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DISCLAIMER: the contents of this transcript were directly lifted from
the discussion on November 27, 2014. Questions left unanswered are
given an opinion that may or may not be correct.
P.S.: HE WHO HOLDS THIS TRANSCRIPT OWES ME A CHEESEBURGER
(PREFERABLY FROM MCDONALDS) =)

NOVEMBER 27, 2014

Section 4:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Two parts of Section 4:
1st No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press
2nd The right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
Originally Section 4 does not include the freedom of expression. The phrase of expression is a
new addition in the 1987 Phil. Constitution. It was here that freedom of speech or of the press was
considered vague as to include other forms of expression, example, and pantomime (acting without words
coming out from a persons mouth). Freedom of speech includes other forms of expression, in the 1987
Phil. Constitution, they made it explicit, it now reads as freedom of the press, of speech and of expression
which now includes different kinds of expression and not only speech.
The second part of Section 4 is an old provision carried by the 1987 Phil. Constitution.
Question:
What are the twin mandates of Section 4?
o 1st is the protection of the freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, and;
o 2nd the protection to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
What does speech, expression, or press include?
o It includes every form of expression, whether oral, written, taped, disc-recorded, movies,
symbolic speech (wearing of arm bands) and peaceful picketing.
What are the two prohibitions of the abridgement of the freedom of speech, expression, or of the
press?
o 1st, the prohibition on prior restraint it is restraint prior to the act. Official government
restriction on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination. Its most blatant form is a system of licensing administered by an executive
officer, movie censorship, although not placed on the same level as press censorship,
belongs to this type of prior restraint. In addition to the acts of prior restraint is judicial
prior restraint which takes the form of injunctions issued by the courts against publication.
Equally objectionable prior restraints are licensing taxes measured by gross receipts for the
privilege to engaging in the business of advertising in any newspaper or flat license fees for
privilege of selling religious books.

o 2nd, prohibition on subsequent punishment restraint of speech, expression, and of the

press after the act. The mere prohibition of government interference (prior restraint) before
words are spoken or published would be inadequate protection of the freedom of
expression if government could punish without restraint after publication. The guarantee
of freedom of expression also means a limitation in the power of the State to impose
subsequent punishment.
Is the warning against media against airing of the conversation between the President and other
personalities constitute constitutional prior restraint?
o Yes, it constitutes prior restraint and is constitutional as held in Chavez vs. Gonzales (Hello
Garci tapes).
When the right to free speech and the press collides with the right of the accused to a fair trial
how will the court dispose of the conflict?
o In the case of Secretary of Justice vs. Sandiganbayan during the hearing in the case of
President Estrada, the Supreme Court said the case involved a petition to allow live
television coverage of the trial of the Former-President Estrada. It is the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press and the right of the people to public
information on the one hand and the fundamental rights of the accused on the other hand.
When these rights are raised against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the rights of
the accused must be preferred to win. In denying the petition, the Court said that television
coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process in the rights of
a criminal-defendant.
o In the Maguindanao Massacre cases, a petition for radio and TV coverage was requested in
this case. The Supreme Court said that the indication of serious risk posed by live coverage
to the accuseds right to due process left unexplained in the Estrada case has left a blow to
the exercise to press freedom and the right to public information. While apparent
circumstance that makes the Maguindanao Massacre different from the Estrada cases is the
impossibility of accommodating all interested parties inside the courtroom (because there
are more than 150 accused). Initially the Supreme Court said, yes, live coverage maybe
done in the Maguindanao Massacre cases, however, on reconsideration, the Supreme Court
did not allow live coverage as reiterated by Chief Justice Sereno, the members of the press
must be allowed inside the courtroom but no live coverage. While the Court recognizes the
freedom of the press and the right to public information (these rights belongs to non-direct
parties) the rights of the direct parties should not be forgotten. In a clash amongst these
competing interests, jurisprudence makes it clear that the balance should always be
weighed in favor of the accused (the decision went back to the justification on the Estrada
case for live coverage).
In the case of Ayer Productions vs. Kapulong, the case involved the production of the 4-day
revolution (a movie-documentary on the EDSA revolution) and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile. Since Enrile
was a crucial player during this revolution the documentary included his persona in the film. Enrile went
to court and wanted to stop the production and the recording of his participation, he asserted his right to
privacy while the petitioner (producers) asserted their right of expression. The Court said that against the
freedom of expression must be balanced to the right to privacy which was recognized by law as the right
to be left alone. A limited intrusion into a persons privacy has long been regarded as permissible where
the person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about
him constitute matters of public character. In this case, there was no doubt that the events of the 4-day
revolution is of a public character. In addition, Enrile was a public figure which meant that he had no
right to prevent the publication of the story of his participation in the event.
Question:
Is the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press absolute?
o No, the freedom of speech is not absolute.
May these rights be lawfully restrained?
o Yes, laws may be had for the restraint for the freedom of speech but there must be a
standard for the restraint.
What is the requirement for the lawful restraint of these rights?

