MANUEL G. VILLATUYA v. ATTY. BEDE S.

TABALINGCOS
A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012 Case Digest
FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December 06, 2004 against
respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the respondent to file a
comment, which the respondent did. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation.
In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, complainant and his
counsel, and the respondent appeared and submitted issues for resolution. The commission ordered the
parties to submit their verified position papers.
In the position paper submitted by the comf3fplainant on August 1, 2005, he averred that he was
employed by the respondent as financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number of corporate
rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled
to 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten
percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was issued by the
courts as a result of his work and the respondent being able to rake in millions from the cases that they
were working on together, the latter did not pay the amount due to him. He also alleged that respondent
engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy firms as fronts for his
legal services. On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing
two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting.
In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the complainant was not an
employee of his law firm but rather an employee of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial
consultancy firms. Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in
performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees
and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary
of complainant had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any unlawful solicitation. To support
his contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement and an affidavit executed by the VicePresident for operations of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality,
respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as
having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. Respondent did not
specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts of respondent
wherein he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification
issued
by
the
NSO.
On January 16, 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant,
claiming that he was not given the opportunity to controvert them. He disclosed that criminal cases for
bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. He
also informed the Commission that he filed Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage
contracts. In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage
Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and

Pilar

Lozano

on

different

occasions.

The Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. Respondent moved for the
suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against him, pending outcome of petition for
nullification he filed with RTC, but was denied. The Commission resolved that the administrative case
against
him
be
submitted
for
resolution.
On February 27, 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the
specific charges against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares
in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the second charge, the Commission found respondent to
have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully
solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. As for the third charge, the
Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Due to the gravity
of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be
stricken
off
the
roll
of
attorneys.
On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and
approved
the
Report
and
Recommendation
of
the
Investigating
Commissioner.
On August 1, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to
disbar
him
was
premature.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their
Resolution
dated
April
15,
2008
recommending
respondents
disbarment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to
complainant;
2.
3.

Whether
Whether

respondent
respondent

is

violated
guilty

of

the
gross

rule
immoral

against
conduct

unlawful
for

solicitation;

having

married

and
thrice.

RULING:
First

charge:

Dishonesty

for

non-payments

of

share

in

the

fees.

Supreme Court affirmed the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but did not concur with
the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of
Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or
agree to divide the fees for legal services rende-red with a person not licensed to practice law. In the case
of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to
share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer
involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainants allegations in this case
had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

Second

charge:

Unlawful

solicitation

of

clients.

In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the
rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached. Based
on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases
for
the
purpose
of
profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises,
though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with
the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can
readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a
cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be
regarded
as
the
practice
of
law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc.,
which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a
means
to
procure
professional
employment;
specifically
for
corporate
rehabilitation
cases.
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice
of law. In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy
or
legal
services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, the Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03
and
15.08
of
the
Code.
Third

charge:

Bigamy.

The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the
qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural
technicalities in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v. Garrido:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the
complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in
the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to
the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the
standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may
inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In this case, complainant
submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latters
first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third
marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his
first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct
which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition
precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No
distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be
expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and
honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The
administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court,
demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients
may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar.
He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of
committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section
27,
Rule
138
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court.58
The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and ordered that his
name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
58 TIONGCO v AGUILAR
(Canon 10

Morada)

Facts:

Issue:

Atty. Tiongco filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a review of a lower courts decision.
The petition contained malicious and intemperate language. Tiongco stated that the decision of the trial
court Judge was crafted to fool the winning party, a hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs favor, it was
the devil who dictated it, the Judge was confused, being born and raised amongst the non-propertied
class
Tiongco also filed a pleading with the SC stating that it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had
read the petition and hold that the same failed to sufficiently show that the respondent Court had
committed grave abuse of discretion.
In a previous resolution, the SC required Atty. Jose B. Tiongco to show cause why he should not be dealt
with administratively for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Tiongcos Compliance, he alleges that the SC failed to mention that he also called the judge a robber,
a rotten manipulator, and abetter of graft and shady deals.

W/N Tiongco must be held administratively liable.

Held: YES

Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively. While Tiongco
tried to justify as true his descriptions of the Judge as liar, thief, perfidious, and blasphemer, he did
not offer any excuse for the other intemperate words and phrases he used. Neither did he show their
relevance to the petition.
By insinuating that this Court did not at all read the petition, Tiongco exhibited gross disrespect and
attempted to discredit the Members of the First Division. He charged them with violating their duty to
render justice, and he thereby promoted distrust in judicial administration.
He also showed disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge, thereby diminishing public
confidence in the latter and in the judiciary.
Although a lawyer has the righteven the dutyto criticize the courts, this right must be exercised
responsibly. The criticism must be bona fide, without using language that would tend to create or promote
distrust in judicial administration and undermine the peoples confidence in the integrity of the members of
this Court.

VILLAFLOR VS. SARITA

308 SCRA 129
FACTS:
Complainant filed a case for disbarment against respondent before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline. The Commissioner assigned to investigate the case
issued an order directing respondent to file his answer or comment to the
complaint. The period of time alloted to answer the complaint lapsed without
respondent submitting his comment. An order was issued requiring the parties to
attend the hearing of the case but the respondent failed to appear. A notice of
hearing was sent to respondent but again he failed to attend the proceeding. After
giving the respondent enough opportunity to face the charges against him, which
the latter did not avail, the case was submitted for resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to obey notices from the IBP investigators constitutes an
unethical act.
HELD:
Yes. As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken.
It is his foremost responsibility to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers. The highest form of respect to the judicial
authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.
Atty. Prieto vs. Atty Corpus and Judge Fe

Attorney Ferdinand Fe was the respondent counsel in the civil case which was dismissed for
the respondent party was not a real party in interest since her right of action has still to
ripen upon the death of her mother. Respondent Fe was appointed as the presiding judge, By
reason of his appointment, he completely detached all his professional relationships with his
clients, and relinquished all case records of his office to all his clients. The previous client of
Judge Ferdinand Fe again filed Civil Case in the counsel of Atty Curpos in the court of Judge

Ferdinand Fe. Being the previous lawyer of the complainant in the civil case Judge Fe
inhibiting himself from the case and ordered that the record of said case be transferred to
the RTC Branch 33. The complainant Attorney Prieto file administrative case against
respondent Judge Ferdinand Fe and Atty Corpuz all are members of the Bar and Bench, for
dishonesty, serious misconduct prejudicial to the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary.
Complainant implies that not only did the respondent lawyer have free access to the records
of through the help of respondent Judge Fe which was the former counsel of the plaintiff.
Another reason for his objection is that, allegedly, some paragraphs in the complaint in Civil
Case were obviously copied from previous case wherein the complaint was prepared by
respondent Judge in his capacity as then lawyer. Complainant claims that the foregoing
constitute misconduct which imply malice or wrongful intent, not just mere errors of
judgment. Complaint not written by Atty Corpus respondent lawyer committed deceit,
which serves as a ground for his disbarment.

Issue:

Held:
The court held that the complaint against the respondents is baseless, as they are mere
allegations founded on pure speculation and conjecture. Sans evidence, his petition was
purposely written to mislead the Court and cast a doubt on the integrity and dignity of the
respondents. Petitioner made the said administrative case as a vehicle to unduly harass or
otherwise prejudice the respondents. Worse, in selfishly satisfying his own desire to vex the
respondents, he had tarnished the integrity of the entire judiciary and the bar. it is the duty
of the lawyer to maintain towards the Court a respectful attitude. Moreover, in filing a
frivolous suit against his opposing counsel, petitioner violated Canons 8 and 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that all lawyers must conduct themselves
with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards their colleagues and should avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel and commands all lawyers to observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. The complaint against
respondent is dismissed. Complainant Attorney is fined 5,000.00 for filing frivolous suit.
JOHN SIY LIM, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARMELITO A. MONTANO, Respondent.

