, 57, 66 less nD 714.
B. Reserve Fleet. DesRons 7, 12, 1.3, 14, 16, 19, 22, 2.3 less DD 5l4,

24, 25.

c.

Decommission Lant.

DesRons 2,

.3, 4, S, 6,

.31 DD

555.

26 2220 COJINORPAC to CDlCPAC ADV info COMSUBPAC CINCPAC PEARL COWERVPAC

COMAIRPAC, COJQRDPHIBFOR, OOM3RDFLT, CTF t S 9Q, 91, 92,42
Plan depart 30 and 31 August with forces present this area as indicated
D\f oporder 9-45 in mail today. Route through AMCHITKA pass via lat 49-ll
N long 17 .3-00 E and point BUGLE rendezvousing with minesweepers 30 miles
south point ARGOSY 0.300Z(GCT) 6th September. Will~ 6th and 7th conduct
minesweeping operations to clear channel eastem TSUGARU STRAIT to OJ.IINA'l'O
anchorage 7th, and it completed enter OMINA'l'O with Task Force 92 on 8th und~
air cover provided by Task Force 49 operating vicinity route po~t CAZETTE.

Zl 0711 CO}QRDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE into CINCAFPAC.

Contacted Japanese Destroyer HATUZAKURA otf o-sHIJlA 0800 this date
carrying nav&l emissaries, pilots, and interpreters.
Para. Took staf't Captains Y. Takasaki of YOKOSUKA ani I. otani from
naval head.qua.rters TOKYO plus 2 interpreters on board MISSOURI. Received
satisfactoey preliminary' information from naval emissaries and informed
them of the time schedule and requirements ot the occupation operations.
PreJ iminary arrangements satisfactoey and no untoward incidents. :Minesweeping by elements of Task Force 31 commencing this date.
Para. Intend SAN DIEGO and Destroyers anchor ott YOKOSUK.A 2S August
if sweeping operations far American Aerial. Mines satisfactory completed.
CTF .31 obtains .further complete information tram Ja}:Rnese naval emissaries

tomorrow.

Para. Further inteiXl moving heavy ships into TOKYO BAY 29 August if
minesweeping has progressed sa.tisfaetoriJ.1'. H-Hour set for 1000 I(-9)

:t

Dq ~ August

Para.

Will establish liaison with Ar.nv advance part,- by air from

COWPENS to ATSUGI a.tter advance part;y arrives.

Para.
dispatch.

Arrangements incident to your arrival covered by separate

3366

,.
27 2312 COMINCH AND ONO to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEARL, COMSOPAC.

War Department agrees maintain token garrisons your 240205 AITUTAKI and

P.ENRYHN pending completion state Department negotiations.

28 f1700 CDiCBPF to QINCAFPAC info ADMIRALTY, CTF lll, SACSEA, CTF

CnlCPAC ADV, RAFT, CTG m.2, CTG lll.3.

l'/

VA(Q), CINCEI,

After consultation with Major General Harrison of staff of SACSEA understand that your intention is that allied OOW and intemees CHINA, FORMOSA
and JAPAN~ in the first plaee be taken by USN transportation to
PHILIPPINES for rehabilitation prior to repatriation, and that CINC AFPAC

accepts responsibility for receiving them there.

Para. Propose that (A) CINC BRIT PAC FLT accepts responsibility for
conveying all allied row internees from HONGKONG to J.UNILA. (BM ER) SACSEA
arrange in conjunction with the INDIA government for the repatriation or
all INDIAN personnel from MANILA to INDIA.
Para. If para 2 (A) is agreed intend to start this movement as soon
as you can informme that POW and internes can be received at MANILA.

ex 10428.

The Japanese Imperial government has been intormed that:" The senior
. Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within
the ~AMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH moo-cHINA south of 16-00
north latitude, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLAND INDIES, Nm GUINEA, BISMARCKS,
and the SOWMONS, shall surrender to the Supreme Conmander Allied Powers,
south EAST ASIA command, and to the Commanding General, Australian Forces
as later designated"
Para. Ex:aet breakdCRm of responsibility with the areas listed for the
acceptance of turrender of Japanese Armed Forces located therein, was to
have been arranged between Mountbatten aDi the Australians. The Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers has chapged with preparation of the details
or execution based on the agreement made.
Para. Since only a partial agreement has been reached covering but a
portion of the areas listed and because timely prel:imina.ry arrangements must
be made for and within the entiBe area, the Japanese Imperial Government is
being informed that paragraph l(C) of General Order Number 1 has been
amended to read as follows: tt(l). The Senior Japanese Commander and all
ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA,
THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA SOUTH of 16-00 north latitude, MALAYA, SUMATRA,
JAVA, , LESSER SUNDAS {including BALI, LOMBOK and TIMOR), BOERCE, CERAM, AMBON
KAI, AROE, TANIBAR and islands in the ARAFURA SEA, CELEBES, M.AIMAHERA and
DUTCH NV GUINEA shall surrender to the SUpreme Allied Commander, south
east ASIA command." r(2). The Senior Japanese commanders and all groWld,
sea, air and auxiliary forces within BORNEO, BRITISH NEW GUINEA, the
BISMARCKS and the SOLOMONS shall surrender to the Commander in Chief,
Australian Mi.litary Force n ~

33 67

General Order Number 1, military and naval, is amended as .follOW's:

(Z 6Z7) para 1 delete subpara C of part 1 and substitute therefor the
following 2 subparas;
SUbPara 1. fiTbe senior Japanese commander and all ground, sea, air and
auxiliary forces within the ADAlWJ'S, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FR.mCH
INOO-CHINA south of 16 degrees north latitude, MALAYA, SUMA'mA, JAVA LESSER
SUNDAS {including BALI, LOMBOK, AND TIMOR), :OOEROE, CERMA, AJIBON, KAI, AROE,
'l'ANIMBAR, and islands in the ARAFURA SEA, CELEBES, HA.LMAHERAS, and DUTCH
NEW GUlllNEA, all surrender to the Supreme Allied Co.nmander, ASIA command"
SubPara 2. n'lbe Senior Japanese Comand.er and all ground, sea, air and
auxiliary forces within BORNEO, BRITISH NEN GUINEA, THE BISMARCKS and
SOWMONS, shall surrender to the Conmander in Chief, AUSTRALIAN Military
Foreesn. Para .2 from SubPara D part 1 delete "RYUKYUS'' Para .3 in SubPar&
E part 1 insert "RmKYUSrt preceding the phrase "and the Philippines" Para
4 in SubPara a of part 2 insert "Naval andn fol.law'ing the word "Landn.
Para 5 in part 12 delete the ]4th word ''Forces and substitute thereto
"Powers"
28 15.5.3 CINCAFPA.C to PRIM MINISTER AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, WARCOS, CINCPAC ADV, IBT
ADMIN KANDY, 1ST AUST CORPS, SEAC, ALLIED LAND FORCES, ALIJ:ED NAVAL FORCES,

ALLim AIR FORCES, 1ST AUST ARMY, LT OOVERNER NEI'HERLANDS INDIES (MELOOURNE)

ex 10599.

Following General Order Number 41, General Headquarters southwest Pacific Area dated 28 August 1945 is quoted for information and guidance:
"Para 1. In accord With instructions fran. the u.s. JCS, effective l200
I {-9), 2 September 1945:
A. The portion of the Southwest Pacific Area south o! the following
descri~d bOWldary, except as noted belOW', is transferred to British Empire
control: beginning on the coast of INDO-CHmA at 16-00 north; thence to
intersect at rrt-40 nortJl 11.6-00 east the boundary between the Philippine
Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of th
Philippines to 05..00 north l27..(YJ east; thence east to 05-00 north J.JQ-00
east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140-00 east; thence to
02-00 south 146-00 east; thence east to 02-20 south 159-00 east; thence
south.
B. The following cOJDDands stated in general orders 1, 18 Aprill942, ar
abolished: (l) Allied Land Forces, SNPA. (2) Allied Naval Forces, ~VPA. {3)
Allied Air Forces 1 SVIPA.
c. All Australian, Netherlands east indies and New Zealand land, sea
and air forces now under the control of the Commander in Chief SlvPA, except;
as hereinafter indicated, will pass to British Empire control.
Para. Pending availability of transportation to evacuate, of other
a.etion to dispose of, and in order to facilitate cOliJDtUl'rl,cations; bases,
airfields and other installations now occupied, with personnel and supplied
therein pertaining to the u.s., will remain under control of the Commander
in Chief, United states A:med Forces, Pacific, for 8lf13' installations,
supplies and personnel, and the conmander in Chief, u.s. Pacific Fleet, for
- continued -

33 68

(cont'd)
naval installations, supplies and personnel. The 2 last named commanders
will negotiate directzy with appropriate Australian and Netherlands East
Indies agencies for the expeditious evacuation ot areas so occupied.
Para. Present coordinating control over logistic arrangements and
present shipping services rendered by agencies of the SNPA will be passed
progressivel;y to agencies designated by the British :&llpire by direct negotation ani in such a manner as to facilitate continuity of operational.
procedure where required and in the interest of good administration.
Para. Kl.ements of forces and personnel of the Allied Powers indicated
in para 1 C above who are serving with u.s. forces or allied Headquarters
north of the boundary described in para 1 A will remain temporari:cy- on duty
therein until orderl;y relief may be made without detriment to good operatio
al procedure and administration.
2S 1823 CINCPAC ADV to SCAP info COMINCH, COMSOPAC, CINCBPF.

Your 2814ll. I have concurred in the occupation of OCEAN and NAURU

by British Commonwealth farces under the direction of CINCBPF. It should
be Ul)derstood that such forces are subject to coordination by CINCPACCINCPOA since these islands are within the Pacific Ocean Areas.
28 2.353 ADMIRALTY to CTG lll.2 info CINCBPF, CINC EAST niDIES. (INTERCEPT)
Part; 1 II13' 282359 REF am 1.300.32 Aug am 13004.2 Aug 1.31957 Aug not to CTG
lll.2. l. Following message from Gimson for Secretary ot State for Colonies carred by messenger to MACAO and tranamitted ty telegraph from H. M.
Consul. "Most immediate. Have sufficient staff' and complete SCLEMQ,A available to set up Civil Adminstration immediatel;y except patrol of nerr territories. For a short period without outside ASSQC DFCTS .A,q GRUDO !! i.I!.
as officer administrating the government. Request immediate advice situation at present quite. InNS QLTAL for incoming Allied commander to mecsm
me immediately on arrival. SUggest landing at or near Sta.nlyr Camp". 2.
Follwing reply sent by Secretary of state for Colonies. 11Your message has
been repeated to Rear Admiral <>arcourt who has been empcNtered irmnediately
on his arrival in HONGKONG to establish military administration by proclamation.

28 2359 ADMIRALTY to CTG lll.2 info CINCBPF, CINC EAST I~IES (INTERCEPT).

Part. 2 final Admiralty 282359 prec part 2.353. You should then at once
comply fully with his instructions. In the meantime warmly approve your
initiative and plans you have madett. 3. You should convey Secretary of
States message to Gimson in case he has not received repl,y via MACAO. 4.
Both above messages have been repeated to Ambassador CHUNKING.

29 OSll CINCFOA ADV to COMHAWSEARRON info cmCPAC PEARL.

In view of the changed status of the war with JAPAN it is desired that
you resubmit reconmendations for the reduction of forces within the Hawaiian Sea Frontier. This to supersede your serial 0003 of 29 J~ giving
consideration to recent directives affecting this 8ubject.
AUGUST (GCT)

33 69

.__
29 1431 CINCAFPAC to WAR DEPl', US MILITARY MISSION MOSCONM&HUNGKING CHINA, KAND!
CEYLON IB'l' ADMIN NET, US SOS OOWESPAC AREA (BRISB_, DECOMAF 20 (POA),
COMGEN 10.

From the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers subj eet is occupation
of the KANOYA AREA. (Z 645) revised dates for these operations are as fol~
lows: Advance party will land 3 September and main forces will land 4- Se.
1945. Desire that Japanese ship begiruling not later than 0600 hours, 3
September 1945, take station to meet u.s. Naval forces at 20 miles, bearing
Z70 degrees, from SATA-MISAKI, southern KYUSHU, and lead these forces into
KAGOSHILA..WAN. S pilots with interpreters will be available on Japanese
ship. These instructions supersede those contained in para 9 of document
4 of "RequirEments of the SUpreme Commander for the Allied Powers presented
to the Japanese representatives at Jlanila, Philippine Islands, 20 August
1945 11 Acknowledge.

Effective 0300 GCT 2nd September that portion ~ the Sv~A south of
the following line Indo China coast at 16-00N 116-00E thence along
AOUTHER international treaty limits of Philippine Archipelago to
05-00N 127-00E thence 05-00N 130-00E Equator 130-DOE Equator 140-00E
02-20S 146-00E and 02-20S 159-00E rever ts to British and Australian
control~
2. ACNB assumes naval responsibility for eastern portion
of this area to SEAC for THEL western portion. 3 ~ The boundary between
SEAC and the Australian area-is yet to be decided but for guidance the
initial Australian responsibility will be for Borneo and to the eastwards,
and the lesser areas to the eastwards of Jymbok. It is unlikely however
that the Australian army will engage in any operations in Dutch New
Guinea, Halmahera or Celebes (except Pinrane). 4. Until the control
of Shihsang is relaxed the present boundaries and ship lines established
for the control of shipping in the SWPA and adjacent comm&1ds remain
effective. Chop line between areas referred to in para 2 above will be
promulgated as required. FKVECAD all HMA ships under the control of
CINC SWPA revert to the control of ACNB but are to continue their present
assignments until directed otherwise by this authority. 6. Communication
plan as in my 371 and 471~

33 70

01 0151 GINCPAC AJJV 'lD COMSERVPAC, Cmt;Q_ENPOA ,IJOMA1:?2AC ,CGF'MFPAC INFO GOHGEI\J T!~J , CG
!L,WPOA.,ISCOM OIUNA~![A~ J;.S.COM IE SHDJI~,.:a._CTU 92 1J,..5,CINC.,POA ~gAHL 1 CINCAFPAC.
In order to aid in the alleviation of a critical backlog of shipping
now awaiting d..i.scha.rge at OKTI~NtJA the follovring action vrlll be taken imntedi.
~e~:
shipme11t
pone
post
will
Co.mrne:mders
Type
Navy
and
(A) ComGenPOA ComGenF1~!FPac
in
prescribed
facilities
the
establish
to
of all ma. terials not required
June)
100231
ADV
ciNCPAC
by
au.g;nented
(as
May
162139
dispatch
CINCPOA PE.-1\.RL
beail"'fields
of
case
the
in
or
191+5,
November
1
to arrive OKIHAWA after
coming operable after 1 Novernber, materials v~ll be shipped at a rate to

correspond with operational dates.

194.5 of all materials
Nov.
1
after
until
shipment
postpone
(B) ComGnPOA will
airfields) essentially
than
(other
j_nstallations,
Army
ma.ke
to
required
not
(A).
see
airfields
For
1945.
November
1
by
operable
(C) Hut and prefab housing for all NCBs ~Engineer Aviation General Service
and Construction Battalions and Regiments will be cancelled. Sueh troops
will continue to use camp facilities initially 1.1p1provided.
Recommended changes to current OKINAJIVA echelon schedules to implement this
directive will be submit.t.ed , by action addees by 7 JlJ].y.
01 0500 COMHAWSEAFRON TO CINCPOA V.
ReUrDi.s 191335 June recorrunend category q.efense reduction HAW~UIP..N ISLP:NDS
from Fleet Opposed to Non Invasion ' ~1d from Categor,y Defense B to Catego11T
Defense A modified as follows: FTP 155 Chapter 5 Section 3 Para .Jl A e~i.nate
general measure number 5 and number 6 A B and c.
I

\, 02 0255 CINCPOA ADV TO CTI~Cli..FPAC ]]JFO COMJ'HIBSPAC,CI}~CPOA PEA.RL,CG6THAl1liT 2COM5THFLT

COMAIRPAC, COM:SERVJ?AC, QGFI~.AQ,,C.q~_,"'C,fl: YEN, C01IEIARIA.N~.,C.0!@.W1GILS ,COHSOPAC.
ComFhibsi)ac 190310 not to all or needed. Para.
Following clarification of responsibility proposed. Para.
Com...PhibsPac and CG 6th Arw.y to be jointly charged with responsibility for
planning embarkation of all OLY"ruWIC land based forces equipntent and initial
supplies whether loaded in assault or later echelons and whether to be nnder
~
control of CINCAFPAC or CINCPAC at the obJective.,.
Representatives of appropriate subordinate commanders can be made available
to them vrhen re(1uested to assist in planning.
In accordance vrith existing POA policy Com.PhibsPac to have overall responsibiLi.ty for loading the ships of the assault echelon conforming insofar
as possible to the desires of CG 6th Army.
ComPhibsPac and CG 6th Army will include in their overall loading plans ,
recom.rnendations to CINCPAC and CINCJl.FPAC as to responsibility for loading
all shipping exclusive of the a~sault echelon#
You~ concurrence or comment requested.
02 0908 CINCPOAAJ2..Y TO CIJ'T.9AFPAC ll~FO . CG TEN, CatAF~JID~C ( CO]!iG.ZNPOJ\) , C,INCPOA )?EARLcr
Your CX 2256 (DTG 010945)., No objection to designation of 7t-h and 27th

Divs in OKTIJAWA as GHQ reserve ;for OI.JD:lPIC provided that in the event .both

the 7th and 27th are committed in OLTI,fPIC another division arrives OK1NA1;VA
i1l.ot later t.han 1 January 1946 to support ga.rrison forces in emergency.

3371

I
0 2 0913 CINCPAC ADV TO

"'

CINC .~-WI)A C

INFO CINGPAC PElLRL:.. COl<ll-1 iiBSPAD,

COM:5THFLT~

Port Director Units f or OLD.fPIC to be established

as follows$ 1 unit of 25 officers in vicinity of mouth ot MANOSE RIVER. l
unit oflO officers at YMWL.'tWA at Western Entrance of KAGOSHil rA 7JAN. 1 unit
of 40 officers in vicinity of. T~lKUSA f or nav al base on eastern shore of
Kt-1GOSHD1A vLU'J . l tmit of 25 officers in .ARi iU\E ~TAN at S:HIBUSHI of P"'UKUSHD!A
GJ\INA (alternate location UCHI NOURA V1lAN ) 1 special unit of 20 officer~ for
Army port at KAC-OSHll.L.'t CITY to -oerform such strictly naval functions as piloting, assembly, routing, sailing and reporting of shipping and distribution
of charts and hydrographic inf ormation.
'5 ,s pecially e quipued LCI will house these units until provision established for them ashore. These units include intra harbor voice and visual
signalling equipment. Of these LCI 2 are being equipped at PE..!\RlJ and 3 a..re
CINC PAC is

eq~ipping

presently at O..INAWA.

Port Director persolmel will be assembled at PEARL. Commanding officers

these units on or before 1 August will be ordered report to ComPhibsPac for '
planning purposes. Other port director personnel vdll join their respective
LCI in time to mount to objective w~th major forces.
Complete Port Director Units 11rill report to Com.PhibsPac Vtr hen required
in time to accompany assault echelons and will later report to CG 6th Army
along with other units of PhibsPac as outlined in CINCAFPAC operations instruc~
tions No. 1.
Request your comments or concurrence.
04 1350 COMil\JCH &

C~!O

TO CINOPAC AJJV INFO CINCAFPAC.

Ref V~~ 25S59 detailed information mentioned consists of JPS 703/1 a

study of nroblem bearing no approval but which is being forwarded to you
for information. In view of experimental nature these installations. Theil...
doubtful effectiveness. The over-riding priorities necessary to their timely ,
construction with consequent impact o:q other essential ~preparations for
And the difficulties of deli very, I am of the opinion that plans
CORO!\~T.
for this operation should not der)end on the provisiorip of artificial harbors
unless they are an essential requisite f or success; Request you consult
. with CINC,;\FPAC on the matter and submit your views.

03 0515 COM3RDFLT TO CINCP.AC BOTH I l\iFO CTF 38.

Your 020152 intend carry out 10 July operation solely aga inst enemy
aircraft and air inst allat i ons :in accordance 1-ri.. th carefully laid plans
and elaborate bri ef ing c. On 16-17 July strikes v~d.ll undertake destruction
enemy men of war TOKYO BlLY Ar ea witn emphasis on N.A.GATO and destroyers
Now t ent a.tively planning destroy enemy men of war IruRE- KOBE Area subsequent
to 20 July replenishment9
03 1353

CINCAFP!~C TO OINCPOA PA.SSED BY

CINCPOA '=EARL TO CINCPOA ADV

If

Ref CINCPAC- CTIJCAFPAC agr eement, general principles of coordi nation of

f orce s dated. 16 7:!ay 1945 request 7th Air For ce be transferr ed t o command AFP::\.c
effective 6 July<~ Info here indicates f oll owing tmits now RYUKYUS : 49ll. Heavy
Bomb Grp, 41 J.!ediurn~ Bomb Grp_, 28 Photo Recon Sq. 1vith 319 Light Bomb Gr p no\"f
displacing and 11 Heavy Bomb Gr1) loaded and ready t o displ a ce ,. In addition
t o ~bove, 31B-, 413 e.nd 5U7 Fig1rt.el" GrouDs attached t o 7th AF now inst a lled.

337 2

\
0 5 1200 CGUSFCT TO CINCPOA VIA RlJO GUAlii,.

CFB 243<8

Co.riunents as requested in radio 030335 concerning OSS project in KORE.A

follow" It is hi ghly desira"bl e t hat i nt elligence be obtained concerning
Ja.p a.J.1E:1Se activities in KOREA.. This theater 'is Ul1dertak.ing a project to
obtain intelligence and has st ~rted to trajn agents for overland p~netration
of KOREA from CHINA o Due to tli.e ina ccessibility of thEf target area it is
estimated that the agents cannot be in position in KOREA for at least 2 months.
In view of this delay , CHINA Theater l.dloks vvi. th favor on the. su.bj ect proj.ect
which, it is assumed, can be initiated immediately.
Since the base area and the 2 radio listening stations will be outside
t his theater it is not considered desirable for 6hina. 'J.'~heater to sponsor the
project. However, any intelli.gence which is Qbta:tned front this project will
be of value to this headquarters.

06 0553 CTIJCPOA !lDV TO G01[GENA.A.FPOA, DEPCOH20'l'H .1\F I!WO GTIJCAFPAC_J3GviGENPOA,CTF 92, .

.Q1Q. 99.2.
CINCAF PAC 031353 request your comment and recmmnendation with particular
reference to units of 20th AF n011v j~ RYUKYUS . AsstlL~e 0000 I(-9) 15 July is
time of transfer.

06 0554 CINCFOA ADV TO CINCAFPAC JNFO CINCPOA PEA..BL.

Your 031353 first obtained from mY PEARL HQ. Concur in transfer not
later thc"tn 15 July. 1 ~Jill advise further after consultation rith DepCom20th..tJ..F
concerning units that command.

06 0822 CINCPAC ADV TO C01.illJCH INFO CINC.AFPAC, C,9T'.fl'JJIFLT

.

CINCAFPAC 051221. Concur in use of destroyers for FORT BAY~tL-r.m :}roject

until about 15 September when they must be withdravm for OLYMPIC.

07

131~ COMINCH \ND CNO TO CINCroA tJJV INFO . CINCPOA .PEARL, CINCPJ' P~1.C.

The British Chiefs of Staff have arranged for the dispatch of

2 assemblies of RJ.F airfield consit.ructton personnel and equipment to the
Pacific for eventual pr e:oa.rat3:.on of VIR facilities in RYUKYUB. It is my
understanding that this construction force vr:ill be pooled with out own an.d
employed wherever needed until required for RAF needs late in 1945.
.The 1st eonvoy lmown as SHIELD F'ORCE consists of $ ships (S ~tMJACK,
SLThH.Fli,IC _, S.AM.SE'I TE, SPJ.t11Y.PA.) SJl'MFEUGH, SA1fKEY, SAVtL}Ji!U, SAMBRE) containing
, 1
15' 000 tons c onstruction equipment and 1000 vehiclesu- The movement is 1ll1de:rway and ships will arrive canal zone in order named betv-reen 7 and 19 July
ll!IPRESS OF :'.JJSTRALIA containing 3100 construction and administrative nersonnel
arri ves Canal Zone about 19 July . The 2nd convoy krtown a s VACUUM: F'ORCE comnosed of simila r ships cargo e..nd :)ers onnel i s scheduled to sail from Un~"ted
Ki ngdom between 14 July and l August.
ld .r :,farsha.l Lloy d who is familia r with al l det ails of t hes e assemblies
is en r oute GUftJl f or consultati on. Follovring consultation with him request
1

you :

(1) Desi gnat e destination for SHIELD FOHCE o.rrange r outing and 1Jrovi de
such e scorts as may. be requir ed.
(B) Submit recommendation as to movement of VACUUM FORCE which ccm if
necessar,r be held in United Kingdom.
(C) !~.dvise contem~plated emnloyment these forc es ~

337 3

The follO'wing measures of reorganization of w:lits now in the 7thFJt a.re

_)ro 'Josed to be made a.t the times indicated in order to improve the sup})Ort
of CtYMPIC and subsequent o..xerations and facilitate Pacific Fleet administration. Your corurnent or concurrence is requested. Turner and Barbey have concurred.
A. About 1 October Com?thFlt relieved from duties in s:lPA and re?ort to
CINCPAC for duties in OLYMPIC.
B. About 1 October ComPhilSeaFron re.l)ort to CTI,JCPAC for duty as a Fleet
Task F'orce Co11mander under the operational control of CINCSlPA in command
of naval forces assigned for duty in Philippine Sea Frontier.
c. On 15 August ComServFo.r 7th Flt change title to ComServRon 7. ServRon 7
becomes unit of ServPac assigned to operational control of Com7thFlt
until 1 October and thereafter to operational control of ComPhilSeaFron
to render service to all Fleet units :in PHILIPFll!ES as required.
D. Effective 15 August all naval shore facilities including naval air bases
in 1.)HIUPPINES pass to command of ComPhilSeaFron.
E. Effective 15 .H.ugust 6om7thPhJ.bFor and staff detached 7thFlt report to
ComPhibsPac and assur~.1e status parallel to Com3rdPhibFor and Cont5thPhibFor.
F. Effective 15 Anooust all units ncm in 7thPhibl1'or pass to command of Co.mPhibsPac co.ubata..nt units to be reallocated to meet current reouirements
including those of H1i1Sea::?ron and other units to form a . subordinate command of the administrative comnand PhibsPac (with an organizational status
parallel to that of the SubCom at GUAM) for the purpose of rendering
service to all PnibsPac units in the PHILIPPIW~S.
G. About 1 October ComP~ir7thFlt change title to ConLtirPhilSeaFron.
H. About 1 October Fair:7ings 10 and 17 pass to operational control of ComPhilSeaFron throu&h ConvlirPhilSeaFron.
OS 0540 CIUCFOA ADV TO co;.:GENPOA,
Subrni t by letter yotu detailed reconunendations as to reductions in defense
measures to conserve Jersonnel and resources on the assumption that category
of defense of Hawaiian Area remains as at present but degree of .implementation
becomes discretionary 1rith CINCPOA.

CINCAFPAC, COL?7TIIFLT INFO Cll,iCPAC PEJ; l.L, COl.r.ATilPAC,

Determination of organization of naval shore based nnit~

Cir,rC~17PAC 060319.
OLYMPIC and .naval base development planning are being handicapped by discrepancies between CTITCAF:).t).C Operations Instruction No. 1 and the staff studies
with rega:;:d to the location of the naval air base. CII\CJU?PAC and CINCPAC staff
studies both sho:Jed developnent of e~d.stin.g Japanese naval air base KANOYA for
u.s. Fava.l ~lir Base. This arrangeJn.ent had the advantage of proxirrd.ty to !Javal
Base at TAKASU which 't'r .i.ll be the center of ma.j or naval activities and naval
cargo discharge.
If Naval Air Base Marine Air Bases and l1Iarine Divisions ouerating areas
are all to be v;est of' KAGOS}II:~.:: BAY it may be advisable to consider relocatip.g
Naval Base at Ki..GO~lHTI 'tA CITY and Ar:my _port facilities at ffAK\SU thus shortening overlc.,nd supnly lines for both services.
Your early comnent requested.

3374

08 1059 CINCAFPAC TO CINC ~J1\C ADV INFO 6TII A:.11iff

ex

'- _ /

240 2.

COMPHIBSPAC

Concur your 020913 relative Port Director Units for future onerations.

Request:

1-

2.

3.

That in addition to Port Director Units listed in reference consideration

be given to establishir.tg units at Yi1ITYAZAKI , ISHAG..U'"J: and KUSHIKIKO to aid
in the control a.11d routing of shil;ping.
That a.representative from Port Director's staff for SHIBUSHI, and for any
of the local ~_ties requested above at which you agree to establish Port
Director Units, confer vdth representatives of 6th Army and A.FW}!;SPAC earliest practicable date at headquro"""cers 6th Arrey for coordination of operating
procedures.
Designations and strengths of .:til Port Director Units vrhich vdll pass to
6th Army. control be furnished this haadquart.ers in order that they may
be included in the troop list for the operation.

09 0900 CINCPOi\,. AIJV TO CINCAF?AG I IJFO COM7THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC, COMllTCH & CNO.
As many LSTs as ;ossible are being allocated for OLYMPIC O.:;eration. 1\ny
assigned especially for corrlmunications or other special purposes must necessarily cause a corresponding reduction in assault lift. I11 view of need ex.Jressed by youf for LST COM7THFLT is directed by this letter to maJte irm:.lediately available to you for use as GHQ communication shi:.')s 2 I.ST from those
now IJIII!Qlii<}M assigned to his eomrnand and is further authorized to increase the
number to 3 if you so re(:uire. He .is also directed to send such assistance
as is needed for structural alterations and installation of your signal com.~unication equipment.
LS~s will continue as urdts of Pacific Fleet.

09 0057 CINCAFPAC 'l"O CINCPAC/CINCPOA PJ)V IEFO :AtlCOS.

ex 24142.

The follo;;ying refers to Joint stai'f study OLYMPIC, u.s. Facific Fleet
and fDA, lS June 1945: The statem.ent bottom of page 16 tt~Nhen the Commanding
General ExpeditionarJr Troops ( ComGen 6th Arrny) assumes com:&~nd of the grotmd
forces established ashore he will report to CIHCAFPAC vrho then a.sS'u.mes com.ma.nd
and responsibility for the campaign in JAPAN, is not concurred in. The responsibilities of CINCJi..F_-Ac are set forth in JGS 1331/3, particularly par~
l.B(l) ttis charged -rrl th the 'JrjJ11ai'Y responsibility of the conduct of the
operation 0Ll.1JJPIG including control, in case of exigencies, of the actual
amphibious asse.ult through the appropriate naval comD.l anderstt. I vlill accompa.rcy
the troops and vd.ll exercise at all times the cor:-mland responsibility directed,
as quoted above, by the JCS.

MyDis 300601. A rear acJmi..ral

.
will be designated by CDTCFAC ADV as Commandant l'J, val O;;era.ting Base . The Na.vo.l O';eratins -Base will e.nbrace all
naval end Marine n.ctivities on KYUSHU as indicated :i.n the follmd.ng sub paras:
( ~~.) Lion 9 will be utilized to establish the Nav.?.~ Ope!"evting Base facilities
at TAKASU.
(B) The 2 Cubs to be designat ed should be ordered to report to CG 6th 1\:rrrry

for further assi~urrent.

( l) L to 5thPhibCor:)s for enroloym.errG during the
vicinity of the nouth of t.he ::r ,.~'TC 0 -~ -~IV. .!J1 ..
- continued -

.? :'1 ;hibious

phase in the

3375

ETC~

co:rr 'D)

. (2) The other to .TI Corps for employmen.t during the a1nphibious -hase in
ARI.AKE :' 'ii.N. Both cubs will pass to control of the comn~andant LOB on
completion of the amphibious phase .
(C) The shore based facilities of the PT operating base at YPJ,IA.KAWA KO 1.1ill
be under the Conmandant NOB. The tenders ana boats will be under onerational control of Com7thFlt.
(D) The Naval Air Base vd.ll be commanded by a naval aviator r.rho in turn vdll
be nnder the Co1:1dt NOB. Corn.Ai.rPac requested to nominate the prospective
coi:UIJander KAIJOYA Naval Air Base.
(E) The lrarine Air Bases at &tiiJ:lt;..N TOJI1fB.ll11A and :.iA.TSUlJAGA will be corrunanded
by Marine aviators. During the complete assault phase while SUp)Ol~ing
V PhibCorps the Ilarine Air Base commanders will be under the Marine Tactical Air Co.mmander at each field. Upon completion of the conbat operations
of V PhibOorps "'vhe __arine Air Bases will pass to control of the Comdt NOB.
ComAirPa.c requested to nonrl.nate 3 Marine aviators for comraand of 3 ~farine
Airfields.
(F) (1) The naval consJcruction troops assigned' to construct i1Iarine airfields
lilnitial:cy- vTill be under the control of CG 6th Ar.nzy-t They will pg.ss
to the control 6>f Comdt NOB upon completion of airfield construction.
(2) 'f.ae 4 N'CBs 1.rith V FhibC0rps will remain under the control of the V
PhibCorps until viithdrawal from Kl'USHU at which time they vd.ll be
assigned to Cemdt HOB.
(3) All naval construction troGps othe:." than those mentioned in (1) and
(2) above vull be under the continuous control of the Comdt NOB.
(H) The Marine AllA Groups will be under control CG 6th Army. For purposes of
general adJnin:istration of the naval servic~ they rr.ill be under adnli..nistrative control of the Comdt NOB . Hovrever H.arine!II'M'E"tt ad.nrl..nistrative matters
will remain under normal lf.arCorps channels.
(I) The various naval COE'ilunication activities nill be assigned to the operational control of the respective officers in charge but uill be under
Condt NOB for type and administrative control.
Geographical locations listed above are subject to changes ',vhich may arise
from further stud.i..es.
.t

09 0907 CilJCFQA 1UJV TO CIEC1U~'PAC

ComServPac recon Jends that the location of the NOB be changed from vicinity

TAKA.SU as proposed by CII\CPCA serial 0005081 lS June to a location on a level

.. lain of the western side of K.AG00HTI.:ft. .. Al~ just north of Y/J.ts.G~ ~r. KO . The fol-

\.J

lmring advantages will be gained by a change o1 location:

(A) Construction time on waterfront facilities 1'dll be materially reduced since
only 4,000 't'Taterfront feet of sheet steel pilll ;dll be involved in lieu of
25,4DO ft.
(3) Dredging operations ~dll be reduced fran 2,3Z7 ,000 cu.yds. to c..pprox:i.rJ.ately
1,000,000 cu.yds. and the base can begin to function independent of dredging
o-oeracions.
(C) Pontoon requireuents v,rill be materially reduced.
(D) Considerable ro2.d construction and :blprove.:':lent 1\rill be eliminated clue to
flat area at the nevr location.
(::J;) Certain i'faterfront development is existing and can be utilized in lieu of
complete new cm1struction.
(P) Nevi location is adjacent to PT o 1erating base ~mel in the same general L?..nd
ri!Jea as all othel' naval .:1ctivities exce.pt those at A.tti lliE ~TAN Yrith resultant
possible consolida;cion of admini strative control.
(G) Anchora ge and ~liaterf:ront facilities vlill be ~n a 1~1ore )rot~cted lo?a.tion.
(H) Naval airfields c.?~n be constructed as convemently Hnd rapJ..dly as 1~he existi nr7 ... i elds at K:JTCYA ct:.1.n be len~hened ax1cl brought to .::n"oper g-rade.
3 37 6
- Continued o

09 0907 CINCPO.A ADV to

PEARLJ..

CirC~..F P!C ,CCJ~ :Z THPitC, IHl~'O

CONT t D)

(I) Ample flat and usabie area exi sts at t he nevJ loce.tion so that crovv-ded.
conditions need not be the consj_deration fo~ t he establishment of both
..
ba.se D.nd :naval a J..r
. I"' ac:t. .u:c1.es
.' .
. t enu
.,_
nB.:va.~1 O?erac::ng
as .m~. gh'
F _-c h ave prove d e:xJ...s~
at the fonner location.
(J) Since the construction tim.e is limited to 120 dBys . nl.a.Xi.rrru.m, a new location
vrhich requires :.e ss construction effort a pperu.. . s to be more practicable a.nd
feasible from the sta.nd:")oint of reduced shipping space required, possible reduction in forces involved and the consolid:ttion of all naval activities in
1 general land area.
The advantages to be gained in relocating the Naval Bc?.se and !Javal ..u..ir
facilities as recomm.ended by ComServPac from a base development point of view
are such tbat this plan appears desirable. Acceptance of this plan vdll alleviate discrepancies given in CINCPAC ADV_&NCE 000002. Request your views.
I

J.

10 0218 Cil\fCPOA ADV TO CINC.AFPAC I~\JFO DEPCOili20TN AF, COMINCH.

Your ex 24152 (090215) is welcome because it O~Jens the \'fay to an early

solution of the proglems concerned. The definite inf'ormation now available
as to the future organization of the Army Air Forces 'IIIill facilitate this
solution. I am in complete agreement that the system of coordination mQ.st
facilitate placing. the full force of all air povr'er on any objective "With
m.inimut!l restriction as to targets. I believe that this can best be achieved
along functional lines with little use of r~strictive boundaries. My conferences v.rith Gen. Giles indicate that he shares this belief. The coordination of the operations of the 2oth AF and of the aircraft under row control
has been achieved effectively by full exchange of informa:tion Td..th .max:ir.aum.
freedom of action as to targets.
It vdll undoubtedly become necessary in the future for fleet units including carriers to attack targets in the. INLAND SEA and to o~?erate not only in
the PHILIPPll'L~ SEA 1r est of' the 135th Meridi?.n but also in the E.AST CHINA SEA
later in the SEA 0~ J ..l.P.ltN and possible aLso in the YJIJ...~a; SEA. I must retain
complete freedom of action in such matters subject to the realities of the
strategic and tactical situations as they develop.
:nth reference to sub paragraphs A and C of your :.;lessage you nay be
assured that the inferences tddik which concern you are mistaken. I am opposed
to any restrictions VIhi ch delay or :iJn;Jede using any availa.ble weapon to
damage the enerrw1 i The text. concerned is part of a general concept and refers
only briefly to the salient features of t..he operations plc.nned. It does not
cover the full u s e of forces against targets of opport.unity (U1d may require
amplification in that respect.
Gen. Giles has . ~greed
.
to send Hajor General Kuter and I viill send l1ear
Admiral Sherman to meet with y our representative to clarify t hese matters at
AA!'J ILA at any t:Lrne convenient on or after 15 July. I consider re:')resentation
from the headqua..rters fu'my Air Forces inadvisable because it would in turn
necessitate re ~Jresent ation f rom t he headquarters of Cominch. I believe that
these 3 officers c::m very quickly evolve solutions vrhich 'rdll be mutually
agreeabl e to you to Spae.tz an d to me.
10 0238 QII;CFOA AJJV TO COT"..!URI~j\C INFQ _ FA~i 1, F~\H 18 AIRPACSUBCOMFOHD.
Re quirements f or 1+ Pr i vateer s quadrons for OLYHPIC a pproxima t ely D plus 45
t o 60 should be met by reduct :.ons elseriher e i n accor dance with foll mvi ng tentative deployment on 1 Jan uar y 1946 by squadrons . l~ HATSBPJ,JE 3 O!uN.A.-J.A. 5 I :. O
and 1~ :-.:11 t,~NJi.S including AJH s c:l.uadron 3 PhilSeaFron. Heath er aircraft are
included. Designation of spe cific squacb:ons can be def erred lU1til late lJovember,.

33 77

10 04.17 US ?1 AC TO CO~ ~GZH CHI IJ.n

ex

24399.
Reference is your CFBX 430. Concurrence in NO:"TH CHINA and KOH.EA operations of RYUKYUS based FE.A.F aircraft . Operations rill begin on or after 15
Ju:cy. Request 14th Al? k eep FEA.t7 and ;' dVon FEAP informed of hostile situation
and areas occupied by friendly forces in sub ject area a nd any other pertinent
matters . '?EI :?D JG Tiill be excluded f rom bo.;nbing attacks except in ca se of
military necessity as determined by this headquarters . FEAF will al"'range f or
attack of targets i n pro')()sed area vJith 14th lJ! and ':dll notify latter of
missions rior t o their disDatch and results thereof on canpletion of missions .
FE.P..F will be authori zed direct communic,s.tion with 14th AF for the coordination
of o -,erations in KCFEA and NO~~'lll CHINA, with your hea.dqu.arters and this headquarters as inforr&:.tion addressees Your comments or concurrence l'\3quested.

10 07 48 CIITCPOA AJJV TO

CO~ iGEJ:I

CHINA I NFO C01~7 .:IL?LT, CT:B' 32,, CO nrAVGR? CHI HA.

A cruiser al1d des(.royer task force has been formed whose tasks 1till include operations along the CHJlJA Coast . Request that y ou arrange t o have l
of Miles officers fa,'ll.i..liar w ith CHil'i.L\. situation nith yartic ular empha sis on
c oastal shipping and as l:Jc'UlY Chi:pese s peal{ing interp:reters as possible up to
9 report to senior naval officer at SM.~ for fUFther transfer t o j oin
Rear AdE~ral Low :in U. S. ship GUAM.

03 0335 CINCPOA Fl!:A-.11.1 TO CINCAFPAC , CO?IGEN CHINA INFO CllJCPOA ADV

Request your cornment and recommendations concerning NAPKO proj ect of

the Office of Strat gic Serv:i:ces transmitted to you by JCS memo of 18 Jnne.

11 OU-6 CI:t-JC PAC ADV HQ TO CO~ DJUDIV l6 , CTF 99 . COM3HDFLT I Nli'Q co;rnJCH , CINCPAC PE~,
CINCAFP1\C , CC~H'E lF , CrfF32 , CTF39 , CTG30 . 5, CTU32. 1 . 2 , 30. 9. 4; . COliGEN CHINA.
Hy OpPlan 4- L:-5 modified as follows:

(1) Add to task orga_nization: (N) Cruiser Task Force (TF 95) RAdm Low in

GU.Aiv~ (CBl) , CruDivs 12 and 16. Desron 24 less BACHE (DD 470) 1liULLANY( DD528)
plus ~JIJ..LARD K..:rrH (DD 775) J . C. OHEiJS (DD 776) iiA.SC>""'I (DD 778) .

( 2) .Add in subpara 3(a) to tasks of 3rdF'lt: Provide air cover for cruiser
task force as 1racticat)le froJn units i n the RYUKYUS area on reouest of CTF 95 .
(.3) Add in subpara 3(b) to takks of RYUKYUS forces: Provide air cover
for cruiser task force as practicable on request of CTF 95 .
(4) Add ne1T subiJara 3(N): Cruiser task f orce e..xercise control of the EAST
CHI E. SEA, interrupt enemy shi_p~.1ing al ong the CHINA Coast, mislead the enenw
as to our next a ssault objective by conducting repeated sweeps in the EAST
CHI NA SEA. :t.lake initial mveep f rom t h e vicinity of TUK YUEG rr~Ao (26- 22N J20- 30
E) nort lJT.;rard to about Lat 2B-4D N. Be pre:Jared to conduct further sweeps
when ordered. CTF 95 request air cover as required direct froa CTF 99 and
from naval air commanders concerned; Keep CINC?AC Culii3RD17LT and all interested
ai:r and naval comrtla.Ilds in HYUKYUS Area informed of movaments . Base at OKINit';A.
{5) Add to Jara L:.: Logistic support at KllJ.. J A available from ComSerlDiv
104 in HI 1 IDL.
11 0153 CINCFAC ftlJV TO CO. ~CRUDTV 16 I nfo CTI,JC!JAC 'E)JtL,COL1JJiiCH ,CO:ICHUDlVl2,CO:!DESJONffi,
C1f G 99 . l, CO:.I;311DFLT , CO'~SdfVHON lO,CTF' 32 ,CTF99 ,CG CHINA , co;:GEN FEJ\F
Form TF 95 RAclm LC10T i n GU1\H composed of GruDiv 16 CruDi v 12 DesHon 24 less
B.. CIE (DD La o) ulJLLil.;y (DD 528) ')lus :ILL_ JD 1~ .TH (DD 775) J . C. a L1~S (DD 776)
- ASS 1~~ ( vD 77 ~5 ) . When ~1FS about 1.3 July TF 95 proce ed f rom ~TE to :lYUKYU Area
UJ 011 completion fuelin~ ~)roc eed to execut e initial task assig.:1ed my llOJA6 .
U~)On COiu::>letion return to vi c inity of O~r iE.lfJA .
Arrange directly TJith ComServDiv lOlt- for logistic su~) Jor t.

337R

Destinations reconunended your 090L~43 July acceptable t3lCee~)t follo-rd.ng.,

Iou $how engineer power pl~:u1t r;taintenance deta.chraent foro S.UPAN in NoITember
whereas n0 such unit listed in CX 215.38 and must rnean eng:.neer refrigeration
ma:tntenance detachn ent due in November for which no destination given. Of 4
Engineer Dunrp rrruck Companies listed in CX 2153B already a.ccepted 2921 company
for OKIKA~'IA per your l4234S J\m_e leav:Lng l each for OKIN ~I!V.A., CAB.TJ and S.AIPAN
altho you list 2 for S""'J Plti',f. Likewise acceptable are destine.tions contained
in your 1003Lr.O asstt.1Li..ng 130 Engineer General Service Reg:in1ent t.o be the 1302
for TI~JIMi and. the 72 Finarace Disbursing Sf?ction to be the 272 for TINilU~.

Ur l0074S. ~ill selected Chinese ~ersonnel fill your interpreter require~:fe have no .llrnericans vdth qualifications. Desire to set up direct ra.dio
contact between Task ?orces and Hdqtrs ConltiavGrp CHINJ:J. Eastern Go:mn1:.1.11d. Short
title COMN1VCHEC. H.adio call t:1T 89. ComNavGHECKis located at KI~I:.NYAHG F~AST
CFENA Lat 27-23 Long llS-08 and has direct operational control of coastal
intelligence nets from SHANGHAI to fJiNATOW. l~lso operational control of 10000
u.s. Navy trained guerrillas. I BJn now temporarily at KIENYANG in wide svring
along coast available any~.rhere for conference. ~:-.rhen do you want ~ersonnel.
Suggest. CH1U'IGTING 25-4-5 118-23 as pick up field.

ments.

Cancel ,my, OpPlan 2-45.. CIY:fCPAC -271215 lfurch refers. (}l~LllEBREAK Opera.tion).

Request GG ~p Pac prepare and keep up to date plans for capture of ;vAJG5
by !,!arines supported by fast carrier task force. Assu.rne enemy g~rrison
now 2700 but deteriorating due to re , JeC~.ted attacks and lack of SU';p~i..es" Keep
CINCPAC advised your estir1ate troops required anc~ un:tts tentativel:sr ear-m..arked.
Initial report desired as to a.:rliest date considered feasible and troops
contempla;t~d for e:!t:)loy.rnent.
ISLiU~D

09 0215 CINCAFP.:\G TO

ex 2l,J 52.

CIUC: :. :~,C ;1DV INFO ~JAH.COS, CC~~GEN:ATI1.

The follCY.Jing refers to Joint Staff Study, u. s. PacFlt 8nd POA,. lS June
There a:re .a number of dl.fferences in concepts betvreen certain sections
of the n.bove document ond the Staff Study a,nd Instructions of CINCAFPi~C relating to the emplo~ent and coordina.tion of a.ir forces. Some of these have
been subjects of conferences and correspondence betv.reen our staff officers,
but definite conclusions have not been reached. On the last exchc<..nge, .your
representative indice.ted disagreement vrith certain features of air coordination
suggested by tlus hec,dquarlers and indicated that a.n alternate scheme would
be \3Ubmittecl~ This scheme has not yet been received. My general concept is
that a sif!rple system of coordination which t~'rill permit the full force of all
ai:r ;)ower . to bear on any objective vvit,h minintu.m restriction as t.o targets is
the correct system. E.xperience in the PHILIPPINES Ca.mp(;rl.gn indicated that 2
air forces could 01)erat.e in the same area 1rtithout interference providing each
was informed t h at t he oth~:3 r would be 'Jresent. The systE;3m that .1.r.y representatives have proposed follo,;;s this general 1ine of thought.
19L~5.

-Continued

3379

 A. Specificall.y , on page 7 of the document referred to above, there is a

strong i xn.pl i cation t hat you desire to i mpose restrictions on Arnw Jar Force
operations against shipping. I con sider that this restriction is unnecessary
and 1..U1desirable. In t h e scheme of air coordi nation :xr:pposed by this head.quarters, t he pr:i.mary t a r get f or Army Air Forces in the RYUKYUS was indicated
as the land area s, . and o~ the Navy Air Force in the RYUKTlJS the sea areas,
each being f1~ee by ~ coor dinat i on with ~ach other to operate in the }3rim.r'lcy
areas of the other. I do not agree that .A.rPJY .Air Forces can not ope :rate ~
against shipping .
B. On this same pa ge, you indi..cate that the .~u. :rrq Air Forc es opera:t:lng from
the lrruK'21. JS would be subject to sue!! measures of coo:r'Clination as you find
necessary for safety or operating effectiveness. There is a need for a
closer undersl:,a.nding on tlus subject. I have all.. eady agreed the;t the assign""~
ment of areas of air, surface al1d submarine activities is your responsibility.
It is e.iq::>eeted, however' that this be COOl"dinated vd.th my headquarters as has
been the .)ractice dul"iL"'lg the last year. As to the matter of traffic control,
it is probable that this control can b e handled localzy between air force
con1.manders in the Rl1JKY1JS vd.thout imposing undue restrictions. Eventually
the FEJlF "i7ill be the _p redominating air force and the comrnander should have a
voice in the coordination provisions ) resor:tbed. This rn.atter should be cla.rified .
c. On page S, the action of the Army Strategic ;U_r Force is confined to
the island of FI:ONS1iU. This is not believed to be in accordance vrith intentions.
Conferences 1i-Tith representatives of the Strategic ..lir Force have alreaey :indicated the intent of ~JL'lcing its fu~eight in the objective area for 10 days
revious to the OLYMPIC assault. A!oreover, there are targets aJ..ong the MANCHURI ~'\J:J mainland and selected targets in northern KYUSRU and SHIKOKU which
are included vrithin the anticipated objectives for the strategic .!lir
.
Force.
These targets are -Jrescribed by the Joint Chief's of Staff, but early decisions
as to coordinating provisions are necessar,y.
D. On pages 17, 34, and 27 a plan is indicated to turn over a yart of the
Marine air forces o~Jerat:lng in the objective area to the ?thFlt !or the purpose
of escort and protection of shipping to and f rom the objective area. This
plan diverges somewh.1.t
: from our a greement that ~farine air operating in the
objective area Vrould be under t he cont rol of, C!NCJ~PAC., Generally, it is bel:Leved thaJG this pl an is meritorious. However, since i t ha. s not ;)revious],y
been explored in conference, it is believed that it should be further e:x:amined
in its relationship to the general coordination of air in the objective area.
E. .Anne);:es 2 and .3 to Appendi x B eliverge fro1~1 sLnrl.lar concepts of the employment of air Yihich has been f avored by this hea dqua rters. These matters should
be a djust ed at t.he earliest nr actica.bl e date.
Par a. . Since t he above l)oints have mi3Xly r amifi cations, it is not believed
t hat they can be set tled sati sfactori ~y by r adio10- Moreover, the Strategic llir
Force has a n 1..m)or'l:;ant i nterest i n the ge ner a l air coordination. . A conference
at the ear liest practic able date i s suggest ed. rJ!ANI L1\ is ~)referred because
det ailed planrting i s novf goililg on h er e, but i f y ou ~.11--.efer otherwise , we vd.ll
conform. If this is agreeable t o you, I vdll arrange t o have the Army Air
Force s , '1\Ta.shington, or t he Army Strategic Air :'?or ce , send rErpr esent at i v es i.t."1
order tha,t final eo11c lusions on t hese mat te1~s c an be reached. For .rurposes
of planning, I sugge st that the conference be held about 20 tJu1y

ll

?, 1'.0 CO'''i!"li't:"'rl'
''t.n.'l
~'1 ~~ l!f
U':' t
,_.,..Lf.J.;

f"<!'P '"J"r''il"ilf~
r';-i;' F "'r~"
.CI'~~rr-s
,\rr''''A
'i
lV c
,_;r}~l)\;
_yl 111'~.U
.--- r-'ttJT110
-4.
.w 1 ~~J ~""ll.!
.... J.l C

fr"fl"\

AX 75775.

f1
.'!!ro- ."1.
jl
c \.,t.t
r~;f.'- ~i..iU
!\ 1\ 'ft't}Y\.~
\..J _1
- .1\TCl
1'
Viki

f'lG"'~O
V
J...: ._

CiQi,fl~T.I'
- .w'U

C'('~J
- ...l . ff',\'lf
;-~~ ?
~.

1. Ji.:;ffectiv e immediately upon ttansfer to YEiU7 of 0 1:Jcra,tional control of the

7th ltF and 20 !2 Ulri.ts in the '{Yill~YUS you :.~rill dire ct the operat ions of these
w..it s to extend the 9.ir offensive from bas es Yrith.in the RYUIITUS against KYUSHU,
SF!II{OI\.U and HON:3HU Nest Of 135-00 E t o:
..... Continu ed ....
Q

33 8

(f.. ) Neutralize and destroy hostile air forces v:herever they ri'.ay be found.
(B) Dest,roy air installations, grotmd forces :~nd defenses ~C~SJJND industrial
and ha.rbor installa:t.ions.
(C) Disrupt vrater lines of cornnlU11.icat5_on olld c lose crit5.ca.l point s on land
~
lines of colnrnunic ation. ~~
2. Upon estab]j_ shrnent of the 7th AF Hq in the l1.YUKYUS the ComGen ?th .AF will
take over operational control of the .301 Fighter rifing.
3. CG Advon FE.-tF w'ill im.mediate~y institute photographic missions _t)er instruc"""
tions given him by Com.B"'EA.t1' on 7 July and report to this headqUEirters when
he is ready to strike.
11

1425 CINCAFPAC TO CTNCPAC ADV IN:B"O COMii.AF,.

ex

24144. ,
Ur 060617. Relatin.g to placing lst

liar~lirWirig

under operational control of

7thli'lt to prepal~e for future operations is reference . Addendum 2 .iUlied Air

Force Opns Instructions 96 refers only to those 1st Ma.rl\irl'J'ing tmits based
units
.
control of lst Nar. \irWing
in SOLOMONS. July 15th da:te for asst.unption
in SOLOJl1fOJ:lS by RAAF corn.roand was agreed to by ComGen 1st Mar!ir~iing in con..:..
ference lilith e.ir officer co.mmanding Ril!W command and Coml\llied Air Forces,.
August 15 tentative date fo-r release of units of lst l';B.r.AirV'ling from operations was reconl!ilended by ComGenEII!AW based on directives to his headquarters
. for preparation for OL1'1viPIC, and consideration of tactical missions in the
SOLOHONS . Remainder of lst 11arAi~1ing is operating under 13th AF in direct
sup')Ort of opera:~i.ons in !illjD.lJJAO and covering lleet units in Lh!t!TE GULF
In view of above do you still. desire the F.MAW released inunediately to the
operatione.l 'Control of Com?thFlt to- :,)reJ?are for futu.re '01)eTa.tions.

of

:.w

llOlL.-6 .. To support initial svreep of TF 95 request heavy strikes on

enertw air bases and other .appropria:ce targets in SHI!. NGHAIArea and FORM~OSA
on date of sweep. CTF 95 advise ')redieted date a..nd confirm or correct V(hen
definite.,
, 12 0217

QJ~!CPAC

IillV TO CO!JITHCH & CiyO INFO CINCPAC F2:ARL EQ,

D:~PQOl!! ~AF .

Ur 071310 and 1Ll737. Ships of SHIELD Bnd VACUl.JlK force"S rrJ.ay be sailed
as scheduled. Unon arrival PANAMA propose they be sailed indep~ndently and
u.nescort"ed to ENIS1~TOK "~?rhere they will remain tu1til called fort~ard to HYUKYUS
in re g;u.l.:u~ echelon c onvoys as required. 'There is at present a very heavy
backlog of $}lipping at OKII'JAlP1A that will be gra.du.elly reduced. Select..ive unloading is nO!iv in effect and will be for some. time. It is expected but can
not be assured that ':Jerson..'1.el with their equipmer!.t vrill be discha. :ged farly
promptly.. No special priority can be granted the Br~itish ships. 1"bey wi.ll
be integrated into the immedia. te requirement~s of the HYlJ1CYUS .e.s a whole . Representatives of cr:,TCPOA British Adm:i.relty and 20th 1\.F are at present conferring
on OKJJ\fA~ fA as to the most effective manner for :httndling such integration.- ~Vill
advise you of' de.velopments. Also see my ll0834.

12 Olf-46 CINCPA.C ADV TO COMINCH..,

Reference-""nri"ssion of Capt Frankel CINCP~~c a}Y...,roves of aerological plans
submitted by Capt Orville and 1w.kes the follo'tir ing recornrnendations . (A) l~stab
lish a duplex radio telety;e circuit betwee:a GUt~:i a.nd a station to be located a
at KHABJ\J?.O'i!SK or hdqtrs Soviet Far East Comr:na,nd vJi-th tentative tre<nsmission
freouencies from GU4Jvi 7580 Kcs 10445 Kcs 17930 I(cs and transmission frequencies
fror~ KH.cWA.r'?:OilSK 7350 Kcs 10200 Kcs 18030 Kcs. (B) EstB.blish a simplex m1:U1t1Al.

- Continued -

3381

circuit connecting a station to be located at P'!::~ROPAVLOVSK vrith the station

at KIH13.'JLOVSK w"ith .frequencies to be designated by the Soviets. (C) Assemble
the com.rn.unic tion and aorologica.l material and personnel in the U. s. (D) In
the event 11egotiations completed prior assembly material contained in recommendation (A) initial establisbment of simpJkx manual circuit connecting GU U~1
.P.nd KII'i.BAr OVSK reco.:Jraended u.sing GUAl1 . traJ1S!~rl.tting frequencies.

Minutes of 21 June conference on signal (x'adio) i~te1ligence plan are

concurred in subject to following comments.
I ovement and establishment of radio intelligence units except vrhere already provided for in troop movement schedules 2..nd base development ..J . ans
are contingent upon:
Availg.bili"C.y of necessaX"~J shipping spa,ce .
1
2 . Ability of those responsible for base development in each area concerned to provide the sites facilities and services reouired for
~
operation ~nd m.o3.ntenance of these units.
B. Cie'Cuit referred to in subpa..ra lS B(l) as l'.:rnry ntlllitplex circtLi.t is the
Strategic .i.r Force au....r OKr"'AVlA multiplox telet;,...-1e circuit (using !Ia:vy
sup )lied multiplex) 1 channel of which has been allocated by S'trati\.il"For
f'or RI use .
c. Paras 10 & ll. Do not concur in plan for 2 ~\F direction finder stations
on already cvowded r.JO Jll.fii . 1 such station now O)era.ted there by 3th
radio sqdn mobile . Consider it could be made to serve both }i'EAF and 20th
AF . As alternative consider FEAF and 2oth AF could arrange for simiL..1.r
dual use of S'trat.Air POA station on GUAM.
l2 1000 CGUSFGT TO CGUS
CF3X

695.

F:~Ac, GGS.;:,_l, CGl?..:J 1.F

Irfft'O CIECPAC ADV, CGJ.l;.AF , CGADVZCl!

J~AF .

'rhis Hea.dqur.rters concurs in p:ciori ty of targets recomrnended in TopSec

CAKX 15388 ref !.r ~IJ..)A secret rdo 23484 please confirm last city nc.med in 23484
as it nas .barbled in transit. Ref yom" top sec CX 24399 in vievJ of status of
PZI.?IITG as a Chinese Kational Shrl:ne vre must insist that any contemplated
bombing attacks on tl1is city be cleared thru ChiP.a Theater . FUrther we desire
to reemphasize the necessity for precision bonbing of targets in ~ny Chinese
city. Area bombings of c rowded Chinese cities in occu_, ied arc,a s of CH:UL.
would result in more deaths and hardship among friendly Chinese thc-tn among
Japs 5

Arey has not o,greed to my proposn.l that the e:d.sting arrangement a.t
OKIEAJ A sho~:ld be contint-ed in effect. Hy modified )roposal is contained in
c,l"~.graphs 2 to 6 and enclosure of JCS JJ..~06/2 Tihich e.re quoted herewith for
..
your inform.ation .~nd conr :ent.
As stated in JCS JJJ-06/1, cr ~:Cil.F";)AC and the Conrru.U1der in Chief
HParct 2..
US Padific Fleet (CI HC_) ~:.c) have nade a Joint Logistic Plan for the 01~YMPIC
Ooere.tion in -rhich have been integrated carefully the .Elt3.tters of :riorities
of be:--.se development, alloc:1tion of ro j ects and the nove!n.ent of sup )lies into
the a.rea, e. nd have set u 1 service .::orces fo "' their im_le~nentation. CIPCP__c
h as been cha ged 1J ith the res )Onsibility for ba se devcloiJment on OKIN .. / L. 11J.1is
res?:Jonsibility hRs causea h ira to ;?.llot Fmch of the HavDJ~ Construction Engineer:
t-..hcse develo 'ments
to Ar r.1.v develonments. Undoubtedly -\;i1en e:,, nd i f control of
.,_
'l
)...
.
'
""
'cl
is passed to the :_nly Lo will cont Lnue t o .?J.lo-t a s may oe Jract.~cao e ur1:t:cs
~

Continued -

3382

of t h ese c onstru ct i on battalions t o the me et ing of lr rny requirements. If

t his cont:Col of develo Jment 6i' Arrny fac ::.liti es i s . to be transferred a s recommen ded it is n-cr tuKlersLanding t hat the control of the development of ' rnzyfields both f or t he Ar :Jy Strategic !..ir ? orce a nd t he Far Eastern Air ?orce
;;rill be incl uded in the trazlSfer.
npara. 3.
Both during OIJTilPIC c-:.nd in the cont inuin~:; future OKIN.:~lA VIill be
a ~)riraary nava l base 2n control of a vital sea area and a.n. air base. During
OLY'l.IEPIC and ; erha:)S for a short :Jeriod thereafter in.portant facilities and
developments are required for use by the .Arm~)T forces
invasion.
HPara 4.
As ste:ted in JCS J1J..06/l I 2.Jn doubtful as to the wisdom of disturbing this agreed organiza tion w'hich is noYl at 1rork a nd ~;regressing vvell. However if the Chief of Staff US Arrny has strong convictions that more effective
progress in the L)rosecution of OI,Y1il'IO uill be effected by the transfer to
CINCAFPAC of the responsibility for the development of faci]j_ties considered
essential f or l1is OIJerations ahd full control thereof including the logistics
involved i acquiesce. This transfer of control .to CIN'CAFPAC to include full
responsibility for ru1d control of development of all A~ installations and
projects in the ~-~YUKYUS (including those for the .llrmy strategic .Air Force)
movement of Army Stll)plies into the area and such harbor and unloading i'a.cilities therefor as shall be mytually agreed to by the 2 commanders concerned.
npara 5
In view of the fact that the defense 0of the HYUIITLJS is pr:Lrn.aJ.---ily
integrated to the general naval defense of the sea areas of the Pacific
Ocean Areas that the defense is primarily air. and naval in nature and according to agreed plan is being implemented by prepondera.n.tly naval air and naval
surface forces res_Ponsibility for the defense of the RYUKYUS should rema.in
~.nth the Comm.e,nder in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINGPOA.) as is the case
with ever-y- other position in the POA.. Such f rmy fotces as may be required in
the defense of the H.YO'KYUS from time to time should be assigned by GIHCAL?FAC
to the operatio1~il control of CINCPOA.
HPara 6.
Accordingly I propose dispatching the attached message (Enclosure
follo~Is. ldessage to the CinC US ArhlY Forces Pacific and CinC of Pacific Fleet.
Para 1. CI NCPAC in consult<.;.t ion with GIEG ..\F .?AC :Till arrange to transfer
to the latter at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 August
responsibility f or and control~ of c.ll Arroy ru.1.d .Arnw Air ~i'orce (including
Army Strategic Air Force) installations and develo) ment projects :Ln the
RYU:KYUS the movement of i\..rmy troops and supplies into _the area and such
harbor and . unloading facilities t :1erefor e,.s shall be .mutually agreed to
bet1:ie~n them. Control of all US fu."nry forces loca:'ced in the RYUKYUS includ-ing t h e lOth ..' rrey- will pass to CI NCAJ.i'7AC except as indicated in the last
paragraph belovT.
Para 2. Siclilar~ CINCPAC will retain responsibility for and control of
all naval an d n&.val air insta l lations and developc1ent projects in the
~lYUKYUS. 'l11e movenent of nava l forces and supplies into the area, and
harbor and unloading fa ciliti es th~refor as shall be mutually agreed to
betvJ-een them.. Control of all US naval forces in the R.YUKYUS vd.ll be vested in CINCPAC.,
Para 3. 'lne def ense of the RYUKYUS Area a.nd its milita ry gove rnment vd.ll
rernain a resy onsibi li ty of CI:NCPOA in a ccordance vrith existing directives.
For t his purpose CIIICAFPAC 1Hil l a ssign t o t he oper a tioncl control of
CTI!CPAC such US ll.:rrrry Force s as may be required f rom t :ilne to tirae. End
of Enclosure).un

of

12 1015 CGUSFCT r20 .QJ!JCP ~ IH~..C IiJiC CGSOSCT , Cat:U::U0FCT , CGJ.4.\F ,-JA.I1COS.
CFBX 689.
Preparation f or FORT BAYAHD is subject. You.r remar k s and recornmende.tions are recru.ested on the follovfing:
A- CHIHA The::.ter ' s -r cs_:;onsibilities in conV(J'{J ope_ation .
- Continued -

33 83

 _c.

l2 1015 CGUSFCT TO CINCPAC CINCAFPAC INFO CGSOSCT ,CGREUSFCT, CGJJt.AF, WARCOS

{CONT t D)

13o:t~S'Jt1NF

B-N&val harbor facill.tiezy~quired at FORT BAYARD and availability thereof

to ClllC. PAC reference $\;OJ U S including movement to FORT BAYARD.

c-Nature and extent of command an~ liaison required between forces or CINCPAC
and CINCAFPAC and CHINA '!'heater involved in FORT BAYARD operatica. It a
conterence is believed necessary' on the above, let us lmow.

l2

~59

9INCAFPAC TO CINCPAC ADV DEPOOlW' 20.

ex

24942. JCS radiogram WX 29914 dated lOth approves plan PASTEL as amended.
CINCAFPAC 's detailed implementation plan requires final coordination prior
to completion. Invitation extended deception representative your headquarters to donterence here 17th JulT with CHINA Theater and CINCAFPAC repre.s entatives for that purpose. Advise.
ll 21.35 q<J4INCH

AND

CNO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO C0!7THFL'l'.

Snbmit by dis}8tch your cohcrete proposals tor reorganizatiO,D of naval.

forces SIP subject to following considerations.
(A) Reorganization of Service Foree 7thFlt should be accomplished earliest
practicable and is not contingent upon departure ot CaJQthFlt for JAPAB.
(B) Naval bases in the PHILIPPINES will pass to jurisdiction of 8canander
Fbilippine Sea Frontier.
(C) Upon the l'eoftF'i zation of Service Force 7thFJ.t am establisbmeut; of
Service Squadron 7, Cogpander US naval forces AUSTRALIA-N'!J/ GtJINEA will
be established. !tds cODDand will function under 80DQthFlt un:til CINCSWPA
relinquishes area responsibility to British at which time CaDdr Daval.
facilities will report to CINCPOA direct.
(D) Concurrent~ with change in area responsibilit7 or sooner i f you so desire
the ADUIRALTY ISLANDS should pass to CINCPOA ttu.-isdicticn and represent&-:
tions will be made to the JCS dependent upon your e<mlllents.
(E) llaintain in PHILIPPINE Area naval force sufficient to coutain Japanese
force rendning in SINGAPCilE Area.

l3 073lllACARBf

TO CINCFOA ADV, CG CHDlA. CX>MAAF INFO CTF 95~

2Sl9
CINCPOA ADV HQ 1101.5.3 giving composition of TF 95 and ildtial movemerd;s,
11.014.6 giving initial. missica TF 95 azxtll2.336 requesting strikes on enemy
air bases and other appropriate targets are references
Candr Allied Air Forces will:
(l) Subject to concurrence ComGen CHINA Theater strike airfields and other
appropriate targets with heaviest strikes within capabilities in the
SHANGHAI area. and FORMOSA on date of initial. sweep of TF 95.
(2) Inform. CINCPOA ADV HQ and C'l'F 95 of strike interdis earliest possible."
Para. CINCPOA ADV HQ iequ.ested to motity tlais ~rs with into to AAF
and ADV HQ FEAF OKINAWA date or intial sweep.
Request concurrence CG CHINA Theater on strikes SHANGHAI area with into
to above addees.

dt

lJ 0749 Q!NCPAC ADV '1'0 g<>!IDICH.

