From Riches To Rags-Libre PDF

East European Quarterly. XXXIX. No.
2
June 2005
FROM RICHES TO RAGS: THE ROMANIAN
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY*
Lavinia Stan
St. Francis Xavier University
Question: Why does the National Christian Democrat
Peasant Party not reconstruct itself?
Answer. Because it did not yet destroy itself completely.
(Romanian political joke)
Among Romanian parties, the National Christian Democrat Peasant
Party (NCDPP) is the only one that moved from the position of the largest partner of a ruling coalition to that of an outside-Parliament party
commanding the allegiance of less than five percent of the electorate.
Today few enthusiasts believe that the NCDPP can make a comeback
and win parliamentary representation in the upcoming 2004 general
elections. Most Romanians dismiss the party as insignificant and forever
relinquished to the fringes of political life. It was not long ago, however,
that tiie Christian Democrats commanded considerable leverage on governmental structures at all levels. This article chronicles the rise and fall
of the NCDPP, presenting the individuals who at one time or another
represented the party, and discussing the party's most important policies
and political choices.
The NCDPP is by no means an exceptional party when it comes to
programmatic goals and historical legacy. Together with the National
Liberal Party and the Social Democrat Party, it is one of three 'historical' parties active in pre-communist Romania, banned by the communist
authorities, and resurrected after the December 1989 anticommunist
revolution.i It is one of Romania's many center-right parties and coalitions with an anticommimist, pro-Western and pro-democratic political
This article was completed with generous funding from the Killam Trust. I would like to
thank Lucian Turcescu, Denisa Mindruta and Daniel Boldureanu for their helpful
conunents on earlier drafis, and Christian Democrat and Christian Popular politicians for
their candor. All errors of interpretation are entirely mine.
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EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY
platform. Some of these electoral coalitions - including the Democratic

Convention of Romania - were formed by the NCDPP itself. The
NCDPP is also the largest Christian Democrat party in Romania, and
one of eleven Eastern European parties affiliated to the Christian
Democrat International. Together with the Polish Electoral Alliance
Solidarity of the Right, the Romanian NCDPP is the only Eastern European Christian Democrat party without parliamentary representation at
the beginning of the new century.
The Beginnings (1990-1996)
The NCDPP registered on 8 January 1990, days after the collapse of
Ceausescu regime. The party presented itself as the revived precommunist National Peasant Party, formed in September 1926 through
the fusion of the National Party and the Peasant Party. The National
Party emerged in 1869 in Transylvania and, under Iuliu Maniu's leadership, became instrumental in the 1918 union of Transylvania and the
Romanian kingdom. Maniu resigned when King Carol II refused to sever
ties with his mistress Elena Lupescu. Formed in 1895 in the Arges
coxmty, the Peasant Party reemerged a quarter of a century later under
the leadership of teacher Ion Mihalache. The pivotal political act that
helped the party gain a significant following was the 1918-1921 land
reform, the most extensive expropriation in inter-war Europe that turned
over 40 percent of all arable land to peasants and destroyed the political
and economic power of the landowning elite. The reform aimed not so
much to improve the social and economic situation of the peasants, who
failed to turn into more efficient farmers as a result, but to prevent them
from becoming political radicals. Land reform and the 1923 constitution
providing for universal male suffrage pacified the peasants, and assured
that the acquiescent Peasant Party rather than the rising extremist parties
enlisted their vote. The political confusion following the 1927 deaths of
King Ferdinand and Liberal leader Bratianu allowed the National Peasant Party to win the 1928 election, the only inter-war poll considered
free of political manipulation. For the next five years, the party moved in
and out of government, ruling the country alternatively with the Liberals.
Accountable democracy was short lived after 1930, when King Carol II
became Romania's dominant figure, first manipulating the political
process, and then establishing a royal dictatorship.
THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY
t8t
After communist authorities banned the party in the wake of the

November 1946 elections, most of its leaders were jailed, and both
Maniu and Mihalache died in prison. The decapitated formation continued its illegal existence throughout the 1947-1989 period under the leadership of Comeliu Coposu. That was no easy task, as communist Romania flowed no opposition and refused to recognize alternate political
parties. Bom in May 1914 in the family of a Greek Catholic priest
residing in the Transylvanian Salaj county, Coposu joined the party at
the age of 19. A law graduate, he acted as Maniu's personal secretary
from 1937 to 1947, a political apprenticeship that came in handy when
Coposu decided to revive the party. In 1947, he was accused of "high
treason against the working classes" and was sentenced to life in prison,
not before waiting eight years for his trial to take place. Coposu was
freed in 1964 as part of an amnesty but the communist secret police continued to monitor his movements closely. Even so, in 1987 at the height
of the communist dictatorship he secretly arranged for the underground
National Peasant Party to join the Christian Democrat Intemational. The
affiliation offered intemational recognition, but was more formal than
substantial as the party remained closer to the old policies of the interwar National Peasant Party than to modem definitions of Christian
Democracy.2 During its first years of existence, the NCDPP benefited
tremendously from Coposu's moral standing, organizational skills and
political capital. While other Romanian politicians struggled to hide past
collaboration with communist authorities and the crass opportunism that
animated their political involvement, Coposu was respected for his
moral rectitude and personal sacrifice. While other politicians tried to
secure undeserved state positions at any cost, Coposu let his colleagues
take formal responsibility as Parliament or committee leaders. Coposu's
mark on the party was indelible, but not entirely beneficial. By refusing
to name a successor he exposed the party to factionalism. By supporting
outsiders for top party and state offices he weakened the Christian Democrats' self-confidence. By making it so dependent on the personality
of its leader, Coposu exposed the party to the threat of personalism,
nepotism and cronyism. IJnfortunately, other party leaders were far less
virtuous, and had no qualms to misuse and abuse the unchecked power
that came with the office.
The new party's claim to represent the interwar National Peasant
Party was supported by its membership composition, dominated by older
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pre-communist activists who either were forced into exile or spent years
in jail as punishment for their 'reactionary' activity. Ion Ratiu, a private
entrepreneur and Cambridge University political science graduate,
belonged to the former category. Nicolae Ionescu-Galbeni, Constantin
('Ticu') Dumitrescu, Gabriel Tepelea and Ion Diaconescu belonged to
the latter category. They were in their seventies when communism
collapsed, and unsurprisingly only a handful made meaningful political
careers afterwards, though were offered seats in Parliament as early as
1990. Of those who did play a role, Ionescu-Galbeni and Tepelea established themselves as the party two-headed eminence gris, known for
their endless manipulations designed to promote their personal proteges
and block the careers of their opponents. Bom in 1926 in Bucharest,
Ionescu-Galbeni joined the National Peasant Party in 1945 and spent the
1947-1955 period in prison. After 1989 his sympathies, antipathies and
suspicions had a tremendous impact on the party. Best known was his
insistence that senator Dumitrescu be excluded from the party for supporting a legislative proposal calling for access to the Securitate files.
The law was eventually adopted and the 2000 elections allowed investigations into the past political involvement of party electoral candidates.
When Ionescu-Galbeni refused to run on the electoral party lists, many
suspected him of prior collaboration with the Securitate, a fact that
would have explained his refusal to support Dimiitrescu. Bom in February 1916 in Transylvania, Tepelea became a National Peasant Party
member in 1933 and foiuieen years later ran on that party's electoral
lists before spending six years in communist prisons. The imprisonment
apparently did nothing to halt his professional career. Unlike other former political prisoners, Tepelea obtained a doctorate under communism
and secured a coveted position in the Bucharest academia. He was a
deputy during the 1990-2000 period, but never introduced more than five
legislative proposals per legislature.
Because many former political prisoners composed its interim leadership, the party's platform refiected their concems and aspirations.
Leaders saw the party primarily as a vehicle for redressing their personal
grievances, for gaining retribution for past injustices suffered at the
hands of communist authorities, and for bringing the country back to its
inter-war position. Indeed, the party asked for the Securitate to be recognized as a political police, and for communist-confiscated property to
revert to its rightful owners. It constructed its identity in opposition to
183
the Communist Party and its heir, the National Salvation Front, and
claimed to be the only party capable of helping Romania break irreversibly with the communist policies and morality. Not all Christian
Democrats nostalgically idealized the inter-war period, but their general
direction was backward not forward, drawing inspiration from the past
instead of taking into account that Romania had changed irreversibly
since 1945. The party stressed what it stood against more than what it
really stood for and offered no concrete and reahstic proposals for
national reconstruction. While its calls for moral reexamination and
rejection of communist practices were justifiable, the NCDPP did not
address the urgent socioeconomic problems that ordinary Romanians
faced during a painful post-communist transition period, including
eroded living standards, unemployment, job insecurity and high crime
rates. The party was to regret this oversight.
As though an imprecise platform was not enough to compromise its
chances for electoral success, the party's call for a retum to inter-war
institutions was more emotional than rational, as it made reference to an
idealized inter-war Romania that had never been as democratic as Christian Democrats contended. Historians have repeatedly pointed to the
shortcomings of the pre-communist democracy, where cronyism and
clientelism were rampant, oligarchic business interests dictated public
policy, nationalist parties commanded significant popular support, and
the electorate felt disenfranchised and helpless in the face of a bureaucracy that overtaxed it. The inter-war political system was a parliamentary
democracy only in form, as instead of being accountable to the voters the
govemment united with the king and the civil service to dominate them,
a corrupt alliance Romanians wished to forget. The project of bringing
the country back to 1945 was complicated by the fact that public support
for the monarchy was feeble. By the time King Michael visited his
native country in 1992 he was already in his seventies, a tired man of
yesterday, by and large out of touch with his country's reality. Contrary
to NCDPP claims, monarchy would likely have turned into another divisive element in a country divided enough.3
Christian Democrats sent representatives to the first postcommimist quasi-Parliament, the Provisional Council of National Unity.
Formed on 1 February 1990, it included 105 Salvation Front representatives and three members for each of the 35 officially registered political parties. Its main task was planning for the first post-communist
184
E A S T ExjROPEAN QUARTERLY
elections. The original electoral law had provided for single-member

