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DISCUSSION
Ponty is doingthis kind of phenomenologywhenhe pointsout in Ph6nomenologiede la perception2 that I experienceobjectsnot in the homogeneous
space describedby the physical scientist but in a space which is oriented
aroundme as subject,and in which I distinguishobjects above and below
each other from those merely side by side.3 This is an example of what
Prof. Wild calls a "worldfact" and the fundamentalphenomenological
point he wants to stressin his articleis that "thereis an orderof worldfact
which is bound up with ordinarylanguage, and which is quite distinct
fromthe differentrangesand levels of scientificfact." 4
From this point of view two other interpreters of Merleau-Ponty,
Michael Kullman and CharlesTaylor, have utterly misunderstoodthe
purpose of Merleau-Pontyand of phenomenologywhen they oppose
phenomenologicaldescriptionto descriptionof the everyday world and
claim: "The Phenomenologyof Perceptionis for Merleau-Pontythe discovery and explorationof the world not such as everyday and scientific
discourse describe it but of the 'pre-objectiveworld' which it presupposes."5 Taylor and Kullmanjustify their assimilationof the Lebenswelt
to the pre-objectiveworld, and their subsequentoppositionof the world
describedby phenomenologyto the worldof everyday,as follows:
Husserl characterizedphenomenologyas "a return to the things themselves." This
watchwordmust not be misinterpreted.It does not mean a return to things in the
1 "Is there a World of OrdinaryLanguage?," The PhilosophicalReview, Oct. 1958,
p. 460.
2 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phen'omnologiede la perception,Paris: 1945, hereafter
cited as PP.
3 Op. cit., p. 470.
4 Ibid., p. 465.
5 "The pre-objective world of Maurice Merleau-Ponty," The Philo8ophicalReview,
559
560
objective world (i.e., such as they are described in everyday and scientific discourse): if it did, phenomenologywould be superfluous.It means rather, a return
to things such as they are, or appearto be in our "original"experienceof them, before they have acquired the determinacy that everyday and scientific discourse
presupposethem to have.6
Ibid., p. 110.
Merleau-Ponty speaks of fungierendeIntentionalitta,"1'intentionaliteoperante."
This "operativeintentionality,"introducedby Husserl to refer to the basic structure of
perceptual experience, is also referred to by Husserl as "founding" or "fundierennde"
intentionality. We will use the latter terminologyto emphasizethe primordialcharacter
of this experience.
8 pp, pp. 18-19.
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sumptions themselves. This contrasts with the case of perceptualimplication in the Lebenswelt
wherean effectivefigurerevealsanotherfigureas
merelyvirtual; and wherewemust followout the referenceof the effective
figure in order to reveal another effective figure, instead of the second
effectivefigureitselffollowingfromthe given one. Thevirtualfigurewhich
follows from the perceptually given figure may be misleading. E.g.,
followingfromthe facade of a house, illusorilytaken to be a house, is the
virtual figure of the back of that house. But the theoreticalconsequence
which follows from the theoreticallygiven figure (the given assumption)
is identicalwith that to which the given figurerefers,so that there is no
such thing as a misleadingor virtual theoretical consequence.From a
theoreticalgiven, whateverfollows,followsvalidly.
In pre-objectiveexperiencethe transition from figure to figure is not
made by figure alone but requiresmediationby an act of consciousness
which is not legislatedby the figuresbut is free to follow or not to follow
their demand,thus showingthat the figuresdo not legislate one another
but are contingentlygiven to one anotheras the circumstance,occasion,
or evocative context of each other'sappearance.This primordialcondition
that figures do not legislate one another into existence but are merely
given to one another through the mediation of consciousness,the appearanceof one figure being merely the circumstanceof the appearance
of another,is the persistenceof the fundierendemode of appearancein the
Lebenswelt.On the other hand, -the appearanceof the virtual figure as
supplementary to the actual figure, forming thereby a "perceptual
implication"10by whichthe actualfigurerefersdeterminatelyto its ground,
is the foreshadowingor intimation of the scientific world in the lived
world. For the virtual figure,in mediatingbetween $he actual figure and
the figure concealedin the ground,partiallytakes the place of the act of
consciousness.In the scientificworld this tendency is merely brought to
final fulfillment,and consciousnesswith its free assent does not mediate
between figure and figure at all. Consciousness,the thinking subject,
merelyhypothesizesor posits the premisesof an ideal conditionand is then
the enthralledspectator of, not the participantin, the unfolding of the
implicationsof the posited figures. This explicitationis accomplishedby
the figures themselves, as if each actual figure implied another not by
means of a virtual figurebut ratherby directlyimplyingthat figureitself.
In so far as this is true, scientific figures are purely self-revealing.They
have no groundand arenot in any way concealed.Theyhave overcomethe
ambiguityof appearingas the revealingof what is concealed.
We may also note how the appearanceof permanentfigures of the
Lebenswelt
is intermediatebetweenthe appearanceof temporaryfiguresof
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