Your ll2159 I am concerned at the degree to which the processes ot
reorganization and changes involved in arrr new conmand arrangements ror 3 3 8 4
OKINAWA will absorb effort and create confusion during the critical 3 and
-;
one halt months rE~Dajning before the OLIMP!C aasaul.t. During this all too
brief period a stupendous base developneut task is to be accOmplished. The
latest reports show that this task is well in hand. Construction is accelerating and during the lst lO dqs of J1icy' approximate:cy- .350,000 tons of cargo

e,.+.. rd

l3 U/49 CINCPAG. ADV TO COMINQH

( CON!'INUED)

wre unloaded.
Ccmnenting on the specific proPo&al.s of JCS

that:

U06/2

I wish to point Ol1t

ot paragraph 2 "lie w1ll continue te allot as ma_y be

practicable units of these construction battaliOD.S to the meeting of
A.1:tq requirements" is undesirable. Actua.J.:cy-, al.though 4 and J/4 coDatructicn BD.s are now working on A.r.ar3' airfields in order to get them
activatecl prompt:cy- for tactical reasons, current plans call tor gradnall7
tranaterring these battalions to naval and to general isl.and develo}JIIm'tj
The excess ot naval engineering effort over naval requirements w:Ul ap.
proximate requirements of and should be used on projects ot coauon nece&.
sit7.and. defense which will be naval responsibilities under JOS 1406/2"
It would be better if no cCIIIIIIitment were made on the JOS leTel concerning
use of NCBs on A.r.ar3' projects.
(B) As of 7 Juq Zl and l/2 BCBs are present of which 15 and 3/4 (incluctina
S and 1/2 regular Bns, 6 stevedore :sns, .2 Pontoon Bns and 1 Truck Bn)
were on general island developact, 3 on Daval base conatructicm., 4 aDd l/2
em naval and llarl.ne airfields and 4 and l/4 on Arl1lr airfields. Of 32
Arttv Eng:t neer Brls }lNsent 13 were assigned to general isla.Dd develo~
and 19 to Ariq airfields. The catego17 ot "general island develo~t"
which includes work on roads, waterfront, water supp]T, tuel s;ystema,
cargo discharge aDd supp~ dumps and which now absorbs 28 and 3/4 out of
59 and 1/2 Bns will decrease iD relatiw priorit7. llaD7 of the COJIIII)D
projects be allocated to either A.r.ar3' or Nav. H~ever to avoid iapeding the whole effort presetdi engineering plans JDI18t remain virtual.q
unchanged . and the separaticm or service responsibilities sst take place
alolrq and c~. It w:Ul probab]T be necesaarr to continue supervision of CCIIID.OD projects by COJDlen 10 for a considerable period. RecQIment addition to paragraph .3 ot the directive of a sentence approximate]T
as follows. 0 'lbe Commanding General l.Ot;h Arlq aiMl his Headquarters aDd
also the present Island Cmunander OKINAWA will continue to act for Cllln>AC
as at present in connection with defense and dn'el.opaeuts of CaDIDOD
necessit7 untU released under arrangements mutuall.T agre~ble to Cili:Al'PAC
(A) The assUrance

amd CINCPAC"

aa D. heart7 agreement with paragraJits .3 atd 5 at JCS 1406/2 as drafted

b7 70U It is 1118' intenticm to use OKINAWA as a base not o~ tor OLDIPIC
and CORO!lft but also tor extending control by' the Pacific Fleet iaitial.:q
over Uhe EAST CHINA SEA and as rapid:q as possible OV'er the YELLCW SEA
and the SEA OF JAPAN. The Naval Operating Baae at OKINAWA is vital. to the
readiness of the neet for effective support; o! OLDIP.IC;'\
(C)

l3

cY/5~

CIHCPAC ADV TO COMINUJj INFO COKZTHFLT ,CINQAFPAC,qOMPHILSEAFROH,CINCPAC fflAll!t

OOMSERVPAC.
.
. Your 112.l.35 not to all adclees. Following recomendations are submitted.
See rq 080,301 and Com'lthFlt ~14.

(A) On 15 Augwst ComServFor'7thFlt change titl.e to CanServRon 7. ServRon 7 be-

come \Ulit of Serv'Pac assigned to operational control of CQB'7thFlt to render service to all fleet units in RIILIPP.INESj
(B) Ettective 15 August establish C<Dnander U S Naval Forces AUSTRALIA NEJJ
GUINEA to function under Caa7thFlt until COOSWPA rel:.t.Dquishea area respcxl8ibilit7 to British at which time C<Ddr US Naval Forces AusrRA.I..IA.-m:W
GUINEA report. to CINCPAC direct.
(C) Ettective 15 August pass to comma.nd ot ComPhil.Sea.Fron all naval shore

facilities including Naval Air Bases in the PHILIPPINES and to CanNavFor

AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA all US naval and naval air tacUities in SWPA outside
PHILIPPINES except KANUS.
33 85
- Continu.ed -

. l3 0751 CINCPAO ADV TO OOMINCH INFO C<JlZTHFLT, CINOAFPAC. COMPHILSEAFRON 1El'C.(C<:mD)

I

(D) EtfectiTe em or betore establishment of NBW BRITISH command area transfer

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS to the Pacific Ocean Areas.
(E) Etfectin l5 Au.gust CCIJi7thRlibFor with flagship aDd statf detached 7thl'lt
report to ComadbsPac. other UDits JlClr in 7thfbibFor pass to CC!IDIMJid ot
ComadbsPac bombatant units to be reallocated to meet current operational
requirements and. ather units to forma subordinate command ot AdComEhtbsPac
to render service to all PhibsPac units in the miUPP.J:BS.
(F) When na British cOJIIIWld area is formed all British ~val forces rea:i.rd.Dg
in Pacific '!'heater pass to command of CINC BPF . .
(G) On 1 October CailthFlt pass to CamFidl.SeaFra operational control of all
units then under his command except. those otherwise assigned by CINCP.AC
to meet OLDIPIC requirements. At this time Air7thFlt change ruuae to Air
Fhil.SeaFron and pass to operational control CanFhil.SeaFron.
(H) On 1 October Com.Ph1l.SeaFron report to CINCPAC for duty as a fleet task
force cc:amander under the operational control of CIR::SWPA in comand of
naval forces assiped by' CINCPAC tor dutT within PHILIPPINE Sea Frontier.
These foreee to he sufficient to contain Japanese naval forces in SINGAP9RE
Area.

l3 08;1 OINCAFPAC TO CDJCPAC A,pV INFO COJffl'HFLT. CG AFWESPA.C,CG6T!W14I.CCJ4SERVPAQ,

CINCPAC

~ARt,

ax 25216.

Cite :your 0909fn Location of Naval Base north ot YAllAGAWA , KO

T.AKASU concurred in. Artq plans no facilities in this area.
!his also answers JOUr 080802Z.
instead

ot at

lJ 0901 5m!CPAC JJ>V TO CQWNCB

CTF 3S, DCBO.

& CNO

INFO

CCJlAIRPAC,CIN'CPOA PEjRL.COJQRDFLT .OOM5:f1Gt .

Concur in princ:lple with 7our 091.314 except consider l Februa17 and l November 1.946 to be more appropriate dates. 'l'o assist in planning the changeonr

in carrier air group ccmp1aaents the .tollCMimg rec0111D8ndati0118 are sul:ID:itteda

(A) Changeover to .36 VB CVLGs be made as soon as practieabl.e. CVIG1 s tor
CVL-48 Class be 24 VF and 24 VBF
(B) No model. distinction betiween VF and VBF and all. smgl.e-seaters on aDT l.
carrier to be same model. VF and VBF in ~VBG s and CVG' s to be about ha.l.l
and hilt.
(C) Increase VF(P) in CVG's frcm 2 to 4.
(D) No change in night groups or units.
(E) CVEGt s aad MCVGt s l8 VBF and 12 VSB.
(F) standard and spotting CompRons 20 VF and 9 VSB as soon as practicable.~
AS/I CompRons 12 VF am 1; VSB.
strongl;r recQDIDlend careful anaqsis VF requirements contained in above caaents
before Cutting back VF production.

1.3 10.3.3 RICHARDSON TO CINCPAC ADV. CG CPBC.

RJ

65600.

Inasmuch as

arrr dcmnvrard

revision of categoey of defense would release,

~, disproportionate to
the resulting l.oss of efficiency and security, it is recoliiD8nded that no c
change be made in the present modification of category of defense B. This
answers y-our radios 191.3.35 June 'l'QPLSETO DKE 2359 J~ also.

tor other use, Arm3' personnel in limited rmmbers

' 3386

{\

13 1309 CINCAFPAC ,'1'0 CDlCPOA 4DV. CG US ARMY STRAT AF (WASH) INFO VIAR.COS. QGFEAF,
CG AAF 20, DEPOOJl AAF 20.

ex 25301.

In view of WAROOS .30889 ot 12th, not to all, conference propoeeci tor this
headquarters 20 Juq ia our C.I 24785 for coordination of air operations is
now suggested for l August in order that General Spaatz ComGen u.s. Artq
strategic Air Force can be present. , Action addees please conc't.lr 'or camnent
With into to all.

lJ ]Jll. 9INCAFPAQ TO CINCPAC @V INFO CQYA..Al

ox 25302.
Concur in your l2f:ll2 reference maintaining axistiDg arrangements on

operational control ot FYAW and .. discussion ot ntAW preparati<m for Mure

operations at UANILA Coil.terence

13132) RUNNER TO

OOU~PAg' (PASSED TO OINQPAC ADV FOR

IBfp).

RUNNER 3rd li>re into area between 39-ll and 39-20. J4ade zig zag search
, up coast passing within l mile ot l. SAKE, 0 SAKI, SANGAN SHllll and OHAKO SAKI.
Also east west searches on Lat lines 39-101 l4 and J.a. Tanker and escorts
seen hugging beach.- Anti submarine vessels traversed area treell' Gear
work:illg pertect:cy-. Consider this survey shows definite absence of defensive
minefields offshore this area. lO d.qs practice has made evaluati011 of ccotacts less ditficult. Resurveyed vicinit;y of 36-Y! 140-50 today' approaching
fran direction of shore. !his revealed that the v.icinity is defiD:it~ clsar.'
Complete report on sOuthem ARWESLCNQJ'NDW WX 08001, 65775, 2 AUC 2.3 IVPP
OK"TRA ,36-40N l41-20E
09 1M2 COMGEN AIR . TO CG FEAF

Wmx29026.

INFO

CGMFPOA (BOI'B HQ)

AdDdDiatration of Air Force UDits ia ~AIIAI AREA is subject. Do nat;

tbiDk the creation o:t another numbered Air Force tor tbia.~purpoae is duirabl.e
at this time Retmad. CX 2.3l.68 dated 4 J~ l945i l possibilit;y is by the 5th
and ]3th AF absorbing the coabat UDita aDd eerrtce elements of the 7th Ar
ud using the Hdqtrs 7th AF to adm.inj ster the J.rwT air units not in FEAF
and proposed USASTAF in the HAWAIIAN AREA. This plan is now Within the capabilities o! the theater and appears to be the simplest solution. I~lana
and couments desired.
lO

0450

AIR
soss.In furtherance of the p10posal
which I

CG AAFPOA TO CG FEAF INFO CG

discussed with you. and General

KacArthur in IIAHILA. regarding the establisbraent of a DQIJiberecl air torce in
HAWAII I have dispatched a message to Gen Richat'd. . with into copies to 10'0.
and General Arnold (see 19' 10102'1 Ju.:cy-) This message contained the proposal
on which I intended to request Admiral Nimitz concurrence of July llth aDd
on wlich Gen. Richardson might commemt. In vi of the into contained in
WARX 29026, date time grOttp 09lM2 J'licy1 addressed to yoa, I feel that I
must now su.spend &'f1l' presentation ot the mambered Air Force proposal to
Admiral Nimitz., The 7th. AF is nor~ yours. General Arnold. s message appears
to coneur im. the basic idea of establishing a DQIJibered Air Force in HAWAII.
D:Ltticult.y arises on:cy- in the clisignation o:r a numbered Air Force Hdqtre to
do the job.' I will be ver.r much interested in receiving a copy ef your rep:cy-

to General .ArDoU.'

3387

12 2019 WARCOS TO ~INCAFPAC INFO CG USA.FMIDPAC. DEPOOMAf20 (PASSED 'fO CINCPOA AD!)
,AL"5t>

F~5$ed.

t:>l

tz.oM.vW-C.I:-l

..

13t9H-I

WARX .30889.
Conference proposes tor 20 Jul;r in Va:nila, reference your ex 243..52 and
CX 247851 at which United states strategic Air Force iD Pacific should be
represented, is subject.
Para. In view ot the importance of the United states An!;" strategic
Air Forces to be established as in WARI 304.38, Cau.GenAir is very desirowl
of having General Spaatz represent him persODal.J.T at the conf'erence in
llanila.
Para .Since General Spaats can not be present in llanil& \llll;U 1 August
would it materia.l.J.T interfere with your pJaming to postpone the conference
from 20

,--.

Juq

to 1 August.

12 2215 CCKGENFEAF SGD KmNEI

A

to

CO:U:GENAAFPOA.

759.3.3.

Refer~ce your Top Secret message 5053 loth: Following is message s a

General Arnold under date ot 11th Jul3:
"Reference 70ur W.X: 29026 9th recommend atfmi n:i stration ot Air Force
units in Hawaii b7 the 7th Fie):lter Wing now there, this wing slight:ll'
augmented is capable ot handling the Arlq Air part or the defense tor that
Area. i'bis augmentation can be taken .traa 1 o.t the fighter wings now set
up on the redeployment schedule. 7th. Air Force, augmented by' redepl0f8d
UDits, plJv's an essential part in the plans tor both OLYKPIC and CORONET.
If this headquart;era is abolished or detached it will be necessary to create
another head.quarters ot similar eize to handle the air units assigned to
the suceeasi~ areas and missions now set up tor the 7th Air Force."

12

00]4 C~f'!iPT tg CINCAFPAC infg ADQQMPHIMPAC 1 CTF 72 1 CTf 76 1 CINCPAC ADV

HQ, COKPHIBSPAC.

The following CCIDI!lents on Cirlcpoa ADV 080,301 are based upon certain
assumptions which han nat; been discussed in the preposed reorganization
of units na~r in the 7th Fleet. Prior to separation from StiPA proTision
should be made regarding the dnties ot COJJi7thFleet# as CIIF.
2. Provision should be made tor corxtrol of naval bases in MANUS, NEW'
GUmEA and AUSTRALIA and a command designated to be responsible tor their
.
roll up.
.3 Pro'fision should be made for the Operational CODtro1 Of submarines
SWPA. SUbject to the above. Concur with A B C E F G aad H Also concur
im principle with D except that date of tra.nS.ter should be not before 1
September and preferable later. N subject. It is suggested that
urmecessary reorganization can be avoided, with the last possibility ot
contusion during the critical period of mounting our forces or the OLDPIC
operation, i t the transfer of naval shore facilities from control ot
ComServ 7th neet to Com PSF is delayed u:ntil after 1 October. Exact date
to be determined later. On that date Com 7th Fleet reports to Cincpac
for duties in OLDIPIC and CPSF will have control of naval shore facilities
through ComSeron 7.
1.3 l.941 WARCOS to GINCAFPAC into CGUSAFMIDPAC, DEPCOMAF
CINCPOA ADV.

X),

COMINCH PASSED TO

3388

WI

13 21.05 CQM3RDFLT to. CTF 'II, CTF 3$. COMBATRON 2. C<JmATDIV Z :ipfo COMINOH. CINCPAC
BOTH HQ, COUSUBPAO. AIL FLAG OFFICERS 3RD FLT. CTF
COMF AIHmlG 18, COMGEN 2lb'1' BOJ&JlK)}l.

9J 1 CQFEAF, COM MARIANA,

This is annex A-1 to nv Op-Plan 9-45. Kovement and attack schedule

subsequent \o 21 Juq. See ~q 2'6l2Z1 June.
Para. Completion replenishment at 1600 2l ~fl Task Force .38 proceed
via direct route to point click to arrive 1200 23 u:q. Thence proceed
to launching position vicinity la.t .31-30 Long l35-00 to arrive 0430 24
J~. Conduct sustained strikes against combatant naval strength KURE,
sweep MIHO, strike air and. air installatiou KURE-KOBE area. At dusk
commence diversion retiranerrt; toward OKINAWA then proceed to launching
position vicinity lat .32-00 Long l36-J.O to arrive 0430 25 Juq. Jlake
ststained strikes against naval caabatant; strength KURE-KOBE area, sweep
MAIZURU1 ~trike air and air installations KOBE-NAGOYA area. At dusk
proceed to fueling rendezvous Lat 28-00 lDng JJS-00 to arrive CT/00 26
Ju:Qr.
Para. Fuel and replenish uutil 1200 Ju.l.T when proceed to launching
position vicinity Lat .3.3-00 Long 138-30 to arrive 0400 28 J~ strike air
and air installations in TOKYo-NAGOYA area. At d.uak retire to southward
until time to arrin launching position vici!rl:t;y Lat .33-30 Long 138-30 at
0400 .30 Juq. Continue strikes as for 28 J~.
P

Para. Task UDit 34.8.1 be prepared bombard HAKAMATSU area of HONSHU

at aboUt 2.300 28 ~ or about 1200 30 Juq as specific~ directed later

rejoiniDg Task Force .38 on completion. ADino al.lowance 30 rounds 8 and 16
inch HC per gun. C'l'F .38 provide night fighters or CAP tor Task Unit 34.S.J.
as required.
Para. Completion strikes .30 Ju:cy- Task Force 38 proceed to fueling
rendezvous Lat. 28-00 Long ]38-00 to arrive 1200 31 Jul1'.
Para. Com.tuel 1200 l August Task Force .38 preceecl to launching position
Ticinity Lat. 3~-40 1.3.3-30 to arrive 0430 2 August. Conduct sustained
strikes against shipping SASE'BO, sweep FUSAN shipping, strike air and a.ir
installations northern KYiJSRU-KURE area. At dusk proceed via Lat. Z7-S5
IAmg l37-40 and Lat. 28-35 Long. ~; to fueling remezvou Lat .3,3.30
Long 147..00 to arrive 0500 ; August.
Para. Compfuel S August proceed .via point CHARM to launching point
vicinity point LIFE or via points CHARM and SCIENCE to launching point
vicinity point CAZETTE as later directed accordance later instructions
launch air strikes against air and air installations in TOKIO PLAINS area
vicinity LIFE or against same targets north HONSHtJ-HOKKAIBO f'rom T.i.cinitJ'
GAZE'rl'E comm.ciDg dawn 7 August. Retire east at suck and retum at da1m
to contuue strikes from. same position on S August.
Para. Task Unit 34,.8.2 be prepared bombard HONSHU or HOKKAIDO targets
on 7 or 8 August as later directed. CTF 38 furnish CAP for Task Unit
34.8.2 as required.
Para. Task Force 37 be prepared operate in conjunction with Task Force
38 in accordaace this schedule as practicable. Also be prepared tor separate
operations 011 north HONsmJ-HOIK.AIDO targets during this period. llov'emeut; and
attack schedule for Taak Force 37 by separate annex later.
Para. Present intention return Task Forces to bases upon completion
ot strikes 8 AugUst.
Para. All of above schedule subject to chatlge due to weather and
tactical deve1opments.
Para. All positions nort,h and east and times I ( -9).

33 89

l3 21.45 CO!QRDFLT TO-- CINCPAC ADV INFO CG2l.BWCOM,COJmARIANAS.CTG99.2.CGlO.COJlAIR IWO,

COMFEAF,OTF93.CTf38,CTF~.ALL TGC TF -38.
.
-.

Request you institute following coordination plan connection Annex Al JV

OpPl.an 9-45. Jfy 132105. Throughout period .cmcerned colltinuation maxilDQII practicable etrort of air forces against the Fm.pire. Speci.tical.:cy' request following: By OKINAWA Air. On 24 & 25 JuJ max:i.mum effort KIUSHU fields striking
fie~ds northem KYUSHU all possible. 28 Jul3 strike northem KYUSHU and
sweep KURE area fields. Repeat on .30 Juq major concentratitG on KURE area.
1 A~t maxil'JIIlll effort northern KYUSHU fields. 2 August southern KIUSHU

fields.

BT Task Force 93: on 24 & 25 July maximum effort; NAGOYA area airfields.
28 a.nd 30 JtLcy" .maximum effort KOBE Area airfields. l August and 2 August
maxi mum effort KOBE-NAGOYA airfields.
21 BomCaa: Continuation basic stategic plan best request foll<M'ing eceptiona it at varian8e with such plan. 2lv-25 Ju:cy- attack air facilities
TOKYO PLAINS area. 1 or 2 August TOKYO-NAGOYA area air f'acilitiee.

In setting up coordination request strikes on the areas assigned to

OKDWf! and. lWO air be b7 groups staggered throughout the days in questica
to keep eneav air constant~ occupied and thus reduce air retaliaticm pc.Jtential
Unforeseen delqs may preclude adhering aactq to schedule in which ease

CINCPAQ is requ.est;ed i t practicable to adjust coordination accordinH to

accomplish the ettect herein outlined.

14 0255 CINCPAC ADV TO CIN04FPAC

J1.r pl.aJming start })ave been giving cmside:rable atteaticn to compliame
JCS WARX 17064 (142.307 June). It would be extremeq helpful it l. or more ot

rour

planners cou1d visit GUAM about 20 Ju:Qr !or a briet ccoterence concera-

ing occupation plans and ineidental.J3 orient 1118' planners connection your
CORONET concepts as they now stand.

14 0256 CINCPAC AJ!JV TO CINC4FPAC

IHFO<DIINCH, CG US.ASTAf DEPQOM USASl'Af.
;
Your 1.31.309.

Dela\r untill.

August of conference concern:irlg air coo:rdi.Da-

tion ~IC first requested by your dispatch CX 24152 of 9 Jul:T is agreeable

to me. Request information as tG whether you now propose a conference CD
the statf level between planning representatives of CINCAFPAC , CINCPAC and.
C(J(G.EN USASTAF or a conference between the Commanders themselves.

14 0901 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCAFPAC .DEPCCJ420. CTF93 Into CGFEAF ,CINCPOA PEARL. COK3RDFLT
CTF 3S, CTF

37

132145. Will appreciate your cooperation in coordinated air strikes at

places and times desired by C~rdFlt 132145 insofar as practicable. "4 '
Request you in:f'orm. this Hq and info addees of your intent am firm plans

3390

l4

21.33 C(J.{GENF\IFPAC to CIMCPAC ADV HQ into CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COM 3RD FLEET,
COM 5TH PHIBFOR, COMGEN SERVCOMD F.MFPAC, COMGEN 5THPHIBCORPS, COOGm

4TH MARDIV.

int regt. as ground force required to

Consider 1 MarDiv (reinf) less
accomplish your 110832. 4th MarDiv nominated. Earliest date to eGIIID8DCe
moutl"Ging from MAUl 15 September with target date pending on rehearsal
requirements naval forces to be employed. Reinforcing UDits nominated and
presenli location as follows: Sth and lOth Amt#racs bns. MAUl. 1 Co 1st
Armd Amph .Bn. SAIPAN. 4th Am]:il Trk Co and 1 Prov Amph Trk Co. JWJI.

1 baab disposal plat. GUAM. Vll()-4. MAUl. lst' rocket; det. llAUI. 1
ProT hea'1' morliar co. MAUl. _ 4.3rd NCB. MAUl. This Will require folldld.Dg
substitutions be made for units nCIIf scheduled tor emplQ1DLent with VAC.
4th and 9th ADrt;rae Bns at GUAM substituted for Sth and lOth Amf:,rac Bns.

1 NOB to be assigned to 2nd lrarDiv at SAIPAN to be su.bstituted for 43rd

NCB. Earl.1' approval desired. aboYe tentatiw t!'QOp list in order that
changes indicated in unit assignments to VAC mq be effected at earliest
practicable date. Contemplated that no garrison forces are provided fraa
above assault force.

l5

(Yf28

CINCPAC ADV to COgDFLEET info CTF

.38

Insure that CTF .38 Op-Order 2-45 modified to contom. with objectives
y-our 0.30SlS and rq ll2.33S to the end that eDell\1 com'batant vesael.s raaa 1 ni ng
TOKYO BAY are destroy'8d

lS

f1720 OINCFOA ADV HQ to CINCAFPAC into COMINCH.

RDIITZ TO MACARTHUR INFO KING.

It is not quite 2 months since our conference in MANILA at which we
2S423 DTG UD72~ and as I thowzht
discussed... th!A~Ub..1eeta covered bJr :r~

ex

arr:Lvect a:" wuu.er~andlllgS wM.Ch, a:L'tllougll they- reprei8ll'tea conceasloDi ~Cit

were te serve as the basis tor eur preparations tor OLDIPIC
both
ted time aTailable. Pursu.a.nt to those understandings I haw
in the
released to you all the major combat elements ot the Arlq then under lilT
control except the bea4quartera l.Otb Arsrq, headquarters 24th Corps, the
7th and the 27th Inta.nlir.r Divisions and various attached units all of
which are still engaged in mopping up operations on OIURAWA but all of
which are b)r a greement or by accepted plans available to y-ou for OLDIPIC

sitt!t

or CORONET as y-ou desire.

Para. It is trae that relativel~' tew serrlce.. ~troops have been. rel.eased
to you but that is because as was well knolfm t~ existed in the Pacific
Ocean-Areas a shortage of Arlq Service Troops for Arlq purposes which bas
been part~ but onq part:cy- aUeViated. by- the use of naval. personnel to
fill Arlq deficiencies.
Para. My" 080.301 Jul;r asked y-our comuent or concurrence on matters
which pert;ained. to the internal organization or the 7th Fleet and spec1ca.].4r left under your operational control the naval. forces assigned. to
your area. Similar reorganizations have been mad.e within the ArlriT forces
in the Pacitic Ocean Areas without reference to me.
Para. I will be glad to confer with you again in. connection with these
pr0blems at any time that you can arrange to be qr guest at Guam for tbat
purpose. current operations will require uq presence here tor a considerable
period.

3391

..

l2 1145 CGUSFCT to WARCOS info GGREUSFCT. CGSOSCT, CGUSFIBT, CINCPAC, CINCAFPAC,

COMG.t!NAAFR>A.

FBI 717.
1. Utiilisation ot FORT BAYARD is subject. Reference t4'ad WARX 22283,
b.ARI 25857 and WAU Zl72 (last 2 radios were not sent to all and are
not required to understand this :radio). China theater has completed
the stuey of materiel and personnel refl0"1N8S required by CinNA theater
tor this project and available to CHINA theater and DIDIA BURMA theater.
2. The results of this stucb" are as tol.l..ows: A. FORT BAYARD will be used
by CHINA theater as an auxll1ar.r temporarr sapp:cy- base w.i.tJl a11 air and
auxiliary ground line of communication forward to support CARB)NAOO
modified. Target date tor 2nd report area is 15 Augus1; 1945. B. The
capacity of the port area is to be 5 liberty ships or their equival.Slt
Type cargo delivered forward initial.l1' will be ~:Qr
per month.
drummed oil. D. Personnel requirements in FORT BAYARD area estimated
as 4300 of which CHINA theater can supp];r S06, INDIA BURMA theater can
supp] the equivalent o 3147. The shortage is 647 made up ot 1
militar;r police CQilp&n1' to and. E 15-37 less .1 traffic platoon, strengt;h

c.

w-m less 1 .
operating platoon, strength 108; Ordnance mam comparq to and E 9-lZ/1
streDgth -ll6; 1 Quartermaster based depot compazv to aDd E 10-367,
strength 76 and 1 port canpa117 to and E 50..177, and 1 Headquarters and
Headquarters detachment port battalion to and E 55-116. CHINA theater
is prepared to accept the cost ot transporting persoDnel plus certa:in
equipment frau DIDIA BURll.A theater to CHINA thea~er and to improvise
initia.l:Qr to cover the above shortages. However, CHINA theater JIIUSt
request that the most; expeditious action be taken to meet the 647
shortage listed above. E. The material loading on the 1st 5 ships 1.8
aatisfactory to CHINA theater as specified in WARX 2SS06 with the
addition of T/E equipnent for 1 port COlllpai\V' anc1 30 dqs B rations for
5,000 men. The. loading schedule tor the tollorl up shipping will be
forwarded to ,-ou as soon as possible. In gceral it will cover ma.i.ntenanee requirements of u.s .. forces in port; area including AV Gas tor
transports and fighter squadrons and cargo to be forwarded which we will
now examine in closer detail. r. The initial destination of the 1st 5
124; Quartermaster petroleum. supJ>l compall1' to and E

ships should be determined b7 CDCAFPAC CHIRA theater recamnends KANILA

time WEICHCJN TAO is a questionable venture and will require
diversion frQD. FORT BAYARD. The information of this area and FORT
BAYARD REQUESTED has been forwarded b7 separate radio.

.3. At this

4. Concur that LUZON air route appears inadvisable at this time it !a-

cUities now allocated to om:NA thea\er must be used. A detailed stuq

this will be continued here. CHINA theater has just seen WARX 29fT/2
answers required will be sent later.

ot
-'-"

16

0141 CINCroA ADVANCE to OOMINCH. ClNCAFPAC, COMGENPOA, COUGENAIR into OOMGENUSA'l'F,

CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

Cinepoa concurs in Richard.son t s RJ 65765 DTG 150946.

16 0247 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ into CG 6TH ARMY. CCU5THPHIB, COY.SERVPAC.

ex

2~864

Refers to your 090610 not to all.. Your assumption. that functions

performed by' naval garrison beach parties will be performed by similar~,
- coutinued -

3392

._,
CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV info CG 6TH ARMY, OOM5THPHIB, OOMSERVPAC

(Cont'gl

Antr
,.-::.

units for KOSID:KI RErTO, southeast KIUSHU and east KYUSHU Jam1ngs is
not correct. . In addition to 4 naval garrison beach part.ies desired b7 Sth
amphibious Corps, 6th ~ c!esires 1 eacll naval garrison beach part;7 for
operational attaebm.ent to each of 8 engineer shore battalions scheduled tor
employment. Further desire 3 battalion headquarters attached to Supervise

these beach parties.

16 Cf'/27 OOMGEN USASTAF to CD'CAFPAC into COMGEN A.FMIDPAC. CDiCPOA BOTH HQ, COllGD'

AIR

OCtlGm USASTF

ADMili

0261 l.ook at CDCPAC ADV 1.20814 GCT JlLcy'. Requirement giv beJ.c. is
based on tollolring asswaptions: A. 1'hia headquartiers responsible all USASi'F
construction in liARIANAS and RYUKYUS; B. withdranl of all constructioa
assistance on .USASi'F airfields such as naval construction battali0118J c.
WithdraJral ot all USAS!AF tmits from cmstruction other than VIR and allied:
.t'lmctions; D. USASTAF caa obtain support frail a theater tor engineer urdts
other thaD those applied by' Arm:~' Air Forces, ie, spare parts companies,

heav

shop companies, dump tru.cks companies and ordanee medium. maintename

companies. E. 'ftle following Ellgineer aviation troops now in this theater

or cCiaitted clan 4 Hq and Hq companies regiments, 34 battalions, 2 depot

canpanies 1 4 maintenance canpanies, 3 topograpldcal compani ea, 1 air force
Hq C<llpaD1' and 3 uliilities companies will be retained by' USASTAF as long as
required.. F. ~enance will be performed in areas to rear ot UARIANAS by
adesigna.ted ai.r force. ; utilities companies and 1 separate COIIlpaZV" ncar
assigned in such areas. Presuming above asaaptions correct, USASTAF will
require 1 engineer counand, aviation, 6 Hq and Hq canpanies reg:l.m.ents, 36
battalions, 2 Depot companies, 6 liaintmance companies, 3 topographical
companies, 1 air force Hq compai\T, 1 topographical battalion and 3 utilities
companies in addition to units . reterred to iD D above from a theater. 'Ibis
creates a shortage of ~ engineer ccanand aviation, 2 Hq and Hq canpanies
regiments, 2 maillteDanCe companies, and 1 topographicak battalion between
units required and units on hand or committed USASTAF. It is understood
it the strategic situation remains st;abilized. as far&$ VLR requirements
are co.ncem.ed that as construction is completed a progr-easin release of
aviation engineer units will be made to a number required for maillteunce
purposes OllJ.T.
16 0249 CitTCAFPAC to CQMGENFEAF info CINCPOA BOTH HQ 1 DEPCO}QF 20 1 OOM:3RDFLEl,
CTF

ex

93

GTF 38, CTF

,37.

2586;

In support of operations 3rd Fleet as outlined im his Amlex lA operations

Plaa 9-45 (.3rd Fleet Radio 1.32105 with info 1'~EAF) desire comGenFEAF in
.
coordination With other RYOXYUS based air forces support operations . to the
manumm ex.ten:t practica.b~e With. strikes in the KYUSHU-KURE area on schec:luls
as indicated. in COmmander 3RD Fleets 132145 (into to FEA.F). Schedule of
strikes to be flexibl.e and to be adjusted to conform to ~ change in pl.aDs
of CoJJ~Dander 3rd Fleet due to untorseen cielqs. Desire you submit earliest
,-aar schedu:Led pl.an for support irlcluding estimated strilci.Dg force and targets
with informatiom to aclees in CINCPOA ADV 140901..

33 93

16 0830 COMGENAF 20 TO USASTAF GUAM info CINCFOA ADV, C01QRDFLEE1', COMGENAIR.

AIDCO 1304.
SUbject operations in coordination 3rd Fleet. Convnents on Com3rdFleets
132l45Z (GCT) follows as requested by your 15004;z. Presume air facilities
means airdrome instal.lations. Attack against Slleh instal.lations at variance
with basic strategic plan. ~ VLR primarr targets principaJ.:cy- aircraft
production instal.lations are located TOKYO..NAGOIA area. Intentions are to
strike our primary targets during the period 24. Jticy" - 2 Augllst; when weather
forecast indicates reasonable chance visual bombing. Otherwise incendiary
destruction of urban industrial. areas will be continued.
\

16 2>13 COJQRDFLEET to CINCPAC ADV BQ info CTF 38.

Your 150728 acknowledged.

c.rF .38 will complJ'.

lJt. QJ2.3i QDOP.AC ADV to CINCAFPAC into COMINCH.

Having in mind the desirability of continued supervision of developaezdi
of OKINAWA by' ComGeni'EN for our mutual advantage and of having at OKINAWA
during the OLDIPIC assault and aruv officer of STmiELLS standing and in
vi also of your OOR(J{ET plans tor the 10th ~ and use of divisions as
OLDlPIC reserves I request your comment or concurrence on the fol.l.Oifing
proposals in connection with the release to :rou of the a:rnv units concerned.
The Headquarters 10th ~to report to y-ou nCM' tor CORONET planning and
l
B

to be released from JJtV operational control. abCN.t 1 DeceJd;)er.

The Headquarters 24th Corps

to

be released to you now.

The 7th am 27th Divisions to be released to you about 1 October.

17 f1'/l7 CINCAFPAC to QINCPAO ADV into WARCOS, OG USATAF, DEPCOM USASTAF.

ox

'2167
Your l402S6Z, August, 1 conference coordination of Air. Staff conf'erence
was intended, hOifever Army Air Forces wish ComUSASTAF to attend. No
objection attendance commanders. Final decisions will of course reJiain
with CINCPAC, CINCAFPAC and. UOMUSASTAF.

17 1725 COMFEAF to CG ADVON FEAF into CmCAFPAC. CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COllSTRATAIR,
COlQRDFLEET, CTF 38, CTF

ll

AX 77476

CDJCAFPAC OX 25865 orders that Far East Air Forces, in support of Com,3rd.Fleet operations outlined in his radio 1.32105 and ill coordination with
other RYUKYUS based air f'orces, conduct air attacks to max:Jnmm exteut
practicable in the KYUSHU-KURE area. Schedule or these air attacks will be
as oul:;lined in Com3rdFleet 132145 and will be flexible to conform. to &1'.\Y
change in plans of Com3rdFleet due to unf'orseen delays.
Para. Ad.von FEAF missions current:cy ordered comp:Q" with this directive.
Advon FEA.F will annOUDCe his air iutent dai~ with information to CmCAFPAC,
CINCPOA !EARL, CINCFO.A. ADV, COMSTRATAIR, COM,3RDFLT, CTF 38 and CTF 'J7.
Para. CINCPOA ADV is requested herewith to direct that radios containing
information on fleet operations plans and fleet movenents include CG ADVON
FEAF as into adee. Copies of references above being forwarded CG ADVON FEAF
by specia.l safehand courier Ju4' 18.

'3394

IJII!II
j

18 0651 giNCPOA A.DV to QINCAfPAQ into 5el'HAIRFORCE, FEAfa Com>HI~SPAC. COMSERJPM

COMSER!lTHFL~, CINOfflA
COMGEN2NDMAftA!~W

PURL*

COJAAIRPAC a COMGENAIREMFfAC, COI4GEN1S'.Q!Al!1

Following Marine Air Units will COillprise the 1st Uarine Air Wing for
OLYMPIC Wing HedRon-l, Wing Seron- 1.1 lla.rine Air Groups 12, 14, 33,
61 as preserxtl.T orguizM . Marine Air ()roup 32 censistin g ot HedRon
32, Seron .32, VllSB-241., VMSB-343, VMTB-]J4. lla.ri.ne Air Grou:p-24 consisting e Hedroa-24 , Seron-24, VIF(H)-54 11 VMF(B)-533. Bedron-62 with air

Warning Squadrons, 3,4,9,12 aDd GCI units :L throqb. S inclusive attaehecl.

AWS .3 and AWS 4 are light weigb.t units. v.MD-254.- Colonel Roberts USMC
on statt C.omGenAirFMFPac arrives MANILA on 19th with detailed iogistic
intormatic m.
18 U103 ClNCPAQ APV to COllZ'fHFLT. - COMPHIBSPAC intq COMSQVPAC. QJ;MCPA(i
COMSER!'lTHFLEJil, COMSERVBON 10.

PJARL,

CDCAFPAC l62lll. Paragraph 8 reads 11petrolewn logistics required

b7 7th Attack Force afioat tlaat assemble in tbe MANILA area for the
oLiiiPIC operation will D8 provided by' ComServ'ltbFleet and will be
"
slated by CIHCPA.C.rt
decision to reorganiz e
confirms
all
to
not
ll21.35
CominCh
Para.
It appears to CINCPAC
7.
servron
establish
and
Fleet
7th
force
service
petroleum logistics
to
respeet
with
bilities
respensi
's
'7
BervRon
that
and 7th attack force
3rd.
as
insofar
icientical
be
will
area
UARILA.
in the
.
all.
to
ot
n
130751
rq
also
See
.
concerned
are
Para. Request J'OV joint recemmen datiou as to changes in CINCAFPAC s
l.62lll neceseary iu l.ight of COJIINCH ll2lJ5 and rq 130751 which Colilthnt furnish to ComPhibsPac.
18 1200 JOINT CHIEFS

OF

STAFF . to CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA into AGWAR_, NAVI DEP.A.Imm:NT.

Victory 65 BG ~. The p rovision of a .harbor of refuge for "tbe

protectio n of Lighterag e and small craft construct ed or block. ships which
would satisfy )"our primar.r ,concern as outlined in CX-24937 is within our

means and can 'be providecl OA time.

Para. ExpansiGn of. the project to include Caissons for the protectio n
of ocean-goi ng vessels requires overridin g priority ewer other major war
programs with possibili ty that tftis might interfere with other programs

more essential to the success orthe operation .

Para. Nav Department has acivised that its towing facilitie s are
being augmented by lO A!A' s ud. 45 Liberty ship towing installat ions.
!herefore believe towing or s'teel eaissons and black ships e an be undertaken withe\xt serious detriment. to CINCAFPAC t S and CINCPAC 'S tating
programs fran west and gult eoaets to forward areas. Navy Department will
select towing units With regard to suitabili ty for ready ships which latter
mq be large~ ua self propelled.
Para. Navy Department states tb.at given priority caissons can 'be
constru.et e4 a.md delivered to theater on time. A.bilitl to assemble at site
must be cemsiderecl.
Para. In view of the impact on other programs and requireme nts and
the necessitr of having reasonabl ;r fi:rm asnrance that if' tne caisseu
are ecmstra.,t ed they will be used CDICAFPACs recommendation is reqaestecl
- coDtinued -

3395

- continue d 18 1200 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAJi'F to CINCAFPAC, CINCFOA info AGWAR, NAVI

DEPART. (Qsmttd)

as a matter of urgency as to whether the Joint Chiefs of starr shall

provide only a harbor of refuge for small cra.t't construc ted wholl1' of
constru ction and delivery block ships or whether they shall proceed with the
1
of the arJ.ific ial barber as defined in CINCAFPAC S CX-249'37 which includes
the provisio n of Caissons capable of shelteri ng cargo shipping~ on the
understa nding that addresSe es are w.l.lling to accept possible impact on
towing and other program s. Further request CINCPOA'S ccmnent.s on naval
phases of project both towing and siting.
18 2252 CINCPAC ADV to CINCAFPAC into COMPHIBSPAC. COM5THFLEET, CINCR>A PEARL.

In the ICEBERG operatio n unexpec ted delays occured in the earl;r

establis hment of adequate air warning faciliti es in the out~ position s
which necessi tated reliance tor air warDing on vulnerab le surface craft
with resultan t loss in men and ships. It is of mutual and paramom t iDporlance that air warning units that are to go into out~ position s for
OLYMPIC be so l.oaded and echelcmed that their efficien t f\mction ing is
assured at the earlies t possible time at the outset of the operatio n to
give the maxinnuu protecti on to the amphibio us effort. Informa tion as to
your plans for the ear:cy- activati on or air warning units on out:cying
position s will be apprecia ted.
19 0455 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CG 6TH

ex

ARMf.

CG PEAF, OOMPHIBSPAC.

26663.

Objectiv e area designa ted in para .3x(4) AFPAC operatio ns instruct ions
number l dated 20 June is subject. AFPAC, FEAF and COMPHIBSPAC are in
agreeme nt in changing delinea tion of objectiv e area to that area south
of 32-30N which is enclosed by arc of circle havin~ radius of 120 nautica l
miles with center at SATA III SAKI ('31..00 N ]JQ-4.0 EJ. Purpose to allow
more water area for forces of COMPHIBSPAC. Request comments or concurre nce.

Into ships hereby detached 3rd Fleet and assigned to CTF 94 :tor
tempora ry operatio nal. control for employment as ASH Task Group.
Para. CTG 32.1 detach SALAMAUA, CTG 3Q.S DEri'ACH DE'S and sail to
rendezvo us as directed by CTF 94.

19 0647 CINCPOA ADV to ClllCAFPAC inf'o COMGJmroA, CINCPO.l PEARL.

CINCPOA coast artiller y unit requirements are now 1 Bn at -PEI.ELIU and
1 Grp Hq and .3 Bns at OKINAWA. All other coast artiller y units COMGENroA

Dispatch 160213 are availab le now for release to you. Advise disposi tion
desired. Upon depa.rt'l re these units present stations operatio nal control.
passes to you.
Para. By 1 August the coast artiller y units at OKINAWA will pass to
your operatio nal contro~ therefor e no action will be taken by CmCPOA on
request for convers ion of 1 CA Bn at OKINAWA to FA containe d COMGENroA
160213.

339

111!

19 0611 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS, CINCPAC, :into COMPHIBSPAC, CG 6THARMY. CG 8TH

ARMY

ex 26685.

Armored divisions for employment in CORONET will not be available for

dispatch from the United states until November or DecEinber. If staged
through PHILIPPINES, arriVing in December or January, respectively, o~
ver:r limited period can be allowed for shakedown and mounting out on or
about 20 Janua.ry. War Department has agreed to shipnent direct to objective
area in sea-trains or other means provided armored divisions can be handled
at destination as required (W 16507 1 13 June).
Para. The following reinforcing units should aCCanpatV" armored
divisions in assault shipping; 2 battalions 155 Gun (SP) 1 2 engineer caabat
battalions, 2 Treadwq Bridge companies, 2 Ordanance Bn companies (Tank),
2 Ordnance Ammunition companies, 2 Quartermaster Gas SUppq companies,
2 Quartermaster truck companies (Aug), 1 Headquarters and Headquarters
Detachment, Quartermaster Battalion (Mobile) 1 1 Quartermaster 'l'ruck
COlDP8l\Y, petroleum (Equipped under Column 2 B). L Corps headquarters
should be alerted to accompany this shipnent in the event that a definite
requirement is established therefor.
. Para. Prel.im:l..nary investigation here indicates feasibility of rel.easing from OLYMPIC 90 LST .fA!! at XRAY plus 35 and 12 APA, and 6 AKA at XRAY
plus ;o for dispatch to west coast to lift 2 armored divisions, reinforced,
direct to CORONET objective area to arrive not later than Y Plus 5.
Para. Request CINCPAC concurrence in utilization of assault shipping
as proposed herein with infomation copy direct to War Department.
Para. Request War Department confirmation of availability of units
listed Qove and apprOYal of assault loading and proposed movement of
2 armored divisions, reintorced, as indicated, from west coast direct to
,
objective area.
Para. Movement of these units by amphibious illt as priority would:
Insure ample time tor preparation prior to entry into combat.
, _A
Relieve congestion in staging area and ports, and
B-'
Effect appreciable reduction in Back-Log o.t shipping.
C
Para. Earl;r rep~ appreciated.

19 lll7 CINCAFPAC to CINCPOA ADVANCE into WARCOS.

ex 2h793.

No further action being taken, reference your 170523 (GCT) relative

to tactical units on OKINAWA, in view of recent directive of the Joint
Chief of staf'f.

19 142.3 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. CD'CPAD .ADVANCE. info Bl}Jk
PEARL, BPNL CINCPAC.

...

ex

26866

This replies to radio Joint Chiefs of stat 1812$0. The recommended

a.rtifieal harbor will be used for the operation as planned and the possible
impact of its provision on towing and other programs has been ful.ly
considered and is accepted. It is recommended that Joint Chief of staff
aul#horize construction and delivery artificial harbor as defined in CX
24937 which includes caissons capable of sheltering cargo shipping.

3397

19 0533 CINC.AFPAC to CINCFOA ADV info WARCOS (FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF ST.Affl, COOTHFLT.

ex 26668.

I have just concluded a series of conferences in an endeavor to

aceonunodate the transfer of the 7th Fleet as proposed in your 080301 and
the transfer of MANUS as proposed in your 130751. This modifies 1'!\V
OX 25993 originated l6ll21. I believe that this can now be accomplished
as you desire subject to the comments of Com7thFleet 120014 and to the overall approval of features which involve the AUSTRALIAN and Dt1l'CH governments. It is ~ understanding that these features will of necessity have
to be arranged by the Joint Chiefs of' starr.

17 0550 GOMPHIBSPAC to QDICPAP ADV info '@CWPHIBSPAC BCII'H. CINCPAC P&ARL HQ.
CINCAFPAC, CG 6tH ARMY, CG 2ND, .)Jm, 5'.t'H MARDIVS, CGFMl'PAC. CG5THPHIBCORf1
.
COM3Rt)6 _. S'fH, m PHIBbl()R, COUPHIBGRPS ll., 12, 13 l4.
. Following requested training schedule modifies my 09091;. 202220
and Z7o635 all of June and has been approved in part; by you. Request
ove~ approval.
A. Philippines 12 ISTS 10 LSM and TransRon 16 now being employed on
continuous bases. . Approved by your 190122 of May and 220818 of June.
B. An additional TransDiv is required in PHILIPPINE area for period ot
1 month commencing 25 Juzy for training additional ROTS not included
in original tentative t .r aining schedule. Requested by CINCAFPAC.
Action not known.
C. TransRon 15 (less BERRIEN, BLADEN, BARROW, LACERTA, MULPHEN) .20 LST
and 10 LSM to arrive PHILIPPINES 30 days prior to loading. Requested
by COMOOBSPAC 090915 of June approval not received.
D.

E.

F.
G.

20

GUAM .3RD MARDIV TransDiv

Approved by your 200724.

37, 10 LST, lD LSM available 21 August.

SAIPAN 2ND MARDIV 4 APAsincluding a division flagship of TransRon

12, 10 I.ST and 10 LSM available 8 September. Requested by Com5thPhib
140021.
OAHU 5TH MARDIV 4 APAS including a division flagship of TransRon 24,
6 LST and 12 LSM available 26 August. Requested by Oom5thPhib 140021.
OAHU 98TH DIVISION ConTransRon 22 in WESTMORELAND. KARNES. BOTTINEAU.
BOWIE, KINGSBURY. ALAMANCE. SAPHiO. 10 LST and lD LSM available 1
August. Approved by your 092.316.

EC.M HOLDERS into COMFAIJMNG 18, COMSUBPAC, CINCPA.q

COMGEN 'l':m, COMGEN FEAF ADVON, COMF AI:mflNG 1.
COMMARIANAS,
HQ,
ADV

1.337 COM)RPFLT to 3RP FLT

It is rq intent to tighten blockade and keep pressure on the enemy

by throwing light force sweeps against EMPIRE coast and ~utl;ring islands
at every opportunity. Objectives denial of coastal sea. lanes to. enem~
destruction shipping and bombardment of shore targets. These raJ.ds will

u~ be ordered suddenl;r.
. Para. Keep currently familiar with locations within operational
range with emphasis on enetey" coastal. shipping refuges. EneJey" mine fields.
And coastal targets euch a.s harbor facilities, railroad bridges, yards
and tunnel.s. Radar and radio stati ons, shore batteries, factories~ town~

3398 .

._
20 1819 cogrnCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ info COOTHF LT. CINCABPAC. COMSOBPAC,
.
CDICPAC PEARL HQ, OOMSERVPAC.
1

Your 130751. Items A B .c E G and H are approved. Item D is under

under advisement and
consideration. Item F and future of CNAF
dependent on ac~ion by JCS on proposal to reorganize SWPAC area. Make
nomination to me for Rear Admiral to command u. s. Naval forces
AUSTRALIA, NEW GUINEA. What are your plans for Task Force 71.

are

19 lll9 GINCAFPAC to WARCOS,(FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAF!t), GINCPAC ADV HQ.

ex

26794.

Will be glad to welcome Bri.ti sh Corps Commander and accanpa.nying

officers. SUggest their arrival earliest date and i t practicable b.1 1
August. Reference Joint Chiefs of staff V 66 BG l45, 18th. CINCPAC
requested to comment or concur directly to Joint Chiefs of staff,
information to CINCAFPAC.

19 2'327 CDICPAC ADV to COMINCH into CINCAFPAC, GINCPAC P.I:WIL HQ.

I concur in CINCAFPAC 19lll9 to WARCUS concerning arrival British
Corps Commander and accompa.nr.i.ng officers.
20 f1710 OOMGENCHINA to CINC,.I\FPAC, CINCroA info WARCQS, OOMGENAF 10, COMG&WSOBCHJ.NA,
COMGENUSF~HINA,

COMGENIATACT.

CFBX ll69.
Agree that meeting between representatives from Headquarters CHINA
THEATER, Headquarters CINCAFPAC a.nd Headquarters CINCPOA at GUAM as

suggested in radio 140304 is higbl desirable. .

Para. A study and assessment of resources and requirements of CHINA
THEATER is being made now. This study will be completed about the end
.of July. If you agree it is recommended that conference be held on or
about 31 Jlicy. Composition o CHINA THEATER party will be furnished later.
Present plans are to leave on or about 30 Juzy. SUggest that CHINA THEATERS
officers return via .MANILA to insure coordination of operations.
Para. Captain Painter has arrived and is providing very valuable
assistance in both our future and operational planning.
Para. For Ma.cArthurs request clearance for 1 C 54 aircraft through your
area on or about 31 July. If you eel ti.at a meeting between CHINA THEATER
officers returning from GUAM and your people would be 'Hneficial they will
retum via MANILA for a brief conference.
~AR(ACTION) PASS TO NAVY FOR ACTION info
CINCAFPAC FOR MACARTHUR, CINCPOA FOR NIMITZ, VICTORY 12S BG 198.

20 1100 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF tq

Construction and provision of an artificial harbor to m.eet the

strategic requirements set forth in CINCAFPAC CX 24937 of 12 Jul.1" is
approved by the Joint Chiefs of sta!f'. The construction and establishment
of this .artificial harbor is charged to the Navy. The Navy will proceed
with this project with priority above all Military and Naval programs
except manhattan project and will be assisted by appropriate agencies
of the War Department as necessary. Appropriate action by the Joint
&ogistical Committee and Joint Military Transportation committee is
directed.

3399

,.

20 llOS JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF .to CINCAFPAC FOR MACARTHUR info CINCPAC FOR NIMITZ.
AG!IYAR, NAVY, NAVY DEPARTMENT VIA AG.fVAR VICTORY l29 BG 192

With regard to ~our C 26799, direct- in Victory 73 perl;ained only

to the R!UKYUS. This does not preclude the. transfer o! responsibilitie s
pertaining to USSI'AF units elsewhere in the Pacific by mutual agreement;
as provided in WAR 6Z773 of 3 April.
20 2208 WARCOS to CINCAFPAC, COMG:EN USFCT info CINCPOA ADV HQ.

WARX 35530.
For operation and maintenance of LCM 1 s for FORT BAYARD PROJECT
CINCAFPAC is requested to (see Navy Ra.d 1921.33) arrange loading and onward shipping of personnel with equipment to destination. Possible use
ot naval escort carft for this should be examined. For information 4th
and 5th ships depart NEW <ELEANS POE 16th and 2J.st Juzy res~tive:cy.
Para. New subject. CHINA THEATER should arrange to fumish tents
fuel and necessar,r logistic support to these navy personnel on arrival.
Believe it proper that navy personnel used in port operations not be
charged against existing navy troop ceiling.
Para. New subject. To facilitate detailed arrangements for these
operations, it appears desiravle for CHINA HQ to establish liaision in
cmCAFPAC headquarters. CHINA'S CFBX 689 J~ 12 refers. WD has not
received into copies of inter theater cables ( CFBX 689) which announce
decisions reference split of responsibilitie s for the operation. It
is requested that War be included as info addressee on all inter theater
cables reference decisions for implementation of this operation.

21 0229 CJNCPAC ADV to COMAIRPAC SUBCOMFWD into COMAIRPAC, COM3RDFI.EEn', CTF 3S.

From Sept 20 to Oct 10 3 u.s. Groups containing 9 CV, 5 CVL, 5 BB, 19

Cruisers will base ENIWETOK. 2 u. s. Groups containing 6 CV, 2 CVL, 4 BB
12 Cruisers will base LEYTE. Af."ter October 10 for indefinite period
proportions will be apprmximately reversed. In addition 5 British CV
and 3 CVL will base ENIWETOK.
Para. These estimates are for planning purposes only. They- mq
change radica.l.:cy' at a.ey time before or during forthcoming operations.
Composition of Groupsas to identity of specific. ships can not be provided
at this time.
21 0645 CnlCPAC ADV HQ to UOMSUBPAC info ADCOMMINPAC, COMDJPAC, COMPHIBSPAC,
COM5THFLT, UINCPAC PEARL HQ, JICroA.
Plans for minefield investigation proposedin your .181445 are approved
subject to following qualification of last sentence. Mine detection
subs will in emergency be considered available for offensive missions,
air sea ~escue duties or reconnaissance if necessity arises. ComnPae
arrange direct with ComSubsPac for conference i f desired.

21 1808 CONCPAC ADV HQ to OOM7THFLEET into CINCAFPAC.

lly 130751 COl!INCH 201819. Request implementation items approved

obtaining concurrence or CINCAFPAC where appropriate.
Para. Request your comment on future submarine requirements SWPA.

3400

20 2209 WARCOS to AFPAC info MID PAC, CINCPAC - CG AFMIDPAC PASSED TO CINCPAC

~OTH

HQ.

-WARX 35531.
Repeated to all addressees. Reference 26685 of 19 J~ 1945. It is
suggested here to place Lieutenant General Alvan c. Gillem who now commands
the 13th Corps Headquarters in charge of this .force upon completion of the
scheduled amphibious training of the units you have indicated you desire.
This is proposed in order to carry out what is considered are your desires.
It is assumed that other reinforcing units for this corps headquarters will
be furnished there by you i f you intend to use this corps in the role or an
Armored Corps. Gillem's Corps is an infantry corps but be happens to be 1
of our best Armored Commanders also. Furnishing reinforcing units requires
minor changes to present redeployment schedule in order to meet target date
,
as follows:
A. 1 field artillery battalion (155 Millimeter Gun) (selt propelled) will
be indirectly redeployed instead of directl;r redeployed in 9th month.
B. 2 Engineer combat battalions will be indirect]3 redeployed instead ot
directly redeployed in loth month.
c. Indirect shipment remainder reinforcing units will be delayed in order
to marry up with this force.
Para. Upon receipt GINCPAC concurrence concerning assault shipping and

your comment or concurrence to the above proposal, the necessary implementation here will be accomplished. An ear~ rep~ woul.d be helpful.
21 2250 COMGENUSASTAF to CINCR:>A ADV HQ info WARCOS, COMGENMJt, CINCOOA PEARL,
COMAF a>, CTF 58, COM3RDFLT, CTF 57, COMGENFEAF, COMMARIANAS, CTG 93./t.

0549

Request USAST~ message 1 no 0313 dated 171643 GCT sent to your headquarters be withdrawn and destroyed and the follONing substitute therefore:
All fighters assigned to USASTAF will be withdrawn fran their primary
mission of escort and given the mission of counter air force operations
of destroying the Japanese air force both in the air and on the ground1
attacking airfields and airfield installations, on the dates and a.t the
places requested by Com3rdF1eet during the execution OpPlan 9-45. The VLR
forces will be employed against major air targets such as aircraft engineer
plants, propellor plants, and other major industrial areas in the general
area and on the :ikK dates requested by Com.3rdF1eet. Your headquaretBs will
be current:cy- infonned. as to the names of the places and dates of attack.

22f1731 COMFE.Af to CINCAFPAC info CINCroA ADV, L"TF 95 1 COMGEN JJJV ECH FEAF, COMGEN
CHINA, CTF 32.
AX 7792JJ
Reference is urad CX 25198 which directed FEA.F to conduct strikes on
ene~ air bases and other appropriate targets, to assist TF 95. Also reference CINCPOA JJJV llOJ.53, 110146 and 1123.36 and CTF 95 radio 120822.
19 Ju]Jr 45 this hed received info copy of CTF 95 radio 182218/Z which first
info that CTF .95 sweep intent for 18 J~ was not conducted a.s scheduled.
Assistance requested in CmCPOA ADV 112336 and directed by urad CX 25198 was
conducted as outlined in Myra.d AX 77215 to provide direct assistance for
TF 95 sweep scheduled daylight 18 July. Current operational plans, including assistance for 3rd Fleet (See my rad AX 77476, 17 Jucy) preclu~es
furnishing aqy .further direct assistance in general target area for TF 95
(This is BIFODE; cancel and file 211050 GR 289 and cancel 211827 GR 59)

3401

20 1303 COMINCH AND CNO Q.OMINCH HQ info \JINCPOA BOTH HQ:;COMINCH & CNO PASSED TO
CINCPOA BOTH HQ,

VICTORY 135.
CINC.AFPAC CXB-24957 and JCS 20~8 refer. I desire a TG charged with
the construction and establishment of the artificial harbor project be set
up in the immediate future, initia.ll.;r directly under COMINCH AND CNO, later
to pass to CIOOPAC. This group to be commanded by a young Read Admiral or
a Commodore especially fitted to give energetic direction. Nominations
b:r my headquarters are desired. The sta.f"f, which initially need not be
large, should include civi1 engineers and 1 or 2 officers.
22 0410 CINCPAC ADV to COM5THFLEET, CO:MPHIBSPAC, COMSERVPAC info COMSERVRON 10.

COMffiiBSPACS 190220. CINCPAC intends that Commodore Hartley in his

capacity as COMSERVDIV 10.3 command the units of SERVRON 10 at the objective
in OLD!PIC. These units will initially be largely those for repair and
salvage. COMSERVDIV 10.3 will be under the operational control of COMFHIBSPAC. Captain Curtis will be assigned to the staff of COMSERVDIV as chief
salvage officer.

22 CY7l9 CINCPOA ADV to CINCAFPAC info COMINCH, COORDFI.EH,T, COM5THFIEET.

Operations instructions number 96 issued by Hdqters Allied Air Forces
SWPA dated 12 Jul.;r with distribution to officers under m:r cammand are
objectionable to me in the following respects:
A. They give orders applicable to "All Forces" concerning air sea. rescue
within the Pacific Ocean Areas.
B. They undertake to prescribe prima.ry air attack areas and to issue
orders in connection theravith which affect ,the operations of the
Pacific Fleet while operating within the Pacific Ocean Areas.
Para. It is requested that the Commanding General Allied Air Forces
&IPA be directed to refrain from issuing orders which directly or by
implication attempt to control the operations of the United states Pacific
Fleet or to make area assignments within the Pacific Ocean Areas.

22 CJ742 CINCPOA ADV to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC PEARL. COMSERVPAC. COMPHIBSPAC,

COM7THF:r.EE:I', COM5THFIEEI', COMSERON lO, COMSERV'ZTHFLEET.
Refer paragraph 8 CINCAFPAC 162lll and J1J3' 200709. CINCPAC approves
procedure COMSERVFOR 7TH F~~ (SEIVRON 7) provide petroleum logistics
for OLD.!PIC amphibious forces assembling in the MANILA AREA. These requirements to be slated by CINCAFPAC. In addition SERVRON 7 should
similarly provide for all other naval forces in the MANILA AREA. Accordingly request deletion of "7th attack Force Anoatrr and substitution
"Pacific Fleet Units."

-\.._/

22 OS39 CINCPAC ADV to COMJRDFLEEr, COM.7THFLEET, CCW.mPAC, COMGENFMFPAC. COM5THFLT,

COMffiiBSPAQ. COMSERVPAC info COMGEN 6THARMY, COM)RDPHIBFOR, COMGEN5THPfiiBCORPS, CINCPOA PEARL. CCM5THPHIBFOR. CWG:ENAIRfMFPAC. COMINCH AND CNO,
CQM7THPHIBFOR, COMGENSERVCOMDFMFPAC, MARCORPS, COMGENAAFroA, CINCAFPAC,
COMGENroA, CTF 96, CTF 99.
Mydis 090901 modified as follavs:

- continued -

3402

,.

- continued -

22 08.39 CINCPAC ADV to COM3RDFLEEr, COM.7THFLEET 1 COMAmPAC, COMGENFMFPAC, COM5THFLI,

COMPHIBSPAC, COMSERVPAC info COMG.EN 6TH ARMY, COM3RDHIIBFOR. COMGEN5THPHIBCORPS, GINCPOA PEARL, COM2THPHIBFOR, COMGENAIRFMFPAC, COMINCH AND CNO
COM7THPHIBFOR, COMGENSERVCOMDFMFPAC, MARCOPS, COMGENAAFPOA, CINCAFPAC,
COMGENPOA. CTF 96, CTF 99. (Cont 'd)
1.

2.

3.

The site present:cy selected for the NOB is at TARA-MISAKI in

KAGOSHIMA BAY
The site present~ selected for the Navai Air Base is at MINATO.
Insert as paragraph (G): The naval hospitals and naval ammunition
Depot will be under the Commandant NOB.
'~

lo>.

22 1040 01-NCFOA ADV to COMGEN USASTAF inf'o COM3RDFLEET.

Concur your 22C1715. (Ref: .3rd Fleet Coordination.)

22 1149 CINCPAD ADV to COMBATRON 1. COMCRUDIV 16 1 COMINPAC. COM.IAIRVqNG 1, COMSERVDIV 104, COMNAVFOR RYUKYUS info COMINCH, CINCPAC PEARL, CINCAFPAC,
COMGEWEAF, COMGENFEAFADVON, CTF 99 1 COMGm CHINA, COM3RDFLT, COM5THl4'LT,
COMSERON 10,

My OpPlan 4-45 will be modified as follows:

(1) Add to Task organization: (N) (TF 95) V.Adm. Oldendorf. With forces
assigned.

,,

(2) Change Tasks of .3rd Fleet to read: Attack Japanese naval and air
forces; shipping, ship,yards, and coastal objectives. Protect sea
and air communicationa along the central Pacif'ie axis.
(3) Modify SubPara .3(N) to read: Maintain control of the EAST CHDlA SEA
and its westem approaches. Interdict to limit of vapabillties the
movement of hostile naval forces and shipping in the YEILOV SEA,
TSUSHIMA STRAITS and the southem part of the SEA OF JAPAN. Protect
friendly shipping. Cover and defend our positions in the RYUKYUS.
Provide air-sea rescue services. SUpport operations or other forces.
Conduct minesweeping as directed by CINCPAC.
(4) Add to SubPara 3(X)6: CTF 95 area of military responsibility is that
part of the conibat area west of the 135th meridian except that the
3rd neet will enter therein in execution of its assigned tasks upon
giving prior notification to forces concerned.
(5) Add new SUbPara 3(X)8: For purposes of coordination direct conmunications between CTF 95 or his subordinate commanders and the cOJllooo.
manders of other forces is authorized as at present.
( 6) This dispatch is effective 250200 at which time rr.ry dispatch 110146
is cancelled.
22 ll50 CINCPAC ADV to COM3RDFLEET, CUMBATRON 1, CTF 95, CTF 39, CTG 99.1. CTG
3u.S. CTG 30,9 info COMINCH, CTF 99, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC. COMSERVPAC,
COMVVESCARFOR, CINCAFPAC, COMGENFEAF, CUMGmFEAF ADVON, COMSERVRON 10 .
Effective 250200 GCT forces assigned to operational control Cam3rdFlt
will comprise those units nQPf assigned to 1"1'-.37, TF-38, 'J.lG-30.6, TG-30.8,
TG-30.9 less TU-30.9. Forces assigned to operational control CTF 95
(V Adm Oldendorf) will comprise those units now assigned to TF-32, TF-39
TF-95, TG-99.l, .TG 30.5, TU 30.9.4 plus such other combatant ships now

- continued -

3403

- continued -

in LEYTE which were formerl;r assigned to Com3rdFl.t and which are not
included in the forces listed.

Para.. For the information of both conrnanders the KASAAN BAY and
SALAMAMU ASW groups are assigned to CTF 94. .

Para. Rotation of CVE to 'I'G-30.8 or to TU-32.1.2 may be arranged

directly byCTG-32.1.
Para. This reassignment does not affedt assignments to Com3rdFlt
contained. in li\f 220259 and 220612. Assignment of additional ships or
transfers between 3rd Fleet and TF 95 will be controlled by CJNCPAC.
Cam3rdFlt make recommendations when and as necessar,y.
22

1915 COMINCH AND CNO to C'INCPAC APV HQ

COFS ARMY.

info CnTCPAC PEARL HQ, CINCAFPAC.

CG MF,
.

Refer WARX 3.3621 to COMGEN FEAF held by 20 AF GUAM and OAHU. For
JAVAllJJI project in support of OLIMPIC COMGEN AAF has requested assistance
from Navy. It is indicated that your approval will be sought on basis
project will be under canmand FEAF and CINCAFPAC and be self supporting at
BUNKHOUsE and all support operated by OSS personnel to be shipped via
MANILA.. If you approve operation it appearswasteful to ship special
facilities for single operation if availablea&BUNKHO~E for temporar,y use~
This applies pa.rliicula.r]3 to LCM, automotive equipment, shops and housing.
Para. Operation is set out in separate message. Facilities requested
are l LCM(3) and following functional components less personnel: 1 A-3,
1 D-12, l E-ll, 1 G-8, l ~l2A
Para. Extensive work on boats required in secluded place for security
reasons. Advise whether you can provide all or part of facilities on .
tanporary basis.
22 1921 COMINCH AND CNO to C!NCP@ ADVA,NCE info CmCAFPAC, CINCPAC PEARt. CG AAF,
COFS ARMY.

Project 11V 221915 is to destroy '=>HIMONOSEKI TUUNELS with 6 drone S5 f'ooi

aircraft rescue bOats and involves installing JAP SEA truck and luggar .
disguise which is prefabicated ready to ship. OSS expects to request ISCOM
to assign midget .sup-Base on MOTOBU PENINStJLA. If J ap Marine raiJJray at
base can be used, estimated installation time with facilities requested :in
l week per boat. 6 Spare boats and disguise kits being provided.
23 0903 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMIN PAC into COMPHIBSPAC, COM3,RDFLEF11', COMBATRON l,

ADCOMINPAC, CINCPAC

PEARI.~

Hg.

Upon completion sweeping area JUNEAU continue minesweeping operations

in EAST CHINA SEA using those minesweepers which have arrived most recent4'
in canbat area. By use of rotational plan of overhaul and rehabilitation
it is expected that sweeping will eontineu indefinitely. Minefield north
of area JUNEAU and field in vicinity of SHANGHAI-CHOSEN are desired swept

as early as practicable and prior to OLYMPIC.

Your 220S37 refers.