FACTS:
In the case at bar, complainant John Siy Lim charged respondent Atty. Montano with gross misconduct relative to his
filing of Civil Case No. C-19928. Complainant alleged that respondent filed the complaint in the said civil case out of
malice, indicating that it involves the same parties, the same causes of action and relief prayed for as that of Civil
Case No. C-14542. In respondents comment, he denied the allegations against him. While he admitted filing the
civil case stated herein as a counsel for plaintiff therein, he asserted that it was not filed with malicious intent.
Moreover, while the new case involved the same party, it was for a different cause of action and relief, and, as such,
the principle of res judicata did not apply. He further explained that the complaint in Civil Case No. C-14542 was for
declaratory relief or reformation of instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928 was for annulment of title. He accepted
the case based on "his professional appreciation that his client had a good case." In his reply, the complainant
stressed that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping; Civil Case No. C-19928 was nothing but a revival of the

old complaint; and "the lame excuse of the respondent that the present case is an action in rem while the other
case is an action in personam" did not merit consideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility and is liable of forum shopping.
HELD:
In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By his own admission, he was aware that Civil
Case No. C-14542 was already final and executory when he filed the second case (Civil Case No. C-19928). His
allegation that he "was not the original counsel of his clients" and that "when he filed the subsequent case for
nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in
the prior case for reformation and quieting of title," deserves scant consideration. As a responsible member of the
bar, he should have explained the effect of such final and executory decision on his clients rights, instead of
encouraging them to file another case involving the same property and asserting the same rights.

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs
contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also
violated Rule 12.0225 and Rule 12.0426 of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate "to delay no man for money or
malice."27

While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, we also note that the power to disbar
should be exercised with great caution, to be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should
never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. Thus, respondent lawyer is
suspended from practice of law for six months.

MARIO S. MARIVELES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ODILON C. MALLARI, respondent.
Rodolfo B. Ta-asan for complainant.
PER CURIAM:
On January 11, 1989, Mario S. Mariveles of Davao City filed an administrative complaint
against his former counsel, Attorney Odilon C. Mallari, whose legal services he had engaged
in 1984 to handle his defense in Criminal Case No. 6608 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City where he was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law.
After an adverse decision was rendered on December 26, 1986, Mariveles instructed
Attorney Mallari to appeal the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, which the
respondent did.
However, in the Court of Appeals, despite numerous extensions of time, totalling 245 days,
which he obtained from the Court, Attorney Mallari failed to file the appellant's brief,
resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.
Complainant discovered his lawyer's desertion only when he was subpoenaed by the trial
court to appear before it for the execution of the decision which had become final.
Through new counsel, complainant filed a Petition for Reinstatement of Appeal, Cancellation
of Entry of Judgment and Admission of Appellant's Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, but it was
denied by the appellate court.
He sought relief in this court (G.R. No. 85964, "Mario S. Mariveles vs. Court of Appeal, et al.")
which, on March 13, 1989, granted his petition, ordered the Court of Appeals to cancel the
entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, reinstate the appeal, and admit the appellant's
brief filed by his new counsel. The Court said:
It is true that the failure of counsel to file brief for the appellant
which led to the dismissal of the appeal does not necessarily

warrant the reinstatement thereof. However, where the

negligence of counsel is so great that the rights of accused are
prejudiced and he is prevented from presenting his defense,
especially where the appellant raises issues which place in
serious doubt the correctness of the trial court's judgment of
conviction, the aforesaid rule must not be rigidly applied to
avoid a miscarriage of justice. These teachings of jurisprudence
are present in the case at bar.
On the first aspect, the failure of petitioner's former counsel to
file the brief, for reasons unknown and without any cause
imputable to petitioner, amounted to deliberate abandonment
of his client's interest and justifies reinstatement with
consequent due consideration of petitioner's appeal through a
new counsel. (pp. 106-107, Rollo).
On February 15, 1989, the administrative complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's Committee on Bar Discipline investigated the complaint and held hearings. On
March 3, 1992, it submitted to this Court a report/resolution finding:
In sum, what was committed by the respondent is a blatant violation of our
Code of Professional Responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of
time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business practicing his profession if in
the course of that practice, he will eventually wreck and destroy the future
and reputation of his client and thus disgrace the law profession. The last
thing that his peers in the law profession and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines would do is to disrobe a member of the profession, for he has
worked for the attainment of his career burning the midnight oil throughout
school and passing the bar. The undersigned, however, could not find any
mitigating circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty. Disbarment is the
only recourse to remove a rotten apple if only to instill and maintain the
respect and confidence of all and sundry to the noble profession. (pp. 249250, Rollo)
The Court concurs with the above observations. The respondent demonstrated not only
appalling indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and his client but also a
shameless disregard for his duties as a lawyer. He is unfit for membership in this noble
profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Attorney Odilon C. Mallari guilty of abandonment
and dereliction of duty toward his client and hereby orders him DISBARRED from the legal
profession and to immediately cease and desist from the practice of law. Let the Office of the
Court Administrator and the Executive Judges of the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth
Judicial Regions, be furnished with copies of this resolution for dissemination to all the courts
in those regions.
SO ORDERED.
RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH IV,
TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEA.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest
order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed
by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the
quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. [1] These were
the eloquent words of the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in exalting the sacred and
honorable legal profession. But he laments the pathetic and deplorable fact that, many a
law practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court, has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent
of the primacy of truth and moral justice, a mercenary purveying the benefits of his
enlightened advocacy in direct proportion to a litigants financial posture instead of a faithful
friend of the courts in the dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor alike. [2] Here, Atty.
Samuel C. Occea, as later shown by his disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such
lawyer who has become an apostate to his exalted position as an officer of the court. He
thus deserves to be weeded out from the legal profession to protect its sanctity and nobility.
This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator William
C. Ogan which has since been pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 423. In 1976,
Judge Fernando S. Ruiz took over the case from Judge Paulino S. Marquez who, in turn,
inherited it from Judge Antonio Beldia. Noting that the proceedings have been pending for
thirteen (13) years, Judge Ruiz then inquired into the principal causes of the delay. He found
out, as will be shown later in detail, that Atty. Samuel C. Occea caused the delay by
disobeying lawful court orders and by willfully prolonging the litigation through his various
maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that he will not willingly sue any
groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any mans cause for money or malice.
Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will and
Testament of the late William C. Ogan, his residuary estate was divided among his seven
children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occea, was named in the will as executrix of the
estate. As such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occea, as her lawyer.
The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United States of
America), and real estate in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased left no debt. Thus,
the settlement of the estate should have been simple and speedy. However, since the death
of the testator on February 1, 1963, the settlement of his estate has not yet been terminated
owing largely to the dilatory tactics of Atty. Occea.
Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix, Necitas
Ogan-Occea, filed a project of partition on August 4, 1967. On September 22, 1967, the
probate court approved the project except certain portions. The executrix then interposed an
appeal. In view of the delay caused by the pendency of the appeal, the other heirs filed
several motions praying that the estates remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its shares
of stocks in the Philippines and in the United States be distributed among all the heirs. The
executrix, through her husband Atty. Occea, vehemently opposed the motions, asserting
that the P250,000.00 cash had already been earmarked for her husbands attorneys fee and
other expenses, and that the shares of stocks could not be distributed among the heirs
because the stock certificates were not in her possession. The dispute between the
executrix, on the one hand, and the other heirs, on the other, which delayed the
proceedings, centered mainly on the P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks.
Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occea, interposed numerous
appeals from the orders of the probate court. For their part, the heirs repeatedly prayed in
their motions for the release of the shares of stocks and the remaining cash. But the
executrix and Atty. Occea opposed the same, thus prolonging the proceedings. In CA-GR
No. 48716-R (December, 1974), the Court of Appeals, in remanding the case to the probate
court, had this to say:
It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle their differences with
the view to closing the estate which has been pending since 1963. The executrix, the heirs,

