G.R. Nos.


March 17, 1934


The defendant, Marcelo Kalalo, lost a litigation with Isabela Holgado over a parcel of
land which the defendant had been cultivating from 1931 to 1932. While the parcel of land was
being harvested by Isabela’s hired help, the defendants, armed with bolos, ordered them to stop.
Isabela along with the victims, Arcadio and Marcelino, arrived and ordered the workers to
continue with the harvest. The defendants approached the victims and killed them. Marcelo
Kalalo then took the revolver that the victim had and fired four shots at Hilarion but he was
fortunate enough to escape unscathed.
Attorney-General maintains that they are guilty of murder in view of the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength in the commission of the acts . The court
found the defendant guilty for murder and discharge of firearms. On appeal, the defendant
assailed the decision of the court questioning wether or not the sentences were in accordance
with the law.

Wether or not the decisions of the court were correct.

The defendant is guilty of simple homicide and attempted homicide. The risk was even
for the both parties and their strength was almost balanced because there is no doubt but that,
under circumstances similar to those of the present case, a revolver is as effective as, if not more
than three bolos. The four shots fired by the defendant shows that he was bent on killing
Hilarion. He performed everything necessary on his part to commit the crime that he determined
to commit but he failed by reason of causes independent of his will, either because of his poor
aim or because his intended victim succeeded in dodging the shots, none of which found its mark

G.R. No. 146458

January 20, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Capt. Llanto was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death by the lower court hence the
automatic review by the supreme court. The defendant assails the decision on the ground that the
trial court misappreciated the facts and misapplied the the law, and gravely abused its discretion
in not admitting the testimonies of their medico-legal experts.
The defendant argues that the testimonies and expert opinions of his witnesses; a
surgeon/lawyer and a gynecologist, that the intact hymen of the victim, as proved by a medical
certificate, negates the charge of rape against him. The trial court did not allow the presentation
of these two witnesses because according to them, a medical certificate is not even necessary in
rape cases.

Wether or not an intact hymen would negate the charge of rape against the defendant.

A broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. Citing the cases of People vs Santos
and People vs Aguinaldo, the courts held that it is possible for the victim’s hymen to remain
intact despite repeated sexual intercourse and that the strength and dilability of the hymen varies
from one woman to another such that it may be elastic as to stretch without laceration during
intercourse, or on the other hand, may be so resistant that its surgical removal is necessary before
intercourse can ensue. In some cases even, the hymen is still intact even after the woman has
given birth.

G.R. No. L-4812

October 30, 1908

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
ROMUALDO MENA, defendant-appellant.

Three carabaos of the defendant entered the property of the plaintiff and caused
considerable damage to his property. The plaintiff took possession of the animals and asked for
compensation for the damage done but the defendant said that he could not pay in kind and also
questioned the amount of damage done. The plaintiff decided to deposit the animals to the justice
of peace until the question of damages could be settled in court.
On his way to the justice of peace, the defendant along with some men demanded the
surrender of the carabaos and drew his bolo when the plaintiff refused. They proceeded to take
the carabaos and threatened the plaintiff with bodily injury if they resisted. The plaintiff filed a
suite charging the defendant with coaccion (grave coercion).

Wether or not the defendant is guilty of coaccion (grave coercion)

The acts committed by the defendant clearly falls within the forgoing definition of the crime of
coaccion (grave coercion). When the complainant is in actual possession of a thing, even if he
has no right to that possession, compelling him by means of violence to give up the possession,
even by the owner himself, is grave coercion.
With violence he compelled the complaining witness to do that which he did not desire to
do that is to say, to turn over the possession of the carabaos and it matters not whether it was
"just or unjust" that they should thus have been turned over to the defendant; whether it was or
was not the duty of the complaining witness to turn them over on demand, the defendant was
guilty of the crime of coaccion unless he was lawfully authorized to enforce his demand when
the complaining witness refused compliance therewith

G.R. No. L-38833

March 12, 1980

AIROL ALING Y MAJURI, accused whose death sentence is under review.

While on the witness stand and on a confession which was sworn to before the court of
clerk the accused pleaded guilty of parricide for killing his wife. He stated that while in prison,
his wife did not visit him, heard that she had a “kabit”, neglected their four children and agreed
that his father-in-law could have custody of his four children. He left the penal colony to
reconcile with his wife but upon seeing him, the wife took flight. The accused overtook her and
stabbed her to death.
The counsel de oficio contends that the accused should not be guilty of parricide because
his marriage with the victim was not undubitably proven.

Wether or not the accused is guilty of parricide.

The contention of the counsel de oficio could not be sustained. The testimony of the
accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal interest. It was a
confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of