34 04

JULY (GCT)
~

0317

CINCPAC ADV HQ to CDJCAFPAC Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMGEN 10, COMDT NOB
OKINAWA, COMINCH

TOP SECRET. Memorandum for record dated 23 July signed by Major General
Chamberlin and Rear Admiral Sherman approved by CINCPAC. On receipt CINCAFPAC
concurrence I will direct Com.Gen 10 with U S Army Forces in the RYUKYUS
report to CDICAFPAC effective 1200 I ( -9) .31 J'licy' which was earliest date
acceptable to your representative and other Army conferees.
2.3 ]J2l

COMGENCHINA to CINCPOA ADV HQ Info CINCAFPAC, COMGENPOA, COMGENAIR, COMGEN

.AAF 10, COMGENSOSCHINA, COMGEN CCC CHINA, COMGENTACTCT, WARCOS
TOP SECRET. CFBX 1480

Due to staff conference at Manila. 1 August conference at GUAM has been

pospponed until at'ter 4 August. Message GUAM 202351Z ( GCT) refers. Present~
plan to leave CHUNGKING 4 August will arrive GUAM late 5 August or ear:cy6 August. Party expected to number about 15 officers and men (including
General Sim.psons party) Request information as to whether this will be
satisfactory. Names of p:!rsons composing party will be forwarded later. New
Subject: (For WARCOS) Eminently satisfactory is Colonel L. J. Lincoln's
presence at this conference He can return with CHINA Theater party.
23 2105

CNO to CINCPOA ADV HQ Info CINCPOA PEARL HQ

TOP SECRET. Mapping and photography of JAPAN JCS 756/2 revised by JIC 153/12
is subject your 181208 of May. JIC 153/20 has been approved and is being
forwarded you by air mail. Recommendations of OAHU mapping conference 25-29
M~ were approvec;l and reassignment of responsibilitie s for mapping photograph~'
of Japanewe areas to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC mutually with assistance of USASTAF
are to be accomplished in accordance with conference aggeements.

24 01 40

COMPHIBSPAC to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC/POA ADV HQ

TOP SECRET. In preparation for OLY.MPIC it is cmsidered most important that

ships assemble early for indoctrination and training. The rlarge numbers invo1ed and the oompleJI organization plus fact that present duties of PhibsPac
does not permit tactical training require this receive special attention.
It is recommended that main elements of the advance and amphibious forces my
serial OOOZ79 of 18 July assemble by 10 September as follows: At LEYTE Gunfire
and Covering Force, Escort Carrier Force, Western Attack Force, South Attack
Force, 3rd Attack r'orce. At MANILA 7th Attack Force. In MARIANAS and HAWAII
5th Attack Force. At LEYTE and in HAWAli Reserve Force.
Para. Assemb:i.y date of 10 September is approximatel\}r 10 days in advance of
dates set forth in Joint staff study. Submit that comp1axities of training,
loading, rehearsals, movements to loading, rehearsal,a.nd objective areas,
to gether with necessar.y upkeep and logistics require a longer period than
at present allowed. If you concur in proposed plan request you subnd.t to
CINCPAC for approval.
/

34 0

.,.
24 0636

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMINCH

TOP SECRET. Request by air mail copy JCS 659/3 of 24 March 1944 and by
dispatch information as to aqy JCS decision which places on area commander
responsibility over and authority to coordinate sea air ~escue within his

area.

24 0844

CINCPAC ADV Hg to COM2RDFLT, COM7'l,HFLT, COMAIRPAC, COM5THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC,

COMSERVPAC, COMGENFlviFPAC Info COMINCH & CNO, MARCORPS, CINCAFPAC, COMGEN6THARMY,
CTF 96, CTF 99, CINCPOA PEARL, COMGENPOA, COM3RDPHlBFOR, COM5THPHIBFOR, COMGEN
2THPHIBCORPS, COM7THPHIBFOR, CQ\[GENAIR FOR MID PAC, COMGEN AIFPOA, COMBEN

SERVCOMDFMFPAC

TOP SECRET. Para (B) bydis 090001 modified to extend that the OTJB at MANOSE
RIVE (or such other place on the West Coast a.s m.a.y be selected) will remain
in support of V Phib Corps as long as needed by the Corps. On or before
withdrawal of the V Phib Corps from KYUSHU this CUB will pass to control of
Commandant .NOB.

24 1349

CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC AJJV HQ Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COJ\lSEliVPAC, COMPHIBSPAC,

COM7THr' LT, COM5THFLT, COMS,t!;RON 10, COMSERY'tl'HFLT

CX 28065 'rOP SECRET. Concur in change oo.tlined your 220742Z (GCT) Ju:cy in
reply to our 162lll. Servon 7 will provide for all naval forces that assemble

in the MANILA area. Request Servon 7 be advised of substation additional

requirements for inclusion in AFP:AC slates.

24 0325

COMBATRON-l to COMESCAR. USS TENNESSEE, COM FAW-1. COMCRUDIV-16. COMINEPAC,

COMSERVDIV 104, COMNAVFOR RYUKYUS lnfo ALL TF, TG COMS PAC, COM3RD & 5THFLTS,
COMGENFEAFADV, cmCPAC BOTH HQ, CINCAFPAC, COMGENFEAF, COMGEN CHINA, COMINCH,
COMFHILSEAFRON.

Organization TF 95. 95.1 TENNESSEE force lt'lagship Captain Heffernan.

95.2 EASY striking Group RAdm Lowe. 95.3 Heavy strild.ng Group V.Adm Uldendorf.
95.4 Mine Group RAdm Sharp. 95.5 Base Covering Group R.Aclm Cobbs. 95.6
OKINAWA Logistic Group Oomdr Ueliher. 95.7 Philippine training Group, R.Adm.
McCormick. 95.8 ESCOVFOR R.Adm Durgin. 95.9 F'leet Air Wing 1, R.Adm f!RRY.

This dispatch effective 250200 GCT.

24 0850

(jC.t-2ET

GINCPAC ADVANCE to OOJJ:lBATRON l, info CRUDIVS 16, COMlNCH. Oo,.,

otV

0E.5 P97C.h'}

G-RG"Etv

If.~ $o

CTF 95 230415. When RFS direct R.Adm LoN with the same force as in preceding operation proceed to conduct shipping sweep in area west of Long125-00E
between Lat. 3Q-OON and 32-30 N. Avoid mine restricted area. in .OHANGHAI-G.tiUSAN
area. Keep Com31'Cl.r'lt, COMGENFE.~, COMGENCHINA and CTF 99 informed of' movements
this force.

23 1226

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC PEARL, COM7THFLT, COMSERVPAC.

Request your comments on COMSERVPACS 210215. CINCPAC cons~ders. a

total of 4 strips on 2 or 3 fields required to support lst Marme Air WJ.ng.

34 06

24 1722 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COM7THFLT, CINCAFPAC, COMSERVPAC,
CINCPAC PEARL HQ. CO:MSUBPAC.

Referring to item H your 130751 and my 201819 the requirement s of my

181305 September 1944 and myser 001a7 of 12. January 1944 for maintenance
of definite numbers cruisers, destroyers and submarines in 7th Fleet
hereby cancelled.

24 1824 NONE GIVEN to CINCAfPAC, QINCPAC. COMGEN USATAfPAC into-non!

V-273.

As a basis of discussion with the Soviet General staff on the subject

Joint Chiefs of staff have made the following proposal inconnectio n
the
of
with u.s. Naval and Air Operations when and if RUSSIA enters the war
against JAPAN:
A. u.s. Naval surface forces may operate without restriction in the
seas of JAPAN and OKHOTSK.
B. u.s. SUbmarines may operate without restriction s in the SEAS OF JAPAN
and OKHOTSK south and east of a line connecting following points:
coast of KOREA at latitude 38 north thence to latitude liJ north
longitude 135 east thence to latitude 45-45 north longitude 140 east
thence east along that latitude.
c. u.s. Air Forces will operate without restriction south and east ofat
a line connecting following points: CAPE IDPATKA-west to a point
latitude 51-10 longitude 147 degrees-then ce to point latitude 45-45
longitude 144-20 thence to point latitude 45-45 longitude 139-30 thence
to point latitude 41-20 longitude 133-20 - thence westward to SEISHIN
KOREAN-thence north to railroad at KOREAN border-then ce westward
along railroad to YUNGKI and CHANGCHUN-thence along the river to
LIAOYUAN KAILU and CHIHFENG-thence along the railroad through TOLUN,
PAOCHANG, WANCHUAN, TOTUNG, FENGC~, TSINING to D'l:EJ:SUI-thence
northwest to the border of outer MONGOUA.
D. The location of taese lines may be changed from time to tinie by
mutual agreement as deemed necessar.y or desirable.
Para. u.s. Submarines and air operations north and west of these
lines will be coordinated with the RUSSIANS and similarly their submarine
and air operations south and east of these lines will be coordinated
with u.s.
Para. Your comment is requested to arrive terminal by 260600Z (GCT).
NOTE (On Originator) - call sign JEBG (The station from which this

dispatch was received) has been used on dispatches originated

by COMINCH AND CNO and JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF - Location is
POTSDAM, GERMANY.

-----.

25 0905 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMBATRON 1 info COMINCH, COMNORPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ,
COMCRUDIV 5. COMCRUPAC, CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LATE CITY.

CRUDIV 5 will be assigned north pacific force in near future.

paration ships for this service is to be initiated imrned.iatel;y.

Pre-

25 0425 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMHIIBSPAC info COM5THFLEET.

Your 240650 seaplane operations during OLYMPIC will be conducted
in KOSHIKI and ARIAKE WAN AREAS as determined by COM5THFLEET. Concur
in desirability of establishinent of tender based seaplane operating area
adjacent to other naval activities. Final determination of site upon
recommendations of commanders concerned.
25 0904 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCAFPAC, COMGEN USASTAF.
Your 241824 (V 273). Strongl;y urge that decision be reached as to
areas in which Pacific Fleet will control and be responsible for safety
of shipping (including such part of the sea route from the United states
to Russia. through the SEA of OKHOTSK as ma.:r be a u.s. Pacific Fleet
responsibility) and that RUSSIAN submarines be excluded fran that area.
Difficulties of communications, language and unaccustomed recognition
procedures ma.kt it extremely inadvisable permit RUSSIAN submarines
operate in areas where United states ships and aircraft are escorting
shipping.
Para. The boundary proposed for United states submarines is satisfactory.
Para. It is recommended that since the ports railroads and rivers
listed in paragraph C of V 273 as the Air Force boundary are themselves
centers of target concentrations they be assigned de.f'inite~ to the
United ~~ates or RUSSIA in all cases.
25 09\fl CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM5THFLEEr info COM7THFI.EET, COMFHIBSPAC, CINCPAC PEARL

cmcAFPAC Aro, GOMSERVPAC.

Your 240358 and 222354. It is expected that COMSERVDIV 103, Como.
Hartley will be responsible for other logistic aCtivities in the objective area as well as for repairs and salvage as indicated in 11\r
Captain Curtis will be assigned to his staff. He will be
220~10.
assigned the C.A.MI'BELL ( CGC-AGC) as flagship and wi.th adequate assistants
to permit him to discharge these duties. It is expected that he will
remain in the area as COMSERVDIV 103. As such he wi:Q. be under the operational control of COM7THFLEET after departureof COM5THFLEET.- The
Army sub Area petroleum officer may accompany Comm.odore Hartley or Admiral
Turner as arranged by the latter. The assignment of the SPl!llCER (CGC)
and INGHAM ( CGC) will.{?~ determined later.

25 1009 CINCAFPAC to

WARCOS info CINCPAC, COMGEN USASTAF.

CREGO. 28231.

Concur with Joint Chiefs of .& taff V-Zl3 24th.

25 1011 GINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS, CINCPAC PEARL, GOMGEN 10,
ISCOM OK~NAWA, COMGENAFMIDPAC, GOMG.ENAF'' fESPAC.

CX-28232.

Reference memorandum for record, dated 23 July 1945, relating to ~

RYUKYUS, signed by Major General Chamberlin and Rear Admiral Sherman,
approved by CINCAFPAC with the word "Administrative" changed to "0perati0naln on page 2, para 3A(l)(A)l. CINCPAC ADV in his 240317/z (GCT) has

approved memorandum.

340e

25 1431 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS, USASTAF, CINCPAC PEARL, CO:MGENAAFroA, AFMIDPAC, COMGEtN'fl'1Af:.

Cx-28307.

Subject is JAVPJff.AN project reference ~JX .3.3621 and COMINCH 221915/Z

( GCT) and 221921/Z Request your concurren ce in proposed operation al
project now assigned to FEAF for execution . Target date later to be
determine d will precede OLYMPIC target date.
12

2336 WARCOS to CINCAFPAC info COMGENAFMIDPAC - COMGENAFMIDPAC PASSED TO

CINCFOA OOTH HEADQUARTERS.

WARX 31108.
A study is now undergoin g priority considera tion wherein ATC
facilitie s (Aircraft crews and maintenan ce personnel ) of the Atlantic
be moved to Pacific beginning in .August.
Para. New grand totals 4 engine transport aircraft to be in the Pacific 'lll'l.der this study will be: 373 in Augu.~st, 375 in September , 399 in .
October, 45.3 in November, 5'51 in December, 600 in January-, 655 in February,
707 in March.
Para. 2 plans being considere d. Plan 1 is to base majority of
ATC HAWAII With personnel fed to that point by water transport ation. Plan
2 is through movement by air from West Coast. Ultimate destinati on to be
PHILIPPINES, LE.'YTE or MANILA or both.
Para. Shipping implicati ons and canpariso n of net Pacific gain
against new Atlantic loss will be resolved here.
Para. Needed l'dthout delay is estimate of theaters ability to:
Para. A. Receive via air total 7600 personnel in August, 18000 in Sept,
20000 in October, 39000 in November, 46000 in December, 55000 in
January, 61000 in February, and 670CJO in Marcp.
Para. B. Provide holding area in Hawaiian. departmen t to accommodate 12500.
Para. c. Provide aceomoda tions for greatly increased permanent personnel
at HICKAM. (Assuming plan l above is accepted)
Para. D. Provide tenn:i.aal facilitie s in PHILIPPINES and assume f'ull
responsib ility for passenger s upon .landing, to .include necessar.y
groUnd transport ation.
Para. E. Provide storage and disbursin g facilitie s for ATC total POL
requireme nts of 41000 short tons in August building up to ll5000
in March.
Para. F. Provide service forces to support such increase.
Para. Directly related and in amplifica tion this problem is radio
DTG lll817 of 11 J~ 45 (dispatch ed via Navy channels) .
Para. For COMGENMIDPAC only. This is ATC augmentat ion message to
be brought to attention of Colonel Hobson, OPD, now TD in Pacific which
was subject of earlier cOmmunication. Hobson to extend TD .M Hawaii and
arrange T\V.Xwith vYD for further details of neeessar.y . Extreme size of
backlog on West Coast forseen between nON and !larch 1946 is causing
great concern here.

25 2104 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCIAC ADVANCE HQTRS.

Ur 2406,36. Copies of JCS 659/1 and 659/3 being forwarded airmail.
No subsequen t JCS action modifies paragraph x 3 of 659/1 which states
"operatio nal control of Air Sea Rescue activitie s and facilitie s is a
responsi bility of theater or area commanders".

34 09

25 .2256 COMGiNUSASTAF to JEBG(POTSDAM, GERMANY) info CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC.

Concur with Joint Chiefs of Staff V-Zt3, 20-4th. Recanmend that
targets ~ along outlined air boundar, be assigned to either RUSSIANS
or United states.
26 0149 CINCFOA ADVANCE to COMGEN TEN info COMINCH AND CNO, CINCAFPAC, CTF 95 1
COMGENAFMIDPAC, CO:MDT NOB OKINAWA, COMGENAFWESPAC, COM3RDFLT, ISCOM
OKINAWA, COMGEN USAST AF, COM5THFLT, COOTHFLT.

Effective 1200 I (-9) 31 Jul.Jr report to CINCAFPAC with all United

states Arley" Forces under your command. At that time control of' United
States held positions in the RYUKYUS will be governed by JCS 181409 Ju.:cyand menorandum for record dated 23rd JW as approved by CINCPAC 2laD317
and CINCAFPAC CX 28232 (DTG 2510ll).
26 0150 ClliCPAC ADVANCE to CDJCAFPAC info COMGEN TEN, ISCOM OIQ:NAWA, COMGENAFMIDPAC

COMGENAFWESPAC, HQUSSOS SWPA.

Your 250847 concur. Copies of memorandum distributed to naval

service will have change incorporated.
26 1225 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMNORPAC, CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

TOP SECRET. Cominch & CNO 251750 request your comment and recommenas suggestions as to how CINCFOA should exercise control.
Expedite reply.
da.t~ons

26 1514 BIS~ ~ ~fRlTY CONTROL (MARSHALL), CINCAFPAC, Info CINCPJ.C ADV

HQ,MiliENUSF'C~

TOP SECRET. WARX 38701

Following for yow infonna.tion in jlmplementat~on piailriing PASTEL. (A) Chinese underground SHANGHAI presently

under United States control. Includes important emplo,yers and labo~

steamer lines, street railw~s, harbor activities, public utilities
plus 15,000 coastal pirates. {B) ComNavGroup CHINA on 14 Jul. proposed
beginning training within 6 weeks 150U key SHANGHAI persormel for
intelligence sabotage Jap installations and protection of port against
Jap sabotage. (C) CO:MINCH concurring directs ComNavGroup CHINA that it
be "accomplished at expense of your other obligations unless it has
sufficient importance to ComGen USFCT .to carry increase in theater
ceilings on persormel and freight in order to meet a target date for
completion, which date is a matter for his decision" Evaluation
follows. (A) Sequence of' actions if taken and date set by ComGen
USFCT will bear on enemy estimate PASTEL. (B) Assistance provided by
cn~c~,PA0 or CINCPAC to above projects will accelerate and augment
appearance your GIQilT.MAVTS SHANGHAI area in accordance PASTEL. (C)
M~ be possible to relate pirate activities to those of TF 95 in operations EAST CHINA SEA. Radio traffic between GUAM and HOCHWAN could
support. this relation. (D) If attention SHANGHAI area maintained or
exaggerated after X-55 per PASTEL special means implementation by Joint
Security Control must be coordinated appropriate~$

34 10

- continued -

for u. s. aircraft to attack targets or make reconnaissance flights north

of the boundar--J' line coordination would be effected by local liaison and
within 24 hours after application. It was further agreed that P9Sition
of the line would be reconsidered if communications proved too slow to
effect prompt coordination.
Para 4th Question- Does the Soviet High Command agree to the proposal
for the immediate establishment of operational coordinatio.n and liaison
as proposed by the u. s. Chiefs of Staff in the letter sent by the Commanding General, u. s. Military Mission, to General Antonov on 5 JuJ.y 1945?
Para 4th Answer- The Soviet Command agrees that beginning with Millta.ry
Operations of the Soviet Union against JAPAN, to0establish liaison groups
between the American and Soviet commanders in the Far East. To accomplish
this liaison it is suggested that there be Soviet Joint Chiefs of staff '
liaison groups with General MacArthur, with Admiral Nimitz, and in addition
in Washington, to have a Soviet Military Mission.
Para. American Liaison Groups will be located w-lth the Soviet High
Commander in the FAR EAST, MARSHALL VASSILIEVSKI, in KHABAROVSK, and with
the Commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yema.shev in VALADIVosroK.
Para. The Soviet Command is ready to accept the Radio-Teletype equipment for installation at the indicated points.
Para Action- Agreed with the understanding that Liaison would be
effected by the commanders in the field without reference to WASHINGTON
and

MOSCOW.

Para 5th Question- it is assumed that, after D-Day, Soviet or u. s.

air and naval craft in emergencies will have access to the nearest Soviet
or u. s. ports : . . or airfields where they may obtain repairs, servicing,
medical care and otherwise be assisted in making a speedy return to combat.
Although in extreme emergency the nearest friendly :facility would be sought,
it is considered desirable to designate certain ports, airfields or areas
where ma.Xi.rnum facilities would be available. Will the Soviet Government
designate such ports, airfields or areas furnishing information neeessar.y
for proper location, identification and approach together with information
on regognition signals, co.,ridors of approach and exit for general use in
aqy emergency, landing or coastal approach? The United States is prepared
to take corresponding action in the case of Soviet Aircraft;
Para 5th Answer- The Soviet Command agrees to select ports and
airfields for ships and planes in need of repairs and to make available, as
tar as possible, repair facilities and medical assistance to the personne1
of the above mentioned ships and planes.
'
Para. Fo;- the purpose we can designate:
SubPara tAJ Naval ports: in the Japanese SEA, port NAHODKA (American
Strati); in the OKHarSK and BERING SEA REGIONS..NIKOLAEVSK, on the
AMUR, and PETROPAVLOVSK, on KAMCHATKA.
SubPara. (b) Ail"fields: in the region of VLADIVOSTOK, in th~ region of
ALEXANDROVSK on SAKHALIN ISLAND and in the region of PEI'ROPAvtoVSK on
KAMCHATKA.
Para Action - Agreed vrlth the understanding that the method of' identification of damaged aircraft arriving at Soviet fields would be established by the Commanders in the Field
. 26 1559 COMGENAIR(POTSDAM) to COMGEN USASTAF info CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, AG!lAR FOR
CASAffi.

3411

- continued -

26 1559 COMGNAIR(rorSDtU0 to COMwEN USA$TAF info CINQAFPAC, CIDJCPAQ, AGWAR FQR

CASAIR.

Victory 343 BG 400

In connection with planning for program in event of a Japanese.
cpaitulatioh it is planned to implement ful~ the B-29 program as now
scheduled, the units to be deployed as early as practicable. You should
prepare for rearrangement of the deploymeht so as to deploy the 4D B-29
groups in OKINAWA, PHILIPPINES, MARIANAS and for 2 groups in the AlEUTIANS.

26 1951 CNO to COllifi'..SSEP.FRON info COMNORPAC, COM 13. COM 17, CDTCPAC BarH Hg.
Desire that you expedite lend lease transfer preparation of vessels
scheduled for MILEPOST and that you sail them to cold bq as early as
practicable maintaining satisfactory standards as regards readiness for
transfer. Advise COMINCH and CNO and info addressees of revised estimated
date arrival COLD BAY all ships which have nat yet departed SEATTLE.
Action being taken to advance date of arrival SEATTLE remaining vessels
not yet available to you.
26 2020 CO!.UNCH to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC PEARL, CINCLANT, COM 13. COMWESSEA-

FRON, COMNORPAC, COM NAVDET FT RANDALL, COMPASEAFRON,

Expedite movement and delivery vessels scheduled for transfer under

MILEroST anticipating arrival and transfer dates a.s much as practicable.
Advise interested adees new arrival dates when lmown.

Zl 0019 CINCPOA PEARL to OINCroA ADVANCE.

It __i~- the opi:Qioo. of cQrolilllllica.tion officers her..e_ thatpnorthero HONSHU
and HOKKAIDO are mc.Luded in the directed beam of OWl SA! IAN- station. The
propsed station if placed in ATTU would be no closer to the population
center of objective area than is OWI SAIPAN. Interrogation of FWS has so
far failed to indicate any general lmowledge of operation of propaganda
stations of OWI. RfB has been unable to detect aQY difference between
the OWI and OSS programs except the pretense of OSS that it comes from
a Japanese source. Control of the station could be exercised only by
assignment of FWB indoctrinated control .officer with freedom of communicatiol
with CINCFOA staff. Conclude that station is unessential and reconunend
that it not be authorized. This refers to your 261225.
27 0250 CINCPOA ADVANCE to UOMINCH, UNO,

CINCAFPAC,

CINCPAC has no techincal data in c~nnaction with the JAVA1~ project.

However from his general lmowledge and based on Pacific Fleet experience
with similar projects he i s doubtful of the value of the project when
measured in terms of the naval support eventuall required to place the
boats in the desired location . CINCPAC requests as complete information
as possible on this project and especi~ as to naval personnel ships or
boats t hat mc;w be r equired and how i t is proposed to move t he boats from
OKINAWA to destination.
Para. If it is decided to carry out the projee~ i t is recommended that
CINCAFPAC assign a site on "OKINAWA and provide the resources r equired.
CINCPAC will provide such material as they Army cannot provide to the extent
to which such mat er ial is available from naval sources and excess to project
of higher pr ior i t y .

3412

27 0253 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINC ..I\FPAC, COMGENFOA, CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

In order to facilitate econoliW' in use of personnel and resources and in

vi en vastly improved strategic situation it is recommended that the category
of defense in the main islands of the Hawaiian Group be reduced to catogory
A and that in. view of his continuing responsibilitie s as area comm.a.nder
CINCroA be authorized to determine the degree of implementation required
with respect to fighter protection, anti-aircraft readiness, mobile combat
troops and harbor defenses.
Para. It is also pertinent at this time to consider the necessity for
retention of the powers conilerred on the Military Commander of the Territory
of Hawaii by executive order 94S9 of 24 October 1944. Lieut. General
Richardson COMGEl\JFOA considers that they should be retained. Having overall responsibility for the security and safety of the territory of Hawaii
as well as other pa.:rts of the Pacific Ocean Areas, I feel that the state
of the war is now such that continuation of the powers vested in Military
authority by that order is no longer justified and according recommend

that it be suspended or revoked.

Zl 0800 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC info COM7THFLT, CINCAFPJ\.C, COMGENTACHCHINA. COMGENSOSCHINA. WARCOS.

CFBX 1003.

For planning purposes prel.iminary to impending visit CHDrA THEATER party

the following is offered for your consideration and comment.
1. The purpose of the FORT BAYARD operation is to open a sea sup~ route
to a temporary base in CHINA, augmenting hump tonnage, to assist in
supporting further operations to the maximum extent possible.
2. The FORT BAYARD area has the fl.UlCtions of furnishing a port for unloading and airstrips for distributing car o. Intelligence information
at hand and a study of aerial photo raphy indicates that these facilities are neither ideal. nor immediatel;y" available. The airstrip will nee(
matting and possibly rebuilding of subgrade, the beaches in the river
are wide mud banks drying at low tide and ship berths appear desirable
to handle the required tonnage, the hydrography is far from ideal and
pilots may be required for river navigation, present indications appear
to dictate a limited draft of ships to 19 feet although the lst 3 ships
are loaded to 22 feet and must cross the bar at high tide. FORT BAYARD
as a port, despite difficulties, is most desirable as a step toward
~ _ J..' o t) , ~ roe 1 N c,.
later operations.
3. As an alternate operation, or as preliminar,y phase of opening FORT
BAYARD, WEIRHOW ISLAND PRN(l090 ~HSDM$BA@X PURl'~P !NflW3Q'BlW'f'JNG
considered. This island is now in c hinese hands and the abandoned runstrip appears easy to reconstruct and lengthen. The harbor appears
suitable to anchor AKs ful.J.y loaded. The sandy beach in the harbor
appears useable for all types of landing craft at all tides.
4. Aircover entirely adequate for either operation will be furnished .f'rom
a field now in our hands at PAKHOI ( 109..04 21-29) Preliminary plans
envisage using 4 P-3S planes giving continuous convoy cover 100 miles
west of the 114 meridian. If convoy arrives at 114 meridian at night
fall this should provide daylight cover west of the l.l.4.

3413

- continued 27 0800 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC info COOTHFLEET, CINCAFPAC, COMGENTACHINA, COMGENSOSCHINA, WARCOS.

5. There is reported a considerable number of enemy troops in INDO CHINA

and YO HAINAN ISLAND with minor en~ naval installations. In order

to interdict the movement, of these troops by water and to protect
t~ port area it is believed that a squadron of PT boats would be
extremely valuable.
6. The plan involving use _, of the island could be }Jllt into effect almost
immediately, after bo't:.P PAKHOI am WEICHCii are in our comtrol. ~
resistance may delq occupation o! LUICHOW PENINSULA and it is desirable
that time be allowed in the FORT BAYARD OPERATION after occupation to
SUl'V'ey the river, install navigational aids and unloading facilities
before AKS are called up. Our thought is that WEICHCNi would be used
to accept shipping if LUICHOW is not secured by 20 August and shift
thereafter made as soon as possible to liORT BAYARD.
7. Fo,r the ViEICHCW operation it is assumed that tbe convoys would proceed
south g HA.INAN ISLAND. J.ntelligence sources do not i.Ddicate that there
are 1Lil1" minetields in TONKING GULA, however HAINAH STRAIT was onee
reportedly mined. The inines in this strait are reported to have broken
loose and carried into TONKIN GULF. There has been :no friendly mining
since May 1944 at which time HAIPHONG HARBOR area bad 90 day mines laid
by the 14th Air Foree.
8. Bequest your consideration to furnishging a naval command to assist in
the operation and to be responsible for the following:
A. To provide required surface convoy protection and. minesweeping.
B. Assume the responsibility of channel and harbor surveying, installing navigational aids and piloting to anchorage area.
,.c,,_ 410 ,N'""'
1
c. The
insl:A11s.tion
a.nd ODe~ ion
w~nrot.flM.iOD
facilitieS
am:b ....
"H~kl)o~ ~"'""'..:f~{fnR-'rf:.tr" o i"DilrL ft.:;5,!~~~,,.. t..- H19A.t3"~ Po?i1~e.

D.
E.

9.

aJ.r 1 ail l.-aJ..rC.Lcw. lol '~

Qi

.11~..:-&'-" ~

I) vr

E y.. c. L

'N"" tJo,,.J

D I r4 C-

Furnishing qualified ~~oiJiett and equipnent for .functioning of

port director in the harbor including maintenance of all landing

and other craft.

Provide the 1:1ecessar.y coiDIJl8,rl and auxiliar.y units including housekeeping with 30 days consuma.bles for naval personnel in the area
and shipping to move personnel and equipnent supplies by the Navy.
F. F\mctioDal. components a.s outlmed in our CFB lOCf/ (Top secret not
to alll including 1 stevedore company and 1 water front engl.neer
company. These units plus pontoon cells for 2 ship berths are
considered necessary. Naval engl.aeers requested could ,install.
docks a.rxi erect the other naval facilities outlined.
G. CHINA THEA'i'ER will assume responsibility for supp]Jr of all class 1,
3, and conmn ~age amn01nition supplies tor ~VAl;.~rsonnel.
H. llaterial and logtstical. support; required for PtJj:l: o'perations would
be responsibility of the naval command.

Requested are your comments on the above prior to the depart,ure of CHINA
THEATER representatives for conference at your headquarters. This is
a planning message only and is not a request or requisition for
assignment of naval resources.

3414

27 2lll COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Refer CINCPAC/POA serial 000576 of 20 Ju.l.;y' Para 3. COMDICH approves.
Equipment aqd communication personnel less senior officer of each unit
to be assembled seattle DYMJSR report COMINCH temporary duty. Movement
designator already assigned .[1!! will be promulgated 9M normal. manner.
Order of priority movement personnel as follows. , Radio Techincians.
Interpreters. Aerological Techinicans. Radiomen. Aerological personnel.
Target date all personnel and material 25 August. CNO will assemble RUSSIAN
speaking laiason teams Washington prior Target Date. Soviets have agreed
in principle establishment facilities and are ready to accept material n~.
Items still undertermined are frequencies and detailed arrangement as to
entr.r u.s. personnel. Unless otherwise advised assume you will direct
COMSERVPAC provide all communication equipment and communication personnel.
F'or info COMSERVPAC all equipment destined for KHABAROVSK to have shippil:Jp;
designated "MOKO" for PE'l'ROPAVLOVSK "TEAM 11 for VLADIVOSTOK "KURT 11
MACARTHUR

Victoey 371 BG 429

At terminal the Jo~t Chiefs of staff put to the RUSSIANS 5 questions
which are listed below With the RUSSIAN answers and the action of the u.s.
and RUSSIAN Chiefs of staff thereon. The agreements are to became effective
upon Soviet entry into the war. Preliminary arrangements in regard to the
subject matter of the 5 items may be made now.
Para. 1st Question -has the Soviet High Command received any instructions regarding the proposal to establish u.s. weather liaison groups in
PETROPAVLOVSK and KHABAROVSK as presented to GENERALISSniDS STALIN by
President Truman on 23 July 1945.
Para. 1st Answer - The Soviet Canmand agrees to establish in PE!'ROPAVLOVSK and KHABAROVSK radio stations for transmitting weather data in
accordance with the request made in a letter from President Truman delivered on 2.3 Ju~ 1945. The Soviet Command is ready' to accept and use the
Radio stations and equipnent proposed in that letter for the above purpose.
Para. As regards the personnel for maintaining and operating the
stations, we consider it wiser to use Soviet personnel which already has a
great deal of experience in working with America& Radio Stations.
Para. In addition to these 2 stations we shall increase the network
of local stations in order to give better information on weather.
Para action - Agreed as above emcept that the radio stations to be
established in PETROPAVI.DVSK and KHABAROVSK are to be manned by U. S.
Personnel.
Para 2nd Question - u. s._Naval surface forces will operate without
restriction in the seas of OKHOTSK and JAPAN. u. s. Submarine forces
will operate without restriction in the SEAS OF OKHOTSK and JAPAN, south and
east of a line established by connecting and following points: coast of
KOREA at 38-00 North, thence to 40-00 north 135-00 east, thence to 45-45
north 140-00 east, thence along the parallel of 45-45 north. This boundary
will be subject to .Later change as the situation may require. u. s.
~ubmarine operations north and west of this botmdary and Soviet operations
south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the
Soviet General t>taff have any suggestions regarding furlher coordination
of Naval operations?
Para 2nd Answer- separate zones of Naval and Air operations are to be

3415

- contine.ed F TO CINCAFPAC MACARTHUR

CINCPAC

USSTAFPAC

set up for the u. s. and the USSR in the SEA OF JAPAN. The boundary
between these zones will be along the lines connecting CAPE BOLTINA on the
coast of KOREA to point 40-00 north 135-00 east to point 45-45 north l4Q-OO
east; thence along the parallel 45-45 north to the line connecting CAPE
CRILLON (KONOO) ( on the southem tip of southern SAKH.ALIN) with CAPE SOYA
MISSAKI ( SOYASAKI) ( on the northern tip of HOKKAIDO)
Para. The ..: USSR naval and air forces will operate north of this line.
u.s. Naval and air forces will operate to the south of this line. This
line shall be the limiting line of operations for surface and submarine
craft and .for aviation.
Para. .Dependi.n,g upon circumstances in the future, this boundary line
mq be subJect to cfiange.
Para. u. s. Naval and air operations north of this bounda.;-y line and
Soviet Naval and air operations south of this boundary line will be subject
to coordination.
Para. In the SEA OF OKHOTSK there shall be a zone of mutual operations
for the naval and air forces of the u. s. and the Soviet Union. Operations
in the OKHOTSK SEA will take place in accordance with mutual agreements.
Para. In the BERING SEA there shall be a zone of mutual. operations
of our Pacific Fleet and aviation and the United States Fleet and aviation
bounded on the north, east and south by a line going from CAPE DEZHNEV to
DIOMEDE ISLAND and thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of
the USSR and the u. s. to parallel 51-30 north and thence through 50..35 nortll
157-00 east; thence to 49-50mnorth 156-20 east and thence along the parallel
49-50 north to the 4th KURILE STRAIT.
Para. The remainder of the BERING SEA as well as bordering regions
of the Pacific Ocean shal.l be the zone of operations of the u. s. Fleet.
Para. Action- Agreed with the understanding thatoperations by u. s.
and Soviet Naval and air forces in the SEA OF OKHOTSK and the BERING SEA
would be coordinated by mutual understanding and cooperation.
Para .3rd Question- u. s .Air Forces will operate without restriction
south and east of the following line: CAPE LOPATKA, west to point at 51-10
north 147-00 east, thence to point at 45-45 north, 144-20 east, thence to
point at 45-45 north 139-30 east, thence to point at 41-20 north 13.3-20
east, thence westward to SEISHIN, KOREA, thence north to railroad at KOREAN BORDER
thence westward along railroad to YUNGKI and CHANGCHUM, thence along the
river to LIAYUAN, KAGLU and CHINNENG, thence along the railroad through
TOLUN, PAOCHANGE, WANCHUAN, TATUNG, FENGCHEN, TSINING to KWEISUI, thence
northwest to the border of outer MONGOLIA. This boundary will be subj eat
to later change as the situation may require. u. s. Air operations north
and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this
boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General staff
have any suggestions regarding further coordination of air operations?
Para .3rd ; Answer- The boundary line between operational zones of the
u. s. and Soviet Air Forces in KOREA and MANCHURIA shall be as follows:
CAPE BOLTINA, CHANGCHUN, LIAOYUAN, KAILU, CHIHNENG, PEKING, TATUNG and
thence along the southem boundary of IDNER MONGOLIA.
Para. u. s. aviation will operate south of this line including all the
above named points. USSR aviation will operate north of this line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. u. s. air
operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line
must be coordinated.
Para Action - Agreed with the understanding that when necessar,y for

3418

..

28 0108 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC, COM3RDFLT, COMNORPAC, CGMSERVPAC, g;to COMINCH

CO~JESSEAFRON, CO:MPHIBSPAC, CINCAFPAC, COMCARDIV 23, COMCARDIV 2
.

Be prepared initiate operations under concept 11f3' serial 0005067 of 26

Copy will be delivered CCilCARDIVS 23 and 26 at ENIWE'l'OK.

1iay on short notice.

28 0457 CINCAFPAC to COMGENAFMIDPAC info WARCOS, CINCPOA ADVANCE HQ.

ex 28945

Bequest that you rxpress direct to the Chief of Staff w:i. th information
copy here your views regarding Hawaiian Defense matters that were raised
in CINCPOA advance dispatch 270253.

25 0740 COMPHI.BSPAC to COM5THli'LT info CINCPAC, CINCAFPAC, CG 6THAHMY. COM 3BD. 5TH,
7TH PHIBFO&S, COMPHIBGRPS 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9. 11. 12, 13,

1ft

Enclosure (A) 1Jf3' seria.p 000279 of 18 July. The task of ca~uring outlying islands to south and southwest of lrnJSHU for establishment of air
waming and fighter direction stations is now assigned to the westera attack
force mounting the 40th Iarantr.r Division, in addition to p:reviousl.7 assigned
tukB. The Southem Attack Force mounting the 158th BOT is assigned the
tasks of l.a.Dd:ing on and securing northem TENEGA SHIMA i f ordered and of
reinforcing jlements of the 6th Arsq ashore as directed. In order to avoid
contusion with the term "Follow-Up Ecbelon" which the Arsq desires used in
place of "Garrison Echelon", the follow-up force (TF 49) is renamed the
reinforcement force. In para 11 the reserve force is erroniously' termed
.
the reserve attack force.

28 0812 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CO:U:GENCHINA into COMINCJI, cmCAFPAC, COJllTHFLT.

~e difficulties inconnection with the FORT BAYARD operation outlined ill
your 270800 appear to be greater than were originally envisaged to a degree
which promts me to invite attention to the last sentence of '11fT 1.30228 June.
From. the information now presented it appears that the WEICHOW Al'roject would
be a preitdmi naey to the FORT BAYARD project and that the total resources
involwd would be greater than could be spared without tmdue detriment to
OLDPIC. It would probably be infeasible to abandon WEICHC1N until long
after FORT BAYABD is occupied. However, I will of course, be glad to leam
more about the project and make this co.mment before our pending conference o
only because you so request.
Para.. Although a techincal factor which can be adjusted it should be
noted that while FORT BAYARD borders on the Pacific Ocean areas WEICHOW
ISLAND and the TONG KING GULF are in the southwest pacific area.

28 0849 CINCAFPAC to iVARCOS info CINCPOA ADVANCE, COMGENAFMIDPAC.

ex

29008.
I recommend most strongly the abolltion within the u. s. sectors of the
Pacific theater of the area. boundaries. They have long ceased to sef'v'e aJV"
useful purpose and now seriously complicate the proper strategical and tactical handling of forces in this single theater of operations. They have
long been ignored as delimiting anything beyond an academic exercise of ove:l'all authority and represent the complete opposite to the serivee unification.
of command which has now become the operational bailie in the theater.
CINCPOA ADVANCE 270253 refers.

3417.

111!

2S 08.35 COMPHIBSPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE into CINCPAC PEARL. COMGENA.FlADPAC. CO:MAF?l.ES.

PAC. COKGEID.O. CINCA.FPAC, COliDRS PHIB GRfS 9. 13, ll. 14. COM5THFLEET,
COliDRS 3, 5, and 7TH PHIBS, C01t7M'LT, COllG:ENPOA.
Your 112.340 not to all. CINCA.FPAC, COJDEN6THARIIY aad COMPHIBSPAC agree
on responsibility for loading OLII4PIC forces as follows. COilGEN6THA.m4Y has
overall responsibility for loading from SWPA all &rii\V' troops plus those nav
and marine troops who wi~ be under 6th A.:mf3' control at objective. CINCPAC
has overall responsibility for loading all navr and marine troops from POA
plus those navy and marine troops .from ~A who wiJiL be under CINCPAC control
at objective. COJilENAFJdiDPAC bas responsibility tor loading all &J.lQ' troops
from POA exclusive of RIUKIUS and willload as arranged with COJDEN6'l'RARYI.
COJIGENlOTHARMY has respoDSibUity for loading all ~troops both grounci
and air from RYUKIUS and will. load ae arranged with COKGEN6THARMY and COllGENFEAF. CINCAFPAC is amending OLIMPIC operations instnctions to include
COl4GENl.OtH ARilY responsibility and ameming CO:UGEHAFJ[[])PAC responsibilit7
as indicated herein. COMPHIBSPAC has responsibility in loading all assault
shipping insofar as safe ani proper deliver of all assault forces to
objective beaches is concerned. Joint planning by COMPHIBSPAC and COllGEN6tH AHilY for loading assault forees progressing ve17 aatisiactoril.7. This
despatc~ baa been agreed to by all concerned. Speed letter in amplification
tollon.
28 09.30 CCltPHIBSPAC to COl!PHIBSGPS 9.8.13.11.!:;7, 5.4, 3. C0115THPHIB.zwaTHPHIB,
COliBATBOll 1. CCitESCARFOR. COll3RDPHIB __:__~ ADC014PHIBSPAC, CIN~fPOA BOTH HQ.
COJ45TH.FLT COlliNPAC~
I

Subject is assemb:cy tor OLYMPIC. COJ.IPHIBSPAC 240140. COllSTHFLT 250245

CINCPAC 2.6CY/40. Not to all or needed. CINCPAC has approTed to the extent
of operationally practicable, the following plan for assembly except that no
prior coanittments of ships will be altered to meet assembly' dates: A.
Jlajor units gunfire and covering force assemble LEITE 10 Sept;. B. ESCARFOR
LEITE 15 Sept. c. .3rd Westem, and Soutbem Attack Forces LEITE 10 AWRH.
E. 5th Attack Force llarianas, Hawaii and l4anil.& l.O Sept. F. Beserve force
LEITE and HAWAII 10 Sept.
Para. Ships having prior cODBDitments which will delq th will job
their respective forces as soon alter assembly dates as practicable.
Para. Upon asaembq ship movements will be controlled by res,ective
force commanders subject to general instractions from higher au.thorit7.
Para. Initial logistics indoctrination and training should be stressed
in early employment of forces.
Para.. It should be understood that PHIBr'OR commanders are responsible
for assembly and training of ships.

28 0917 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CClUNCH AND ONO info CINOPOA PEARL, COMNORPAC.
Northem HONSHU and HOKKAIDO are within directed beam of 0WI SAIPAN

station. Proposed station in ALEUTIANS would be no closer to population

center of objective area than is SAIPAN. Your 251750. Anticipate increased
communication activity ALEUTIAN and consequent need for present and possibl7
additional facilities there. For these reasons plus uncertainly as to how
Bll>ADAXE/PASTEL could be supported thereby consider establisbment OSS/OWI
broadcast from ALEUTIANS undesirable.

3418

._
29 0209 CINCBP.F to

C~CPAD

ADV HQ.

For BPFLO. It is intended to discuss the followiag subjects at GUAM

.
during visit of Commander in Chief.
1
in tactical cooperation
group
a
Para. 1. The inclusion of CVL S as

with

cvs.

Para. 2. How British Task Groups will be required to operate in

October onwards including the scale of effort.
Para. 3 Long tem requirements of British Task Groupe.
Para. 4. Facilities at ENIWETOK as a result of report, fran TINE
CINCPAC ADV HQ 070415 refers.
Para. 5. Routing polic7. 19" 200819 refers.
Para. 6. Belief for late eommander GOVJrfT your 2.30915 refers.

29 0525 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COJISERVPAC. C014NORPAC, COJl MARIANAS info COlmE&SEAFBOH,

/
COlWICH, CINCPAC PEABL. COI43RDt'LEET, COMAIRPAC. . .
.

Take appropriate action accordance COMINCH AND CNO 272W. passed you
separatel1" keeping CINCPAC advised.. COMSERVPAC request from CNO such
personnel and material required and not present~ available for this
utilization. CNO hereb7 requested adTise CINCPAC of all action taken to
implement.

30 0237

C07'l'HF~

to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

SHERMAN TO llCOJ:a((S ONLY.

Cordially received. Had long and Tel7 amicable conference with Genere.l
MacArthur. He accedes to naval features and to naval and air shaw of force
as soon as fighting stops. He considers it unwise to risk landing marines
or seizing airfields until troops arrive in strength. He had the Joint
Chiefs of Staff message but did not consider it a directi"fe and has asked
for one.
Para. Unless I receive other instructions I wiJ.l adjust plans to make
all early landings contingent operations with timing to be deteDDined
later and will if requested make 3 MarDivs available to Army for JAPAN because it appears impossible for A:rnry to move sufficient divisions rapidly
without some marines.
Para. 'the foregoing concessions will permit reaching an agreement
unless unforseen demands are made. His plans are being made and ours will
be expanded to cover KOREA and CHINA insofar as troop allocations are
concerned.

30 1306 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM7THFLEET.

MCMORRIS TO SHERMAN ONLY.
Do not concur that landing of marines or occupying airfields .rnuat be
deferred until troops land in strength. No commitment of that nature is
to be made _as such action is likely to be necessary in order to exercise
essential control. The naval officer on the spot must be ftee to act
expeditiously to cope with any existing situation. Trust your skill and
judgement to avoid this question becoming an issue in current discussions.

Para.. 2nd Para your 300237 not entirely clear. It is interpreted to

mean that landing operations by naval forces will be contingent upon the
situation which exists when naval forces arrive in Japanese ports and

3419

- continued -

30 1306 CINCPAC

ADVANCE to COMZTHFLEET ( Cont 'd)

MCMORRIS TO SHEIWAN (Cont 1 d)

developuent s which immediately follow with the tim$ of a:ny such landing
if made to be determined by events as they unfold. If this intrpretatio n
is correct then concur otherwise need amPlificati on.
Para. In view prospeetive requirement s for marines elsewhere it
appears here that no more should be committed in JAPAN proper than is
essential for early stages of occupation. Some will doubtless be reYou are authorized to make up to 3 divisions available
qui~d :..initial.l.y.
for early and rapid movement into JAPAN, i f your discussions there
.
indicate advisabilit y of so doing.
giving
directives
Para. Having in mind that JCS may issue subsequent
CINCPAC a .free hand. until CINCAFPAC arrives in JAPAN with his forces &n1'
agreements or understandi ng you make should carry a proviso for revision
of any part that might prove to be inconsisten t with any later directiTe
issued by JCS.
31 0900 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS, COYINCH, CINCAFPAC, COit]THFLT, .
COWENCHINATACT, COWENCCCCT, COllGERSOS.
CFBX 2231

Difficultie s in connection with operations against LIUCHCNV PENINSULA

is subject your 281202Z GU.AJt refers. Difficultie s of FORT BAYARD operation
are no more serious than initially envisaged. Our CFBX 1803 was for
planni.ng purposes and information only. ihe operation will be rmderlaken
with resources available or being made available to this theater. This
headquarter s i f fully in sympathy with presently projected strategy- and
will not expect equipnent or resources which would in 8Jl1' way jeopradize
OLD.IPIC.
Para. WEICHCW ISLAND is an alterna.te operation. It will only be
undertaken if Japa prove unexpectedl y stubbom in BAYARD ABEA and it
becomes apparent that as a result there will be a protracted delay in
securing that port. This headquarter s aincereJ.t appreciates your
interest in theaters operations.

30 2029

COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Project as outlined in your 120446 has been apprond by Soviets and

action initiated. CNO will provide all material and personnel required
for the establishme nt of the SIBERIAN facilities. Additions to ~
revisions or this project brought about by CINCPAC/POA serial 0005762
of 20 July and ~ 272lll have not yet been submitted to Soviets and are
to be considered separately. Advise COMSERVPAC to take no furt,her action.
31 0810 CINCPOA ADVANCE to BOliSER'IPAC info CINCPAC PEARL HQ.
Comply with directive to COJISERVPAC in last sentence CO:MINCH
302029 passed you separately. See CINCPAC 120446 passed you.

3420

~:L;:.~~ (GOT)

31 1509 CINC/Ui-.PAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE into COUGEN FEAF ADVON, COMGEN FEAF.

ex

~9846.

Not specitieal.ly included in Marine Air Units available operational

control CIHCAFPAC (reference memorandum for record GUAM conference 21-2.3
July) is headquarters 2 Marine Air Wing which nonnally' control as integrated
force all RYOKYUS Marine Air Defense units. Without above Headquarters
.these units would operate directly under headquarters 7th Air Force OKDlAWA.
Your intentions regarding operational control headquarters 2nd lfarine Air
Wing requested. Pending instructions COA.F 7 exercises operational control
lAarine Air Defense units through 2 nd Marine Air Wing Headquarters.

01 1.310 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPA.C ADVANCE HQ.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed in principle that that part
of the southwest pacific area lfing south of the boundar.y described bel~
shall pass from u.s. to British Command as soon as possible. The British
Chiefs of Staff' have undertaken to obtain the agreements of the Australian,
.New Zealand and Dutch governments to these propos!Us and to investigate
and report the earliest practieable date on which the transfer can be
effected. "Beginning on the eoast of INDO CHINA at 16 degrees north;
thence to intersect at 07-40 north latitude 116-00 east longitude, the
boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British
North BORNEO; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to
latitude 05...00 north longitude 127..00 e$-st; thence east to 05..00 nort;b
1.30.00 east; thence south to the equator; thenee east to 14D-OO east;
thence generally southeast to 02-20 south 146-00 east; thence east to
02-20 south 159-oo east; thenee south". , What are your views concerning
the disposition of EMIRAU which lies north of this British area of
responsibility.
02 0311 CINCAFPAC to CmCPAC ADVANCE HQ info CO:MGENUSASTAF, WA.RCOS, COMGENFEAF.

ex 3014.;.

Agreements for coordination of air operations, signed by Sherman,

Chamberlin/and Lindsay, dated l August 1945, approved with following
change in sub paragraphs 1 A and B, X Ray miaus 7 should beXBa.y minus
Copies for local distribution will be changed.

s.

02 0547 COM'ZTHFLT to COMSUBS TI'f!FLT. COMPHILSEAFRON info ComNCH AND CNO,

CINCPAC BOTH B.Q, ALL .TFC AND TQC 7Tffit'LEET.
Effective 15 August 1945 COMSUBS 7THFLEET will direct Commander Sublfarines Advance Base: A. Navy 3002. And Navy recuperation Camp. Navy
3002. To report to COMPHILSEAFRON for matters pertaining to defense.

Maintenance and construction. The operational and a.dm.inistrati'le control

will remain with Commander Submarines 7th F.Leet. The intent of this
direetive is to establish a command relationship between COMPHILSEAFRON
and COHSUBS 7THFLEET analagous to that outlined in general order number 21.

AUGUST

342}_

02 0710 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMSERVPAC, COMG:ENPOA, COMGENFMFPAC info CINCAFPAC,

COMGEN lOTH ARMY, COlliM.ARIANAS, CINCPOA PEARL HQ.
Cancel CINCPOA PEARL ll0l49
Para. 1. Former ICERBEG reserve now redesignated 11farianas OLIMPIC
reserve. Action addressees will reconstitute this reserve by 15 October
with s~ items and quanti ties as original.l.;r prescribed for ICEBEIG and
wUl. maintain same at prescribed levels until ordered discontinued by
CINCFOA. Effective 15 October and weekly thereafter action addressees
will notify CDlCPOA info COMMARIANAS of any existing deficiencies and
estimated date of replenishment. Negative reports are desired.
Para. 2. COMPHIBSPAC or COMGEN 6TH ARl4Y will forward all requests
for supplies from the Mananas OLYMPIC reserve direct to CO:uMARIANAS
for release. COMMARIANAS will coordinate shipnents. Action adees or
their designated representatives will make available for shipment those
supplies requested which are in the Marianas OLYMPIC reserve.
Part. 3. Emergency supplies for the RYUKIUS or other areas will be
filled from regular stocks of normal. supply agencies. Marianas OLD4PIC
reserve shall not be considered a source of such emergenc.y supply unless
replenishment of the reserve can be effected by 15 October. COlla:Efi POA
200425 not to or needed by all refers.
02 10 36 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMJRDFLT. CTF 94, CTF 95,
COMFAI~fiNG 18. COMGEN USASTAF.

niu:o

CTF 38. COMFAIW!I!G 1

'

A .s pecial operation will be conducted by the 509th Bomb Group on

or 5 August at a time to be announced later. .No ship or aircraft of the

Pacific Fleet will come within 50 miles of NAUASAKI, KOKUltA, or HIROSHDIA

fran 4 hours before to 6 hours after the announced time. Acknowledge.

02 1429 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

CINC;BPF 290254 and 290209. Am 1 correct in assuming that all combat
units of British Pacific Fleet will be at my disposal during OLIUPIC
including preparator.y phases. If so assume you will have no objections
to proposals of reference. In view early arrival CINCBPF in GU.tW for
discussions various matters request reply your earliest convenience.

31 1338 ClliCPOA ADVANCE to COMGENPOA info C:rnCPOA PEA.'1.1 HQ.

In accordance with para 3 of recommendations made b.y representatives
of CINCAFPAC, COMGEN20THAF and CINCPOA at the inter-theater mapping conference held at Pearl 25-29 May which has subsequently been approved by
all commanders of theatres involved and the JCS it is requested that
operational direction of the 64th and 3oth Engineer Topographic Battalions
and attached units be returned to CINCPOA on or about 31 Ju~. Outstanding requisitions fran AFPAC will be completed on the terms of present
arra:ngements.

3422

31 0756 COM7THFLT to COMSERTITHFLT, C<l.w:R7THFLT info C~IO, COMINCH, CINCPAC/POA

BOTH HQ, ClliCAFPAC, COMSERVPAC, ALL TF AND TG C<E>RS 7THFLmET!' & CSVNPSF.,
Effective 15 August -1945 there is hereby establiShed under Commander
7th Fleet the command U. -s. Naval forces AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA. TF 70.
Which will include all u.s. Naval Bases and shore facilities and Naval
Air and Seaplane bases in Sw.VPA outside the Philippines except, MANUS. The
name of the Commander u.s. Navy for AUSTRALIA-NEVf GUINEA, CTF 79, and the
location of his headquarters will be announced.
Para. CW.SERV'?THFLT and COMA.m7THFLT respectively will direct the
commanders of all u.s. Naval Shore, air and seaplane facilities within the
Area delineated to report to Com u.s. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEW' GUINEA for
operational and administrative control. Units decommissioned but not
yet moved forward are to be included.
Para. Com U.s. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEJN GUINEA will be responsible for:
A. Logistic support as practicable for Pac Fleet and allied Nav~
Forces, 'Wlits in his area.
B. Expeditious roll up and staging of u.s. Naval personnel and equipnent
scheduled for forward movement
c. Orderly transfer of excess material and of facilities or equipment
d~ authorized to be taken o~r by other allied services.
Para. COMSERV7TH as CON~ERON 7 will continue to provide logistic
support for u.s. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEVi GUINEA and to schedule and provide
shipping for roll up. New Subject. COMSERVFOR 7THFLT, COMSERON 7, will
retain responsibility for operation. Administration and defense of MANUS
pending further decision on Para D of CINCPAC 130751 not to or needed by
all.
31 1349 COMGENATit. to -CINCPAC ADVANCE, DEPCOM 20TH AF info GHQ SWPA.

WARX 41360.

In connection with terminaJ. VIC'fORY 34.3 of 26 July, the following

information received from ALASKA DEPARTMENT is submitted for your info:
A year round port operation at AMCHITKA practicable and adequate. B. Capacity avgas AMCHITKA 1,510,000 gallson existing. c. Capacity hardstands
total 150 ver,y heavy bomber AMCHITKA, length of longest runway 10,000 feet,
2 additional runways 5,000 feet each. D. Available for ver,y heav,y bomber
deployment is tenthousing. some prefabricated tent frames and necessary
tentage are available. Material for mobilization type construction is
available in theatre but additional labor will be required.
Para. In event it becomes necessary to deploy a very heavy bomber
force in Norlh Pacific Area, it is believed that AMCHITKA is the most
suitable location. COMGEN ALASKAN DEPAR'I'MENT is being advised of the
contemplated strength and campositmon of force for planning purposes.

31 1351 CINCPAC ADVAN'CE to COMGENFMFPAC info MARCORPS, CINCPAC PEARL.

UrDis 280ll9 not to all or needed. Target date for the next major
operation for which the 3rd Phib Corps is scheduled is 1 lviarch and readiness datefor this operation m.a;r be set by FMF PAC according:cy- however due
to the general world situayion with which you are familiar and in order
to take advantage of a surrender or collapse of the Japanese Empire ~!F
units should be prepared for occupation duty which might well include
active combat with readiness dates as f91lows:
(l) 5th PHIBCORPS units ready now. t2) 4th MarDiv reinforced ready by
1 s ept. (3) 3d PHIBCORPS units (less 4thMarDiv) by 1 October.

34 2 3

JULY - AUGUST ( GCT)

30 1523 CINBPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH AND CNO ADMIN info COMSUBPAC.

Your 201819. Am redvcing u.s. Sub~es 7th Fleet to 2 squadrons
totalling 24 submarines. Plan further reduction to 1 squadron after
British Command area is formed provided ene~ cruisers SINGAPORE are
immobilized at that time. Estimate life guard requireroonts onl;y after
1 September 1945.

30 2320 RICHARDSON to WARCOS info CINCAFPAC - AFMIDPAC PASSES TO CTIICPAC BOTH HQ.
RJ 67045 ..

Here reference is made to CINCAFPAC radio CX 28945 dated 2$ Jlicy 1945.

to COMGENAFMIDPAC with info to WARCOS and CINCPOA advance. The subject
matters under discussion are indicated in CINCPOA dispatch 2702532 ( GCT)
July 1945 to COMINCH. At this point it is especially desirable to invite
attention to .the fact that CINCPOA dispatch referred to abovetrea.ts and
relates 2 distinct subjects which actually are unrelated, namely: (l) the
category of defense for the Hawaiian Group, which is prescribed by the
JCS; and (2) executive .o rder No. 9W39 of the 24th of October 1944, prescribe~
by the President directing the secretary of War to appoint the Commanding
General, Pacific Ocean Areas Milita.J:Y commander for the territory of IWV'AII.
Para. I will expre'ss nw views on these 2 subjects in 2 parts in the
order listed.
Para. Part 1. Category of defense period under present directives of
the JCS HAWAII is under category of defense nBn modified, which provides
for fighter protection, consisting of a Group of day fighters of 3 sqs and
2 night fighter flights; 5 battalions of guna (anti-aircraft); 5 battalions
of anti-aircraft artillery automatic weapons; 1 battalion and 1/2 of searchlights; complete early-warning radar coarage and integrated air warning
service. These defenses in general are located around the critical areas
of PEARL HARBOR, HONULULU, and principal air fields. They have been
detennined by the best local military opinion to be the minimum necessary
to provide adequate4' against the eventuality of a suicide attack by the
Japanese. Compared vdth the overwhelming resources in aircraft and antiaircraft at the disposal of the American Anny, these defensive forces
are small indeed and they represent the minimum insurance that the
Unfted states Arrrry charged with the grave responsibility of defending
HA1VAII should provide to protect the vital installations of HONOLULU and
especially PE.ARL HARBOR. To reduce them in order, as ClliCPOA recommends
"to facilitate economy in use of personnel and resources, etcn is un. justifiable just so long as there is any possibility of a sneak raid and
it is particularly unwarranted in view of our ample resources in aircraft
and antiaircraft. Any economy of personnel or resources so effected would
be extremely small compared with the over all strength of the Army. The
reduction could only- be justified if the Anrry was in dire need of units
of the character employed in the defense, which of course is not the case.
Para. It is true that the strategic position of the u.s. forces in
the Pacific is much more favorable at this time than at any time since
the War began and that the likelihood of the J apa.nese attacking HAWAII is
remote. To date, however, I have received no o:ficial conuntmication from.
CINCPOA-CINCPAC notifying me of the comptete destruction of the aircraft
carriers ana aircraft carrier escorts of the Japanese Navy, which con- .
stitute the main potential threat to any attack on these islands, either by
aircraft of a single carrier or of a group of carriers, and I therefore can
not assume the impossibility of a sneak suicide raid. Furthermore, it is
- continued -

3424

- continued -

30 2320 RICHARDSON to WARCOS info CINCAFPAC - ft..F1JITDPAC PASSES TO CINCPAC BOTH HQ,
pertinent to observe that the 1\merican people have invested in this war
billions of dollars, several of which are represented by extensive vital
installations in HAWAII, notabzy PEARL HARBOR, and the people would be in
-no mood to condone a failure to provide adequate defenses should a Japanese
suicide attack occur, especia.lly in view of the prodigality of troops a.rx:l
reso~es provided by congress.
Para, I can not give nw consent to the reduction proposed by OINCPAC
BOTH for reasons of prudence and caution, and because the onus would be on
the u.s, .A.:t"nzy" and on the local Commanding General should the risk be
accepted of having inadequate defense forces in the event of an air suicide
attack by the Japanese.
Para. Therefore, I recommend that there be no change in the present
category of .defense of the Hawaiian Group, namely category "Bn as now
modified.~aragraph

Para. Part 2. Presidential executive order number 9489, 24 October

1944. The recommendation by CINCPAC in his radio Z70253Z ( GCT) that the

said order be suspended or revoked is based on the following 2 grounds:

(A) that its provisions affect his overall responsibility for the security
and safety of the territory of Hawaii as well as other parts of the Pacific
Ocean Areas; and (B) that the state of war is now such that continuation
of the powers vested in Military authority by that order is no longer
justified. These contentions will be answered seriatim.
Para.. (A) CDJCPAC'S authority and responsibilities as theater commander
stem from directives. of the JCS and therefore his responsibilities must be
interpreted in the light of these directives. There is an apparent misunderstanding on CmCPAC'S part that his directives in some way impose
upon him responsibilities connected with the executive order. I know of
no directive from the J CS or from any other authority that relates my
responsibilities unde ithe executive order to CINCPAC'S responsibilities
as charged to him by extant joint Chiefs of Staff DIRECTIVES.
Para. Executive order 949S replaced certain security measures that
were exercised by me as Military Governor under martial law and which were
felt to be necessary for the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands.
At this point it should be emphasized that Presidential Ex:ecuti ve Order is
not concerned with military operations against the enemy but deals with
the control of civilians in u.s. Territory. It places in the hands of
the Military Commander means whereby he .rney secure these islands against
espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage that might be practiced by
civilians in our own territory. The authority for the exercise of these
povters stems from the President to the Secretary of War, who was directed
by the President to delegate this authority to me, the commanding General
.A.:t"nzy" Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas and to appoint me Militar,y Commander
of HAWAII. This authority does not stem from the JCS and therefore must
legally be interpreted as a separate authority because w)tere I challenge
in the courts by a citizen or alienfor a.Dy act of mine committed under
this authority I could not plead as a defense that I acted uhdP.r the
authority of CINCPAG-CINCPOA exercising unity i:m of command under joint
Chiefs of staff directives. As an illustration of the misunderstanding
referred to supra, CD!CPAC-CINCPOA invoked this executive order as 1
reason for not releasing my headquarters to the control of CINCAFPAC in the
implementation of JCS directive 1259/4 of April. In his dispatch 260229 G
GCT April 1945 he states Pursuant to the terms of executive order 94$9
- continued -

3425

- continued -

30 2320 RICHARDSON to WARCOS info

Cll~CAFPAC

- AFMID PASSES TO CINCPAC BOTH HQ

.issued by the President, COMGENPOA is designated as the Military Commander

for the Territory of HAWAII and has. responsibilitie s, powers 1 and authority
which makt it necessary that in this capacity COMGENPOA eontinue in his
pres_e nt relationship with CINCPOA in view of CINCPOA responsibilitie s vvith
respect to the Hawaiian Arean but for reasons stated above I am unable to
recognize that CINCPAC legally has jurisdiction over me under this order.
Therefore, CDJCPAC'S contention. that the provisions of the Executive Order
affect his overall responsibility for the security and sa.f'ety of the
Territory of HAWAII as well as other pa:rts of the Pa.cif'ic Ocean Areas is
untenable insofar as it applies to the executive order.
Para. Turning now to CINCPAC' S 2nd contention, that the state of war
is now such that the continuation of the powers vested in military authority
by the E:.x:ecutive order is no longer justified, and his further statement
that "Lieutenant General Richardson, COMGENPOA, considers that they should
be retainedf1 rrr:J cOmments are as follows:
Para. It is twe that the present writing I consider that the powers
of that orEier should be retained, although CINCP.A.C has never invited my
recommendations or discussed the subject with me. The reasons for the
retention of the executive order are abvioUs from a study of the security
_
orders issued under its authority
Para. At the present time there are 6 essential security orders in
existence covering the following subjects: They are necessarybecause of
the large allen population in HAWAII.
Para. 1. Conduct of enem;r aliens and prohibition against their possessing firearms, sho~-wave radio, etc; 2. Instructions to civilians covering
vehicular traffic, ~eating of congested areas and use of lights in the
_
event of air raids, air raid alarms, etc;
Para.. .3. Designation of restricted areas requiring identification passes
for entry such as harbor areas and certain vital. installations and the
handling of explosives in these areas;
Para . 4. Travel control of civilians necessitated by the linrl.ted amount
of joint shipping in Pacific Ocean Areas; priorities are established for
necessary surface and air eivilia.n travel;
Para. 5. Mail and cable and radio censorship and control o short wa:
radio.
Para. 6. The cargo and passenger control which coordinates commerciaJ.
use of harbors and harbor equipment with the needs of the military.
Para. In addition, executive order 9498 is the only authority for the
evacuation of American citizens deemed dangerous to the u.s. Since the
effective date of the order, 24 October 1944, 6 citizens of Japanese
ancestry have been evacuated from the territory to TULE LAKE segregation
center CALIFORl\l'IA. In testimony before a hearing board these persons
openly confessed their loyalty to JAPAN expressmng a desire that JAPAN win
the war. Some of them rei'used when drafted to _serve in the Army of the
u.s. Therefore, it is believed, still other Japanese of TFDPRLEHUECNSYASE
the community.
Para. Minimum use is being made of the authority contained in the
said executive order and the security orders which I have issued pursuant
to it are revi~T~d periodically with the view to rescinding any regua.a.tion _
not necessary to the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands. For
example, a. month ago I dispensed with the Curfew and presently study is
being given to relaxing civilian censorship.
- continued -

3426

- continued PAC

30 2320 RICHARDSON to -WARCOS info_CINGAFPAC-AFMID/PASSES to CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Para. My policy has been and will continue to be the rescission of
all restritive security orders just as soon as the need for them disappears.
Para. In view of the above it is recommended that the executive order
be kept in effect and, to summarize, that the status of both the categpr,r
of defense and of the executive order remain for the present undisturbed.
03 02ll CINCPOA ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC.

Relaxation of air attacks on FORMOSAN airfields and installations gives

the enemy opportunity for rehabilitation and restoration of his air strength
and supplies threat. There is some evidence that this is now being accomplishetl. Re~uest you continue neutralization of FORMOSA in order to
protect our communication lines to the PHEIPPINES, to sai'ebuard our forces
and installations on OKINAWA from air attack by FORMOSA based planes and
in order to deny the enemy the use of gasoline and other supplies remaining

in FORMOSA.

03 0429

CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC AJJV HQ, CG USASTAF GUAM

TOP SECRET. CX 20410

To make the phraseology identical in , each subparagraph of paragraph
1 B staff Conference 1 August signed by Sherman-Chamberlin-Lindsay suggest
paragraph 3 in parenthesis read "The 5th Fleet Will assume primary
responsibility for air defense in the objective area but will take such
action etc u. Request concurrence.
02 1745 WARCOS to CINCAFPAC - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.
YU.R 4Z740
Navy has raised the point of the necessity for the early installation
of shore based radar for ear~ warning and fighter direction purposes
during OLYMPIC. They emphasize the extreme importance of early establishment of land based air warning ~d fighter direction facilities in order
to minimize losses in an operation where frequent and sustained suicide
attacks by the enemy may be expteiied. The foregoing points were raised
in connection with a discussion between war and navy department; staff
officers and are furnished for your information.

03 0154 CDTCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMGENUSASTAF, COMGENFEAF, WARCOS,

COMINCH.

Reference agreements for coordination of air operations dated 1 Augast

1945 signed by Sherman, Chamberlain and Lindsay approved after changing
XRay' minus 7 to XRay minus 8 in subparagraphs lA and B. Copies in
local distribution will be changed.
04 0024 CINCPAC ~IDV ANCE HQ to CINCl~FPAC info COMGEN USAST AF

It appears to CINCPAC that the change proposed in your 030429 would

effect a considerable change in the repponsibilities of FEAF and 5th Fleet
within the objective area- As it now reads subpara l(B)(3) states the
employment of 5th Fleet aircraft but recognized the planned volume and

3427

- continued 04 0024 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info CQ\.1GEN USASTAF.

weight of FEAF air effort within the objective area as worked out between
FEAF and COMPHIBSPAC. As proposed the change would release FEAF from
responsi bilities within the objective area vrltich it should share in order
to give the troops and ships the max:i.mum cover and support. According ly
request te.xt stand as now drafted.