winner-take-all districts that favored the larger, better-organized Front.
The imcertaindes of the revolution prompted many Communist Party
cells to join the Front, which benefited both numerically and organizationally. On March 14, however, the Council agreed on an electoral
system of proportional representation in constituencies and no threshold
requirement, thus allowing small parties to enter Parliament and fragment the party system. Even so, the odds were especially unfavorable for
opposition parties. To maintain its advantage, the Front called for
elections to be organized only months after new parties were allowed to
register. The time for campaigning and devising electoral strategies was
limited, as were the financial resources new parties could enlist. Almost
effortlessly the Front won a majority of seats in the May 1990 general
elections and secured its dominance over the first legislature.
The national leadership and a handful of enthusiastic local organizations prepared the Christian Democrats for the first elections, as a
result of which the party gained positions in the state apparatus. Its
electoral platform stressed the need for comprehensive economic
reforms, as opposed to the Front's cautious proposals, but warned
against the infiuence of foreign capital, an attitude fostered by the power
of German capital in the inter-war period. Its radical agricultural reform
program called for dismantling the collective farm system and granting
land tenure to small farmers. The party, however, was unable to explain
convincingly how its policy pronouncements would benefit ordinary
citizens, and thus fell prey to the Salvation Front, which alleged that
Christian Democrats wished to recreate the "wild capitalism" and deep
social inequalities of pre-communist times. Instead of promoting a positive discourse, Christian Democrats attacked the Front, giving the
impression that they were suited as the opposition more than the government. The party stressed abstract themes like liberty, democracy and
civil society, which the population was unfamiliar with and did not comprehend. A further misteke was a slate of parliamentary candidates that
included only older males lacking solid academic training and managerial experience. Christian Democrats got 2.5 percent of the national vote,
and ofiFered all their 12 deputy and one senatorial seats to former political prisoners, including Diaconescu, Ionescu-Galbeni and Tepelea.
Equally disappointing was the performance of the Christian Democrat presidential candidate, who nonetheless got slightly more than what
185
the party gamered (4.3 percent of the vote). The party insisted on presenting its own candidate, but none of its leaders felt confident enou^ to
run for the office. Unwilling to endorse the other candidates - Liberal
leader Radu Campeanu or former communist official and Front leader
Ion Iliescu - Christian Democrats accepted Ratiu's candidacy. Because
he repatriated only on 24 January 1990, Ratiu missed the party's official
registration and held no formal leadership position when elections took
place. His political involvement abroad, willingness to run and considerable personal wealth recommended him for the job at a time when the
party was ill prepared for electoral competition and lacked financial
resources to mount an effective campaign. Working against Ratiu were
his age and incapability to relate personally to the plight of Romanian
electors, both because of his wealtii and because he lived for some fifty
years abroad. With their job security and living standards under threat,
Romanians could not identify with Ratiu's elegant, but out-dated, bow
ties. His promise to offer all female voters expensive perfumes fell on
the deaf ears of Romanians who barely afforded their daily bread. While
unable to fulfill his life long dream of becoming Romanian President,
Ratiu used his nomination to enter the party leadership. Within a year he
became party vice-president, and in 1992 he secured the Chamber of
Deputies vice-presidency, which he held up to his death in early 2000.
Despite his generosity and willingness to use his connections to important British political figures to promote the party, Ratiu remained an outsider to the party core. He complained that party leaders asked him with
impunity to cover the costs of tiieir travels abroad, even of those carried
out for personal reasons.'* After he set up the Cotidianul daily, and
assured its independence, the NCDPP tried to assert control over the
newspaper, occasionally even by force. The daily's distribution peaked
to 3,000 copies in 1997, when Ion Cristoiu, an experienced joumalist of
nationalistic persuasion, took over.
As election results provided grounds for mild pessimism, some
voices called for the leadership to be confirmed in mid-1990, but the
former political prisoners' grip on the party remained tight. It was agreed
for the party president and first deputy president to represent the historical regions of Transylvania and tiie Old Kingdom (including southem
Romania and Moldova). The party elected its president (Coposu, representing Transylvania), first deputy president (Diaconescu, representing
the Old Kingdom), secretary general (Barbu Pitigoi) and three vice-
186
presidents, but the division of labor between leaders remained unspecified and as a result confiicts ensued when leaders tried to solidify their
position within the party by gaining support from contending factions.
Bom in August 1917 in Arges, Diaconescu joined the National Peasant
Party in 1936 and its leadership eight years later, but was arrested in
1947 and spent 17 years in prison, a detention period matched only by
Coposu's. Diaconescu was an NCDPP deputy during the 1990-2000
period, and Chamber of Deputies president from 1996 to 2000. A deputy
from 1992 to 2000, Pitigoi was bom in 1931 in Arges and, like
Diaconescu, was an engineer by training, graduating from the Bucharest
Polytechnic Institute in 1956 and receiving his doctorate in 1973.
Organized in late September 1991 at a time when Christian Democrats did not enjoy more than five percent of electoral support, the first
party congress elected the leadership, and approved the statutes and the
program. While Coposu remained the uncontested leader (respectfully
known by friends and foes as the "Senior") and Diaconescu consolidated
his position as first deputy president, vice-presidents were Ratiu and four
former political prisoners, Tepelea among them. Their average age was
above 70, but almost all other top party posts were held by younger men
selected for their managerial skills, educational and professional background and the protection they enjoyed from senior leaders. They
included Constantin ('Dudu') Ionescu, Mircea Ciumara, Radu Vasile,
Remus Opris and Ulm Spineanu. In half a decade, the newcomers moved
from virtual obscurity to the highest positions in the state. Seven occupied prime-ministerial, ministerial and deputy ministerial offices sometimes between 1996 and 2000. The party extended a hand to the Valea
Jiului miners, who were given a warm welcome at the first congress.
Delegates made donations to that disadvantaged social group, but the
attempt to expand the party's social base was soon aborted as the
NCDPP chose not to recruit regional trade imion leaders.
The party program upheld the four principles to which Maniu and
Mihalache once subscribed: enlightened patriotism, social justice, Christian morality and democracy. To them, it added a Christian Democratic
commitment to "the restoration of Christian values through the society's
transformation." This Christian rebirth was to be centered on the three
pillars of family, school and church, while the party was to be guided by
"solidarity, tolerance, dialogue, pluralism, creativity and decentralization," and a commitment to NATO and European Union integration.^
187
Stressing the paramount importance of private property, the program

called for restitutio in integrum, the complete restitution of all property
confiscated by cotrunimist authorities, a radical approach that drastically
limited its electorate. Its electoral pool was further reduced when the
party called for a ban on abortion. This alienated Romanian women, who
still remembered Ceausescu's pro-natalist policies. While other parties
adopted radical approaches toward homosexuality, the NCDPP went a
step further, claiming that "incest was preferable to homosexuality since
at least the former preserved the chance of procreation." Coposu categorically opposed "sexual aberrations," arguing that the party's Christian
moral foundation led it "to combat every deviation from the law of
nature and from the moral principles of a future balanced society."^
The party remained strictly centralized. National leaders, elected by
the Standing Delegation not the Congress, could over-ride decisions
made by local party structures and decide unilaterally the names of individuals worthy of inclusion on electoral lists. Coposu and his tight circle
of supporters towered over the party rank and file, without always feeling conq)elled to justify their programmatic choices to ordinary party
members whom tiiey claimed to represent. Commimication between
leaders and ordinary party members remained deficient, with the latter
often finding out the party's official position from newspapers. The same
could be said about recruitment, which remained closed to pre-communist Peasant Party members and their relatives. Only feeble efforts were
made to diversify the social base of the party membership by co-opting
workers, new entrepreneurs, women and young people.^
It did not take long for the opposition parties to imderstand that the
only way to defeat the Front was to set aside their differences and run
together on a single electoral ticket. After much negotiation in November 1991 the Democratic Convention was set up as an lunbrella coalition
of a dozen parties, the most important of which were the Christian
Democrats and the Liberals. Despite the agreement to cooperate, there
were significant differences among coalition partners based on ideology,
electoral programs, constituencies and personal rivalries among leaders.
Only shared antipathy toward Iliescu and his supporters united these
diverse groups. In the months preceding the 1992 presidential poll bickering among party leaders - and Coposu's support - produced an
unknown presidential candidate with no party affiliation, the University
of Bucharest rector and geology professor Emil Constantinescu. A better
188
choice might have been someone already known to the public or a

prominent politician, but Coposu backed an outsider for fear that priviieging a Christian Democrat would alienate the other party leaders and
breed factionalism. Compared to Ratiu, Constantinescu had some aces
down his sleeve. He shared the socio-economic background of the
Romanian electorate: relatively young and of modest means, he had
spent all his life in the country trying to build an academic career under
the precarious conditions of communist mle. A self-made man, Constantinescu had been a Communist Party member for many years without, however, sharing its political vision.
In view of the 1992 parliamentary elections, the proportional representation system was retained, with party lists in each of the 41 counties
and Bucharest and seats distributed among counties according to population (70,000 for a lower chamber seat, 160,000 for the upper chamber).
To reduce the number of parties in Parliament, a national threshold was
established at three percent for a single party and up to eight percent for
multiparty coalitions. Although it ran a negative campaign and proposed
old and impractical candidates who had a hard time coming to terms
with each other, the Convention won 82 deputy and 34 senatorial seats
(that is, 20 percent of the vote), thus becoming the country's second
largest political force. Christian Democrats got 42 and 21 seats, respectively. Only six of the new Christian Democrat members of Parliament
had previous experience as deputies or senators, while 11 deputies were
former political prisoners bom between 1916 and 1933. The party took
advantage of its parliamentary representation to influence the legislative
process by advocating land restitution, the formal separation of the ruling party from the state structures, and the reorganization of local govemment along the lines of the French-inspired pre-communist system.
Christian Democrats chaired four important parliamentary commissions
(human rights, abuses and petitions, national defense and economy) and
obtained representation in tiie parliamentary executive and the teams for
negotiations with intemational organizations.* Despite the headway,
observers agree that up to 1996 the party was unable to influence significantly the policy process and accelerate the pace of reforms.
Wary that nostalgic forces would infiltrate the party and undermine
it from within, the leaders banned former communists from seeking
party membership. It is difficult to ascertain the benefits of a move over
which party members remain divided, and which gave the Christian
189
Democrats the nickname of Romania's Talibans. A Christian Democrat

leader acknowledged that "we do not have capable party members to
promote. At the beginning, only former political prisoners were accepted
as members. In those days, the dominant criterion for acceptance was
non-membership in the Communist Party, not skills or social status.
Because of that, the party lost many quahfied individuals."' It is certain
that in the long run the party paid dearly for its inability to formulate a
coherent strategy for diversifying its membership and securing the support of broader social categories. In time, the party acquired a misogynic
reputation implying that women were not welcomed, none being represented in the party top national leadership until the late 1990s. Over the
1990-2000 period, Christian Democrats promoted fewer women to
Parliament than any other major party. It also became known as a hardline formation unwilling to recognize that there were many shades of
collaboration with the communist regime or the fact that ordinary communists could be blamed for their opportunism more than for actively
supporting the defunct regime's notorious policies. When the party
opened its ranks to former communists in 1994 it found out that a lot of
the country's specialists had already pledged allegiance to the Liberals
and the Salvation Front off-springs, the Party of Social Democracy or
the Democratic Party. 10
Coposu's death in November 1995 robbed the party of its most respected figure, and opened a bitter fight for party leadership. The party's
second congress, hastily organized two months later, offered no real surprises. Diaconescu stepped into Coposu's shoes to become party leader,
while Tepelea took Diaconescu's post as first deputy president, with
Vasile becoming secretary general. The number of vice-presidents
almost doubled, being raised from five to nine, each assimiing formal
responsibility for a specific area. Alongside Ionescu-Galbeni and Ratiu,
the leaders of the most powerful local stmctures - Vasile Lupu (Iasi),
Opris (Prahova) and Sorin Lepsa (Brasov) - became vice-presidents.
The Leadership Bureau was completed by ten members, Ionescu and
loan Avram Muresan among them. An effort to broaden its representation by including younger leaders representing Romania's major regions
was clearly evident. Of all 22 leaders only three were former political
prisoners. True, they occupied the top positions of party president, first
deputy president and vice-president and continued to exert considerable
influence over the party but for the first time political prisoners were
190
outnumbered when decisions needed the support of the majority. After

six years of democratic politics it was felt tiiat party and public offices
must be offered to active members, not party veterans without a solid
activity record.
In Government (November 1996 - November 2000)
The NCDPP's biggest victory came in 1996. First, in the local elections the Convention won 320 mayoral seats, including that of Romania's capital. Several months later Christian Democrat nominee Emil
Constantinescu secured the presidency and the Convention formed the
government. The number of parliamentary seats the party gained raised
to 109 in 1996, of which 82 were deputy and 27 senatorial seats. Of all
1996-2000 NCDPP deputies five were women (that is, 6.2 percent), all
but one had university degrees, 18 had doctoral degrees, and 25 had
previous parliamentary experience (31.2 percent). Five were older than
70, but 15 were younger tiian 40. But members of Parliament remained
weak political actors unable to challenge effectively the executive or
their own leadership, as committee assignments and support services
were channeled through party caucuses. There were no budgets, staff or
offices for individual members and it was difficult to establish ties to
constituents.
This electoral success was due to a mix of factors. For some, the
victory of the opposition was a vote de blame against a Social Democrat
rule marred by infighting, corruption and clientelism, lack of transparency and communication, and chaotic policy choices. Others remarked
that the opposition was better organized, presenting the electorate with a
"Contract with Romania" that defined the guiding principles of its government. These included "change, the fight against corruption, the
settlement of the disputes related to the property confiscated under
communist rule, privatization and acceleration of the reform program."
In a bold move, the Contract promised economic recovery within 200
days or the government's resignation. The Convention ran a balanced
electoral campaign coordinated by a private foundation set up for the
administration of donationsfi-omabroad. Endowed with modem equipment, the Romanian Communication Center was supervised by electoral
can:q)aign coordinator Opris.
191
In mid-December 1996 the Convention-dominated government was

swom in. Headed by Victor Ciorbea, the cabinet included 28 ministers.!i
A communist-era prosecutor and union leader bom in 1955, Ciorbea ran
the 1990 elections on the leftist Socialist Labor Party lists for the Senate
but failed to win a seat. When in 1993 co-leader Miron Mitrea
announced his intention to affiliate the union to the Social Democrats,
Ciorbea set up the Christian Democrat Union League, whose support he
pledged to presidential candidate Constantinescu. In mid-1996, Ciorbea
was designated Convention candidate for the Bucharest mayor position.
Half a year later he became Premier at the proposal of the Civic Alliance, a grass-roots organization dominated by intellectuals who argued
that a "politically neutral" person must take the job if fighting between
Christian Democrats and Liberals, the main ruling partners, was to be
avoided. As premier, Ciorbea refused to give up the position of Bucharest mayor, and tried unsuccessfully to amend the law on local government to suit his needs, but his changes were later tumed down by the
Constitutional Court. 12
The new govenunent took time to laimch its programs, convinced
that public opinion would remain loyal as long as cabinet ministers verbally rejected communism and favored reforms. From the beginning, the
Ciorbea team lacked transparency and coherence, a fact suggesting that
the Democratic Convention assumed power without being prepared to
govem.i3 The first signs of instability appeared during negotiations for
selecting the new premier and his team. To minimize dissension, the
ruling coalition adopted a political algorithm for dividing state positions
among constituent partners. Christian Democrats insisted for an algorithm based on each party's share of the vote in the 1996 elections, a
formula that guaranteed their hegemony over junior partners like the
Liberals and the Democrats. The algorithm specified the number of positions partners were allotted, but it did not say which specific positions
were those. Fighting ensued when parties tried to secure posts most
likely to give them access to coveted resources or control over state
agencies, or to allow them to translate their electoral promises into reality. Cabinet formation was delayed as many parties sought each ministerial portfolio. Afterwards mling partners continued to seek every post
that became available.
Apparently, in 1997 the Christian Democrats' main goal was to
nominate their close associates to state office and to attract new mem-
192
bers fi"om among bureaucrats, administrators and civil servants, often

