Professional Documents
Culture Documents
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 94825. September 4, 1992.]
PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, and ODIN SECURITY AGENCY, as
representative of its Security Guards, Respondents.
Franklin J. Andrada for Petitioner.
Ramon Encarnacion and Reynato V. Siozon for Private
Respondents.
SYLLABUS
March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 556]. . . . The Wage Orders are
statutory and mandatory and can not be waived. The petitioner
can not escape liability since the law provides the joint and
solidary liability of the principal and the contractor for the
protection
of
the
laborers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS OBSERVED IN CASE AT
BAR. The contention that it was deprived due process
because no hearing was conducted does not deserve merit. A
decision on the merits is proper where the issues raised by the
parties did not involve intricate questions of law. (See Blue Bar
Coconut Phils. Inc. v. Minister of Labor, 174 SCRA 25 [1989])
There can be no question that the security guards are entitled
to wage adjustments. The computation of the amount due to
each individual guard can be made during the execution of the
decision where hearings can be held. (See Section 3, Rule VIII
of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC).
4. ID.; INDIRECT EMPLOYER; ESTOPPED FROM
ASSAILING CONTRACT. Petitioner assail the contract for
security services for being void ab initio on the ground that it
did not comply with the bidding requirements set by law.
Undeniably, services were rendered already and the petitioner
benefitted from said contract for two (2) years now. The
petitioner is therefore estopped from assailing the contract.
1|Page
DECISION
(h) Operational Expenses
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
2|Page
(3) Granting arguendo that there is legal basis for the award,
the stipulation under the contract allowing an increase of wage
rate is void ab initio. (Rollo, p. 86)
On June 25, 1990, the motion for reconsideration was denied.
3|Page
4|Page
ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.
and
Romero, JJ.,
concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121439. January 25, 2000]
AKLAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INCORPORATED
(AKELCO), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (Fourth Division), RODOLFO M. RETISO and
[1]
165 OTHERS, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In his petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
petitioner assails (a) the decision dated April 20, 1995, of
public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Fourth (4th) Division, Cebu City, in NLRC Case No. V0143-94 reversing the February 25, 1994 decision of Labor
Arbiter Dennis D. Juanon and ordering petitioner to pay wages
in the aggregate amount of P6,485,767.90 to private
respondents, and (b) the resolution dated July 28, 1995
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on
October 9, 1995 enjoining public respondent from executing
the questioned decision upon a surety bond posted by
[2]
petitioner in the amount of P6,400,000.00.
[3]
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8|Page
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10 | P a g e
[1]
11 | P a g e
- versus -
- versus -
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,*
CARPIO,** Acting
Chairperson,
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,***
CORONA,
CARPIO
MORALES,*** and
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 30, 2009
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
12 | P a g e
3)
4)
Pay
P1,000,000.00
as
exemplary damages to each of
the complainants.
5)
SO ORDERED.
[16]
[19]
13 | P a g e
1.
2.
3.
14 | P a g e
allegedly
tantamount
to
15 | P a g e
16 | P a g e
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WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Acting
Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
*
**
On Official Leave.
Acting Chairperson in lieu of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno as per Special Order No.
552-A.
***
Additional Members in lieu of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justice Adolfo S.
Azcuna as per Special Order No. 553.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta, with Associate Justices
Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (ret.) and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, concurring; Rollo, Vol. II, at 6676.
[2]
Id. at 78.
[3]
Id. at 50-62.
[4]
Rollo, Vol. I, at 94-114, 121-135, 141-143.
[5]
Sugue and Valderramas Position Paper, p. 6; CA Rollo, at 44.
[6]
Id. at 70.
[7]
Id. at 71-74.
[8]
Id. at 84-85.
[9]
Id. at 86-88.
[10]
Id. at 90.
[11]
Id. at 92.
[12]
Id. at 95.
[13]
Id. at 96.
[14]
Id. at 97.
[15]
Id. at 38.
[16]
Rollo, Vol. II, at 48-49.