04 0109 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS info CG6THARMY, COMGENFEAF, COMPHIBSPAC, CINCPAC ADV

ex

30632.
Refers to your W 4Z140 not to all MFLJKOPNG of navy emphasis of
importanc e for early installat ion of shore based radar for early warning
and fighter direction purposes in OLYMPIC. Plans include establishm ents
for such purposes on 6 outlying islands to south and southwest of
oQjective area. on XRccy- minus 3. With no satisfacto ry outlying Ground
Locations to the east and southeast coverage in that direction will be
provided by naval ships radar screen until ground instaJJ.at ions are established at corps beachhead s on XRay plus 2. CINCPAC has been requested
to comment on the above by our 200503 of July not to WARCOS.
04 0353 COMGENUSASTAF to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMGENAlR, COMGENFE.AF.
1253.
Approve air coordinat ion agreement of 1 August 45 signed by Sherman,
CHamberla in and Lindsay together with changes proposed by CINCAFPAC and
CINCPAC in their dispatche s: CINCPAC 030154, CINCAFPAC 030429 ~GCT).
Local copies will be changed.
04 f1747 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEET info CINCAFPAC, COMINCH.
Your 040351. In view CINCAFPAC 040403 desire you concentra te your
next effort against ene.Iey" air forces in north HONSHU and HOKKAIDO
instead of TOKYO area. All available intelligen ce data will be furnished
in separate despatch.
04 0841 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINC;WPAC.
Request that agreement s made for OIK.MPIC apply also the CORONET
concernin g long lines as well as internal wire installati ons at naval
establishm ents.
04 1011 COM3RDFLEET to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info CTF 38, CTF 37
Your 040747 wilco. Planning strike S August. (referenc e strike
against ene~ air forces in north HONSHU and HOKKAIDO _instead TOKYO AREA).

342 8

04 1451 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COMGENUSASTAF.

ex

30858
Refreence your 040024Z, in the agreements of 16 Ma;r 1945 we agreed
that all air forces in the objective area during the ~phibious phase
would operate tmder your control. Responsibility for the air missions
in that area necessari4r goes with control. The agreement also contemplated that FEAF would be employed. The objective area and arrangJBments
therefor are now being coordinated in the detailed planning conference
:in progress. CX .30410 was not intended to impl3" a withdrawal or lessening
of FEAF air effort in the objective area or to release FEAF from responsibilities within the objective area which it is expected to share in
heavy volume, but to obti.:in assurance that the 5th Fleet would be prima.ri]
responsible for the mission of air defense or CAP in that area as FEAF
and the 3RD FLEET are in other defined areas. Request that my suggestion
'
in ex 30410 be reconsidered.
04 194.3 COMGENAIR to CJNCPAC ADVANCE info CINCARPAC.

.J

WARX 44043.
Here is further technical data and information requested on J AV.AM.AN
PROJECT in your Z70250. J AVN!!AN PROJECT involves the employment of
80-5 foot rescue boats each carrying 50000 pounds of explosives. These
boat a are carefully disguised as J ap luggers and sea trucks and are
remotely controlled by radio, radar and television fran aircraft having
a control range o 55 to 80 miles. The cruising range of loaded boat is
800 to 1200 miles. For this operation 6 disguised ARB boats will be
employed. 4 will be loaded missiles and 2 will be escorts and will
proceed from BU1~HOUSE to destination under own power. Skeleton crews
leave missiles between 10 and 20 miles from target and trill return to
BUNKHOUSE by 2 escorting ARB boats. 4 Millile ARB boats are then directed
to target by radio control and television from B-17 control planes. VVhen
disguised Milliles enter magnetic field of tunnel, M.A.D. equipment on
boat by telemetering records on television screens in B-17 and operator
by remote detonation SCUTTLES boat over target. No personnel required
from CINCPOA. All personnel, for project alreaqy on detached service
to CTI{CAFPAC. Present plans, because of disguise fact~r of this CM OHK
JNPPD FPRQTION, do not contemplate use of naval escort ships 16r naval
escort aircraft. 2 disguised ARB boats will serve a.s surface escorts
and plans call for FEAF to provide air cover for control planes and ARB
Missiles. state of development of this equipment and technique has, as
result of m~y tests g;gainst simula.ted targets, been determined to be
completely operational and practical.

05 0100 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM MARIANAS.

Inaugurate appropriate air search and provide naval surface unit for
possible interception enemy 1UffiCUS bound units in connection CINCPOA

PEARL 041956.

IIJIJII!!)
04 2320 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMGENUSASTAF.
After thorough consideration of your '041451 GCT and all the associated
questions believe that the phraseology of the agreement of 1 Augast 1945
is preferable to the change proposed by your CX 30410. If the language
lV"ere to be changed it would be necessary to redraft the paragraph considerably to bring out the f~ot that FEAF and also USASTAF must share in the
responsibility for providing in the objective area the full weight of air
effort required for air defense a.nd for support of the troops and ships
therein. I believe it better to ' let\ the draft stand as 1st approved by
your 0203ll and my 030154 and let the details with~ objective area. be
developed in the further planning between FEAF, PHIBSPAC and USASTAF.
05 07 51 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEJi~T info CINCAFPAC, OOMGENUSASTAF, COMGENFEAi.
Your 042125. Consider it unnecessary to make special request on FE!F
and USASTAF in vievr nature their routine operations at this time. Their
strikes are made as often as practicable and cover wide areas FEAF,
USASTJ\F and TF 38 operations are all mutua.lly supporting as now planned.
05 0754 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC, COM?THFLT,

COMPHIBSP~C.

CINCAFPAC has requested that the USS TACLOBAN (EX-TULSA) be made

available pri.marily to copy na.vy conmunications of interest to CINCAFPAC
and transmit same to CINCAFPAC headquarters on shore in objective area.
TACLOBAN is hereby made available for this duty and during the OLYMPIC
operation will. be assigned to COM5THFLEET for operational control. Since
TACLOBAN has previously performed same duty for CTIJCAFPAC no additional
installations will be ma.de. '
05 0755 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC info COM5THFLT, COM3RDFLT, CAPSCF, COMNOB
OKINAWA, COM NABS OKINAWA.
Replacement carrier aircraft must be available at OKINAWA during
OLYMPIC to meet needs of the fleet. Existing directives which require
the buildup to 500 pool aircraft as rapidly after 1 November as is
feasible are confirmed.
05 0845 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV ~o WA.11,COS 2 . COM~, CINCPAC PEARL, AFMIDPAC,
US!STAF, COMGE!,NFEAF, J?.QJiOVAN 0.!:

ex 30940.

Para. l. Reference row CX 28307 CINCPAC ADV~TCE 270250 GOT and COMINCH
281625 GCT. Proposed to destroy KA'MMON TUNNEL in SHDA:ONOSEKI STRAITS.
4 air rescue boats of S5 foot length disguised as enenw craft and loaded
with 25 tons high explosive each are sailed into west entrance of STRArrs.
Boats are fitted vr.ith remote control, radar and television devices and self
destructive elements and are controlled from aircraft at a .m.aximum range
of 100 miles. Boats are directed to target located by magnetie indicator
and scuttled. Main charges are detonated by time delay and counter rnining.
Pa:rt. 2. All necessary operational equipment. and personnel has been
assigned FEAF. FEA.F will recover personnel after boats are abandoned by
their crews. A heavy bombing attack in the area will cove!:' the operation.

34 30

- continu ed AFMIDPAC
05 OS45 CINCAYPAC to CINCPAC ADVP.NCE info WARCOS, COMGENAIR, CINCPAC PEARL,
d)
t
DONOVAN OSSF. ( Corit
USAST AF', COMGENFE..

I\F;

No navy person nel, ships or aircra ft will be reqtrl,r ed.

ted
~ Para. Part 3. Referen ce COMINGH 221915 GCT projee t will be expedi
months
3
exceed
to
and shippin g conserv ed if you can furnish for not
effecti ve 1 Septem ber the follow ing functio nal components less person nel:
1 A-3, 1 G-S, 1 E-ll, 1 D-10, 2 N-18, 1 P-12A, 1 C-8. It is desired to le.
establi sh the projec t and above facilit ies in a navy base area if possib
Para. Part 4. Reques t your concurr ence in the operati on and indica tion
of extent above logisti cs suppor t you can furnish . Separa te radio follows
with code name for operati on.
06 0719 CINCi4.FPAC to CINCPAC ADVJU\JCE HQ.

c .31175.

Action being taken . Referen ce your 0302ll reques ting continu ation
of neutra lizatio n of FORMOSA.
06 0819 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH AND CNO.

Your 011310 . EMIRAU ISLAND is now in use as a base .for Marine Air
- Group 61. However it was agreed at M!l\JILA confere nce 30 July - 1 August
that all units of lst l!ar Air ~Jifing will be concen trated in souther n
be ..
PHILIPPINES as soon as possib le. After this is done recommend EMIRAU
our
by
release d to British as it will not be needed in the near future
operati ng units and may be of use to British in connec tion with their
moppin g up of RABAUL and K!VIENG. Furthe r recommend retenti on flRight
later time.
to Use~ if needed at

04 0403 CINCAFPAG to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info CG FEAF, COM3RDFLT.

ex

30653.
strong indicat ions that Japs iQtend an airborn e operati on agains t
OKIN.AWA area after 9 August . Troop Carrie rs are geing concen trated in
northe ast HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, both beyond operati ng radius of FEAF at
OKINAWA. Sugges t if practic able that 3rd Fleet during ~e.sent operati ons
in EMPIRE waters strike the concen tration s in northe ast HONSHU and
HOK~AIOO.

07 0.331 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH

CINCPAC PEARL.

& CNO info CO:MNORPAC, COMCRIJPAC, CCMSERVPAC,

Your 061.648 recommend CONCORD and RICHMOND remain on presen t duty

until ice closes traffic into AMUR RIVER about 1 Octobe r then proceed
CANAL ZONE.

AUGUST (GCT)

3431

'llfi!II!T)
07 0330 CINCPAC ADV to COMGENCHINA CijUNGKING info CO~GENTACTCT, CumTGKING,'
COMGENAAFCT KUNMING, COMGENSOSCT CHUN&KING, 001J!GENCCCT KlJNlUNG, GINCAEPAC
FERN 5.

Para. 1. Formal p~sentation of JEMEDAR made at 1000, 6 August.

CINCPAC and key starr attended. Afternoon devoted to discussion of
availability of persoru1el and supplies. Everyone must cooperative and
int~ntion solving all difficulties.
Para. 2. Admiral Sherman feels that JCS must issue a. directive to
establish responsibilities among 3 theaters if operation is to be carried
out on time. He feels CHINA should handle land matters and GUAM or JlANTI.A
handle the naval responsibilities.
Para. 3. Lino0ln says that War Department is also interested in cutting
red tape with this operation and to tha.t end S & P produced a draft directive. No action has been taken due to absence of key people at POTSDAM.
Para. 4. All timin-g is based <;>n securing target area by 15 August.
7th Fleet questions whether cha.lmel will be secured from ground attack
(coastal or field batteries) in time to set up the initial convoys about
20 August. Conference working on assumption that convoys can safely pass
into channel on or about 20 August.
Para. 5. Tentative ETD GUAM night of 7 August

07 0553 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH 1 CINCAFPAC, COMGENCHINA info

CO!VT.SERVPAC, CINCPAC P:BtARL liQ, OOMSERY7THFLT,

GOM7THFLE..~,
COMWi~SCAROLI!~S, WARCOS.

The representatives of COMGENCHINA now at GUA..'M inform me that it is

eonf'idently expected that the Chinese A:rm:f will oeeupy FORT BAYARD on 15
Augst. Although numerous explorat"o ry dispatche,s have been ax:ehanged definite action does not appear to have been taken to ensure the operation
of the port and the unloading of the supplies available. In my opinion the
advantages to be gained by such action and the obvious .d isadvantages of
failing to deliver effectively even token supplies to the Chinese when they
first take useful seaport are controlling and justify the minor diversion
of naval resottrces involved.
Para. 2. In view of the short time remaining earliest conaurrence in
the following is requested.
Para. 3. A. Com?thFlt load in 7 LSTS the following naval advance base
personnel and material, prepare them for shipment- to FORT BAYARD as soon
as possible and advise readiness date. Listed by component designation number of personnel- mea.surera.ent tons. AJ-43-200. Bl-Zl-100. B2B-29-210.
B3-18-200. B4-10..;500. B5A-6-50. B5B-2S-28., B7-21-l02. Bl0-0-100. 03-10-40
. CB-8-23. 09-9-34. Hl4C-0-15.3. Dl0-2~835. D22-6-9. E9-l8-225. G?-68-431.
J2-4-27. One quarter Fl-300-1500. One quarter Pl-300-2500. PB-0-1500.
Pl2A-l-30. Pl2C-l-.30. 21\IlA-50-940. Total 983 personnel 9767 measurement
tons.
B. Rear Admiral E. Buelonaster proceed via air and break flag in
SPENCER( COO) or INGHAM (CGC) as commander South China Naval Force (TF 93)
which w.ill consist of 1 CGO-l~YMS-1PCE(R)-6PGM-2I. CS(L) designated by Com
7thFlt plus 2 CVE-6DE-71ST--1AOG-1AGS desigpated by CINCPAC. CTF 93 prepare the forces assigned -for movement to FORT BAYARD when a.ndas requested

AUGUST (GCT)

3432

- continued -

CJ7

055J

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMI NCH, CI,NCAF PAC, COMGENCHINA info COMJTHFLEET

COMSERVP.{\C, CINCPAC PEARL HQ , COMSERV7THFLT, COMU;\IESCAROLINES,, WARCOS.
by COMGENCHINA and develop naval base facilities at FORT BAYARD. The
Escort Carriers with 2 destroyer escorts will be released to CINCPAC after
arrival. of the lst AK convoy at FORT BAYARD.
e. On arrival in FORT BAYARD CTF 93 and forces under hsi colllnW.nd will

and support the forces of the CHINA THEATER..

D. CINCPAC replace as prompt~ as possible such naval advance base
components supplied by the 7th Fleet as need to be replaced.
E. LSTs. to be used only for the initial lift. Other naval craft to
be released as required by CINCPAC if necessary to avoid interference with
cov~r

OLYMPIC.

07 0717 CINCPOA ADVi\NCE HQ to COMGENCHINA, CHUNGKING.

GENERAL CARAWAY SENDS: .
CINCPOA is sending despatch tod~ to CNO, CINCAFPAC, COMGE!'l'CIIDTA
concerning JEMEDAR operation. Components listed therein cover naval
requirements for operation of port. In addition it establishes small naval

surface force to provide protection for port and convoys thereto. This
message is FERN 6.
Para. 2. In opinion of CHINA party proposal if approved furnishes
minimum requirements for operation in time to meet target dates.
Para. 3. Recormnend that CHINA THEATER make request that War Department
take necess~ action in conjunction with Nav,r Department to obt_a in
approval and :implementation of CINCPAC'S proposed action.
Para. 4. AdmiraJ. Sherman and CINCPAC' S staff state that the diversions
of components and ships to JIDJ!EDAR will not interfere with MACA.R.THUR'S
logistic support of OKINMVA forces. They further state that personnel and
shipping vmich are necessary to OLYMPIC committed to support of CHINA Ina3'
be withdrawn for period of that operation, to be replaced or retumed
CHINA after.
Para. 5. Admiral Sherman indicates naval tm.its operating port insta1lations being placed under Flag Officer because that furnishes most
convenient means of adrn.i.'listration and control. He indicates that CINCPAC
may consider dividing forces into 2 parts, placing port installations
under CHINA at later date. It appears that CHINA theater should insist
on operational control now of naval shore installations at port with
administrative control remaining under Admiral Buckmaster since these
installati ons will be supporting CHI NA and not be for support of naval
forces.

07 0824 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMSERVP!C info CI NCPOA PEARL, CNO, COME>ERON 10.
Refer to your 262225 of July. Due to importance of subject operation
consider floating st orage too great r i sk. Request contained your 262225
floating storage OLYMPIC is disapproved.
07 .0833 CINCPAC ADV.t\NCE t o CINCAFPAC i nfo COMINCH,

CN~ .

Reference your 251431 July and 050845 Aug. Fea si bi lity and desi~4 3 ~
u
abilit y of J AVJ!lt'\N are believed to be matters for det erminat i on by
o
t
e
abl
avail
resources
from
CINCAFPAC and COMIFEAF. Navy can furnish
COMNOB OKINAWA such assistance and materials in E-ll component as are
peculiar to PT boats plus 1 LCM ~ Suggest that all other mat er ials refer red
to in COMINCH .221915 be supplies from stocks available t o COMGENlO co~g:~~V

08 0500 CGUSFCT to CINCAFPAC, WA.RCOS info CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ, COM7THFLT.

3010.
Concur rence with plan outline d by Advance HeadqU arters CINCPAC in Top
Secret GU~~ 070553 of 7 August is express ed by Commanding Genera l China
Theate r.
Para. To CINCAFPAC. Reques t your concurr ence in propose d arrange ment.
Para. To WARCOS. Reques t action in conjtm ction Wash. Navy Departm ent
to obtain JCS approv al and urgent liaplem entatio n of action propose d by
CTIJCPAC to make timely provisi on for operati on of port at JE!\W)AR and a
.
small naval surface force to protec t port and convoys proceed ing thereto
of
ation
continu
Reques t that directi ve be issued includi ng provisi on for
cooper ative action essent ial to continu ed use of JEMADAR port until subunction becomes availab le, all withou t detrime nt to OLD.A:PIC, and that
command arrange ment include operat ional contro l by Commanding Genera l
CHINA THEATER over shore install ations , since these will be serving this
'
theate r.
Para. Every effort being made to insure occupa tion of FORT BAYARD
.
by 15 August and securit y of area includi ng local approac hes by 20 August
0$ 0522 CINCPAC .IDVANCE HQ to COM3RDFLT.

Your 000309 approve d. Assume you will take maximum advanta ge of any
improve ment in weathe r to expand coverag e over assigne d area. With em.
phasis on destruc tion KATA.J.JA force. Interes ted commands will be advised
(Aro),
08 1540 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC PEARL, COMSEitVPAC
A.
OKINAW
GHQ SUB A.R.EA PETROLEUM OFFICER, ASCOMI

Concur propose d amendments your top secret 040939 .

CJ7 1505

HQ.
ALUSNA MOSCOW to COMINCH AND CNO - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE
Vice Admira l Gavrilo v head of Rec.i::.Navy Co.mnn.mications today presen ted
Navy's desires for commu nication set up for use of their operati onal
liaison groups 4th questio n Victory 351 refers. They desire 2 circui ts
between VLADIVOSTOCK and WASHINGTON 1 being the circui t VLADIVOSTOK MOSCOW
r!ASHINGTON as now establi shed. A 2nd to be a direct circui t between
VLADIVOSTOK and V:ASHINGTON. For this . circuit they propose to use 1
station at VL~~IVOSTOK of about 10 Kilowa tt power man~al operati on using
interna tional code. This station has previou sly establi shed commun cations
with HONOLULU on 13635 KC between 0300 and 0400 GMT. See rrry 241410 OCT
and related dispatc hes. They desire the use this frequen cy and time for
cies
1 schedu le but reques t our recomrn endation regardi ng additio nal frequen
ng
receivi
and
and schedu les. They believe 6 periods per day for sending
will be adequa te. The call sign SAB is propose d for TJJ.~SHINGTON and G.AL
for VLADIVOSTOK. They sedire our recoiD[ne ndation s and sugges tions regard
Th~
tests.
of
ing this circui t bef ore establi shing definit e prograrn
desire to establi sh 1 ci rcuit f or our ovr.n use betwee n VLADIVOSTOK and
GUAM 24 hour service is desired and the follmri ng wave lengths and

AUGUST

34 34

AUGUST ( GCT)

,........
- continued -

07 1505 ALUSNA MOSCOW to COMINCH AND CNO

- COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC .IDVANCE HQ.

schedules are proposed between 2100 GMT and 0900 GMT basic wave length
14480 KC standby 16240 KC. Between 0900 GMT and 2100 G!IT basic wave
length 7990 KC standby 9125 KC. SUggested call signs are VLADIVOSTOK KBN
GUAM: ZTK. Soviet will use ovm station at VLADIVOSTOK but desire U.s.
furnish facilities at GUJIM. They are sending a communication team of 1
officer 4 radio operators and 3 coders to GUAM as part of liaison group.
Following is over a.nd above any stations or facilities which United states
. may desire to establish at VLADIVOSTOK for own use. New Subject. At a
meeting ~th SLAVIN todczy regarding weather facilities, see my 040820, he
stated that questions concerning this project were under study but that
no answers were ready at this time.
08 2227 OINCPAC ADVi\NCE to COMNORPAC info CTF 49, COM3RDFLT.
Present task force l~9 vTill pass to your operational control upon
departure ENT~ 1TETOK. Consider it desirable that you arrange coordinated
air attack and surface bombardment against a.rlobjective in the KURILES as
soon as forces can be assembled and also make sweeps against en~ shipping
which may appear.
OS 2028 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNCRPAC info COMINCH, CINCAFPAC, CGUSFCT, ALL TF
COMDRS PAC FLT, OOM3RDLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT.

North Pacific Force with forces currently assigned plus Cru.Div 5,

CarDivs 23, 26 and DesRon 45 as separately reconstituted for this purpose
assigned follO"wing additional tasks.
Establish and maintain control of a line of communications from the
ALEUTIANS across the SEA OF OKHOTSK.
Neutralize Japanese bases threatening this line of communications.
Provide protection for convoys against hostile air surface arid
submarine attacks between the ALEUTIANS and escort turn around points
in the SEA OF OKHOTSK.
Para. This modifies my OpPlan 4-45.
09 0050 CllJCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info COMSUBPAC.

There are u.s. submarines in the SEA OF JP..PAN north of the boundary
established in VICTORY 371. Request action to ensure that they not be
attacked. Orders have been issued for them to move scuth of the boundary.
line.
Para. In view lack of recognition signals propose to keep Pacific
Fleet submarines outside HMutual" zones until liaison becomes effective
except for the SEA OF OKHOTSK south of 47th parallel whic~ must be used
by submarines in passage.
Para. Request use of TARTJL~Y STRAIT be obtained for entr.y and exit
of submarines as soon as posSible.
09 0129 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CTF 37, CTF 38.

AUGUST.

Your 082226 intend continue present attacks on loth fuel 11th strike
12 and 13th. W
ill advise later as to Task Force 37 ability to participate
after lOth. Det8ils of plans by separate dispatch.

343 5

09 0216 CINCPA.e ADVANCE to COl/INAVGR CHINA info eOMGEN CHINA THEATER, COMINCH.
CTG 95.2 080733 passed separatel y. I request that requests for support
of the activitie s of u. s .. :forces in CHINA by units of the Pacific Fleet
ge addressed to CINCPAC whenever time permits and normally through the
Comdg General u.s. Forces in CHINA . Departure from proper channelS in
matters of this nature will inevitabl y lead to confusion and 'misunders tand.in
and \"rill not be conducive to the most efficient use of the resources which
can be made available to ~upport the CHINA THEAT.ER.
09 0503 eiNC ..\F'PAC to WJlttCOS, CG USFCT info CINCPAC 1\..DVANCE, COM?THFLT.

ex

31S9S.
Reference vV:X: 45950 and CFBX 3010. Concur in CINCPAC ADVANCE 070553Z
(GCT) relating to Naval planning for FORT BAYARD except OPS PCE (R) is
not available . All PCE' S this area have been converted to co.rmnunications
ships and are plarmed for use in our coming operation s.
1

09 0816

ClNG~AC

ADVANCE to CTF 95 info C01QRDFLT, CTG 95.2.

Detach CruDiv 16 when RFS and direct ComDruDiv 16 with his division
proceed LEYTE reporting on arrival to COM3RDFLT for duty. eruniv 16 will
be available for inclusion in TF 3S for operati9n s scheduled commence late
August.
09 1403

eiNCS~lPA

to COMAAP info eiNCPAC ADVANCE, CG USASTAF 2 COMANF.

ex 32046.
Bounda:cy line connectin g the following points delimits air and Naval
operating areas for u.s. and USSR air and naval forces: point at intersecti ot:
of 45-45 north latitude and line joing CAP CRILLON (KONDO) (southern tip of
SAKHALKN) and CAPE SOYA MISSft.KI (SOYASAKI) (Northern tip of HOKKAIOO), west
to point at 45-45 north lqtitude 140-00 east longitude , point at 40-00 norbh
latitude ~35-00 east longitude , CAPE BOLTIN (11USU KUTCHI) on KOREM~ COAST,
eHANGCHUN, LIAIYU~J., KATI,U, CHIHFblJG, PEKING, TATUNG, southern boundary of
IN~TER MONGOLIA. All points inclusive to US Forces. RUSSI,.W naval and air
forces will operate north of the boundary line and u.s. naval and air forces
will openate south of the boundary line. Air forces of this command will
operate north of the bounda.ry line and in the SEA OF OKHOTSK only on
specific authority from this headquart ers. Reference our ex 26304 designating area of operation s for FEAF in north CHINA arxl KOREA, FEAF will operate
north or west of line indicated in reference only on authority of this
headquar ters. Clearance is being reque~ted of commanding general. USFCT
for operation s of FEAF . :in area included between the line: 'MUSU KUTCHI,
MUKDEN, PEKLTIJG and the line: Cl\P BOLTINA (1WSU KUTeHI) CHANGCHUN, LIAOYUAN,
KAILU, CHIHFT:!J'NG, PEKING.

343h

AUGUST (GCT)

09 0957

AT..,USNA MOSCOW to COMINCH

.AND CNO - COMINCH

PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Answering your 011400 Red Navy submits following. They estir.aa.te convoys
can be initiated within 5 to 10 daS after beginning of hostilities and
consider that it will be necessar,y to despatch from 3 to 4 convoys of
from J2 to 15 vessels per convoy per .month but add that convoys can begin
as soon as the u.s. Navy has laid down the necessary operating arrangern.ent s
in the region around the southern portion of KAMCHATKA and in OKHOTSK SEA.
Their plan submitted for your consideratio n calls for u.s. convoying of
Soviet merchant and mile post vessels to PETROPAVLOVSK except they desire
such milepost vessels a.s are properzy equipped and trained to be used as
escorts with convoys to PETROPAVLOSK . Despatch of these convoys to be
entirely as decided by u.s. Naval authorities . Convoys for NIKOLAEVSK
will be made up at PETROPAVLOVSK. Responsibil ity for maintaining line of
. communicati on$ between PETROPAVLOVSK and NIKOLAEVSK will be a mutual
responsibil ity of u.s. Na1rJ and Soviet .Pacific Fleet but they state they
desire U.s. Navy to have control and responsibil ity of convoys until they
arrive at NIKOLAEVSK. The composition of the escort vessels and the convoy
coinmander to be assigned by U.s. N'avf. Red Navy will furnish supplementa ry
escort strength but is not able now to state numbers or types. Despatch
of convoys to NIKOLAEVSK to be a .matter of agreement between their Paicife
Fleet and the convoy commander. They assume that the escort arriving at
NIKOLAEVSK will pick up return convoy with PETROPAVLOVSK at 1st destination .
Despatch of this return convoy to be a L'latter of agreement between their
Pacific Fleet and convoy commander. LikeVv"ise despatch of convoys from
PETROPAVLOVSK to UNITED STATES to be a. matter of agreement between convoy
commander and commander PETROPAVLOVSK Naval Base but UNITED STATES to have
entire responsibil ity and control M these convoys_ They desire that the
same system. that was used v.rith convoy movements from the UNITED STATES and
ENGLAND to northern pos:ts of the USSR be established . They will take the
necessary steps to insure that Soviet submarines will be excluded from
areas where. convoys are operatin_g and an anchorage will be arranged at
PETROP.AVLOVSK for escorts and attending auxiliaries . Soviet vessels in
BERJ~G SEA between 50-53 north and 57-30 north and east of 166-00 east
have been directed to proceed to u.s. Ports. Vessels in allied ports will
be instructed as to their future movements by Soviet Convoy Officer.
New Subject: They request initial numbers of liaison group for VT..JADIVOSTOK
be held to lowest possible .minimum. because of lack of accommodati ons there .
They vrould also li.lce to be informed of number of u.s. submarines operating
in SEA OF JAP~~~. The naval section of the Soviet liaison group at GUA}!
will consist of 4 officers and 7 enlisted men. They were advised that
this group could progably be flO"wn to GU~t\M in u.s. plane which brought
in u.s. Liaison G-roup on assumption this group will be flown in. Request
confirmatio n. They are greatly interested in matter of recognition
between surface craft and aircraft and between surface and aircraft and
will submit their ideas shortly
09 1540 ALUSNA MOSCOW to CINCPAC . ADVANCE info COMINCH.
vVhile delivering substance of your 090050 to Red Navy was advised that
an American submarine was observed at 1410 on August Sth about 52 miles
south of CAPE G~ROV and at 1540 on same date Soviet airplace observed
fragments of a Merchantman which ha.d been sUnk in the region where the sub
had been seen. Presence of U.s. Subs within this area complicates

AUGUST

3437

- e ontinued 09 1540 .uLUSNA MOSCOW to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMINCH (Cont t d).

commencement of their naval activity and they desire to be informed when

all submarines have left their zone. They will ta.'k:e such action as they
can to assure tha~ submarines are not attacked. With reference to passage
of TARTARY STRlU:T they promise ear]Jr reply~

09 2115 COM3RDFLT to

CINCPAC info GTF

38, CTF 37.

For stri..lces after August llth fueling intend to be prepared to shift

full wei~t of attack to TOKYO AREA if my assigned primary northern targets
are inaccessible or if fields now under attack are no longer good targets.
09 2202 COMINCH AND GNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMNORPAC,. ALUSNA MO~

to you. Comment on donvoy and

With , respect Sf recognition s,rstems

Refer AI.USNA l~OSCOW 090957 being passed

escort control proposals therein.

CNO 091415 refers.

10 OBll CINCPAC ADVANCE to COlffi1JCH info COMNORPAC, ALUSNA MOSCOW.

Your 092202. .ALUSNA MOSCOW 090957.
conc.ept my Joint Staff Dtudy KEELBLOGKS

Recormnend convoy system follo\Y"

4 of 26 Ma,y 1945.

Para. Specifically recommend that (A)AChop line as suggested in study

be established within the SEA OF OKHOTSK east of which the UNITED STATES
have complete responsibility for air and surface protection of convoys and
east of which no Russian SUbrDari.Des operate. West of the Chop line the
reverse situation should exist. (B) Convoys assemble at ADAK and routed
direct through the . IillRILES via ONNEKOTAN, SHASUKOTr or lliTJSHIRU STRAITS
to Russian ports or direct to PETROPAVLOSK. Minim:um traffic between
PETROPAVLOSK and ports to westward. (C) :Minimum use of PETROPAVLOSK. No
u.s. Naval shore establishments in Russian ports except for communications
and liaison. (D) Dispatch of westbound convoys to be controlled by
COMNORPAC and east.bound convoys by Russian Naval Command. Direct coordination and consultation between CO:MNORPAC and appropriate Russian naval
commander required.
10

1609 CINCPAC

to COM3RDFLT info COMINCH, CTF 38, CINCAFPAC, OOMNORPAC,

COM7THFLT, COM5THFI{f.
ADVt~l\l"CE

The text of my Joint Staff study CAMPUS dated 9 August insofar as

naval landing force operations are concerned nov; reads as follows. "At
each principal anchorage occupied an operational airfield will if practiable be occupied to facilitate communications and airborne troop landings
and for eventual development for .n aval purposes. The timing of this
'occupation will be such as to support the landing of troops in strength
but rn.ay be adjusted by the local naval cormnander as necessary to meet the
requirements of the situation as i t develops after the arrival of naval
forces in Japanese ports. Key positions on shore in the vicinity of the
anchorages occupied m~ be occupied if such action becomes necessar,y to
,
insure the safety of naval f orces".
Para. If time permits desire advance notification of any landing force -:J
operations under naval command.

v
AUGUST

343 8

10 1614 CINCPAC ADVANCE to ALFDA info COMINCH.

The public announcement by the Japanese of counter proposals for the
termination of the war must not be permitted to affect vigilance against
Japanese attacks. Neither the Japanese nor fJ.lied Forces have stopped
fighting. Take precautions against treachery even if local or general
surrender should be suddenly annmmced. Maintain all current reconnaissance and patrols. Offensive action shall be contined unless otherwise
specifically directed.
02 0912 CINCPAC ADVAI'JCE to COMGENUSASTAF info COMGEN20THAF.
Desire that any mines laid in SASEBO, NAGASAKI, KOBE, OSAKA, NAGOYA,
TOKYO, all other southern and eastern HONSHU ports, and all INLAND SEA e..reas
other than eastern approach to SHTI,!ONSEKI STRAITS and other than INLAND
SEA area between 133-00E and 134-45E be sterilized .by 1 December 1945.
Also request that the number of mines planted in INLAND SEA area between
133-00E and 134-45E that will not be sterilized by 1 December 1945 be
held to a mdr.OJaum. Sterilizing times for other targets indicated in
COMGEN21BOMCOHS 300035 June and COMAF 20 t s 2907 Lr,.O July as agreed to by rey020256 July.
10 1407 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC lillV AtJCE HO.

c 32375.

Tentative troop lists for BLACKLIST are approaching completion in

current conferences with 6th, 8th and lOth .t\rmy commanders and with FEAF.
Request that representatives of the Amphibious Forces \v.hich you intend to
designate to work with each -~ Contraander be instructed to contact ~
Commanders for detailed planning. Headquarters 6th Army now San Fernando,
Pampang, Headquarters Sth Army now LEYTE; headquarters lOth ..tu-rrry now
OKINAYA. Arrey" connnanders will be responsible for the loading out of FSAF
elements.
10 1507 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC PEARL, CG V WJ.AR AMPHIB CORPS,
COMAF 13, COMGEN FEAF

ex

'

32403.
FEAF has assigned 13th tir Force mission of support 5th Amphibious
Corps during OLYJ!PIC. Propose authorizing direct liaison between representatives 13th Air Force and 5th Marine Amphibious Corps on matters pertaining operational coordination and utilization aircraft warning control
groups in direct support Marine OLYMPIC operations. Involves sending aircraft and liaison personnel to HAWAUN required for liaison purposes. Your
comments requested.
10 2314 CINCPAG ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC info CO:MGEI\JFEAF, COM;\Fl3, COMGEN5THPHIBCO..ID:.
Your 101507 concur subject to tte comment that the 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing is planned to be furnishe d as a component of the w..its of the Fleet
Marine Force which may parti cipate i n OLYMPIC. As far as practicable
Marine Ground Forces . should b e supported by Marine Aviation and Ground Air
Liaison with Fleet Marine Force should be carried on by Marines.

3439

...

10 2000 COMINCH AND CNO to C[l'ICP.A.C BOTH HQ, COMEASTFRON, COMNESSEAF:RON, COMGULFSEA.
FRON info . SECNAV
,
,
In order to conform with War Department policy ;for public relations and
censorship purposes concerning military use of ATOMIC energy and ATOMIC
bomb war Department policy is quoted belo\l}r for guidance. Doubtful matters
should be submitted to Navy Department puginfo for clearance War Department
or u.s. Office of Censorship representatives. n1. Censors mtzy" pass material
dealing 'Ttvith ATOM BOMB and :military use of ATOMIC energy "t-rlthin bounds of
official releases only. 2. Indu.stries universities, individuals etc may be .
identified with the overall development in general terms but may not
elaborate on their technical contributions. 3. Historical information of
non-military nature concerning ATOMIC energy provided technical informa.tion
on ATOMIC research after January 1940 is not revealed. Censors should stop
for security reasons following infonnation. 1. References to specific
processes forn!lllae and mechanics of operation. 2. Stocks location of stocks
procurement of stocks and stocks consumption. It may be said that ura:nilron.
is used. 3. Quality and quantity of production of active materials for ATOM
bombs. 4. Physics characteristics and future military improvements or
developments of ATOMIC energy- or AT01liC BOMB. 5. Descriptions or pictures
of bomb and nature of its action other than comparative explosives equivalents such as equal to- 20,000 tons of TI-lT or 2000 times more powerful
than any bomb yet used. 6. Techniques of operational use of the bomb.
7. Information as to relative importance of the various methods or plants
or of their relative functions or effihcencies. General references may be
made to these installations only plants adjacent to OAK RIDGE, TENNEsSEE
and RICHMON.p, WASHINGTON and the laboratory near SA.NTE FE, NEN MEXICO.''
10 2315 CINCPAC _.IDVANCE to JCS info CINCPAC PEl~.HL, Cil'JCAFPAC, _CG USFCT.

Subject is l'TAPKO PROJECT which involves introduction of OSS personnel

into KOREA by submarine and establishment of 2 radio listerung posts at
forward bases to receive information.
Para. Objectives are (A) to organize intelligence net\~ork in KOREA;
(B) assist in rescue of d~rr.ned aviators;(C) provi~e base for further pen
etration of JAPAN proper by clandestine agents; (D) organize resistence,
sabotage and guerrilla activities. Principal value may lie in (D).
Para.. Comments on CINCAFPAC and CG USFCT on t:b..is project are contained
in their 15lll9 July and 051200 July respectively both of which have been
passed to JCS for information.
Para. CINCPAC does not favor project at this time but is prepared to
furnish submarine to transport personnel if required.
10 2317 CTNCPA.G ADVANCH; to CONfPHIBSPAC .. .COM3RDPHIBFOR, COM5THPHIBFOR,
info .C011{INCH, C,IN.9:j!:,PAG, CO:M7TH~ T, COM5THFLT, COMGE11'6THA!.1MY,

COMGEN 8, CINCt<\C PEAHL HQ.

My Joint, Staff study CA![PUS provide~ th3.t the planning and execution of
the occupation of J APJ\.N by u. s. P..rmy Fo:rces will be coordinated with CINC11-FPAC.. COMPHIBSPAC will control the amphibious movement and debarkation of
the occupation forces through the various amphibious force and group commanders. An amphibious force comma nder will be designated to operate in
close coordination with each Army Commander and to conduct the movement to
t he objective of the forces assigned each Army. COM3RDPHIBFOR will move

344 0

- continued COM:5THPHIBFOR, COM?THPHIBFOR,

COMGEN6THA.t!?.MY, COMGEN 10

the Sth .4;rmy, COM5THPHIBFOR the 6th Army and COM7THPHIBFOR the lOth Ju-royn .
Para. Amphibious force commanders concerned establish planning liaison
immediately with Army Commanders. Headquarters 6th Army now San Fernando.
Headquarters 8th Arrey now Leyte. Headquarters loth Army now Okinawa.
ll 0217 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCAFPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT,
CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMNORPAC, USS SOUTH DAKOTA.
In the event of a Japanese surrender it is my present intention to
continue to exercise my command from my headquarters atGUAM except when
my presence is required elsewhere for particUlar purposes. Admiral Halsey
will remain in JJITSSOtr:r-tr. Admiral Spruance vdll break his flag in NE'V
JERSEY. SOUTH DAKOTA lAJill remain in company with Admiral Halsey and will
be prepared to serve as my flagship when required. I expect to move
between GUAM and SOUTH DAKOTA by seaplane when necessary.
11 OS29 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CJNCAFPAC info COM5THFLT, COMINPAC.

Due to quantities of United States pressure type mines laid in KOBEOSAKA AREA specifically in the OSAKA WAN it appears impracticable to
operate in that area until sterilizers render the mines inoperative in
February 1946. KURE appears to be preferable as a base from which to
control -INLAND SEA. This affects CAMPUS and BLACKLIST to a controlling
degree.
ll 1215 C01:IGENCHINA to CINCPAC info CINCAFPAC, COMGENSOSCHINA, COMGENTACT

CHTI~TA,

WARCOS.

CFBX 4309.
Regardless of Japanese surrender request a~l material, shipping and
personnel designated for FORT BAYARD at GUAM conference be considered as
firm agreements. All material, shipping and personnel agreed upon are
required by CHINA THEATER whether port is established at BAY.A.RD, KO~iVLOON
or elsewhere.
12

0244. CINCPAC

ADVA.I~CE to COM5THFLT info COM3RDFLT, COMP~IBSPAC, COM..lSTCARTFPAC,

C01!2NDCARTFPAC 2 CASCU PHIBSPAC.

Refer to CASCU top secret serial 00015 dated ll July and COM5THFLT 2nd
endorsement serial 000155 of 7 August thereto subject dusk and dawn fighter
patrols.
Para. It is considered infeasible to accomplish the training of fleet
pilots on any such scale as visualized. Commanders of fast carrier task
forces should take such measures as are practicable to insure that VF pilotf
flying dusk CAP'S are capable of landing on board parent carriers after dar1
Para. The maintenance of the day C.ttP after sunset is within the
operationa~ control of appropriate commanders and should be so ordered if
req_uired.
AUGUST

3441

J2 0807 CINCPAC .ADVANCE HQ to COH5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMINCH, CINCAFPAC, COM3RDFLT,

COMNORPAC.

For occupation planning am modifying concept my Joint Staff study

with respect to areas of responsibilities of action adees. COM5THFLEEI'
will command naval occupation western HONSHU, SHIKOKU and KYUSHU and
will control I1~tUID SEA, southern half of SEA OF JAPAN, and waters east
of line from $outhern tip of KOREA at 1Z7-00 east south to 32-00 north lZl00 east southwest to 26-30 north 123-00 east thence south to 20-00 north.
This will give COM7THFLEET responsibility for planning and conducting
operations from LUI CHOW PENINSULA along CHINA COAST, in YANGTSE RIVER,
and in YELLOW SEA. It will more nearly conform to boundaries between
zones of action of 6th and lOth armies. Request your comment .
COJ.!GEN3RDPHIBCOR.
..
ll 0858 CINCPAC .ADVANCE to COHGENFMFPAC info FMFPAC REP MA11.I.t\.NAS,

Alert 1 RCT From 6th MarDiv for immediate occupation duty if required.
Unit should be completely equipped and ready for active combat operations .
5 units of fire and 30 days rupply to accompany. If anployed this RCT
vdll be withdra-vm later for subsequent employment with parent division.
Advise unit designated earliest.
11 1344 ALUSNA MOSCOW to CTIJCPAC l'J)VANCE info COMINCH AND CNO .

Soviets consider that entry and exit of u.s. submarines through TARTARY
STRAIT can be arranged for on] after exchange of liaison groups between
Soviet and United States Pacific Fleets and after a s,ystem of recognition
on which they are presently engaged has been worked out. Cincpac 090050
refers.
12 0111 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

Request e~rly action on my 070553 since the operations involved will

be required to support operations directed by WrtRX 47513 (JCS 102217) even
if Japanese surrender.
J2 0112 CINCPAC PJJV.ANCE .to CO:M?THFLT.

CINCAFPACS 090503 indicates that 3 patrol craft escort (rescue) have

been converted into communication ships. It is noted that they were not
included in your l2Jlt-06 or 300821 as available for OLY1EPIC. Please
furnish me complete data on status these craft including date authority
and extent of their conversion, present employment, source and service
ovrnership of additional equipment.
Para. ill ships of the Pacific Fleet which participate in CAMPUS
will be assigned by me to an appropriate Task Organization.
AUGUST

3442

12 1202 CTIJCBPF to GTF 112 i:nfo VA( Q}, RA(D }, AC 1.

Further to rrw 120226... i have n ow b een instructed by GTF lll to prepare
a plan to move 3 small com.posi te groups vdth air and logistic support to

HONG KONG, SHANGHAI and perhaps STI\JGAFORE..

Para 2. T.o achieve this all Cruisers and majority of destroyers of _

TG 37.3 may be required to augment. TG 111.2 and these ships 'Will require
replenishment as far as possible at MliNUS o
Para 3. Further signal will be made when situation has been appreciated
and instructions of HM: Governm.ent which are expected have been received.
Para 4. MJJLT\!WXIKE (A) Requirements of CTG 38.5 should continue to have'
1st priority. Some reduction M,!. his JULYR. requireme~ts w.ay prove possible
if situation clears quickly.
(B) Units of Fleet Train and Escorts which are operationa.lly
useful should not come south of ];iAJ:.ffiS.
.
(C) Movements of CVE' S to AUSTRALI.A should continue as previously arra..n ged.

12 15Z7 CINCAFPAC to COM3RDPHIB, C,GlS.!ARMY, COM1THPHIB, CQM5THPHIB, WARCOS, COMPHIBSPAG, _USASTAF, CG 6TH ARMY, F.MFPAC, CG STHAR1VIY, CG lOTH ARMY, .ASCOM 2
pG AFWESPAC, COMGENFE.!U' ~ i\FMIDPAC, CINCPAC ADV11P'CE H~.

ex 33017.

BLACKLIST Play~ 3rd Edition, dated S August, is hereby amended to

designa.te the 20-4t,h Corps as occupation force, KOREA. the 20-4th Corps
w:i.ll assume respons:lbilitie s assigned loth Army fu KOREA, functioning as
a Task Force directly under this headquarters. Responsibilities of the
lOth Army in the RYUKYUS and for mounting out troops for BLACKLIST remain
unchanged.
Para. Tenta.ti ve troop list for BLACKLIST distributed 12 August as
inclosure to letter this headquarters file AG 322 (ll .ttugust 1945) GC (not
to all or needed) is amended as follows: on page 1 substitute the words
"Part 1: 2hth Corpsrr,. for the words 11 Pa~ 1: lOth U.~. Army*' Delete the
following units from Part 1: Headquarters and Headquarters Company lOth
Army, 519 ~Military Police Battalion (Army), 85 signal operations battalion
to headquarters and Headquarters company ASCO]! 10 is designated headquarters
and Headquarters company 24.
Para. The lOth Army will reinforce headquarters, 24th Corps with ,
commissioned and enlisted personnel, and such other appropriate resources
as may be available, to enable _the 24th Corps to perform its assigned
area command and roilita~ government functions.
12 214S COMINCH ! ND CNO to ClNCPAC ADVANCE info COMGEN CHit.fA, COS USA.

Assembly of personnel and material and arrangements for s..hipping your

070553 are approved f or employment on CHI NA COAST .in accordance with JCS
d:i.rective

AUGUST ( GCT)

to

be i ss ued when desi n ation determined.,

3443
,

AUGUS 'I, ( GCT)

14 0629 CINCP}ill ADVAlJCE to COMS~VPAC, COMAffiPA, COMGENfl.ilFPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT
Q.OJ~1PHIBSPAC, ,C9M7THFLT .i.t'..fo COlNCH, . CNO, MARCORPB,, COMNORPAC, Cll~C.:\FPAC,
C..OMGEN6THARMY, COMGJi:NPOA, . COMGEN,5THPliiBCORPS, COMGE)JSERVCOMDF1fFPAC, CINCPOA

PEARl,, COM;2RDPHIBFOR, COM5THP1LTBFOR, . COM.7THPHIBFOR, CTF 9_6, COM lfARIAN;.\S

COMGEN2NDMARAIRl~!ING, PMFPAOREP MARIJi.N ~13-:l-COMGEN!IHFMFPAC.

WARNING ORDER. Be prepared to execute operation C.A1!PUS on short notice

in accordance CIHCPOA Joint Staff Study serial 0005103 August -~ Troop
list will be in accordance CINCPAC 100904, 12o623, 120624. 5thPhibCorps
should be ordered to report to COMGEN6THA.RM.Y" for pla.tLrri.ng.
Para" Lt. Col. B. J. Truitt, USMC is designated as Ma:rAirBase
co.rnrn.ander YOKOSUKA. Col. B. L. Smith, USM.CR is designated as MarAirBase
commander SASEBO-NAGASP.EI and should be ordered to report to COMGEN2ND
at earliest for teansfer with gro\Uld ech ]l.:i.G 22. COMAL'U?AC .
.
I!lA.R. \..T.Rr'TING
nominate Mar off at earliest for duty as ComMarAirBase KURE. Capt. G. J.
Dufek, USN is designated a.s CO!v1NAVAIRBASE OMINATO. He ~hould be ordered
to report for transportation to CO of ACORN to be designated for this NAB.

14 0819 CINCRAC ADVANCE to CTIJCAFPAC info COM7THFLT, COMPHILSEAFRON, COMINCH.

Since COM7THFLT vd11 be required to operate as a. Task Fleet Commander
out side the south,trest Pacific area in connection \Ad.th occupation operations
at an earlier date than contemplated for OLYMPIC, it is desirable that he
pass to COMPHILSEI\FRON at tne earliest possible date all his remaining
fU-'1ctions as senior Naval Commander in the S!NPA originally planned for
1 October accordance paragraph G of my 130751 approved by COMINCH 201819
and placed in effect by n~ 211808. Request your earlY- concurrence.
, Para. Suggest COrt7THFLEET and COMPHILSEAFRON confer and advise r.o.e abd
1
Cll{CAFPAC earliest practicable date for transfer.

14 0829 CINC BPF .to CTF 112, info ,OTG .J-11.2) CTG 38.5 2 CINCPAC P..DV.ANCE.
Admiralty have now stated intention of sending BI;itish Naval Force to

HON&KONG subject to arrangements with u.s. Chiefs of Staff.

Para 2. Force will be drawn from TG lll.2.
Para 3. Provision of oilf;}rs is essential to this move even at some
expense of TG 38.5
Para 4. Consider foJ~owing moves will provide rnaxinu.:lrn flexibility
(A) S.AN iUtffiRDSIO and SA~J J..DOLPHO to refill at ULITHI (B) WAVE EMPEROR
and SAN A:MA.OO after refitting at ENT:NETOK to proceed to ULITHI.
Para 5. CTF 112 (A) report inenntions to CINC BPF and CTG 38.5 (B)
make direct arrangements with C~NCPAC ADVANCE and SOMSERVIDN 10 regarding
.
ULITHI.

14 1455 CINCAFPAC to CJJ\TCPAC.

33551.

Further to conference of ll August v;ith your representative (Admiral

Sherman) a vessel capable of sustained sptaed 17 knots is being loaded
MANILA with materials and personnel necessary f or construction of bulk
aviation gasoline facilities TOh.'YO to go forward from OKD\JAI.VA 1st Navy
echelon. Inasmuch as water capacity this vessel is limited it is requested
that navy facilities for watering at both OKINAWA and objective area be
made availab .. e The name of vessel vrill be given in a separate radio.
Advise if watering f,acilitie s for approximately 600 perso~el will be
,AUGUST (GCT).

availc.ble..

344 4

llt- 2318 JlARSHALL to

~VEDEUEYER,

JlACAHTHUR info NIMITZ.

W.ARX 49578.
For your information with reference to ~fAR 49042, the British Chiefs
of Staff now inform the u.s. Chiefs of Staff that they have issued instructions to Admiral Fraser concerning acceptance of surrender of Japanese
.
at HONGKONG.
Para. In another paper the British asked the concurrence or comment
.of the u.s. Chiefs of staff on instructions already sent to Mountbatten
on which, in view of the time factor, the British are going ahead with
all preparations. These instructions in summar.y are that, after acceptance of Japanese surrender, main tasks will be:
A. Reoccupation of keyareas of occupied territory and surrender and
disarmatnent of J aps.
B. Release of British and Allied prisoners of war.
c. Protection of British interests in CHINA.
D. Participation in the occupation of JAPAN.
Para. Assumptions on policy are:
A. Parts of Soutmrest Pacific will pass to British and Australian
command on cease fire.
B. Highly important British accept HONGKONG surrender and show
British flat at main Chinese ports.
c. British take part in Japanese occupation with British CorMnonwealth force in which Great Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand and
probab~ Canada will each be represented by a Brigade Group supported
by an air component.
Para. .:~ountbatten has been asked to submit plins for operations in
order of priority:
A. Complete occupation of BUR?lA., reopen MALACCA STRAITS, and occupy
SINGA.l?ORE and key: areas of MALAYA.
B. Reestablish a British garrison in HONGKONG using initially British
Pacific Fleet and an Australian force from BORNEO. These to be released
as soon as possible with Brigade and tactical air force from S~AC.
c. SmE~ll forces ~or certain Chinese ports.
D. Occuuation of J PMI.
E. Dispatch of force to S UGON. l\rrangements b'jing made to ship
French forces and civil affairs personnel as a follow up. Hountbatten r s
forces should not occuJy more of INOO CHINA than necessa~J to assure the
control of headquarters of the Japanese southern armies.
F. Dispatch forces to JAVA as soon as possible to accept surrender
there. Arrangements are being made to ship Dutch security forces.
G. SUJI.i.4.TRA is in lovrer priority than JAVA.
Para. Australian forces are being asked to take initial responsibility
for BOH.NEO Bn:d enemy occupied territories in the east. At later date
Mountbatten must be prepared to provide the ustra.lians a small proportion
of force and some merchant shipping.
H. Mm.u1tbatten should appreciate that many of these arrangements are
subject to agreement of Governments, vrhich the British are novr undertakin..g.
Para. This ends sur~~ry of orders issued by British Chiefs of staff
to Mountbatten.
Para. Request Wedemeyer r s and Macluthttr s exped _tious conunents on
the foregoing.
Para. This message passed to Nimitz at req.uest of Havy Department.
A

AUGUST (GCT}

3445

15 0216 CIN~C ADV.\NCE to COHINCH.

At 142130 Halsey acknowledged receipt of orders to suspend air
attack operations. The initial attack was already undervray when I
received your directive to suspend the operations.
15 0305 CINCAFPAC to CG 6THAR.MY, CG 8TH ~RMY, CG lOTHAm<,IT, CG XXIV CORPS, COHGEN
FEAF, CG .A.FWESP. C, ADl':IDPAC, info CTNCPAC .ADVANCE, COMPHIJlSPAC, C01QRDFLT,
COM5'rHFLT, C01Jl7THFLT, COM3RDPHIBFOR, COM7THPHIBFOR, CG FMFPAC, CG USA.STAF,
WAILCOS, OOM5THPHIBFOR, CG lsT .a.P~.

ex

33638.
Follows warning order for execution of BLACKLIST operation. Action
adees will immediately initiate the execution of operations to occupy
JAPAN and KOREA as outlined in BLACKLIST. COMGEN 6TH and 8TH l\.rmies and
24th Corps will expedite arrangements respectively with Commanders 5!-h,
3rd, and 7th AmrJhibious Forces and air Task Force Commanders. Operations
instructions number 4 directing preparations for the occupation of JAP~I
and KOREA being issued this date. B Day the effective date of 01 number
4 is 15 August 1945. Operation :MAJESTIC suspended indefinitely. Warning
Orders for execution of B 60 will follow. No actual landing in JAPAN or
KOREA will be made prior to a date to be announced later.
15 0245 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC PJJVAl'ICE, CG 6TH .L\RMY, CG 8TH AR1,1Y, CG lOTH ARMY,
CG XXIV CORPS, A.FWESPAC, AFJMIDPAC, COMPHTBSPAC.

ex

33634.
Priorities for allocation of seaborne troop lift for phase 1 BLACKLIST
are as follows: 1st, for 8th Army, 3 and 1/3 reenforced r\.r.my Divisions
plus headquarters and supporting troop~ as follOiiV's: G.HQ AFPAC, Bth Army,
11 Corps, 14 Corps, destination TOKYO. 2nd, for 6th Army, 1 reinforced
Marine Division of the 5th Amphibious Corps,- plus available elements of
5th Arl\,.Dhibious Corps Headquarters botp from M.-ffiiANAS; destination SASEBQNAGASAKI. 3rd, for 6th lrrrrry, 2 Reinforced !u-my Divisions plus 6th Arnw
and 1 Cvrps Headquarters and supporting troops, destination OSAKA. 4th, f
for 24 Corps, 2 Reinforced Army Divisions plus 24 Corps Headquarters and
corps troops, destination KIEJO. 5th, for 8th Army, 1 reinforced .~
Division plus 9th Corps Headquarters and supporting troops, destination
OMINATO. 6th, for 6th lu:my, 1 Marine Division plus remainder of 5th
Amphibious Corps Headquarters and supporting troops from HAWAII, destination SASEBO-N\GASA.KI. 7th, for 6th Army, 1 Reinforced .trnw Division from
HAWAII, destination OS.\KA. 8th, for 6th Army, 1 reinforced Marine Divison
from Marianas, destina:~ion SASEBO-NAGAS.A.KI. 9th, for 6th Arrey, 1 Reinforced
ft.rnry division, destination OSAKA. lOth, for 8th 1\rrrry, 1 and 1/3 reinforced
Army Divisions, destination 01UNATO.
Para. :Jhere more than 1 Division is allocated for initial movement
to a given objective, the movement may, at the discretion of the -A.rmy or
Corps Commander concerned, (6th Army, 8th Army or 2 SXLKUKTitS) and as
arranged with the corresponding naval task force commander, be conducted
by reinforced division rather than by.slinultaneous movement of the entire
allocation.
Para. The follmdng paragraph for CINCPAC only: this message confirms
priorities handed Admiral Sherman at 1.1anila 13 August on BLACKLIST priorties and troo1) lift estimates. The esti.rru-1te for the troous involved in tihe
AUGUST ( GCT) initial movement to the TOKYO area should read upersonnel, 151 allocaj(i on 0
of shi pping should be obtained from the Army Comr.n.ander concernedn.
j 4 4 r-

15

1333

Cil\fC.AJ?PAC to INARCOS FOR JCS info CI:NCPAC 1IDVANCJ&, CO]~GEN US FORCES CHINA.

CX

33830- This radio in4 parts.

Para. 1.

Present

plarm~d

BLACKLIST contemplates employment, JAPAN

19 Divisions, KOREA 3 Divisions, Philippine Garrison 2 Divisions, reference

WX 49334. It is considered that forces and shipping allocate for JAPAN
proper must rem8.in available pending determination of conditions after
initial landings vrhich will be made by 14 Divisions.
Para 2. By confining KO.REAN occupation to KEIJO JtREA and reducing
initial ent:cy to the initlal division only, a division. with shipping can
be made available for DJ.l.RIEN at a relatively early date. Eventua.l
accomplishment of occupation mission in the United States zone of KOREA
will require commitment of an additional A.xnry division not now allocated
if DA..t.t:?.I.E:N is occupied.
Para 3. Occupation of SH.Al'JGHAI by 2 <livisions of' the 3rd Phib Corps
is proposed by CINCP.~..c in conjunction with COMGEN CHINA 1'1Then shipping
becomes available, this can be accomplished if no unexpected requirements
arise -in JAPAN proper . or KOREA.
It is recornrnended that any occupations on the CHINA COAST
~ara. 4.
by United States forces further to those cited above be placed in a .
contingent category dependent upon the development of the situation in
higher priority areas and availability of resources.

to COM3RDFLT,

15 0206 CINCPAO ADVJLI\JCE

5THPHIBCORPS info

COM5THFT~T, COikif5THPr[.[BFOR, COThfNORPAC, COMGEN

Cll~CAFPAC.

Para 1. CINCJ.FPAC staff study BLii,CKLIST mailed today. Following

changes made -since publication.
A. 24th Corps designated as occupation force, KOREA. 24th Corps
will assume responsibilities assigned lOth Army in KOREA, functioning
as a Task Force directly under CINC AFPAC. lOth t~.rmy responsibility in the
RYU1ITUS and for mounting out troops for BLACKLIST remain liDChanged.
B. In B 2 the 5th Phib Corps is substituted for the l Corps in the
SASEBO-NAGASiiKI 1lliEA. The 1 Corps, reinforced with the 9Sth Division
will be employed f'or B 10 in the OSAKA AREA.
c. Z7 Division is removed from 24 Corps and will be employed in B 60.
Z7 Division replaces 98 division within the 14 Corps. 3S Division remains

in AFPAC reserve.
D. 96 Division is included in 24 Corps replac:ing Z7 DiVision.
E.. Delete all references to occupation of any part of K.lll'tAFUTO. Such

operations will not be conducted.

Para 2. Foregoing changes also apply to applicalbe parts of my Joint

Staff Study C.l\M:PUS

3447

COMINCJi f:u~ GJ:.!O ,AND CHIEF' OF .S~,yy US .A.Rtvf:{ to ,CTI\IC,P...Fl?AC 1 C.l.f!Q?AC ADVA~JGE
info U. S .. MILIT@Y MISSION ThfOSQ.QY!.

15 2127

With Japanese capitulation previous arrangements for liaison. groups

J'irmy and Navy at KHABAHOVSK and VLADIVOSTOK appear to be subject to modi-

fication. In this connection it is suggested that a Cruiser or other

suitable vessel be provided for the use of li..rrrw and Navy liaison representatives to deal. with the Russian Cornrnand in whatever ASIATIC FDRT
appears desirable such as DAIREN. The sending of a Cruiser for this
liaison pu~ose should be considered in coru1ection with previous directive
regarding the occupation of DAIHEN by United States forces . (For Deane
reference to visits to or occupation of DAIREN is not to be communicated
,
to the Soviets at this time).
Para 2. Taking foregoing into consideration information desired from
MacArthur and Nimitz as to what changes if any they desire as regards
present arrangements for liaison groups at KH.WAROVSK and VLADIVOSIDK
inforrn.ing .m:i;.1itacy mission MOSCOW at same time .
Para J . In connection with above CINCPAC is advised that a group visa
for Navy liaison group has not as yet been received but Rear Admiral Settle
with 8 additional Naval officers and 6 enlisted mEn are proceeding by
air to GUAM from Washington evening 16 August to report to him for further
assignment in connection with this duty. .
CNS SAlUR to COM'7THl~LT info .COUSERVPAC, COMSE~Y: ,7TM, CINCPAC BOTH H2.

16 0433

~My

serial 0002 of 1 3 August Re: FORT BAYARD operation. Have assigned

6 officers from NABU 13 including Commander John Harold Sedtz USNR 86937

to this operation. Latter assigned ac~ing Commanding Officer of NABU

pending confirmation or designation of another by higher authority. Essential to have an organized NABU to avoid confusion. New Subject.
Have not yet arrived but are
D~signation of 7 LST s reoeived this date .
expected tomorrow. Unless othe~rise directed will begin loading upon .
arrival. At moment appears that 3 additional 1ST ' s w-ill be required
but will advise of additional shipping requirements later. Personnel
from GROPAC PEARL not arrived. Request sl1ipping designator.

16 07'24

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COl:,UNCH AND CNO info WARCOS 1 CINCAF'Pt:i.C ..

In vi~r of current developments believe it better to cancel exchange
of Flag Officers on basis originally planned. Your 152127. The presence
o!.' a. Russian Liaison Group at .my headquarters vvould have many disadvantages

Para. In lievv
CINCPAC break his
and later to such
Para. Propose

thereof propose that Rear Admiral Settle report to

flag in a cruiser and proceed initially to VLADIVOST{)K
othel"' port as may be desirable.
to use LOUISVILLE escorted by a destroyerl i f :y-ou concur.

16 1141 C;l:NCAFPAG. to COl\ITNCH & GUO WARCOS, invo US

CIJ~JG?AC, USASTAF

~JITL.ITARY MIS~ION

MOSCOW,

340S7.

AUGUST ( GC1

ReUrad 1521272 the mission assigned to the Ue~S Military liaison group
which has been organized .for station in KHABAFOVSK was to effect operatio-nal coordination and liaison with the Red Army in connection with Milita:cy
oper_a tions against J . ~AN. So far as this command ~s concerned. direct
liaison in no longer necessary- query shall the proJect be contmued.
)

34 4 R

16 0809

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC.

Your 141507. CX 33547 My 150846 also refers. Naval tacilities

required to be furnished i n each occupationa l area as follows:
A. .Entire naval base at YOKOSUKA vdth all present facilities and
living quar t .ers for a pproximatel y ?600 Navy and 5lJ-00 4th Marine RCT.
250 acres minimum space. YOKOSUKA Naval air base with living quarters
for '-1!)00 Navy personnel. Recreation area S AG.Alt~li BEACH with 1 mile of
beach and 50 acres for athletic fields. 50 trucks at least 1 1/2 tons.
25 passenger vehicles.
B. OMi l\JATO. Entire naval base at O:MINATO with all present facilities.
KABA.Y,:!JviA airfield with living quarters for 3000 personnel. 50 truck not
less than l 1/2 ton. 10 passenger ears. Clearance al-l highwa;rs between
.
port and airfield.
C. HIROSHIMA airf'ield with living qua.rt.ers for 3500. Pier and landing
facilities as close as possible to airfield with 10 acres cleared for
sorting a rea in rear. 50 trucks not less than 1 1/2 ton. 10 passenger
vehicles. Clearance all highways between port and airfi eld.
D. SASEBO. Enti:ee naval ba se at SASEBO rd th all present faeilities.
OMUHA seapl ane base and airfield with all adjacent unloading facilities.
Living quarters for 4000. 50 trucks not less than 1 1/2 ton. 10 passenger
vehicles.
E. All existing wire conununicati ons systems between and in subject airfields and adjacent naval bases or ports. l'J .l existing radio station
installation s at these naval bases or ports and ai~fields and all co~
munication facilities for port control to be left intact.
F. Airfields to be complete with all existing facilities. Runways
taxiways and adjacent areas cleared of debris and ready" for operation.
G. J:I.J.a.val bases to be complete with piers workshops, drydocks, hospitals
and equipment cleared of debris and ready for operation.
H. Faciliti es at airfields and bases to include adequate electric power
water and seqage disposal.
Para. Various additional f acilitie s may be required and will be
requested as t he situat ion dev~ lops.

14 1101 CINCAFPAC to CI}rCP!C ,~.ltDV,. FMFPAG, 7vA.RCOS, COMGENlJHill.MY, COMGEN$TH..I\RJA;Y,

COMGENlOTHARlviT ., ASCOM 1, COMGENAFV\fESPAC,. COMGEI\fFEAF, AFMIDP'1.\TI, COMPHIBSP/\0

COiviGENlstA..li.MY, C QMGE!I~ SAS TAE.

ex 33452.

BLACKLI ST plan, edition number 3, this headquarter s dated 8 August 45

is amended as follovrs:
A. I n. B2 t he 5th J\mphibious Corps is substituted for the 1 Corps in
t h e SASEBO- N'AGASAKI AREA. The 1 Corps, reiri.for'led "<v1ith the 98 divisi on.,
will b e employ ed f or B-10 in t he OS!IYA J.REA.
B. The 27 Division is r emov e d from. 24 Cor ps and will be employed in
B-60. The Zl division replaces the 98 division within the 14 Cor ps .. The
38 Division reJI'!l3..ins in AFPAC reserve .
C, The 96 division is included in the 2L,.. Cor ps r eplac ing the 27 Div.
D. Delete all references to operations for the oecupa.tion of any part
of KARAFUTU ~~ S~ch operations vrill not be conducted.
AUGUST (GC~)

3449

15 0529

CINCAFPAC to CINGPAC ADV, COMGENCHINA, W&~COS 2 SAQ~A, CC'MGEtJUSASTAF, IVIIL

':MISSION MOSCOVJ'.

ex

33657-

Pursu~t to directive from the P~esident of the United States and in

accordance with agreement araong the governments . of the United states,
Chinese republic, United Kingdo, and Union of Socialist Republics I have
been designated as the _Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces to accept,
coordinate and carry into effect the Japanese surrender. I assume command
accordingly. . The channel of comrnunica.tions -vti:ch the Japanese Imperial
Government and Japan_.ese Imperail Headquarter s will be through this

headquarter s, 1~a.c.A.rthur.

16 0045

JOINT CHIEFS OF srAFF to CIJ\1CPAC @V info Cl}JCAFPAC, BRITISH ADMTY DELEG.

WARX 501g2.
You

\~ll

release to the full control of Admiral Fraser such parts of

the British Pacific Fleet as he requests.

16 0250

CINCFOA ft.DVANCE ~o CINCAFPAC info COMINCH, JVM1COS. ,

Your CX 338:31. Will send Rear Admiral S[lerrn.an to represent me at

Manila do.ring meeting with trapanese representat ives 17 August.

Pava. The presence of a liaison group to represent me at your headl!JUarters in the TOKYO AREA will be very advantageou s and I propose to
send a group headed by a Flag Officer with comnru.nicati on and intelligenc e
personnel as required. Will advise shortly as to personality .

15 1442 COMGENCHINA to WA_FWOS Info COMINCH, CDJCAFPAC, CTNCPAC, COMGENIB

In view of final decision that immediate
requirement s of China Theater for U S troops to occupy key positions

TOP SECRET.

CFBX 4740

cannot be furnished, determined measures must be taken to retain control

of the situation here. Refer. WAR 49574~ First: It is urgently requested that no aircraft be removed from the India-China Wing, ATC,
see WAR 4994'3. The present instruction s issued General 'funner in
personal ATC message from Washington have caused him to take the measure
of alerting 50 C-54' s he removal of which from. the Hump is costing
China Theater 12000 tons per. month and this loss in the absence of
immediate U S occupation forces on the CHINA COAST is jeopardizin g
the nmv mission of the China Theater VJARX 47593. Chinese troops are
being alterted for move to secure the most critical areashm~ever their
arrival will be a roattel. . of weeks or months if airlift is not employed.