resorting to threat and intimidation. According to a Christian Democrat
local leader,
the Democratic Convention promised to promote to the leadership
of [public] institutions professionals of impeccable moral standing,
regardless of their political options, and it assures the public it
wants to keep its promise. We believe that the Social Democrats
forced some professionals to adhere to the Party of Social Democracy under the threat of removal from leadership positions. We offer
all those who joined that party against their will the possibility to
make public their resignation frx)m the party as soon as possible....
We promise not to launch a political vendetta against those who
remain Party of Social Democracy members and are both capable
professionals and moral individuals.)'*
The protnise was never fulfilled, and the NCDPP followed the Social
Democrat lead in appointing its members in the state apparatus at all
levels. To avoid removal, leaders of state agencies and public institutions
joined the NCDPP in great numbers, without sharing a Christian Democrat commitment and provoking much chagrin to long-term party
members eyeing the posts. For some Christian Democrats this massive
swelling of the party rank and file led to ideological confusion as "if
asked, tnany members could not distinguish between Liberalism, Social
Democracy and Christian Democracy."'5
Positions open to loyal party members included those of ambassadors, directors of ministerial departments, managers of state-owned
commercial companies, heads of public utilities, decentralized county
branches of ministries, public television and radio stations, managers and
leaders of the State Ownership Fund (the governmental agency in charge
of privatizing state-owned enterprises), heads of secret service agencies
and presidents of major banks. According to local analysts, recmitment
was carried out unprofessionally, with disastrous consequences for party
organization, public image and governmental performance. Although
replacement of bureaucrats and administrators with 15,000 "specialists"
was hailed as necessary for Romania's irreversible progress toward
democracy and a market economy, the NCDPP and Democratic Convention leaders divided high public offices without taking into account
the affinities between various posts. Loyalty to party leaders took prece-
193
dence over merit and professional conq)etency, a matter of concern even

for Christian Democrats. A disgruntled member observed that top party
leaders "were not Communist Party members but the nepotism and corrupt mentalities ofthe old [pre-commxmist] times run in their blood. It is
as though they are saying 'we stand against commimism, but love its
methods'."i6
Christian Democrats also made the takeover of mass-media outlets
a priority, after for a long time Romania libera was the only daily to
support them. The party launched the Dreptatea (Justice) daily, which
failed to win a large readership because of its inability to attract competent journalists. Once in government the NCDPP sou^t control over the
public television, still the number one information source for Romanians. As its new managers, luminaries knoAvn for their anti-Social
Democrat stance like Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Stere Gulea transformed
the public television into a propaganda tool in the hands of conservative
Christian Democrats. In early 2002, Constantinescu revealed that while
head of the news department, Mungiu-Pippidi frequently sought the
approval of presidential councilor Zoe Petre. The statement disproved
Christian Democrat claims that, although it imposed its own supporters
to the helm of the national public radio and television, these media outlets retnained independent. 17 A 1998 study revealed that only six percent
of public television news coverage depicted activities of the opposition
(though the latter won 45 percent of national vote) and 60 percent of
commentaries on govemment and the NCDPP were favorable. 18
Observers agree that up to 1996 Romania was a paragon of inefficiency and patrimonialism, a fa9ade democracy with multiple power
centers competing for power and the captive ofthe ruling Front granting
favors to loyal individuals with power at the local, county and national
level. Formally the political game was democratic, but political power
was administered along clientelistic lines, family relations were found at
every level of power, and clan mentality guaranteed the most prestigious
and lucrative positions. Justice was personalized, as attachment toward
those who controlled access to resources and public offices often proved
more important than the written law, which was used against enemies,
never against friends. Politics was dominated by abuses and corruption
scandals, charismatic leaders and their clientele. Unfortunately, the
country's new office-seeking leadership failed to change the rules ofthe
political game. The relatives of political leaders were promoted to state
194
office or found unexpected success in business. Newspapers relished in

tracking down Diaconescu's cousins and nephews, who overnight
became deputy ministers, county council presidents and bank and construction company managers. The press revealed important donations the
party and its satellite foundations got from entrepreneurs eager to access
piiblic resources, and the fact that Christian Democrats used public funds
for their own and their party's benefit. The party lacked mass support,
and relied instead on a small group of interrelated people, relatives and
clients with superficial and vertical ties to the periphery.
The "Contract with Romania" remained unfulfilled, but the Ciorbea
cabinet refused to step down. While Romanians expected solutions to
economic malaise, in 1997 the govemment launched a NATO integration campaign of unlikely success. A year later the campaign's failure
forced the govemment to return to economic problems, but already
Romania was facing political deadlock and the Democratic Party was
threatening to abandon the ruling coalition. To strengthen his position
within the party and boost his authority as head of the govemment
Ciorbea was appointed party vice-president, but the nomination could
not bridge divisions between the premier and his ministers. In April
1998, the party withdrew its support and allowed the Ciorbea govemment to fail. The cabinet went down for its erratic decisions taken and
revoked for no good reasons, inability to adopt a coherent program, policies based on incomplete information, failure to identify the roots of the
crisis and to evaluate policies rationally, incapacity to separate individuals from issues, time and resource mismanagement and abuse of power
by leaders associated with different interest groups. Ciorbea's removal
revealed the problems of coalition govemment in a country where political compromise was not valued.
Rather than accepting defeat, Ciorbea left the NCDPP to form the
National Christian Democrat Alliance, which claimed to be the 'clean'
part of the NCDPP that refused to condone corrupt practices and betray
the ideals of the inter-war National Peasant Party. The formation remained a pocket size party, but attracted prominent Christian Democrat
leaders like Matei and loan Boila, Maniu's nephews. Throughout its
short existence the Alliance promoted a virulent campaign against
NCDPP leaders and President Constantinescu, whom it accused of having accepted corruption and clientelism, "the advantages and privileges
of being in power, and a [personal] wealth that was offensive to a nation
195
reduced to poverty." On its intemet site, the Alliance stressed that

"before reforming the country, the NCDPP had to reform itself," as it
"lacked any principles, and was increasingly demagogic, inefficient,
materialistic and atheistic.''^^
In April 1998 Christian Democrat general secretary Vasile formed
the govenunent. Vasile was bom in 1942 in the Transylvanian town of
Sibiu. Because his father was a political prisoner, until 1963 young Radu
had to discontinue his university education. Nine years later he started
teaching at the Bucharest-based Academy of Economic Sciences and in
1977 got a doctorate in economy, but could not advance past assistant
professorship because he never joined the Commimist Party. A Christian
Democrat since 1990, he entered the Senate two years later and served as
its vice-president from 1993 to 1998. While enjoying a relatively good
standing in the party, Vasile did not deliver on his promise of economic
recovery and faced one of Romanian democracy's worst crisis in January 1999 when Valea Jiului miners threatened to take Bucharest by
force. Ultimately, under Vasile's rule the Christian Democrats adopted
the practices of their rivals, the Social Democrats, supporting banlmipt
state-owned enterprises in exchange of donations to party coffers, cooperating with technocratic, administrative and financial elites and sacrificing reforms for the desire to retain power.
In August that year. Premier Vasile stated his intention to assume
the party leadership and his readiness to collaborate with the Social
Democrats to renew his mandate.20 The declaration divided the party
into Vasile's supporters, less revengeful and prone to collaboration with
the old enemy, and Diaconescu's allies, who considered such plans
unacceptable. Vasile's archenemy Opris acted as the spokesman for
Diaconescu's side, and the two became embroiled in a bitter struggle for
party control that ultimately ended in Vasile's undignified removal from
office. President Constantinescu supported the removal, and used (many
said, abused) his constitutional prerogatives to sideline the reluctant
premier. Ironically, after loosing the premiership Vasile followed
Ciorbea's example and together with ten NCDPP deputies formed the
Popular Party of Romania, which denounced the NCDPP as a clientelistic political police that had suppressed freedom of opinion within its
ranks and accused Opris of subordinating the party to his own interests.
A shrewd politician, Vasile abandoned the Popular Party when it became
apparent that the latter had no chances to win parliamentary representa-
196
tion and joined the Democratic Party, which he has represented in the
Senate since late 2000.
In December 1999, for the third time in as many years, Christian
Democrats nominated a new premier. With the 2000 general elections
around the comer, the party agreed to give up the privilege of seeing a
party leader taking over the premiership. Instead, it supported the candidacy of Central Bank governor Mugur Isarescu, a well-known financier
whose cabinet represented a compromise between the Christian Democrat desires to maintain control over the state apparatus, on the one hand,
and to improve a battered economic record in view of the upcoming
general elections, on the other hand. Isarescu showed no desire to join
the party, even when invited to be its presidential candidate. He accepted
the candidates proposed by the ruling parties as cabinet ministers, but
faced Christian Democrat opposition when he reduced the number of
ministerial and deputy tninisterial portfolios and appointed technocrats
to high state office.
Two months later the Standing Delegation elected a new party
leadership. Diaconescu continued as party president, but Tepelea stepped
down to make room for the younger, but equally intransigent, Muresan.
Opris defeated Ionescu and replaced Vasile as secretary general. The
party's eight vice-presidents included Tanase Barde, Gheorghe
Ciiihandru, Ionescu, Ionescu-Galbeni, Lupu and Radu Sarbu. Barde and
Ciuhandru gained prominence in the Constanta and Timis party organizations, respectively. The Leadership Bureau included ten other members, one of which was a woman. The new statutes recognized the Congress, the Steering Committee, the Standing Delegation, the Leadership
Bureau and the president as party leadership organs. The president's prerogatives were extended so he could summon the leadership, assume the
office of Prime Minister, and designate cabinet members. The Standing
Delegation, which included 50 members and met monthly, ruled on the
party's participation in government and parliamentary coalitions. Decisions on mergers and statutes alterations became the exclusive prerogatives of the Steering Committee.21
As general elections approached, the leadership's top priority
became electoral list drafting, a contentious process that further weakened the party, pitting local structures seeking greater autonomy against
a central leadership bent on upholding strict centralization. An NCDPP
local leader explained that "at the national level there is a [National
197
Leadership] Bureau with final saying as regards the names to be

included on party lists. [Bureau members] often say 'in this county we
have this person nominated by the local party organization, a nice guy,
but we prefer the other one'."22 Defections to other parties multiplied
when NCDPP members of Parliament found out that their names were
excluded from the lists. Ordinary party members complained that the
lists were drafted without consultation with local organizations. In January 2000, ten NCDPP members of Parliament formed the Republican
Popular Party and Bucharest general mayor Viorel Lis, whose onerous
dealings had been repeatedly denounced by the press, set up the New
Generation Party. Senator Florin Bogdan left the party when asked to
contribute 700 tnillion lei (around US$35,000) to make it on electoral
lists on an eligible position.23 By late 2000 half of the senators and
deputies representing the NCDPP had left the party, which also faced a
significant out-fiux of ordinary members.
Christian Democrats registered a resounding defeat in the summer
2000 local elections and secured only 4.98 percent of councilor and
mayoral mandates, the largest Romanian party to move from the position
of main partner in govemment to the fringes of political life. In the parliamentary poll, most of its meager support came from Transylvania,
with the NCDPP being credited with only five percent of the national
vote, well below the minimum ten percent needed to qualify for parliamentary representation. By contrast, the Social Democrats, the Greater
Romania Party, and even the Christian Democrats' partners in govemment (the Democratic Party and the Liberals) obtained seats in Parliament. The defeat came as a surprise only to Christian Democrats and
their sympathizers, who remained oblivious to the popular antipathy
bred by their inefficient governmental perfonnance.24
The Spell of Renewal (January - July 2001)
On 19-21 January 2001 Christian Democrats organized the first
congress following their shameful electoral defeat in order to address
five major issues considered crucial for the party's revival: 1) clarifying
its ideological principles, and implicitly redefining the electoral segment
it targeted; 2) re-examining its 1996-2000 performance as governing
party and identifying its accomplishments and mistakes; 3) selecting a
new leadership willing to steer the party away from the perilous road it
seemed unable to abandon; 4) formulating the short- and long-term
198
strategy for the party's reconstruction; and 5) defining a position relative