[17]
Docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 028290-01.
[18]
Rollo, Vol. II, at 23.
[19]
Id. at 76.
[20]
Id. at 87.
[21]
Id. at 12.
[22]
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 14.
[23]
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Alfa RTW Manufacturing Corporation, et
al., G.R. No. 133877, November 14, 2001, 368 SCRA 611, 617.
[24]
Gabriel v. Mabanta, G.R. No. 142403, March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 573, 579-580.
[25]
G.R. No. 127549, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 351, 357-358.
[26]
Francisco v. NLRC, G.R. No. 170087, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 690, 702-703.
[27]
Docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-06-03008-2000 and raffled to Labor Arbiter
Daisy G. Cauton Barcelona.
[28]
Sugue and Valderramas Position Paper; CA Rollo, at 39.
[29]
92 Phil. 575, 577-578 (1953).
[30]
92 Phil. 997, 1000 (1953).
[31]
Social Security System v. SSS Supervisors Union-CUGCO, G.R. No. L-31832
October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 746, 749; Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila
Diamond Hotel, G.R. No. 158075, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 195, 214.
[32]
Annex K of Valderrama and Sugues Position Paper; CA Rollo, at 70.
[33]
Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, p. 467.
[34]
Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158922, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 358, 367.
[35]
CA Rollo, at 61.
[36]
Id. at 79.
[37]
Sobrepea v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111148, October 10, 1997, 280 SCRA
476, 489-490.
[38]
Tinio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171764, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 533, 541.
[39]
CA Rollo, p. 222.
[40]
Id. at 80-81.
[41]
Id. at 200-201.
[42]
Id. at 243.
[43]
Id. at 249.
[44]
Id. at 93-94.
[45]
G.R. No. 112963, July 20, 1999, 310 SCRA 653, 656.
[46]
Mendoza v. Rural Bank of Lucban, G.R. No. 155421, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 756,
765.
[47]
CA Rollo, p. 192.
[48]
Sta. Catalina College v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 144483,
November 2003, 416 SCRA 233, 239-240.
[49]
Jo v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 121605, February 2, 2000,
324 SCRA 437, 446.
[50]
Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158693, November 17,
2004, 442 SCRA 573, 606-607.
18 | P a g e
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad,
the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos,
cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid
more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course,
beside the point. The point is that employees should be given
equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long
honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on
fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold
today.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for
short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of
foreign
diplomatic
personnel
and
other
temporary
[1]
residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its
educational program and improve its standard of instruction,
Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to
employ its own teaching and management personnel
selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or
other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from
otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending
their employment, except laws that have been or will be
enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers
as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests
to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as
a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which
allegiance?
country
does
one
owe
economic
19 | P a g e
[17]
20 | P a g e
21 | P a g e
Issued on June 19, 1975 (authorizing International School, Inc. to Donate Its
Real Properties to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
Granting It Certain Rights.)
[2]
Rollo, p. 328.
[3]
Id., at 324.
[4]
Id., at 8.
[5]
- 17
-2
-1
-2
-1
-2
-2
-1
-1
-5
-1
-1
-1
-1
[6]
Id., at 39.
Id., at 38-39.
In Section 1, Article XIII thereof.
[9]
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.
[10]
M. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, International Law 75 (1999), citing Judge
Hudson in River Meuse Case, (1937) Ser. A/B No. 70.
[11]
Ibid., citing Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India vs. Pakistan), 50 ILR 2 (1968)
[12]
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10,
1948. Article 1 thereof states: "All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights." Article 2 provides, "1. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status."
[13]
Adopted by the General of the United Nations in Resolution 2200 (XXI) of 16
December 1966. Article 2 provides: "2. The States Parties to the present
Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present
Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status."
[14]
Adopted by the General assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 2106
(XX) 21 December 1965. Article 2 of the Convention states: "States Parties
condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means
and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and
promoting understanding among all races xxx."