Adequate forces to insure security of these key areas cannot be moved

in time unless all presently assigned aircraft are available to lift

the troops and to bring fuel into CHINA.. 2nd: It is urgently requested
that additional assistance be given by .making Avi gas available at the
airfields in vicinity of NANKING a.nd in t he rri ENTSIN-PEIPI I'JG area for
the .movem.ent of occupationa l .Chilaese f orces., It is sugge~rted that U S
Na~ convoy shipment o:f aviga.sa
Para. Utilizing vessels set u.p for J F~lEDAR should :meet our emergency
requirement s for t he Nt11'IKING area , provided we can expect contir ued
shipments, means which can be nw.de ava ilable plus personnel and equipment

3450

15

~+2

16 1940

----(con tinued) ----

previou sly allocate d by CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC a.nd WAR for JEMEDAii should
enable us to handle' this operatio n. H.euqest ~hat all resource s allocate d
for JE11EDAB. be diverted to NAl'{KING.
Para. In addition request the 7 LST' s origina lly earmarke d for
naval pre-conv oy in Jl&MJ:!;DAR be retained after off loading at NANKING
with addition of any others 11\fhich can be made ava:Llab le for lift of druramed
a vi gas from OKINAWA to TIENTSIN.
Para. 3rd: The allocati on of LCI craft for coastal or river movement intra CHINA would D.ateria l increase our capabil ities for the ":1ovement
of forces into the vital areas. It j,s recommended that Task Force 93
be augmente d by a minimum oi' ~ LCI for this purpose .
Para. The urgency and importan ce of the above must not be underestimate d. There are reports that fighting is already in progress between
Central Government and Communist Troops in the TSTI~GTAO area and elsewhe re,
with the Communists attempti ng to seize all key towns and airfield s in
northea st CHINA. Each dey 1 s delay in placing a major force in the
conflic t
crit~cal areas i~creases the probabi lity of widespre ad civil
CHTifA as
within
and ~eopardizes our 1st task of securing the key areas
stated in WAR 49574.
COMINCii AND CNO OHIEF Oi;i#STA.FF to MIJJUS MOSCOW - COMINCH PJ\.SSES TO CI:t{CPAC.

CINCAFPAC.

My 152127 and MIUfiS MOSCOW ]JfX 25322 since arrangem ents with Soviets for
exchang ing Army, Navy liaison groups KHlillARAVO$K and VLADIVOSTOK and U. S.
Headqua rters were to effect war operatio nal coordin ation we now propose to
cancel these liaison mission s.
Para 2. In order to provide for contact ~1.ith the_Sov iet Pacific Naval
headqua rters we propose to send a Cruiser and 1 or 2 Destroy ers initiall y
to VLADIVOSTOK and. later to such other ports as may be desirab le.
Para 3. Obtain Soviet concurre nce on above and advise originat ors
and info addresse es. Upon receipt of Soviet concurre nce regardin g visit
to VLJ\DIVOSTOK CINCPAC make detailed arrangements and notifica tion direct

through ALUSNA MOSCOW keeping CO:MINCH advised.

Para 4. If, the need should arise for addj_tion a.l liaison in connecti on
vdth coordin ation ofPOSC surrende r activiti es proposa ls therefo r will be
furnishe d at a. later"Ciate.

17 0615

COMGEN CHTIIJA to WE.COS....info CINCA.FPAC, CINGP4Q.

CFBX 41370.

Referenc e paragrap h A of 4th documen t 11 General Order Number 1 M..i.litar y

and Navalu (VVAR L,E672 as amended by subseque nt message s) request that
the term 11 M.:!~.I'JCHURIAn be defined. Chinese authori ties state that the
term. UivfAJ\ICH011IAn includes only 3 province s, namely, LIAONING, K!\RIN and
However sine e the Japanese created the puppet governm ent of
HE!LUNGKIAI~G.
:M;tl\JCHUKUO they have irleluded the province of JE:HOL which the Chinese govern,..
ment conside rs to be an integra l part of CHINA and not a part of MANCI-TIJRIA.
rrhe Chinese state that I.4JiCHHRIA as a geograp hical term definete ly does
not include JEHOL and they feel it to be vitally importan t tha:t JEHOL be
express ly excluded from the term rtMANGHURIAH as used in the surrend er
Request that this matte~ be clarifie d and if possible that
doeu~ents~
JEHOL be definite ly eiooluded from M.A)JCHUHIA as used in General Order No. 1.

Request prompt informa tion as to action taken.

AUGUST .{ C-!JTf

3451

16 0944 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to NIMITZ AND WEDEUE!ER info MACARTHUR.

wx 50181.

This message refers to Wedemeyers 4352, MacArthurs 33449 and W

49334 and Cincpacs 120242.

Priority' tar areas to be eecupied as given in WX 47945 and 48004
will not be changed at this time. However, it is desired that everr
etton be made to expedite the mwement ot u. s. Forces into key ports
on the CHINA COAST. The Joint Chiefs ot statf recognize that the
attitude
Homeland
into the
re~ to

of the Japanese adm1n:Jatration and armed forces in the Jap

and the subsequent; size and speed of movement of u. s. Forces
Japanese Homeland rem:Jns to be determined. In if"~ a
493341 it is requested that consideration be given to proceedilag
with arrangeD1811ts on a basis that in addition to KEIJO or another
KOREAN port, DAIREN i t not alreac\Y occupied by the Russians, a CHINA
COAST port will be mtered prior to comad:t.nt ot forces tor 2nd
priority objectives in JAPAN PROF!:R as set forth in BLACKLIST .plan ,
dated 25 J-u:q. 'l'hia suggesticm is mad~ with the thought that it ~~~q
be practicabl.e to set up arrangements so that farces intended tor ports
around the YELWW SEA can, up to their actual landing, still be shifted
to the Japanese Homeland if the developing situation so indicates.
On the matter of a specific port or ports on the CHINA COAST, this is
lett tor the time being to COIIID&llders concerned. Wedemeyer should obtain
views ot the Generalissimo on the port to be selected, it , &1\1 one can
be entered in the near future. For your information, state Department
considers the occupation ot 'l'S!NGTAO or TAKU should take priority over
SHANGHAI. In light of the foregoing am in answering 49334, and this message, request that, after consulting Wedemeyer, MacArthur and Nimitz
furnish their best estimate o time schedule on a port in KOREA, DAIREN
and a CHINA PORT. In you(time schedule there should be included alternate
portis to be occupied by the fQrces set up should DAIREN and/or KEIJO
have been previous]T occupied. by the Soviets.
,

AUGUST ( GCT)

3452

AUGUST (GCT)

.17 0906 CINCPAC ADVJJ\TCE to COMJlA:ARI;UIJAS 2 ' coM:Nl"JlRQ.J~I~S ..info COM3RnFLT, COM5THFLT,
COMAIRPAC, COMINCH, CINCl:AC P_E.:lRL 2 CINCl\fPAC.
A

Make plans and preparations to receive the surrender of all Japanese

forces remaining in the BONINS, .MARIA.I\JAS, C,AROLIN1~ and 1~L~HSHA.LLS . For
these purposes the co~d - areas sho~rn in Appendix 1 to Annex B of my
OpPlan 12-45 are applicalil , -. Advise means required to irn.plem.ent plans .
Para. Plans should include provision for concentre.ting prisoners in
the larger islands or Atolls and for their repatriation when circumstances
and shipping perr.ait subject to arrangements between CINCi.\FPAC and CINCPi\.C .,
Para. Mru(e prelimina~J plans for activating naval airfields on WLtKE
and MARCUS for use of ~7ATS and other transient aircraft .
17 1045 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVAJIJCE HQ.

C-.34353.

From Sherman. Have passed JGS WX 501$1 to CO:MPHIBSPAC and asked him.
to submit to you and CINC.AFPAC his best estimates of timing llllder the
pres:ent priorities and possible alterna.tives to permit earlier movements
to CHINA.
Para Estimates by Wilkinson contemplates arrivals TOKYO as follows:
B plus 16, lith Corps Hdqtrs, 1st Cav Div and lJ2 RCT. B plus 20 2 Americal
B plus 29 43 inf Div and 14th Corps Hdqtrs. Assuming use of same ships
the 9th Corps Hdqtrs and 1 Div would arrive OMINA.TO B plus 40 . 2nd Div
OMINATOat B plus 47.
Para. 6th Army est:ima:bes 1st arrivals as: 5th 1\[arDiv B plus 31. 98th
B plus 41. 3rd B plus 47. 27th B plus 57.
Para. . CINCAFPAC has asked COIJGEN CHTIIJA to send representative here.
Para. Perhpas Carter can produce a helpful estimate from his own

records.

l8 OSlO COMGEmJSAS'I'AF to GINCPOA ADVANCE info ,CINCAFPAC, COMGENAIR, COMAF 20;

COMAF B, COMMAHI ANAS.
s

2346.

Ftlrlher reference CINCPOA ADVANCE Top Sec message date time group
160SOSZ August and our number 2229 date time group 176131Z, your attention
is invited to the fact that prior to the termination of hostilities war
department policy prescr-l'Qed that USASTAF construction be in accordance
with .minimum war operational requirements. As a result, much of the construction that n~v exists is not desirable for either permanent or Semiperraanent use. In view o! either the permanent or semi-permanent nature
that many USASTJlF installations may have, USASTAF desire to reserve the
right to review current const-ruction projects in light of post V-J day
requirements and to propose construction that mey be either of a permanent
or semi-permanent nature as well as projects in categories you list. You
are advised of USASTAF APOS position in this matter inasmuch as your
policy makes no provision for future war department approval of post-war
projects.

AUGUsrr (Gq,~

3453

19 002,3 WJL11.COS to

CINC.~FPAC,

CHUNGKING CHINA THEATER

HQ USAF, CBI IWN DEUII, DEPCOM 20AF GUA!J:.

H1~

info GINCPOA ADVANCE Hq.

lN.A..tL\ 511t.Sl.
In reply to a message from the Prime Minister, the President has ansv;ered as follows: "From the u.s . standpoint there is no objection to the
surrender of HONGKONG being accepted by a Bri:tish Officer provided Military
coordination is effected beforehand by the British with the Generalissimo
on operational matters connected with assistance and support through that
area to Chinese and ,Mnerican forces who nwy still be eitrier engaged against
the enemy or involved in securing surrender of Japanese forces in the
hinterland_. General MacArthur will be instructed to arrange for the
surrender of HONGKONG to the British Commander whenever the above coordination is effected.

Para. The Secretary of State informed T. V. Soo~ here this morning

of thus contemplated action statihg that it did not ~ any wa;y represent
u.s .. views regarding the future status of HONGKQNG.

19 0219 COM3IIDFLT to COMG:E.:NSTHA..B.MY info CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC ADV, C.TF 31, COMGEN4THM.AR.
HALSEY .TO EICHELBERGER.

. ~UGUST (GCT2.

Predicated on assn.lllption fleet arrives SAGAMI WAN 23rd, airborne landing llth AB division takes place 25th, and troops Vtdll initially occupy
only ATSUGI-YOKOStnV\ and area to southward I have formulated 2 alternate
plans (plan 1) 4th Marines a.nd Fleet Marine landing force under B. G. Clement
land at SHINJIKU. L~th Uarines spearheaded by ta..nks ma.ke 2 prong simultaneou~
advance on YOKOSUKA airbase and YOKOSUK..~ naval ba.se. Fleet Marines protect
rear and flanks. Ship fire support in both SAGAMI WAN and TOKYO BAY. Plan
2 forces land at YOKOSUKA air base and envelope YOKOSUKA naval base from
rear by land.
Para. Both plans contemplate landings on same day as airborne landings
with H hour for naval landings approx.:i..mately sa. rne
. as time designated for
airborne landings or as you may direct. Plan 1 preferred as it avoids
exposing transports to treachery in very restricted waters. Both plans
perm:i:t subsequent isolating and disarming enemy forces on peninsula south
of KOKOSUKA-SHINJIKU line after fleet landing forces take over security
duty at YOKOSUKA air and ~~val bases. .
Para.. Nav;;I landing forces Cofll:prise l~th Marines a_nd 1$00 (3 battalions)
:marines from the fleet under Clement, a reserve force of 1200 (3 battalions) ,
u.s. bluejackets and 1 ba.t~alion (400 men) from British F:iheet for secutiy
duty. ffi~ additional reserve of 5 battalions (2000 men) of u.s. bluejackets
. can be mustered but with inferior equipment.
Para. In order to c~Jsta~lize details of my plans request follov;ing
infoiYnation earliest (A) on what air field or fields will 11th .~ divlsion
land (B) is my plan 1 agreeable to you (C) vfha;t if any support of airborne
operation do you require from 3rd fleet air surface or ground forces (D)
do you wish to designate I1 hour for .my forces ol" will you be satisfied with
iny intent to time it Tf>rith initial airborne landings (E) a~e you agreeable
.to my normal amphibious organization ( CTF 31 R Adm Badger Commander attack
Force) Brig Gen Clement Commander Landing Force) under which Clement is
COMGEN <?.shore until notified that he is relived by the officer you designatej
Para. With the answers to the :or~going I can meet any time table 1Nith
72 hours notice in adv:ance of earLi..est scheduled date of. ai:rborRe Je,.r;.ding.
j

4'Jq,

19 2113 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to M~\CARTHUR, 'NED~Th""'YER info NIMI'rZ, \f'IHEELER, SPAI,TZ
BRITISH JOINT ST11.FF MI.SSION.

WAllX 51776.
Concerning WA.."RX 51481, Niac.Arthur will arrange for the surrender of
HONGKONG to a British Commander as soon as the militartJ coordination with
the Generaliss~no on operational matters indicated by the President is
effected by the British. VIedemeyer will keep MacArthur informed of the
progress of these arrangements with the vi~v to expeditious action.
lS 2313 WAHCOS to CJJ!QAfPAC . Info H~ US}li7 BI, HQ USP..Ji'CT, CINCPOA ADVANCE.

VLARX 51397.
state Department requests you be informed that the President has now
decided that, in addition to representatives of the u.s., Great Britian,
China, and the Soviet Union, representatives of Australia, Canada, France,
Ne~tr Zealand and thy Netherlands will be invited to be present at. the
acceptance of the Japanese surrender. Reference is WARX .500~.3 . Communications have gone to those goverrunents asking them to name representatives
and to communicate, if possible, directly 1~ri th you on deta:ils, including
arrangements for attendance.
Para. State Department requests appropriate instructions be issued to
you to provide for the presence of these representatives . The foregoing
is for your info1~~tion and guidance.
19 0909 SUPREME COll:L~.ANDER FOR ALLIED POHER.S to CINCPAC 'illVANCE, COMGEN CHINA
( GSNERALISSDK)), GH'", .AUSTRALI.Al'J MILITARY FORCES {GENL BLA1.tiEY) :: CHIEF, U. s .
KILITARY MISSION, MOSCOW ,CIIJC SOVIET FORCES, F.AR EA.ST CG 29TH CORPS, CG
3TH AI1J,lY, -CG b~H:~~J~CSEA info WARCOS (~c's), CG 10TflA.R.l1Y: 24TH CORPS, USJ(S~~~
CG AF 'tll}~SPAC.

\J

X 2515 .

Herewith for information are official teA~s of 3 basic documents sover.ning general surrender of Japanese and Japanese controlled anned for ces which
are being handed by me to Japanese representatives at my headquarters 20
August 1945 for compliance as indicated. (A) proclamation by the Emperor
of JAPAN. n Accepting the terms set forth in declaration by the heads of
the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China on July 26
1945 at POTSDAM and subseQuently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Repuglics, I_have commanded the Japanese Imperial Government and the
Jauanese Imperial General Headquarters to sign on my behalf the instrument
of surrender presented by the Supreme Commander for the Ulied Powers and
to issue general orders to the militar.y ru1d naval forces in accordance with
the direction of the Supreme Commander for the j\J .lied Powers. I command
all my people fortmvith to cease host illties, to lay dcwm their arms and
faithfully to carry out all the provisions of the instrument of surrender
and the general orders issued by the Japanese J..rnper-lal General Headquarters
hereunder 11
Be II Instrument of surrenderu. We, acting by command of and on behalf
of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese C':10vernment and the Japanese I-mperial
General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions in the declaration issued
gy the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great
Britain 26 July 19l~5 at POT.SDAM, and subsequently adhered to by the Union
of the Soviet Socialist Republics, vrhich 4 powers are hereafter referred to

345 .5

as the Ulied Powers

- continued -

- continued V'i e hereby proclaim the unconditional .surrender to the .Allied Powers
of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese ._IU'med
Forces and all Armed Force~ under Japanese control wherever situated~
Para.. We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the
Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith, to pre~erve and save from
da.mage all sb.ips, aircrafts, and milita!"iJ and civil properly and to compl.y
vd th all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Comrr.ander for the
Allied Powers ~v by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.
Para We li19reby eommand the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to
issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japa.nese Forces and all forces
under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally than.selves and all forces under their control.
Para. We hereby comrna.nd all civil, military a.nd naval officials to
obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the
Supreme Cormnander for the Allied POW'er.s to be proper and to effectuate tbis
surrender and issued by him or under his authority and vre direct all such
officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their noncombatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or ooder his authority.
Para 6. vJe hereby undevtake for the Era.peror, the Japanese Government
and their successors to carry out the provisions of the POTSDAM declaration
in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be
required by the Supreme Commanders for the Allied Powers or by aey other
designated representatives of the Allied Povrers for the purpose of giving
effect to that declaration.
Para 7. lie ,._ereby command the Japanese Imperia~ Government and the
Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of 11Tar and civilian interne-e s now un~er Japanese control and to provide
for their protection, care, maintenance and immecli.ate transportation to
places as directed.
Pa.ra 8., . The authority of the Er..o.peror and the Japanese Government to
rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers who will taJ~e such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these
tBrms of surrender.
Para. Signed at blank at blank on the blank day of blank, 1945 Blank
by command in behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government.
Bla.nlf by comrn..md and in behalf of the Ja.panese Imperial General Headquarters.
Para. Accepted at, blank at blank on the blank day of b!arut 1945, for
the United States, Hepbulic of China, United Kingdom~ and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republica, and in the interest of the other United Nations at
war with Japan. Blank Sup:rem.e Comrnander for the Allied Powevs. Blank
United States repres~nta.tive. Blank Republic of China representative. Blank
Uni_ted Kingdom representative. Bla~lk Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
representativen .,
C. General orde!' nwn.ber 1, military and naval., trThe Imperial General
Headquarters by direct.ion of the Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender of
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese Armed Forces
by the Emperor, hereb7 orders all of it.s comman ders in Japan and abroad
to cause the Japanese Armed forces and Janc11ese controlled forces U..t'lder
cease hostilities at onc~;t to la.y down their arms, to rema.ir
their comraand
in their present locations and to snrrender Ul'lconditionally to comrnanders
acting on behalf of the United St ates, The Republic of China, the Un:tted
Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union 9f Soviet ' Socialist H.epublics
as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Co.mmandeJ
for the . Allied Povrers,. JJnmediate contact will be T!l.ade with the indicate
comrnanders, or their designated rerJresentati ves, subject to any changes i
Para~

to

- continued -

3456

- continued -

detail presceibed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their
instructions will be complet~ly and immediately carrier out (A) the Senior
.J apanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within
CHINA, _ (excluding M_lliCHUPJA)., F0~1M:OSA and FRENCH INOO-CHIRA nort}?. of 16-00
north shall surrender to Generalissimo CHIANG KAI-SHEK. (B) The Senior
_
Japanese col'Ilf!l8ilders and all ground, sea, and av..2dliar;J forces within
. M,c\I'TCHURIA, KOREA north of .38-00 north and KlffiAli'UTO shall surrender to the
Comraander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.
Para. (C) The senior Japanese comrCk"31lders and all ground, sea., air and
aux.i..lia.ry forces within the AND.AMANS, NICOBARS, BtJRMA, THAILAND, FRENCH
INDO-CHINA SOUTH of 16-00 north, 1L4LAYA, BORNEO, l\fETiiE:HL~NDS Il\TDT2S, Nl?liV'
GUINEA, BISlvL\RKS, and the SOLOMONS, shall stlri'ender (to the SUpreme Commander
South East ASia Cornn18.11d or the commanding gen.eral Australian Forces-the
exact breakdovvn bet'ween Mountbat ten and the Australians to be arranged
between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers. (D) The ~enior Japanese Commanders
all ground, sea, air and aw.i.lia.:ry forces in the Ja.pa.nese llfandated Islands,
RYUKYUS, BONIHS, and other Pacific islands shall surrender to the Corro.nander
in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Para. (E) To the Lmperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders,
and all ground, sea, air and amd..liary forces in the ma:in islands of JAPAN,
minor islands adjacent thereto, KOREA south of 38-00 north and the Philippines shall surrender to the Corruncwder in Chief, Ut).ited States Arnw Forces
in the Pacific.
Para. (F) The/ above indicated comrruanders are the only representatives
Povlfers empowered to accetp surrender, and all surrenders of
.
of the . Ulied
Japanese forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.
Para. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its
commanders in J APAIT and abroad to disarm completely all forces of JAPAN or
under Japanese control, wherever they may be situated, and to deliver intact
and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such tiLne and
at such places as may be prescribed by the .Allied comman(\ers indicated above.
Para. Pending further instructions, the Japanese police force in the
main isl8.nds of Japan V'Jill be exempt from this disarmament provlsion. The
police force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for
the preservation of law and order. The strength and anns of such a police

force will be prescribed~

Para 2. The Japanese Imperial Genera~ Headquarters ahall furnish to
the Supreme. Comrnander for the Allied Povrers, within (time limit) of receipt
of this order, complete information vr.ith respect to J/\.PAN and all areas

under Japanese control, as fq_Uows:

shOt~~Ting locations and
uni..ts
antiaircraft
and
land~
all
of
A. Lists
strengths in officers and men.
B Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and llivil, g..i.vlng complete
information as to the number, type, location 7 and condition of such aircraft.
c. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, surface
and submarine and/ auxiLiary naval craft in or out of com."nission and under
construction giving their position, condition and movement.
D., Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of
over 100 tons (Gross), in and out of commission and under construction, including merchant ships .onm.rly belonging to eny of the United Nations which .
are n01H in Japanese hands, giving their position, condition and movement.
E.., Complete and detailed in~ormation, accompanied by maps sho.l<ling
., locations a~d layouts of all mines, minefields, and other obstacles to

and

..... continued -

3457

- continued movement by land, sea or air, a nd t he safety lenes in connection trterennh.

F. Locations and descriptions of all mil:itar;y"'" installations and est.a.blishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, antiaircraft defenses, ports
and _naval bases, storage depot,s, perm.a.nent ~.nd ter!lport::try land and coast
,
forticiations; fortresses and other fortified areas.
G. Locations ' of all carnps and other Places of detention of United

Nations prisioners of war and civilian internees.

Para 34t' Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will
insure that all Japanese w.ilita!"'J, naval and civilian aircraft remain on
the ground, on the water, or aboard ship, until further notification of the
disposition to be made of them.
Para 4. Japru1ese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels of
all types will be maintained without damage and vvill undertake no movement
pending instructions from the Supreme Comma.nder for the 1Ulied Povfers .
Vessels at sea will immedia:cely render harmless and .throvv overboard explosives of all types. Vessels not a-t sea will immediately remove explosives
of all types to safe storage ashore.
Para 5. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled military and civil
authorities will insure that =
A. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by
land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to instructions
of the 6upreme Cornraander for the PJJied Powers.
B. All aids to navigation be reestablished at once.
c. All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pendin accorrL.;.ulishment of above.
ara 6. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and e ivi
authorities will. hold intact and i~ good condition pending further instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:
A. ..ill arms, awn.unition, explosives, rnilita~J equipment, stores and
supplies, and other imrement s of war of all kinds and all other war material
.
(except as specifically prescribed in section 4 of this order).
B. All land, vrater and air transportation and communication facilities
and equipment.
C. All military installati-ons and establishments, including airfields,
seaplane bases, antiaircraft defense, ports ruid naval bases, storage depots,
permanent abd temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other
fortified areas, together With plans a.nd drawings of all such fortifications
installations and establishments.
D. All factories, pl.a.n:ts, shops, res~arch instititions, laboratories,
testing stat~ons, technical data, patents, plans dra.vdngs and iriventions
designed or intended to produ.ce or to facilitate the productions or use of
all implements of war a.nd other material and property used by or intended
_
for use by military or part.
Para. Yilitary organization in connection with its operations.
Para 7. The Japanese Imperial Headquarters 1rd ll furnish to the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Pawers, within (time limit) of receipt of
this order; complete lists of all the items specified in paragraphs A, B,
and D of section 6 above, indicating the nu.rnbeis, typ es and ;:Locations of

each.

Para 8. The manufacttJ.re and distribution of all arms, amn:runition a_n.d

implements of war vrill cease forthwith.
- continued -

345R

.... continued -

19 lOL1,7

Para 9. With respect to United Nations prisoners , of war and civilian

internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-co ntrolled authorities :
A. The safety and Well-being of all Un:J.ted Nations prisoners of war
and civilian internees will be scrupulousl y preserved, to inc;:Lude the
administrat ive and $Upply service essential to provide adequate food, shelter
,
clothing, and medical care until such re~ponsibility is undertaken by the
Powers.
Allied
the
Supreme Commander for
B. Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners
of war~ and civilian internees together with its equipment, stores, recortls,
arms, and amnmn cion will be delivered immediately to the Command of the
senior officer or designated representat ive of the prisoners of war and
civilian internees.
c. As directed by the Supreme Comr.a...'Ulder for the Allied Powers, prisoners
of war and civilian internees 'i'rill be transported to places of safety where
they can be accepted by allied authorities .
D. The Japanese imperial General Hea.dquart.e:rs will furnish to the
Supreme Commander for :bhe Allied Powers, V\.r:ithin (time limit) of the receipt
of this order, complete lists of all United Nations prisoners of war'" and
civilian internees~ indicating ,their locations LTXIBXEA. P~l Japanese and
J apanese-con :brolled mil:i.tary and e i vil authorities shall aid and assist
the occupa.tion of Japan and Japanese controlled areas by forces of the
J!J.lied Powers.
Para 11. The Japanese Im.perlal General Headquarter s and appropriate
Japanese officials shall be prepared, on instruction s !rom Allied occupation
coroo~nders, to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of the
Ja9anese civilian population.
Para 12. This and all subsequent. instruction s issued by the Supreme
Commander for the JUlied Fortres of otu1.er iUlied rn_i..litary aut.horities will be
scrupulousl y and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japa.n~se-controlled military
and civil officials and private persons. "!llY delay or failure to comply
with bb,e provisions of this on subsequent orders, and any action which the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers deternunes to be detrimental to the
Allied Powers, w~iJ..l incur drastic and slurun.ary punishment at the hands of
Allied Military a.uthori ties and the Japanese Government.
SUPR~J;J\,JE COM.MANDRB. FOR THE !LLIEQ POV'iERS to ..llCDEA, __C-DC AUSrfRA).:J:lll:I }.ITLIT.A.tW
FORCEE; (DELIVER GEtxJElliili BL..~lJ?.Y IN MA.NILALinfo ~y~~cosQQl c:Il\TCPAC ADVANCE.

z 517.

It is anticipat,ed that the actual surxender in TOKYO vtill take place

11
2$ August.. Instruclf:'~ions received by this headquarle!' s direct that: The
forces
senior Japanese conmlaXlders and all ground, sea, air and aUY..ilia.ry
within the A.ND.ll"MANS, NICOB,.Jl'R.S, BUHM.;\,. THA.II.u\ND, FRJ!HCH INDO-CHINA south .of
16 degrees north latitude, MAL.A.YA, BORNEO, NETHERL:\.NDS INDIES, NEW GUINEA,
BISitt\.r1KS, and the SOIDMONS, shall surrender to the Supreme t~llied. Commander,
southeast ASIA corillnand or the Comnanding General, Australian Forces - the
exact breakdown bet1veen Mountaatten and the AustraJ.ia.ns to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Stl!!U'eme
Goltllt!8nder for the JUlied Powersrr~ '
Para, Action addressess are requested to arrange between them the
areas within which they vdll resrectively receive the surrender of Japanese
forces and advise at earliest.

3459

S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SEH

CINCPAC AND CINCPOA

INCOMING

~E

FlAlN

~RD!~~

AND NAVAL~ IS AMENDEI? A~ FR~LOW_ s; {Z627 }

SUBPARAGRAPH {C uF PART 1 AND \)UBol ~ TUTE THERF- f-P:1
FOLLOW ING 2 SUBPARAGRAPHS; 1ST SUBPARAGRAPH) "THE SENIOR

NUI:JBER

f i\Hi\~.,H APH :l
-~\E

ROUT~ ~JE

;;,..M1LITARV

DtLt. l t.

e oMMANDER AND ALL GROUNll

<JAPt~NESE

SEA

A~R

AND AUX f L ~ AR\' FORCES

PJiTH:r~ THr::: Ar1DAMA N8 NICOBARS BU~MA fHAlLAND~ FRENCH INDO- CH tNJ\

SOUTH OF ~1 6-Y.J r~ O RTA lATITUDE: MALAYA, SUMATHA~ JAVA . LESHER SUNl:& t~

.I

"

(INCLUDING BALI 1 LOMBOKA CERAM 1 AMBONA KAlA AROE, TA N~ MBAR, AND

!SLANDS ~ ~ THE RRAFURA ~EA CELEBES NAL~AMERAS AND DUTCH NE W
,;

.,

GUiNEAt~ SjAJ....L SURRENDER TO,THE SUPR~ME AlLIED c0Mr:iJ\NDERt AS ti A

COMM!H~D " X ~2ND SUBPARAGRAPH) ."THE SEN I OR JAPANESE COMMANDER AN.J)

ALL 3R0UND& oEA AIR AND AUXIl!ARYFORCES -WITHtN BOR NEO BR IT NEW

~t l i4i:ft~ 7, THE B I S~ARCf<S AND SOLOMONS j SHALL SURRENDER T0 fHE COtHJJA.f-;1;":' ~

~ N~(}H! EF COA 1-\lJSTRAL I AN MILt TA.RY FORCES~~ X PARAGHAPH 2 FROM SUBlr

JJ.CRYPTO-GROUP
\

Adm

t.~

I.

NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERV1

CINCPAC AND CINCPOA

(:' Af{:tGFL~Pl--.\ .D PAl1T :t DELETE nR. YUf\YUS" X PARAGRAPH :) IN SUBPARAGRi\PH

E PidtT ~L iNSEI1T HftYU~<YUSa THE PHRASE nAND THE PHILIPPINES" X ?i\ f-U\ GH /~ PF 4 i rJ SU 8 PAR f\ GH APH A 0F PAR T 2 I NS ERT n NAVAL AiJ D RPT !l H
f'.lC THE WORD 11 LAf'JDn X PARAGRAPH 5 IN PAHT 2 DELCTE THE :t4TH
Jffr) Hf[JflCE sn AND SUBSTITUTE l:1!Bf.C rrpoWERS"
ILLO~'J

J.

(ADD!T; OtJAL ADDEES FROrJ REJ~DDRESS)

fNFJ TO: COM7THFLT

COi,rl 5THFL T
COL1NORP /\C
GOM3flDFL T

(ORIGINATOR)

(DATE TIME GROUP)

Pf A!N

(CLASSIFICATION)

(PAGE)

3461

19 1615 SUPREME COM1A1UIDER fPR Till:!~ iU..LIED P01;JERS_ to CINCl~AC ifDV ~ CONIGENCHINA USASTAF
~Q..~NESPAC, JCS, C,_GlOTHI\.HMY, OOC AUSTRALii~JJ MILlTARY FORCES ( GE~fEHAL BLl\VlEY)
GHIEl<' US MILITll.:tY MISSTON MOSCOW ( CINQ. SOVlgf FOHGES .F !ill EAST .info GG
~ORPS, CG 6TH ARl\TY,. SACSEA,, WAil:COS (JC,S)

e-m-

X 2520.

My Z-515, da~e.time group 190909 GCT, (Z 520) paragraph n(c)n, General

Order number 1 m.l.l~tary and naval n, sub-paragraph (B) is hereby arn.anded to
read 11 'f.a? S?nior Japanese_ Co~anders and all ground, sea, air and au.x_i_lia.ry
forces WJ...thJ.n MANCHtJRIA; KORJ:i.;.~.. north of 38-00 north latitude KA.RtU~'UTO
and the KURILE ISLJ~J<IDS' shall surrender to the Commander in Chlef of soviet
Forces in the Far East n. Reference 1Jt!a.shin-gton Radiogram WX 51396 (not to
all nor needed).
20

2137

JOINT CHIEFS O:t STAFF. to DEANE info NTIITZ, HACAliTHUR, SPA..i\TZ.

WARX 52004.

The follovring with .reference to your M 25339 is for your information.

Para. Ther~ will be a large number of u. s. aircraft operating over
and i..YJ:to J 1\PAN, particulax'ly in the next months. These include the occupational air forces, transport runs into and from JJ'~. .Piu'T and KOREA, and naval
air operations. A transport route from the 1U..~EUTIANS probably VJ"ill be
inaugurated. U. s. Naval and merchant vessels will operate throughout the
north Pacific and the SEA OF J .AEA.N. The requirement for the best possible
weather service over JAPAN and adjacent areas in the .north Pacific 1rill
therefore be intensified as a result of the Japanese capitulation and the
weather centrals will be needed.

Para. As for the liaison groups, it is recognized that "some means

of liaison will be necessar.y to handle the details of post hostilities
problems you mention. However, the great bul."k of these vr.i.ll concern the
coordination of movement of ships and aircraft into a port or areas irr~edi-
ately adjacen-t, to a port. It is considered that this liaison can most
expeditiously be handled by a liaison group aboard ship, 1~rhich will permit
the liaison group to be present on the spot required and not be immobilized
at a place where it may not be needed. In this connection it is believed
that the great bull< of the new problems which will arise as the resut.t of
the Japanese capitulation -vdll, on the soviet side, require resolution in
M.OSCOW rather than by commanders in the field.
Para. Since the Soviets have alre~dy been infonned of the decision on
this matter and the weather personnel a,nd equipment is now en route, it is
considered no action should be taken to justify this decision to the Sovi~ts
at tfuis time unle~s they raise the question.,

21 0813 CINCPAC ADV.lU~CE to COMINCH info CINCfo~PAC, COMGEN CHINA, COl\((THFLT.

A conference took place at Manila 19 August between representatives

CINCPAC, COM7THFLT and COflGEl'J CHINA. The follovring concept of operations
was concurred in by COM711iFLT, by COMGE!~CHINA.' S representative and by the
headquarters of CINCA.FPAC on the staff level. It is recommended for
approf"al aB the basis for intetim operations and for ftuther planning.
TP..is constitutes my com.ment on COMGENCHINA 1 S CFBX

50181.

- continued -

4740

CFBX

4906

and JCS

3462

AUGUST ( G<IT)

continued -

21 0818 CINCPAC ADVJll 'JCE to COM:INCH ~o C IN9,.AF:AC~ COMGENCHI NA, COMJTHFI,T (Cont '_d)

Para. It a:ppear.s t hat 30 September is the ear]j,_~st realistic p;Lanning

date for landing marines on CHI !'\TA COAST without undue interference ~rl.th
occupat i on J APAN and KOREli ..
Para. Concept of operations:
A.
Establish north CHINA naval force under COk'7THFLT in SH.AN'TUNGCHINNANGTAO area as soon as possible to consi st of 2 battle cruisers,. 4
heavy cruisers, l CarDiv and accoMp~ing destroyers. This torce would
control YEL~W SEA and GULF OF CHIHLI and also support occupation of KOP~A.
B.
Establish YiiNGTSE patrol U..'rlder COM7THFL'r with 2 light cruisers
_destroyers and sr0.all types as CHINA THEATER forces reach Y.f.U\JGTSE and status
of minesweping permits.
C.
Establish south CHINA patnol under C0ful7THFLT vdth gunboats and
destroyers escorts as soon as CHINA THEATER forces take a port . Troops
available are the 3rd Phib Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops, the lst
MarDiv and the 6th 1KarDiv less l regiment. In vievf of prospect demobilization requirements it is not advisable to commit the l+th MarDiv which
would make a total of 6 lt[arine Divisions :in J APAN and CHDJ.A. CINCAFP.\CS
representative indicated that. a MarDiv from the 5th PhibCorps could be
released from J :'l Pl.IJ'J when relieved in October by the S6th or 87th Inf Div.
This 1farDiv could reinforce the 3rd PhibCorps.
Para. Inf-o rmation from. COMGENCHINA indicates that unless unfavorable
developments occur divisions of the Chinese combat corrrrnsnd controlled by
American officers vri.ll 'IY.r late September be in control of SHJ.J\iGHAI, NANKING
and CA.I\fTO.N and that no other troops vd.ll be needed in SHANGHAI to make
naval operatio~s feasible in the YANGTSE RIVM.:R.
D.
Operate temp~rari~ in 7th F~aet ap oroximate~ 72 landing craft
infantry for use as coastal and river transport and gunboats ..
E..
Divert supplies intended previously for FORT BAYARD to such
port as COMGEIJCHI NA may designate. 7/e~TS/N 7-AkO a.u.d/~
F.
P repare for occup ation ~HINGH.i1.NGTAO a.nd TSI NGTAO or, alternately
1 when forc es are ready, occupation of
if C1i_;rrL,RIU..t CHI NAsituation required,
SHANGH..t\I area.
to SACSEA GOC AUSTRP1.LIJ~T MTLITA3.Y
CI NAP.ltC )\DVtl}JC~~ HQ.

z 534.

Refe r enc e i s made to 111y Z5l? of 19 August.

voi ded and the f ol1ovvi ng sub sti tuted theref or:

Desire t hat mes sa ge be

11 I t i s ant :t cipated that
t he actual surrender i n TOKYO i~ ll t ake place 31 August~t. Instructi ons
recei v ed by this he adquarters direct t hat: uThe s enior Japanese commanders
and all ground, s ea, air and au..:"ti.liary forces v<Jit hi n the lti'<TDANL'\NS, NICOBlL'qS
BUB1'11A, THJ,~LAHD , Ft'b~ITCH JJrOO- CHINA, sourrH OF 16-00 north, MAJ..~AYA, BOi1.NEO,
I{:.trfHEPJ.,ANDS INDIES, NE'J!J GUINEA, BISMARCKS, And the SOIDMONS, shall surre..tuie:x
to t he Suprer11e tllied Cort.ltl1ander, southeast ASIA corill1l:Cmd, and t o t he Com
manding General, Australian Forces, as. latel" desi gnat ed''
Action addressees are requested to arrane;e betwe en themselv es t he area s
within wttic h they will respectively receive the surrender of Japanese
for ces and advise this headquar~ers at earliest .

3463

21 0517

CINC.AFPAC to COM3HDFLT Ini'o C__GBTH ..lffi1'11Y, CTI\JGPAC iillV Hq, CG FE.4F 2 CG liTH

AIRBOHNE

CX 35347.

190219.

From CG Sth Army to Com3rdFlt.

In vievr of the fact

Heference your radio dispatched

that HAYA.tVJ.!, ZUSHI and KPJ.!IAKURA have been

ss.lected as the headquarters area of the Supreme Allied Cormnander, and

advice given the Japanese emrnissaries that the initial landings would be
in restricted areas, it is considered advisable to put into effect the
general provision of your Plan 2, nth not to exceed vmat is normally
considered to be a regimental combat team, of 3 battalions of infant~J
and 1 b~ttalion of supporting artillery, initial~. Additional troops
to be landed as required.. Landing force as limited o,bove is acceptable.
Brigadier General Clement will report by radio upon my assumption of command about 1200 I (-9) 28 August. His force wiLl land in the vlcinity
of YOKOSUKA and occupy the general area: URAGA-KUBIHI-FUNAKOSHI-YOKOSUKA,
all inclusive. Commanding General lith Airborne Division is charged with
coordinatj_on of boundaries. .~i.rfield for lith ~rborne and H Hour will
be designated by SCAP. Employm.ent of elements of the 3rd Fleet air and
naval gunfire support nill be arranged directly vrith eomrnand_ing General
11th . ,. i_rborne Di v:i.sion at OKINA\'TA. Recommend liaison officers be dispatched by air to Headquarters lhlth Airborne Divisi n to coordinate
details. Essential ')ersonnel to furnish comnrunications to be supplied
by AFPAC Jasco unit at OKINA"CJA. The emissaries were directed to have the
area evacuated of Japanese troops but we must be alert to guard against
surprise.

21 0755
CFBX 5409 Your to;_Jsec radio ~ 515 assigning areas of r esponsibility for accepting surrenG.er Ja;A.qnese omitted ~reference to the
PESC!illORES IJ . .:'UfDS. ~Ye are assuming that subject area is including in
CHil,:A Theater's a:rea of responsibility mn absence of instructions to the
contrary.
TOP SECHET.

22 0915

CINCAFPAC to COMGEN

CIITI~A

info CINCPAC lillV Hq

TOP SECR ~T. 35704.

Your CFB 5250 dated 20th and CFBX 4906. dated 17th
are references. This heaC:o.uarters has made no estimate of nor received
requests for United . tates -Imny service troops in support of the : ':arine
fo~ces indiacted by CIECPAC a s available for CI-r'~ NA coast operations, other
thal'l those previously alloca.ted for the FOHT BAYARD operation.
1vailabilit;y
can be determ.ined only after complete requirement is knovvn. Generally
S )eaking mar1.y types of service units are now short of requirements for
occuoation &tiPAN and KOI-?EA and qup.Jorting bases. ITo understood is requirement for air forces. Rq;:LEAGER indicates e.vailc.bility of ~ rarine aircraft
vling.. Port oersonne l provided by CINCAFPAC for F01{t: BAYARD project are
novlf"loadm:tig and will proceed in accordance "cvith CINCPA.C instrucVi.ons ..
1

Pare.. For CI!'TCP ~,c on~y, CGT 1GENCHIN.1 CFB 5250 dated 20th is being repeated
to you for infor.rnation :~n accordance -vrit h this dj_spatch.
21 1220

COMGE.N CEI!\!A to .'~JA?COb Info CINC_\17 PAq 1 CINCPOA , COYTGErlp3rr, COJ GENAAACHTIIA,
COJ'G~osCl{IEA , COh{G'1~NCQ9.9Jt)JJA
TOP

S~illi'l,.

CFBX 5404

.?~PW~fJ~~!'Yr AT'~VJDS

of CHI11A Theater, General

Carawa~r

3464

.__,
AUGUST ( GCT)

),

21 1220

(continued)
and Captain Paint.er, USN proceeded to MANIU~, 18 August nursuru.1.t to a
m~ssage requesting conferences among representatives of CINCPAC, CINCAFPAC,
and CONfGENCHINA Message CX 34316 refers. Discussions dealt with availability of occupG.tion forces for CHINA and vrith problems of logistic support and personnel lift. The foD_ovdng subjects were discussed on a
planning level only and agreements reached on tr12.t level as indicated
below:

Para A. The gu~stion of priorities for o9cupational forces. It was

agreed that the lst priority m:ust remain JAPAN and TCOR.EA. It was
tentatively indicated that forces would :'Jrobably be moved into key pomnts
on CHirTA coast after 10 divisions had reached JAPAN and 2 divisons had
been put a.Br1ore in KOREA lst 2 divisions therefore could J.and in CHINA
approximately 30 Sept ember.

Para B. Naval assistance for CHINA.. Preliminary examination and planning

are under ~,r9-y covering Qperations of 7th Fleet under Adrniral Kinkaid to
support CHINA Theater forces and to control coastal waters. As presently
planned 3 naval forces would be established to include: A SOUTH CHINA
Naval Force basing general in the C.!UlTON area; A NORTH CHINA Task Force
in TSINGTAO-CI-LEFCO-CHIN~V'li.NGTA area, and . a Y.l\.NGTZE patrol for operations
in the YANGTZE. The not firm and is subject to approval by CLTIJCAFFAC,
CONGENCHIN"A and CHO; \IASHINGTON.
Para C. United States forces for occupation il"l ney areas on CHINA .Q~.
As previously agreed bet-ween CINCPAC, CINC.AF'PAC and COI-,IGEHCHINA Lr
Marine divisions (less 1 regimentatieomisq team) ~.rill be available for
occupation of key points on the Chinese coast wit!! a possibili.. ty of
later getting a 3rd Marine division if it can be replaced by 1 of the
US \l"'rrrJ divisons present~ly enroute from United States

Far a D. ~urnishing of tran!Jportation f9.r. movement of Chinese forces to

key occuoationa.l areas. As previously agreed 11Xf.'t for 2 Uarine di vi. sons
initially allotted to the occupation of CHTI~JA Theater areas can be turned
over to CHII.lA. Theater for movement of forces thereafter (about 15 October).
In addition, an exploratory eY..amination is being undertaken to determine
\lrhether aporoximately 50 la.nc.ti.ng craft infantry can be furnished for uae .
in moving the Chinese troops along the '1 est, Y 'l.NG'fZE and .BLE Rivers/Ivgr
coastal movement. CINCPAC has stated that this type craft is not suitable
for large scale movement of US forces into JAPAN and KOI1EA.
Para E.. Convoy to open port and fur:nish sup;Jlies t:o .cHINA. It was agreed
that the convoy of the -lst 5 ships plus the additional equipment and
. personnel furnished by CINCP ~C and CINCAFPAC would be rnn into the SHANGHAI
NANKING iffiEA as soon as SHANGHAI and NANKING are secured (estimated about
15 Se}Jtember) It was further agreed that the 1st convoy could go into
].\TANKING if necessa,ry to facilitate distibution of gasoline and other
critical supplies,.. Thereafter the ::nain port would be established at
SHJU\]'GHAI. ~rhe lOVirer YfiJJGTZE must be swept YFC mines prior to the bringing
of the convoy into CHINA.
Para F. EYacuation of U,.S. and Allied Personnel Liberated in ASI G.. Dis-cussion on staff level in CINCi1.FP!~C indicates that shipping could possibly
be made available by the IOXBKPHHE recovered personnel could be assembled

- continued -

3465

continue d and transpo rted to a port area and meanwhi le cn~JCPAC is exa.I11J..nJ..ng the
availab ility of evacuati on and hospita l ships and Nl{fS aircraft for rapid
movement of recovere d personn el to OKIN.A.1rV.A or the M.ARIJ\.N.AS for processL n.g
and necessa ry hospita lization prior to their being placed in the norm.:tl
evacuati on pipeling via the Pacific, the United States.
Para G. Japanese disarmed and civilian Eersonn el in CHIN A. Prel:i.nl.inary
discussi ons t-'rere held with represe ntatives of CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC on
prioriti es for evacuati on of Japanese disarmed personn el from CHII\fA to the
Japanese main islands and it was agreed that earJ,y evacuati on of all
Japanese rnilitary and civilian ,person nel from CHI~JA was mandato ry to
prevent serious w...rest in CHil\TA a..nd the possibi lity of large groups of
Japanese becorrdng establis hed in Chinese Comml.Ultes.
Para. Informa tion rdll be furnishe d Cif,JCAFPAC when firm request for
naval assistan ce are forvrarde d through ~far Departm ent for processi ng as
per instruct ions in WAil<\ 51172. IJ.'hat is all.

ER
21 2230 JOINT CHIEFS 01<" STfoJi'F TO MACARfHUR info J\TJl!ITZ, WHEELER, SPA..4.TZ, TNEDEJ!JkEY
WA11X 52674. United States Pol..i.cy Reurad C 34637 follows:
Para. HThe 4 Allied Powers are bound by the POTSD"~~ ultimatu m to
permit the ret,urn of Japanese military forces, afte~rthey are complet ely
disa:rrned , to their homes. Pending such return, which of necessit y depends
on the availab ility of transpo rtation, this personn el may be used for such
purpose s and subject .to such conditio ns and directiv es as may be prescrib ed
BHPXYE nationa l Commanders authoriz ed to receive he surrende r. Surrend er
Jaoanese soldiers should be consider ed as disarmed persorul el and not necesa
rily as prisone rs of' war.
Para.. Until the JapaJ1es e .lu-med Forces are secured., discussi on and
commitm ents concerni ng treatmen t of Japanese disro'"med forces during the
period between their surrende r and their return to their homes should be
held to the essenti al rninimu. . u
Para. Desire you inform 1tountba tten of above suggesti ng that he ney
vt.ish to ado}Jt a sirnilar noJJ_cy referenc e the STL F this personn el.

21 .2327 COM3RDFLT to CTn 30..J.::, CTG ;;o.2t C:CG 20.9, 30t.5, 2Q.~....t5::l..Jld~F 31
25 2 27 :t 38, . COHl~q.Arl.TA~I'\':fOR, _Q.Q}QPI-IJ.B info COIJGJ~N20TEAIRF'~AlCJ:i~, COl~I\,.IRPAC

SUBCOlfF'<'D, COl.fSERVPAC, CONIINCT:T, CINCBPF, . COM5THFLT, COMSUBPAC, CON))l;'ffiGIL,S,

crrG 94.1,. _CTF 95, CTG 95.~9, c~~F 99, COMSERON 10, SOP s:~RON 10 ULITIII,
, COMCOMPHIB.SP~Lc, 3HDFLT, COJ.~GEii8THARMY, CINCP '~G BO~rH H'": ' _COEGEN US..-..S.T.AF
...
ADVON
AF
COFHENFE
EAF,
COr.lQ-ElTr
AC,
,Cf:NC.~~P
LT,
COll>?THF
1.fh.
~~ARI .~.NAS, C011AI"1P1

v
/

Here is COM3RDFIEET OpPlan 11-45.

A. Task Group 30.tl Fleet Flagship Group Captain Murrey.
B.~: Task Group 30.2 British Biagship Group Captain Nicholl .
C. Task Group 30.5 Air Search and reconn. Group Captain GrD.nt.
D. Task Group 30.6 Allied P01N rescue group Commodore Simpson. ,
E.. . Task Group 30.8 Logistic Support Group RAdm Beary.
F. Task Group 30.9 ENI\ ~ ETOK service group Commodore Acuff.
G. Task Force 31 YOKOSUKA occupati on force RAdm Badger.
H. Task Force 32 31"d Amphibiou s Force VAdm Vfmlkinso n ...
H Sub 1 and H Sub 2 Task Forces 33 and 34 respecti vely con:mlal"lders
a:nd forces as ass.i gned by CTF 32.
H Stili 3 ann Task Force 36 landing forceJvfa jor General (as specifie

ed for each landing) -

- continue d -

3466

continu ed -

I . Task Force 35 suppor t force RAdm Jones.,

J . Task Force 37 British Suppor t force VAdm Rawling s RN .
d by
K. Task Force 3S 2nd Carrie r Task Force VAdm McCain until relive
VAdm Towers.
1. Task Force 39 lst Carrie r Task Force VAdm Sherman .
and 36 as
UP~ts for all groups and forces less task forces, 33, 34
Units assig.
h
dispatc
by
cation
modifi
latex'
to
t.
subjec
d
curren tly assigne
ned Task Forces 3), 34 arrl 36 as directe d by CTF 32.
Para. Japan ~s surrend ered. Inforna tion of TOKYO BAY A..ttEA and enemy
forces b~r mail and separa te disr:a tch . Army forces have seized ATSUGI
airfiel d and CINCitFPAC Advanc e Headqu arters are establi shed there . CTF
are
31 forces hold YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE and airfiel dq and 3rel Fleet forces
ing
dispose d in the TOKYO BAY- SAGAMI WAN lUIE:-A. 3rd Fleet Air is patroll
by our
HONSHU and the TOKYO B/<.Y &rcEA. KANOYA airfiel d KYUSHU is held
OpPlan 12-45
CINCP~~
occrrpa tion forces . TI1is OpPle.n st~ns from CINCPAC M~D
ions
operat
which
and covers landing of Sth Arn:zy- units in TOI\.'YO BAY ~tEA
coinci-d e with executi on of CINCJl.L'?PAC B-20 operati en.
Para . This Fleet, while continu ing mission s assigne d in my OpPlan
ns as arrange d
.Ef1ill 45, vdll la.nd 4nd firmly establi sh ashore at locatioand
assist the ft..:t'nzy"
Army
with CThiCAFPAC designa ted elemen ts of the 8th u.s.
ry, polirnilita.
e
exercis
in enforci ng surrend er terms in order to gain and
.
tical and econow ic contro l of the Japane se Rmpire

Para. Task .Groups 30 . 1, 30.2, 3o.5, 3016, 30. 8 and 30 . 9 Task Forces
ing
31" 35, 37, 3S continu e mission s assigne d by rny OpPlan 10- 45 . Follow
8
.
30
Group
Task
E
ed.
additio nal nrission s herevd th assigne d as indicat
BAY
provide logisti c suppor t for 3rd Amphib ious Forces at sea and in T0~0
Forces
ious
.Arn.phib
3rd
t
AREA . G, I , J Task Forces , 31, 35, and 37 sUDpor

and
as specifi ed in Annex B this OpPlan . H Task Force .32 T-ransp ort, land
elel'.REA
B/lY
TOKYO
the
of
s
establi sh firmly ashore in designa ted section
t
ments of the U,. S. 8th Army.. K, L Task Forces 38, 39 cover a.Dd suppor
,
OpPlan.
this
D
3rd Amphib ious Forces as specifi ed in At~..nex
SubPara Xl SubPar s Xl and X3 nw Opplan 19- 45 apply.
X2 3rdPhib will land lith Corps headqu arters, 1st cavalry
Div and 112 RCY OIBR DL KSGT YOKOHAiviA and YOKOSUKA about
31 August, knerica n r!iv- over beaches at SAGAMI KAWA- E:No .
SHJ]!IA about 6 Septera. ber and 43rd Div over YOKOH.~JiA~
YOI\OSUf>..A docks 13 Septem ber. iul dates subjec t to later
delay.
X 3 Annexes A E G H ~ and J my opla.n l0-L~5 apply to this plan.
X4 Annex B specia l instruc tions to Task Forces .Annex D air
plan 1~riJ~ be is.sued by separa te dispatc h.
X5 This plan will be placed in effect by dispa:t. ch.
.
Para.. Logist ics in acco:rd ance logisti cs plan Annex ~ nw opla...fl 10-lJ:.5
and
32
CTF
vlit~
10-45
oplEn
my
F
Para. Conun.aJl.d locatio ns as in annex
F'orce
CTF 39 added as It:ajor subord inate commands. Cor'&na.nder 3:rd Arnphibiotis
io .s
Operat
lous
Am"?hi1Y
the
of
cornrnand
in
is
or his delega ted group conlJnander
of
command
time:;
which
at
ashore
shed
until the landing force is establi
in
forces ashore passes to the landing force cor.arnan der . Commu nication s
1-45.
Oplan
my
H
Annex
and
12-45
OpPlan
accorda nce with Pac 70-B CINCPAC
Comrna..nder 3rd Fleet in l:ITSSOURI in TOKYO B\Y a

- continu ed ...

3461

- continued -

Aru'lex B my Opl an 11-45. Specia l instructions to Task Forces.

Para.. Ta's k Fore~ 31 assist ltrmy Porces as necessar.f to clear dock
a reas in YOKOSuKA- YOKOHAOA 1L~Et~3 in preparation for disembarkation of
troops by Jrd Phib on about 31 August and 13 September. Render such assistanc~ as CTF 32 may request in furnishing advance dock parties at YOKOSUKA,
sp ecial comDlU .nications during landings and traffic control through YOKOSUKA
naval zone,. Provide such p ersonnel and vessels to CTF 35 as may be required to accomplish Tasks assigned to him.
Para. Task Force 35 clear water a1.1d beach a pproaches in a,rea SAGAJilli
K.A'.~! A-J~ro SHIMA and rnark sarfie in preparation for amphibious landings that
area on abou:b 6 September. Obtain necessary udts, APDs and . other oersonnel
and vessels as rnay be required for this pu~oose from CTF 31. Provide fire
suDnort units for all landings as CTF 32 may request .
Para . Task Force 37 provide fire support units for landings as CTF
.
32 may request .
Par9-. All Task Forces authorized comrnunicate direct V\d.th CTF 32 in
arranging details accordance these instructions keeping originator advised.
21 2)41 COM3RDFLT to CTF .38, .CTF 39 info CO]PJJJCH, CTI\fQJlPF ,, C_01~5THFI.JT, CO]iSUt:;PAC
C0~ 1,1ARGJ.I~S, CTG 94,. 1, 95.9, CTF 25, 99, COMSERON 10, SOP SERON LO ULITHI
COMPHIBSPAC, 3RDFLT, QOYGEN 8Tf1Jrn1fi, COM3RDPH~B~ CI1~TCPAC BOTH HQ, COl.IGEliJ
USAST.AF, COMG~~T 20TH .ll.F, COI,/Ll\tAHIANAS, COM:ALB.PACSUBCOMF!'JD, COJJSERVPAC,
COM !.URPA~, CINCf;:P.AC , GCHGEN FE/\F ' COITGEJ:,JF:J;J. }J)Y.Qli.
~4nnex D my oplan 11-45. My 212327.
Para. 1. General Air Tasks outlined PJID.ex D rey- OpPlB.n 10-lt5 a)ply
except no a:Lr base assemply required from surface units 3rd Fleet. 3rd Flt
area of responsibility is combat area east of I35th Meridian and east of
air coordinating line except when directed by CTii CPAC w-estern boundary 3rd .
fleet area of res_t')onsibility moved eastvrard to 139tn Meridian for sea and
area and in the Japanese homeland to correspond to western li.rnit occupation
area Sth Arilllf. Also when directed by CINCPAC northern boundary 3rd fleet
area of responsibility moved southward to lt.Oth parallel except that COMJRD
FI.EET will coordinate activities 3rd fleet and north pacific force in
HOKKAIDO-O]tiTI\TATO area insofar as cooperation vrith 8th Amy is concerned.
Para 2.. Operations (A) OTF 38 . 'PJhen basic plan placed in effect
CTF 38 responsible ~or general air tasks east of 139 meridian (areas stars
and flagstaff) and east of the line of demarkation: of occupation areas for
6th and 8th arrnies. Within this area of responsibility (l) conduct dai~
air searches sea appraches J 'apanese horn.eland. ( 2) conduct air patrols over
airfields Japanese home1a.nd. (3) Maintain show of force over Japanese
territo~J. (4) Provide air cover occupation forces. (5) Be prepared to
furnish direct aJ..r su ppor-t f or a-ttack and ground forces as requested by
Com3rd PhibFor as folloV<rs: For each l anding area air cover, air support
group with coordilmtor, tact ical ob s erve r and photo pl anes plus both
observer and c ombat air patrol f or SAGAMI landing, all cont ro l led by CASCU
in 3rd PhibFor Flagship ,. ( 6) Be prepar ed t o furnish direct air support for
ground f orces a s r equested by 8t h Ar nw upon assumption of CO.trln!and ashore.
(7) Be pr epared t o a ct against a.ny oppositi on encount er ed when directed
by Com3rdFl t. ( 8) Be preap r ed to strike Japanese airborne or gTolmder aircraft air installations or enemy troop concent rations as directed by Com3r d Fl eet. (9) Be prepared Jc o reinforc e supnort and/or cover 3rd Fleet
forc es as direct ed ,. (B) CTF 39 . 'VV1'len basic plan plac ed in effect CTF 39

Jl,ir .Plan.

- corrtinued -

34 68

- continued -

AUGUST (GCT)

responsible for general air tasks sea area betvH:3en 135th and 139 meridians
(area stripes) and J apa11ese homeland petween air coordination ~i.ne ( A:tmex
D rey- OpPlan 10-45) and the line of dern.arka;cion occupation areas 6th and 8th
armies. Within this area of responsibility (1) Donduct. daily air searches
sea ap~)roaches Japanese homeland .. (2) conduct .air patrols over airfields
Japanese homeland. (3) ~Iaintain show of force over JR.panese territory. (Lr)
provide air cover for occupation forces m~lng through sea area of responsibility.. (5) Be prepared to act, against any opposition encount ;;rd when
directed by Com3rdFlt. (6) Be prepared to strike Japanese 8i.rborne or
grounded aircraft, -:dr insta~lations or enemy troop concentrations as directed by Com3rd.Flt. (7) Be prepared to reinforce support and/or cover 3rd
Flt forces as directed. (C) Com3rdPhibFor . When basic plan placed in
effect Com3rdPhibFor being responsible for a.m.phibious and landing operatiens ~
of Sth il.:rmy will (1) request from CTF 3S and 39 air cover required for
movement of a.rn.ph~bious forces within the l.imits of the areas of responsibility of the 2 forces. (2) Hequest from CTF 38 direct air support required
in the conduct of the Amphibious and landing operations. (D) CTG 30.5
.!ihen basic plan placed in effect C~~G 30;5 ;vill (1) Conduct daily and nightly
patrols outlined in tasks assigned in An..Ylex D rey- OpPla11 10-45. (2) Limit
patrols to east of l39th .m.eridian and/or south of 40th parallel when directed by COM3EDFLT. (3) Be prepared for offensive patrols and searches as
m.a.y be d_trected by Com3rd.Flt. (h) Be prepared to control serive and accomodate limited numbers of transient seaplanes. (5) Be prepared to cover and
supr)ort 3rd Fleet forces as directed.
Para 3. Garrison. (A) M_t\G 31. (B) NATS landplane unit. 1 garrison
squadrons and ground echelons will be assigned appropriate tasks when
installed.
22 0729 CINCPAC ADV~J.TCE to COM3HFLT; COU5jJIFLT 1 C01.ft~F:l.T, C01fpJIIBSPl\.C, COHGENF1~lFPAC
CC::SERVPA, CGM.;\IRPAC, C01l:'ESSE.IU7l10N, QO!.T.SUBPA, COUPJlGTI. B, C0J!lPHIL.SE!Ii1RON,
COllJf~jSKAFRON, COMJ!T ,, H.IAN AS.

Ope rat ion 1v'tt"W'"SEJTIC suspended indefin:Lt ely.

22 1200 COMGEN CHTIJA to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC, WARCOS.
VWBX

55FJ7.

Commanding Germral CHINA TrU:!;ATER. is instructed to inform CTNC.AF?AC of

a.rry British-Chinese negotiations re HONGKONG~t 1'llul.t1 51776 refers. To the

present no inform-::ttion concerning subject negotiations between the British

a11d Chinese goverr.Jnent s has been reported to me.. r}uery addressed to Generalissimo headqu.a.rters elicited that to their knovv-ledge no negotiations
had been instituted between the 2 governments covering operations in
HONGKONG area.

3469

continued-

22 1210 COMGF.cNCHI NA to
!' -

CFBX

W,~_RCO :t.

.QOMI NCH info CINC-Af?,AC, CTNCPl1C.

55S6.

\life are instructed t hat ar rangements for full military coordination

should be made between British and Chinese GovernmerJts p rior to B:r-itish
participa:tiori in operations in the CHI IlA. TI-:!J"~ATER . Also General Hac Arthur
has been instructed to arrange surrender of HONGKONG to British Commander
when such coordina tion ha s been completed. CINCPAC has forl~arded us a
message for information which indicates that CINCBPF is requesting fuelling
and servicing facilities from u. s. resources in }jhilippines for British
Naval forces earmarked- for o9cupation of HONGKONG. To my knowledge the
necessary milita~J coordit1a.tion between the British and the Generalissimo
is not being made reference WAPt.X 5U81.
22 l835 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACAR1'HUR, NI MITZ info Q.OMMANDER US NAVAL FORGES
f:tUSTRALIA-N'Ei\T GUINEA~
VlARX

53079'4

Adjustment of the bounda r i es of the southwest Pacific a:rea ( S\7PA)

and changes in command responsibili tes agreed to at termincW- will become
effective at the time of the formal surrender of JAPA.J:.r. Concureently
t here1i'"ith the co.m.L.1.al1d 11 Comrnander 1Ulied Naval Forces SVJPAH wiD. be
abolished and all Allied Naval vessels of this command other than United
States vessels will pass to Bri tish Empire control.

17 lllO COMGEN Ch'TNA to CINC.AFPAC, CINCPAC info

W.c~ RCOS,

CG GCCT, CG SOSCT.

CFBX 492S.

The problem of orderly surrender of :bhe bulk of J apa.nese Trooy;s in

the CHIPA THEAT:El1 vrith the preservation of law and order in presently
Japanese occupied areas resolves itself to one of rapi~ly deploying cnetral
go-vernment troops into strategic areas.
Para. Means of moving occupational armies are linli ted to air, rivers,
destroyed railroads hig~t~s, due to t h e condition of the latter 2 and the
engineering problems involved in repairs, only air and water routes offer
any immediate possibilities for r apid movement of troops a~1d supplies.
Para. The bull\ of troop s to be moved are in south and central CHllJf{.
VThere by means locally available centrations may be assembled in the
ViUCHO~'l (lll-40-23-30) CAN,.fON ,\nd Hlll\TKOVJ AREAS .
Para. Plan s are bei ng formulated to airlift 1 Army to NANKI NG requiring 30 days with th e resour ces available. This w'ill be .followed by
a 2nd .Ptrrey which vrill b e moved to north CHI NA, t his move wlll rec;_uire app. roximat ely 20 a ddit i onal days .. T'he se troop movements are less than 50
percent of the movement considr ed essenti a l to meet the emergency situa tion
vrith whic h we ar e fac ed.
Para v The additioneJ. mov ement of 1 Army (35000 men plus 2000 tons)
from W!UTK0~:1 to SH/\NGIIJti and l Army from 'ViUCHO\'f to TAKU ar e considered urgent,.
Para .. The limitations of airlift are largely based on pool available in the thea.ter, t he only present supply line being over the hump .
Para . The follo1Ying v.rater rout es are good mov ement possibilit ies :
Coasto.l CHINA SEA.
1 .,
-:-! .;1:-JGT ~ .~ river from IIAI:T.KU~ to Sl-UJIGH1\I .,
2.

- continued -

3470

- continued The VJ.EHT RIV.&"1 from ~7lYCECh: to HONGKOIJG. Un..-i_ted 3tates a.ir attrition
of Chinese river craft has been so heav:rr. that but fev; powered craft remain
availa.ole for rapid troop deploymen t. It therefore follows that limited
air lift is the on..1y rapid troop movement and sup~)ly means ava._-Llable to this
theater under present condition s.
Para . The follor.ring measures would help to remedy this situation :
Open an east coast port or P/llIKrJG as recorfl!llended in rrr:t CFBX 4780 .
A.
It is assuraed tbat the Japanese would not attempt to deny allied use of
the YP.NGTZE.
The assignmen t of suitable river and coastal vessels . - :\y CFBX L.,.740
B.
recowmend ed LC 1 craft for this purpose . Later plal11Jed essential water
movements are l additiona l A.rrrry from .iUCHOH to TAKU, l from C 'JJTON t o
HANGCHO.J and 1 from either HUIPHOlrG or ClNTON to T.:lliU . These a r e minimum
essential moves and should be follOl;red by a continuin g redistr ibution of
u.s. sponsored troops to the critical key coastal areas .
Para . Based on the above and your nresent c ommitment s in the Pacific
would appreciat e your cornment and suggestio n as to methods and means vrhich
might be available to this theater from your resources .

3.

22 1934 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to NIMITZ into llACARTHtJR. WEplllE!'ER.

WARX S3lll
Book Jll8&sage. Your lD23lS (not required b7 informati on addressee s).
In T.lew of Japanese surreDder no further action desired with reapect to
NAPKO project for introduct ion of OSS personnel into KOREA by submarine .

23 1516 COJmlCH to CINCPAC ADVANCE into CINCAFPAC, CG CHINA THEATER.

For your informati on. British COS have issued instructio ns to CDiCB:W
that forces intended tor HONGKONG should be held at LE!TE or some other
convenien t port until further orders. CINCBPP has been directed b7 them
to ccmtorm ~ HacArthur s views on the timing of Jap surrender .
~;;.

23 2208
""'

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to

MACARTHUR.

SP.UTZ. BRITJ:SB JOIHT STAFf liiSSION

tpP ECRET

:Into rmqTZ. WflEELER,

.

WARX S3785

Wedem.qer is directed to inform ll'ac~hur

when militarr coordinat ion with him and with the Chinese Board ot llilit&ry'
Operation s is completed by' the British at which time llac.Arthur will
arrange tor the surrender ot HONG KONG to the British. In this connectio n
the British deeire that the surrender. should be made to a British eonman
der to be nominated by Admiral Fraser.
gi-ve
will
they
that
state
Para. Tke British Chiefs ORHBREAJ further
full facilitie s through the HONG KONG area {so tar as the condition s ot
the port all.ow) .tor the assistanc e and support ot Chinese and American
forces who mq still be either engaged against the enell\1 or invo~ved
in securing the surrender of Japanese forces in the hinterlan d Furbher
to WARX 51776, the British Chiefs of sta.tt state that military coordination on operation al matters is being effected by
. 'l'ep aecret book message

th.

3471

..
24 0118

CINCPAC ADV HQ to <;OM5THFLT, CCllZTHFLT, CCJmORPAC Into SUPRlE CC14MANDER

ALLIED FORCES

TOP SJOORET. Oompl,y with directive 11J1' OpPlan with respect to occupation
and control ot coastal waters ot JAPAN and CHINA. as soon as practicable
atter 31 August. Inform me as to your plans.

24 0820

CINCPOA @V HQ to OINCAFPAC Info CINCPOA PEARL HQ, COM.AIRPAC, OOUGEXFJIFPAC, COMSERVPAC, COMGENAIRFMFPAC, COlQRDFLT, COJ.GTHFLT

TOP SECRET. Reference your 220851 not to all or needed. Units listed
on Fage B-5 nv serial 0005i0.3 include those units listed in 7our operations instruction 4 Anna: .;. Initial operations ot llarine tigb'ber
groups to 'be under Com3rd and 5th Fleets tor protection anchorages and
escorts for shipping. Operational contro~ of these groups to pass to
CDCAFPAC when and as desired by COOAFPA.C. CDlCPAC retains respouibility- for logistic support of all units except as modified by JIG" 200700.
'l'his eancela 111 120624. Naval search squadrons and MATS augmented b7
VllR squadrons rEID&in under naval control at all times. _
25 01.39

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CQ5THFLT.