and the lawyers, are reminded that the prolongation of administrative proceedings can only
benefit the executor or administrator or the counsels for the contending parties. It always
results in the diminution of the share of each of the heirs because the estate is burdened
with the expenses of the administration proceedings, the heir must have to pay attorneys
fee and the longer the proceedings the bigger the attorneys fee. [3]
Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty. Occeas
claim for attorneys fee in the amount of P250,000.00 and the executrixs refusal, through
her husband, to account for the shares of stocks belonging to the estate which, according to
her, were not in her possession. The other heirs could not accept that explanation because
as executrix, she was charged with the responsibility of collecting all the assets of the
estate.
Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to comment
why the securities were not in her possession. She filed her comment, through her husband,
that some Philippine and American securities were not in her possession. To determine which
securities were in her possession, Judge Ruiz on October 22, 1977, issued an order requiring
her to submit within 30 days the latest inventory of all the securities of the estate. However,
she failed to comply with the order. Judge Ruiz then issued another order on February 6,
1978, directing her to take possession of all certificates of stocks or their replacements
belonging to the estate and to make an up-to-date inventory thereof with a statement of
their nature and their value. Again, she did not comply with the order.
Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the executrix, through
Atty. Occea, appealed the numerous interlocutory orders of the probate court to the Court
of Appeals, hence, adding to the delay. Because of the propensity of the executrix, through
Atty. Occea, to elevate interlocutory orders to the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruiz issued an
order on June 16, 1978 directing her to refrain from instituting any action or proceeding
without first informing the court. The executrix and her husband disobeyed this order. In
fact, he filed six cases with the Court of Appeals and one with this Court.
On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson, one of
the heirs, to go to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on the five parcels of
land owned by the estate and to submit a report to the probate court. To provide money for
the purpose, the court ordered the executrix to release to Nancy Ogan-Gibson the sum of
$1,000.00 from the estate fund, the same to be liquidated with supporting receipts upon her
submission of her report on or before September 30, 1979. The executrix assailed the order
before the Court of Appeals in a petition for prohibition and certiorari, docketed therein as
CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on January 13, 1981 for lack of merit, the
Court of Appeals said:
Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose such an order of the court
which is and would be for the benefit of the estate and the heirs. All the other heirs
completely agreed with what the trial court did. xxx
Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned orders he should be complimented in finding ways and means of promptly and
expeditiously determining the assets of the estate to be ultimately distributed among the
heirs.
On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court for her failure to
obey the orders of October 22, 1977, December 8, 1977, February 6, 1978 and October 16,
1979 and directed her to report to the court which securities were and were not in her
possession and to give the reason therefor.
On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occea were held in contempt of court
and fined P250.00 each for disobeying the court order of August 15, 1979 requiring the
executrix to release $1,000.00 to Nancy Ogan-Gibson. Both were given the chance to
explain their failure to comply with the order, but they did not submit any explanation. On
January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-10326.
It bears emphasis that this incident delayed the proceedings for four (4) years.
On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the executrix to
distribute immediately among the heirs all the shares of stocks of the estate in the

Batangas-Laguna Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall, Inc. and the Motor Service Co.; to
report her compliance within 10 days from notice; and within the same period, to file a
written report to the court stating (a) what other certificates of stocks belonging to the
estate are in her possession; and (b) which certificates of stocks are not with her, giving the
reasons therefor. Again, the executrix and her husband, Atty. Occea, did not comply with
the said order. The probate court thus ordered her to explain why she should not be
punished for contempt of court. After several postponements at her instance and that of her
husband, the incident was set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them appeared,
thus delaying the proceedings for about a year and a half. Finding the executrix unfaithful in
the performance of her duties, the probate court, on May 12, 1981, adjudged her in
contempt of court.
Forthwith, Atty. Occea and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao City, Civil Case No.
14456 for damages (P200,000.00 as moral damages and expenses of litigation) against
Judge Ruiz. But, on October 13, 1981, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occea filed with the Tanodbayan a
letter-complaint against Judge Ruiz, charging him with knowingly rendering unjust
interlocutory orders, in that without prior notice and hearing, he punished the executrix for
indirect contempt of court and censured her for non-compliance with the probate courts
order of October 16, 1979. For lack of merit, Atty. Occeas complaint was dismissed by then
Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez in a Resolution dated November 19, 1984.
On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occea filed with this Court Administrative Case No. 2345CFI against Judge Ruiz for gross inefficiency and dishonesty. In a Resolution dated October
11, 1982, this Court dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Occea to substantiate his
charges during the investigation.
Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said administrative
complaint, Atty. Occea and his wife filed with the CFI of Davao City Civil Case No. 14957 for
damages against the former. The couple alleged that they suffered damages upon reading
the judges comment filed with the Supreme Court. On June 11, 1982, the CFI dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action, the comment being an absolutely privileged
communication.
By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints, found to
be groundless, Atty. Occea further delayed with malice the probate proceedings and
inflicted hardship and pain upon Judge Ruiz.
More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings, Atty. Occea has
inflicted greater harm to the other heirs, with the executrix herself as his willing partner.
From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed
with this Court and the Court of Appeals by Atty. Occea, questioning the interlocutory
orders of the probate court. But most, if not all, were without merit.
Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia, in the same
probate proceedings, was also harassed by Atty. Occea with groundless administrative
charges and suits, both criminal and civil. These cases, while pending, were then utilized by
Atty. Occea in securing restraining orders from the Court of Appeals or as grounds for the
judges inhibition.
Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court providing inter alia that
the CFI may suspend an attorney from the practice of law for cause, Judge Ruiz, on May 26,
1982, filed with the same probate court Administrative Case No. 44 charging Atty. Occea
with gross misconduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer and willful disobedience of lawful
court orders. Instead of filing an answer, he submitted a motion praying for the inhibition of
Judge Ruiz. This motion was denied. Atty. Occea was then directed to file his answer within
15 days from notice which was extended to another 15 days upon his motion. Still, he did
not file an answer. What he submitted was a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. But it was denied for lack of merit.
Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3, 1982, morning
and afternoon. Upon Atty. Occeas motion, he was given an extension of 15 days from

November 3, 1982 within which to file his answer. However, he did not comply. Neither did
he appear during the hearing.
Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this Court issued a
temporary restraining order in G. R. No. 62453, Samuel Occea vs. District Judge Fernando
S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol for prohibition. However, on August 15, 1983, this Court dismissed
Atty. Occeas petition for lack of merit. The hearing of the administrative case was set on
January 30 and 31, 1984, but again, he did not appear.
The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occea failed to appear. Upon his
telegraphic request, the hearing was reset on December 13 and 14, 1984. On December 7,
1984, he filed his Answer and Motion for Referral to the Solicitor General or the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. His motion was denied. The hearing was reset on May 8 and 9, 1985.
Upon another telegraphic request of Atty. Occea, the hearing was postponed to August 14
and 15, 1985. Again, he did not appear. Thus, in its order of August 15, 1985, the probate
court considered his failure to appear as a waiver of his right to present evidence. [4]
On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing that Atty.
Occea has abused, misused and overused the judicial system, [5] Judge Ruiz rendered a
decision suspending[6] him from the practice of law for three (3) years. The
decision[7] unfolded a long list of his administrative offenses, thus:
I
Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court;
gross misconduct in office
During the probate proceedings, respondent Occea, on behalf of his wife executrix, filed
with the Court of Appeals six (6) cases; and with the Supreme Court one (1) case, assailing
the order of the probate court directing the said executrix to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized
to determine the assets of the estate in the U.S., $1,000.00 to be taken from the estate; and
the order ordering the same executrix to report to the probate court the securities belonging
to the estate. Atty. Occeas refusal to obey the said orders and elevating the same to the
higher courts unnecessarily delayed the probate proceedings.
II
Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless
suits and gave aid or consent to the same; delayed
persons for money or malice
Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the probate court two actions
for damages which were both dismissed for lack of merit and lack of cause of action.
Respondent also filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint charging the judge of the
probate court with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders. The complaint was
likewise dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent also filed with this Court an administrative
complaint which was again dismissed for failure of respondent to substantiate the charge.
By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative complaint and criminal
charge which were found to be groundless and unsubstantiated, respondent unduly delayed
the settlement of the estate proceedings by harassing Judge Ruiz who had to spend time,
effort and money to defend himself against said frivolous and unmeritorious cases.
In fact, respondents propensity to file groundless administrative charges, as well as civil and
criminal suits, harassed not only Judge Ruiz but also the previous judges who handled the
case. As a measure of self defense, these judges were compelled to prepare and file
pleadings or comments thereby using time which could have been devoted to expediting the
closure of the estate proceedings.
Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were
filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals questioning the interlocutory orders
of the probate court. Most, if not all of these petitions, were determined to be groundless
and without merit.
III
Disobeying the laws