to other Christian Democrat parties in Romania. As it turned out, there
were irreconcilable divisions within the party with respect to each and
every issue.
Debates over the party name had been ongoing ever since the party
registered in 1990. The party never knew for sure its electorate, as it ran
all elections but the first one under Democratic Convention banner.
While certainty lacked, approximation suggested that Christian Democrats drew their support mainly from a relatively young urban electorate
with reformist and pro-Western political orientations. For observers this
limited appeal called into question the NCDPP's contention to be a national formation promoting the interests of the peasantry and warranted a
reassessment of the electoral segment it claimed to represent. For the
daily Adevarul the party was not "national" because "after years of
looking for its leaders' personal interest it could not claim to speak in the
name of the people," and it was not "peasant" because "no peasant ever
voted for the party since 1989." Neither was it a Christian Democrat
party, the daily reckoned, since it did not observe the Christian qualities
of morality, humility and remorse, was ready to disregard the law when
it suited it, and failed to apply democratic principles to its own life.^^
As it entered its third congress, it was crucial for the party to take
stock of the accomplishments (or lack thereof) of its 1996-2000 governance. Party leaders stressed that the Christian Democrats' failure to keep
electoral promises was the result of exogenous factors first and of mistakes attributable to the leadership second. For them, political opponents
were guilty of constantly blocking Christian Democrat legislative initiatives, but the view did not recognize that while in government the party
failed to transpose its promises into policy pronouncements promptly
and efficiently and that occasionally its own parliamentary representatives refused to support reform programs. TTie media was ihe other
scapegoat blamed for the party's ever deteriorating image, despite the
fact that once in government the party brought the public radio and television under its control, and newspapers and tabloids like Romania
Libera and 22 unconditionally placed themselves under its command.
While Romania lacks an independent Western-type media, by and large
local media reports mirror the country's situation. It was not the media's
fault that the reflected image was unflattering for the ruling Christian
Democrats.
199
Everyone except its leadership understood that the party had been
ousted from govemment and Parliament by a combination of factors
largely under the party's control. Among them were ill-conceived policies benefiting a tiny social segment and limiting the party's support
base, the appointment of people with a dubious record in high positions,
lack of a coherent strategy to pull the country out of crisis, disregard for
public opinion and a stubborn refusal to dissociate itself from the leaders
accused of corruption. For some, incontestable proof for the party's
irrq)otency was the fact that Social Democrats effected in 2000-2002
some Christian Democrat key electoral promises, while the latter failed
to do so in four years of rule. These accomplishments included the
adoption of the land restitution law, the removal of visa requirements for
Romanians wishing to visit the European Community and the retum of
King Michael and his family to live in Romania as private citizens.
Many Romanians believed that during the 1996-2000 period the NCDPP
leaders viewed the state as their personal feud and misused it to reach
their narrow personal goal of securing positions of wealth and privilege.
For one observer "the party's biggest problem were its leaders, people
influential enough to create their own support base, ambitious enough to
obtain governmental office, but lacking character and loyalty, [because
they] used the party, and then abandoned it without hesitation, leaving it
to take the blame for their failures."26
The almost unconditional support for leaders suspected of involvement in corruption was widely viewed as responsible for the Christian
Democrats' demise. As party member and fomier Romanian ambassador
to France Dumitm Ceausu wrote in an open letter addressed to the
NCDPP leadership only days before the congress, "the party failed
because its leaders entered politics not for the benefit of the many, but
for serving their own interests." As such, Ceausu continued, the party's
legitimacy and political capital, "based on historical legacy and the suffering endured by those imprisoned under commxinism, were wasted by
those who govemed in [the party's] name."27 Another Christian Democrat, former Privatization Minister Ulm Spineanu, saw a party abandoned
to group interests under the leader-ship of tainted individuals who refused to assume responsibility for the party's electoral failure in 2000.28
Others believed that the party faced a winner-take-all fight for leadership
that left no room for self-assessment and negotiation. As respected independent political commentator Octavian Paler argued, "consumed not by
200
remorse [for their mistakes] but by the fear of losing their seats, Christian Democrat leaders fight not to save the party but to grab the party
presidency."29 "Pulled in opposite directions by equal-strength factions,"
another joumalist noted, "the party is bent on self-destmction, tom apart
by groups seeking to control ttie public administration and to draw illicit
advantages."30
Suggestions for the party's reconstruction came from various corners. For one commentator, party revival required a more sustained
effort than the mere replacement of the elder party president Diaconescu
with a younger leader, since "older Christian Democrat leaders could not
drive the party outside Parliament without the help of ambitious but immature and incompetent younger leaders." The writer opined that party
reconstruction had to start with the honest re-analysis of its ideological
program and had to include the formulation of genuine right-wing public
policies based on a positive discourse that would send a clear and
responsible message to the electorate. But the same joumalist saw little
drive for such a substantial transmogrification in a party "willing to
change its skin, but nothing undemeath it."3l Still other political observers advocated as possible solutions the opening of the party to younger
members and the rewriting of the party's doctrine, program and statutes.
The NCDPP entered the congress divided into two factions with
radically antithetical programs, suggestively dubbed the 'reformists' and
the 'conservatives' by the local press. The reformists thought that the
party must look to the future, acknowledge that the peasant vote could
never be gained and that the project of reconstructing the inter-war Romanian social fabric was but a grand illusion, and retain only a Christian
Democrat flavor. They insisted that the party should reassess its ideological program, redefine its aims and convert from a closed, elitist party
to a catch-all party drawing support from larger societal segments. Part
of the transformation was the leaders' acceptance of responsibility for
the 2000 electoral defeat, and their replacement with a team able to effect change. The conservatives wanted the party to preserve its historical
link by continuing to present itself as 'national' and 'peasant' because,
they thought, this helped the party retain its ascendancy over myriad
political formations that could boast no major contribution to Romanian
political life. The faction contended that a media and Social Democrat
conspiracy highlighted the failures but not the many achievements of the
1996-2000 govemment and stressed that to criticize the NCDPP's gov-
201
emmental performance was tantamount to admitting that their political

enemies were right. Instead, Christian Democrats should support their
leaders to prevent them from abandoning the party to form splinter
groups. Conservatives claimed that those who devised the party's 2000
campaign strategy had nothing to be ashamed for, as the party's defeat
was orchestrated by mischievous external forces. Both camps numbered
members of the 1996-2000 government, but reformists included many
candidates who secured mayoral positions, party members without governmental positions during the 1996-2000 period and state dignitaries
who pursued reformist programs often without NCDPP support. While
many reformist leaders had been elected directly by the population, most
conservatives had been nominated by the party leadership or elected
indirectly on party lists for positions of Parliament members, ministers
and deputy ministers, prefects and deputy prefects or local and county
councilors.
Despite the conservatives' elaborate maneuvers to dictate the final
vote, the congress unexpectedly turned the tables in favor of the reformists. Four relatively young candidates entered the race for the party leadership. Reformists nominated Lupu and Calin Catalin Chirita, while conservatives supported Ionescu and Muresan. A university professor bom
in 1950 in the northeastem Suceava county, Lupu had been a deputy
during the 1992-2000 period. He was the only party member whose
name was linked to a key legislative proposal that gained parliamentary
approval, the law on land restitution (law no. 1/2001). TTie party was
quick to claim credit for the law's enactment, though at the time of its
passing it was no longer represented in Parliament, but clearly the adoption was more the result of Lupu's stubbornness than of party mobilization and support. Lupu and Chirita had the advantage of being free of
corruption scandals, but Chirita's chances had been seriously diminished
by his unsuccessful attempt to win a Bucharest district mayoral seat even
with the party running an extremely expensive campaign on his behalf
Ionescu was bom in 1956 in Bucharest, the nephew of an inter-war
National Peasant Party minister. An engineer by training, he became a
researcher but his tainted family history prevented him from occupying
management positions. He joined the Christian Democrats in 1990 and,
imder Coposu's protective wing, built a successful political career. A
deputy during the 1992-2000 period, he became a deputy Defense Minister in 1996 and Interior Minister in January 1999, despite his mediocre
202
parliamentary performance. With his quiet and thoughtful demeanor,

Ionescu had supporters both inside and outside the party, but many imputed him lack of charisma, casual association with persons involved in
corruption scandals, and reluctance to reform the Interior Ministry while
at its helm.
The only Transylvanian candidate, Muresan was bom in 1959 in the
northem Baia Mare town, and later obtained an engineer degree. He
joined the NCDPP in 1990, represented the party as deputy from 1992 to
2000, and was appointed Reform Minister in 1997 and Agriculture
Minister in November 1998. The press accused Muresan of bringing the
country's agriculture on the verge of collapse and of masterminding
shady privatization deals that favored his close friends and brought him
considerable wealth. Muresan's white Mercedes inspired many jokes,
but also much envy and condemnation in a country where most people
can barely survive. While Lupu was by far the most competent for the
job, secret negotiations behind closed doors gave the conservatives the
upper hand, with Muresan being promised the support of the wealthier
Transylvania and Ionescu that ofthe more populous Old Kingdom. Proof
that factions, not candidates, were disputing the race was the fact that
each conservative candidate promised to give the other the vicepresidency if he himself secured the presidency. Apparently, a similar
arrangement was binding reformist candidates.
While many party members suggested that university professor
Andrei Marga should enter the race, the party statutes stipulated that
only those who had been party members for at least five years could seek
the party presidency. A Christian Democrat only since 1999, Marga was
thus disqualified, but he mustered enough support from party members
eager for change for the conservatives to consider his candidacy as a
serious threat that needed to be swiftly neutralized. A week before the
congress, the conservative-dominated Cluj organization, to which Marga
belonged, refused to name him among congress delegates, on grounds
that he was not known enough to the party rank and file. The reason was
ungrounded. Bom in 1946 in Bucharest, Marga eamed a doctorate in
philosophy from a German university in 1976 during the brief period
when Romanian communist authorities allowed gifted and politically
reliable students to pursue graduate studies abroad. After 1989 Marga
became the head of the Cluj-based University of Babes-Bolyai, a position that gave him considerable media exposure. During the 1997-2000
203
period, he distinguished himself both as a solid scholar and an Education

Minister ready to risk his ministerial portfolio rather than stall the reform
program he pledged to introduce.
At the end ofthe first day of congress, candidates Lupu and Chirita
promised to withdraw from the race if Marga joined it. Last minute statute changes allowed Marga to compete, and after stormy debates he won
the presidency well ahead of his conservative opponents. His success
was possible because for the first time the party president was elected
directly by the congress, not by the party leadership poised to keep outsiders like Marga away from key posts. Clearly, a revolution rocked the
NCDPP but many wondered why the party waited so long to reform.
Several explanations come to mind. The conservatives enjoyed monopoly of power within the party, both as a result of the way the statutes
were formulated and the fact that up to the December 2000 elections
they alone decided the allocations of state and party offices among
deserving party members. Dissatisfied party members could not air their
opposition for fear of losing their office or diminishing their chances to
secure one. But the reversal was also tme, as the silence and cooperation
of many could be bought with handsome state portfolios. Equally
important was the fact that allegations of corruption against the conservatives were hard to prove as long as they were the ones to control the
levers of power. Note tiiat Marga's election was allowed by statute
changes approved only hours before the vote. While the changes
refiected the mood of the congress and their spontaneous adoption was
free and fair, congress delegates had no mandate from local chapters to
discuss sweeping changes to party statutes. Moreover, the legislation in
effect called for new statutes to be registered officially with the courts
before the vote for the presidency took place, a requirement impossible
to meet in the short time span separating the two votes. This legal detail
allowed many party members not present at the January congress, as
well as the conservative leaders opposed to Marga, to dispute the new
president's authority.
Tme to his belief that "the party's revival is possible only if all
[former] party leaders accept to step back," Marga chose Lupu as first
deputy president and Chirita as secretary general. The move helped
boost his image of a resolute reformer unwilling to associate with party
members tainted by cormption, but forever alienated the conservatives,
who felt utterly marginalized. During heated debates, congress repre-
204
sentatives repeatedly asked Marga to nominate Ionescu as first deputy