[15]
Adopted at Paris, December 14, 1960. Under Article 3, the States Parties
undertake, among others, "to abrogate any statutory provisions and any
administrative instructions and to discontinue any administrative practices which
involve discrimination in education." Under Article 4, "The States Parties to this
Convention undertake further more to formulate, develop and apply a national
policy which, by methods appropriate to the circumstances and to national
usage, will tend to promote equality of opportunity and of treatment in the matter
of education xxx."
[16]
Adopted by the General Conference of the International Labor Organization at
Geneva, June 25, 1958. Article 2 provides that, "Each Member for which this
Convention is in force undertakes to declare and pursue a national policy
designed to promote, by methods appropriate to national condition and practice,
equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation,
with a view to eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof."
[17]
In Article XIII, Section 3 thereof.
[18]
Id.
[19]
In Article 3 thereof.
[20]
E.g., Article 135 of the Labor Code declares it unlawful for the employer to
require, not only as a condition of employment, but also as a condition for
the continuation of employment, that a woman shall not get married.
[21]
In relation to Articles 288 and 289 of the same Code.
[22]
Indeed, the government employs this rule in fixing the compensation of
government employees. Thus, Republic Act No. 6758 (An Act Prescribing a
Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government
and for Other Purposes) declares it "the policy of the State to provide equal pay
for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive
differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions. See also the Preamble of Presidential Decree No. 985 (A Decree
Revising the Position Classification and Compensation Systems in the National
Government, and Integrating the same)
[23]
Rollo, p. 491.
[24]
183 SCRA 610 (1990)
[25]
In Section 18, Article II thereof.
[26]
In Section 3, Article XIII thereof. See also Article 3 of the Labor Code.
[27]
See Sec. 3, Article XIII, Constitution. Article 3 of the Labor Code.
[28]
Article 1700, Civil Code.
[29]
Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Federation
Labor Union and the Secretary of Labor and Employment, 268 SCRA 573
(1997); San Miguel Corporation vs. Laguesma, 236 SCRA 595 (1994)
[30]
San Miguel Corporation vs. Laguesma, supra.
[31]
Belyca Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 168 SCRA 184 (1988)
[7]
[8]
22 | P a g e
23 | P a g e
"All other issues are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit" (pp.
111-112, Rollo)
The parties appealed to the NLRC. Culla was disastified with
the monetary awards, because he was not given full
backwages nor the 15% commission, incentive leave pay,
damages, and attorney's fees.
On the other hand, the Tanongon spouses assailed the Labor
Arbiter's finding that Culla was their employee. They alleged
that Culla was an independent contractor doing mainly the
work of a mechanic who was paid on a piece-work basis; that
he was free to accept repair jobs from other customers, that he
had no regular hours of work and they had no control over his
work except to indicate what part of a taxicab needed to be
repaired.
As earlier mentioned, the First Division 2 of the NLRC affirmed
on March 5, 1991 the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It
dismissed the appeal of the Tanongon spouses for having
been filed late and for lack of the required supersedeas bond.
It denied Culla's claim for the 15% commission on the ground
that:
"There is nothing on record to substantiate this claim. If, as
complainant claims, he is entitled to a commission as part of
his wage and/or in addition to his basic pay, we cannot
understand why he never made any claims therefor during his
six years of service." (Emphasis supplied; p. 23, Rollo)
Separate petitions for certiorari were filed by Culla (G.R. No.
104526) and Tanongon or Arms Taxi (G.R. No. 104523) which
were later consolidated.
24 | P a g e
25 | P a g e
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121927. April 22, 1998]
ANTONIO W. IRAN (doing business under the name and
style of Tones Iran Enterprises), petitioner, vs.NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fourth Division),
GODOFREDO O. PETRALBA, MORENO CADALSO,
PEPITO TECSON, APOLINARIO GOTHONG GEMINA,
JESUS BANDILAO, EDWIN MARTIN, CELSO LABIAGA,
DIOSDADO GONZALGO, FERNANDO M.