Respondent violated his lawyers oath of office by flagrantly disobeying the clear provision of
Rule 140, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court, entitled Charges Against Judges of First
Instance, which reads as follows:
Sec. 6. Confidential - Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and
confidential.
During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter No. 23345-CFI, Exh. Z)
filed by respondent against Judge Ruiz in the Supreme Court, he violated the private and
confidential nature thereof three (3) times, to wit:
1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and
certiorari, entitled Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R.
No. SP-10604, questioning an interlocutory order of the probate court (No. 2, Exh. V) to
which he attached as Annex AW a complete copy of his aforesaid administrative complaint
against Judge Ruiz albeit the same is completely immaterial to the issue raised in said
petition.
2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled Estate of William C. Ogan, et al.
vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-13162 (No. 4, Exh. V), impugning an
interlocutory order of the probate court, he attached as Annex C thereof a true and
complete copy of the said administrative complaint although not relevant to the question
therein raised; and
3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal complaint with the
Tanodbayan (Exh. Y), he also attached as Annex A thereof a true and complete copy of
said administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz even if said administrative complaint is not
germane to the charge (Page 2, No. 1, Exh. Y).
By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court, respondent, as an officer of the
court, put to naught one of the principal purposes thereof which is to protect the personal
and professional reputation of judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive
and irresponsible clients, litigants and counsels (In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; Murillo vs.
Superable, Adm. Case No. 341, March 23, 1960; Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. VI,
page 260). Respondent committed gross misconduct in office and has not conducted himself
as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion.
IV
Did falsehood and consented to the
doing of same in court.
In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456 (Exh. W),
respondent alleged in paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. W-1) that his wife-executrix Necitas
Ogan Occea was held in contempt and censured, without any hearing, for not obeying
the probate courts order of October 16, 1979 (Exh. N).
However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 423) would show that in
the order of February 26, 1980, the probate court directed said executrix to explain within 5
days from notice why she should not be cited for contempt (Exh. O). In the order of April 8,
1980, the contempt charge was set for hearing on June 23, 1980, at 9:00 oclock in the
morning (Exh. P) but was reset to October 22, 1980 after the lifting of the restraining order
of the Court of Appeals (Exh. Q). This was again reset to April 20, 1981, subsequent to the
denial by the Supreme Court of the respondents petition for review impugning the Court of
Appeals decision. As stated in the order of May 12, 1981, page 2, paragraph 3 (Exh. R),
copies of the order setting the hearing of the contempt charge on said date (April 20, 1981)
were received by the respondent and his wife-executrix on March 24, 1981. On the date of
the hearing, neither the executrix nor respondent appeared. The following day (April 21,
1981), the court received executrixs motion for postponement of the hearing, which was
denied for lack of merit. Subsequently, the order of May 12, 1981 (Exh. R) was rendered
holding the executrix in contempt and penalized with censure.
In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her counsel did not attend.
Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he subsequently alleged
under oath in his letter-complaint to the Tanodbayan, dated March 29, 1982, against Judge
Ruiz (Exh. Y) that without prior notice and without any hearing, Judge Ruiz

adjudged executrix Necitas Ogan Occea guilty of contempt and censuring her (page 2,
paragraph 2, Exh. Y-2; page 5, paragraph 9b, Exh. Y-3).
Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court order of August 15, 1979
(Exh. C), directing said executrix to remit immediately the sum of $1,000.00 to her co-heir
Nancy Ogan-Gibson with which to meet whatever necessary expenses that she might incur
in inquiring into the status of the 5 parcels of land owned by the estate at Vinton County,
Ohio, U.S.A., respondent and his wife-executrix committed falsehood when they stated in
their petition filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10326 that the said order was
issued without hearing and thus a violation of procedural due process. The Court of
Appeals, in its decision which has become final (Exh. E), confirmed this falsehood when it
held that the petitioner-executrix was not deprived of her right to be heard when the
respondent judge issued the two orders in question (Page 6, Exh. E).
In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 138 [8] and Section 9, Rule 139[9] of
the Revised Rules of Court, Judge Ruiz, on November 26, 1985, transmitted to this Court a
certified true copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of facts. [10]
On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeas motion, restrained Judge Ruiz
from enforcing his decision of November 14, 1985. The case then has remained pending so
that on May 30, 1989, this Court issued an Order [11] requiring the parties to move in the
premises, by informing the Court about the status of the decision or order suspending Atty.
Samuel C. Occea from the practice of law, Judge Ruiz particularly indicating if he still
pursues the instant case, within ten (10) days from notice.
On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting for this Courts
action on his decision suspending Atty. Occea.
On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occea filed an Explanation and Motion praying that the case
be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and recommendation.
This Court denied the motion and instead referred the case to Atty. Emilio Rebueno (now
deceased), then Bar Confidant, for evaluation, report and recommendation. After going over
the records, he recommended that the temporary restraining order enjoining Judge
Fernando S. Ruiz from enforcing the decision dated November 14, 1985 suspending Atty.
Samuel C. Occea from the practice of law for a period of three years be
forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty. Samuel C. Occea be DISBARRED from the practice of law
for grave violation of his oath of office as attorney; likewise, that his name
be DROPPED from the roll of attorneys.
We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the same being supported by the facts on record.
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault
or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [12] His guilt,
however, cannot be presumed.[13] It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as
well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in
his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel. [14] All these requirements have been
complied with in the case at hand.
In fact, it was Atty. Occea who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the
administrative case against him which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many times so that
he could be accorded the full measure of due process. The court a quo, therefore,
appropriately proceeded to hear the case ex parte as Atty. Occea deliberately failed to
appear and answer the accusations against him.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the Bar
may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross
misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyers oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to
do so. Not only did Atty. Occea commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and
willful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these transgressions, he violated the
lawyers oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following duties, thus:

I, __________________,of __________________,do
(place of birth)
solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willing promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to
the court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
As shown by the records, Atty. Occea gravely violated his oath of office in his handling
of Special Proceedings No. 423. The facts of the case succinctly show that through his
atrocious maneuvers, he successfully delayed the disposition of the case for the last thirtyeight (38) years, causing untold hurt and prejudice, not only to the heirs, but also to Judges
Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For respondents part and that of his wife, such
prolonged litigation obviously benefited them. As aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, the
delay can only benefit the executor or administrator and the longer the proceedings, the
bigger the attorneys fees. But the more tragic reality is the fact that Atty. Occea has
caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the administration of
justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral conduct. Indeed, he
abused beyond measure his privilege to practice law.
This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for
the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his
knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the
same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while
he owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice.[15]
The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed
only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. [16] A lawyer
must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. [17] He must faithfully perform
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high
standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by this
Court which includes suspension and disbarment.
Clearly, Atty. Occeas conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession
even for a single moment.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the legal profession.[18] Atty. Occea has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he
engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. This Court has
repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a
lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession, [19] because it cannot be denied that the
respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the
Bar betrays their trust and confidence. [20] Thus, for his serious administrative offenses,
punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occea deserves the ultimate penalty, that of
expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His
name is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

Santiago vs Fojas

TOPIC: Legal Ethics, Canon 14 CPR

FACTS:
An expulsion case was faced by the complainants contending that they have illegally
removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. The lower court resolved
in favor of Salvador and ordered the complainants to pay, jointly and severally, Mr. Salvador.
The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals. The complainants lost in their petition
at the Court of Appeals due to abandonment, failure to act accordingly, or serious neglect of
their counsel, Atty. Fojas to answer the civil complaint on an expulsion case. Atty. Fojas
assured them that everything was in order and he had already answered the complaint.
However, the appellants soon discovered that he never answered it after all because,
according to him, he was a very busy man. Atty. Fojas admitted his mistake in failing to
file an answer for the expulsion case, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a
motion for reconsideration. However, such motion for reconsideration was denied. Atty.
Fojas defended his negligence with the reason that the case was a losing cause after all.
Atty. Fojas also asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his
services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally
terminated by complainant. Complainants then filed for a disbarment case.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary
action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once
he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. This means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of
the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. In his
motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of
the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and
pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake
and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial
court. Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did
not comply with his duty to file an answer.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondents inability to
exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer
accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Furthermore, a breach of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the
complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which
provides: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Atty. Fojass negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact
a losing cause. The Supreme Court held that he should have seasonably informed the
complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
expressly provides: A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable results of the clients case, neither overstating nor
understanding the prospects of the case.
REPRIMANDED AND ADMONISHED
93 DALISAY v MAURICIO

Facts:

This is the case against Batas Mauricio, the TV host.