president. Marga's adamant refusal was interpreted as a sign that he was
willing to hear the voice of party members only when it suited him.
Partly to correct for the power imbalance between the two factions, the
congress elected conservative-dominated Leadership Bureau and Standing Delegation (formed of eight and 25 members, respectively). Dissatisfied conservatives vowed to continue the fight against the new leaders or
leave the party altogether. As we shall see, the conservative faction only
apparently lost the battle.
It proved easier for Marga to win the NCDPP leadership than to reform the party. Marga consistently stated that the party had stepped into
a new, qualitatively superior phase superceding the one "when a handful
of Bucharest leaders decide on everything while local organizations vote
like a machine."32 The post-congress party remained deeply divided
between factions not giving each other the benefit of the doubt. To the
reformists' calls for quitting the Leadership Bureau and the Standing
Delegation at least temporarily, the conservatives replied by singlemindedly undermining all attempts to change the party fundamentally.
But Marga's failure to restore the party to its former glory also stemmed
from the legal uncertainty surrounding his election and his political
inexperience, inability to bridge the differences between the two camps,
aloofiiess to the concems of the other groups represented in the party,
and unpopularity with the European Christian Democrats. Because many
party members contested his election and considered him an outsider, the
new president foimd himself in the unenAdable position of being a leader
who lacked the authority needed to effect radical change.
Immediately after the congress, the new leadership announced plans
to rewrite the party statutes, launch elections for local leadership
positions, designate a shadow cabinet for monitoring the activity of the
Social Democrat govemment, and revive the party's newspaper Dreptatea. The party was to be guided by dynamism, modemity and capacity
to react quickly but the rift between the two camps soon re-emerged
when the Marga-Lupu-Chirita triumvirate asked the Leadership Bureau
to analyze corruption charges against former NCDPP state dignitaries,
and defied the accused to state their innocence publicly. In response, the
two Christian Democrat leaders whom the press considered the most
corrupt, Sarbu and Muresan, urged the party to show support for members not yet under investigation. In the end the Leadership Bureau, to
205
which both Sarbu and Muresan belonged, decided that the party "will
not endorse corruption acts, irrespective of their perpetrator" but that it
"supports former NCDPP state dignitaries who implemented the party
political program and rejects the accusations that the [current Social
Democrat] govemment brings against them." The resolution did not
name the leaders who "implemented the party political program" while
occupying high state positions, and thus seemed to imply that all former
Christian Democrat state dignitaries had followed the party line and
therefore were entitled to party support. Instead of excluding Sarbu, the
Bureau asked for "Marga's right to speak in the name of the party without prior consultation with the Bureau be limited."33 Sarbu made a spectacular political career after 1989, and in year 2000 became leader of^the
Cluj Christian Democrats, a position which he used to block Marga's
participation in the congress. The press repeatedly accused Sarbu of
partisan appointments and rigged privatization tenders while State Ownership Fund president.
The rift deepened when Marga removed the head of the party Press
Department without prior consultations with the vice-president responsible for image issues. Ion Caramitm. The Leadership Bureau deplored
Marga's dictatorial style as refiective of an incapacity to communicate
with party leaders who, like him, had been democratically elected by the
congress, with Marga replying that he will strictly fulfill the mandate to
rebuild the party he received from the congress. Undeterred, the new
leaders continued to pressure the conservatives into stepping aside from
the party leadership organs. Chirita threatened to start investigating the
many foundations and non-governmental organizations headed by conservative party leaders, and Lupu officially asked the police to verify the
financial assets of all former state dignitaries, including NCDPP representatives.S'* In reply, conservatives called for party unity and dismissed
corruption changes as pure fabrications with no real basis. Once the details of the Cico affair hit the press and the Social Democrat govemment
launched inquiries into the involvement of prominent NCDPP members,
Chirita insisted that Sarbu leave the party until investigations were completed, but Sarbu did not follow the suggestion. According to the press,
in March 1999 the Fund agreed to transfer 70 percent of Cico's ownership to the Investment Society Mimtenia. Up to that point a state owned
company, Cico was the main Bucharest producer of non-alcoholic beverages which just won a Coca-Cola contract. Within a month, the press
206
alleged, Muntenia transferred the bulk of the Cico shares to a private entrepreneur.35 The Prime Minister's Control Department investigated the
transaction in June 1999, but no definite conclusions were ever formulated.
In May, Marga again asked NCDPP leaders under suspicion of corruption to leave the party. "The Need for Complete Change" declaration
that Marga presented read that "the party pays dearly for people who for
years have been suspected of corruption."36 In reply, Sarbu claimed that
Marga's accusations against fellow NCDPP members were destroying
the party image, and Ionescu again asked the Bureau to forbid Marga to
make public statements in the name of the party. The conservatives
refused to leave the party, and challenged Marga to exclude them. When
the Bureau again voiced support for them, Marga rightly noted that intraparty sohdarity should be distinguished from the moral and political
obligation of each member to clear his name of alleged involvement in
illegal activities.
Marga proved a quick learner of the covert negotiations that had
been the NCDPP hallmark. To change the balance of power in the party
leadership organs he stepped up the merger with the National Christian
Democrat Alliance, and on 6 March Marga and Ciorbea signed a protocol that the two parties adopted on 2 June. Earlier Ciorbea and his Alliance claimed to have left the NCDPP only after trying unsuccessfully all
available methods to reform it from within.37 But in 2001 the former
Prime Minister was ready to retum when he and other top Alliance
members were offered leadership positions in the new reconstituted
party. Following the merger, the Leadership Bureau and the Standing
Delegation were enlarged with Alliance members whose dislike for the
conservatives made them likely to take the side of the reformists. Apparently Marga's plan to overwhelm the conservatives was successful. Not
for long.
With the composition of leadership bodies altered in their favor,
reformists renewed efforts to marginalize party leaders whose public
image was tainted by corruption changes. Tlie strategy seemingly
worked. Only weeks after the merger the enlarged Bureau, where for the
first time conservatives formed a minority, rejected a proposal for unconditionally supporting former NCDPP state dignitaries allegedly
involved in corruption scandals. This small success aside, reformists still
felt unsure of their hold on the Bureau and the Standing Delegation, so
207
in a bold move they called for an extraordinary congress in August in the

hope that conservative leaders were removed by popular vote. Targeted
were Sarbu, Muresan and Opris. Bom in November 1958 in Ploiesti,
Opris became leader of the NCDPP Youth Organization and a Leadership Bureau member in 1991, before winning applause for leading the
1996 Democratic Convention electoral campaign. From December 1996
to April 1998, physician Opris headed the powerful Department for
Local Public Acbninistration, the agency appointing the central govemment's local representatives, the prefects. As such, Opris commanded
enormous influence over the NCDPP local chapters and had much leverage over party members contemplating prefect positions. The prefects
are the most important political figures in Romania's 41 counties and
Bucharest, and their position is akin to that of the county First Secretary
of bygone communist days. After the NCDPP's electoral defeat in 2000,
the Prahova party chapter excluded him, but Opris persuaded the Leadership Bureau to dissolve the Prahova leadership structures and nominate
new leaders from among his friends.
Dissension also marked the drafting of the new NCDPP political
program. By mid-March, the reformist leadership had finalized a new
program according to which the party ceased to be 'peasant' becoming
instead a 'popular' party where decision-making was decentralized in
favor of local structures. Leaders were to be selected by the congress on
the basis of motions, and the minimal duration of party membership
needed to run for leadership positions was reduced from five to two
years. On behalf of the conservatives, Ionescu drafted an altemative program, and for a while it appeared as if the Bureau would discuss two
programs. On 3 Jime, however, the Bureau unanimously approved
Marga's program and refused to consider the altemative. In a last minute
attempt to prevent party decentralization, conservatives asked for the
Bureau to have the right to veto the candidate lists proposed by local
structures, but the proposal was rejected. Conservatives also asked that
leaders be punished if publicly criticizing their colleagues. In the words
of former Minister of Culture Ion Caramitru, a popular actor, "the
current [Social Democrat] government's attacks against Christian
Democrats conducted imder the pretext of corruption were amplified by
none others than Christian Democrats. We cannot help Social Democrats
by refusing to support our colleagues who stand accused without evi-
208
dence or are brought in political trials that seek to destroy their public
image."38 That proposal was also tumed down.
The Conservative Restoration
On 6 July, Marga renounced the party presidency in a move as
unexpected as his nomination by the congress. Whatever the reasons for
his resignation, the manner in which he conducted it estranged his
followers and enraged his political opponents. Without consulting with
the Bucharest party leaders, not even his close allies Lupu and Chirita,
Marga faxed his resignation letter from Cluj. Rather paradoxically he
blamed his decision on the party's failure to effect rapid change and
remove the leaders responsible for the party's defeat in 2000, the very
objectives that the January congress mandated him with. As Marga
wrote, "the party could not go beyond the public distmst in its leaders,"
and "could not reconcile the actions of the few with the party's choice
for morality in public life." He blamed the conservative-dominated
Leadership Bureau and Standing Delegation for his failure to reform the
party and reestablish it as a credible political actor.^'
Marga's radical gesture left his collaborators at a loss as to the
course of action they should take and reopened the fight for party leadership. In his letter, Marga named first deputy president Lupu as his
successor. Following Article 82.1 of party statute, if the president resigns
either the deputy president (Lupu at the time) or the head of Leadership
Bureau (Ciorbea) assumes the leadership, but according to Article 69 the
president could delegate his responsibilities to whoever he wants. A
hasty Bureau meeting behind closed-doors supported Ciorbea for the
office (with 10 votes for and one against), amid Lupu's protests. Lupu
claimed that he could continue as party president because Marga named
him successor both in the letter announcing the transfer of power and in
the subsequent letter of resignation. His contesters countered that Lupu
could fulfill the role of party president only up to Marga's resignation,
and then it was up to the Leadership Bxireau to choose the new leader.
Given Marga's undignified exit and accusations directed against them it
could hardly be expected that the Bureau members would follow his
recommendation and name Lupu as party president. The Bureau took
advantage of Marga's capitulation to remove the entire reformist triumvirate. While their opposition to Lupu was understandable given the
harsh accusations of cormption he laid on them, Ciorbea and the NCDPP
209
conservatives made for strange bedfellows. Only months earlier, as Alliance president, Ciorbea publicly denounced the conservatives for helping mastermind his April 1998 removal from premiership. His longstanding criticism toward the conservative camp prompted Ionescu to
give Ciorbea a cold shoulder after the merger.^o
Legally, the leadership change was problematic. Why was the
Bureau so quick to interpret Lupu's sudden leave of the meeting room as
a 'verbal' withdrawal from his position as deputy president? The
capitulation, later vehemently denied by Lupu and not reflected in the
minutes, conveniently left Ciorbea as the only choice for party president.
To avoid misunderstanding, the Bureau should have allowed Lupu to
clarify his position. Lupu enjoyed almost no support in the Bureau, so
the outcome of the vote for the interim president would have remained
favorable to conservatives. There were additional problems with
Ciorbea's status. The NCDPP-AUiance merger had little juridical value
unless entered in the national political party registry, which would have
led to the Alliance officially ceasing its existence. When appointed
interim president, Ciorbea had a NCDPP card, but the merger was still
unrecognized officially by the courts, a fact that made the card more of a
token symbol to his retum to the party than proof of the Alliance's
dissolution. Besides, as a communist prosecutor, Ciorbea lacked the credentials of a convinced anticommimist, the NCDPP prototype. To patch
things up, Ciorbea and the conservatives rewrote history and agreed that
his defection from the party was the result of him being removed from
premiership not by the conservatives but by Vasile. According to
Diaconescu, "Ciorbea was forced to leave the party by Vasile, but was
never an adversary of Christian Democrat principles.'"*! Letting Vasile
take the blame for Ciorbea's earlier split from the NCDPP did not solve
the practical problems that party leaders faced in mid-2001. By assuming
the party presidency, Ciorbea had to find ways to appease the resentments of party members dissatisfied with his performance as premier
and his forming of the Alliance. The mission was difficult, forcing
Ciorbea to give up the principles he supported as Alliance member. To
boost the credentials of a conservative leadership tainted by corruption
and venality, the interim NCDPP president sought the support of luminaries like Doina Comea. One of Romania's rare anti-communist
dissidents, Comea was named a Standing Delegation member soon after
joining the party.
210
In an open letter. Alliance leader Nicolae Balota revealed the secret

pre-merger negotiations between Marga and Ciorbea. The letter painted
Ciorbea as a person ready to make compromises to gain any kind of
leadership position, even that of a shattered outside-Parliament party.
Marga allowed Ciorbea to be second in command in the party if he
promised not to seek the party presidency for the next eight years or join
forces with the conservatives. Evidently, Ciorbea failed to keep his
promises. Moreover, Balota wrote, "instead of trying to convince Marga,
exasperated by the insidious manipulations of his adversaries and their
attempts to stop the party's revival, to reconsider his resignation,
Ciorbea sold him to his adversaries."^^ jn his rush to overwhelm his
opponents Marga overlooked their ties to Ciorbea. The political careers
of many conservatives were closely intertwined with Ciorbea's, many
becoming members of his cabinet, and losing their positions with his
removal from office. Muresan included Ciorbea on NCDPP party lists
for the 2000 elections first among senatorial candidates representing the
Alba county. Even in the absence of such rapprochement, the newly
minted interim president could hardly refuse collaboration with the
conservatives. He could not follow Marga and abandon the party weeks
after the merger, the more so since Marga's departure seemed grounded
in personal, not ideological, reasons. Leaving the party was not an
option, as many Alliance members announced their opposition to such a
move. Ciorbea had to do his best to forge amicable relations with the
conservatives, even if that required him to renege on his prior understanding with the reformists. On their part, conservatives preferred an
outsider like Ciorbea to an endless fratricide unleashed among leaders of
comparable force.43
Details of the 6 July Leadership Bureau meeting that were subsequently leaked to the press by the reformists revealed the deep divisions
and animosities separating the two camps, and Lupu's and Chirita's
growing isolation within the party leadership stmctures following
Marga's resignation. Angry that Marga had to resign as a result of what
he saw as insidious plots against the party's reformation, Lupu accused
the conservatives of using the party's good name and influence for
amassing considerable personal fortunes. In his words, "I saw manipulation, greed and cowardliness that I could never imagine [to exist]....
Boys, you stole as much as you could!" An obfuscated Mxiresan vociferously countered by accusing Lupu and the reformists of mismanaging
THE ROMANUN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY
211
the party funds, but by doing so admitted that he facilitated transfers of