117 24011S. Your 241415. When w:Lll ships of 5th Fleet oecuw and
control waters of JAPAN.
25 0801 CINCPAC ADV to cac:NCH into CINCAFPAC, COMGl!K CHINA, OOJll'rHFL'r.

JCS 242317. '!'he proposals ot rq 21081.8 with reepeet to CHINA assumed

the prior seisure ot a port in KOREA. Tr&MRon 17 will be ready to saU
from OKINAWA 7 Se}:t,ember for KOREA with the 7th Intant17 Division .
embarked plus designated Corps Troops. Date or sailing 40th and 96th
Divisions from the FmLIPPINES not available ta me. Will advise when

known.

Para. It the Russians seize EXIJO reccrmmend. the occupation or FUSAN

which cOirmands the KOREA arl1 'l'SUSHIMA. STRAITS ancl controls important

rail cormmmications.

25 0839 CDTCPAC ADV to COMSERVPAC into COMSEVRON lO, COttsERVDIV' S 101, 102, JD3,
104, COlQRDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, OOYSERVRON 6, OOHNORPAC. COMl.STCARTFPAC. COM2NDCARTFPAC, CINCPAC PEARL.

This organizatio n of mobUe serviee forces tor operation C.A.MPUs-

BELEAGER modifies rq OpPlan 12-45.

Para. CO:tlSERVRDN 6 will operate directly under COMSERVPAC, will
provide replenishme nt at sea for the Fast Carrier Task Forces and ather
fleet forces as required, and will allocate to their logi.stic support;
groups service units from those assigned to SERVRON 6. CO:MSERVRON 6
.
mq himself ccmnand 1 of these logistic support groups.
will proCOMSERVPAC,
under
directl\r
operate
Para. COMSERVROli 10 will
MAR-GILa
AREA,
MARIANAS
AREA,
RYUKYUS
the
.
vide mobile base services in
AREA and at LEYTE, and will allocate to se~ce divisions in occupied
areas in JAPAN and to the rear ba.sea above mentioned service units from
those assigned SERVRON lD. COYSERVDIVS 101, 192 and 103 with their statts

3472

- continued-

be moved forward to naval anchorages in occupied areas in JAPAN and

CHINA at the discretion of COM7TH., 3RD and 5TH Fleets respective~. This
.
modifies my 160833.
~

25 0853 CmCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC.

Refer 110" 22CY'/03. Your concurrence COM7THFLT 180140 requesteci.

24 1626 COUINCH AND ONO to CINCPAC ADVANCE.
J.(y 191648 was tor planning purposes and. comment is directed both as
to permanent setup and time or times of implementation. Co11111ent should
include art3' desired interim proposals. Reply need not be made until you
have had adequate opportunity for consideration.

20

0725 CG CHINA
CFB

to CINCAfPAC passed

to CINCPAC ADV, JCC GUAM.

5250.

Joint statt stud;y BELEA.GER section 6 para B mentions landing forces

to consist of Corps Headquarters am Corps Troops in addition to Jlarine
Division query will the composition of Corpa be adequate to provide
necessary port and limited area construction, hospital.ization~ m111tar:y
police., ordnance maintenance, motor transportation, port loading and
unloading, signal service~ depot suppJ.;r for common user items, and housekeeping personnel such as ArJJv postal service, food inspection, lfalaria
control and survey., water publication and port; overhead in support of
approximate~ 7500 American Troops (in addition to the Landing Force) in
the SHANGHAI AREA to include 3 or 4 fighter groups, 2 Reoon squadron, 2
air service groups and an air depot group. Information is urgent to
determine stoppage of certain units now ready for air and water lift from.
u.s. that were previous~ set up for BAYARD. Also into required tor
decision with IBT as to disposition of units present~ suspended in IBT
where inteDied to support BAYARD. Prefer bringi.ng in all necess817
supply and supporting troops (other than air corps) direct from Paeitic
to conserve critical transportation trans INDIA am CHINA. Can similar
supporting units be later supplied for other ports such as CANTON it
required by u. s. Operations.

25 0820 COMGBNCHINA to CINCAFPAC. CINCPOA ADV into OOMGENSOSCHINA, COMGENIB,

scg.

CFBX 5849.
Refer to CINCAFPAC 35704 dated 22 August. OIMCAFPAC 210818 GCT also
refers it is now as~ed that occupation of SHANGHAI w:il.l be accomplished
by Chinese Central Government Forces. Marine Divisions will occupy TAKU
and TSINGTAO in that priority. It is assumed here that these llarine Unite
will be self supporting and will be supplied by CINCPAC. LNo marine air units are required as CHINA. THEATER can furnish entire air support. CHINA
THEATER will operate port of SHANGHAI with resources previous:cy- available .
for operation of FORT BAYARD including sane .f'rom INDIA BURMA THEATER and
some from CINCPAC as listed 1a his 07055.3. Through this port we w:i11
eventual.J.l" support all CHINA THEATER, U.

s.

Forces and INDIA BURMA THEATER

port operating units and all common user items for 3500 shore based Nav
which should take care of LCI crews and YANGTSE patrol shore units.
347~

26 0419 SOAP to WARCOS FOR JCS into COMGENCHINA, CINCPAC @V. OOKlTHFLT, COM7TH
.

HIIB, COMG:Dl AATH CORPS.

ex 3685.3.

Reference WX 54514, also CINCPAC 250801 not to all or needed. The

present plan is for the 7th Division to occuw KEIJO on 11. Sept,ember.
Conf'erences this date indicate that the initial movement of light~

armed troops~ IE, APA and AKA~ can take place leaving OKINAWA on the 4th
arriving KEIJO on the 7th. This movemEnt will be followed with heavier
equipment as rapidq as posaible.

This plan is being approved and instruct-

ions a.re being issued to COMG!X24THCORPS and others to execute generaJ.lT

as indicated.

26 0127 CniCPAC ADV to COMGENCHINA into CINCAFPAC. CDJCPAC PEARL. COMGENFMFPAC,

OOJll'lHFLT.

Your 2501;0 to CINCAFPAC and 250820 to CINCPAC. Corps Troops to be

landed with other wrl.ts ot the Fleet Marine Force in North CHINA are in
general limited to those required tor the direct support of the Amphibious
Corps and attached cOJI'bat units ground and air. Detailed list .rol.l..ows in
separate dispatch.
Para. I these troops are cODIII.itted in North CHINA as now proposed
there will be no similar units available from resources under 1111' control
tor use at SHANGHAI.
Para. Your 25083) refers to TAKU whereas n;r 210818 refers to CHINGWANGTAO. Suggest this be lett open as a local tactical matter until your
liaison part,y arrives and meanwhile we both refer to "TlmnSIN AREA.".

26 0908 CINCPAC NJV to COYMA.RGII.S, COUAIRPA.C, COMSERVPAC into CamtCH AND CNO,
COMNATSPAC, CIRCPOA PEARL HQ, COY.GENFM.FPAC.

J(y' top secret 170906. Plan to activate WAKE as naval air base (under
administrative operational control and logl.stic support of ComMa.rGila) to
support limited operation of search and patrol aircraft and. pr:lmarily tor
servicing transient aircraft including .scheduled operation ot NATS. Provide
no defenses . Limit personnel to .min1.J.imm for accomplishment above mission
initia.ll;r tor landplanes. COMSERVPAC, COllAIRPAC render such assistance aa
COMMARGILS may require. COMAmPAC nom:Jnate naval aviator rank Capt,ain or
Conma.nder as prospective Commander Naval Air Base WAKE~

26 0907

CINCPAC ADV to COMMARIANAS, COMAIRPAC, OOMSERVPAC inf'o COMINCH AND CNO,

OOMNATSPAC, CINCPOA PEARL, OO:M.GP.m'MFPAC.

J17 top secret 170906. Plan to activate MARCUS as naval air base (under
administrative operational control and logistic support of OOM MARIANAS) to
support limited operation ot search and pt.trol ai.rcratt and primari:ijr tor s
servicing transient aircraft including scheduled operation o! NATS. Provide
mission initia.lly tor landplanes. COMSimVPAC, OOMAIRPAC render such assistance as COM MARIANAS mq require. CO!LURPAC nominate naval aviator raDii
Captain or Commander as prospective Commander Naval Air Base MARCUS.

AUGUST ( GCT)

3474

26 0821 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CDICAFPAC into CINCPOA PEARL. CG FMFPAC, CG 6TH ARMY

oowmroA.

UrDis 251509. Present tentative plans for demobilization of Marine

Corps units include the disbaBiment of all Marine AAA Group Headquarters
aD! AAA Bns with the exception of 2 Jlarine AAA Bns which have definite
post war cOJIIDitments in the Pacific Ocean Area. Em.ployment ot 2 Amphibious
Corps and 5 Jlarine Divisions in CAUPUS and BELEAGER siDmltaneous:q
necessitates the disbandment of certain other nm lmits in order to aeet
additional serd.ce requirsEilts and to permit a partial demobilization ot
Marine Corps personnel In vial o! the above regret that AAA units requened
~
UrDis 25~509 are not available.
to you.
release
for
available
Para. All Arsv AAA units in MA.RIANAS are
JITDi~ 161512 Ju:cy. refers.

24 OllS CINCPAO ADV to C05THFLT, OOMZTHFLT, COMNORPAC. SUPRDJE COMMANDER ALLIED

.
.
POWER.
Comp:cy- with directive 111' OpPlan with respect to occupation and control
of coastal waters of JAPAN and CHINA as aoon as praeticable after .31 August.
Inform me as to ;your plana.
26 1713 CINCP!C ADVANCE to COIISERVP.-lC. COMAIRPAC. CO!ZTHFLT. COJllTHPHIBFOR. OOJlPHIBSPAC into OOUGFli2NDUARAIRWDG, OO:MGEN4TJ.DlARAIRWING, CO)(GP}l6THMARJ)IV,
CINCR>A PEARL. OOMGENCHINA. C01(2'ftiFLT. COJ4GENlS'ftWmiV, OOMGEZQRDMARDIV,
COKINCH AND CNO, CTF 99, OO!QBDFLT. ClNCAFPA.C, COMGENFMFPAC. KARCORPS.
COMGEN3BDPHIB. OODORPAO,' CTF 96, C<U.WUANA. COJL~POA. FMFPAC REP
MARIANAS, COMGl!llAIRFMFPAC, COMGENSERVOMDF.MFPAC.
WARNING ORDER. Initiate preparations for operation BELEAGER with target
date (M-Dq) .30 SeptaDber 1945 in accordaDCe Joint statt stuq serial
0005105 Augu~ l3 with exception of modifications contained herein. Admiral.
T.C. Kinkaid will command the operation with Vice !dmiral B. E. Barie7 in
cormnand of amphibious forces and Major General Keller E. Rockey USMC coamander e2P8dit1onar.r troops. Occupation troops will consist of 3rdPhiDCorps Hq. Hq Tropps, 1st JlarDiv ReiDt. occu.pying TIJrBTSIN AREl and 6th
VarDiv reinforces (less 4th RCT) occupying TSDlGTAO AREA. An alternate to
the foregoing i f Central CHDlA situation requires, when forces are read;r,
is the occupation of SHANGHAI AREA. 4th llarDiv will be in area reserve in
HAWAIIAN AREA. Marine Aviaticn units will consist ot lst MarAirWing including hed:ron 1, seron 1, 1 Ma.rA.irWarning wqdn, MAG l2 with Hed.Ron 12,
Seron 12~ WF 1151 VUF 211, VMF 218, MAG 24 with Hedroa 24, Seron 24, WF(N)
535, WF(N) 541, MAG .32 with Hedron 32, Seron 321 VMSB 244, VMSB 34.3, VMTB
JJ4, MAG 25 with Hedron 25, Seron 25, VMR 152, WR JS3. COMGmlatMARAIRWING
report to OOMGEN.3RDPHIBCORPS and C01l7THPHIB FOR by dispatch for planning.
Parae Col. W. J. Fox USMCR is designated as Comanding Officer IIAB
No. 1 in TIPN'l'SIN AREA. Col. F. J. Schlapkohl USMC is designated as
Commandjng Officer MA.B No. 2 in TSINGTAO AREA. These officersshould be
ordered to report to COMGENl.STMAW far duty at earliest. COMGENlS'l'JlAW
advise earliest of planned distribution of air units between MAB No. 1 and
.MAB No. 2.
Para. MAB'S will b8 under command of COMGENlSTMA.RAmNING. lSTMA.W
will be under operational control of OOJ,!GEN3RDPHIBCORPS. When COMG;:iRD
miBCORPS asswnes command ashore in CHINA he will be under operatic

- continued -

347~

..,.1

.- continued -

26 1713 (Conttd)
control ot OOltGENCHINA and will report by despatch to COllGENCHINA aecol'din.gq
Para.

llyDis

220626.

1 GROPAC

A. For TIENTSIN AREA. other GROPAO

B. F<>r rsmarAO mEA 'Both .GROPACS are assigned operational control

.3RDPHIBCORPS. OOMSERVPAC advise designation Gt GROPAC tor each area and

order 00 of each te report at earllaat b,- dispatch to COXGE}GRDPRIBCORPS.
CCHSERVPAC advise location availability date and shipping implications ot

each aom.poneJlt,. COJl7THPHIBFOR will be responsible tor providing shipping,

loading and. DIQYement of all urdts mounting west of the HAWAIIAI ISLANDS and
for issuance of general loading and saS ling instl"llctions to OOMAIRPAC and.
OO:MSERVPAC tor units ud.er their cgguizance mo&ting in tlae HAWAIIAI area
and west eeast. CINCPAC PEARL will provide shipping and COJISERVPA.C will
arrange for the leading and m.ovemct of alluits under COMSERVPAC and
OOXAIRPAC cogniZance .-.ting from the HAWAIIAN AREA and tke west eoast.
Para. Jlounting out su.pplies,38 clqs elasses 1, 2, 3, 4, including water
in. DRUMS and cans 2 gal/lf'IBii/ds;r S d.ap, winter elo:thing1 chemical protective
cl.othiag an4 equipaent, construction supplies aa clirecte4 by' 3RDF!IIBCORPS .
tor m1nimwn rehabili'tatioa airfields, waterfront taoilities and roads, class
V 3U/F combat troops, l U/F semee troops, V-A JD .missions. Direct liaiaoa
and. camnmication between <:OM7THPBIBFOR1 OOJlGDI.3RDPHIBCORPS, OOMSmVPAC and.
COllAIRP.AC is authorized.. Iastmcties oa renpJ>l.T, levels, maintenance etc.,

to be issued later.

Z1 0108 CINCPAC ADVANCE to ALL FLAG OFFICERS.

Questions as te disposition and use et captured or occupied territor.y
are }lolitieal ones tea be cietermineclby responsible officials of the government. Where the governmental policy has not been aDilO'fDlCed the American.
pesition should not be aarrasseci 'by hip raaking naval officers giving
expression to their own opirdons particular] as they mq be lacking
information on all the considerations involved. You will be govemed
accor~.

3476

26 1520 DEANE to ACIIAR FOR WARCOS, C:mCAFPAC - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.
Ja

25417.

Following is

u.s.

Military Mission Moscow RUSSIA MX 25416 to War

Department dated 25 August

~945

.Antonov called me early this morning and handed me the following letter
which he wishes transmitted tc General MacArthur "After reading your letter
ot 19 August 1945 which contained the Instrument ot Surrender of Japan
the General Staff of the Red .A:I:'m;y coasiders it necessary to include in this
Instrument the following amendments.
1. Change paragraph 3 to read we hereby comand all Japanese Forces
wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities fortbrith.
To preserve and save frcm damage all ships~ aircratta, and militar'J' and
civ:U property and to comply with all requirEillents which mq be imposed by'
the Supreme COIIIllallder for the Allied Powers and by the separate Allied
High COIIID&Ilds in their respective theaters of operations or by agencies
ot the Japanese Government at their direction.
2. Change paragraph 5 to read. We hereb7 cOIIID&nd all civil militar:r
and naval officials to obey and entorce all proclamations, orders and
directivea deemed by the SUpreme Conmander for the Allied Powers and by'
the separate Allied High Commands in their respective theaters of operationa
to be proper and to effectuate this surrender and issued by tbam or under
their authori t7 and we shall direct all such officials to ran&in at their
posts and to continue to pertorm their non combatant duties. unless epecifica.ll.T relieved by the Supreme Comander for the Allied Forces or by the
separate Allied High CoiiiD&I'lders in their respective theaters or under their

aulihorit7.
3. Change paragraph 8 to read. The authority of the &nperor and the
Japanese Government to rale the state shall be subject to the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers or to such org~zation as the Allied
Powers may create tor these purposes who will take such steps as they de
proper to effectuate these terms ot surrender". Antonov stated that the
qove amendments had the approval of' Generalissimo stalin. He explained
that the amemaents to paragraphs 3 and 5 were tor the purpose of taking
care of the local situation in the ti.tferent theaters of operation.
Para. Inconnection with the amendments proposed in paragraph 8 he
stated that initia.ll.T the authority of the Emperor would be subject to the
sole authority of the SUpreme Commander for the Allied Powers, but that it
might l.ater be founded desirable to set up an organization for the
governrant of JAPAN similar to that which now exists for the government
of GermaJ:lY. I request I be given information upon which to base a
reply.

Finds.

'Z7 1300 C(J.{GENCHINA to CINePOA. ADVANCE info CCJIDENFCHINA

Clt""'B 6092.

Concur in irlcluding a marine aircraft wing at reduced strmgt,h for

marine corps operations in TII!fTSIEN and/or TSINGrAO area of north
CHINA.

AUGUST (GCT.l

3477

'Zl 0209 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMGENFMFPAC. COMSERVPAC. COMA,IRPAC. CO!ZTHfLT. COMPHIBSPAC, CQ)QRDPHIBQORPS, COMZTHPHIBFOR. COMGENPOA info COM.5THFLT, COM<DAIRFMFPAC, COUINCH & CNO, MARCORPS, COMNORPAC 1 COM MARIANAS, COMGENlSTM!W,
FMFPACREf!ARIANAS, COMGJ!IDSTMARDIV, COMGENSERVCOUDFMFPAC, OTF 99, CTF 96,
CmCPOA PEARL, OOMGEN6THMARDIV, COMGENCHINA.

For planning purposes only following tentative logistic plan tor land
based naval and marine forces BELEAGER part, 4 of annex H to 1113' OpPlan 12-45
is effective. Target Date (M-Dq) ):) September. CnlCP.AC agencies as indicated herein are responsible complete logi.stic support marine and naval unit
in occupied areas. Occupied areas TSINGTAO and TIENTSIN.
Para 1. Suppy.
.
A Mounting supp~es. COMSERVPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMG!m'MFPAC and COil
GENPOA responsible in accordance exi.sting policy for providing following
mount~ supplies: 30 dqs classes 1,2,.3,4 inclll.ding water in drums, cans
2 gaJ./m&n/d;q 5 dqs, winter clothing, chemical protective clothing and
equipment. Constru.ction supplies as directed by CaGRDPHIBCCilPS for
minimum rehabilitation airfields, waterfront facilities and roads. Class
5 e units fire combat troops, l unit fire service troops, V-A. 10 missions.
B. Resupp:cy-. Agencies listed above responsible for prov.i.ding reaupp~.
COli.GENFIIF:AC is charged with responsibility for coordination of
procurement, assembling and shipping of resuppq or all classes tor all
Navy and Marine forces ashore in the objective. CINCPAC Will furnish shipping as requested by COMGENFMFPA.C. Resupp:cy- shipments of classes 1~2.3,4
will )le scheduled to arrive 15 Dq intervals beginning Y plus 10 and will
consist of 30 d""s each until supp:q level is reached. Supply leve1s to be
maintained at objective 30 dq minimum and .30 dq operating lsvel. ot
classes 1,2,.3, and 4, 3 units fire combat troops, 1 unit fire service troops. 10 missions class V-A. Automatic supp:cy- 1st l20 dqs. SUpplies in
MARIANAS, OKINAWA, and RA.WAn will be used in accordame current directives
Direct liaison and conmmication between COMGmn.IFPAC, responsib1e su.ppl\1
agencies, 7th Fleet and 7th PhibFor authorized.
Para 2. Transportation.
COll7THPHIBFOR responsible provi.ding shipping, loading and movement all
units mounting west of Hawaiian Islands and issuance general loading and
sailing instructions to COMAIRPAC and COMSERVPAC for ~ts under their
cognizance mounting in Hawaiian Area and west coast. CINCPAC Pearl provide
shipping and COMSERVPAC arra.ng e 1oading and movement all units under CCilSERVP.AC and COMAIRPAC cognizance mounting Hawaiian Area and West Coast.
Shipping designators later by despatch.
Para 3. Medical. Medical service as ill part 1 this annex. Evacuation
to Marianas by suftace. .3 AH r s will be assigned. Air evacuation by VRE-1
to OKINAlrfA and MARIANAS 2 planes per dq.
Para 4. Troop list. .3RDPHmCORPS censisting ot Hq am Hq Tps, 1st
MarDiv, 6th MarDiv (less 1 RCT) plus lstMarAirWi.ng consisting of Hedron 1 1
Seron 1, MAW Sq, MAG 12 with Hadron l2 and Seron 121 VMF Sqs 115, 21.1, 2lS
MAG 24 with Hedron 24 and Seron 24, Vl&F(N) Sqs 5.3.3, 541; MAG .32 with Hadron
.32, Seron .32, VMSB Sqs 244, .343, VMTB Sq 1.34, MAG 25 with Hedron 25, Seron
25, VMR Sqs 152 and
2 GROPAOS. Troops 'l'Smcn'AO AREA 22,100, TIENTSIN
AREAS .31,100 total troops 5.3,200.
Para ;. Base Development. Construction limited to that essential to
placing airfields, roads and waterfront facilities in operational status.
2 Marine Airfields will be established, l in TIENTSIN AREA, the other
TSINGTAO.
Para 6. Miscellaneous. currency and mail directives issued later.

15,.

347P

Z7 C17S5 CQl({THFLT to CTF 79, COMPHILSEAFRQN, COMSERVRON 7 into COMSERVPA9, COilSERVRON 10 1 COMSERVDIV 101., CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CINCAFPAC, CG AFWESPAC, COONCH.

Action addresses hereby directed to assume as applicabl e all present

logistic responsi bilities and conmitm.ents of COM'7THFLT in the suppy of
.Allied Naval Forces. Further direct COMSERVRON 7 under the operation al
control of OOMPHILSEAFRON and administr ative control of COMSERVPAC furnish
logi.stics requireme nts personnel and supplies to all naval units afloat
and ashore in SvVPA including all U.s. Navy vessels. Thus continuin g
logistics support to naval forces AUSTRALIA, NEll GUINEA and MANUS and
having access to the resources of MANUS, HOLLANDIA, PHILIPPINE BASES nad
other south west pacific bases. In the event means are not then available
make represent ations to COMSERVPAC for necessaey additiona l supplies and
facilitie s. Responsi bilit,- ot OOliSERDN 7 for logistics support to the
7th Flt terminate s upon the departure ot latter in operation CA14PUS at
0800 I(-9) 28 August 1945. 7th Flt thereafte r will receive logistic
support from CMRDander Service Foree Pacific.

'!'his is JGT OpOrder l.v-45.

A. Cruiser Group TG 77.3 RAdmLow. CrW>iv 16. ALASKA and GU.AU.
CruDiv 6 San Francisco , New, Orleans, Jtinneapo lis and Tuscaloos a. DD' S
Haraden (;a;), stevens (4?7), .Wiley ( 597) t Bell ( 58:7) Bums ( 588), Hubbard
(74$), Cunningham (752), Frank Evans (754J, John Bole1 (755).
Para 1. F.nsny forces have been forbidden to operate. However be prepared for attacks and alert for treacher.y . Further informati on including
enemy and allied mine fields in Annex C JV OpPlan 13-45 now being distribut ed by- air. Own forces are not y-et operating in the DL1DW SEA. TG 94.5 is
sweeping area SKAGNAY, and may sweep mine line 7 just west of KUKUZAN to.
Fair Wing l continues regular searches.
Para 2. This force will operate to control the YELiaV SEA.
Para 3.(a) Rendesvous as directed off' OKINAWA and proced into the
YELLON SEA. Conduct operation s as directed by COillllallder 7th Fleet.
Para 4. Logistics in OKINAWA and as called forward.
.
Para 5. Guard 7th Fleet Task Force and Task Group conmanders circuit
(41..35 series) and appropria te POA Foxes. Commander 7th Fleet in linneapo lis

Z7 1,328 COMGENCHINA to cmCPOA ADV into CINCPOA PEARL. CINCARPAC, COM7THFLT.

CFBX 6132.

Subject is your 260lZ/ concur in your recommendation that whether the

landing in North CHINA be at TAKU or CHllWIANGTAO be lett for deciiion later.
Hencefort h we will reter to TIENTSIN AREA.

AUGUST ( GCT)

347g

Zl 1419 CDlCAFPAC

to

WARCOS (JCS) info CINCPAC ADV. CG US.ASTAF, COMGENIB, COMGEN

CHINA, BRIT JOINT STAFF MISSION.

ex

10320.
The assumption contained in WX 54882, 25 August is correct.

25 1944 JCS to MACAATHUR inte Nll4ITZ, SPAATZ, WHEELER. WEDEMEY.ER, AND BRITISH
JOINT stAFF MISSION.
WARX ;4882.

The British Chiefs of Staf'f nave asked i f their assumption is correct

that the Japanese Commanders will be required to furnish arv- information
required direct~t.o the representatives of the Allied Commander and their

representatives.

Para. We are informing the British Chiefs ot statf that the toregoiag
is correct and that you are acting accordingl;r.

assumptio~J;

3480

2S 1225 COMGENCH~A to CINCAfPAC, CINCPAC into COM7THFLT. CGSOSCT.

CFBX 6228.

Your CX .36.362 it is de.s ired that AK'S and LST'S in original Task Force
93 enter SHANGHAI at earliest practicable date. Preliminary information
given by 1113' representatives reeentl.y in M'ANILA. indicated that necessa.J.7
minesweeping would allow entry on 15 September. Please commeut. Occupation

of SHANGHAI by Chinese Nationalist Troops will proceed on schedule. See

CFBX 5404. For Lattimore. As Port operations will be from. ship to
wharf direct:cy- naval boat~ barge and DUKW crews from IBT 'mEATER are being
~

dropped.

2S 1219 CINCAFPAC to WAR DEPT - C011INCH PASSES TO CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

c 10;26.

Among other minor changes ~e in General. Order Number 1 replying ,..our

WX 55352 is l directing the Japanese to surrender their forces in the
RYUKYUS to CINCAFPAC with Commanding General lOth Art1IT beiDg designated to
receive the local surrender. That officer has been under the command of
CINC~PA.C since August 1 and the designation of CINCPAC to receive the
surrender there would not only be contusing admintstrative4r but would also
controvene the general directive providing that respective local theater
c0l11Dalld.ers receive surrender.

29

0050

OOM7FLT to

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ into OOM7THPHIB.

Your 250759. Expect to meet new advanced target date o f 7 September

for KEIJO landing with lightly armed troops of 7th Division and elements of
24th Corps using shipping immediatel\Y available and follow with heavy
equiJXD.eDt as additional shipping availability permits. 40th. Division should
land KEUJO about 1 October. The date and place of landing the 96 Division
in KOREA are not yet firm.
Para. 24th Corps plan also includes sending a small advance party by'
air to arrive 4 SeptEmber if approved by SCAP and can be negotiated.

29 0751 CINCPAC ADVANCE to 00lf1THFLT info CINCAFPAC, COMGENCHINA, CG SOSCT.

Camneut direct to COMGENCHINA his CFBX 6228 DTG 281225. Re: It is
desired that AK' S and LSTt s in original. Task Foree 9.3 enter SHANGHAI at

earliest practicable date;

3481

... .

29 1357 MOUNTBATTEN SACSEA to CARTON DE WIART MA CHUNGKING info HAROOURT, CTG lll.2.
SAC

./

20299.

With reference to BAAG signal 6420 of 2616JIJ not to CTG lll.2. If you
and Ambassadore see no objection I should like you to give Wedemeyer the
following message from me. "As you know Rear Admiral Harcourt; will take
surrender of HONGKONG as soon as General MacArthur has concluded his surrender meeting in TOKYO and will when Admiral Fraser thinks fit, hand over
:to SEAC forces under Major General Festing. In the meantime the Generalissimo has stated he will not send Chinese Troops to HONGKONG. I have
reports that some small American Units are however planning to enter
HONGKONG by air or overland. ~ I have details
.30 2141 JOnJT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC.

.
WARX 57.346.
The Joint Chiefs of staff prefer not to change the provisions of General
Order Number 1 as approved by th.e. President. Reference surrender procedure
in the RYUKYUS and therefor direct that while the arrangement s now in
progress under the direction of General stilwell JD81' be continued their
execution by stilwell will be subject to the supervision of Admiral Nimitz

.31 0137 cmCAFPAC to COMGEN'CHINA info CG SOSCT, OOM'ZTHFLT(AFIDAT) - INTERCEPI' MESG.

Cite CX lll58.

Entrance SHANGHAI earliest practicable date is desirable

reura.d CFBX 6228 AY exact information respecting progress of minesweepin g

will come from Navy sources. . Original Task Foree 93 now designated Task
Force 74 by 7th Fleet operation Plan 1.3-45
.30 2141 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC BOTH HQ, info CINCLANT, COMWESSEAFRON.

My 191827 refers. Your 20CJ740 approved except those cv S unable transit_

Canal without prior removal gun sponsons are to be routed via CAPE OF GOOD
HOPE or STRAITS OF MAGELLAN depending upon shortest route at time of release .

.31 11.38 CINCPAC AFIDAT to COM3RDFLT info CDICPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Your .310404 approved with the understandi ng that tenure of occupancy of

minor naval bases will be limited to time required to seize or render inoperative the midget submarines and suicide cra.tt. present. Ea.r4r report
on adequacy of' YOKOSAKA airfield

rar

R5D operations desired

.31 1745 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Subject is OCEAN AND NAURU. Following furnished for your information .

Bnitish Chiefs of staff propose "A" NAURU surrender to AUSTRALIAN commander
and ."B" OCEAN surrender to AUSTRALIAN commander acting in behalf of UK in
compa.:ey- wi th a representat ive of the high commissione r for the Western Pac.
u.s. Chiefs of Staff have replied in substance as follows: To interest of
expediting surrender and occupation these islands there is no obj action to
use of AUSTRALIAN forces and shipping provided commander concerned reports
to CINCPA.C for this employment and accepts surrender in his name. Whether
representat ive of CINCPAC is to accompany AUSTRALIAN :forces is left to
CINCPAC discretion.

AUGUST ( GCT)

348?

Nli IT3 QFTLy

ItjLY (OCT)

03 1300 CO..flNCH & CNO '1'0 CINC~-~C .WV: (KING TO NTifrez) (CONT'JYj

"Item 3. ~Vhatever facilities can be afforded under. (1) and (2) above
the First Sea Lord considers it essential that we should have increased
use of 1~ 'lliUS and that ue should be eiven authority to install 1 more Monab
at ")ITYLIU. Some storage for amnrunition at H\NUS is also required. These
additional facilities at EANUS will certainly be required for the forthcoming
o .:erations .
nitem l~. Eagle Farm at BRISBAl'J.ll: is not being used to any extent by US
air forces and is requi red urgently by the BPF to erect a:i.t'craft which are
being shiplJed to \UST&-\LIA.
"Item 5. ~7e can provide some ~600 engineers and 3000 pioneers ( unsldlled
labour) to construct airstrips at any intermediat e base which may be allocate<
for the BPF. In addition to these labour forces we have call on 2500 RAF
constructio nal ~ersonnelwho are the lst echelon of the VLR project and are
novJ on pg.ssage to the Pacific and may 'be available if any delay occurs in
sup orting vrork at OKINf:rA. Ccn it be stated that -the serVimes of those
parties will be required at a forward or intermediat e base.
"It~m 6. A very early rep}Jr vrould be appreciated in cormection vrith
Item 2 since the constructio nal personnel are ~nediately available and
shi~s carrying material now in AUSTRALIA cannot be held and have to be
unloaded now unless allocated elsewhere.n
I

aJ11

making representat ions to General Marshall in corection with Item J.,.

03 2226 JOINT CIITEFS OF Sr::.FF TO !-~ ~C~ffi'rHUR NTIITTZ \ \ND Al.i:NOLD.

1YARX 26350 . EYES ONLY.

1Su~/~~~~<l 3~ 0 .h"il~'l!Z..{"- ~~)1/i3a.H

~7S1 1/I~~0\-

KYOTO, HIR6SHTI.1A, KOKDRA and NIIdATA will not be

attacked by aqy forces under your command unless further directions are issued
by the Joint Chiefs of staff.
Para. Knowledge of the above instruction s vd..ll be limited Ito the minimum
number of -)ersons essential to car~J out the instruction s.
04 0825 BINCPAC ADV TO CINC \FPAC

I request that CO!IFE~ be directed to cancel his 0405l,.O which I consider

to be im~'Jroner and lacldng in military courtesy. Responsibil ity for air
sea rescue o>Jerations within the POA v'lest of Long. 135...00 E has been assigned
by ijl.e to ComFairFing l and my directive must stand until other arrangement s
have been reached betv.reen you and me.
05 0820 CINCPAC 1\.DV TO CINCBPF (NIMI1,Z TO !!RASER)
~~bile I regret the delay in your visit I agree as to the advantage in
conferring after the conference in EUROPE. I a.m holding Hopkins here through
the 6th for conference ~vith Commodore Boak to assist me in making further
recomrnenda tions to .'\dmiral King concerning your increased use of JJLI\NUS.
05 OS15 CIECPAC ADV TO CQliilJCH (ND~ITTZ TO KilJG)
1

Your 031300. Item 1. The anchorages in question will probably be J..J-rrrcE ULITHI
and ENT.T.2:TOK. Item 2. Establishme nt of British shore facilities or use of
British constructio n forces e:.t such anchor ~ises is not recommended. Item 3.
Increased use of !'.,.,~_NUS by BPF is desirable. Cornmo Boak will arrive GUA.M tomorrovr 6 July for cop_ference concerning details. Item 4. CINCPAC agrees. Item 5.
Brit ish constructio n forces are not re~)eat no-t. desired in 1t:11\.RSHAIJ.;..S M1\.RIL\NA.S
C ~ROLIFP.S or PHIIJDPIT Js. Reports on '"ctrrs SHil:l'. indicate desirability t~ ~
the isl3nd over to Bril~ish for development with British resources.
J Lf. 0 .__)

ND~ITZ

ONIY

JUJ.V ~Jltl

05 0655 CINCPAC ADV TO C01ITNCii (NJ2:ITTZ TO YING)

Pa..ra 1. The followinc:: is submitted for consideration in connection nronosals tu1derstood to be before the Joint Chiefs of .Staff for che..nges in command responsibilitie s in the RYUKYUS.
Para 2. The recently ca;tured positions in the OICIN\:JA group are being
develo)ed to meet initially requirements in connection Yiith OLYllPIC and subsequently requirements in connection vrith other operations for the defeat
of J~PAN. The developments include bases for the operation of the tactical
and strategic air forces of the Arnw, a Naval Operating Base for the support
of the Pacific Fleet including airfields for fleet aircraft and also facilities for staging and mounting troops. The Naval Operating Base at OKINA~JA
is vital to the readiness of. the fleet for effecti"\('e supnort of OLYM.t-:JIC.
It is also essential to future fleet onerations in the EAST CHINA SEA YELLO~f
SEA and SEA uF J "..PAl\Jo It vdll be our most western naval base through the
final phases of this war and extending into the oost war period.
Para 3. Plans have now been integrated and the development of the various
base installations and facilities is in progress. A change in overall command
from CINCPAC CIHCFCA to CINCll.FPAC CINCSJT A as understood to be proposed would
be undesirable simply because it 1Yould be a change and the required reorganiza
tion would be inherently vrasteful of much needed time. The development of
OKJ~NA~'J".A during the next few months vdll be best supported by avoiding changes.
The support of future fleet operations including Fleet Air ~rings after OLYlriPIC
vdll be best assured by retention of present command arrangements. Even
though a transfer to CINCAFFAC would facilitate Army operations administration
and logistics in the immediate future, naval operations administration and
logistics would suffer nov\r and during the foreseeable future.
Para 4. If however a change is decided upon it is recommended that it be
based on the follovring principles:

A. CINCAFPAC to assume responsibility for the local grolind and air

B.

c.
D.
E.
F.

G.

defense and military government of the OKINA~'JA Group. CINCPAC to

retain responsibility for the naval defense as at present.
CINCPAC to retain direct corrunand and control of the Naval Operating
Base including the Yraters of BUCKlf.ii:R BAY and the shores thereof and
the naval and marine airfields at YONABARU CHJJ.,IU A~:vASE and the islcmd
of TSUGEN .SHiliA.
CINCPAC to retajJl direct operational control of naval forces based
in the RYUKYUS including Fleet Air W'ing 1.
CINCPuA to retain control and responsibility for the sea areas now
in the Pacific Ocean Areas.
CINCPAC to retain' direct control of units of the Fleet Marine Force
end naval construction t:roops in the HYUh.'11JS except as t.hey m.ay 'be
passed by him to the tem")orary control of the Isla.nd Commander to
assist in island defense and general island development.
CINC?.:~c to retain O')erationcl control of the naval communications
faciliti_es and navc.l radio stations excent as he m.ay nass tb.em to
local control by the Island Commo.nder for joint use under arran.e;ements
agreed to by CIHCF ~.C ..
Naval ~>ersonnel and resources to be released by the Ar~:1y Island
Command as r apidly a s :pos s i bl e under t he con cept of JCS 032140 of
- 'Jii.l 19h5 ..

3484

09

0fS57

rro

CC:,illJCH. (NIMITZ to KING)

\;
~~
/
I do not know what prompted CIHCAFPAC 'S 090057 at this time. It appears
to substitute ttat all tiruestt for 11 in case of e.xigenciest1 The _hrase objected
to ap~1eared also on :p.:3.ge 10 of my prellin.i..Yla_ry" draft of J.3 May and has not
before been objected to. The language irruuediat~:cy preceding was drafted by
CINC~PAC and incor_')orated in our agreement of 16 Eay.
The natter should be
of little consequence but I am disturbed by the implications. I shall rna.lce
no renly pending receipt of your commento You may have information as to
background 1tJhich is not available to me.
t.;INCPAC ADV

09 Q920 CI: CPOA lillV TO COHINCH. (ND,1TIZ TO KTIJG)

I am deferring action on certain matters corm~ction OKilJ HA until future

corru-,and status is settled. J. ccordingly request I be informed if it is deaided
to let present arra.ngenents stand,.

09 1035 QIIJC '0A ADV rl:O COMINCH & CNO. (N:C iiTZ TO IITIIG)
\

CNO 052055. Reco .unend no repeat no change in category defense or COL'1IY1.8J1d

arrangements in . --iLEtJ'
.
..:IANS at this time because of :;ossible requirer.nents incident to Russian entry into vvar.
09 2010 CIDl(L,JCH & CNO TO CINC?.AC . WV. (KING TO NIITTZ)

It ap_)ears to me tha 1st part of last sentence on page _16 referred to in

:?AC 'S CX 24142 and in your 090057 was not entirely necessary particular-

en C_"

ly in the light oi the :i.JnnlBdiately preceding rya,ragraph.

The last ')art '"rvho

then assumes cort~nand c.nd responsibility for the cam)a.ign in J \PA.tJ" does ')l"'esem
a basis for ')ro:)er objection, and for that reason should be 1'vi thdravm. There
is a continuing responsibility vested in CINC.\FPAC. Hovrever nincludmg conjJrol
in case of exigencies, of the actnal amphibious assault n is intended to apply
only in those cases in wh-i.ch exigencies or emergencies arise during the actual
am.phibious assaults being executed against hostile beaches.

Your CX 2411!2 DrG 090057 The sentence referred to l.rill be deleted incident to the next revision of nw Joint Staff Study OLYllFIC uhich 1:Till be
issued after the co1lferenee referred to in your 090215 and my l0021B. However it is Iny tmderstanding that uincluding control, in case of exigencies
of the act ua1 runJhibious assault u is intended to apply o11J.y in those cases
in uhich exigencies or emergencies arlse during the actual aniphibious assaults
being executed against hostile beaches.

348 .~

JULY

11 OlDl JOINT CHIE~S Of\ STAFF TO JtACARTHTJR. NIMITZ. SPAAr z.

WARX ?!W/8.

JCS have this date approved the following directive:

J.. 1he War Department has established an air CODID&llcl designated nu. S."
Arsv ~tegi.c Air Forces (USASrAF) 11 consisting initial.ll' ot those combat

and service units assigned to or operating with the 2oth AF, the Hq and Hq
Sqdn, 8th AF, and other elaaeut,s aubsequent:q to be mtua.J.:Qr agreed upon by
CINCAFPAC, CDICPAC and the CoDinarlding General, USASTAF, or as prescribed by
higher authorit7:
2.

ComGentJSASTAF is charged witb. the

responsibility for the conciuct

ot land based strategic air operations against JAPAN with the object ot accelll-:

plishing the progressive destruction and dislocation of JAPAN~s militar.r,

industrial and ecCilt"Gdc systems to a point where her capacitJ' .tor ar.d resistance is fatal.q weakenect. He will collaborate with CINCAFPAC and CIHCPAC
in such strategtc air operations of ArJv Air Forces or Rav carrier based
air forces as CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC mq elect to conduct. This responsibil1t7
will be discharged in accordance with directins which han been or which
ma:r be issu.e4 fraa time to time by the JCS through the ComGen, Arlq Air Forces

as eDCUtiw apnt

3. COIDGEilUSA.srAF Will continue operati0Jl8 to support; the accomplishment ot

the overall objective to dateat JAPAN and will cooperate with CINCAFPAC a.ncl
CINCPAC .i n the preparation and execution of plans . for the invasion ot JAPA!f~;

4..

~SASTAF will be responsible for the iDternal administration ard

internalloglstical support; of all forces assigoed to USAS'f.AF and will present
his requirements tor theater logistical supporli to CIBCAFPA.C . and CIHCPAC raspectivel.l", as ~ USASTAF will be acDinistered as directed b7 the War
ne~rtment. CIHCAFPAG and CINCPAC are charged with the respoasibility ot
et#ing CG USASrAF!.s logistic requirements subject to the overall avai.laJ:d11t7
of resources

5. A headquarters will be designated to discharge the tunctioo.s of AAFFOA

which are not assumed under the provisions ot this dtrectil'e by' USASTAF .-~
The tranBter ot functions will be subject to agreement between CIHCAFPAC,
CINCPAC and OOUGEB USASTAF

6. All understandings,

cQIID.i.tmsnts, agreements and directives with reference

to the 20th AF will remain in effect and app] to USASrAF until amended or
rescinded by' the appropriate authority.

7. Coauanders concerned will implcent this directive as

possible without interference with current operations.

s.

upeditious~

as

D:Lreetiws in conflict with the above are modified acco~

'~

348t

l l 0101 J"OI NT CHIEFS OF fJ .C fUrF

1

~7AFL"'C

29978.

SPAATZ.

The JCS have this date ap~Jroved the following directive:

l. The War Dei)ctrtment has established an air com'11B.nd designa;ted uu.s.
Arrey- Strategic Ji.ir Forces (USASTAF) H consisting initially of those combat and
service units assigned to or operating with the 20th .AF, the Hq an.d Hq Sqdn,
8th AF, and other elernents subsequently to be mutually agreed upon by CIECAFPAC
CINC 1:AC a.:;.'ld the Comi1k"Uld:i.ng Genera, us;~sTAF, or as .~..Jrescribed by higher authority.
.
2~
ComGenUSASTJlF is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct
of lru1d based strategic air operations against JAPAN vdth the object of accomlJlishing the ')regressive destruction and dislocation of JAP.:\.J"Jl S military,
industrial and economic systems to a point Yfhere her capacity for ann.ed
resistance is fataD vreakened. He ld.ll collaborate vdth CilJCAFPAC and CI:rJCPAC
in such strategic air operations of Army Air Forces or Na~J carrier based air
forces as C1NCAFPAC and CINCPAC may elect to conduct. This responsibility
vdll be discharged in accordance' rd_th directives which have been or which may
be issued from time to t:Lrne by the Joint Ch:ie fs of Staff through the Commanding C-Bneral, Army Air Forces as executive agent.

3. ComGenUSASTAF rdll continue operations to sup]ort the accomplishrnent of

the overall objective to defeat JAPAN and will cooc:J erate with CINC..tlFPAC and
CINCPAC in the preparation and execution of plans for the imrasion of JAPAN.
4. ComGenUSASTAF vdll be responsible for the internal adw.inistration and
internal logistical sup)ort of all forces assigned to USASTAF and rdll present
his requirements for theater logistical support to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC respectively, as required. USASTAF will be adnli.nistered as directed by the War
Department. CINCAF.PAC and CINCPAC are charged vJith the responsibility of
meeting CG USAST.A.Fts logistic requirements subject to the overall availability
of resources.
'
5. A h~~dquarters ~v.ill be designated to discharge the functions of AAFPOA
vJhich are not assuraed under the :Jrovisions of this clirective by USAST .AF.
The transfer of functions will be subject to agreement between CINCAFPAC,
CINCPAC and COMwNDSASTAF

6. All understandings, commitments, agreements and directives with reference

to the 2oth AF TJ'ill remain in effect and apply to USASTi'Ji' until amended or
rescinded by the appropriate authority.
7. Commanders concerned vrill implement this directive as e~)editiously as
possible -;:Jithout interference iiv"i.th current operations.
8. Directives in conflict viith the apove are modified accordingly.

10 2347 JOII\IT CHIEFS OF S1,"4FF' TO

l.~ACllittTHUR, NDITTZ II\TFO ,JEDKLITER,EMMONS , &11.NOLD.

WARX 299U.
.
.
Plan PASTEL as agreed at conferences between "your representatives and
Joint Security Control in Washington is approved. Para 5 B (4) of the plan
calls for an annex. setting forth details of specific responsibility and timing
of the strategic o:;::>erational deception and special deception measures to
implement PASTEL. It is suggested that you hold conference of planning and
comn:runi.cations represent ative s of all addressees in order that this annex
may be ex,)editiously Jl"epared and coordinated.

3487

IiT ~IT6 O]LY

J ULY (GCTl
.11 2335
.. \...I T) If' ADV m')
l.\J CC"' ::
~ ~7ffi"Ci'T
'
5- CT~-T,.,
~ .~T
4

..J.j,\J

ll 2335

(I rr I'.T'l.

L.J

m10 F.~-'"
~rx
.L.a.t.LH.,.w.l
X
...

My 020152 and your 030515. The continued e:Ldstence of the remaining Ja~a
nese 11:1val forces Jnake s it necessary to use on defensive rrrl.ssions larger
nav2.l forces than vrould ot:1errrise su.ffice. The re:-cining heavy enemy ships
must be eliminated nrior to OLYMPIC and this elimination is the responsibility
of the Pacific Fleet. If t!AGITO ILuUNA I.SE HYUGA and other im'3orlant enemy
vessels are still in being and KEELBLCCKS 4 is ordered our escort recruiremerr'cs
1~"iil be la.rger than need other'lid se beo
...

11 0030 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO WEDnlEYER, NIMITZ, MACARTHUR INFO KINKAID. _

WARX 2!]972.
With reference to the FORI' BAYARD supplemental suppJ.;r project for CHINA,
there remain additional factors of intereA to the JCS en which further anion
appears necessarr. fhese include the amhange of additional information,
with information copies to the JCS on:

(l) Wedeyerts estimate of eneli\V' air capabilities and waluation as to

nf'ficienq of available comrter measure;
(2) Informati(B on m.inetields; and
(.3) EarlieSt 4onsidered estimate of umloading time requ1recl for FORT

BAYARD.

To eaable JCS te evaluate cost of contiml:lng aupp]T througll FORT BAY~

subsequeut to S cargo shipa nor~ scheduled, it is desired that CDICPA~ after

1 v.l.necessary cODS11lta\1ou with CINCAFPAC and C:G CHINA Theater1 submit h1s
on naval resources required. For plamdng purposes, it will be assumed that
.3 cargo ships per month will toll the lst 5.
At such tiE as adeqU.ate into:rmation becomes available to WedefJTer, the

JCS .desire him t,o submit complete plan for the FORT BAYARD supplemental 81:lPPl7
project to mclucle: lq'drographie illfo:naation, aid tor dischargillg cargo J1MCI..
ed f'r<la ou.tside CHINA-Bt.JRMA-niDIA Theater, unload.i.Dg tiae fer ships, AA d..
tenses for FORT BAYARD, target date, air support; plau and enemy and allied
m:i.D.e fields.

l3 C1747 CINCPAC ADV TO OOJW!CH. (NIMITZ TO KING ONtr)

JI.T cOIIIilents em JCS JJIJ6/2 drafted ill form. tor general use are transmitted
aeparatel.7. If you must acquiesce in givillg .ArJv control owr their projects

and can. get no better settlement paragraph 4 ot fliT 05()6;; represents the
absohlte miDimum with which we can operate auecesstw.:IT. You should knOll'
that General. lfacArth\lr and General Kenney are Tirt~ in control of their OKINAwA projects now aaeral Kenner is obviousll' operating c the asS'QIIJ'tic
that JCS 1406 as originally proposed is or soon will be approved. I shall
i t possible avoid disagreeable incidents with him but aD earq decision .-....-......... . .
be he~ptul in that regard. I ban confidence in Sliilwell and he is opt....,.....~ ~
as to unloading and base development. Price will take atter our HOB on

Jlicy"e

..

~
. .
,

...

'.

l4 fYT23 CIRCAPPAC TO cnroPOA.

Mv, WAlteos INFO c:mc

AND MARSHA.I.L DlFO .KING

ct 2S423

.~

us FIEE'l.
~

~ ,

(MACARTHUR TO

marz

~4 I have been concerned for sane tilDe with regard to the uecution ot
the directive set forth in JCS 1259/4. 'l'his directive required a transfer
of ArtrJy and NayY" resources as apeditiousJ as possible untU each eervice
was under the control of ita own service CQDmalJ4erl 1'he .fundamental. purpose
was to rearrange the CODJDaad qat in the Pacii'lc to facilitate the -.r
against JAPAN and it mat have been the intent that this rearrangement be
effected prior to the launching of the decisive campaigns This di.rectiTe '
specificalJ.l' indicated that contlictimg provisions ot existing directives
to CINCPOA and CINCSWPA are moditied accord:i.n&J.T" With thia interpretation
~mind, TOU _will recall I sent staff representatives to GU.AK in mid-April
to explore the general problem and determine procedures to compq nth JCS
directions. This conference was nCJt fruitful because of the ditterences in
our respectiw interpretations of the JCS directive; In response to ~
radio lh02;o GCT April in which 7ou proposed to turn over a4Dinistrative bat
no operational control or ArfrJT forces in your area I accepted in ratio ex
14288 as a 1st step in caupliance with instructions, but stated that great.r
control. Of krn13" resources wolU.d be required by me: This reJ>ll' took into
consideration that under the operating ptoced.ures in Pacific Ocean Areas aa
abrupt reversion or resources to appropriate service control in certain i.stances was imctvisablee- I JII'OP08ed in D\V' CI 14288 to tum over at once all
Naval resources under JJU" comnand to you This was resented for the reasons
set forth in your al0344 GC'l' Aprn.. '!here have been DUIII8rous exchanges of
radiograms between you and uveelf' concerning se);erate features of this general.
problem, but the resultant effect as it applies to the e~liance with the
JCS directive has been disappointillg.Qr meager: en several occa.._. 7'* have
quoted certain directions which were issued prior to JCS 1259/4 and which
70\1 -D8lleved wre not moditied b7 JCS l2.S9/4 irrespective of the quote
given earlier in tbis radio. In this belief I do not concur
4 ' Three and one-halt months have DCM' elapsed since the issuance of the JOS
directive and' I fiDd that there has been transterred to 1fiT full ccmtrol the
7th Air Force, 9th Corps Hdqtrs, 4 ,IntDLvs, and a spriDlcl.hg ot combat and
service support troops, with administrative .control onq of other units, a
control completel1' ineffective in so tar as the tundam.ental concept or the
directive of the JCS is eoncemed. There remain Wlder your control General
Richardson s Bdq,lra, ~ of lf11' main echelons ot co.umand in the Pacitic, an
ArtrJy hdqtra, a Corps H~rs, and numerous ground, combat and service support
units estimated to aggregate upon arrival of redeployed units between 325,000

and

3:

350,000 troops;.

It has become increa~ embarrassing for me to plan future operations

with . the A.rm3' resources ot ..the Pacific whea I am denied the authoritY' to c~
trol the relative priority of their retention at various locations or deter-:
mine the relative importance of their requirement in ccmpariaon with their
need for the invasion ot JAPAN. I J!llst necessari4' under the existing circuJil-
stances resort; to negotiations for each individual unit with you, causing
great aciDi.Distrative labor and d.elq. n etermination of the Arrtla' redeplO)'JD8Dt
requirements of resonrces from EUROPE and the U:s without a knowledge of the
detailed euapJ.GJmeut or need for the resources now ill the Pacific ill- y-our area
is little better than an educated guess, with the inevitable result that auy
unnecessar.r movent of resources into the Pacific will cause a dispersion
and waste of the critical shipping means of the u.s.: This situation has been
exemplified in the last ff!JW days in a conference of various officers throUghout the Pacific to surV'8T our deficiencies as relates to the support of the
- C<mtitmed. -

348 9

v
, 17 \/f23 V!CA!PAC TO OmcPOA ADV :UQ, WARCOS INFO CINC US FtEEl' (CO:N'l'INUED)

20th Air Force~ ibis cont'erence a attend.ed b7 42 ottieera ot var.tc>ua

organizations. The solutions accepted at the conclusion of this conference
necessarily reflect the maze ot contl.icting and complicated comand arrangements and leave uncerta.i.tlty and contusions in 118JJ1'. minds'
. 4. B7 7C1R11' OS0,301 GCT Jucy you indicate a need for the naval resoarees of
the Pacific te be more close4r controlled by' you ill order to launch the
operations against JAPAN. I likewise need a closer control onr the A1gy
resources ot the Pacific to .tuJ..q perform JfiT tUDCtions I consider that the
time has now come tor final accomplishrilent of the JCS directive concurreat]3
with consideration of your 000.301 Juq. 'l'h:i.s woald involve:
(A) A plan tor the ftrn over of ArrrrT resoUrces in tile Pacitic to ~J.FPAO.
(B) A determiDaticn ot the localities to be transferred c the basis' ot
pa.ramourt;

iaterest

(C) . The establishment of prqcedures whereby operational control of the

forces ot each service may be placed. under CIBCStPA or CI!ePOA to cOl'ldnct
operations as apecitical.J directed by the JCS from time to tiDe.:
(D) A target date tor completioD ot the above ,
.
5~ U .7ou are DOW preJ8Nc1 to cti.scuse the full implED.entation of the JCS
direetiw., it is suggested that a conference ~ arrangecL;; It# however., 70'1
are of the opiDion that these are irreconc1lab1e poiirts ot v.Lew, I feel that
thev should DOW be presented to the JCS tor decisioa.

14 0.304 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGEIJ US FORCES CHINA INFO CINCAFPAC. {!liJ([TZ TO WEDEMEYER INFO
MACARliHDR)

Your l2lDJ.S. It woulci ~e ax:treme:Q- helpful in elar.i.fying our plana aDd

concepts or tuture operations i t you or your repreatative could Yisit JV
headq~ers at GUAll to Giscuss naval support of your operations al.ong the
CHIHA Coast and the emplOJIIlent at fleet units to exercise control of the sea
areas adjacent to the Coast of CHINA. If ,-ou find such a rlsit feasible
I 1l'ill invite GeaemlllacArthur to send a representative alsoe
16 lll9 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ
....r

c 25992

In view of your 150720 I doubt that at1Y' practicable resu.lt ean eventuate
from. another conference on a theater level ani therefore prefer to leave
alf3' further clarification if they- so desire in the hands of the Joint Chiefs
of staff.

3490

--.

NIMITZ ~1LY
JULY (GCT)

18 1409 JOINT CHIEFS OF

V73

BG152

STAFF to
'

CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC ADV HQ Info AGWAR, NAVY DEPT.

.

TOP SECRET. From JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR and NIMITZ. In order
to .facilitate preparation .for and execution of OLYMPIC, CINCPAC and
CINCAFPAC will arrange to transfer to CINCAFPAC at the earliest practicable
date and not later than 1 August control of u.s.-held areas in the RYUKIUS,
all u.s. Army forces located in the RYUKnJS, including lOth Arn\Y, responsibility for defense of the u.s.-held positions, and responsibil ities
pertaining to USST units now vested in CINCPAC.
CINCPAC will retain responsibil ity for and control of all naval
and naval air installation s and deveJ.opment projects in the RYUKYUS, the
movement or naval forces and supplies into the area, and harbor and
unloading facilities therefor as shall be mut~ agreed to between
them. Control ot all u.s. Naval forces in the RYUKIUS will be vested in
CmCPAC.

Para.

l8 1212

JOINT CHIEfS OF STAFF to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info ClNCAfPAC. AQNAR, NAVI

DEPr. V6b BG.l45

TOP SEX;m."T. From JOINT CH:iliFS Oft, 6'TAFF to NllfiTZ. For your information
pertinent extracts of CINCAFPACs C-24215 of 9 Ju:cy have been passed to
the British Chiefs of staff at CCS 17 July 1945, the Joint Chiefs of
staf'.t accepted in principle the use of British Canmonwealth forces .tor
employment in the main operations against JAPAN. The .s ubstance of the
British proposal was covered in WAR 28Z74 of 7 J~ to MACARTHUR,copy 1
of which War Department Will repeat to CINCPAC together with CINCAFPAC s
rep4", C-24215 ot 9 July. The acceptance in principle of the u.s.
Chiefs of staff pertained o~ to ground foraes. The British proposal
as regards a tactical air canponent was left as a matter for further
discussion. The Joint Chief's of staff further approved the British
request to dispatch an Army corps commander to the Pacific to consult
'With CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC on the various factors involved in the employment of British Commonwealth f'orces and to submit recommendations
as a result of such conferences . It is lmderstood that air and naval
officers will accanpany the corps eanmander. It is requested that
CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC indicate when this visit can be convenientl y
made.

Para. Although decision has not been made, the British Chiets of Sliat.t
indicate they have. under consideratio n the use of the 8th Indian Division
f'rom ITALY which had a notable record in the Italian campaign, and is
therefore acclijmaled , the 2nd or 36th Divisions (both British) now in
SEAC, as well as veberan .N:EW ZEALAND, CANADIAN and AUSTRALIAN divisions.
The British Divisions are not included in the SIOOAPORE campaign. Due
to improbabili ty of reequipping British, Indian and Australian divisions
the Ca.na.dian division with u.s. equipnent would probab.cy operate in a
u.s. corps. Plans have not developed to the point oherp decision !!! be
taken on the composition of the forces.

3491

19 0041 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CINCroA~

WDCMC SVC 15259.

Followins is rel.q of War 28Z74 dated 7 Jucy to MacArthur fran

Marshall. British parliicipa tion in the invasion of JAPAN is subject.
ID addition to the British Pacific Fleet and VLR force of . ~. squadrons ,
the British now propose that the VLR force be increased to 2o squadrons
a~ a later date when more airfieldsbecome available , and that a British
torce ot 3 to 5 British, Indian and Dominion divisions participa te in
CORONET under American Camma.n<il. The British do noli give source of these
divisions but some or all are apparent4 " expected to be released af'ter
the capture of SINGAPORE, scheduled for November 1945. They would also
be carried in British ships, provided with the necessary assault li.tt and
supported by the East Indies Fleet augmented by the British Pacific Fleet
if' necessary and by a tactical air force ot some lS s<iuadrons. The
British have made the 3 following specific suggestio ns as to the use of
this .force:
A. A force of 1 or possibly 2 divisions in the assault, together with 2
or 3 divisions in the build-up, administr atively large~ self-supp orting.
B. A force of .3 divisions in the assault and immediate follow-up and 1
or possibly 2 divisions in the build-up, re:cying, to a considera ble
degree, on American administr ative assistanc e.
c. A force of up to 5 divisions in the build-up administr atively large)T
self-supp orting.
British prefer a course which allows them to take a part in the
assault. Simul.taneousl,y with CORONET the British would maintain pressure
from BURMA toward SIAM and additional:cy' might conduct amphibiou s operation~
against SIAM, JAVA, SUMATRA or HONGKONG. Request for use at the coming
conferenc e your initial comments by 9 J~ on this proposal, follovred by
any more detailed comments you wish to make. It is evident that the use
of these British Divisions should replace u. s. Divisions to the same
number. Such a course would meet with wide public approval from the
viewpoint of-lessen ing the requireme nts of u. s. soldiers, expec~
on the part of the articulat e who assail British and ATFDCK administr ation
for non-parti cipation of allies in conquest of JAPAN, etc. Request
your views include comment en command and control arrangeme nts.
Now begins answer to preceding War message. C 24215 from. CINCAFP AC
"From GHQ SWPA sgd MacArthur to WAROOS for MARSHALL cite C 24215. Msg
is TOP SECRET. The scope of the British' proposal for participa tion in
CORONEr, replying your W 28Zl4, presents problems not heretofor e encountered when the CANADIAN and FRENCH contingen ts were considere d. 'l'hese
pr.obJ.ems must be viewed in their proper prespective as they relate to the
specific operation in contempla tion unless complexit y, particular~ as
applies to Logistics , and lack of homogene ity of forces dest~ combat
effective ness or require a de~ in target date. This operation , at
present visualize d as being launched across beaches on the 2 sides of
laANC:FliOOD BAY, is confialid to narrow limits. There will be no opportunity to assign separate sectors of .responsi bility along national lines .
'rhe assault is to be made into heavily defended areas and calls for the
closest coordinat ion of air, naval and groundl forces, and within the

3492

"I
)

19 0041 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CINCPOA ( Continu eql

ground forces themselv es. Acceptan ce of the British in the assault with
the differen ces in organiz ation, composi tion, equipme nt, training proce~
and doctrine s will complic ate command, operatio ns and logistic support; .
Redeployment geared to the support; of HOMOGENEOUS forces and now well
advanced , would have to undergo a large scale readjust ment, particular~
t&ki.ng into conside ration a paralle l line or British logistic channel s,
includin g separate bases, storage , issuance and mainten ance faciliti es,
and personn el therefo re. The changes in redeploy ment alone will have .
world wide effect and is apt to cause confusio n. British forces particip ating in operatio ns against SINGAPORE in November could not be prepared
for the assault phase in CORONET. It is consider ed doubtfu l that these
forces could particip ate even in the follCNI-up. Cert~, to utilize
conside rable numbers of troops without adequate opportu nity on the part:,
of higher commanders of this area to exercise command function s prior to
their use would be a most dangerou s expedie nt. Moreover, it would be
entire]J ' unsatisf actory to hS.ve the availab ility of troops schedule d
for CORONET depende nt in any way upon their release from another campaign. Availab ility of these troops as well as all others committe d
must be certain tor a fixed date. Bearing the above in 'mind, it is
consider ed that ~ solution in the use of British troops must discourage their employment in the assault and the establish ment for them of
a separate logistic al chain. Conside red solel;r from the standpo int of
public approva l, the ollCW1ing general plan is suggeste d as being one
which will obviate the full impact or the objectio nable features indic.a .ted above. This plan takes into conside ration previous communications
relating to the use or Australi an forces as well as Canadian forces.
A. Limit British ~pire particip ation to 1 corps of 3 division s; 1
British, 1 Canadian , and 1 Austral ian.
B. Re-equip British divisd.on and corps troops and Australi an division
with American equipme nt, logistic support to be provided by the United
states on the same scale as provided for our troops.

c.

The Austral ian division to be either the 7th or 9th Division , now
concent rated in the BORNED-MOROTAI area.
D. Require British division and corps troops to be concent rated by 1st
December in the BORNEO-MOROTAI area or as an altemat e, in the United .
states, i f these units can be equipped there.
E. Amphibiously train 1 British divisicn and 1 Canadian division prior
to arrival in concent ration area. The Australi an division is already
amphibi ously trained .
F. Lift this corps on assault shipping to be provided by the British
to arrive in the objectiv e area about Y plus 10. It will there be

3492

NIMITZ ONLY
JULY (GCT)

19 0041

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCR>A (continue d)

used as the AFPAC Assault Reserve Afloat. Canadian division to be
lifted direct:cy- from the Uni. ted States, Australia n division from the
BORNEO-MOROTAI area, and British div-lsion and corps troops from either
area depending on where it is concentra ted.
G. Fight this corps as an integral corps within a United states aney-.
Reserve the privilege to utilize divions separatez y within American
corps if the exigencie s of the situation so demand. I doubt the
advisabi lity of employing troops of native origin in this canplex
operation where homogene ity of language wi.thin the corps is required.
Likewise, there is a question of the advisabil ity of utilizing troops
of tropical origin iri a temperate zone without an extended period of
accl.imat ization. Hence, the acceptanc e of Indian troops is not concurred
in. The British elivision should be Anglo-Sax on. The foregoing comments
are equ~ applicabl e to .Allled Air componen ts, aggravate d by the difficulties of integrati ng relative4 ' small air forces in tactical operations under the restrictio ns imposed by a comparati vely limited air
deploymen t potential . There are ample American air forces in or projected for this area to support; all troops in CORONET operation s..
Therefore , I re~ammend that the offer of the British tactical squadrons
be declined and acceptanc e of the proposed increase in British veey
long range squadrons be delayed until the availabil ity of more airfields
is assured. Althowzh not Inentioned tn ~ur radipgram it~ is Dre1wn.ed
that you have consiaere d that extens~ve
augmeiitat!:on Of Alliea. errort
in the Pacific, including components from the various . forces, Jn83" cause
a demand for the' establishm ent of an overall command under CCS control
similar to that employed in EUROPE.

20 1407

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH

Confirmat ion is requested of m::r understan ding that JCS 181409 ves:t;s
in CINCAFPAC responsib ility for Military Government in the RYf:IKYUS.

21 0810

CINCFQA ADV HQ to COMGEN USASTAF.

To clarify logistic planning request you obtain definitio n of
"External logistica l support". and ninterna.l logistiea .l support n as
used in JCS despatch 110101 WARX 29978 paragraph 4.

21 1415

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARrHUR, NIMITZ, WEDEMEYER, AglAR info NAVY

1
VICTORY 169 BG 248 or your informati on the combined chiefs of
staff on 20 July approved the following directive to the SUpreme Allied
Commander, Southeast Asia with the understan ding that the British Chiefs
of staff' would take steps to obtain the agreement of the DTJl'CH, NEW
ZEALAND, and AUSTRALIAN governmen ts to the proposed reallocat ion of
areas and command setup in Southeast ASIA and Southwest Pacific.
Directive begins.
Para 1. Your primary task is the opening of the STRAITS OF MALACCA
at the earliest possible moment. It is also intended that British
, 3 <"'t1! 9r.,

... continued -

21 1415

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NlMITZ, WEDEMEYER, AGNAR info NAVY.

Commonwealth Land Forces should take part in the main operation s against
JAPAN which have been agreed as the SUpreme operation s in the war; and
that operation s should continue in the outer zone to the extent that
forces and resources permit.
BOUNDRIES OF COMMAND
Para 2. The Eastern boundary of your command will be extended to
include BORNEO, JAVA and the CELEBES.
Para. Full details of this extension are contained in the appendix.
Para .3. Further informati on will be sent to you regarding INDO-CHINA.
Para 4. It is desirable that you assume command of the additiona l
areas as soon as practicab le after the 15th August, 1945. You will
report to the Combined Chiefs of staff the date on which you expect to
be in a position to undertake this additiona l responsi bility.
Para 5. From tha:t date, such DOMINION and DUTCH FORCES as mq be
operating in your new area will come under your command. They will,
h011ever, continue to be based on AUSTRALIA.
Para 6. The area to the east of your new boundary will be an
AUSTRALIAN COMMAND under the British Chiefs of, staff.
BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN MAIN OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN
It has been agreed in principle that a British Commonwealth
7.
Para
from 3 to 5 divisions and, if possible, a small tactical
of
land force
air force should take part in the main operation s against JAPAN in the
spring of 19~. Units of the EAST INDIES FI.Elm' ~ also take part.
Certain important factors relating to this are still under examinati on.
Para 8. You will be required to provide a proportio n of this force
together with the assault lift for 2 divisions . The exact compositi on
of this force and its role and the moWlting and supportin g arrangeme nts
will be discussed between Admiral Nimitz~ General MacArthur and the
British force commanders, and will receive final approval by the Combined Chiefs of staf'.
Para 9. The requireme nts or the force taking part in the main
operation s against JAPAN must have priority over all the other tasks
indicated below.
OPmATIONS m THE OUTER ZONE
Para 10. SUbject to the fu.li'illme nt of the higher priority
commi.ttments given above, you will, within the limits of available

resources , carry out operation s assigned to:

SUbPara. !:-comple te the qberatio n of MAL!!!.
SubPa.ra B. Maintain pressure on the Japanese across the BURMASIAM frontier.
Sub Para C. Capture the key areas of SIAM.
&ubPara D. Establish bridgehea ds in JAVA and/or SUMATRA to
enable the subsequen t clearance of these areas to be undertake n in
.due course.
Para 11. You will' submit a programme of operation s to the Canbined
Chief's of Staff as soon as you are in a position to do so.
DEVELOPMENT OF BASES
Para 12. You will develop SINGAPORE and such other bases as you
- continued -

34' qr
v'

"

- continued 21

1415

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, WEDEMEYER, AGNAR info NAVY.

require to the exl;ent necessary for operations against the Japanese.