Allegedly, Mauricio demanded and received exorbitant attorneys fees but did not take any action on
Valerina Dalisays case.
Initially, she paid P25T as acceptance fee.
In total, she paid Mauricio P56T: P8T filing fee (though the case was already filed) the balance might be a
combination of the ff:
o
Additional acceptance fee P90,000.00, with the explanation that he can give a discount should
she pay in cash.
o
P3,000.00 as appearance fee
notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legal service. She terminated their
attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents. Mauicio refused.
The IBP Board of Governors wanted to dismiss the case.

Issue:

W/N the case against Mauricio should be dismissed.

Held:

No. He should be suspended for 6 months.

When respondent accepted P56,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the

latters case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it was expected
of him to serve complainant with competence and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion.

But there is nothing on record that Mauricio entered his appearance as counsel of record.
He did not even follow-up the case which remained pending up to the time she terminated his services.
Regarding the P8T: (allegedly as docket fees for other cases): there was no evidence nor any

pleadings submitted to show that respondent filed any case considering that the filing fee had to be
paid simultaneously with the filing of a case.

when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his
rights.
Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services. However, he should
charge only a reasonable amount of fees.

Villaflores v Atty. Limos AC No. 7504, Nov 23,2007 (TABAG)

FACTS:
-

Complaint for disbarment filed by Virginia Villaflores against Atty. Sinamar Limos because of Gross Negliegence and
Dereliction of Duty
Atty. Limos was the counsel of Villaflores in another case filed before the RTC where the latter is a defenadant. Before
this, Atty. Limos handled a case for Villaflores son.
In the original case where Villaflores was a defendant, the RTC rendered a judgment unfavorable to Villaflores. She
wanted to appeal. She initially sought PAOs (Public Attorneys Office) services but decided to solicit the services of
Atty. Limos.
Villaflores initially paid her 10,000 (on Sept 8, 2004) , then another 10,000 (on Sept 9, 2004), then another 2,000 for
miscellaneous expenses (on Sept 21, 2004). Atty. Limos was paid a total of 22,000 duly receipted and acknowledged
by the latter.
Subsequent to the payments, on Sept 21, 2004, an Employment Contract was signed by Atty. Limos and VIllaflores to
formally engage the lawyers professional services.
However, Villaflores appeal (the original case) was dismissed because Atty. Limos was not able to file an appellants
brief within the required reglementary period.
After knowledge of this, there have been many unsuccessful attempts by Villaflores to see Atty. Limos, the lawyer
refusing to talk to Villaflores.
Villaflores filed a complaint with the IBP, the Comission of Bar disciplined that Atty. Limos should be declared guilty of
gross negligence in failing to file the required appellants brief and should be suspended for 1 year and must return the
22,000 paid by Villaflores. The IBP Board of Governers adopted this resolition and modified it, suspending Atty. Limos
for 3 months instead.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants case as would warrant disciplinary action.

HELD:
YES!
-

The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is retained. To establish the professional relation, it
is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney are sought and received in any manner pertinent to his
profession.
THUS, as early as Sept 8 (first payment was made), respondent was already considered as counsel and not merely on
Sept 21 when the Employment Contract was signed. The acceptance of payment and the records of the case bars the
attorney from disclaiming the existence of the attorney-client relationship.

No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once he agrees to take up
the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory.
Respondents defense that complainant failed to inform her of the exact date when to reckon the 45 days within which
to file the appellants brief does not inspire belief or, at the very least, justify such failure. If anything, it only shows
respondents cavalier attitude towards her clients cause.
CANOY vs ORTIZ, Court ruled that failure to file a position paper by the counsel is to be considered a violation of Rule
18.03. Same is true in this case. It was the lawyers duty to inform the client of the status of the case.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Failure of respondent to file the appellants brief for complainant within the reglementary period constitutes gross
negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

In re suspension of VICENTE PELAEZ, attorney,

Juan Sumulong for respondent.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez by Judge of First Instance Wislizenus for a
period of one year, the case has been elevated to this court as provided by law, for full investigation of
the facts involved, and for the rendition of the appropriate order.
The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine Bar, residing at Cebu, Cebu. On March
20, 1918, he was appointed guardian of the minor Gracia Cabrera. As such guardian, he came into
possession of certain property, including twenty shares of the E. Michael & Co., Inc., and ten shares
of the Philippine Engineering Co. While Pelaez was still the guardian of the minor, he borrowed
P2,800 from the Cebu branch of the Philippine National bank. Shortly thereafter, to guarantee the
loan, Pelaez, without the knowledge or consent of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, deposited with
the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank the shares of stock corresponding to the
guardianship. On April 13, 1921, Pelaez executed a written agreement in favor of the Cebu branch of
the Philippine National Bank, pledging, without the authority of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the
shares of stock in question, to guarantee the payment of the loan above referred to.
These are the facts, taken principally from the memorandum filed in this court on behalf of the
respondent, which caused the judge of First Instance to suspend him from the legal profession. To
quote counsel for the respondent, "the misconduct of which the respondent in this case is guilty
consist of having pledged the shares belonging to his ward, to guarantee the payment of his personal
debt."
Two questions present themselves for the resolution. The first question is this: Are the courts in the
Philippines authorized to suspend or disbar a lawyer for causes other than those enumerated in the
statute? The second questions is this: May a lawyer be suspended or disbarred for non-professional
misconduct?
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from this office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any of the causes therein enumerated.
It will be noticed that our statute merely provides that certain cause shall be deemed sufficient for the
revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. It does not provide that these shall constitute the
only causes for disbarment, or that an attorney may not be disbarred or suspended for other reasons.

It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of the grounds of disbarment is not to be taken as
a limitation of the general power of the court in this respect. Even where the Legislature has specified
the grounds for disbarment, the inherent power of the court over its officer is not restricted.
The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed,
the statute is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer.
Passing now to the second point as a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline
one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a
general rule with many exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has
shown, through misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such professional honesty
as render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal
business of others. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which
admits an attorney to the bar, and the court requires for such admission the possession of good moral
character.
The principal authority for the respondent is the case of People ex rel. vs. Appleton ([1883], 105 Ill.,
474). Here it was held, by a divided court, that where property is conveyed to an attorney in trust,
without his professional advice, and he mortgages the same, for the purpose of raising a sum of
money which he claims is due him from the cestui que trust, and the trustee afterwards sells the
property and appropriates the proceeds of the sale to his own use, the relation of client and attorney
not being created by such trust, his conduct, however censurable as an individual occupying the
position of a trustee, is not such as to warrant the summary disbarring of him on motion to the court to
strike his name from the roll of attorneys, but the injured party must be left to his proper remedy by
suit. The Illinois court, however, admits that although the general rule is, that an attorney-at-law will
not be disbarred for misconduct not in his professional capacity, but as an individual, there are cases
forming an exception where his misconduct in his private capacity may be of so gross a character as
to require his disbarment.