some 10 billion lei (around US$400,000) from undisclosed sources to
the party coffers. His confession did not elicit protests from the meeting
participants, proof for the local mass-media that the conservative camp
was familiar with Muresan's shady party financing practices.
Marga was followed by Lupu and Chirita, with other reformists
who refused to recognize the interim leadership being promptly excluded
by interim president Ciorbea and new secretary general Ionescu. It was
not the first time that the party excluded its members for not toeing the
leaders' line, but the summer 2001 purging campaign went further than
all others, destroying the party's very foundation. In the first week following Marga's resignation, 30 locd party leaders were expelled from
the party. The new party leaders postponed the date of the extraordinary
congress to mid-December to allow for the removal of the reformistdominated leadership of 14 county chapters, and warned that those in
favor of an earlier congress will be expelled from the party.''4 Amid
revelations that Article 83 of the statute called for interim leaderships to
organize an extraordinary congress within 60 days and charges that a
delayed congress would prolong intra-party conflict unnecessarily,
Ciorbea's followers called the congress on 14 August. On behalf of 24
local chapters Lupu and Chirita, still viewing themselves as the legitimate party leaders, filed with the Leadership Bureau a request calling for
the congress to be organized on 17-19 August and for Marga to retum to
the party presidency. For a congress to be organized at least 16 structures
must support the call. The Bureau chose to ignore Lupu's request.
Both camps claimed to have majority support in the party, but in
fact neither knew for sure how many members it could count on. Defections from one camp to the other and to other parties multiplied. The
fight eventually degenerated in physical altercations, with Ciorbea sympathizers assaulting Lupu supporters in Iasi and Giurgiu. Several local
structures split between the two camps, resulting in some counties
having two parallel chapters each claiming to be the authentic NCDPP,
and the party losing promising members like Zamfir Iorgus (Mangalia
mayor), Gheorghe Nicut (Curtea de Arges mayor) and Dorel Popa
(Targu Mures mayor). On 4 July in the Transylvanian county of Bihor,
around 500 dissatisfied Christian Democrats left the party not before
accusing Ciorbea of having used the defunct Alliance to his own advantage, and the party of allowing "personal pride to take precedence over
212
general interests.'"*^ By late July the party had lost or excluded so many
members and local chapters that its very existence was threatened. Lupu
warned that the party could be dissolved, as more than half of its county
structures were shut down, with Ciorbea saying that he dissolved only
leaderships "illegally" appointed by reformists and not the chapters per
se. On 13 August, the press reported that of all 47 county and Bucharest
party chapters, 27 were divided between the two camps, 15 were clearly
pro-conservative and only 5 were predominantly pro-reformist. Days
later the entire Women Organization defected to the reformist camp.
Instead of seriously reflecting on the loss, the conservatives ironically
commented that the resulting damage was minimal, since "[women]
were the major source of the gossip and rumors plaguing party headIn a last attempt to reestablish control over the party, reformists
gathered representatives of 23 county structures in Cluj, to show support
for Marga's retum as president and the removal of corrupt leaders. Former anticommunist dissident Comea, present at the meeting, dismissed
accusations of corruption laid at the conservatives' door. Her statements
give us a hint of the arguments the conservative side used in its defense.
In her words, "How can you ask one to withdraw from the party when he
considers himself innocent and the withdrawal would look like recognition of a guilt that only the courts can establish? As Christian Democrats
we must defend them."'*'' The daily Romania libera, the mouthpiece of
the conservative camp, faulted Marga for equating party revival with the
removal of members accused of corruption, and for "ailing to understand
that a person not found guilty by the courts is innocent. If a person is
called before the courts, the party can ask him to clarify his position, and
can even exclude him for the duration of the trial. It would be a gross
injustice if somebody, for merely being summoned by the police, would
not receive party support."48 The daily was hinting at Marga's tough
stand against Sarbu after the police questioned him in relation to the
RomTelecom affair. In reply, Marga accused unnamed conservatives of
misusing public and private funds and donations to discredit him.
Romania libera's position was important in a country where not so
long ago the accused had to prove his innocence instead of the prosecution proving him guilty. But it ignored the fact that a party's reputation
and electoral support rested on more fickle subjective factors and on
rumor more than on indisputable proof of wrongdoing. Even in a country
213
like Romania, where accusations of corruption are nonchalantly levied

on politicians and public officials on a daily basis, there are limits to the
public's acceptance of particularistic behavior benefiting only a small
segment of the society. T'rue, allegations have seldom been supported by
hard evidence and few high profile politicians stand accused of bribes,
embezzlement, abuse of power and misappropriation of funds, for
reasons that are too numerous to be detailed here. Only one Romanian
politician. Democratic Party leader Traian Basescu, relinquished his
parUamentary immunity in an effort to clear his name. The option was
available to NCDPP politicians, and their adamant refusal to make use of
it heightened popular suspicion that they had something to hide.
As summer 2001 drew to a close, Lupu and Chirita petitioned the
courts asking for their party membership be recognized and the interim
leadership be denied access to the NCDPP bank accounts until the courts
recognized one of the two factions as the 'real' NCDPP. The Bucharest
Tribunal judge hearing the case questioned the validity of the merger,
and pointed out that the documents presented had been signed by
Ciorbea as Alliance president and again by Ciorbea as NCDPP leader.
The judge wamed that, following the law on political parties, a person
could not belong to two formations simultaneously. Legal experts suggested that the merger protocol was a political act without judicial
effects until registered by the courts. In his final statement, the judge
invalidated all decisions that followed Marga's resignation, including
Ciorbea's recognition as NCDPP leader. While in his comments the
judge did not refer to Marga and his supporters, his decision left Lupu
the party interim president, Chirita secretary general, with Ciorbea
remaining Alliance president and Marga a simple party member.
Ciorbea's supporters denounced the verdict as politically motivated,
promised to appeal it, and threatened to petition the European Christian
Democrats against what they saw as a great injustice. Ciorbea stressed
that the merger protocol he and Marga signed was valid after being
endorsed in early June by the Christian Democrat Alliance and NCDPP
leaderships. He went on to state that the courts should submit to the "will
of the people" and recognize the merger even if the latter was not yet
officially entered in the party registry. To speed up things and possibly
boost his chances for a favorable appeal, Ciorbea went intemationally
and complained to the European Christian Democrats (the largest party
in the European Parliament) against a politically motivated verdict which
214
allegedly was the result of pressures on the judiciary exerted by Lupu

and Marga. The Romanian media and politick class dismissed the claim
as unfounded, since a small political group like Marga's lacked the
political clout needed to influence the verdict significantly. In response,
Marga charged Ciorbea with an attempt to infiuence the outcome of the
trial by threatening to transform the tension pitting two factions of a
small outside-Parliament party into an intemational confiict."*'
Unaware of the details of the confiict, European politicians took
Ciorbea's complaint seriously and at face value. Following Ciorbea's
charges that die ruling Social Democrats masterminded the entire
confiict to drive Christian Democrats first outside Parliament and then
outside the law, the European Christian Democrats asked the European
Parliament to restart monitoring the Romanian political process. They
felt that the government's alleged direct intervention in tiie activity of
the judiciary was clear proof that the country lacked separation of power,
one of the key requirements for accession to the European Union.
Ciorbea conveniently failed to mention the fact that earlier the same
Bucharest court rejected Lupu and Chirita's petitions to deny Ciorbea
access to party accounts. In response to the European politicians' strong
stand against the govemment and in favor of Ciorbea, both Romanian
Prime Minister Adrian Nastase and Lupu send letters to explain their
position and refute Ciorbea's allegations.50
On 4 September, Ciorbea contested the verdict, charging that the
judge refused to read all materials included in the file, preferring instead
to focus on one Alliance and one NCDPP document signed by him.
Ciorbea claimed to have signed the documents only for 'conformity' and
stressed that they in no way presented him as president of two parties at
the same time. While giving no details on the 'conformity' he was talking about, Ciorbea argued that on 19 June he received the NCDPP card
and from that moment on he ceased to represent the Alliance. Proof for
this, he claimed, was the fact that the Alliance ceased to exist, although
the party did not shut down its web-site and many local organizations
had problems assimilating into the reconstituted party. The appeal was
accompanied by original docimients attesting that the leaderstdp structures of both political formations agreed to the merger. However, as long
as the merger was not officially registered the Alliance was not yet dissolved.
215
In an effort to unite party members, Ciorbea stepped up his aggressive campaign blaming Social Democrats for everything bad that
happened to him and his party. In mid-September, he wrote to the European Christian Democrats to complain that his family was banned from
leaving the country. Quite imderstandably, European Parliament leader
Hans-Gert Poettering showed concem toward the Romanian govemment's treatment of Ciorbea and again threatened to stall Romania's integration in the European Union. Poettering did not consider it necessary
to contact the Romanian government and gather additional information
before voicing his threats in the European Parliament, an oversight that
later placed him in a delicate position. In reality, Ciorbea's daughter
tried to exit Romania with an expired diplomatic passport. Because she
was stopped at the border where flie passport was confiscated, she had to
obtain a regular passport. That delayed her travel plans, made her miss
the beginning of the academic year at the American university she attended, and provoked much concem to her parents. According to Article
6 of the Governmental Ordinance 65 of 28 August 1997, signed by Premier Ciorbea, "at the end of the mandate passports must be surrendered
within five days to authorities. The ending of the office that entitled a
person to a diplomatic passport results in the passport being declared
void." As Christian Democrat governments did not enforce this legal
provision and did not verify the validity of the 2,000 Romanian diplomatic passports. In 2001, the Social Democrat government started to
revoke and confiscate these passports. When comered by the press to
justify his complaint filed with the European Christian Democrats,
Ciorbea said that his dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that he was
not wamed beforehand of this new policy. The legislation does not
require the govemment to do that, as it is the responsibility of the passport bearer to check the validity of the document. The Extemal Affairs
Ministry retorted that as the leader of an out-of-Parliament party,
Ciorbea had no right to a diplomatic passport, something that Ciorbea
himself knew very well.^i
Four Congresses in Six Months
Eager to show the strong support it enjoyed within party ranks, in
late July the Ciorbea wing announced that two-thirds of all county and
Bucharest party chapters planned to send delegates to the 14 August
congress. Some 430 delegates elected Ciorbea as party president in a
216
race he ran alone with his ironically-titled "The Force of Unity" motion,
which drew heavily on Ionescu's altemative party program the reformists refused to consider. The motion recognized the recovery of the vote
of the intellectuals, young people and women, and strengthened relations
with civil society groups and the Church as primary party goals. The
congress overwhelmingly adopted the motion alongside the new party
program, which reaffirmed the political formation as a national, peasant
and Christian Democrat party proud of its historical heritage.
A pre-congress Leadership Bureau meeting approved new statutes
that enlarged the leadership organs to the point of recognizing one in
every four delegates as a party luminary. TTie new Bureau included 27
members, while the Standing Delegation had 75 regular and 23 alternate
members, making the NCDPP leadership as numerous as that of Romania's major party, the ruling Social Democrats. Practically, all loyal
party members of any national or local prominence received leadership
positions, with Ionescu becoming secretary general and Sarbu and
Muresan being anointed party vice-presidents and Bureau members. The
congress also allowed hard-line conservatives like Ionescu-Galbeni to air
their dissatisfaction with the reformist policies implemented by Marga
and his team. Paradoxically, the speakers stressed that "the [ruling]
Social Democrats imposed [Marga], a professor of Marxism-Leninism,
as leader of the most anticommunist party in Romania in order to destroy
it," and concluded that "only Ciorbea's nomination as party leader could
stop this insidious plot."52 The charge is hardly believable, since Social
Democrats did not send observers to the January congress that elected
Marga, did not interfere with the vote for the NCDPP presidency, and
could hardly drew any tangible advantages from destroying a party that
was already on the fringe of pohtical life. In fact, many delegates to the
14 August congress had attended the January congress, and had voted
for Marga becoming the party president.
Although it confirmed Ciorbea as party leader, the congress was a
major disappointment to the conservatives. Instead of outpouring support
from all comers of the country, only 450 demoralized delegates who had
to cover their own participation costs showed up. The legality of the
congress, of the new Leadership Bureau and StancUng Delegation, and of
Ciorbea's presidency remained uncertain imtil recognized by the courts.
The party was decimated, with most members with significant popular
support having defected. Of the 98 new party leaders, only seven (that is.
217
12 percent) were ever voted as mayors directly by the electorate, with 27