COLINA, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Whether or not commissions are included in determining
compliance with the minimum wage requirement is the
principal issue presented in this petition.
Petitioner Antonio Iran is engaged in softdrinks
merchandising and distribution in Mandaue City, Cebu,
employing truck drivers who double as salesmen, truck
helpers, and non-field personnel in pursuit thereof. Petitioner
hired private respondents Godofredo Petralba, Moreno
Cadalso, Celso Labiaga and Fernando Colina as
drivers/salesmen while private respondents Pepito Tecson,
Apolinario Gimena, Jesus Bandilao, Edwin Martin and
Diosdado Gonzalgo were hired as truck helpers.
Drivers/salesmen drove petitioners delivery trucks and
promoted, sold and delivered softdrinks to various outlets in
Mandaue City. The truck helpers assisted in the delivery of
softdrinks to the different outlets covered by the
driver/salesmen.
As part of their compensation, the driver/salesmen and
truck helpers of petitioner received commissions per case of
softdrinks sold at the following rates:
SALESMEN:
Ten Centavos (P0.10) per case of Regular
softdrinks.
Twelve Centavos (P0.12) per case of Family Size
softdrinks.
TRUCK HELPERS:
Eight Centavos (P0.08) per case of Regular softdrinks.
Ten Centavos (P0.10) per case of Family Size softdrinks.
Sometime in June 1991, petitioner, while conducting an
audit of his operations, discovered cash shortages and
irregularities
allegedly
committed
by
private
respondents. Pending the investigation of irregularities and
settlement of the cash shortages, petitioner required private
respondents to report for work everyday. They were not
allowed, however, to go on their respective routes. A few days
thereafter, despite aforesaid order, private respondents
stopped reporting for work, prompting petitioner to conclude
that the former had abandoned their employment.
Consequently, petitioner terminated their services. He also
26 | P a g e
7,411.66
------------P81,528.29
========
[2]
27 | P a g e
28 | P a g e
[1]
Rollo, p. 40-41.
Ibid., p. 45.
[3]
Id., p. 32.
[4]
Philippine Duplicators, Inc. vs. NLRC, 227 SCRA 747 (1993).
[5]
Songco vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 610 (1990).
[6]
Supra, Note 4.
[7]
247 SCRA 256 (1995).
[8]
Malaya Shipping vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121698, March 26, 1998.
[9]
Rollo, p. 18-19.
[10]
Ibid., p. 19.
[11]
Sebuguero vs. NLRC, 248 SCRA 532 (1995).
[12]
Supra, Note 8.
[13]
Better Buildings, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 109714, December 15,
1997; see also Note 8.
[14]
Section 3(e) x x x x x x
xxx
The term its equivalent as used in paragraph (c) hereof shall
include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profit-sharing payments and
other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic
salary but shall not include cash and stock dividends, cost of living
allowances and all other allowances regularly enjoyed by the
employee, as well as non-monetray benefits. Where an employer pays
less than 1/12th of the employees basic salary, the employer shall pay
the difference.
[15]
Art. 221. Technical rules not binding and prior resort to amicable
development. In any proceeding before the Commission or any of the
Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or
equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this
Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters
shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of
law and procedure, all in the interest of due process.
xxx
xxx
x x x.
[16]
Columbia Development Corporation vs. Minister of Labor and
Employment, 146 SCRA 421 (1986).
[17]
Bristol Laboratories Employees Association vs. NLRC, 187 SCRA
118 (1990); PT&T vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451 (1990); Haverton
Shipping Ltd. vs. NLRC, 135 SCRA 685 (1985).
[18]
De Ocampo vs. NLRC, 213 SCRA 653 (1992).
[19]
NFSW vs. Ovejera, 114 SCRA 354 (1982).
[20]
Dole Philippines vs. Leogardo, Jr., 117 SCRA 938 (1982).
