Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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MILTON CHARLES VAN NOLAND and )
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JOY GARNER ) CASE NO. 2:09-cv-2035-MCE-DAD
)
13 ) PLAINTIFFS REPLY TO DEFENDANTS
Plaintiffs, ) RESPONSE & MEMORANDUM OF LAW
14 ) &VERIFIED STATEMENT OF FACTS
vs. )
15 ) RE: SHOW CAUSE MOTION FOR
ERIC S. PELLETIER and GRRR! LIMITED ) REMAND AND SANCTIONS
16 )
Defendants HEARING DATE: January 15th 2010
17 TIME: 10:00 am
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TO THE HONORABLE MAGISTRATE JUDGE DROZD (OR JUDGE ENGLAND; See L.R.
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Rule 302 (c) (21)) FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA OF THE UNITED
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STATES:
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In answer to the Plaintiffs’ motion for remand, defendants present evidence that
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Grrr! Limited is a corporation. The Plaintiffs file this memorandum to address diversity
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jurisdiction for an alien corporation with its principal place of business in the state of California.
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THE ALIEN CORPORATION
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On January 27, 2009 in Caribbean Telecom., the Honorable Judge Harold Ackerman,
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after “careful consideration of the statute’s language, history, and purpose,” found that an alien
9 A most excellent law journal article on this specific subject, which also addresses some
10 similar issues and the distinctions made in Dresser Industries v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of
11 London, 106 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1997), is attached to this filing as Exhibit A. In Danjaq, S.A. v.
12 Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 979 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1992), (case is attached as Exhibit B) an
13 identical issue was raised. The Ninth Circuit concluded that;
“This appeal involves two arcane issues of subject matter jurisdiction that
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are of first impression in this Circuit. Both issues relate to the
15 determination of a corporation's principal place of business for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction. The first is whether alien corporations are subject to
16 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), which states that a corporation is a citizen both of its
place of incorporation and the location of its principal place of business.
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We agree with the district court that an alien corporation, like a domestic
18 corporation, is a citizen of both.” (Emphasis added.)
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In Jerguson v. Blue Dot Investment, Inc., 659 F.2d 31, 32-36 (5th Cir.1981) (attached
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as Exhibit C) a similar conclusion was reached:
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“We therefore hold that a foreign corporation is a citizen for diversity
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jurisdiction purposes of a state where it has its principal place of
23 business.”
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THE “NERVE CENTER” TEST
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly and consistently found that: “Where a
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majority of a corporation's business activity takes place in one state, that state is the corporation's
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principal place of business, even if the corporate headquarters are located in a different state.”
25 OPERATIONS
26 a. Corporate Activities: The only noticed company meeting of the Grrr! entity ever held,
27 was in Sacramento, California on December 8th- thru the 9th, 2008. At this meeting; (1) plans were
28 made to conduct the initial product launch in the State of California, (2) plans were made to
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5 engineers who have ever worked on the GameRunner product, ALL reside and work exclusively
6 in the State of California, and all activities related to the GameRunner product which were
7 carried out by them, were executed exclusively in the State of California.
8 i. Location of GameRunner Website Development and Maintenance: The GameRunner
9 websites (gamerunner.us and FPGamerunner.com) were designed, developed, and are
10 maintained, exclusively here in California.
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15 A “CORPORATION”
16 As a corporation Grrr! Limited has citizenship in the State of California, as demonstrated
17 in pages 3 - 6 of this pleading and verified affidavit. No other single location can be shown as
18 having a predominance of the company’s activities, nor can any other location be shown as a
19 “nerve center”. Therefore, there is no diversity jurisdiction in this case. The Plaintiffs call the
20 Court’s attention to these 9th Circuit cases:
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22 1. In Industrial Tectonics v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1990) (case attached as
23 Exhibit D) the court stated:
“We hold that, where a majority of a corporation's business activity takes
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place in one state, that state is the corporation's principal place of business,
25 even if the corporate headquarters are located in a different state. The
"nerve center" test should be used only when no state contains a
26 substantial predominance of the corporation's business activities.”