(around 26 percent) having been elected on party lists as members of
Parliament and county and local councils, and 26 other being nominated
by the party during the 1996-2000 period as deputy ministers, prefects
and heads of public utilities. Clearly, more than two-thirds of them
needed party support if they ever wanted to occupy political offices, the
more so since their political capital was minimal. Many former members
of Parliament, ministers, deputy ministers and prefects co-opted in the
new leadership stmctures had had their names linked to irregularities,
cormption charges and accusations of mismanagement and incompetence. But none had been brought to justice in a country where politicians have joined forces to hamper cases of cormption frx)m being
solved.
Among the Leadership Bureau and Standing Delegation members
were people whom the local press and the Marga wdng repeatedly
accused of cormption. While accusations did not lead to formal charges,
it is worth noting that after the congress the police continued to question
party vice-president Sarbu about his involvement in the RomTelecom
affair.53 Standing Delegation member Alexandm Simionovici, former
Botosani prefect and Parliament member, came imder fire for accepting
bribes in exchange for granting a lucrative contract for printing the 2000
local election ballots. A successful communist apparatchik, Simionovici
amassed a considerable fortune over the years and reportedly ran the
Botosani county as his personal feud.S'* Former Bucharest prefect Ion
Iordan was charged with embezzling 1.8 billion lei (US$60,000) from
the 2000 election fund destined for ballot printing, and the press contended that former Interior Minister Ionescu had protected a member of
the shadow economy from being brought to justice.55 At around the
same time the newly constituted commission investigating cormption
scandals involving high state officials simimoned Muresan to explain his
involvement in the Sun Oil affair. As Agriculture Minister, Muresan
allegedly approved the transfer of 5,000 tones of oil from state reserves
to a private firm to help it get out of financial difficulty. When the company refiised to repay die loan by the agreed deadline, Muresan okayed a
payment extension, the press contended, against a Jeep and various sums
of money. Investigators failed to discover documents attesting to the
company's financial distress and charged that the reserve oil must not be
used for the benefit of private firms. Muresan denounced the commis-
218
sion as dominated by Social Democrats bent on tainting his reputation

with unfounded accusations. The echo of that corruption scand^ barely
faded when in Febmary 2002 Gorj Christian Democrat leader Ion
Negricioiu was arrested for a 7 bilUon lei (around US$ 230,000) damage
and a 700 million-worth tax evasion.56
Days after the Ciorbea-wing's congress, on 17-19 August more than
700 delegates from all counties gathered in the capital to show support
for the reformist, dissident faction. They rejected the conservatives'
decision to nominate Ciorbea as interim party president and to exclude
Lupu, Marga and Chirita from the party, and agreed to regard Lupu as
the rightful NCDPP president following Marga's recommendation,
Chirita as secretary general and Marga as party member and representative of the Cluj chapter. The congress elected an Interim Leadership
Bureau of 9 vice-presidents and 7 other members, former deputy minister Anton Vlad, former deputies Laurentiu Dumitrascu and Claudiu
Pavelescu, former senator Vichentie Zagan and Curtea de Arges mayor
Nicut among them. Reformists claimed the support of several former
state officials (4 ministers, 7 deputy ministers, 6 prefects and 30 members of Parliament) and an acting county council president. As in the
case of the earlier Ciorbea congress, the gathering opened with speeches
incriminating the other camp, and Chirita reiterating the position that
reforms within the party stalled because the conservative leaders failed
to understand that any significant change must start with them. Chirita
wamed that Ciorbea was in a delicate legal position resulting from him
being both an Alliance and a NCDPP leader. During discussions Marga
presented the confused congress with a proposal for changing the party
name. After some opposition, an 11-member Initiative Committee
headed by Marga was asked to prepare the documents needed for a party
name change. In his bid for the new party's presidency, Marga called for
drafting a comprehensive strategy for economic revival, finalizing the
privatization process, guaranteeing private property, improving education and public access to information, and integrating Romania into
NATO and the European Union.
While shghtly better attended than its immediate predecessor, the
gathering seemed poorly organized and unable to fulfill its promise to
"analyze the legality of the decisions the Leadership Bureau and the
Standing Delegation adopted after 6 July [the day of Marga's resignation] and to suggest ways in which legality could be restored."57 Other
219
than acknowledging defeat and asking for a party name change (equivalent to surrendering the party name to the other camp), no substantive
proposals were on the table. In October 2001, the Initiative Committee
announced plans to unify center-rightist forces and represent all those
wishing for another style of doing politics and an uncorrupt political
class. The Committee invited other parties to join the new political
formation, but the call fell on deaf years. The response did not come as a
surprise as such mergers offered substantial advantages to the new party
but none to its collaborators. Parties belonging to the parliamentary
opposition were too established on the Romanian political scene to agree
for a new, obscure political formation with uncertain future to share their
seats in Parliament. They also had little regard for the new formation's
Christian Democrat heritage, which they saw as a Westem Protestant
and Roman Catholic invention with little applicability in Romania,
where the Orthodox Church claims the allegiance of some 86 percent of
the country's population. Not even small parties outside Parliament considered the offer advantageous as long as the new party did not pass the
minimal test of political survival and electoral success. To everyone's
surprise Chirita told the press that the new party's leadership and political program will be approved at yet another congress to be organized in
December. The congress was to seal the merger of the new party with
the Popular Party of Romania, the tiny formation former Premier Vasile
once started.
The support the reformists enjoyed came as a surprise to Ciorbea
and his followers, still under the impression that they commanded the
loyalty of most NCDPP members. To show the numerical strength of his
faction and overwhelm the dissident camp, Ciorbea called for a new
congress on 30 September, days before the courts were scheduled to discuss the legal status of the NCDPP. Embroiled in a legal battle over the
party name, leadership, statutes and pohtical program, Ciorbea refused
to name the statutes on which he based his insistence for a second
extraordinary congress within only a month and a half. New elections
were called for the party leadership, but in fact they only allowed the
candidates nominated by the 14 August congress to be reconfirmed as
Leadership Bureau and Standing Delegation members by a broader and
more representative congress. Again, Ciorbea was the only candidate for
the party presidency, with all Bureau and Delegation members being
dutifully reconfirmed.
220
EAST EtmopEAN QUARTERLY
The ofBcial reason for organizing this new congress was the need to
celebrate the party's 75th anniversary. Close to 5,000 people attended
the congress, including some reformists, if the organizers were correct.
Conservative delegates honored with merit medals all loyal senior
Christian Democrats, prominent civil society leaders together with the
Romanian Orthodox Patriarch Teoctist, a calculated move destined to
boost the party's popular support. With 98 percent of the vote, the congress reconfiimed Ciorbea as party president and Ionescu as secretary
general and anathematized the reformist wing for its reftisal to recognize
the two conservative-dominated congresses. That such show of support
could be seen only dtiring the Communist Party meetings did not bother
Ciorbea and Ionescu, eager to legitimize their grip on the party at any
price. It was only after the congress that Ciorbea and his supporters
started traveling across the country to rebuild local party structure.
Ciorbea consolidated his position with an extensive tour in the Americas
and Europe. The November 2001 meeting of Christian Democrat representatives worldwide elected Ciorbea's close ally Alexandru Herlea as
an Executive Committee member and adopted a resolution condemning
the attempts of the Romanian governing Social Democrats to control the
country's political life and the judiciary.58
On 15 December, the reformist camp organized the founding congress of the Christian Popular Party which, they hoped, would provide
an altemative to the NCDPP. To everybody's disappointment Marga did
not show up to take over the party presidency, so Lupu retained the
position, while Chirita became secretary general and Vlad executive
president. Some 500 delegates from 38 counties and Bucharest elected
13 vice-presidents. In an xmprecedented step, two women, former deputies Silvia Petrovici and Gabriela Radu, became party vice-presidents.
Two months later Lupu submitted the documents needed for the new
party's official registration.
By spring 2002, disgruntled defectors from other parties were leading the NCDPP, while founders and long-time party members were
sidelined. Note that leader Ciorbea was once a supporter of socialist
ideals, while party vice-presidents Comel Boiangiu and Decebal Traian
Remes had long careers with the Liberals. Their promotion to party
leadership spoke for the conservatives' desperate attempts to gain recognition and tiie fact that the party needed these people more than they
needed it. Boiangiu brought into the party his Dolj supporters and
221
parliamentary representation, while former Finance Minister Remes was

a controversial but well-known public figure. Their commitment to
Christian Democrat values seemed overshadowed by opportunism, as
both Boiangiu and Remes were "political travelers" who repeatedly
switched sides to avoid political obliteration. Boiangiu abandoned the
Liberals in 1992 after quarrels with leader Radu Campeanu, five years
later rejoined the party, and in 2001 he again left, trying unsuccessfully
to set up another political formation together with Remes.
wiiile leaders wagged war among themselves, massive defections
reduced the party to a shadow of its former self. Ciorbea claimed that his
party lost only 30,000 of its 200,000 members, but it is more likely that
the party lost a third of its membership since late 2000.59 The NCDPP
further disintegrated when tensions erupted between Ciorbea and his
lieutenants. In May 2002, at the prompting of European Christian
Democrat leader Wim Van Welzen, Ciorbea asked Muresan, Sarbu,
Opris and Ionescu to "sacrifice themselves and give up their party card"
so that the party's good name can be restored. Muresan retorted that
those who once abandoned the party cannot ask him to give up the party
vice-presidency.60 Ciorbea's determination to sideline the tainted leaders
led to the sending of a secret envoy to Lupu to ask for his retum to the
party, together with his supporters. Lupu promptly rejected the offer.
Soon afterwards Ionescu, Opris, Muresan and Caramitru were sidelined and Ciorbea assumed sole responsibility for party reconstmction.
In an unexpected tum of events, Ciorbea fulfilled Marga's promise to
push the conservative leaders aside, a move that Ciorbea's very nomination as party president one year earlier should have prevented. Ciorbea
could not bring new blood in the party leadership, but he relegated
conservatives to the task of examining their previous govemmental
performance. The changes were symptomatic for the growing lack of
communication and sympathy between Ciorbea sympathizers and opponents within the Leadership Bureau. Both camps complained diat
Ciorbea refused to make decisions unless he consulted with each Bureau
member and obtained consensus on issues, a fact that led to unnecessary
delays and hampered party activity. While pointing the finger to the
other camp, both sides contributed to this state of affairs. Ciorbea's weak
leadership and endless bargaining resulted from his fragile position
within the party, which he saw fit to counteract with a collective decision
making style that gave conservatives some stake in the process. Conser-
222
vatives insisted for the president to speak up and lead the party rather
than being led by it, but that would only have left Ciorbea exposed to the
criticism of not consulting with other leaders and of promoting the
Fuhrerprinzip of a bygone era.
Ashes to Ashes
The year 2003 brought further turmoil and imcertainty to the Christian Democrat camp. In March, vice-president Tanase Barde summarized the complaints of the conservatives against the Christian Democrat
president in a letter sent to the European Christian Democrats. The letter
recognized the need to unify the Romanian opposition, bring untainted
personalities to the NCDPP leadership, clarifying the programmatic
goals of the Christian Democratic movement, and realistically assess
Ciorbea's progress toward improving the NCDPP's standing. Barde
echoed Tariuc's earlier assessment that the NCDPP leaders were
unwilling to call a spade a spade:
The Christian Democrats' impotency to say what they want is
determined by their chronic incapacity to accept who they are....
We are so numerous, that [nobody] knows for sure how many
members are there...and how many local structures are legally constituted; we are so strong, that mass media barely notices us, and
that only when we appeal to nostalgic memories and when it has
nothing else to write about, and our most bitter adversaries do not
even make the effort to attack us; we can barely speak of luminaries
who benefit the party as long as our party president ranks first in
popular distrust, other leaders unwillingly follow him and we continue to attack each other... .^1
In response, Barde was expelled from the party, while other leaders who
supported the letter were either expelled (student leader Bogdan Pitigoi),
suspended for a year (Ionescu, Opris) or just admonished (Mirel Tariuc).
A deeply dissatisfied Barde told joumalists that "Ciorbea has become a
kind of Saddam Hussein of the NCDPP. [The atmosphere] in the party is
now worse than in the Communist Parfy." He revealed that his letter
rested on a poll showing that 15 percent of Romanians support Christian
Democracy, but less than 2 percent vote for the NCDPP.62 The severity
of the penalties was meant to discourage NCDPP members from undermining Ciorbea's privileged relationship with the European Christian
223
Democrats, which some saw as the only reason why Ciorbea commanded loyalty from party rank and file. The European Popular Party
continued to support Ciorbea unconditionally, and refused to recognize
that other parties better served the Christian Democrat cause in Romania.
Barde was hardly in a position to judge Ciorbea, as he himself contributed to the demise of the once powerful Constanta structure. The
young engineer Barde (bom 1965) joined the NCDPP in tiie early 1990s
and quickly estabhshed himself as the Christian Democrat leader of
Constanta county. In 1996 he became a deputy, and for a brief period of
time was a member of the Chamber of Deputies executive, at the same
time ruling tiie local structure with an iron fist. His critics pointed to his
lack of initiative as a member of Parliament, his tendency to place the
interests of the party above the interests of the county he was supposed
to represent in tiie house, his promotion of cormpt and inefficient party
members as deputy ministers, prefects and heads of public utilities, and
his unwillingness to collaborate with the local media. In 2000 the Constanta Christian Democrats obtained a limited number of seats in the
county and local councils, but filled all seats with individuals whom
local members saw as the main reason for the electoral defeat. By the
time Barde composed his letter to Ciorbea, the Christian Democrat local
representatives had become increasingly isolated from their own party
structure, the national party leaders, and the Constanta electorate.
The drastic measures taken against the powerful conservative vicepresidents had tremendous impact on the NCDPP. First, they upset the
European Christian Democrats, who finally realized that Ciorbea was
not worth their trust as long as he did not feel accoimtable to anyone,
quashed honest attempts to assess realistically the NCDPP's chances for
electoral success, and failed to devise a winning strategy for guaranteeing parliamentary representation. Without the support of its traditional
allies, tiie NCDPP was indistinguishable from other Romanian Christian
Democrat formations, which the European Christian Democrats refused
to support, and was robbed of financial donations key to its daily operation and strategic programs. Second, the luinecessarily severe response
to the letter alienated party members who voluntarily left the party in
support of Barde and his followers. Trying to preempt a massive loss of
members, Ciorbea lifted the sanctions, but it was too late. Barde became
a Democratic Party local leader, Pitigoi set up his own non-political
student organization, Ionescu joined the newly constituted Popular
224
Action. The few reformists who chose to retum to the NCDPP (including Chirita), could not outset these massive defections.
The NCDPP made an effort to remain in the public eye by organizing an anti-governmental protest against corruption and poverty on 21
September 2002 and by joining the 11 March 2003 'human chain' condemning the slow progress in immasking communist-era political police
agents. Some 4,000 delegates from different Romanian regions came to
Bucharest at Ciorbea's call to take a stand against governmental economic policies and lack of progress in combating political corruption.
Half a year later, the party brought only a couple hundred of protesters,
both because meanwhile its membership base had dwindled significantly
and because the need to access the files compiled by the commimist
political police and to find out the identity of political police agents was
considered less important and urgent t l ^ addressing socio-economic
problems. Sure that its proud historical heritage alone would guarantee
its survival, the NCDPP rejected proposals to unify the opposition in an
electoral block able to defeat the ruling Social Democrats if those proposals meant the party's incorporation into a new coalition or an already
existing stronger party. The hesitation ofthe NCDPP leaders, and the unreasonable conditions imposed by both parties, precluded a truce with
Lupu's reformists, who joined flie Popular Action, set up by former
President Constantinescu. The Liberals and the Democrats simply
ignored the Christian Democrats when launching negotiations for a new
electoral alliance. With 21 senatorial and 55 deputy seats in the current
legislature, the two parties considered the NCDPP a potential liability
and a factor likely to diminish the appeal of the new alliance. The
NCDPP incorporated the tiny associations of former political prisoners
and owners whose property was confiscated by the communist regime.
This small success aside, it is highly improbable that the NCDPP
could gain parliamentary representation in the next elections. Its demoralized members, increasingly isolated leadership, unrealistic assessment
of Romanian realities, unclear programmatic goals, lack of funds, resources and political appeal, inability to obtain favorable media coverage
are as many drawbacks that cannot be addressed in the few months
preceding the elections of late 2004. There is little evidence that intemal
problems receive the attention they merit. Centralism gave the impression of organizational coherence, but could not address the party's
structural problems. Party discipline is given precedence over diversity
225
of opinion, and party unity is still understood as unconditional support