[2]
29 | P a g e
PAPER INDUSTRIES
THE
PHILIPPINES
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioners
numbering
one
hundred
sixteen
[1]
(116) occupied the positions of Technical Staff, Unit
Manager, Section Manager, Department Manager, Division
Manager and Vice President in the mill site of respondent
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) in
Bislig, Surigao del Sur. In 1992 PICOP suffered a major
financial setback allegedly brought about by the joint impact of
restrictive government regulations on logging and the
economic crisis. To avert further losses, it undertook a
retrenchment program and terminated the services of
petitioners. Accordingly, petitioners received separation pay
computed at the rate of one (1) month basic pay for every year
of service. Believing however that the allowances they
allegedly regularly received on a monthly basis during their
employment should have been included in the computation
thereof they lodged a complaint for separation pay differentials.
The allowances in question pertained to the following 1. Staff/Manager's Allowance Respondent PICOP provides free housing facilities to
supervisory and managerial employees assigned in Bislig. The
privilege includes free water and electric consumption. Owing
however to shortage of such facilities, it was constrained to
grant Staff allowance instead to those who live in rented
houses outside but near the vicinity of the mill site. But the
allowance ceases whenever a vacancy occurs in the
company's housing facilities. The former grantee is then
directed to fill the vacancy. For Unit, Section and Department
Managers, respondent PICOP gives an additional amount to
meet the same kind of expenses called Manager's allowance.
2. Transportation Allowance To relieve respondent PICOP's motor pool in Bislig from a
barrage of requests for company vehicles and to stabilize
company vehicle requirements it grants transportation
allowance to key officers and Managers assigned in the mill
site who use their own vehicles in the performance of their
duties. It is a conditional grant such that when the conditions
no longer obtain, the privilege is discontinued. The recipients
of this kind of allowance are required to liquidate it by
submitting a report with a detailed enumeration of expenses
incurred.
3. Bislig Allowance The Bislig Allowance is given to Division Managers and
corporate officers assigned in Bislig on account of the hostile
environment prevailing therein. But once the recipient is
transferred elsewhere outside Bislig, the allowance ceases.
30 | P a g e
31 | P a g e
[1]
32 | P a g e
[3]
[4]
Decision penned by
Martinez; Rollo, p. 68.
Executive
Labor
Arbiter
Conchita
J.
March 2, 2011
[5]
[7]
Rollo, p. 50.
[8]
See Note 2.
[9]
See Note 3.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
See Note 5.
[16]
Rollo, p. 234.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the January
1
2
11, 2006 Decision and the March 31, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 00598 which
3
affirmed with modification the March 31, 2004 Decision and
4
December 15, 2004 Resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC Decision found the
petitioners, SLL International Cables Specialist (SLL) and its
manager, Sonny L. Lagon(petitioners), not liable for the illegal
dismissal of Roldan Lopez, Danilo Caete and Edgardo
Zuiga (private respondents) but held them jointly and
severally liable for payment of certain monetary claims to said
respondents.
A chronicle of the factual antecedents has been succinctly
summarized by the CA as follows:
[17]
33 | P a g e
the said rule, included the place where the employee was
supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment
or travel, which in this case was Cebu.
As to the status of their employment, the LA opined that private
respondents were regular employees because they were
repeatedly hired by petitioners and they performed activities
which were usual, necessary and desirable in the business or
trade of the employer.
With regard to the underpayment of wages, the LA found that
private respondents were underpaid. It ruled that the free
board and lodging, electricity, water, and food enjoyed by them
could not be included in the computation of their wages
because these were given without their written consent.
The LA, however, found that petitioners were not liable for
illegal dismissal. The LA viewed private respondents act of
going home as an act of indifference when petitioners decided
7
to prohibit overtime work.
In its March 31, 2004 Decision, the NLRC affirmed the findings
of the LA. In addition, the NLRC noted that not a single report
of project completion was filed with the nearest Public
Employment
Office
as
required
by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
8
Department Order No. 19, Series of 1993. The NLRC later
9
10
denied the motion for reconsideration subsequently filed by
petitioners.