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney,
uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification
is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would
seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which
shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him.
We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of Kansas are sound.
The relation of guardian and ward requires of the guardian the continual maintenance of the utmost
good faith in his dealings with the estate of the ward. The bond and the oath of the guardian require
him to manage the estate of the ward according to law for the best interests of the ward, and faithfully
to discharge his trust in relation thereto. Moreover, it has not escaped our attention that in the petition
by Vicente Pelaez, asking the court to appoint him the guardian of Gracia Cabrera, he begins his
petition in this manner: "El abogado que subscribe, nombrado tutor testamentario, etc." (The
undersigned attorney, appointed testamentary guardian, etc.) which indicates that petitioner might not
have been named the guardian in this particular case had he not at the same time been a lawyer.
Counsel argues that the misconduct for which the respondent has been suspended by the lower court
is single and isolated. "It forms," he says, "the only blot upon the escutcheon." We feel, however, that

the trial court has been extremely considerate of the respondent, and that were we sitting in first
instance, we would probably incline to a more severe sentence.
Judgment affirmed. So ordered.
Orbe vs Adaza
In November 1996, Attorney Adaza went to Priscilla Orbe to borrow P60k. Orbe loaned Adaza the said amount. As
security, Adaza issued Orbe two checks to cover the loan plus interest. The checks however bounced (the second
check was even post dated by Adaza to bear the date January 24, 1996- many months before November 1996 when
the loan was made). Subsequently, because of Adazas failure to pay despite notices and demand from Orbe, the
latter filed a complaint for grave misconduct against Adaza. Orbe alleged that Adaza is unfit to be a member of the
bar. Eventually, the case was referred to the respective Integrated Bar of Philippines chapter. Despite notices, Adaza
failed to appear in any of the proceedings. The IBP chapter then recommended Adazas suspension for one year.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza should be suspended.
HELD: Yes. Adazas issuance of worthless checks and his contumacious refusal to comply with his just obligation
for nearly eight years (from SCs date of decision [2004]) is appalling. The Supreme Court also elucidated on the
following:
A member of the bar may be so removed or suspended from office as an attorney for any deceit, malpractice, or
misconduct in office. The word conduct used in the rules is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the
performance of the lawyers professional duties but it also refers to any misconduct, although not connected with his
professional duties, that would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him. The grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court are not
limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct, including dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity. Such misdeed puts his moral fiber, as well as his fitness to continue in the advocacy of law, in
serious doubt.

Cruz-Villanueva vs Rivera
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Maria Divina Cruz-Villanueva (complainant) against Atty. Carlos P.
Rivera (respondent Rivera) and Atty. Alexander P. Simeon, Jr. (respondent Simeon, Jr.) for grave misconduct
and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
The Facts
Sometime in January 2004, complainant engaged the services of respondent Rivera to prepare the documents,
and to pay all the necessary expenses, relating to the sale of complainants property to Samson B. Bautista
(Bautista). As shown by an acknowledgment receipt, [1] respondent Rivera received P80,000 from complainant to
cover expenses payable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the Register of Deeds, the City Treasurers Office,
and others.
On Bautistas death in February 2004, complainant learned that the property had been transferred in Bautistas
name based on a Deed of Reconveyance[2] executed by complainant. Bautistas widow also informed complainant
that final payment for the property would be withheld pending payment of all the necessary taxes. [3] The BIR also
directed complainant to explain why no tax evasion charges should be filed against her for non-payment of taxes on
the transfer.[4]
Respondent Rivera then convinced complainant to file an adverse claim on the property and to file cases
for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 against Bautistas widow. Respondent Rivera requested and
received P13,000 as acceptance fee and representation expenses.[5]
After repeated verbal requests, complainant wrote a letter [6] to respondent Rivera to clarify the issue on the
non-payment of taxes and the alleged Deed of Reconveyance, which complainant claimed she did not

execute. Complainant likewise inquired about the adverse claim supposedly filed by respondent Rivera on her
behalf. Complainant also directed respondent Rivera to pay immediately the necessary taxes to the BIR.
Complainant later learned that respondent Rivera had no notarial commission for the years 2003 and 2004.[7]
Complainant
also
charged
respondent
Simeon,
Jr.,
Regional
Director,
Registry
of
Deeds, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, of conspiracy with respondent Rivera in registering the property under Bautistas
name based on the Deed of Reconveyance without payment of the proper taxes. Complainant alleged that
respondent Simeon, Jr. allowed the registration despite knowledge that there was a prior Deed of Sale [8] and that
respondent Simeon, Jr. received part of the P80,000 to facilitate the transfer.
In an Order dated 18 October 2004, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
directed respondents to answer the complaint. Respondent Rivera asked for an extension of ten days to file his
answer.[9] However, respondent Rivera did not file any answer.
In his Answer[10] dated 22 November 2004, respondent Simeon, Jr. denied complainants allegations and prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint against him. On the registration in Bautistas name without payment of the
required taxes, respondent Simeon, Jr. claimed that he relied on the genuineness and authenticity of the documents
presented by respondent Rivera. Respondent Simeon, Jr. denied that he received money from respondent Rivera to
facilitate the transfer. Respondent Simeon, Jr. also disavowed any knowledge of a prior Deed of Sale.
IBP Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco (Commissioner Pacheco) set the case for mandatory conference on
11 March 2005. Only complainant and respondent Simeon, Jr. appeared in the 11 March 2005 hearing. The hearing
was canceled and reset for 15 April 2005. Only complainant appeared in the 15 April 2005 hearing. Despite receipt
of notices of hearing, respondent Rivera did not attend any of the hearings.
Commissioner Pacheco required all the parties to submit their position papers and documentary
evidence. Complainant and respondent Simeon, Jr. both filed position papers. Respondent Simeon, Jr. submitted a
reply to complainants position paper. Respondent Rivera did not submit any position paper, thus waiving his right
to comment and participate in the investigation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-07 dated 28 January 2006 adopting with
modification[11] Commissioner Pachecos Report and Recommendation finding respondent Rivera guilty of grave
misconduct and serious violation of the Code. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition on
respondent Rivera of a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent Simeon, Jr. for
lack of merit.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the instant case to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule
139-B[12] of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent Rivera liable for violation of the lawyers oath and the Code.
The Court agrees with the IBP that the complaint against respondent Simeon, Jr. should be dismissed.
Complaint Must be Supported by Substantial Evidence
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving with substantial evidence the
allegations in the complaint.[13] Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.[14]

Aside from complainants bare allegations, complainant did not present any evidence to prove that respondent
Simeon, Jr. conspired with respondent Rivera in registering the property in Bautistas name based on the Deed
of Reconveyance without payment of taxes. Likewise, complainant did not present any evidence to prove that
respondent Simeon, Jr. received part of the P80,000 from respondent Rivera for the registration. Hence, the
complaint against respondent Simeon, Jr. should be dismissed.
Respondent Rivera Not Commissioned as Notary Public
A member of the Bar who notarizes a document when he has no authorization or commission to do so may be
subjected to disciplinary action. Notarization is not an empty act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and due
execution.[15]
Respondent Rivera notarized the Deed of Sale and the Deed of Reconveyance sometime in January
2004. However, the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, issued a
certification that respondent Rivera had no notarial commission for the years 2003 and 2004.[16] Respondent Rivera
did not present any evidence to the contrary. Therefore, when respondent Rivera notarized the two deeds, he had no
authority to do so.
In performing notarial work without a commission, respondent Rivera violated the lawyers oath to obey the
law, specifically the Notarial Law, and to do no falsehood. Respondent Rivera also violated Rule 1.01[17] of the
Code because he deceived complainant into believing that he was authorized to act as notary public when he was
not. Respondent Riveras conduct constitutes malpractice and falsification of a public document.[18]
Respondent Rivera Failed to Account for the Money
He Received from Complainant
The Code mandates that every lawyer shall hold in trust all funds of his client that may come into his
possession.[19] The Code further states that a lawyer shall account for all money received from the client. [20]
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer must render an accounting
to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. [21] Consequently, if the lawyer does not use
the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client. [22]
Respondent Rivera specifically received P80,000 from complainant for expenses to the BIR, the Register of
Deeds, the City Treasurers Office and other related purposes. Respondent Rivera also received P13,000 from
complainant as acceptance fee and representation expenses for the filing of the adverse claim and criminal charges
against Bautistas widow. However, respondent Rivera did not pay the taxes to the BIR and did not file an adverse
claim. Hence, respondent Rivera should have promptly accounted for and returned the money to complainant.
Respondent Riveras failure to make an accounting or to return the money to complainant is a violation of the
trust reposed on him. As a lawyer, respondent Rivera should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to
him in his professional capacity because the Code exacts a high degree of fidelity and trust from members of the bar.
[23]