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3 “Tosco Corporation ("Tosco") claims that the district court has diversity
jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. 1332 because, under the
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"nerve center " test, its principal place of business is Connecticut. But we
5 apply the "place of operations" test when a corporation conducts a
substantial predominance of its business activities within a state.”
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3. In Melinda Friend v. Hertz Corporation 9th, (2008) No. 08-16963, (unpublished, but
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allowed as precedent under 9th, Cir. R. 36-3, and attached to this pleading as Exhibit G) the court
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succinctly summarized the intent and conclusions of the above two cases, once again affirming
11 its stance on this same issue. The panel included Fernandez, Callahan and Ikuta. There was no
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dissent. NOTE: This case has been appealed to the US Supreme Court, argued on Nov. 10th,
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2009 and is awaiting a decision. The issues raised and the implications for corporate diversity
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jurisdiction are covered in a brief attached as Exhibit H. Hertz is a Delaware corporation with its
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16 company headquarters in New Jersey. Hertz argued for a “never center” test (rather than
17 “predominance” of activity) to support a finding that its citizenship belongs in New Jersey. The
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state of incorporation was not at issue in the appeal, nor in any of the decisions leading up to it.
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SANCTIONS
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22 After almost six months of repeated insistence that Grrr! Limited is an LLC, defense
23 counsel now takes the position that Grrr! Limited is actually a corporation, but he has failed to
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inquire into, (let alone cite) the relevant jurisdictional laws, (or facts) which might support
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diversity jurisdiction with his new story. (Could this be because there aren’t any facts or law to
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support it?) Defense counsel had an obligation to learn and cite the relevant applicable laws,
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2 his new and self-contradicting facts support jurisdiction, when they do not.
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When the Plaintiffs confronted defense counsel with the fact that he had outright lied to
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the court about the presence of a federal question in the suit, counsel did recant under safe harbor
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of Rule 11, but only because the lie was so blatant, so obvious, that he knew there was simply no
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wiggle-room there. Now defense counsel has the gall to accuse the Plaintiffs of dancing around
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with the law, when defense counsel has been engaged in a whimsical and mercurial, tango-tap-
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dance with the actual facts. The Plaintiffs are simply trying to get to the factual truths, (no easy
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task) so that they know which laws apply, each time they get a new story from defense. The
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Plaintiffs’ only goal is to see to it that whichever court hears this case, it is the one with the
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correct jurisdiction to do so. Without this, any judgment would be worthless, and much more
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time would be lost.
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14 Defense counsel has made no “colorable arguments” in his recently changed story.
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Jurisdiction cannot be assumed merely because defense counsel has come up with a new story
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which contradicts his prior statements of fact. Defense counsel was not blind to the obvious
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applicable 9th Circuit cases here, or to the facts. He simply chose to ignore them, hoping that both
19 the “Pro Se” Plaintiffs and this court, would be ignorant of them.
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DEFENSE COUNSEL’S INTENTIONAL DECEPTION UPON THE COURT
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In defense counsel’s arguments, (Filed Dec, 31st, 2009, footnote 1 on page 2) counsel
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24 attempts to intentionally deceive the court into believing that the Plaintiffs have some intention
25 of dismissing Grrr! Limited from the lawsuit, when nothing could be further from the truth. The
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Plaintiffs’ use of the word “odd” could not possibly have been interpreted by defense counsel to
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mean that the Plaintiffs have any intention of dismissing such an indispensable defendant/party
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2 property, which is the entire subject matter of this suit. It was nothing short of fraud for defense
3 counsel to make such a representation to the Court concerning the Plaintiffs’ intentions. The only
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thing the Plaintiffs found to be “odd” was how defense counsel’s prior repeated assertions of
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Grrr! Limited’s LLC status, put the Plaintiffs on both sides of the suit.
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RULE 11
8 One purpose of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to prevent an attorney
9 from haling a party into federal court without having performed, at the very least, a reasonable
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inquiry into the jurisdictional underpinning of the lawsuit. Rule 11 mandates sanctions where it
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is clear that: (1) a reasonable inquiry into the basis for a pleading has not been made; (2) under
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13 existing precedents there is no chance of success; and (3) no reasonable argument has been
14 advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands. Cf. Norris v. Grosvenor Marketing
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Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281, 1288 (2d Cir.1986).