for tiie leaders. As a result, the Christian Democrats lack a forum for
honest debate and communication among different party leaders,
between national and sub-national party structures, and between leaders
and ordinary party members. All these issues must be addressed if the
NCDPP is to make a new start.
Notes
1. The "historical" Social Democrats were incorporated into the ruling Social Democrat Party, the former Party of Social Democracy in Romania, which many regard as the heir
ofthe defunct Communist Party.
2. Daniel Barbu, Sapte teme de politica romaneasca (Bucharest: Antet, 1998), and
Ghita Ionescu, "Reading Notes, Winter 1996; Good News, Bad News - Pax Americana,
Comeliu Coposu," Govemment and Opposition 31, no. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 108-109.
3. J. F. Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastem Europe after Communism (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1994), p. 102.
4. Ion Ratiu, Din zitete unei democratii originate. Note zitnice ianuarie decembrie
1991 (Bucharest: Trustul de Presa Regent House, 2000).
5. Sinteza. Program politic al NCDPP, pp 1-2.
6. Quoted in Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu, "Romanian Orthodox Church and
Democratization," Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 8 (December 2000), p. 1480.
7. The party did set up weak women's and youth organizations that never emancipated
from the rule of the Bureau. The Christian Democrat youth was divided into student and
non-student organizations that served as career advancement vehicles for sons of prominent
party leaders, and never managed to come to term with each other.
8. Gabriela Tarla, Personatitati publice, potitice (Bucuresti: Editura Holding Reporter,
1994), p. 163.
9. Interview with local Christian Democrat leader, 24 February 1999.
10. Interview with local Christian Democrat leaders, 3 and 5 March 1999.
11. Lavinia Stan, "Comparing Post-Communist Governance: A Case Study," Journal
of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 18, no. 3 (September 2002), pp. 77-109.
12. Following the Law on local public administration, a person cannot simultaneously
hold the positions of mayor and prime minister. In 1997, the Governmental Ordinance no. 82
allowed Ciorbea to reclaim the mayoral mandate if he lost the premiership, provided that that
happened before the mayoral mandate was expiring. The ordinance was turned down by the
Constitutional Court as unconstitutional.
13. A view recently confirmed by Liberal leader and former Ciorbea cabinet member
Valeriu Stoica in Provocari liberate. Vateriu Stoica in dialog cu Dragos Paut Atigica
(Bucharest: Humanitas, 2003).
14. Constanta Christian Democrat leader Nicolae Jianu, quoted in Dimineata (Bucharest), 14 November 1996.
15. Interview with local Christian Democrat leader, 20 April 1999.
17. Jurnatut national (Bucharest), 22 March 2002.
18. Cotidianut(9 September 1998).
226
19. Nicolae Balota, the Alliance president, Romania libera (Bucharest), 3 August
1999, p. 1, and loan Boila, "Speech at the Alliance's Formation," available on www.ancd.ro.
20. For his motivations, see Radu Vasile, Cursa pe contrasens. Amintirile unui prim
ministru (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2002).
21. Sorina Soare, "Analyse du systeme des partis en Roumanie apres 1989," Transitions, vol. XL, nos. 1-2 (1999), pp. 149-150.
23. Evenimentul Zilei (15 September 2000).
24. See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, "The Retum of Populism; The 2000 Romanian Elections," Government and Opposition vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 230-252.
25. Adevarul (Bucharest), 23 January 2001.
26. Adevarul (16 January 2001).
27. Romania libera (6 January 2001).
28. Ziua (24 January 2001).
29. Octavian Paler, Romania libera (16 January 2001).
30. Ziua (10 January 2001).
31. Adevarul (5 January 2001).
32. Cronica romana (Bucharest), 22 January 2001.
33. Curentul (Bucharest), 1 February 2001.
34. Cotidianul (26 March 2001).
35. Ziua (17 November 2001) and Jumalul National (19 November 2001).
36. yuma/u/na(<o/ia/(24 May 2001).
37. Nicolae Balota, Romania libera (3 August 1999). The merger was harder to
implement at the local level, with local Alliance and Party leaders trying to control local
organizations, and leaving the party when unsuccessful. In Arges die Alliance tried to
marginalize the NCDPP local leaders. In a radical step, the entire Timis county Alliance
organization joined the Democratic Party, some Arad organizations joined the National
Christian Democrat Party, while most Bucharest Alliance members joined the Union of
Rightist Forces. For reports, see Cotidianul (7 May 2001).
38. Cotidianul (4 June 2001).
39. His resignation came the day after the police summoned Sarbu to detail his involvement in the RomTelecom affair. As former Fund president, the press contended, Sarbu
offered a US$9 million-worth fee to a consulting firm for mediating the transfer of the
Romanian telecommunications monopoly RomTelecom to a Greek investor. The prosecution
alleged that the fee was higher than tfie percentage stipulated in the contract and that in any
case it should have been paid by RomTelecom itself, not by the Fund. Found guilty, Sarbu
was ordered to pay damages. Jumalul National (21 November 2001) and Ziua (22 November 2001).
40. Author's interview with Christian Democrat leader, 7 July 2002, Bucharest.
41. Cotidianul (16 July 2001).
42. Cotidianul (7 March 2001).
43. Interview with Christian Democrat leaders, July 2002, Bucharest.
44. Romania has 41 counties. Bucharest, the capital, is divided into six districts, each
one with its own local party organization. That brings the total number of local organizations
to 47.
45. Cotidianul (14 July 2001) and Evenimentul Zilei (16 July 2001).
46. Evenimentul Zilei (30 August 2001).
47. Adevarul (11 July 2001) and Romania libera (12 July 2001).
227
48. Romania lihera (10 July 2001).

49. Cotidianul (24 and 30 August 2001).
50. Evenimentul Zitei (6 September 2001). Nastase's letters are posted on
www.guv.ro.
51. Cotidianul (18 September 2001).
52. CurentuI (IS August 2001).
53. The press announced that in January 1999 Sarbu received a state-owned apartment
in a desirable Bucharest residential area. Later he bought the property at a ridiculously low
price allegedly with the approval of the NCDPP Bucharest mayor Viorel Lis. Sarbu's
worries did not stop there, as shortly afterwards the police questioned him regarding the
Bucharest Hotel privatization. The winning Noni Travel company was supposed to cover the
transaction cost within two months, but it failed to do so. The Fund, which mediated the privatization deal under Sarbu's leadership, neglected to ask for the sale price to be updated
according to the inflation rate. According to the local press, as a result of the delay in payment the Fund incurred an estimated six million dollar loss. To recover part of the loss, the
police took possession of Sarbu's apartment only to find out that it had been emptied of all
of its contents. Evenimentul Zilei (7 September 2001) and Cotidianul (22 November 2001).
54. Adevarui (6 October 2001) and Romania Libera (19 November 2001).
55. Apparently for some time Ionescu's interests "coincided" with those of interloper
figure Mihai Bucurenciu, who ordered the kidnapping and torture of Valentin Raducanu for
stealing half a million dollars from his car. When Raducanu reported the kidnapping, the
police asked Bucurenciu to clarify the source of the stolen money. Bucurenciu used his
political contacts to obtain an audience with Minister Ionescu and later bragged that Bucharest police chief, Mircea Bot, lost his position as a result of the meeting. Ionescu dismissed
the charges, but refused to provide details on the infamous audience. Adevarui (6 October
2001) and Ziua (8 and 13 November 2001).
56. Cuget liber, 16 February 2002, and Adevarui, 16 February 2002. Former head of
Bucharest police General Mircea Bot alleged that Ionescu removed him from office when he
was about to solve a case involving leaders of the interlope world.
57. Jumalul national (13 August 2001).
58. Ziua (22 November 2001).
59. Adevarui (7 May 2002). In August 2002 the total NCDPP membership was
190,000 people, of which around 70,000 had been paying dues. The strongest local organizations were Bucharest (with S,667 members), Bistrita Nasaud (3,SS0), Timis (3,S37) and
Constanta (2,612). The number of active members is much lower. Party leader Teodor
Morariu also announced that of the ISO Christian Democrat mayors elected in year 2000,
108 remained loyal to the pro-Ciorbea wing, which also could count on 117 of the 1S6
county councilors, and 2,363 of the 2,7S4 local councilors elected at the same time on
NCDPP lists. See Curierul National (27 August 2002).
60. Romania tibera (20 May 2002).
61. Mirel Tariuc, "PNTCD - Ultimul Inceput" (Bucharest: hstitutul de Studii Crestin
Democrate, 2002). I thank the author for a copy of the manuscript.
62. Telegraful de Constanta (28 March 2003).

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East European Quarterly. XXXIX. No.

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

platform. Some of these electoral coalitions - including the Democratic

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

After communist authorities banned the party in the wake of the

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

elections. The original electoral law had provided for single-member

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

Stressing the paramount importance of private property, the program

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

choice might have been someone already known to the public or a

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

Democrats the nickname of Romania's Talibans. A Christian Democrat

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

outnumbered when decisions needed the support of the majority. After

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

In mid-December 1996 the Convention-dominated government was

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

bers fi"om among bureaucrats, administrators and civil servants, often

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

dence over merit and professional conq)etency, a matter of concern even

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

office or found unexpected success in business. Newspapers relished in

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

reduced to poverty." On its intemet site, the Alliance stressed that

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

Leadership] Bureau with final saying as regards the names to be

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

strategy for the party's reconstruction; and 5) defining a position relative

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

emmental performance was tantamount to admitting that their political

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

parliamentary performance. With his quiet and thoughtful demeanor,

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

period, he distinguished himself both as a solid scholar and an Education

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

sentatives repeatedly asked Marga to nominate Ionescu as first deputy

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

in a bold move they called for an extraordinary congress in August in the

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

In an open letter. Alliance leader Nicolae Balota revealed the secret

THE ROMANUN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

the party funds, but by doing so admitted that he facilitated transfers of

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

like Romania, where accusations of corruption are nonchalantly levied

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

allegedly was the result of pressures on the judiciary exerted by Lupu

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY

THE ROMANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PEASANT PARTY

12 percent) were ever voted as mayors directly by the electorate, with 27