When the matter was elevated to the CA on a petition for
certiorari, it affirmed the findings that the private respondents
were regular employees. It considered the fact that they
performed functions which were the regular and usual
business of petitioners. According to the CA, they were clearly
members of a work pool from which petitioners drew their
project employees.
The CA also stated that the failure of petitioners to comply with
the simple but compulsory requirement to submit a report of
termination to the nearest Public Employment Office every time
private respondents employment was terminated was proof
that the latter were not project employees but regular
employees.
The CA likewise found that the private respondents were
underpaid. It ruled that the board and lodging, electricity, water,
and food enjoyed by the private respondents could not be
included in the computation of their wages because these were
given without their written consent. The CA added that the
private respondents were entitled to 13th month pay.
The CA also agreed with the NLRC that there was no illegal
On
January
18,
2001,
Labor
Arbiter
Reynoso dismissal. The CA opined that it was the petitioners
5
Belarmino (LA) rendered his decision declaring that his office prerogative to grant or deny any request for overtime work and
had jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed by that the private respondents act of leaving the workplace after
private respondents. Referring to Rule IV, Sec. 1 (a) of the their request was denied was an act of abandonment.
6
NLRC Rules of Procedure prevailing at that time, the LA ruled
that it had jurisdiction because the "workplace," as defined in
34 | P a g e
35 | P a g e
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
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MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to modify the decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No.
RB-IV-20840-78-T entitled, "Jose Songco and Romeo Cipres,
Complainants-Appellants, v. F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc.,
Respondent-Appellee" and NLRC Case No. RN- IV-20855-78T entitled, "Amancio Manuel, Complainant-Appellant, v. F.E.
Zuellig (M), Inc., Respondent-Appellee," which dismissed the
appeal of petitioners herein and in effect affirmed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter ordering private respondent to pay
petitioners separation pay equivalent to their one month salary
(exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of
service.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., (hereinafter referred
to as Zuellig) filed with the Department of Labor (Regional
Office No. 4) an application seeking clearance to terminate the
services of petitioners Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres, and
Amancio Manuel (hereinafter referred to as petitioners)
allegedly on the ground of retrenchment due to financial
losses. This application was seasonably opposed by
petitioners alleging that the company is not suffering from any
losses. They alleged further that they are being dismissed
because of their membership in the union. At the last hearing
of the case, however, petitioners manifested that they are no
longer contesting their dismissal. The parties then agreed that
the sole issue to be resolved is the basis of the separation pay
due to petitioners. Petitioners, who were in the sales force of
Zuellig received monthly salaries of at least P40,000. In
addition, they received commissions for every sale they made.
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x x x.
Even Articles 273 and 274 (sic) invariably use 'monthly
pay or monthly salary'.
The above terms found in those Articles and the
particular Rules were intentionally used to express the
intent of the framers of the law that for purposes of
separation pay they mean to be specifically referring to
salary only.
.... Each particular benefit provided in the Code and
other Decrees on Labor has its own pecularities and
nuances and should be interpreted in that light. Thus,
for a specific provision, a specific meaning is attached to
simplify matters that may arise there from. The general
guidelines in (sic) the formation of specific rules for
particular purpose. Thus, that what should be controlling
in matters concerning termination pay should be the
specific provisions of both Book VI of the Code and the
Rules. At any rate, settled is the rule that in matters of
conflict between the general provision of law and that of
a particular- or specific provision, the latter should
prevail.
On its part, the NLRC ruled (p. 110, Rollo):
From the aforequoted provisions of the law and the
implementing rules, it could be deduced that wage is
used in its generic sense and obviously refers to the
basic wage rate to be ascertained on a time, task, piece
or commission basis or other method of calculating the
same. It does not, however, mean that commission,
allowances or analogous income necessarily forms part
of the employee's salary because to do so would lead to
anomalies (sic), if not absurd, construction of the word
"salary." For what will prevent the employee from
insisting that emergency living allowance, 13th month
pay, overtime, and premium pay, and other fringe
benefits should be added to the computation of their
separation pay. This situation, to our mind, is not the
real intent of the Code and its rules.