Directive ends. Appendix Begins.

EASTERN BOUNDARY OF COMMAND

Para. Beginning on the coast of I~HINA at 15 degrees north;

thence through the BALABAC STRAIT along the 193 9 boun$.ry line
between the PHILIPPINES arid BORNEO to latitude 05 degrees norlh, thence
eastward to 05-00 north - 12&-00 east, thence southwestward to 02...(X) south
123-00 east; ;thence sou:theastward to OS-00 south - 125-00 east; thence
southwestward to J.S-{)0 south - 110-00 east end of directive and appendix.
TOP -SECREI'
NIMITZ ONLY
JULY

xoo;o

211820

25 0830

COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC/CINCPOA BOTH HQ . info COMINCH AND CNO ADMIN.

Understanding contained in your 201JIJ7 is confirmed.

CINCAFPAC to COMANF info COMINCH, CmCPAC ADVANCE HQ.
CX 2S196 authority granted
violations of existing
for
inspect
and
board
intercept,
your ~810 to
are discovered Hospital.
violations
f
i
port
into
bring
to
and
conventions
Ship TACHIBANA MARU.
Eyes only for Kinkaid, King and Nimitz.

25 0906

cmCPAC ADVANCE HQ to

CIN~PAC

PEARL HQ.

Nimitz to Towers only. Obtain from COMAIRPAC and send to me in

this s.ystem his nomination 6 escort carriers with 2 Flag Officers to
concentrate in MARSHALlS in near future for use in KEELBLOCKS 4 i f
required. Also wam COMSERVPAC to be continttal:cy" prepared on short
notice nominate SERVPAC tmits listed page 6 ray serial 0005067 of 26
May. Utmost secrecy directed.

NIMITZ ONLY
JULY (GCT)

/ 26 1946

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ info SPAA.TZ, AGWAR, NAVY DEPT.

BG 412 V 357

..

Coordinatio n of plans for the procedure to be followed in the event

of Japanese govermental surrender is now a pressing necessity. Early
information is desired regarding the conference reported to be in progress
at GUAM on this subject.
Para. It appears to the JOINT (,'HIEFS OF STAFF that in such event
immediate naval occupation of critical parts of JAPAN is desirable to
include in each case, if practical, an operational airfield to facilitate
communicati on and permit airborne troop landings.
Para. It also appears to JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF that it would be
high:cy desirable for similar procedure to be followed on the AS.LA1~
MAINLAND in following order or priority: SHANGHAI, FUSAN IN KOREA,
CHEFOO, and CHINffiVANGTAO on the MANCHURIAN BORDER. Also that preliminary
landings on ASIATIC continent might best be carried out by Marines. A
landing at TAKU to permit the blocking of the critical communicati on
points of PEIKING-TSINTSIEN would be more desirable that at CHINCW/ANGTAO
but probably is impractical from the viewpoint of Naval Craft. The
Joint Chiefs o'f Staff do not desire to become involved in the campaign in
CHINA on the mainland other than by air, but it is considered highly
desirable to seize the ports in order better to facilitate the reoccupatio n
of the country by CHINESE Forces. The occupation of the north tip of
FORMOSA would be a great aid to air operation and communicati on to JAPAN
and CHINA.
Para. There appears to be a necessity for an early decision as to
tpe movement of divisions of the 1st Army now in the United States,
particular:cy as concerns complicatio n regarding their equipment now
enroute to PHILIPPINES. It might be desirableto route some of these
divisions directly to JAPAN as follow up units, thus avoiding the shipment of divisions from the PHILIPPINES for the same purpose.
Para. The formal surrender or enforced submission of the Japanese
government will be received jointly by General MacArthur and Admiral
Nimitz or their designated representat ives. In order th~t there may
be a continuity of policy of procedure in dealing with Japanese Imperial
Headquarter s or its ministries, representat ives of CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC
will jointly perform this function until GINCAFPAC has actually landed
in JAPAN and personally assumed this responsibil ity. The foregoing
provisions will not be allowed to interfere with conduct of local
surrenders by naval or other u. s. Commanders concerned.

349

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC, COM:SERVPAC info CTIJCFQA PEARL HQ.

28 0102

NIMITZ TO MONTGOMERY AND Sf!A:ITH ONLY INFO HOOVER ONLY.

28 0107

Plans for procedure to be followed in case of Japanese surrender

are under development. It is anticipated that requirements would include
1 streamlined ACORN and 1 streamlined GROPAC for emergency ust at
YOKUSUKA air and seaplane base and 3 other ACORNS and GROPACS to follow
Survey situation and advise units most
prompt~ for other areas.
readi] available. :My present inclination is to direct COM :MARIANAS
be rea~ to produce a streamlined ACORN b,r stripping local facilities.
Comment.
CINCPOA ADVANCE to C01lliORPAC info COMINCH.
NllilTZ TO FLETCHER ONLY, INFO KING.
In order to be ready to execute KEELBLOCKS 4 on short notice a.m
sending you PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY and CHESTER and 2 more Destroyers
and am preparing Task Force 49 with 6 CVE and 9 DD ready to move on short
notice from ENIWETOK. 2 Heavy landplane search squadrons have been sent
you.
Para. Use forces available to extend and exercise your control of
the eastern portion of the SEA OF OKHOTSK.
Para. Request from me info COMSERVPAC such augnentations in
auxiliary vessels as you must have to service your combat units as they
are increased.

27 1318

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC info COM7THFLEET, CO:MINCH.

:My 27092JJ. If agreeable to you will send Rear Admiral Sherman
accom{>ained by ~ig Gen :M_andell, Brig Gen Goss, Capt Espe 1 Col Mabie
and Lieut Col'IlCir Grant to arrive MANILA afternoon 29 July to coordinate
occupation plans.
New SUbject. Conference with COMGEN CHINA rey 140304 will take
place 4 Augtl.st and presence of representative from your headqu.a.rters
would be welcome.

j 27 0920

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCAFPAC, COMGEN USASTAF.

NINITTZ TO KING, INFO MACARTHUR AND SPAATZ.

-v

"J.-.~

tt.f ,, {f

The follow:ing information is furnished to 6form you of the status

of planning in reply to 2nd sentence of JCS 261446 (V 357).
Para. During the P.sit of CINOAFPAC representatives to CINCPAC'S
Advance Headquarters 21-23 J~ which was concerned primarily with making
detailed arrangements for compliance with the JCS directive V 73 of 18
July concerning the RYUKYUS copies of CINCAFPAC 1 s plan BLACKLIST were
received and since that time CINCPAC'S tentative plan CAMPUS has been
revised to accord vrith BLACKLIST insofa~ as the occupation of JAPAN
by Army Forces iB concerned. CAMPUS contemplates naval and amphibious

349R
/

NIMITZ ONLY

1 - continu ed -

JULY (GCT)

'Z1 0920

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CO:MINCH info CllJCAFPAC, COMGEN USASTAF.

NDfiTZ TO KING, INFO MACARTHUR AND SPAATZ ( Cont t d)

31 0112

30 1306

operati ons in 3 phases . Phase A. Emergency naval occupa tion of TOKYO BAY.
Phase B. Comple te deploym ent of naval occupa tion forces .
Phase C. Ar.a.phibious operati ons connec ted with the occupa tion of
JAPAN by u. s. A:rrrry Forces .
Para. Copies of the CAMPUS draft as revised will be taken to
MANILA for confere nce with represe ntative s of CINCAFPAC on 29 July.
Propose draft separat e plan for occupa tion critica l points CHINA COAST
{using Fleet Marine Force) in confere nce with COMGEN CHINA who will
arrive GUA\1 4 August under presen t arrange ments and with CINCAFPAC
_
repres entativ es.
COMNORPAC to CTI~CPAD ADVANCE HQ info COMSERVPAC.
Reur 280107 reques t l AD be inade availab le this command upon ,arriva l
CRUDIV 5 and escorti ng DD' s. With arriva l TF 49 reques t followi ng
additio nal auxilia ries 1 AO, 2 YO, 2 YOG, 1 ATF, 1 YG, 4 LCM and 1
refrige rated cargo ship in additio n to the 1 presen tly supplyi ng all
ar.med forces in the ALEUTL4NS.
CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM7THFIERr.
MCMORRIS TO SHERMAN ONLY.
Do not concur that landing of Marine s or occupy ing airfiel ds nmst
be deferre d until troops land in strengt h. No commitment of that nature
is to be made as such action is likely to be necess ary in order to
exercis e essent ial contro l. The naval office r on the spotmu st be free
to act expedi tiously to cope with any existin g situati on. Trust your
skill and judgement, to avoid this questio n becomin g an issue in
curren t discus sions.
Para. 2nd paragra ph your 300237 not entirel y clear. It is interpr eted
to mean that landing operati ons by naval forces will be conting ent upon
the situati on which exists when naval forces arrive in Japane se ports
and develop ments which immedi ately follow with the time of any such
landing if made to be determ ined by events as they unfold . If this
interpr etation is correc t then concur otherw ise need amplif ication .
Para. In. view prospe ctive require ments for ma.rine s elsewh ere it
appears here that no more should be commit ted in JAPAN proper than is
essent ial for early stages of occupa tion. Some will doubtle ss be
require d initia.l lJ'. You are authori zed to make up to 3 divisio ns
availab le for early and rapid movement into JAPAN if your discuss ions
there indica te advisa bility of so doing.
Para. Having in mind that JCS may issue subsequ ent directi ves
giving CThfCPAC a free hand until CINCAFPAC arrives in JAPAN with his
forces any agreem ents or unders tanding you make should carry a proviso
for revisio n of any part that might prove to be incons istent with aQY
later directi ve issued by JCS.

(.

NIMITZ ONLY
JULY (GCT)
28 1948

COMAIRPAC to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEA.RL HQ.

MONTGOMERY TO NllflTZ lNFO HOOVER.
Concur that streamlined ACORN be produced from units currently
in Marianas. Your 280102. Additional] are ACORNS 53, 55 and .57
all West Coast. La-st schedule'd for RATSBANE other 2 presently unassigned.

28 1239

CINCPOA ADV.ANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMINCH.

NniTTZ TO MACARTHUR.

28 0721

Your 280459. I consider that JCS 142307 June (WARX 17064) together
with JCS 261946 (BG V 357) constitute a directive requiring prompt
compliance on my: part and accordingly will send Rear Admiral Sherman
and party to MANILA tomorrow as planned the coordinatio n of occupation
plans is the principal purpose of their visit at this t:Lme. They will
have incidental conferences with COM.7THFLT and COMPHIBSPAC concerning
naval matters and those required can remain for conference with your
staff and USASTAF representat ives concerning OLTiv1PIC air coordinatio n.
Para. :My 140.304 gives the purpose of the conference with COMGEN
u.s. Forces CHINA at GUAM on 4 August. However advantge will be taken
of that meeting to improve coordinatio n and understandi ng on various
matters notv pending including the FORT BAYARD project and possible
occupation measures along the CHINA COAST. Your representat ive will

be welcome at that time as always.

0lliCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH info BUPERS.
NTIUTZ TO EDWARDS info JACOBS.

In view of JCS 271000 (Victory 371) request immediate assignment

to my headquarter s of an officer qualified to be my liaison officer
1qith Commander Soviet Pacific Fleet. Captain Frank P. Thomas believed
to be well qualified and is requested if available. If not available
request names of others available.

01 0931

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM?THFLEET.

FOR REAR ADMIRAL SHERMAN EYES ONLY.
Immediate deliver,y desired. Various articles in press and other
pronounceme nts are critical of existing command arrangement s in
Pacific. CllTCPAC desires that if possible agreement be reached regarding command exchange of information spheres of operation intelligenc e
etc of air forces of CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA and COlt.STRATEGIC AIR FORCES In
order to secure close coordinatio n and effectivene ss. Believe SPA.~TZ
entertains much same concept as ourselves. If not already done make
ever.y effort to secure an understandi ng for maximum effective air effort
against Japanese by coordinated action. Such a goal is not incompatibl e
with retention of independenc e of action by respective commands.
Para. Your 010545 just received. If you think advisable delay
departing to act on this message.

350Q

- continued -

ND.1:ITZ ONLY
AUGUST {GCT)

30 0237

COM7THFLT to CINCPOA ADVAlJCE HQ (Conttd)

JAPAN because it appears impossibl e for Ar.my to move sufficien t
divisions rapidly without some marines.
Para. The foregoing concessio ns will permit reaching an agreement
unless unforesee n demands are made. His plans are being made and ours
will be expanded to cover KOREA and CHINA insofar as troop allocatio ns
are concerned .

28 2ll3 . COMSERVPAC to CINCPAC/POA BOTH HQ, COM.AIRPAC ..

SiviTTH TO NThiTTZ INFORMATION HOOVER AND MONTGOMERY ONLY.

Your 280102 GROPAC 13 lirunediate ly available at PEARL for streamlin ed

GROPAC provided it not be used in FOIT BAYARD or OKINAWA as previousl y
suggested . For 3 other GROPACS recommend (A) slowdovm and curtailme nt
OKINAWA base developme nt thus perntittin g CNOB to form 3 suitable GROPACS
from personnel under his command and equiprn.errt dravm in construct ion
materials pool shipment. s see entry 119 of my serial 001402 ;.Of 19 Dec
1944. (B) 1st alternate form 2 GROPACS from OKmAWA as outlined in
(A) and a similar uriit from MARIANAS. (C) 2nd alternate form 3 GROPACS
from units assemblin g on West Coast for OLThfPIC. If emergency a:ction
be taken on (C) under personal direction of service force represent atives
consider that suitable units could be ready for sailing in 30 days.
I

28

0459

CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

c 28946.

Will be glad to welcome Admiral Sherman and his partyvvho I understan d

vdll be prepared to discuss matters pertainin g to air coordinat ion for .
OLYMPIC your 271318. Our respectiv e views on occupatio n are so divergent
that I believe it would be difficult to coordinat e them prior to the
receipt, of some directive from the JCS. We will of course be gla.d
neverthel ess to discuss the matter with Sherman -vvhen he comes.
Para. Regarding the 1NEDEMEYER conferenc e, it was our understan ding
that it had as its purpose the coordinat ion of the FORT BAYARD project.
Insofar as this headquart ers is concerned it would not be deemed
advisable to attempt to expand it into a discussio n of plans for
operation al occupatio n of the CHINA COAST until a definite directive
has been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3501

NDA:ITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

01 0545

COM7THFLT to CJNCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

SHERMAN TO MCMORRIS.

Completed air coordination conference and expect return GUAM

tomorrow 2 August.
Para. Plans fo~ occupation coordinated satisfactori~ insofar as
troop movements are concerned. Early naval occupation of "Japanese
Waters" accepted by CJNCAFPAC but any landing whatsoever by naval or
marine elements prior to CINCAFPACS personal landing is emphatically
Accordin~ I have left that feature as one on
unacceptab~e to him.
which agreement could not be reached and in which Joint Action is
not essential and concentrated on other features which because of
their nature do require coordination. There will be no written record
of our planning conference other than the plans themselves which will
be adequate~ correlated except for landing force operations prior
to the arrival of Army troops in strength.

/31 0024

COM7THFLT to CTIJCPAC ADV_4.NCE HQ.

EYES ONLY. SHERMAN TO MCMORRIS ONLY.

Conference and revision of both BLACKLIST and CMIPUS proceeding

satisfactorily although considerable insistence still required on ~
part. CD\JCAFPACS headqu.arters is hoping for a directive along OLYMPIC
lines or which will give CINCAFPAC overall command for the occupation.
Para. Have deleted prmvisions for ear~ landings and inserted
provision for a CTIJ'C.A.FPAC representative to go to Halsey 1 s Flagship
and thereafter Halsey and tre CINCAFPAC representative would funtion
as the Quote Joint Representatives Unquote mentioned in last paragraph
of JCS message.
Para. It now appears that CINCAFPAC will occupy the KOBE OSAKA
KYOTA AREA instead of the KURE area so the. 5th Fleet will be initia.lly
at KOBE. The 5th PhibCorps is planned to occupy the KOBE-OSAK'it AREA
initially. The 3rd PhibCorps is reserved for the CHTIJA COAST which I
now believe v-Till not be covered in CINCAFPACS plan as it is vVEDEMEYERS
area.
Para. Have promised to make TULSA available for purpose of guarding
navy circuits and supplying CINCAFPAC with intercept traffic after
landing. They vlill not ask for the 3rd LST.

30 0237

COM7THFLT to CINCPOA ADVANCE HQ.

SHERMAN TO MCMORRIS ONLY.

Cordia~ received. Had long and ve~ amicab~e conference with

General MacArthur. He accedes to naval features and to naval and air
show of force as soon as fighting stops. He considers it unwise to
risk landing any marines or seizing airfields until troops arrive in
strength. He had the JCS message but did not consider it a directive

and has asked for oneo

Para. Unless I receive other instructions I will adjust plans to
make all early landings contingent operations with timing to be determined later and will if requested make 3 MarDivs available to arnw for

- continued -

35 0?

NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST ( GCT)
03 0209

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

ND.ITTZ TO KING ONLY.
Your 312010. My nnderstanding is that Shermans relief should have
about 2 months overlap and that he would be available in August and
preferably early August. It is nzy- desire that Sherman remain with me
until all plans and preparations far OLTI~PIC are completed but not
necessarily until after execution OLYMPIC which might drag indefinite~.
My 260Sll was based on assumption that Schoeffel would be available :in
August.

03 0212

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KING Otr-LY.

Cities of KYOTO HIROSHIMA KOKURA and NIIGATA were reserved for

special attack with which you are familiar. SecWar directed substitution NAGASAKI for KYOTO. Understand reason being that latter is an
important cultural center that he did not wish destroyed. Request I
be informed i f KYOTO' is to remain immune from normal bombing attacks.
Assume also that JCS are familiar with fact that POW camp is at
NAGASAKI.

03 0911

CINCPAC ADVANCE to

NIMITZ TO

CO~UNCH.

KDT~.

Sherman returned from MANILA and reports that BLACKLIST and CAMPUS
have both been revised and are mutually acceptable except for the
question of landings by naval or marine personnel before CINCAFPAC lands
in person. The language of CAMPUS in this regard was dra.fted as follows
nAt each principal anchorage, an eperational airfield will if practicablE
be occupied to facilitate co~nunications and airborne troop landings,
and for subsequent development for naval purposes. The timing of this
occupation will be such as to support the landing of tro~ps in strength,
but may be adjusted by the local naval commander as necessary to meet
the requirements of the situation ~ as it may develop after the arrival of
naval forces in Japanese ports
. Para. Key positions on shore in the vicinity of the principal
anchorages may be occupied i f such action becomes necessar.y to ensure
the safety of naval forces".
Para. Since this ];articular language was not accepted by CINCAFPAC
it was noted on the margin of copies furnished him that "it is subject
to later revision as directed by CINCPAC 11
Para. The sequence of ground occupations as now contemplated by
BLACKLIST and CA)/IPU~ in the 1st Phase is as follows ILA..NTO PLAIN. SASEBO..
NAGASAKI . OSAKE-KOBE-KYOTO. KEIJO AOMORI-OMINATO . The 5th PhibCorps
is planned to be used in the OSAKA-KOBE-~JOTO area and the 3rd PhibCorps
is left available for use on the CHJ~A COAST.
Para. /U1 offer to place a command ship (AGC) at the disposal of
CINCAFPAC was accepted. An offer to accommodate in Halse,rs flagship
the representative contemplated by last paragraph of JCS 261946 V 357
was not accepted on the grounds that CINCA.FPAC would have no representative before he arrived in person.
- continued -

' 350

- continued -

03 0911

.I

CINCPAC ADVANCE TO COMINCH (CONTD)

Para. Am informed that all discussions were carried on in a most
amicable manner and that General MacArthur received my representat ive

most cordiaily.
n of all air forces from
coordinatio
concerning
Para. Agreements
to the satisfactio n of
reached
quic~
were
OLYMPIC
now until after
CHAl\ffiERLIN,
KENNEY,
SPAATZ,
between
conference
in
all concerned
PRIDE.
SHERMAN and
Para. I see no better time than the near future for a visit to the
. Vvestern Pacific by you and Marshall and hope that you vdll come
prepared to make decisions of the Joint Chiefs of staff.

03 1332

CINCPAC ADVANCE

t?

COM3RDFLEET.

NllUTZ TO HALSEY ONLY.

It is imperative that there be no interfe~ence with operations of
509th Bomb Group. Although their objective has been indicated it may
be changed. It is accordingly directed that you send no planes over
KYUSHU or western HONSHU until specifically authorized by me. It is
my intention to give you freedom of action as soon as the spedial
mission has been completed. At this t:Une it appears probable that
task will be completed on the 5th and that you can strike as you
currently plan on the 6th. Will keep you informed.
Para. After your next attack desire your fleet return to port in
order that it may be ready to renew operations in late August.
Aclmo?rledge.
04 08Z7

COM3RDFLEET to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ
As soon as possible after arrival in PRDY would ver,r much like
to visit you with about 4 of my staff. If agreeable to you please
designate convenient date arrange air transportat ion and advise.
New Subject. Intend shift my flag to New Jersey ENIWETOK
leaving Missouri in all respects reaqy to receive CINCPAC.

04 0753

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ TO COM5THFLEET, COMPHIBSPAC.

NniTTZ TO SPRUANCE AND TURNER ONLY.
As yet no agreements have been made in connection with the
coverage of OLYMPIC by press representat ives. Until arrangement s
have been made between CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC as to the degree to
which Pacific Fleet corresponde nts may cover operations on shore
make no firm commitments connection reception AFPAC corresponde nts
in ships of the fleet. Requests for such commitments should be
referred to CINCPAC for coordinatio n.

' 350 4

NThiTTZ ONLY
AUGUST .. ( OOT)
04 0612

COMGENUSASTAF to CINCFOA, CINCAFPAC

EYES ONLY NIMITZ AND MACARTHUR.

Operational intention is to strike primar,y HL~OSHIMA at 060945/K
(-10) or seconda.cy' KOKURA at 061010/K or tertiary NAGASAKI at 061030/K.
A firm decision confirming the times listed above will leave this
headquarters by 051430/K. It is mandato:ey that no friendly aircraft
enter a 50 mile area around the 3 targets scheduled for attack between
the hours 060545/K and 061700/K if firm decision confirms the above
target times
04 2253

CINCPAC ADVANQ.E Hg to COM3RDFLEET.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY.
Your Q40005 lll.a0' further complicate an already complicated situation
with respect to command and ,coordination of air forces in the Pacific
Theater. In the minds of many Arrrry Air Commanders there begins to arise
questions as to which forces are "Primar,ytr and which are "SUpportingn.
According:cy- I must request that your suggestions as to overall
coordination of FEAF, USASTAF and Fleet Aircraft be made to me on.l.

Definite agreements have been made as to principles and are being

OLYMPIC.
through
now
from
matter
this
cover
which
you
mailed to
06 1630

COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Pursuant to agreement with Soviets. 4th Question Victory 351 refers.
Lock up. J <?int Chiefs of staff will propose establishment Army and
Army Air operational liaison group at KHABAROVSK headed by General
officer to which will be attached only 1 Cpatin and about 2 enlisted
from Navy, and establishment at VlADIVOSTOK of naval operational
liaison group headed by Flag Officer to include 3 officers and 3 enlisted from Army Air Forces. Estimate here that total personnel
VLADIVOSTOK group will entail 20 officers 45 enlisted to handle liaison,
convoy and routing, and necessary communications which would include
ADAK FOX, ADAK-VLADIVOSTOK, ship to shore, and VLADIVOSTOK-GUAM via
KHABAROESK weather central. Envisaged that operatio~l communications
with PETROPAVLOVSK would be to st-ation ship as no shore facilties other
than weather central contemplated there. Your corrunent on this arrangement vdth particular reference to number of personnel VLADIVOSTOK is
requested as a matter of urgency. In this connection note that
reciprocal Soviet liaison group of similar composition at GUAM may
be expected. Similar information has been provided MacArthur and
Spaatz by Army in iVARJC 44735.

350 v

NDKITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

04 1831

ARNOLD to SPAATZ info CINGPAC, CINCAFPAC.

WARX 44014.
Further to WARX 29973 dated 10 July which states your overall
mission priority of objectives is as follows:
Para. 1. lkission.
SUbPara A. Your overall mission is as stated in JCS 742/12.
In carrying out the progressive destruction and dislocation of
J AP..W' S military, industrial and economic systems, your priority
of objectives is as follows:
Para. 2. Objectives.
' SubPara A. Primary objectives (in order).
SubPara 1. Initiate and carry out attacks upon suitable
Japanese railw~ targets of special importance to economic traffic.
SubPara 2. Continue the present program against aircraft
production.
SubPara 3. Conduct coneentrated attacks against major ammunition storage areas.
SubPara 4. Complete the present program against industrial
concentrations and stores located in urban areas.
SubPara B. Secondar.y objectives.
SubPara 1. Attack selected arsenals producing heavy ordnance.
SubPara 2. Direct available surplus effort against secondary
aircraft targets and against nitrogen production and oil storage
as auxilia~J to invasion and preparatory to post invasion operations
SubPara c. other objectives.
SubPara i .. ~tiPing operations. To continue present mining
operations that cannot be performed by FEAF or Navy in order to
maintain the blockade of Japanese Home Isl8nds.
SubPara 2. Photography. Contine the program of photographing
for operational .purposes and complete the present program of
photographing JAPAN and approaches thereto as directed by the
Joint Chiefs of staff.

I\

31 2014

COM3RDFLT to CTI.JCPAC IillV ANCE

HALSEY TO NIMITZ.
Pending receipt of directive from you I have forrrrulated OpPlan for
preliminary steps phase 1 salient features being. A. Arrangements for
delivery of your terms. B. Receive local surrender on board MISSOURI
and dictate local tenns. c. Com3RdFlt in MISSOURI with suitable screen
proceed initial anchorage SAGAMI WAN. D. Fleet at sea in striking
.
position. E. RAdm Badger local Tast Commander with headquarters
supplied
Commanders
YOKOSUKA and staff and necessary subordinate Task
to Cpm3Rd.Flt. F. Initially occupy only YOKOSUKA including airfield and
seaplane base and local~y initiate following measures. 1. Minesweeping.
2. Evacuation enemlf armed forces from YOKOSUKA P~~NSULA except ke.y
hostages and certain service personnel. 3. Spiking or covering continuo
enemy installations~ 4. Harbor patrol. 5. Local security. 6 ~n

- continued -

35 QC

) tl

ND.ITTZ ONLY
AUGUST ( GCT)

31 2014

- continued -

COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADVM~CE (Cont 1 d)

essential civil administration. 7. Sanitation. S. Receiving Ship
facilities and hospital ships. 9. Communications. 10. Other local
practicable measures. G. Com3rdFleet will initiate the following:
1~ Instructions for withdrawal of enemy forces beyond a specified
fixed line. 2. Freezing of all enemy forces in TOKYO AREA. 3. Delivery
of specified shipping weapons, equipment and transportation. 4. Delivery
and care of allied prisoners. 5. Security air patrol and other necessar,y
surveillance measures. 6. General communication regulations and
restrictions. 7. Preparations to receive CINCPAC including readiness
of 'WISCONSIN. S. Preparations to receive ship borne or air home occupation personnel and forces 9. Logistic support of Badgers local
occupation force.
Para. Foregoing not complete but intended to indicate nature and
e.xtent of plans to utilize forces and facilities imrnediately available
and pave the wa:y for extension of control.
Para. Plans will be prepared take similar measures at other designated focal points east of arbitrarily assumed line 134 east assuming
CTF 95 will act west of 134.
Para. Plan will be airmailed to you when annexes are completed
but no distribution will be made other than to Badger pending further
instruction. Am prepared to send staff representative to GUAM.

07 0832

CINCPAC AJJV HQ to COlvrlliCH

'
TOP SECRET. NIMITZ TO KING. Your 061630. Is it intended to
establish a direct radio circuit ADAK to VLADIVOSTOK or will relay
through KHABAROVSK be satisfactory. See Annex 1 to Appendix C
KEELBLOCKS 4.
Para. I have succeeded in limiting the liaison officers exchanged
with CINC British Pacific Fleet to the grade of captain. This has
the advantage of avoiding large liaison staffs and permitting business
to be transacted between liaison officers and appropriate staff officers exc~pt where major policy is concerned. strongly urge that
liaison officers exchanged vdth Soviet CINC be captains also. 'If
Soviets are penaitted to send a flag officer British will undoubtedly
demand to do likevdse. Housing of senior officers and their staffs
is an linportant factor.
Para. Othervdse concur in your 061630.

J07 0554

CINQPAC /illV HQ to COMINCH

TOP SECRET. NTI~ITTZ TO KING ONLY.. In a separate dispatch I am
proposing to order Rear Admiral Buckmaster to con~and the South
CHINA Naval Force as a task force commander. Before the FORT BAYARD
project became urgent I had planned to recrunmend eliminat~ng the
Western C.,I.\ ROLINES Sub-area as an echelon of command no longer necessary and such a recommendation will follow in a few days.
Para. It appears probable that FORT BAYARD will be followed
after OLYMPIC by C.A...NTON and HONGKONG either by combat operations or
as a result of Japanese collapse or local withdrawal. It is therefor t imely to establish a flag officer in the area and have him

35 07

07 0554

(continued)
prepared to handle additional forces when necessary.
Para. For the present prefer that he remain responsible to CINCPAC
in order to avoid precedents in cormection with relations with CHIANG
KAI SHEK.

07 0837

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMCARDIV

Nll~ITZ TO BOGAN ONLY.

Have been informed that you will be ordered
as Comdt NOB KAGOSHlli1A reporting to me for that duty about 15 September
after suitable leave. Commodore Kessing now corndg LION 9 which will
be 1 of major components your command. Comment on proposal that he
serve as you deputy and chief of staff.
Para. Desire you visit my headquarters prior going on leave.

08 2226

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEET info COlviiNCH, CO:MNORPAC.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY TI\JFO

Kll~G

AND FlETCHER.

In order to indicate strong support of RUSSIAN attack desire you

continue pperations against enemy air forces and airdrome installations
and targets of opportunity in northern HONSHU, HOKKAIOO and ETOROFU for
at least 2 days after 10 August.
09 0443

CTIICAFPAC to WARCOS passed by COMINCH to CINCPAC ADV HQ (ADMIRAL ND,ITTZ

EYES ONLY)
TOP SECRET. C 18
EYE Oi.iLY for GENERAL V~RSHALL~from MACARTHUR.
Reference WAR 453 9 0715352 I am certain that the Jananese air
potential reported. to you as accuntulating to counter our OLYMPIC operation
is greatly exaggerated. We have recently seen the 3rd Fleet approach the
northern and central shoreline's of J A.PAN close enough for gunfire bombardment and yet no reaction from the Japanese air has taken place. Our air
forces are daily flying throughout J AP A..l\f and provoke no reaction. The
situation repeats that of the PHILIPPINE cam:PaigJ.1i. Prior to the invasion
of LUZON, reports were received of the concentration of air both on LUZON
and on FORl~OSA. An erroneous estin~te of widely dispersed planes being
held back for the eventuality of landings was repeatedly made. I .._'further
doubt the often repeated reports that large numbers of aircraft are still
being manufactured in JAPA~. As to the movement of ground forces, the
Japanese are reported as trying to concentrate inethe few areas in which
landings can be effected ~rom TOKYO southward, and it j_s possible that
some strength may have been dravm from the areas of northern HONSHU. I
do not credit, however, the heavy strengths reported to you in southern
KYUSI-TIJ. The limited capacity of railroads and the continued\ shipping
losses discourage belief that large forces can be concentrated or supported
effectively in southern KYUSHU. Kenney's air forces are nnly now becomin..g
effective from OKilJXJA and it is anticipated that t he re vrill be a rapid
buildup to an effecti ve strength in early September of approxiJnately
2000 cmnbat planes, and prior to OLTifPIC of approximately 3000 planes.
These are in addition to the VDH and escorting fighters in the MARIANSS.
It is antici~ated that this great weight of air ~vill quickly ~eek out

350R

).

09 0443

(continued)
and destroy in the southern Jananese islands all enemy air potential and
vdll practically immobilize ground forces in their present positions .
The maintenance of such forces in southern KYUSHU cannot fail to become
increasingly difficult and it is anticipated that they will be greatly
weakened prior to OLYMPIC.
Para. In my opinion, there should not be the slightest thought of
changing the OLYMPIC operation. Its fundruaental purpose is to obtain
air bases under cover of which we can deploy our forces to the northward
into the industrial heart of JAPAN. The plan is sound and 1till be
successful. An attack directly into TOKYO or to the northward thereof
would have to be made vdthout the benefit of land based aviation other
than VLR and for that reason alone would be fraught with greatest danger.
I seriously doubt the advisability of a direct attack into TOKYO 1qithout
the installation of heav;r air forces closer than OKINAWA. Only a
limited study has been made. of the SENDA.I and OMINATO areas. Insofar
as OMINATO is concerned, weather alone would seem to indicate the
im.practicability t>or a.n attack during 1945 or early 19l.,.6, especially
for the installation of air forces which l-'Tould prepare the way into the
industrial heart of JAPAN. SENDJi..I has somewhat greater potentialities
although some difficulty in establishing satisfactory bases rnight be
exPerienced. This area is very close to the TOKYO area and would be
subjected to heavy infiltration of gr-onnd troops tb.erefrom. Throughout
the Southlirest Pacific Area campaigns, as we have neared and operation
intelligence has invariably pointed to greatly increased enemy forces.
In this
V~ithout exception, this build-up has been found to be erroneous.
particular case, the destruction that is going on in JAPAN would seem
to indicate that it is very probable that the enenw is resorting to
deception.

07 1535

QPD W.A...R (M.&T:?.SHALL) to Iv1ACARTHUR passed bv COMINCH to CINCPA(} AJJV HQ

TOP SECRET. FOR .ADHIRAL ND~ITZ 1'YES ONLY. HARSHAL~ TO MACARTHUR EYES
.
OI!LY. WAll 45369.
Intelligence reports on Jar) dispositions which have been presented
to me and which I understand have been sent to your staff are that the
Japanese have undertaken a large buildup both of divisions and of air
forces in KYUSHU and southern HONSHU. The air buildup is reported as
including a large component of suicide planes which the intelligence
estirnates here consider are readily available for en~loyrnent only in
the 1dcinity of their present bases. Concurrently with the reported
reinforcement of I\'YUSHU, the Jananese are reported to have reduced forces
north of the TOKYO PtAIN to a point where the defensive capabili ties in
northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO aopear to be extraordin<-"l. rily weak viewed
from the standpoint of t he JaDanese General Staff. The question has
arisen in my mind as to whether t he Japanese may not be including some
deceution in the sources from which our intelligence is being drawn.
-Para. In order to assitt in discussions likely to arise here on
t h e meaning of reported disnositions on J .:\.PA.N roper and possible
alternate objecti ves to OLYMPIC, such as TOKYO , SENDAI and OMINATO, I
would a:;preciate y our personal estimate of the Ja'lanese intentions and
canabilities as related to your current directive m1d available
resources.

3508

1-

09 2205

COMINCH l\.ND C1TO to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

KING TO Nll.ITTZ SYES 01'-JLY.
Desire your comments on ~~.fiJt 45369 (071535) and MACARTHURS 31897
(090443) passed to you EYES ONLY . Send your reply info MACARTHUR.

10 0731

CINCAFPAC to CINCPOA ADV, COMGEl\J TEN info ilF'MIDPAC, JCS.

32204.

Concur Richardson's 262220 concerning return of infected prisoners

to RYUKYUS. Reference CINCPOA ADVANCE 280725 and COMGEN TEN 0304342.
Desire prisoners presently at OKINAvvA remain there pending immediately
forthcoming conference in RYUKYUS between representative of Chief Provost
Marshall AFPAC and . COMGEN 'l'EN.
10 1135

COHINCH 1lllD CNO to CI NCPAC lillVANCE.

KING TO ND.~ITTZ.
This is a peace Wal~ng. TOKYO has indicated in ultra channels
that J .APAN wishes to bring about peace immediately and that she will
accept the Joint Declaration by leaders of u.s., Breat Britian and
CHINA provided tlnt the stipuJations do not include a demand for aleratior
of the authority of the emporer to rule the state. It is now probable
that the Swedish or Swiss governments will soon transmit official
messages to the )JJies regarding Jap capitulation desires. Your
movements anq dispositions should be guided by this information pending
further more definite word or instructions.

01 1400

COMINCH AND CNO to ALUSNArMOSCOW - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADV, COM~

NORPAC.

Pursuant to terminal agreements and conversations with Russians it is

apparent that u.s. convoy of Soviet shipp~g from West Coast ports and of
FIDLA 2 ships cannot be instituted after outbrealt of hostilities until
operational liaison groups as agreed to are set up and functioning.
Apparent further that western terminus these convoys must be SAKHALIN
GULF area until Soviets open LA PEROUSE or we open TSUSHTI~iA. In order
plans here for institution convoy escorts may have f i r.m basis desire
ansvrers to following in light of fo:negoing stipulations. A. What is
deadline beyond which sailings from west coast ports and COLD BAY should
cease until escort can be effected. B. Hhat is size and frequency of
convoys desired by Soviets v'rhen sailings can be resumed. C. 'fuere is
desired CHOP line where u.s. responsibility and control of convoys ceases
and Soviet escort begins. In coru1ection foregoing' desire arranger~nt
with Soviets whereby their submarines keep clear of convoys while under
U.s. protection and whereby anchorage at PETROPAVLOVSK is available
for u.s. escorts and necessary supporting fuel and repair ships
t herefor. Ends,.

10 1357

C0~1.3RDFLT

to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO NDITTZ.
Your 100813 acknowledged and understood. Must ma'ke sure however
that you nnders~and the follovdng. During last 2 days over 500 enemy
planes positively destroyed or damaged in north HONSHU and a great macy
others strafed rocketed, bombed and undoubtedly ,damaged but not claimed.
North HONSHU is for the time being 1ftlrecked and powerless. stationary
fog belt whose southern edge lies at about lat 39. This Unless otherwise directed I will now do in effort to find an operating area from
which to attack HOKKP.IOO KURILES but unless you signify that such attack
is of utmost urgency will not take the abnormal risks to pilots involved
in flight operations when fog is present or positive~y iminent. ~;phoon
may alter all plans. Will keep you advised.
10 1646

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLT, info COMINCH.

Nll.UTZ TO HALSEY INFO KING.
Your current orders hereby amended. Vfuile striking at discretion move
your fleet to southvrard and prepare to execute operations under concept
my Joint staff stuey C.AJJPUS dated 9 August. 10 copies will be flown
to Island Commander IINO JIMA forenoon 11 August to await pickup by
carrier aircraft. CO:M3RDFLF..T remain in ltissouri. Am ordering New
Jersey to GUAM. My 082226 amended to accord with above.

10 1608

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEET info COMINCH, CINCAFPAC.

Pending the arrival of the Conrr~der in Chief u.s. Pacific Fleet in
Japanese waters the Corrnnander 3rd Fleet will be his designated
representative for purposes indicated in JCS 261946 Victory 357.

10 1602

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CTF 95 info COMFluR.WING 1, COM3HDFLT, COMINPAC,

CINCAFPAC.
Alert 2 squadrons of patrol seaplanes and adequate tenders for
immediate movement northeastward for d)lty with Com3rd.Flt. Alert all
available fast minesweepers and a suitable tender for similar movement.
Advise numbers available and prospective dates readiness. See my Joint
'
Staff Study Clti,IPUS.
your Flagship)
(except
OKINAWA
in
Para. Prepare units of BatRon 1 now
for similar movement with suitable screen.

10 1604
;/

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COlliNORPAC info COiviTNCH, C@RDFLEET.

NDHTZ TO FLETCH&-q INFO HALSEY AND KING.
~farning order:rn the event of Japanese capitulation which now
appears imminent you vdll be directed to employ forces nnder your comman
for naval occupation HAKODATE - AOM:ORI - OrJINATO area vrith .f orces under
your cormnand. Forces contemplated are 3 CA, 2 OCL, 9 DD, 1 AV, 1 AVP,
1 AR, 1 ART.J available nri.neS\"reepers. You vdll be authorized embark in a
ship of this force and exercise personal command if in your judgement
such act~on is advisable. An AGC may become available.

3511

HIMITZ ONLY
;1UGUST (GCT)
10 1144

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINC.AF?AC, USASTAF 2 C~NCPAC .WV HQ.

WARX 47190.

TO HACARTHUR, NlliiTZ, i\l\JD SPAATZ FOR INFORMATION.

As a result of administrat ive errors code word OLY1v1PIC was compromised by being published in a mamerandum classified restricted.
Investigatio n failed to show that meaning of code word was compromised .
As a matter of abs9lute safety decision reached to cancel OLYJ!PIC and
sub~ti tute 1fAJESTIC instead.

10 2002

COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC IDVANCE HQ.

FROM AD:MIRltL KING FOR THE EYES ONLY OF fJJMIRAL Nll,fiTZ.
SecNav is of the opinion that an opportunity should be afforded the
American people to p~ tribute to the men of the Navy which they will
undoubtedly vdsh to express. He suggests that whenever operational
requirement s permit a task group composed of some" outstanding vessels
be sent back to the U.s. as a token return of the Fleet~ He further.
suggests that your return with this group at least to the 1st port of
call would enhance public enthusiasm and interest but the Secretary
appreciates that any arrangement s depend on demands of your time in
the Pacific. Desire your comments.

11 0216

CINCPAC A.DV.ANCE to CINCAFPAC info COMINCH, COM?THFLT.

NllfiTZ TO MACAJtTHUR INFO KING AND KINCAID.
In the event of Japanese surrender it is my plan to place at your
disposal immediately 1 of the command ships (AGC) now in the Philippines
and to assign it to a special task group which v-rill be commanded by a
Flag Officer and w'ill include an appropriate escort. I believe that
this class of ship will best serve you as a headg.uarter s afloat vvith
adequate accommodati ons and communicati ons. Request your comments.

09 0326

COHAF 20 to CINCPAC ADVANCE, CQ],IDSASTAF.

APCOM

5449.

KIRKPATRICK TO NDAITZ f.LI\TD SPAATZ.

Note: This. is extract of copy to Washington (In view of the effects at

TRINITY and HIROSHTIJA which far exceeded opt~stic expectation s, Purnell
Parsons and Farrell believe question of targets should be reViewed irnmediately. The subject was discussed with Nimitz and Spa.atz today at
.
GUAM and both concurred in our views expressed below.
at
be
practicable
vkre
should
targets
potency
great
of
Para. Because
having
areas
out
burned
partially
with
Targets
side.
a
on
least 3 miles
large remaining. population and some indust~ offer great possibilitie s
for psychologic al effects. We consider the 11 Scare Radius" to be at
least 10 miles. It is recommended that the TNar Department should no
longer require visual bombing but leave decision to the field command.
Vle consider
11've~J effort will be made to get best bombing conditions.
or
inadequate
as
KOKURA
of
exception
vdth
targets
approved
remaining
improperly , shaped areas. We do not want to waste any of effects. It is
recownar~ed that the list be revi sed to include several large cities. It
is expressedly recomr.1ended that the region of TOKYO be included as a
target.

351~

NllviTTZ ONLY
AUGUST ( GCT)

11 2254

11 2010

COMINCH tLT\ID CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

EYES ONLY lillMIRAL NlliTTZ.
Pl~s under consideration contemplate that for the occupation
of JAPAN and the enforcement of surrender terms :MACARTHUR will be
the Supreme Conunander for the Allied powers and together with
representatives of the u.s, GREAT BRITTAN, CHINA and USSR will
accept the Japanese surrender on board the :MISSOURI. You will
be the u.s . representative. Foregoing f9r your advance information.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCAFPAC, CINcr:J.\C._AJ2YAN..CE, COHGFJJUSFCT
9HUNGKING, info COHGEN USASTAF GUAllf, COKGEN US ~IT LIAISON SECTION
HDQTS SOUTHEAST ASIA COlviltUJD KA1\rD~"'YJRM
Vl.AR 47945.
TOPSEC BOOK MESSAGE T.Q MACARTHUR, NDf[TZ, ~'IEDEf.fu"YER, SP.AATZ AND WHEElER
FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.
Para 1. Further to WAR.X 1~064 JJ.J. June 1945 and VICTORY 357 of 26
July, key areas of JAPAN proper, KOREA and the CHINA coast will be
occupied upon capitualtion or collapse of the Japanese Government.
Occupation operations will be initiated on order of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Para 2. Preparations for the operations required under paragraph
1 above, must be subsidiary to, and without jeopardy to, those for
directed operations prior to Japanese capitulation or collapse. The
operations following Japanese capitulation should in so far as practicab
le be planned as developing from the dispositions, preparations and
arrangements for the Campaign in J AP.AN, except that as practicable
Marine Corps troops allocated CINC/i.FPAC .should be used for preliminary
landings on the ASIATIC CONTIN}1~T.
Para 3.
A. In order that there m~ be a continuity of policy and
procedure in dealing vlith the Jaoanese imperial High Command and existent agencies of the Japanese Government, representatives of CINCAFPAC
and CINCPAC will jointly perform this function until CINCAFPAC has
landed in JAPAJf and assumed this responsibility.
B. Except as mdicated in paragraphs 3C and 3D, belovr, CINCAFPAC
and CINCPAC are charged with carr-ying out the military operations
incident to the occupation in accordance vvith the same command responsibilities and arrangements established under W"\RX ~938 of 25 Hay 1945
. In preparing plans for occupation operations on the CHINA COAST, CTI\JCAFPAC and CINCPAC will collaborate .with COMGENCHINA.
C. COHGE1TCHINA. will assume command or operational control of
Pacific Theater forces after they are established ashore on the CHINA
COAST in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon by the
comrnanders concerned. C01.1GENCHINA is responsible for coordination
GEl'JERJ.I~ISSD.t:O CHIANG KAI-CHEK of those parts of those parts of the
occupation plans pertaining to CHTI~A.
D. Forces involved in the imnediate naval occupation of critical
ports in JAPAN, as contemplated in VICTORY 357, a.nd on ASIATIC MAINLl~ND v-rill continue under the control of CTIJCPAC until such time as
CINC~\FPAC and CO~~GEIJCHIE. are in a position to exercise control of
the occupation.

351~

---

- continued NIMITZ ONLY.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CTIJCAFPAC, CI NCP.AC ADVANCE, COMGENUSFCT
CHUNGKING, info COl/fGEN USASTAF GUAM , COMGEN US AitMY LIAISON SECTION
HD(,!TS SOUTHEAST ASIJ~ CO!Jl.JIAND KANDY CEYLON.
Para

?
12 1055

4.

A. The lirunediate objective of occupation operations against

JAPAN and KOREA is early introduction of forces (including seizure of
critical ports and port facilities and airfields) into major strategic
land and sea areas in order to seize control, immobilize and disanfi
eneL~ forces arid impose the conditions which are required by the immediate militar.y situation. Earliest possible u.s. custody of allied
prisoners of war and interned persons is essential.
B. The 1st objective of occupation operations on the CHINA
COAST is to afford such assistance to CHINA THEATER forces, by gaining
control of key ports and communications points, as is practicable without involvement in a major land campaign.
Para 5.
A. Prompt occupation in J AP~"J PROPER is the supreme operation
and constitutes a 1st charge upon resources available to Pacific Commanders.
B. Early occupation of KEIJO in KOREA and acceptance of surrender of Japanese forces in that area constitutes a second charge upon
such resources.
C. Subject to the above priorities, operations will be undertaken on the CHINA COAST and FOID~OSA.
Para 6. The responsibility for the execution of the terms of
sur render in J .t;PAN PROPER and in KOREA is assigned to CINCAFPAC.
Para 7. CINCAFPAC and CINC PAC will arrange for immediate acceptance
of possible local surrenders by any u.s. Commander on the spot. These
arrangements will include provision for continuity in dealing vrith local
Japanese authorities.
Para 8. Planning \A
rl.ll recognize the probability of participation
of small aJ.Jied task forces of other nations in subsequent phases of
the occupation and in accordance with directives to be issued L~ter.
Para 9. In order to facilit ate operations, KOREA is included in
the Pacific Theat er in so f ar as United States Corrrrnand is concerned.
Para 10. CTITC.:FPAC, Ci lJCPAC and COHGENCI-i..J}L..). . after consulting or
exchanging vievrs tYill submit recommendations concerning occupa.tion
oDer ati ons on t he CHI NA COAST and FORMOSA.
Para ll. Upon designation of a supreme commander for the Allied
Ters , a s is ~ont emplat ed , t he f oregoing respon si bilities an~ comrnand
rra.ng ements become sup ject t o t he authority conferred upon him by his
rective.
I
CllTC ..'\.FPAC t o CI.r'I!CPAC i\.DVANCE ..

c 32887 .

FOR AD11IRilL Nll.fl'l'Z EYES ALONE FROU GENER.U.J MACiJtEHUR.

I n view l atest plans for surrender received this date whic h differ
fundamentally from those :-Jreviously envisioned it is s uc;3e.sted that i f
:)ossible you send a rei)resen'1 ative to this headquarters as t hese latest
instruction make ne c essa~J a reconsideration of all loc al -~)lans
previously considered.

3514

I~

12 0520

COHGENCHIHA to VV!L'ftCOS, 1.ACAHTHUR, NTiilTZ

NR 4352.

1YES _:UDNZ TO \LARGOS, HACARr,,HUR AND ND,UTZ.

Para. 1. Deeply concerned am I relative possible lack of appreciation in V}ashington of explosive and portentous possibilities in
CHINA when JAPAN surrenders. Instructions emanating from Washington
(I cite WA...R. 47943, HiLR.X 47945 and nAR 48004) indicate that I have failed
to impress the implications of Chinese Communist movement and effect
upon relization of u.s. objectives, in this area.
Para 2. It is my considered opinion that the American contingents
contemplated in occupational plans (WP..R 40831) must arrive as promptly
as possible in CHINA. ~Ltil.X 47945 places Japanese Archipelago in lst
priority, KOREA in 2nd, and CHINA in 3rd or last priority. As I view
overall situation in Far East upon surrender of Japanese, the Archipelago will present no immediate problems relative to control, repatriation, disarmament or disturbances of revolutionary characters; '~Nher
as on the ASIATIC TIAINLl'JJD vve are confronted with 2 serious possibilitie
requiring prompt action on part of Allies. 1st, Chinese communist forces
may precipitate civil war in CHINA; 2nd, the Japanese Army remaining
on the mainland, approximately 2,000,000 strong, may contme to fight
either in force or in isolated areas, requiring continued employannt
of air and land forces. The area of CHINA is so vast and communications
so limited, the problems posed by the above 2 conditions obviously
require TllvillUX and appropriate Qisposition of allied forces, 1Unerican
and Chinese. .Definitely CHINA THEATERS minimum reqQirements for Americru
occupational forces should be given 1st priority.
Para 3. The Chinese communist leader to~ issued a radio proclamation to Japanese and Chinese puppets admonishing them to surrender to
nearest anti-Japanese troops. Ambassador Hur~~ has provided State
Department with copy of proclamation. The primary object of Chinese
communists is to obtain Japanese arms and equipment and tirus further
strengthen their capabilities. It is not unreasonable to expect Japanese cooperation in this regard. The geographical objectives of the
Chinese corrununits have been and continue to be the very same key., and
as vital by the u.s. Joint Chief
.
stragegic points and theas RECOOHM. UED
of Staff, vrho selected the majority of such points and areas for projected Junerican occupation; including SHA]\JGH.AI, NANKING, T...'iKU, TIENT$DJ,
PEKING, TSINGTAO and CANTON. He will do utmost to red.ispose and employ
Chinese forces in strength to prevlude widespread uprising and Sisorder,
and to localize Chinese communist efforts. u.s. resources available
1\rill be employed in consonance vr ith new CHINA THEATER.
Para 4. In my personal letter to you, delivered by SJJJ:PSON, and
in subsequent radios, I have t r ied to portray the problems presented
in CHJJ\T.A, particul arly pe rtaining to the total lack of organization and
planning. de americans can and do make plans embodying sound recommendations, but their implementation in this land of confusion, intrigue an
indecision remains problematical. I am sure t hat you a 9preciate my
position and earnest desire to comply v1ith instructions from v.t ashington
Throughout r~ service here I have tried earnestly and objectively to
- continued -

351 C:

I )

NTI.ITTZ ONIX
AUGUST (GCT)
12 0520

- continued -

COHGENCHINA to WA!1.COS, MACARTHUR, rnf.ITZ.

Chiefs of Staff factual data and considere d

judgement relative to the applicatio n of instructio ns to the realistic
condition s prevailin g in CHINA.
Para 5. Recommen dations in view of above follovring forces be
dispatche d in 1st Priority.
Sub-Para A. 2 divisions to SHANGHAI area.
Sub-Para B. 2 divisions to TAKU area.
Sub-Para c .1 division to C.ANTON area.
Sub-Para D. If above is impractic able, I consid.e r it imperativ e
that, as absolute minimum, 2 divisions be dispatche d to SHANGHAI AREA,
1 division to T/iJill Az.l1EA and 1 regi.ment to CliNTON AREA immediate ly.
Sub-Para E. If at all possible lriAC~OOI-illR stipulate at surrender
meeting that Japanese commanders in CHINA be instructe d to surrender to
Chinese Central C~ver.ment Commanders.
PROVIDE YOU Al'JD THE

12 1837

~.Toint

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MAC/t.ttTHUR, NDITTZ info Y/EDElffiYER.

v;ARX 48625.

As a matter of urgency request lflACARTHUR and NlllJ:TZ comments on

~IEDEUEYERS 4352 of l2 August be furnished Joint Chiefs of Staff vd th
info copies to Wedemeyer.
Para. As for ~JEDEMEYER S reconunen dation in ~Jaragraph 5 E, present
draft of general order number 1 to be issued by Japanese GHQ provides
for the surrender of Japanese comrnanders and all forces ~rithin CIIINA
(excludin g iANCHURIA) to the GENEHALISSIMO. This general order has
not yet been finally approved.

112

2051

EAHSHALL to YJEDEMEYER info NTILITZ, 1:~CARTHUR.

VIAR 47943.
FOR INFOR2t"'.TION ONLY FOR MACARTIIDR 1S AND NIMITZ'S
f.fSYZR ' S EY2S ONLY FROM I:IARSHALL ..

~YES

ONLY. FOR

T;EDE-

Para. ';oe are in a discuss.:.i..on now regarding deploymen t of troops into

JAPAN and the return of tired out high score men from the Pacific to
the United Stc,tes. The 1st requireme nt involves immediate ly the diversion of C-54' s to a special run from the Philippin es. to OKINAWA and
another prosuectj_ ve run into J 1\PAN. This diversion of course immediate ly reduces the evacuatio n from the Pacific of high score men by the
multiple of just that rrany pla..11es.
Para. \"'That I shou..ld like to knmr from you is hovr soon you feel
vre could make a lst reduction of HUMP tonnage in order to release C-54s
I mean by this a recuction prior to the opening of a port; for the
situation thereafte r of course you already have notificat ion.
Para . I should like an est1mate from you as to how much longer the
present Bimnp tonnar;e vvill be required in order to complete the equipmen
of the ALFA. divisions on the assumptio n that no further combat operatic""
ns are required but that of course num.erous movements will be involved
in order to herd the Japanese Army according to plan . Please aclmovvledge receipt immediate ly.

14

NllHTZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

13 1050

SHEHNAN to ND.ITTZ.
From 5 to 6 PH, conferred with General ~IacArthur and staff concerning occupatio n and surrender . He considers that as supreme allied co~
mander he is novf fully res Jonsible for, and commanda all phases of the
occupatio n of JAPAN. He desires no communic ation vdth Jananese authorities by forc~s in the Pacific except throughhi s headq~rters. He
expects to summon Japanese represent atives to HPJ\JILA to make a preliminary arrru1geme nt for the surrender .
Para. He reiterate d in most ~nhatic terms his disapprov al of the
use of a fleet landing force prior to the arrival of troops in strength
and prior to the clearance of Japanese forces from the area under armistice arrangeme nts. This disapprov al is based on both mill tary grounds
and effect on service relations hips.
Para. He repeated his full agreement .vdth occupatio n of Japanese
ports and coastal waters and complete blockade by the ships of the
'
fleet.
of the TOKYO AR6A he proposes a Joint
seizure
initial
the
For
Para.
and 27th infantry divisions , both
airborne
11th
the
using
operation
the 4th Marine Combat Team.
landing
time
same
the
at
and
airborne,
condition s set at HAI'JILA
until
place
take
not
would
operation
This
L
had been met.
.
Para. I expect to" take off at midnight.
Para. General L!ac~t\.rthur was shown the foregoing pa~agraphs.

13 2331

WAR to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ, COMGENCHINA.

COMES ANOTHER RELAY AT REQUEST OF HAR TO Cll~CPAC ADVANCE AJ\ID COMGENCHINA
EYES ONLY ld:A..li.SHALL TO MACARTHUR EYES ONLY.
WlL~

48342.

Para. For your informati on and guidruice the President today dispatched to the Prime Minister, Generalis simo Chiang Kaishek and Generalissimo Stalin messages stationg in substance as follows:
Para. Generat of the Army Douglas MacArthur is proposed as supreme
Commander for the Allied powers to accept, coordinat e and carry into
effect the general surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces.
Para. If you will furnish name of the officer you wish to act as
your represent ative, General MacArthur will be instructe d to make the
necessary arrangeme nts for the represent ative to be present at the
surrender .
Para. The message to the Prime Minister stated that it is contemplated that MacArthur vrill direct the (Japanese Imperial General
Headquar ters to surrender unconditi onally Japanese Forces in Southeast
ASIA and parts of HALAYSIA to Admiral Mountbatt en or his subordina te
In the messege to Generaliss~no Chiang Kaishek, it is
co~manders.
Imperial Heddquar ters will be directed to have
Japanese
that
stated
Japanese Forces in CHINA other than those opposing the Russians
surrender uncond.tionally to the Generalis simo or his subordina te

35.17

- continued -

NTIJIITZ ONLY
AUGUST (meT)

13 2331

WAR to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ, COMGENCHINA.

( Cont' d).

commanders. In the message to Stalin it is stated that l~cArthur

will direct Japanese Imperial Headquarters to have Japanese Forces
in the Soviet Area of operations surrender unconditional~ to the
Soviet High ComEJ.a.rider in the Far East or to his subordinate commanders.
Para. Preliminar,y instructions are being issued to General MacArthur and inrrnediate advice is requested concerning designaxed representatives so that MacArthur may be notified. It is suggested that
direct communication with MacArthur on arrangements be initiated at
once. This ends substance of messages sent to heads of state by the
President.
Para. The President would like to have the General Surrender take
place on American soil, that is, a Battleship, preferably the Battleship MISSOURI.
Para. The present plan for the acceptance of the surrender by you
as Supreme Commander provides that each of the 4 Jv:ajor Powers, u.s.,
CHINA, UK and USSR, vvill have a representative present, and A.dmiral
Nimitz will serve in the capacity of u.s. representative at the forrnal
surrender. .Admiral Nimitz has been infored of this and also concerning
the use of the Battleship MISSOURI.
Para. The foregoing constitutes your prelimina~J instructions.
Para. The following is purely for your information and is furnished
and '!Jill be u_sed for pla.'l"ll1ing oply.
Para. The State Department has replied to the Japanese Government
inforrni..."1g that that the Emperor will be required to authorize and insur
the signature by the Government of J AP1\N and_ the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the
provisions of the POTSDAM declaration and vJill be required to direct
surrender of Japc~ese Armed Forces and issue such other orders as the
Supreme Corrrrnander ma.y require to give effect to the surrender terms.
~
No reply has been received from the Japanese Government. /
case
in
use
for
basis
planning
a
on
considered
Para. Novv being
the Japanese accept the conditions is a message to the Japanese Government that it should immediately:
Para. (1) Direct cessation of hostilities by Japanese Forces,
informing the Supreme Commander for the Allied PolNers of the effective
date and hour of such cespation.
( 2) Send Emissaries to the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers with information of the disposition of the Japanese forces and
commanders, and fully empowered to make any arrangements directed
by the Supreme Comrn.ander for the All__ ed Pm,r ers to enable him and his
accompanying forces to arrive at the place designated by him to
receive the f orrnal surrender.
Para. Separate Subject: The Br itish h.ave now proposed transfer
to them of areas agreed at terminal effective on capitulation being
accepted.

14 1916

COJ1INCH AlTD CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE H2 "ulQUlu1.TZR.S .

KING TO NIMITZ.
Suspend attack air operations

fort~rith.

l:v

14 l41S

cm,ITNCH lU\fD CNO to CINCPAC JillV MJCE

HEAIY~UARTERS.

FOR ADMIR.I\1 NDilTZ EYi!JS ONLY.

Include in your plans the return of a representative force of

distinguished combatant vessels to the United States whenever in your
estimation vessels can be spared from duties in connection vvith the
Naval phases of the occupation of Japanese Territory. Your 110736.
Concur in your views as to your return in person . SecNav has been
informed of the substance of your reply. Submit for approval Brief of
your plans.

14 OSl4

CINCPl.tC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEET 2 info COM:INCH.

TO H.4LSEY INFO KING.
Macltrthur will' be appointed Supreme Allied Commander to "Exercise
Supreme Command over all Land, Sea and Air Forces which may be allocated for enforcement in JAPP..N of the surrender terms by the LUlled
Forces concerned". Until othe:nfiee directed by me do not lanP, any
in JAPAN. See COM7TH FLEErS 131050 passed separately.
ND.~ITZ

/14 0845

COMGENCHINA to r,VAJ."iCOS info MACP..RTHUR, NlliTTZ.

EYES ALONE TO WARCOS FOR JCS INFO EYES ALONE TO MP..GA.TtTHUR .AND NIMITZ .
CFBX 4580.
Para 1. Provision embodied in last paragraph of WARX 4S625 is
subject. I am sure that you recognize that MANCHURIA may properly be
termed the critical area in connection with current and projected
activities of Chinese Communists, and possib~ Soviet Communits. If
the General Order Number 1 to be issued by Japanese Headquarters provides for the surrender of Japanese . Conrrnander and of forces within
CHINA to the Generalissimo but excludes M.ANCHURIA insofar as the Generalissimo is concerned, following .implications should be noted:
SubPara A. The attitude of Soviet Russia tovrard the Chinese Communists has never been determined a ccttrately nor have Soviet intentions
in CHINA been formalized to a degree that Americans can view the
situation with equanimity. Hovrever it is not unreasonable to expect
penetration of Soviet communists ideologies in HANCHURIA with cooperation of Chinese Communists. If the General Order above referred to
excludes JJflJ,TCHURIA as now contemplated, there is extreme danger that
Japanese equipment will become available surreptitiously or openly to
the Chinese Communists in J~ILL''TCHURIA . Further the Chinese Communist
overall plans will be facilitated. If on the other hand the General
Order cl~arly stipulates that JaDanese Forces would surrender only to
Soviet Russian Forces and/or the Generalissimo 's forces, the above
dan '3 ers would be minimized perhaps obviated.
SubPara B. The ideas embodied in this message and in n1essages I
have sent to you the ~Jast several days might suggest partisan leaning
on my part . This is not the case. HoHever, the U.S. :POlicy has been
and continues to be full support of the Gener1 .lissimo vrho heads the
only officially and universally recogDized constituted goverrunent in
CHINA. The Generalissimo is concerned at present to be the strongest
- continued -

351~

NThiTTZ ONLY
AUGUST ( GCT)

14 0$45

- continued -

COMGENCHINA to 1:'JA-11COS info MACARTHUR, NThfiTZ. ( Cont 'd).

Chinese leader and the only one cap able of possibly accomplishing
a modicum of stability during this period of uncertainty. It vrould
t herefore a )~1 ear sound to create conditions by continued u.s. Political
Economic 8.1."1d Eilitary support (short of involvement in fratricidal war)
This
"~Nhich would strengthen t he existing central governments position.
surinsure
to
support s hould include iron clad stipulations designed
render of Japanese forces and equipment to the Generalissimo throughout
CHI NA including LA.NCHURL\, except in the immediate combat areas of the
Russians.
SubPara c. I view ASIA as an enormous pot, seething and boiling,
the fumes of vrhich may readily snuff out the advantages gained by
allied sacrifices the past several years and may also definitely
preclude realization of the objectives of th~ atlantic Charter, and
the TEHERAN, YALTA and POTSDAM agreements. In nzy- CFB 526, 9 July,
paragraphs 2 and 3, pertinent ideas and suggestions are expressed
that have stronger and immediate ap9lication today.
Para 2. I am so remote from internation negotiations, it is vdth
some :rb.isgivings that I submit following 2 alternate suggestions:
SubPara A. Schedule a conf'erence 1~th representatives from Soviet
Russia, u.s., Great Britian, China :Lfl DELHI, INDIA, as early as possibl<
to investigate and recommend appropriate steps necessa~J to preclude
Civil War in CHINA, or.
SubPara B. 3 Big Powers issue agreed proclamation to Chinese
Cornrnunists and Chinese Central Government that Civil 1;Iar will not be
tolerated in CHINA in any form or degree; that Big 3 are determined
to take appropriate steps and employ necessa~ force in premises;
that political and internal affairs must be settled vdthout employment
of force; that Big 3 recognized CHINA sovereignty and right of
determination by Chinese of form of Government; that employment of
force by factions in CHINA has serious ~m.plications Tf.ri th regard to
peace in the Far East and vmrld order in ..gseneral

14 1122
TO H ,~~.LSEY.
Your 140403. See my ]40813 which will I believe provide for
difficulties and envisage and vrill also avoid competition between
services as to priority of landing.

NTI~UTZ

14 1049

CINCAFPAC to lftf!tRCOS (JCS), AGNAI?. ~'lASH D C info COMGENCHINA, CThTCPAC.

ex 33449

.wswering your \llX 48625, 12 August requesting comments on Wedemeyer's 4325, 12 Au gust. Upon c paitulation the prompt occupation of
J APAN PROPER. is paramount and that operation should be given the
highest priority- i n the uti Jization of Pacific resources. The occupation of KOREA should be given 2nd priorit y , vrith CHIITA 3rd, and
then only to an extent t hat would i nsure U~it ed St ates ground forces
not becoming involved in a major l and cam.pai@'l in any part of the CH1N2\
THJ:ATER.
- cont i nued -

352 0

NTIITTZ ONLY
AUGUST GCT l

14

1049

- continued -

CINCAFPAC to HARCOS (JCS) ~ ACJ!lAR ~'JASH D C info COMGENCHINA, CINCPAC.

Para. Since the r e sources immediately available to CINCAFPAC will
be required for the execution of BLACKLIST, it ,.J'rotud be impossible to
divert forces to CHIN!\. as suggested by Hedemeyer in the priority
recommended and only at a future date is redeployrnent were continued
~o supply the means required.

" 14 0925

CINC.:I\FPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMGENCHllJA, COMINCH, WARGO~,

COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMGEl.\JFMFPAC, COMPHIBSPAC.

CO~~.QRDFLT,

ex

33438.
Your 120243/Z, prompt occupation of JAPAN in case of surrender
constitutes a first charge upon resources available in the Pacific
and is dependent on use of Divisions, including 5th Amphibious Corps,
which have been prepared for MAJESTIC. Use of 5th Amphibious Corps
in KOREA would cause large scale changes in fundamental arrangements
for supporting troops and inevitably cause delay and confusion. In
accord informal conferences with Admiral Sherma, II'Till proceed on basis
that 5th Amphibious Corps vdll be utilized .. in JAPAN PROPER. 24th
Corps will occupy KOREA. Noted is your plan for 3rd Amphibious Corps
and 1 Regimental Combat 6th :Marine Division.

14 0140

JOINT c'HIEFS OF STAFF TO MI\.C ~~. RTHUR, info l\JIMITZ WEDEMEYER.

i/IARX 49182.

Para. Read with reference to WAR. Lt-8672:

Para. A. The President has approved the wording of the lst document
which is the directive to the Supreme Conunander for the Allied Powers,
1vith the deletion in the 1st sentence of paragraph 3 of the words
11 as witnesses TDA 11
Para B. The President has approved the wording of the 2nd docu..rmmt
which is the proclamation by the Emperor of JAPAN.
Para C. The President has apnroved the wording of the 3rd document
which is the instrument of surrender with deletion of the words nby
the Supreme Commander for the All ied Powers 11 at the end of paragraph
7 and vv-i th the addition of provision for signatu!'es of representatives
of the Allied Powers. The President desires that, after you have
signed accepting the surrender, you invite the 4 representatives of
the Allied Powers to place their signatures on the surrender document
belo-v~r and to the left of the signature of the supreme com -:a nder,
in order as follows and 1.:-ith the follovdng designations printed or
typed under the respective signatures: u.s. representative, Repb.hlic
of CHINA representative, United Kingdon Representative, Union of
Soviet Socialist Re publics representative. The offici~l document vdll
be in the ~ngli sh language.
Para D. The 4th docwnent vrhich is General Order No. 1, is under
consideration here and minor modifications are being made.