The Court also notes respondent Riveras lack of respect for the IBP and its proceedings. After filing the
Motion for Extension of Time to File an Answer [24] and despite receipt of the IBPs orders and notices, respondent
Rivera did not participate in the investigation. Respondent Riveras actuation shows a high degree of
irresponsibility which stains the nobility of the legal profession. [25]
On the Appropriate Penalty Against Respondent Rivera

Notaries public who notarize documents without the requisite commission are penalized with revocation of
their notarial commission and are barred from being commissioned as notary public. [26] Thus, respondent Rivera
should be barred from being commissioned as notary public for one year and his notarial commission, if any,
revoked.
On the other hand, lawyers guilty of violation of Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code are suspended from
the practice of law for six months to one year. [27] Considering respondent Riveras lack of prior administrative
record, suspension from the practice of law for one year and not disbarment, as prayed for by complainant, serves
the purpose of protecting the interest of the public and the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera GUILTY of violation of the lawyers
oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 16, and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this
decision. Further, respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for
one year and his present commission, if any, is REVOKED. Furthermore, respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
is ORDERED TO ACCOUNT to complainant, within 20 days from notice of this decision, for the P80,000 and
the P13,000.
We DISMISS the complaint against respondent Atty. Alexander P. Simeon, Jr.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents personal record as attorneys. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Briones vs Zapanta
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Estela Anastacio-Briones against respondent Atty. Alfredo A.
Zapanta for abandonment and neglect of duties.
In her Complaint[1] dated December 1, 2003, Estela Anastacio-Briones stated that she engaged the services
of respondent to file three civil cases involving a parcel of land located in Antipolo City. The cases were then
consolidated[2] before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73.
Complainant averred that on October 25, 2002, she showed respondent a copy of Discharge and
Appearance of Counsels with Ex-parte Motion to Cancel the October 25, 2002 Hearing she intended to file that
day. She claimed that even prior to the hearing, she informed respondent of her joint venture agreement with a real
estate developer who offered the services of its own counsel. Complainant added that respondent requested her not
to file it and he would submit a withdrawal of appearance instead. Complainant also informed respondent that she
could not attend the hearing on January 6, 2003 because of other commitments. Respondent allegedly assured her
that he would be present in the hearing.
On January 6, 2003, both respondent and complainant failed to appear in the hearing. As a result, the trial
court declared them to have waived their right to present further witnesses and directed them to file their formal
offer of evidence within ten days from notice. The trial court noted that respondent received its Order on January
24, 2003, but respondent did not act on it within the ten-day period. Instead of filing a formal offer of evidence,
respondent filed a withdrawal of appearance on March 5, 2003. On March 10, 2003, the trial court dismissed the
case with prejudice.[3]
On May 5, 2003, complainant learned that the cases were dismissed and that respondent did not attend
the January 6, 2003 hearing and did not file a formal offer of evidence.

Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for abandoning her case and withdrawing his appearance
as counsel without her knowledge.
In his Comment[4] dated June 10, 2004, respondent countered that he was discharged as complainants
counsel after the October 25, 2002 hearing. Respondent added that he prepared a withdrawal of appearance
on October 30, 2002 but complainant ignored his several requests to sign it in his office. Nevertheless, he claimed
he filed a withdrawal of appearance on March 5, 2003 without complainants conformity.
Respondent denied promising complainant that he would attend the January 6, 2003 hearing. According to
him, complainant informed his secretary that her new lawyer would attend. Respondent claimed further that
complainants new lawyer should be faulted for belatedly filing an entry of appearance and a motion for
reconsideration. Respondent claimed that he was merely being used as a scapegoat for complainants own
negligence in pursuing the cases.
In a Resolution[5] dated September 20, 2004, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated May 26, 2005, Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for negligence in the performance of his duties as counsel,
and for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner Funa recommended respondents
suspension for three months from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XVII-2005-104 dated October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Funa. OnNovember 15, 2005, the IBP Board of
Governors forwarded the Report to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
On January 4, 2006, respondent filed with this Court a motion for reconsideration. In its comment, the IBP,
through Commissioner Funa, recommended the denial of the motion.
We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent was remiss in performing his duties as counsel of
complainant. The Court finds respondent liable for negligence and for violation of Canon 18 [6] specifically Rules
18.03[7] and 18.04[8] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [9] provides the proper procedure for a lawyers withdrawal as
counsel in a case. Unless the procedure prescribed in the abovementioned section is complied with, the attorney of
record is regarded as the counsel who should be served with copies of the judgments, orders and pleadings and who
should be held responsible for the case.[10] For its part, the court could recognize no other representation on behalf of
the client except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected. [11]
In Orcino v. Gaspar,[12] we held that until a lawyers withdrawal shall have been approved, he remains
counsel of record and is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client
require. He must still appear on the date of hearing for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until
there is a withdrawal of his appearance on record.
In this case, respondent admitted that he did not attend the January 6, 2003 hearing despite being notified
by the court. His claim that he was already discharged as counsel as early as October 25, 2002 is negated by the
record that he withdrew his appearance only on March 5, 2003. Until his dismissal or withdrawal was made of
record, any judicial notice sent to him was binding upon his client even though as between them the professional
relationship may have been terminated. [13] Thus, unless properly relieved, respondent is responsible for the conduct
of the cases and his failure to attend the hearing and comply with the trial courts directive to file a formal offer of
evidence constituteinexcusable negligence.
Moreover, respondents negligence is not excused by his claim that he had prepared his withdrawal of
appearance as early as October 30, 2002 but complainant refused to sign it. In Macarilay v. Seria,[14] with similar

facts, we rejected the counsels excuse for failing to file the complaints, although the complaints were finished, due
to his clients refusal to sign them.
Certainly not to be overlooked is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of the developments of the
case.[15] We note that it was only on May 5, 2003 that complainant learned that she defaulted in the case. As a
lawyer mindful of the interest of his client, respondent should have informed the complainant of the courts order
addressed to him, especially if he considered himself discharged in order for complainant and her new counsel to be
guided accordingly.
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts. The penalties for a lawyers failure to file a brief or other pleading range from reprimand,
warning with fine, suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment. [16] In this case, this Court sustains the
recommendation of the IBP for respondents suspension of three months.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alfredo A. Zapanta is hereby found GUILTY of negligence and is meted
the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law forTHREE MONTHS effective upon finality of this
Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in this
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

ONG vs CIBA Ceigy

This is a petition for review on certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. [1]
This case began when respondent Ciba Geigy (Phils.), Inc. sued petitioner Abraham Ong for a sum of
money before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 132.[2] On July 17, 1998, the RTC rendered a
decision[3] against petitioner, ordering him to pay P564,851.01 plus interest, the cost of collection, the cost of suit
and attorneys fees. On August 12, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied in an order dated December 3, 1998, a copy of which petitioners counsel received on December 17, 1998.[4]
On December 28, 1998, 10 days after the lapse of the reglementary period, counsel for petitioner filed a
notice of appeal. Respondent moved to dismiss the appeal for having been filed out of time. On February 16, 1999,
the RTC issued an order denying the notice of appeal.[5]
On April 6, 1999, petitioner, with the assistance of new counsel, filed a petition for relief [6] from judgment
before the court a quo, alleging that he only learned of the December 3, 1998 order and the entry of judgment on
March 1, 1999 because his counsel failed to inform him about them. On April 30, 1999, the trial court issued an
order denying the petition for relief from judgment for lack of merit.[7]
On August 24, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the court a quo.[8] On February 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision and on July 10, 2001, denied reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The only issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that petitioner was bound by the negligence of his former counsel, Atty. Patria Generoso-Abella, to whom he
attributes the loss of both his case and his chance to appeal.