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NARVASA, C.J.:
What items or items of employee remuneration should go into
the computation of thirteenth month pay is the basic issue
presented in these consolidated petitions. Otherwise stated,
the question is whether or not the respondent labor officials in
computing said benefit, committed "grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction," by giving effect to Section 5
of the Revised Guidelines on the implementation of the
Thirteenth Month Pay (Presidential Decree No. 851)
promulgated by then Secretary of Labor and Employment,
Hon. Franklin Drilon, and overruling petitioner's contention that
said provision constituted a usurpation of legislative power
because not justified by or within the authority of the law
sought to be implemented besides being violative of the equal
protection of the law clause of the Constitution.
Resolution of the issue entails, first, a review of the pertinent
provisions of the laws and implementing regulations.
Sections 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 851, the
Thirteenth Month Pay Law, read as follows:
Sec 1. All employees are hereby required to
pay all their employees receiving basic
salary of not more than P1,000.00 a month,
regardless of the nature of the employment,
a 13th month pay not later than December
24 of every year.
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A motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed by BoieTakeda under date of August 3, 1989. Treated as an appeal, it
was
resolved
on
January 17, 1990 by then Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio de
la Serna, who affirmed the July 24, 1989 Order with
modification that the sales commissions earned by BoieTakeda's medical representatives before August 13, 1989, the
effectivity date of Memorandum Order No. 28 and its
Implementing Guidelines, shall be excluded in the computation
5
of their 13th month pay.
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The
exclusion
of
the
cost-of-living
allowances under Presidential Decree 525
and Letter of Instructions No. 174, and profitsharing payments indicate the intention to
strip basic salary of other payments which
are properly considered as "fringe" benefits.
Likewise, the catch-all exclusionary phrase
"all allowances and monetary benefits which
are not considered or integrated as part of
the basic salary" shows also the intention to
strip basic salary of any and all additions
which may be in the form of allowances or
"fringe" benefits.
In the case of San Miguel Corp. vs. Inciong, 103 SCRA 139,
this Court delineated the coverage of the term "basic salary" as
used in P.D. 851. We said at some length:
Profit-sharing
Under
the
Rules
and
Regulations
implementing Presidential Decree 851, the
following compensations are deemed not
part of the basic salary:
a)
Cost-of-living
allowances
granted
pursuant to Presidential
Decree 525 and Letter of
Instructions No. 174;
b)
payments;
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Unabridged, 1971.
9 5 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 292.
10 Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs. Drilon, 176
SCRA 24, citing Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, 42
SCRA 660.
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We observe that the third item excluded from the term "basic
salary" is cast in open ended and apparently circular terms:
"other remunerations which are not part of the basic salary."
However, what particular types of earnings and remuneration
are or are not properly included or integrated in the basic
salary are questions to be resolved on a case to case basis, in
the light of the specific and detailed facts of each case. In
principle, where these earnings and remuneration are closely
akin to fringe benefits, overtime pay or profit-sharing payments,
they are properlyexcluded in computing the 13th month pay.
However, sales commissions which are effectively an integral
portion of the basic salary structure of an employee, shall
be included in determining his 13th month pay.
We recognize that both productivity bonuses and sales
commissions may have an incentive effect. But there is reason
to distinguish one from the other here. Productivity bonuses
are generally tied to the productivity or profit generation of the
employer corporation. Productivity bonuses are not directly
dependent on the extent an individual employee exerts himself.
A productivity bonus is something extra for which no specific
additional services are rendered by any particular employee
and hence not legally demandable, absent a contractual
undertaking to pay it. Sales commissions, on the other hand,
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Total Earnings
4 See Rollo of Boie-Takeda v. Trajano, p.
126; Rollo of Fuji Xerox v. Trajano,
p. 27.
5 92 Phil. 381 (1952).
6 92 Phil. at 385; see also Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 15 SCRA 660 (1965).
7 92 Phil. 754 (1953).