- continued -

3521

NDITTZ ON1JY
A~GUST (GCTl

- continued -

JOINT CHIEFS OF ST;\FF TO

HACARTJiQ)~~'

info NTIITTZ, .3EDEMEThR.

Para E. There are minor editirial changes in the lst and 3rd
documents. Official copies of the lst, 3 docUJUents are being forw-arded
today by courier to MacArthur.
Para 2. V!i th reference to the directive to the supreme commander
for the Allied Powers, this will become effective when you are
officially notified by the V!a.r Department of Japanese Capitulatio n.
Para 3. The British, the Chinese, and the Russians have now all
agreed to the proposal of the President contained in ~'JAR 48342. The
Russians have designated Lieutenant General Deiviankl as their
The British have designated Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser.
representativ~.
~ar Department messages 1~342 and 48672 are being passed
Para 4.
to Admiral 1J:im.:itz and General Wedemeyer.

/13 2325

VvlLB.COS to CINCA.li'PAC info CINCPAC, COMGEUCHINA, COMGENIB.

49042.
The British Chiefs State that they assume that the U.S. will take
the lead in all general matters concerning an early Japanese Surrender
but have asked that the U.S. Chiefs keep them informed.
Para. British consider it of paramount political importance that
a British Commonwealth Force be sent at the earliest possible moment
to accept the surrender of the Japanese at HONG KONG. They propose to
send a detachment of the British Fleet at once to HONG KONG, followed
as soon as possi~le by an AustraLian Force in British Shipping, subject
to agreement with the Australian Goverrunent and to necessary arrangements being made with you and Nimitz. They also propose that the
adjustment of the boundary of S~'JPA as agreed at TERJ:JTI,J.'\.1 should take
effect upon the date of the cease fire order. Th~ ask the u.s. Chiefs
of Staff to be prepared to instruct you and Nimitz to mru(e available
the forces to send to HONG KONG. British will seek the agreement of
the Australian GovernJnent and instruct Admiral Fraser to concert his
plans for HONG KONG with you and Nimitz. 4-td of British proposal.
Para. The u.s. Chiefs have answered this proposal as follows:
Para A. P~ree to keep British informed of 'pertinent action t~(en
by the u.s. Chiefs and have passed WARX 47945 to British.
. Para B. The u.~. Chiefs will accede to a request to release to
British control at time of surrender all or part of the British Pacifi
Fleet. However, Nimitz has accepted a British Offmr, of a force of
1 BB, 2 CL, 1 CV and the necessary destroyers to participate with the
u.s. Fleet in the Naval occupation of J APi\N, if such occurs.
Para C. Occupation of HONG KONG is a matter for arrangement
between the Br:l:cish and Chinese Governments . The release of British
Forces is unrela~ed to any British proposals regarding HONG KONG. No
arrangement vTith General MacArthur for release of Australians appears
necessa~J other than detailed local arrangement s for the turnover.
Para D. Agree that the adjustment to the boundary of SWPA should
take effect on the date of the Japanese surrender. End of u.s. answer.
Para. The above is furnished you for your information . 1'EF?l;IINAL
agreement referred to provided for a passage from u.s. to British
Command as soon as possible of that part of s f?A lying south of following described boundary: beginning on the coast of I11DO CHINA at

~'TARX

352 ?

- continued -

NllJliTZ ONLY

AUGUST ( GQf)

13 2325

V:.iLB.COS to CINCAFFAC info Cil'JCPAC, COMGENCIIINA, COMGENIB.

16-00N; thence to intersect at 07-4JJN 116-00E, the boundary between

the Philippine Islands and British North BORNEO; thence along the
1939 boundary line of the Philippines to 05-00N 127-00E; thence east
to 05-00N 130-00E; thence south to the equator; thence east to :1.40-00E
thence generally south east to 02-20S 146-00E; thence east to 02-208
159-00E; thence south

l4 0403

OOM3RDFLEET to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CTF 31.

C.AMPUS 9 August. Strongly recomrnend reconsideration your 120241
. Assignment of a HarDiv considered necessary for following reasons:
A. Uncertainty of Japanese behavior.
B. Necessity of conducting shore operations on a normal combat
scale.
c. Task 1vill include occupation of air base, naval base ~d adjacent danger points. Enforcing evacuation of C<?ntrol zone. Establishing
secure and effective perimeter.
D. Length of interval between naval occu~)ation and the arrival
of designated Army occupation forces.
E. Inadequacy of equipment training and experience of personnel
of fleet landing force for other than tasks not involving risk of
stiff combat .
Para. Any problem of Army-Na~J jurisdiction could be solved by
transfe~ering to CINCA.FPAC operational control any troops of MarDiv
employed beyond limits of naval zones.

14 0812

CINCPAC MJV MICE to COl\ITNGH ..

NlliTTZ TO KING.

For your informatioh Sherman brought me from l:1anila a. copy of

:Marshalls W 48672 to MacArthur which contains complete copy of proposed
directive to Supreme Corrunander, proclamation by the Emperor of JAP.A.'f'T,
instrument of surrender and general order number 1.

14 0813

CINCPAC ADVAECE to CINCAFPAC.

NruiTZ TO UAC.\HTHUR.
I concur hearti~ in the proposal that the initial seizure of the
TOKYO .ARE:\ be effected by a Joint operation us ng the llth A.:irborne
and 27th Infantry Divisions both Airborne c;,nd at the sam.e time landing
the 4th :rarine Combat Team and other units of the Fleet Landing Force.

352~

NTI 1I TZ ONI ,y
LUGU.ST -@q!)

l4 2303

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINC.AFPAC, COMGENCHIEA info COH?THFLT, COMINCH.

Reque st CINCJ.FPAC pass to C0117THFLT i'fedemeyers CFBX 4580 and
similar messages which it is appropriate that he see in view of his
prospective assignment as Task Fleet Corrunander responsible for naval
operations along the CHINA co~ ST. Request COMGENCHINA. also include
COU?THFLT as appropriate.

lL~

2302

CINCPAC _IDVANCE to CINCAFPAC info COMINCH, COMGEN CHTIJA, :'!ARCOS, COHPHIBSPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM?THFLT, C01~GEN FMFPAC .
I concur in your CX 33438 DTG 140925.
PROPER constitutes first charge .

14 2035

Re: Occupation of JAPAN

CINCPAC .IDVANCE HQ to COMINCH.

Your 141916. 1!Jhat action should be taken regarding submarine
Re: suspend attack air operations forth,~th
attacks, bombardment etc.

J 14 1903

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to M.!.CA.RTHUR, Nll,ITTZ info VlEDE'J.JEl'ER.

w.~mx

49334.

With reference to W.\RX 4$004, the Chiefs of Staff have received the
following memorandum from the White House:
Para. 11 Referring .to memorandum dated 11 August directing such
advance arrangements as are practicable for the occupation of DAIREN
and a port in KOREA.
Para. FOVHPAuR further information, it is now considered v1ise
from a political point of view to also occupy as soon as possible
after the Japanese surrender some other mainland por-ts that definitely
are not in the area of Soviet operationsn. This ends. memorandum from
the White. House.
Para. The Chiefs of Staff are not able to appraise your capabilities to execute the primary mission of securing J AP!L'f\J PROPER and to
seize DUREN and a port in KOREA as envisaged in 7Ll.TG"Y 48004 and also
to seize l or more ports in CHINA defjnitely not in the area of Soviet
operations. Your analysis of the matter will be appreciated for
their use.

3524

19 0225

COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC 1illV.ANCE

HALSEY TO

Hq.

~ffi!ITTZ.

Shermen 1 s 181019 can meet all requireme nts but may find it advisable
to move heavy ships into TOKYO BAY on 25th instead of 24th depending
,on satisfacr oty completio n of sweeping and on plans for coverning landings (see my 190219 to EICHELB}~1.GER); this should not upset any other
lmovrn plans of yours or Mac: rthur' s. Landing forces from fleet consist
of:
A. 1800 marines in 3 battalion s tmder Cler11ents' co.rnmand and assigned
tasks conunensu. rate with their capabilit ies and equipment .
B. 1200 u.s. Bluejacke ts in 3 battalion s and a British Landing Force
of 400 men available for security duty in wake of combat troops.
C. Reserve of 2000 additiona l Bluejacke ts in 5 battalion s available
for security duty but poorly e~ipped.
D. Special Bluejacke t operating comnanies of artificer s for service
duties pending arrival of seabees and garrison forces. Your 181535 my
plans have at all times taken limitatio ns into considera tionand I
contempla te minimum use ashore consisten t Yfi th security and doing a
-)roper job. New Subject. Your 1813541 most helpful and everythin g
should proceed smoothly.
17 2214

11.\B.SHALL to l!IACA.J.lTHUR,

~n-IEEIER, ~JEDEt:lliYER

info NIMITZ.

50693.
HA3.SHALL TO =rACAJ1THUR, :tHEELER J\.ITD ~JEDEUEY'ER INFO NTI:ITTZ.
u.s. Chiefs have informed British regarding rnatters give in W.t-tH.X 4957
in substance as follows:
A. Accept in principle participa tion of British Ground forces in
occupatio n of J \P.U~, details as to size and compositi on being matters for
later determina tion.
B. PresuJne British will shortly furnish views concernin g forces for

JTAJ.T-LX.

KORE\.

C. Consider previous agreement s on the employmen t of British Ground

and Air forces in the Pacific supersede d and rec 1uest informati on co~cern
ing dispositi on of tic;er force elements a~ready in the Pacific.
D. Point out the following in connectio n with British proposal regarding operation s outside of their aiTeed area of responsib ility:
Pacific theater less areas agreed to pass to British on day of
Jaryanese surrender (/.\~?X 49042) is an area of u.s. resnonsib ility and
u.s. vriL_ continue vrith operation s in that area connected with Japanese
surrender ;

Generalis simo is t he Supreme Com.m.ander in CHINA;

responsib le
be
to
n
Iountbatte
T
for
provides
agreenent
Governr11ental
commander
U.S.
and
J;.\Y.SIA
!~~.
of
parts
and
SS.\C
in
atters
for surrender n
for the Pacific Theater;
Chinese a e;reement to surrender arran~ement s obtained on the basis
that surrender of J ay:Js in CI-II~:!A (ex cluding thos e onoosing the Hussians)
vTould be a matter for t he Genera lissimo;
- continued -

f
- continued -

17 2214

Lil RSHALL to :.::;l.CA.RTIHJR.,

u.s. Chiefs have alreaqy issued instructions that u.s. forces

entering the CHINA THK'\TE~l 1Nill be vdth the approval and cogn.i..za.nce of th
Generalissimo and subject to control of Hedemeyer vrho (as his chief of
staff) is resnonsible to the Generalissimo.
E. Hatter of priorities within British Area of responsibility is
British concern so suggest that any resources that the British have
available beyond those required in their ovm area of responsibility be
defined with a vievr to their use in assisting in the u.s. area of responsibility.
F. u.s. has placed the opening of a CHIHA. PORT (in collaboration
with and to assist Chinese) in a priority below the securing of JAP1tN
and a Dort in KOREA. If British are able to make forces ouicklv available to~ enter a CHINA PORT, th.ey should be considered for the main effort.
G. Suwnarizing, u.s. government considers a~y rnatters concerning
British Forces entering CHINA THE~TER should be arranged between British
and Chinese Governments. After completion of such governmental arrangements, coordination involving l:1acArthur, Hedemeyer and Nimitz can go
forward. If such governrnentat arrangements are completed, u. s. stands
ready to integr2.te British proposals (agreed by the Generalissimo) with
other Pacific operations. This ends u.s. reply.
Para. The above is furnished for your information.
21 0600

COU?1'HFLT to ODJCP. C ADVANCE HQ.

KTI\JKAID TO .NTIIITZ X

Capt Carroll B. Jones, Naval aviation rn.ember advance party to

TOKYO was informed by GHQ today that he I'Jould not be allowed to inspect
and obtain lst hand information on airfield and facilities YOKOSill(A.
Party will be kent toeether vicinity ATSUGI to prevent possible incident
All available information field and facilities YOKOSUl\A is to be
supplied to advance party by Japanese.
16 0718

CINCP1lC

~\DV

to C01.HNCH .t.i.ND CNO

NllUTZ TO KING ONLY.

It is my present concept that as soon as troops occupy J '..PAN in

strength (in about 1 month to 6 weeks) it will be T)6ssible to greatly
reduce fleet strength in the western pacific. :\t that time I propose
to have Spruance take over all forces in Japanese vv-aters a11d return
approxL~tely 2/Jrds of the 0resent fast carrier task force to the
eastern Pacific . At the same time Fletcher can return to the north Pac
or take le2.ve and Halsey can be returned for leave. All fast battleshins can be returned exceDt lT.i:.! J .2.S'SY and possibly l other. It will
probably be necessary t; retain many of the cruisers and destroyers.
Some of the old battleships can return at the sante tline.
Para. The foregoing is admittedly general in netture and vrill be
made more specific as the situation clarifies. It is furnished now in
res;Jonse to your l4l418~

..-Jll.HTZ OHLY
AUGUST ( GCT)
17 0830

US '\FY:x LI.:~TSO:'T .SECTICH K~'J'IDY C.1YLDN TST 228 to '.JIU1 D~P,ffiTEE!.TT COJ.f_:
ITT CHI-;;F : ..R11 1Y FORCES :!?;1~Cil'"'TC :wl\ITNISTR!~TTOlJ HIUJlLA, PHILI::mrl1ES
COJ:ITNCH oasses to CINCPJlJ.C.

:LJ".~D=R

To Earshall personal info ,:acArthur and ~ledeneyer both personal

from :/heeler TST 238. Here a paraphrase of top secret emergency
operatio:p signal sent by the Commander in Chief British Pacific Fleet
to the Commander in Chief East Indies Fleet info .~d.rniralty and SACSEA
on the 16th of August . Begins.
1. Dispositions have been made for the occupation of HOHGKONG as
follows:
A. Under Rear Ad.rn:i.ral Harcourt in IKDOI:rrABlli with venerable
s:~J:FTSURE 3 DD' s and PlUNCE ROBJRT. task force 111.2 sailed from SYDNEY
completed insofar as possible voJith rehabilitation personnel and supplies
on the 15th of August for l;LiNUS and L'SYTE. This force could arrive
off HONGKONG the 26th of August.
B. Proceeding with the "A1.ustralian Governrilent are negotiations for
SHROPSHIRE ( Commodre Collins) HOBART and 2 DD' s to depart from SUBIC
with the date of arrival at HONGKONG 2 days after leaving SUBIC. Ran
mine sweepers are sailing from gc,ROTAI probably 20 August . Submarines
and ~lAID STOlTE and OXFORBSHIHE which are now at SUBIC would also join
Yrith this force.
2. Task Group lll.3 under rear Admiral Servaes in BERMUDA vdth
COLOSSUS evnd 3 DD' s left SYDNEY 15 August headed for ~G'1.NUS and LEYTE
and subsequently for duty elservhere along the CHITTA CO \ST as required.
3. Task Groups 111.2 and 111.3 are augmented respectively by
EURYALUS and ~lliGON: UT and 1 DD each at I.:ANUS . 3nds.
18 2312

~!ARCOS

to

CII!CP~

C ADV, CIIIC \FP! C info

DE~COI.,1 20~;_f_,_J[:__CT

CHUNGKTI,JG.

~JATL"'
.. \ 51396.

This message should h:-..ve the minimum distribution essential to its

implementation.
Para. For your information, the President today sent to Generalissimo Stalin the following message: rrRe:pl~;ring to your message of lugust
16, I agree to your renuest to modify General Crder Ntmber 1 to include
all the ICUl1ILr~ ISLA:.~DD in the area to be Slli"'rendered to the Commander
in Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far ~ast. HoT,ever, :r shoudl like
it to be understood. that the Un; ted 8t2.tes .r-;overnr:1errt desires air base
rights .:or land end sea aircraft on some 1 of the EUH.IL.!: ISL.'uTDS, preferably in the Central Group, for militcu. .y ]"Yur:)oses end for comr.o.ercial
use. I should be glad if you 1:;ould advise me -GhC1t you vrill agree to
such an arrangement, the loca:tion and other detaisl to be vrorked out
for this ,ur-Jose .
Para . J.egarding your susgestion as to the surrender of Japanese
forces on the island HC~Ic:: U:OO to Soviet forces, it is my intention and
arrangements ha.ve been made for the surrender of Japanese Forces on all
the islc.nds of J_uJ.pp J FHOPl~1l, HOT"Y:~roo , I-K.Jl1ISHU, SHir~uKU, and KYUSHU
to General Lac.l.X'thur ,.
- continued -

3527

- corrt.inued -

N111IT2: o:;r_,y

..

AUGUST (~~CT L

Para. General ~ acarthur 1Nill employ allied token forces, uhich,

of course, includes .Soviet forces, in so much of a temporary occupation
of JAP;.N PJ.O?::.!ill as he considers it necessary to occu~JY in order to
accomplish our allied surrender ter.:.1s 11.
Para. The foregoing is for yolrr information and guidance and you
should wn.end Gener<:,l Order Humber l to include a~l the KUHl~~ ISLANDS
in the area to be surrendered to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet
Forces in the Far East .

23 1945

MARSHALL to COMGENCHINA inf'o CINCAFPAC. CINCPOA ADVANCE HQ.

WAKI 53670.
Generalissimo h&s informed the President in substance as follows:
"British have been notified that I agree to delegate authority to a
Britiah COlJID&llder to accept the surrender of HONGKONG and I will also
designate a Chinese and an American Officer to participate therein. British have been asked to effect necessary militar.r coordizlation
on operational matters with Wedemeyer and the Chinese board of military
operations." End or message from Generalissimo.
Para. You will shortly receive a JCS directive on this.

,24 OJM

CINCPAC

APV

HQ

to COM7THFLT

TOP SECRET. NIMITZ to KINKAID EYES ONtr. Cru.Div 16 with screen has
been assigned to you and action is being taken to send you a fast
carrier division. The importance of the projected operations in the
YEI.JJJN SEA KOREA and north CHINA accordance 1lf3' 210818 indicate the
desirability of your shifting your flag il'lto a CB or CA at ear:cy date
and exercising tactical co.trJDand of' the North CHINA Naval Force leaving your rear echelon to follow in .A.GC. Request your views and
estimate of timing.

24 1053

CINCAFPAC to cmCPAC ADV HQ Into COMINCH, WARCOS

TOP SEX::RET. CX 36334 Prime Minister of Australia by urgent dispatch
expresses the desire of his. government to have Task Force 74.1 consisting of 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers proceed TOKYO BAY to arrive there
before surrender August .31st stating that in view of the part played
through the Pacific war by Australian forces in association with
United statev forces the government would be grateful i f we would
provide necessary facilities, including logistic support to enable
this to be done. The force is now at SUBIC and it is stated would
have to sail before AM 25 August and fuel at OKINAWA. The Prime
Minister also stated that the government wishes and Australian foree
to operate under an Australian commander subject only to SCAP. With
your concurrence as to logistic support I propose to reply giving
approval but stating that in order to avoid contusion it is deemed
essential that the Canmander Australian Squadron report to Com 3rd
Fleet upon arrival. Your urgent comment requested.

352

24 0219

COM 3RD FLT to SCAP Into CINCPAC ADV HQ

(Corrected Cop,y Below)

Request statement of your policy

concerning .rqr initiating on and after thirty first assistance and
evacuation to POWs located in arv waterfront POW camps in TOKYO BAY

HALSEY to MACARTHUR Info NIMITZ.

area.

24 1446

CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINC!FPAC Into COMINCH. WARCOS, C01QRDFLEET, CTF 95,

OOM5THFLEET

TOP SECRET.

/24

2.317

Your 241053 concur.

Will provide tuel OKINAWA and TOKYO.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ _into WEDEMF:YER

. WARX 545]4.

War.x 47945 directed the occupation ot ~0 in KOREA as a 2nd choice

upon recources avaiJ.able to the Pacific COIIID&Ilders. Warx 4&J04 directed
that, in accordance with the Presidents desires, arrangements would be
made to occupy a port in KOREA. War.x 49.334 requested an&qsis of your
capabilities or securing JAPAN and also occupying a port in KOREA.. Wan
50181 directed MacArthur and Nimitz, after conaultation with Wedemeyer,
to furnish the best estimate of a time schedule for the occupation of a
port in KOREA including an alternate port in case the Russians bad occupied
KEIJO. .
Para. While stalin has agreed in a message to the President to receiving the surrender of Jap forces as provided in General. Order No. 1,
there is no certain assurance that the Soviets will not eontinue th~r .
occupation monments southward in KOREA ur.diil such time aa ther meet
u.s. forces. There are~
_ ontiaed reports that the Soviets are planning
movements south of the o-o degree line.
Para. Request earlie . . sible rep~ to directive containecl 1n
Warx 50181 insofar as KOREA is concerned.

24 0219

COM3RDFLT to SCAP into cmCPAC ADV HQ.

Halsey to MacArthur into Nimitz. Request statement of your policy
concerning Jl\T initiating on and after 26 August assistance and evacuation
to POWS located in aiW waterfront F'C1N camps in TOKYO BAY ARE!.

25 0002

CnlCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

Nimitz to King onl;r. The value of the combatant ships of the Japanese
Navy is extreme]Jr little insofar as the major pavers are concexned. Their
nuisance value in the hands of the Chinese or certain other nations might
be verr great. The process ot division can be very vexatious and complicated. Accordingly recommend that high level decision be made to make
Japanese fighting ships available in JAPAN tor technical inspection and
then destroy them.

AOOUST ( GCT)

352C4

25 0803

CINCPAC ADV to COMSOPA.C, OOMMARGILS into CINCPOA PEARL HQ, COMINCH.

Nimitz to H!Jldren

am

Harrill into King.

The resident comissione r

TARAWA has asked COMMA.RGlLS concerning plans for reoccupatio n OCEAN and

NAURU. Due to the more urgent requirement s elsewhere these islands have
a rela.tivel.y low priority insofar as the use of u. s. Forces is concerned.
Para. Requests from British CODnOnwealth sources for information
concerning pl:ans to occupy ocean and NAURU should be countered by' suggestion that those interested submit to COMSOPAC pl.ans and proposals tor
accomplishment of occupation using British resources.
25 1010

CO!Q}IDFLT to CINCPAC ADV into . St1PR!l1E COMDE FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.
/'

l25 0813

SCAP 250608 just received.

still reeonmend approval rq 250935.

CO!lZTHFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Kinka.id to Nimitz only. Plyes Onl..y. Your 240148. My intention has

been to command projected 7th Flt operations in KOREA and north CHINA
with !IV flag in ROCKY MOUNT. Date RFS ROCKY MOUNT has been advanced to
l. September which will permit me to embark 'With staf't in time to join
Amphibious Group departing OKINAWA .for objective area. Believe command
function can be exercised .more effective] from AGC than fran BB because
of better conmun:i cations and presence of' entire start. Present Plan.
Minesweeper Group start sweeping channel. through line 7 minefield on
E minus 7 and start eeping in objective area on E .Minus 3. Covering
Group for minesweeping operations canposed of 2 evE'S now assigned 7th
Fleet plus Cru.Div 6 and Destroyer screen. Fast Carrier Division upon
reporting will be directed replenish then relieve CVE 'S which will return
to base to prepare for mxt operation. Cru.Div 16 join and proceed to
objective area with Amphibious Group.
25 11,3a

CDICPAC ADVANCE to SCAP.

As a matter of urgency strongly recommend your approval Com3rdFleet
250935. In order to expedite request your rep~ be to Com.3rdFl.eet info
criNCFOA. Your 2506oS applies.

25 1458

COMINCEI' AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE into COM5THFLT.

From King to Nimitz and Spruance. AP press releases here report
interview With Spru.anee in whiCh he questions the political wisdom of
American retention of OKINAWA. It is probable that the United states will
desire to continue the occupation and use ot OKIN~A. In such event it
is essential that the American position should not be handicapped or
embarrassed by ill-advised expressions ot opinion on such matters by
high COJIIIWlders in the field. Desire that you. issue appropriate instructions in regard to foregoing.

AUGUST ( OOT)

353 0

26 0822

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH.

Nm!TZ TO KING ONLY. j

Unless you see reasons to the contrary I plan to consolidate rq .
my headquarters at Pearl as soon as the occupation of JAPAN is well in
hand and to turn the command facilities at GUAM over to Commander

Marianas to use

and to

maintain in readiness tor such future use by

CINCPAC as mq be required.

\The processes

ot

demobilization and

rollup can be handled much better.a.t Pearl in close touch with the
type conmanders -and with a United staff.

26 0829

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM3RDFLT.

:NIMITZ TO HALSEY.
I wM shift rrq. flag from South Dakota to Missouri about 0900
on the dq of the surrmder ceremony and will shift it back to South
Dakota when I retum to that ship atter the eeremorv-. To compl\r with
instructions from higher authority it will be necessary tha.t you
transfer your flag to South Dakota after I return to .Guam and then
~ ~ send Missouri to GUAM for rq .further use . as F1eet Flagship.

2b 0128

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMGENCHINA.

NDITZ TO WEDDlEYER ONLY.

Your 250S3l. lla.rine Air Units are integral components of the

Fleet Marine Force. Each Marine Amphibious Corps on the field has
attached to it a Uarine Aircraft Wing. It is not desired to operate
lfarine Amphibious Corps without such npport. For operations in CHINA
li\Y Joint staff Study' contemplates a Marine Aircraft Wing to reduced
strength. Your concurrence requested.

26 0]47

CmCPAC ADVANCE to COW'l'HFLT info COMINCH.

NDliTZ TO KINKAID INFO KING.

Your 250813 does not indicate satisfactory compliance rq 240118 in
that is appears to contemplate dela\ving use of the naval forces avail.able to you until minesweeping starts and then to orient them entire~
with respect to the movement of troops.
Para. I do not consider that there is a:ny air threat which require
use of Fast Carriers to c<Wer minesweeping operations. There is ampl.e
access to YELI.CW SEA west of Mine Line 7.
Para. lfJr purpose in assigning to the 7th Fleet a Fast Carrier Division, a Heavy Cruiser Division, the GUAM am ALASKA and their escorts
is to establish in the YELLOW SEA irmnediately an impressive naval force
which well in advance ot the arrival of troops can occupy and control
those waters and can by a timely sh<M' of naval force inf'luence the
general situation in north CHINA and the special situation now developing as indicated by Jqs 242317. See Sub Para A of 3rd Para lf13' 210818.
Para. Expedite compliance rq 240llB using Cruisers 1nitial.JT and
augmenting with Fast Cariiers when they arrive. Aeknwledge.

35 3--

NIMITZ ONLY

AUGUST ( GCT)

26 0419Z

SCAP to WARCOS FOR JCS into CWGENCHINA. CmCPAC APVANCE. COJlZTHFLT,

COWTHPHIB. OOMGEN 24TH CORPS. J

ex 36853.

Reference W.X 54514, also CINCPAC 250801 not to all or needed. The
present plan is for the 7th Division to occupy KEIJO on 11 September.
Conferences this date indicate that the initial movement of light:cy- .
armed troops, IE, APA and AKA, cant~ place leaving OKINAWA on the
4th arriving KEIJO on the 7th. This movement will 'be followed with
heavier equ:LJ108nt as rapidl;y as possible. This plan is being approved
and instructions are being issued to COM GEN 24TH CORPS and others
to execute general.ly as indicated.

COM'ZTHFLT to OmCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COMINCH.

EYES ONLY. KINKAID TO NDaTZ INFO KING.

Your 260147. Regret misunderstanding. Com7thFleet will shift
flag into UINNEAPOLIS Zl August ani depart Manila with CRUDIV 6 on
28 August to be joined by CRUDIV l.6 off OKINAWA for operations
SHANTUNG-CHINWANGTAO AREA accordance SUbPara A of 3rd Para y-our
2l081S. Unless otherwise directed will turn over to Fbilippine
Sea Frontier duties outlined 1119' 180140 as of 28 August.

26 Aug.

WARCOS to CINCA.FPAC - COMINCH PASSES 'ID CINCPAC ADVANCE.J .

WAR 55315.
state Department gl.ves infomation that Russian foreign office
have asked whether General Order Number 1 has been amended to include
KURILES in area to be surrendered to the USSR. Secretary of state
is replying confirming that General Order Number 1 has been so

amended.
Para.

26 0531

The foregoing is for your information.

CQM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ. The introduction of Japanese Pubinfos into the
picture involves some security consideration which appear unacceptable
from a military standpoint 8.nd unfair to Allied eorrespondents from
the standpoint of censorship. From both standpoints I look with the
utmost disfavor on enemy personnel being accorded the priviled.ge ot
visiting Amercan men of War or naval installations and urge that u.s.
Nav.y stand on its security rigpts in resisting ~ such concessions
nor or later.

35 3?

NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST ( GCT)

2S 0740 CINCPAC ADVANCE HEAPQUARTERS to COMINCH.

NDn:TZ TO KING J
Your 251540. Propose to send approximately following to Atlantic Coast
ports 'Wlder command Vice Adm. F. c. Shennan arriving Canal Zone about 10
October. MISSOURI (BB 63), NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55), WASHINGTON (BB 56},
NEW MEXICO (BB L.D), MISSISSIPPI (BB 41), IDAHO (BB 42), N1M YORK (BB 34),
RANDOLPH ( CV 15), WASP ( crv 18), ENTERPRISE ( CV 6), RANGER ( CV 4), MONTEREY
( CVL 2h), BATAAN ( CVL 29), LANGLEY ( CVL 'Zl), BOISE ( CL 47), RICHMOND ( CL 9),
CONCORD (CL 10), DESRON 25 and DESHON 23 less BRAINE (DD 630). All except
MISSOURI allocated to LantFlt by your 251555 and would be transferred to
CinCLant for duty upon arrival Atlantic. Missouri would return to Pacific
upon completion visit.
Para. Propose approximately following to Pacific Coast Ports under
co.umand Admiral Halsey arriving b y Navy Dq. SOUTH DAKOTA {BB 57), WISCONSIE,
(BB 64), INDIANA (BB 58) ALABAMA (BB 60), I(JNA (BB 61), WEST VIRGINIA
(BB 48), COLORADO (BB 45~, MARYLAND (BB 46), ARKANIAS (BB 33), TEXAS (BB 35)
TICONDEROGA (CV 14), HORNET (CV 12), SARATOGA (CV 4), BUNKER HILL {CV 17),
BALTIMORE (CA 68), PITTSBURGH (CA 72), AMS'l'ERDAM (CL 101}, VICKSBURG (CL 86)
TUCSON ( CL 98), DESRON 61.
31 0404 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC AFLOAT - CINCPAC AFLOAT PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.
HALSEY TO NIMITZ J
Subject: Proposed operations in 3rd Fleet area of control. I propose
the following.
A. On receipt of adequ.9.te information from Japanese initiate Navy operations to temporar~ seize all minor Japanese bases for the sole purpose of
taking possession of midget submarines, suicide craft, human torpedoes, and
other naval installations and equipment. In each case appropriate arrangements to be made with A.rm;y'. Unless a general covering directive is received
f'rom you I will in each case report what installations and vessels are located and will request instructions as to moving same to YOKOST.fl{A, SINKING,
or destroying. .
B. Will make general survey: of 3rd Fleet area of responsibility and wi.lJ
then make reconunendation as to the establishment of' inspection or visiting
patrols or permanent guard f'or (10 groups missing- being serviced)
CUFF will make specific recommendation concerning base development necessary
ror-the support of the eastern control forces~

31 0402 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC AFLOAT - CINCPAC AFLOAT

PA~SES

TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ J
Subject: Estimate and intentions based on current informat~on and
pertinent instructions from CINCPAC AFLOAT. I plan to institute the
following measures.
A. Immediately ret urn officers and men in the fleet landing force who
are attached to ships departing for overhaul on 3 September.
B. Order into SAGAMI anchorage all ships due to depart from the western
Pacific under vice Admiral Shermans command to pick up their landing force
persormel and clear up fag ends.

35.3

(Cont'd)

c. Place remaining 3rd Fleet Fast Carrier forces under command of

Vice Admiral Towers.
D. Establish system of rotation for 3rd Fleet carrier task forces
operating in EMPIRE waters. Forces not relieved at sea to anchor in SAGAMI
and TOKYO .AREA. Separately after completion of fly fly operation will make
reconunendations as to strength of carrier forces required at sea to cope
with Japanese situation.

E. Upon receipt of your action on these recommendations will make

reestimate of fuel and logistic support requirements with view to earliest
release of surplus.
F. Will at later date separately submit further estimates based on
contemplated tithdrawal of additionai forces to west coast.
31 1743 JCS to NDITTZ, MACARTHUR

WARX 57808.
In view of the Division of responsibility established in the RYUKYUS
by JCS 181409, JCS 100345 (Dec 44) should be interpreted as requiring that
the Commander in Chief, u.s. ~ Forces, Pacific assume responsibility for
the supervisio~ and utilization of shipping to Arir'ly oontroUed ports of the
RYUKYUS.

29 2316 CINCPAC AFWAT to COMINCH info CmCPAC ADVANCE HQ. )

NIMITZ TO KING.
Para 1. Your 282050. The following comments on CINCAFPACS C 10526 of
28 August are based on m:r understanding that the RYUKYUS are located in
the Pacific Ocean Areas and that certainpositions therein were transferred
to CINCAFPAC (NOT CINCSVIPA) as stated in Victory 73 "To !aeiliate preparation for and execution of OLYMPIC 11
Para 2. The realities of the situation are that as in the Marianas,
Marshalls and elsewhere the surrender of Japanese held islands is best
accomplishe~ by the use of naval vessels and landing forces of min:imum.
size. The Japanese forces if repatriated must be transported in ships.
Islands which we do not need as bases do not need to be occupied by our
troops in strength.
Para. If the enell\1 held positions in the RYUKYUS are to be transferred
to CINCAFPAC as soon as they w.rrender to CINCPAC it V'till be advantageous
to have them surrender direct to CINCAFPAC. If the RYUKYUS are to revert
to the control of cmCPAC-ciNCPOA it will be better to have them surrender
to CINCPAC.
Para. It is feasible for CINCPAC to accept the surrender of the remai ning islands in the RYUKYUS.

29 1755 JCS to NMTZ, VllEDEMEYER., MACARTHUR. j

WARX 56636.
As a basis for interim operations and for future planning the JCS approv
e the concept of operations on the CHINA COAST as outlined in CINCPACS
210818 of August with exception of last para which should reaci:
Para. "F. Prepare for occupation of TIENTSIN-TAKU BXld/or CHINGlvANGTAO
- continued -

35 3 !~

(Contd)

and TSINGTAO or, alternativel;y i f CENTRAL CHlliA situation requires when

forces are ready, occupation of SHANGHAI AREA.

Para. Conmand arrangements for these operations will be as prescribed in WARX 47945, ll August 1945.

28 1.8.30 CINCPAC to SCAP info COl.QRDFLT, COMINCH, CINCAFPAC, OOMGEN 8TH ARMY.
NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR INFO HALSEY.

Com3rdFleet 2Sll01. ln view circumstances outlined in reference urge

that you i.mmed.iate:cy authorize Halsey to take inmediate action to contact
FOW and to take such steps as necessa.Ij" for alleviating their condition and
moving them into American Jurisdiction. In order that the intolerable
conditions outlined in reference lllaJ7 be corrected in minimum time and to
provide for possible failure or delay in conmunications Com3rd.Fleet is hereby authorized, if no repzy is received from you by 1300 TOKYO TIME todq,
to initiate such local action as to PCJN as humanitarian considerations require.
2S ll.01 COM3RDFLT to SCAP info CnlCPAC ADVANCE.
HALSEY TO MACARTHUR INFO NDilTZ.
.
Swiss representative of international Red Cross now with CTF 31 anchored
off YOKOSUKA reports ~ prison~rs of war sick, 150 seriously ill in SHINEG..llWA CAMPS hospital. All camps desperately in need of food. 200 aviation
personnel in bad state at OMORI camp on the waterfront. The urgency- of the
situation is confirmed by extensive photographic coverage of POW CAMPS with
prisoners waving to planes and signs "Food " on ground, by information from
Japanese JWissaries that there are 6,125 allied prisoners of war in the
TOKYO AREA of which 417 are bedridden, and by information obtained from 2
British Marine prisoners who escaped from KAMAOMKI CAMP and where picked up
by picket boat near SAGAMI WAN ANCHORAGE. All or the facilities under D\V
command are available to you and to the Commanding General of the Sth ArB\V
for the immediate extension of urgent care, assistance and evacuation of the
allied prisoners of war in eastem HONSHU. I suggest that liaison officers
of the 8th Arrtry be sent to me at YOKOSUKA in order that I may initiate and
expedite this task in accordance with your policies.
Para. I have immediately available in TOKYO AREA 3 hospital ships 2
APDS, .30 doctors, 90 corpsmen, and clothing and foor for 3000 men. I will
have available on the afternoon of 1st September in addition to above 2 LSVS
2 APAS, 20 additional doctors and 60 corpS{je:n, food and clothing for 4000
men. I have a tactical organization reaqy with all available information
and prepared to act.
Para.. I propose for most expeditious action. A. To send medical assistance and food with Red _Cross and Japanese Liaison to TOKYO BAY waterfront
camps prompt4' reporting to COMGEN STHARMY and to you on conditions f'oWld.
B. To receive released 90WS on board hospital ships and APAS in TOKYO BAY
for evacuation to points COMGEN STH ARMY directs. c. Send on 3 September
with 8th Arrtry liaison party l lSV, 1 APA with appropriate escorts and
minesweepers to an east coast port in the S:ENDAI AREA to contact camps in
that area extend medical assistance and evacuate to points COMGEN8THARMY
directs. n. 'ro establish transient hospital clothing and supply station r
tor POW at YOKOSUKA for use as required.
35 3

STANDARD FORM NO.

64

Office Memorandum
1'0
FROM

00

uNITED sTATEs GovERNMENT

DATE:

0...3

I'(

3538

..

.,COMM.i~ND
.

AND GEN:sRAL STAFF COLLEGE:t

. 609 .

... .

. . LECTURE
... THE NAVY IN, WORLD W
Ai

IJ.

V;Lce Admiral Forre- ~t p. Sherman, USN

Deputy Chief of. Nava:L . Op~rati.ons, Navy Dep~.
:Lt. ' Gen. Gerow- Introductory Remarks~
In the period. between the two World T'Jars we gave very little consider4o.t
ation to the problems of combined or joint

Each service went

operations~

about its own business as if decisive battles of future wars were to be

t'

fought independently by air, eround or na_val forces.

entered i'vorld

V~ar

Cons_equently, when we

II most of our offic,ers were sadlJ: _lacking in a knowledge

of the capabilities and limitations of their sister service.s ,

Jealousies

between the services, shortages of funds, . ~ack of faciliti~s, equipment and

persortnel had retarded training and a development of technique for welding
air~ ground and naval units into a smooth working, efficient. team operating

under a single COil'l.ftland.

During the progress of World VJar II we learned . this

team work, hut we learned it the hard way, after the fighting started.

In

order to' .keepalive this "know how" and to employ our techniques and to

disseminate this knowledge to as many officers as possible considerable time

has been allowed to this cours e t? the study of air and naval operations,
by these two forces acting _alone and in coordination
To assist

us

wi~h

the ground forces.

in putting over this instruction the Chief of Naval Operations

has very kindly design::->.t ed several of his most distinguished an,d outstanding officers to address the- class during the academic year.

We are honored

today in having as our first Navy g~e_s~ speaker; Vice Admiral Forrest

p.

Sherman, Depu'ty Chief of Naval Operations, who will talk on the Navy

~n

vj6rld 1Var II. The:r-e is no o~ficer: b~t.ter qualified to address the class
. ..
~

6n this oubjoct.

Shortly. befor e 1~ !orld War II and shortly thereafter he

played a vor;r prominent pa rt in.thepr:- c paration Qf war plans .for the opera-

'

tion of our naval units on a ll s ea s

~f

the globe.

Afterthat assignment

he was detailed as Corlunande r of t he aircraft F!ASP, and followed it in all

its e nga geme nts until :i_t was sunk b y _e,neiny action in 1942..

In accord with

l ong standing Navy tradition Admira l Sherman was the las.t person to leave
1 ;...

35 37

..

"-

the TrJASP before it sunk,

and _swam for an hour and a half in the ocean.;

ered with oil,. until he was picked up by a rescue party.

co~~

After he left

the \'",rASP he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet and
of the Pacific Ocean areas.. In that capacity he participated and planned

many of the operations that took place in this very very extensive area.
It is a great pleasure for me this morning to introduce an old friOnd
and a distinguished sailor and aviator, Admiral Sherman,
- Thank

yo~.

Vice Admiral Sherman Speaking -It is a very great privilege for me to be out here to visit this
school.

It is my first visit to Leavenworth and it is my understanding

that the visits by Naval officers out here have not been as many as they
should have been in the past.

:'Je intend to take advantage of every oppor-

tunity to increase the interchange of officers between our service schools.

During the past year we have worked out a new organization of the
National Military establishment and by legislative fiat have created a
framework.

That framework can be no better than the peoplein it, and we

all look to the educational process to produco the people who will be aware, not only of their own problems, but of the problems of the other
services, to make the whole organization work and work well,
in these principal service schools that in

pe~ce

And it is

time a great deal of the

progress will have to be made,

I was asked to talk this morning about the strategic and tactical concepts of the Navy in V:orld War II . The time available will not permit me
to give you a consecutive account .of the war in thq Pacific and I do not
think it necessary to inflict it on you, . This diagram (a Pacific wall
board) will however, be of use in picking out exnmples of some of the rnajor. points that I would like to make .
Looking ba ck to the prewa r years

we

vvc re all brought up to understand

that the purposes of naval forces

wer e really three. . First, in peacetime
..
to implement Natio.t}o.l policy and to further diploma tic action.. In war to
make sure tha t we have the usc of the sea s

~nd

that our opponents do not

have tho use of tho seas, _whcther for milita ry opera tions or for the move- 2 ... .

35 38

mont of commerce.

The third great purpose of

nav~l

to hinder or to support military operations on

forces has always been

shor.~.

Under that concept

battle at sea by tho naval forces is only a moans to o.n end, and I think
it is very important to boar that in mind not only in. trying to interpret
what has gone on in the past but in interpreting and solving our problems .
for the future.

Po shouldn't' let our concepts of naval warfare revolve too

mucharound an enemy battle fleet and disposing of that enemy battle fleet
as an end in itself.
. summer of 1944, the

For exa.tnple, after we landed in the Marianas, in the

Jap~nese

fleet came out and attempted to fly aircraft

into Guam, a southern island, in order to strike our forces and our
ports that were

Siapu.n.

tr~ns-

Admiral Spruance who wns in overall command of

th[l. t operation was then faced with two .:l.lterna ti ves.

One was to go after

the Japanese fleet, ha.(n.mer and tongs, the other wD.s to be a little more

.,

conservB. tivo and to give prunc..ry consider?. tion to the security of the transports and shipping nt the objectiye area,
in such a

WR Y

Ho made his decision; he operated

as to achievc his primary purpose which was to insure the

landing of those troops and the capture of the Marin.nas.

He .?.lso succeeded

in destroying pre. ctically every Japanese airplane that flew.

obtained in sinking enemy

'

. .

ship~

. .

wore not as great as they could have

been if he had gone full speed after the enemy.

the way he operated kept tho othcr

The results

JG}~ nose

direction from getting in on his transports.

But, on the other hand,

forces c6ming in 'from another

I gave you tl1at
'

an example

:J.S

of the correct intorpretat'ion of the purpose of that naval force.

Back in tho period between the end of tho Napoleanic wars and the 'beginning of

1.7orld

'.'g,r I_, there developed

3.

concept of navLl l strategy exempli-

fied in the .writings of Mahan, which pla cod greQ t emphasis on tl1e concen.
tA#\l... ~wJfv .so c,1
tration of naval forces ~.t the key points. The kaY naval forces actu,-:.ted
1.4:,,.;t. ,
"

in part by tho results of tho naval concept which wa s general among naval
officers and others concerned with the problems.

Tho Germans apprQised

their naval problem as one which required tremendous

concentro. tion~

knew the. t t hey could not be strong every where, t he r efore they
be strong in the North Soc. .

Thn. t in turn imposed

.,(_

,g_

They

t t empted to

on Britain the . ncco'ssity

for r educing the British Naval deployment around tho world in order to in-

- 3-

35 3<1

..

crease it in home wat.ers o.nd to form what bec3.Irle tho Gr0.nd Fleet.

So

there resulted tw6 opposing concentrations with minimum deployment away

from tho vi t a l North Sea area .and tho record of 1Vorld 1 ~Jar I from a naval
point of vi8w

is distinctive

because of that grcn.t concentration of two

very strong fl'cets opposing each other across a narrow sea and sparring
for opportunities to win a decisive action.
During the period between VTo rld T'.Jar I nnd World War II all of our thinking in our navy and to a degree in th o ne.vies of qthcr countries was influenced by that concept of having the strongest

poss~ble

battle fleet.

It resulted in our own training in tho Ne.vy being pointed toward fleet
action, our preparations being pointed toward fleet action.
we had

prac~icalljr

For many years

our whole fleet concentrated on tho coast of southern

California, which in terms of the distance from the western Pc:.cific to the
eastern Atl:1ntic was strategica lly a mid-point.

That strategic concept of

concentre. tion of forces e.nd trtJining .to bring n.bout a great fleet action in
the event of war .1.fter

whic~1

you would gnin cont-rol of the seas and all

other things would be simple, .extended even to tho propC'-ra tion of tho forces
for the ri1inor 3- spocts of war .
In 1939

'~Ne

did not havo n:n amphibious force.

;:a hr-td not prepared

and we he.d not trained for moving troops oversott s and landing them against
opposition.

Our Clnti-subma rino . forces vvere not a s good as they should be,

our reconnaissc:tnc e forces 1No r o not ado qua te.

T.'fv were prepared to fight a

great fleet ba.t tlo but we were not prepared for tho day-in e.nd d.s.y-out
dirty work o.f na VP.l wn.rfnro.
YVnon the war begrln we "Ne re still operating under. the battle .fleet
concept.

-::.'e

had noA.rly the 'Nholo

trated.. The results of

th~ t

off~ctive

you know.

fleet in the Pacific concen-

iie had too many ships pe'.cked in

one port a nd ' wo lost c. groat many of them for the time boing.

That re-

ve rse (Pe ?.rl He-.rbor) hnd one ve r y us e ful effect in that it freed . tho
c~rriers an d the task forces that wor e l oft to follow out a newer and

be tt e r concept of fle et opera tions which was of the fast t a sk forces

operating s eparately .
The first ph-:.se of t he wa r in the Pa cific for tho Navy was one of

- 4-

3540

es-tablishing: ci.hd m2-intaining a line of communictt t.lons~ . After tho ''~Ni thdrawal out o f the Philippines into the DutchEe.st .Indies,

-the loss of the

Dutch East Indies, it was decided to hold ' Australia a:s a : ba. sc : 'for . further
o"pera tions.

And to a predominately n a val commnnd, with headqua rters at

Pe .:trl Ha rbor, was given the task of maintaining the : lines of conununice.tion
from

Pe a rl ~

Harbor to Australia . We had Pec:. rl; we had 1'.-fidway in our posses-

sion, we had Johnston Island, which is . about here, -we had the i$land of Can.ton, we had the S2Jnoa Islc:mds which r.re dorvn here.

'Je moved into Fiji.

An

Army t2.sk force at tho beginning of the war wa s dispatched and occupied .
Now Caledonia and from th0n on our early

nav~l

operations were continued

to hold t :h:.:.t lino, Tho Japanese, a fter their initial

.s1.1Ccess,~~~ir

A
holdings down to the coast of Now Guinea and they, in ., effect, had control

of the Pacific out to this red broken line,

,In the spring, May of 1942,

it developed that tho Japa ries:..; were goif:\g to try to extend their holdings
'down to the Solomon Islands o.nd also to invade Australia. : So we were
forced then into defensive no.vC'. J. action in which we used the carriers and
light forces a vailable to stam thc;.t advance . . After one or two minor strikes
by the carriers it eventuated in the battle of the Coral Sea in which both
The J J.:. pa ncse lost the Shoho, we lo~,t the Lexington,
a.-j-k a.. c.(.~~ i; VI /-e 1 f /{ '
but we, in effect, held tho line there. Then, as lfOU all know, we .inoved

side 's suffered losses,

"

'into the Solomons nnd there we eng-:tged in c-, 'w!_tr of a ttrition for nca:r:ly a
year .
Going

b~.ck

to prc1Na r str.Tt cgic conc e pts.

.1e had .J.lways visunlized .

amphibious ope r a tions a s being conducte d by the movcmcnt . of troop convoys

.with the

necessc_;. r~y transports

and ?.ssault shipping, . We:

.so pn:r a t e .from a ny such movement

~lforld

' !e~ r

11

wh~t

visunlize~ng

we ce.lled n nP..vnl covering force.

In

I the gr,!].nd flee t in the Nb rth Sen a cte d as a _covering force for

the 'first movement of tho Briti s h Expeditione. r y f orc e 3. cross the cho.nnel.

' ' . ' f orce. t o cover th c

. ~
. h Ti'1a r the At 1 :lntlc
a cted n. s a covcrlng
I n our own Spa nls
T

.A

movement of our troops from thu Unit ed Sta tes to cuba.

The old concept of

a cove ring f or..c e iNa.s t :hat ' it i nt er pos ed bet ween the troop moveme nt a nd the
e n emy . fl ee t . ..i!!hen we we nt ;: into the Solomons we dld not do th['. t.

We we re

short of forc es an d we u s e d our cnrri er t a sk f orc e in the immedic.t o support

"- 5 -

354 __

..

of troop ino\temerit , . ~~Jc concentra ted first in the Fiji islr:mds wbere we held
n rehearsal t!1eri' we moved up to Guadalce.nal all in one compe.ct body.

There

were no preliminary 2-tte.cks; the assault came in at daylight, _ preceded only

by an hour or two; by our air attacks, and it was all one compact force.
That was not the best way; we learned that the older concept of a

sopar~te

movement was better and in all subsequent operations in the Pacific war we
P.lways used a n3.val covering force or a naval striking force which wr_s
separate from the e.mphibious movement.

That concept is so important that

I would like to develop the usc of the covering force and the factors that
control the

.
timing of its

use.

The first operation over long distance at

Tarawa and Makin.

'Fell, our problem

was to move ships all tho way1 d.own from Pearl , Harbor to the objective and
one of tho strategic problems in a long

ovcrsc~s

movement was the fact that

we had the tractor groups, the amphibie_n tank ,'lnd tho e.mphibian tre.ctor,
which had to. be the first units to land.

They had to be embarked in LST 1 s J

which wore all slow speed, and in a movement over a groat distance that
presented a difficult strategic problem because those units tnd to sail
and be at sea long before the 15 knot transport group with the great rnajority of tho troops.

Tho significanc e of th2t is tha t the timing of the

fi:rst strike by our carrier task force had to be early enough to give cover and protection to

tl ~o

movement of thc;. t slow tractor group so that

the latest time a t which we could begin the ,')_ir nttack on an objective was
the time when our tractor groups, wluch were relatively defenseless , would
come within striking dist3.nce of tho enemy air ashore.

Th::>,t point is not .

well und e rstood and it has lead to some conjecture as to the type of prolirnina ry opcr:-r.tions tha t we conducted.

So thn t one of the prime considora-

tions in tho us c of our carrier t1.sk force to cover an amphibious operation

was the. t J..t ha d to strike c 'irly .
The next considera ti on we-s tha t insten.d of me r ely

deployin,~

in readi-

ness for. a ction v:hor e ve r we l P.ndod in tho Pa cific, vmith this well developed
ne twork of Jp, pa nes o air pRsos, wo always ha d to us e our carriE:Jr task force
for two purpose s.

One wr:>. s to be::. t down the enemy 2: ir which was within

... 6

354 2

striking distance of our .:?.mphibious asso.ul t nnd tho other was to give direct
support to the runphibious assault.
Our first prime objective in our centrnl Pacific campaign was to get
into tho

Marshalls~

However, if we had gone into the Marshalls as e.n

(~~

initial operation wo would have had enemy air b!:>.ses here on this flank, we
I'

would have had the air bases at Eniwetok and ~leolap on tho.t flank c:.nd this
.

whole mass of bases in tho centr,s.l Pacific.

operation to tnke these out.

So we landed here as a first

,/\

Then for tho Marshalls ass3.ult we used our

carrier aircr::tft to smother Eniwotok, which was the only base within reach
of tho objective .?.rca.

Our actual landing was .. c:.t Kwe.jeloin so that our

C3.rriers hrtd the strategic task of donying any anomy c.ir opc.ra tions from
/.'

Eniwctok, v,r otje, f,\'lleolap and

J~.lui t

all of which were in enemy h.g,nds.

In planning the: t operation then we hr,. d to h2. ve our carrier task force
arrive and begin its engn.gemonts at about tho time that our low speed tracActually we

tor group was in this position on its wo.y down to Kwr.jolein.

did th:2. t by moving the cnrriers all the way around c.nd coming in from this
~
(.Jft
direction in order to develop a cort2in degree of surprise. Having gotten
.
. ... /' . .
on stn tion then, B. bout four days or fi vo do.ys ahead of the assault, they
;

had, to operate continuously f:rom. thE'.t time until the assault took place.
Then there developed the othGr r equirement of closo air support for the
troops thn t were landing which mo?.nt thr.t those same aircraft operating
from the same carri2rs which were moving out J.t s ea at high speed had then
to bo passed to the control of tho amphibious commander and later to the
control of tho troop commander after ho wc:.s ashore. So, ste.rting in thn t
opert. tion A.nd going on through the war in the Pacific we .developed the
tacticJ.l requirement that tho s o.me m'lss of a ircra ft would have to first

be the striking power of the cove ring force then "b-B:e ~s:a:m;e:.;;~.p@l~-'!l..t would
./
h2.vc to shift to diroct support of r'. n ?.mphibi ous l o.ndinr; and eventually be

under thG control of the C0111IIk'1nder of troops on shore..

deal of doing.

ThJ.t took

rt

good

But it was a

V.'e went through a gr cn. t ma ny growing pains.

well work od out .:tnd functioning s yst em a t thG ond of tho war.
Aft e r we t ook &n air
the c 2rri or

t ~ sk

b~ s ~

t ho r o then de volopGd another

r ~ quirement

for

f orc e , which was to continue to give a ir cover and a ir

- 7-

354 ~

suppo rt to tho posi tion ashor e until field s could be

. ncti vo.t (:d ~nd our own
shore be.sed air flown in.
pullin g out too s:Oon..
d2y.

In the Solom ons actio n we mi:>.de the mista ke of

!o wi thdrcw tho carri ers on the morni ng of the third

Incidc ntc:Llly, tho amphi bious commander c:.nd tho troop

comma nder had

said they only wante d them for o0e

day~

~.~o

s tnycd an extra da.;y and pulled

out on tho third dc:.y and t turned out not to be long

enoug h.

But at that

st['.go of tho war we didn' t ha_,:ve fuelin g system s vrorko

d out, we didn' t have
the replnc omon t aircr.:;".ft, or tho spare pilot s to keep
going ,
' the end of the wetr

;J{G

found

th~.t

But towar d

we rnd to be prc;pa red to keep tho carri ers

on statio n until our shore based :~.ir had boon moved

in and was funct ionin g.
So those e.re the .oo.jor requir emen ts in tho durat ion
of tho susta ined
cRrxi or opera tion..

It ha d to begin early enoug h

t~

give secur ity to the

appro achin g amphi bious force , it had to contin uo long

enoug h to cover the
estab lishm ent on shore until shore bP.sed c.ir could
take over s.nd durin g the
cours e of this pc;rio d it had to be suffi cient ly flexib
le so that it could
be shifte d from a plano strike missi on in strate gic
suppo rt of the opera tion
over to a close suppo rt, detai led pinpo int troop suppo
rt

opera~ion.

Anoth er consi dor2.t ion which gover ned our opcr2 tions
of CC,1.rrier s throu ghou.t the wr<.r was that

0~ch

one of these prelim in::try cover ing strike s had to

bo plc:.cod propo rly in tho light of the next opera tion

e.hoad .
2ftor we wore oste.b lished on shore in tho

lit~ rshr.lls,

Adnir~ ~ l

For instan ce,

Sprua nco took

the carri e r t .q sk force h!."cttle ships and cruis ers out

west o.nd mP.de the first
strik e on Truk.
sure off

This wn. s a. form of strate gic suppo rt which took the

pros-

~~ M.:l Jttr.1'l!~
4;J;.}i7 ~rM

comp letely .

As soon as he got

b~.ck

in from Truk we

took Eniwe tok and then in order to ge.t photo gra phs
and inform ['.tion on the
Maria nas, about which vve had known nothin g since tho
begin ning of the war,
we turne d them -::tround and sent them up to strike tho
Maria nas, which .:.gain
wns .prote cting

throu gh which they

v.r~uld

got . us the inforn ia tion

ope r a tion.

'NO

tt'

beco.u se it hit the Je.pE.nese right in the pipe- line

hc. vc t o

r ee nforc e thi.s- <:1. r oa , nn d C'. t the; s::u:1e time

neede d with which to rn."'.ko

P.

decis ion on the next

Ugtil we gGt the r e sults of thos e two attack s in suppo

rt of the

. ,lvi:1 rshe.l ls opor0. tions we l a cke d the photo gr r'.phs

o.nd the dJ. ta on which to

decid e n. s bet Nocn Truk and the Ma riana s

.. - 8' -

354 t1.

Th e ne xt op e r a ti on
of the cov or in g f o rc
e wa s in co nn ec tio n
wi th th e
mo v eme nt up to Ho lla
nd ia. . Du ri! 1g th e cam
pa i gn in th e So lom on
s a nd on up
t o th e s pr in g of 19
44 the so ut hwo st _Pa cif 4-c
f o rc es ha d ha d to mo
ve up th e
coa st of Now Gu ine a
in _jw np s wh ich we re
go ve rn ed pr im ar ily
by th e ef fe ct iv e
ra di us of th ei r own
fig ht e rs in or de r th
r;. t th ey wo uld ha ve
th ei r lan d
ba se d a ir to co ve r 2.n
d su pp or t th ei r lan di
ng s r:i th th e r a pi d
au gr: 10 nta tio n
of th e fl e et by th e
de liv er y of new sh ip
s we ha d go tte n to a
po in t wh ere we
co uld su sta in th e op
e r a ti on s of th e fl e
et mo re r 3.p id ly th an
we co uld as se m- .
bl e an d mo un t am ph ibi
ou s ope r a tio ns . Fu
rth e rm ore , th e tli ain
g of an y move
in th e ce nt ra l Pa ci
fic ha d to be so a dj
us t c;d th a t be fo re we
moved fro m
Ta rawa up to Kvva je le
in , fo r in sta nc e, or
fro m Kwa je le in to th
e :M ari an as,
we wo uld hc. ve to de
ve lo p th os e ai r ba s
e s, go t the m fu nc tio
ni ng , an d go t
th e l a nd ba se d ai r
to t he po in t wh ere it
wa s ef fe ct iv e. So ,
in or de r to
ke ep th e fl e et bu sy
we then sh ift ed it
ov er to co ve rin g an d
su pp or tin g
th e lan di ng a t Ho lla
nd ia ,. Th e for m of
th:-'.t su pp or t wh ich wa
s arr nn gc d
by a co nf ere nc e dow
n in Br isb an e wn. s fo
r th e ca rr ie rs to mo
ve al l th e way
ou t to Pa lau nn d de
liv er e, st rik e th er e.
The rea so 1 fo r th e
se l ct io n of
th a t ob je ct iv e wa s
fi rs t to cu t of f th
~. t :?.Venue of su
pp ly of Ja pa ne se ai r
to Ho lln nd ia . Se co nd
....
t o ge t a ve ry ni ce
br'. g of Ja pa ne s e cr ui
s e rs an d de str oy er s wh ich we kn
ew wa s in po rt, a nd
th ird to a g:~. in str ik
e a pl ac e
wh ich wo uld gi ve in
di re ct pr ot ec tio n to
th e de ve lop me nt of
tho 3o ba se s
ba ck he re .

Th at op e r P-.ti on wRs
su cc e ss fu l o.n d o..s a n
ad di tio na l div ide nd
on th e
wa y br'. ck to th e br. s
c th e c.!:1.rr ie r t a sk f
o rc e moved ov er a nd
n tt 0. ck ed Tr uk .
It wa s a lwly s a pri me
co ns id e r a ti on in ou
r na va l op e r a tio ns in
the Pa ci fic
to st rik e th e J G. pa ne
s o po sit io ns in th e
Li.1. nd a te s fr e qu en tly
en ou gh to ke ep
th em fro m be comi ng
s a f e b::L s Gs f or in t e rf
e rin g wi th th e op c; r :rt
io'n s ~ lQng th e
Ne w Gu ine a c oR. st . Du
ring t ho e:. rl y dn.;rs
i.t:J. t ho So l oEw ns wo
h:1d n ot be en
'lb l c t o dQ tha t a.nd
t he r e su lt hn:d be en
th a.t a ll du rin g th e
So lom on cam pa i gn we wo r e r eg ul
a rl y rt nd c on s i s t en tly
wo rk ed ov e r by J a pa
ne s e fo rc es
co mi ng dow n fr om th
e Mt', n da t es , de l i ve rin
g tt t ta ck s on th~ Gua
da lc a ne. l po siti on a nd then vvi th dr
e.w in g ..
/

Th o ne xt mc jl) r op o r
n.t Lon wa s t he mo v em
e nt in to the Ma ri a no.
s a nd tha t

- 9 :-' .

,.

. . . . . .-ll'it.

from which w~ cemld strike J a pan propor ..- The .results of tha..t I need not
go into but they were very deeisive,
we worked on down into P,::tlau..

Fo+lowing the; seizure. o:f the Ma.r .iqno.s

General :MacArthur's movement into Moritai

took plc:.ce the same dc:ty under cover of heavy strikes on Vandanao; following
which the cHrriers re.nged north to dcve.lop information and also reduce
Jc.panesc strength -in .the Philippines

ns

o. whole.

There a gain the princi-

ple was the same, strike t he ple,c:e froa which interf8rcnce might come and
al~~

ge,t informD.tion

.~nd

third keeP. up the prcss.uro c:>..nd continue to destroy

enemy _aircraft ..
From then on the pat torn, the usc of th1.t

fo-rce~

-:had been pretty use-

In general, 2-lways to r0ach oLJ.t, _conduct prelimine;ry

- fully_ established:

strikes, fe.ll b.-:.~k, give direct support to the landing:, t hen move out again.
Tbe - times when we_ ha d failures, c: ncl we hc:.d them, were usually due to mistakes in preliminary plo.rining, over-optimisQ o.p tho part of the construetion pe?ple

~.nd

the shore air comr1anders as to the dqte by which they could

Over-optimism in

be ready.
. so:ne of our

initi~" l

the~

reverses.

Gu6dc.lcana l oper2.tion was responsible for

Over-optimism as to the time when the shore

based a ir force could take over _"Ne.s r e sponsible for, not bQ.d results, _but
dis?rdo.rly

r~~ults_

-in our

in.i~in. l

le.ndings in the Philippines where at

one .. time . the carr;iers v.rc re_ turned. -loose and then

h~d

to go bc-.ck. - ;rell;.

we should h2.vc pl::tnned to keep them there all the time but the over--
optimism on the d.e.tG by which the fields in Loyto would be -operating was
. due to the

, f~1 ct

that the aircrc:;.ft photographs did not show the mud :a nd

. bc-:.d.. terrqin on which we were planning to build field s.

As the
Luzon.

~B r

progressed it became neccssLry to plRn on getting into

The;. t wr::.s a v Gry intere sting pl:-t.n be c2. use the preliminary fe :.1 turcs,

the support of the opGra tion involvGd so mQny different headqu~rters.

There

w~

fiv e t hcA. t or s, -or the cqui vo.lent, r epr e s ent-ed in the preliminary con-

f e r e ncc which t ook plc.>, ce in Holln.ndi "- in Now Guine.q one or two days o.fter
we l r1nde d in Lcytc .

The Chin:.. t ho.'". t e r was represented, tho India-Burma

Theq tGr, tho southwest Pncific , the centra l f[lcific a nd the 20th Air Jorce,
s o we hn.d fiv.o

sign~,_ ture s

on the

coordin~tion

.,.. 10 -

plnn for tha t show.

And the

35 4._

suppo rting, mo~ sur c ~ r~nged

all the way from B 29 a ttacks on J a pan to strikes

by the ca rriers a long the south Chin;:t co ~J. st, .strikes ag~ inst Formosa ,
strikes

r'.ga in~t .

Okine.vva , the 'lt _ta cks from our own Army

aircr~ft

in the

sout he rn Philippines 3.g0.inst Luzon, bombardments of Iwo Jima by ships bnsed

in the Mari:tnas..

The se. nll hp.d to tC1.ke pla ce o.nd they wero all part of tho

ovc r .q ll concept of .using nC'.Vf1.1 forces, long rango .:.tir forces, to give the
best possible strc. togic support , to

2.

difficult l a nding, and then shifting

the mobile nr~.val units to. ' clos 0 support ns rapidly as possible.

That

worked out very well and we then were r ea dy for further e.nd even.more

difficult objectives.:tiho l l)ndings in Iwo Jime. and Okimwa a s far ns the

over C'..ll strC'.tegic concepts presented no now fertturos.

The Jape;.nese fleet

had been more or .l oss destroyed but we still had this fundamental necessity
for a fleet to support the l Rndings, nnd to cover the landings, in its own
offensive operations.

Actun. lly although we had no enem;y' fleet .left that is

where wo took our greatest

d~.mr.go

in the PA. cific . As I recall it we had

323 ships I think it was, put out of action in

th~. t

three months and at

that period of the wc:.r the L19..jor f e2.ture which governed all of our operations, stre.togic3.l and

tf.'.c~ic~l,

had gotten into one of simple arithmetic.

We used to k eep three curves, one wa~ the numbers of J::~.panese P.ircraft
considered to be operational, .nnothcr we.s tho dt?.ily volume of Kamikaze
attacks.

The other curve , to

light escort vessels.

appropri ~. t e

sc3.lc, wns the nvailc=tbility of

As long a s our curve of

av~ilability

of ships

stayed P.bov o the slope of the one of J ;:..pane s o e.ircra ft we f elt thr;.t we
would be successful.
Tho s o are really the s'a li cnt f ea tures of the strqtcgic concepts governing the us c of our m2jor na va l forc e s.
a rc giving

prim~ry

nuedod to make

w."~. r

emphasis to keeping in being the bnsic units th~ t a re

~
-?'
Nt tunder the concGpt ~ you cnn.,.. scp.!lr a t o nP.V2l strat-

c gy from a ir strategy.
ground operations.

In our pla nning for the future we

You cannot s cp:::.r :->. t o eithe r on e of them from

rvo a r o kc;eping c:.n .".Elphibious f orc e , we a rc keeping a

C9. rrie r striking f orce, we arc ke e ping n.n anti-subm2. rino force for tho
pr otecti on of lines of c oomunic;"_ tions..,

>r.re t'. r c keeping a submP.rine force

to cut enemy s en. s c ommunications J.nd vrc n.ro keeping the cruis e rs, do-

- 11-

35117

stro;ycrs

.!"'~nd

Looking

gun fire ships th'. t it t".kcs to

.~.he'1.d

. . . t the bro".der

~.spccts

make ther11 n.ll go.

of n!"'. V::'.l str...,_tegy '='-nd

nc.vc-~1

deployments we c".n sb s th:-:.t :1s time goes o:;;n.nd up until the time when
".ny possible opponent cra".tes .'1.

b'1.ttle

concentr~ted

oper".tions will be distinguishc cl by

".void~.nce

only requirement is to be '".ble to oppose

stronger, i'.nrl to tho dom".nd th ". t we be

.~n

~. blc

fleet,~

our nC'.v:..l

of concentr".tion bec:'.usc our

cneny force vrith something

to deploy our forces so th!".t

we C''.n meet our rosponsibili tics r.nd. ".chicvo SUCCGSS ':Ji th " Sl11".ller

tot~.l

strength.
Another

proble1~

th=tt vrc

h~~vc h'1.c~

is to so doplo;y our floot and so .J .d-

just the usc th::>.t we. m::tko of tho personnel r>.nc:l funds that we hc:tve so P.s to
c:1.rry on our

with grer.tcr onphnsis on joint tra.ining.

tr.~.ining

I would

sr.y thr. t in our opcr~.tions tod~.;y n.bout 50% of our trr..tning is .::.ssocifl.tod
with joint training or trr..ining of ci vili:::.n components r?. thcr th".n acrely
training intern:-~.lly in

P..

fleet of the type we n2int?.incd before the w~.r.

Those nre the high points nnd I v.rould be very g1!'2.d to 'l.nsvver :tny
questions th'tt :tnyono wishes to
press uy

grr.tific~.tion

~.sk.

Before closing I vr1.nt to

?.g~.in

ex-

for the privilege ofe 3.ppe .J .ring out here :'.nd my hope

th".t this intcrch".ngc of instructors, students <J.nd visitors botweon ou_r

service schools will

incrc ~ sc

in the futuro.

- 12 -