To prove his allegations of Atty. Abellas gross and inexcusable negligence in the defense of his cause,
petitioner cited two principal omissions on her part: (1) she failed to file a notice of appeal before the lapse of
the reglementary period, thereby preventing petitioner from taking an appeal and (2) her gross negligence during
the trial, which allowed incompetent evidence to be adduced in favor of the respondent and which prevented the trial
court from appreciating material and relevant evidence in petitioners favor which could have altered the outcome of
the case.
Specific instances of Atty. Abellas negligence during the trial included: (1) her failure to question the
competence of respondents sole witness who, according to petitioner, was not even an employee of respondent but
of a different company altogether; (2) her failure to raise petitioners counterclaims in his answer; (3) her failure to
raise defenses and to present and highlight evidence that would have proven that he had no outstanding obligation to
respondent and (4) her gross carelessness in the handling of vital documentary evidence for the petitioner, which
resulted in the impairment of the probative value of such evidence.
The general rule is that the client is bound by the actuation of his counsel in the conduct of the case and
cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded
differently. In criminal cases, as well as in civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and
mistakes may have been made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel does not constitute a ground for new trial. [9] The exception to this rule is
when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. [10]
Having studied the records of this case and comparable jurisprudence, we conclude that
Atty. Abellas negligence, while quite regrettable, was not so gross as to warrant a new trial. The fact that she
committed most of her mistakes in the course of her presentation of petitioners evidence instantly destroys the
parallelisms which petitioner is attempting to draw between the instant case and the ones he cited.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we relieved petitioner of his lawyers incompetence on the ground that,
by filing a demurrer to evidence even after the trial court had denied leave, counsel deprived petitioner of his chance
to present evidence that could have exonerated him.
In Tan v. Court of Appeals,[12] the issue was not even whether respondent DPG Development &
Management Corporation (DPG) was entitled to relief from its lawyers incompetence but whether the rules on
proper substitution of counsel were followed. In pointing out that all the respondent had done was to secure
additional counsel, we explained that DPG was entitled to an additional lawyer due to the negligence of the original
one whose failure to file an answer despite two extensions had resulted in DPG being declared in default.
In Ginete v. Court of Appeals,[13] counsel for petitioners therein failed to file their appellants brief within
the period given. Ginete is inapplicable because, in this case, the Court of Appeals never even acquired jurisdiction
over the appeal on account of the failure to file a notice of appeal.
Clearly, none of the jurisprudence cited by petitioner supports his position, given the wide disparity of facts
by which we justified our decisions in those cases. As grave as Atty. Abellas errors might have been, they still
boiled down to incompetence during the proceedings in the trial court which, by itself, did not relieve petitioner
from the consequences of her negligence.
Finally, Atty. Abellas failure to file a timely notice of appeal was not tantamount to depriving petitioner of
his day in court. In Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals [14] where counsel for petitioner failed to
file a timely notice of appeal, we found the lawyers concerned guilty of mere simple negligence as opposed to gross
negligence. We said:
Indeed, by failing to file its appeal within the reglementary period, it could not be
successfully argued that petitioner was deprived of its day in court.
Time and again it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of
due process, it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in

accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply
with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
The foregoing considered, we affirm the Court of Appeals finding that the respondent court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners petition for relief from judgment. In Taada v. Angara,[15] we
defined grave abuse of discretion in the following manner:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be
grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will
result in the dismissal of the petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Mortera vs Pagatpatan
How far may a lawyer go to ensure that he gets paid?
The answer to this question is stated clearly in Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for Lawyers[1] and in decisions[2]applying the same, but it is apparently not plain enough to the respondent
in this case. It therefore behooves us to make an example of him for the improvement of the legal
profession.
This disbarment case originated from the execution of a judgment in a civil action for rescission of
contracts with a prayer for prohibitory mandatory injunction. [3]
In brief, the complainants, then the plaintiffs, sued their mother, one Renato C. Aguilar and one
Philip Arnold Palmer Bradfield for the rescission of a contract of sale. They secured judgment under
which Aguilar was to pay them P155,000 for the property, which this Court affirmed. [4]
On April 15, 1994, respondent did the unthinkable. Under a secret agreement with Aguilar, he
accepted P150,000 from the latter as partial payment of the judgment sum, issuing a receipt for the
amount.[5] He then deposited the money in his personal bank account without the knowledge of
complainants.[6] Until now, respondent adamantly refuses to surrender the money to complainants, despite
the successive Orders of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. [7]
For his part, respondent, in his comment [8] admits his secret agreement with and receipt of the money
from Aguilar, interposing as his defense the fact that the complainants and their mother owed him the
money he appropriated for services previously rendered. They would not have paid him his fees had he
not done what he did.[9] In support of his argument, the respondent narrated his years of service as counsel
for the complainants and their mother. He alleged the amounts they owed him although he presented no
evidence of any agreement between him and the complainants for the exact amount of his compensation.

Respondents responsibility to the complainants is unequivocally stated in Canons 15 and 16 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility. The four rules governing this situation were: he owed candor to his
clients;[10] he was bound to account for whatever money he received for and from them; [11] as a lawyer, he
was obligated to keep his own money separate from that of his clients; [12] and, although he was entitled to
a lien over the funds in order to satisfy his lawful fees, [13] he was also bound to give prompt notice to his
clients of such liens and to deliver the funds to them upon demand or when due.
Respondent violated each and every one of these rules.
Respondent cited the need to protect the money from other persons claiming to be heirs of Eusebio
Montera[14] and from the volatile temperament of the complainants [15] but did not present any evidence at
all to prove either claim. Thus, these claims should be ignored.
Because the respondent admitted concealing his clients money, the only question in our minds is
how severe his punishment should be.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines resolved [16] to suspend the
respondent for one year.
We do not agree.
In Aldovino v. Pujalte,[17] respondent Atty. Pedro C. Pujalte similarly faced disbarment charges for
having withheld his clients money in violation of Canon 16. Pujalte alleged a lien for his fees over the
contested amount but adduced no evidence of this supposed lien.
In disposing of that case, we said:
Respondent has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally, as lawyers lien, the
sum of P250,000, as attorneys fees. In fact, he did not adduce any proof of such
agreement. His mere allegation or claim is not proof. Obviously, his failure to return the
money to complainants upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he
misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. His act of holding on to their
money without their acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety.
He was clinging to something not his and to which he had no right.

As a penalty for his infraction, Atty. Pujalte was suspended for a year.
However, in the more recent case of de Guzman Buado and Lising v. Layag[18] which involved a
violation of Canons 15, 16 and 17, the Court En Banc imposed the much heavier penalty of indefinite
suspension.
In that case, Atty. Eufracio Layag, the lawyer of the complainants Lising and de Guzman,
successfully prosecuted a case against Inland Trailways, Inc. (Inland). Pursuant to the judgment, Inland
issued three checks, one payable to Layag, one payable to Lising and one payable to de Guzman who had
already passed away by then. Layag received all three checks from the deputy sheriff but did not inform
the complainants. He then gave them to one Marie Paz Gonzales for encashment on the strength of a
special power of attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by the late de Guzman appointing her as his
attorney-in-fact. This SPA authorized Gonzales to encash any check or bill of exchange received in

settlement of the case. Even after complainants learned of the issuance of the checks two years later and
demanded delivery of the proceeds, Layag refused to do so.
In imposing upon Layag the penalty of indefinite suspension, the Court En Banc considered his
years of experience as a lawyer, his ignorance of the law, specifically the Civil Code, and his violation of
not one but three Canons.
Even though, on its face, this case has more in common with Pujalte than with Layag, a one-year
suspension seems too lenient for a number of reasons.
First, the respondent in this case has been a practicing lawyer since 1974 [19] and even runs his own
small law firm. For all his vast experience, however, he claims that he has done nothing wrong by
concealing and withholding his clients money from them. [20] Coming from a seasoned practitioner of the
law, this attitude is inexcusable.
Second, the respondent had other means of recovering his fees, having filed a case for that purpose
which was, however, dismissed for his failure to properly implead an indispensable party. [21] In short,
having botched his own effort to recover his fees, he sought to simply subvert both law and proper
procedure by holding on to the money.
Clearly, the respondents actuations were thoroughly tainted with bad faith, deceit and utter contempt
of his sworn duty as a lawyer. Thus, a heavier penalty than a mere one-year suspension is definitely called
for.
WHEREFORE, the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XV-2002-223 in Administrative Case
No. 4562, finding respondent liable for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that instead of a one-year suspension, Atty. Renato B.
Pagatpatan is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years.
Respondent is further directed to turn over to the complainants, within five (5) days from receipt
of this resolution, the P150,000 he received in their behalf.
Respondent is also ORDERED to report to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance
herewith within 15 days from such compliance.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Renato B. Pagatpatan and
copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.