8 92 Phil, at 757; see also Claparols v. Court
of Industrial Relations, 65 SCRA 613 (1975).
9 189 SCRA 274 (1990).
10 189 SCRA at 277.
Footnotes
1 The second paragraph of Section 5 (a) of
the Revised Guidelines Implementing the
13th Month Pay reads as follows:
Employees who are paid a fixed or
guaranteed wage plus commission are also
entitled to the mandated 13th month pay,
based on their total earnings during the
calendar year, i.e., on both their fixed or
guaranteed wage and commission.
2 See Annex "A", Records of G.R. No.
110068, Philippine Duplicators, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission.
3 This column is added by the Court. We
have assumed that the amount paid as 13th
month pay, as shown in the preceding
column, represented a full month's fixed
wage, without any deductions for,e.g.,
absences, undertime, etc. In the items below
marked with an asterisk, the amount of the
13th month pay is so tiny as to give rise to
the impression that some deduction
therefrom was probably made; the nature of
such deduction is not here pertinent.
The 15%-30% range in the proportion of
fixed wages to total earnings is obtained by
the following fraction:
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2. Six (6) to Ten (10) yrs. of : Two and One-half With regards to the second issue, the petitioner maintains that
under the principle of "fair day's wage for fair day's labor",
(21/2)service months salary
gratuity pay should be computed on the basis of 26 days for
one month salary considering that the employees are daily
3 Eleven (ll) to Fifteen yrs. of service : 4 months salary
paid.
4 Sixteen (16) to twenty yrs. of : 5 months
5 Twenty one yrs. of service and above : Twelve (12)
months salary.
... To say that awarding the daily wage earner salary for
more than 26 days is paying him for days he does not
work misses the point entirely. The issue here is not
payment for days worked but payment of gratuity pay
equivalent to one month or 30 days salary. (p. 29, Rollo)
Looking into the definition of gratuity, we find the following in
Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary, to wit:
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FIRST DIVISION
That paid to the beneficiary for past services rendered
purely out of the generosity of the giver or grantor.- G.R. No. 85073 August 24, 1993
Peralta v. Auditor General, 100 Phil. 1054.
Salary or compensation. The very term 'gratuity' differs
from the words 'salary' or 'compensation' in leaving the
amount thereof, within the limits of reason, to the
arvitrament of the giver.-Herranz & Garriz v. Barbudo,12
Phil. 9.
From the foregoing, gratuity pay is therefore, not intended to
pay a worker for actual services rendered. It is a money benefit
given to the workers whose purpose is "to reward employees
or laborers, who have rendered satisfactory and efficient
service to the company." (Sec. 2, CBA) While it may be
enforced once it forms part of a contractual undertaking, the
grant of such benefit is not mandatory so as to be considered a
part of labor standard law unlike the salary, cost of living
allowances, holiday pay, leave benefits, etc., which are
covered by the Labor Code. Nowhere has it ever been stated
that gratuity pay should be based on the actual number of days
worked over the period of years forming its basis. We see no
point in counting the number of days worked over a ten-year
period to determine the meaning of "two and one- half months'
gratuity." Moreover any doubts or ambiguity in the contract
between management and the union members should be
resolved in the light of Article 1702 of the Civil Code that:
In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all
labor contracts shall be construed in favor of
the safety and decent living for the laborer.
This is also in consonance with the principle enunciated in the
Labor Code that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
worker.
The Civil Code provides that when months are not designated
by name, a month is understood to be thirty (30) days. The In its answer, petitioner claimed that it erroneously included
provision applies under the circumstances of this case.
items subject of the complaint in the computation of the
thirteenth month pay for the years prior to 1982, upon a
In view of the foregoing, the public respondent did not act with doubtful and difficult question of law. According to petitioner,
grave abuse of discretion when it rendered the assailed this mistake was discovered only in 1981 after the
promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in the case of San
decision which is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Miguel Corporation v. Inciong (103 SCRA 139).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
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concur.
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