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The Rule "explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to
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19 conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed." Eastway
20 Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir.1985). This requirement
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assures that lawyers are prepared to demonstrate that they have done the necessary investigation
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prior to appearing in court.
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Attorney James Arguelles’ arguments and constantly shifting “facts” are not even worthy
25 of being referred to as crafty "post hoc sleight of hand" calculations to make plausible very
26 tenuous jurisdictional claims. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 1013, 1022
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(1988). Defense counsel most recently submits new facts which contradict his prior statements,
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2 jurisdiction) when even the newly submitted and contradictory facts still do not support diversity
3 jurisdiction.
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Given defense counsel’s most recent and current assertion that Grrr! Limited is really a
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corporation, (and he now claims to have known this all along) defense counsel could have, and
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should have, conducted at least a cursory legal investigation into how an alien corporation,
8 whose predominant business operations are conducted in a state other than its state of
9 incorporation, affects its citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
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Defense counsel doesn’t bother himself with such details. However, Defense counsel did
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find the time over the holidays, to seek out, locate and harass the defendant’s business associates,
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slandering the Plaintiffs to them.
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ADDITIONAL RELEIF IS REQUIRED AT THIS TIME
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When the Plaintiffs confronted defense counsel as to why he was contacting their
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associates at all, defense counsel nervously stated that he “did not know where” to “serve” the
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Plaintiffs with “legal documents” and that this was why he had sought out and contacted the
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Plaintiffs’ business associates. (This however, did not begin to explain the slanderous and untrue
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remarks defense counsel made to them about the Plaintiffs.) There is no question that defense
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counsel knows perfectly well where to find the Plaintiffs, and how to arrange to serve them with
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documents. The Plaintiffs have never once attempted to deny they’ve received any legal
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documents in this case. Defense counsel however, has refused to allow his secretary to accept
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any legal paper from the Plaintiffs at the firm’s front desk during normal business hours. It is
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also well documented that Defense counsel’s client engaged in service-ducking for months when
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this suit began.
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AND A LITTLE MORE DECEPTION FOR GOOD MEASURE
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20 DOUBTS?
Removal jurisdiction is to be strictly construed, with all doubts as to its propriety to be
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22 resolved in favor of remand. Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch and Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006,
23 1010 (3d Cir. 1987). Here there is no doubt that the indispensable defendant company Grrr!
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Limited has its principle place of business in the State of California. Beyond simply the
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“predominant” activities of Grrr! Limited, (which are clearly established) California is also the
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“nerve center” location, which encompasses$$ the actual meetings here, the base of operations
28 for the “President” and “Director of Marketing” and the Director of Manufacturing, etc. Whether
2 test) or dual citizenship, Guernsey is not the citizenship of Grrr! Limited for the purpose of
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IMMEDIATE RELIEF IS NEEDED
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THE PLAINTIFFS PRAY, this court order that defense counsel is PROHIBITED from
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contacting the Plaintiff’s personal business associates for any purpose and that; he is
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PROHBITED from slandering the Plaintiffs to any party. Defense counsel is counsel for the
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defense, not his personal servant in attempting to ruin the Plaintiff’s business interests. Defense
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counsel has never had a problem locating the Plaintiffs directly, and any argument he may offer
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that he has had trouble here, is pure fraud. Defense counsel has no legitimate purpose in
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contacting the Plaintiffs’ business associates, let alone making slanderous and untrue remarks to
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them about the Plaintiffs. This behavior must stop.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray this court remand this case to the court from which it was
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removed and sanction defendants and defense counsel in an amount reasonably calculated by the
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court to deter such behavior in the future.
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Respectfully submitted,
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DATE:_____________ __________________ ___________________________
24 Joy Garner Milton Charles Van Noland
7164 Marblethorpe Drive 116 Murphy Street
25 Roseville, CA 95747 Grass Valley, CA 94945
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916-872-4753 530-210-1001
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28 VERIFICATION / AFFIDAVIT
5 ______________________________ ______________________________________
Joy Garner Milton Charles Van Noland
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