o Dangerous tendency rule speech can be curtailed or punished when it creates a

dangerous tendency to bring about the evil which the state has the right to prevent. The
tendency alone for the evil to come about will justify the restraint these rights. All it
requires for speech to be punishable is that there be rational connection between the
speech and the evil sought to be apprehended.
o Clear and present danger rule is founded on whether the words used are used in such
circumstance and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree in both instances. In the dangerous tendency rule, if the speech is uttered in such a
way that there is a tendency to bring about the evil sought to be prevented then speech may
be curtailed. Under the clear and present danger rule there must already be a clear and
present danger of the evil before the right to speech, to expression, or of the press to be
curtailed.
o Balancing of interest rule Courts have the duty to balance the evil sought to be prevented
as against the rights. If general welfare is the reason for the curtailment of speech then
speech may be prevented. But if the courts, in balancing this interest will say that the
speech does not prevent the evil sought to be avoided then the courts will allow speech.
Jurisprudence in this test uses the case of Gonzales vs. COMELEC.
Freedom of expression has never been understood to be an absolute right. Some forms of speech
are not protected by the Constitution.
Question:
What are the forms of speech not protected by the Constitution?
o Libel jurisprudence on libel has been developed around 353 of the revised penal code.
Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, a vice, a defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit,
or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Elements required to be liable for libel:
1. The allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another;
2. Publication of the charge;
3. Identity of the person defamed;
4. Existence of malice.
When is a speech libelous?
o When the imputation is public;
o When it is malicious.
When is imputation considered public?
o The imputation is public when the information is made known to anyone
other than the person to home it is written.
When is speech/statement considered malicious?
o It is malicious when the author of the imputation is prompted by evil or spite
or speech not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the
person who claims to have been defamed.
o Obscenity
If a speech is not malicious even if defamatory it is privileged, libel does not set in as stated in the
case of Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals.
In Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious even if it
be untrue. If no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
Exceptions:
1. A private communication to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty;
2. A fair and true report made in good faith without any comments/remarks of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in such proceedings or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their duties and functions.

Question:
Are pleadings filed in court privileged?
o The prevailing rule is that parties, counsels and witnesses are exempted from liability in
libel or slander, for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial
proceedings, provided, the statements are relevant to the case (Armovit vs. Judge Purisima).
Pleadings are privileged, but to be so, they must be relevant to the matter under
investigation (Gutierrez vs. Abila)
People vs. Del Rosario defines who is injured in cases of libel. In criminal law, in the
commission of the crime, it is the State who is injured, in libel it is not the
disturbance of public order coxed by defamatory language but its tendency to injure
the person defamed.
There are three objects of criticisms in the life of a public figure:
1. His public and official acts;
2. His mental, moral and physical fitness for office;
3. His strictly private life.
When the object of criticism is his strictly private life, defamatory implications are not constitutionally
protected expression. When object of criticism is his public or official acts then the expression is
constitutionally protected. True criticism of a persons mental, moral and physical fitness for office is
privilege but false criticism is not privilege if malicious (if used as a cloak for assaults for a persons
private life).
Fermin vs. People, Public figures are not unprotected, they are protected from criticisms.
Second part of Section 4:
The right of the people to peaceably assemble cannot and must not be impaired, but it may be
regulated (like the other rights).
Standards for allowing restraint or regulation:
1. Dangerous Tendency rule;
2. Clear and Present danger rule;
3. Balancing of interest rule.
Evangelista vs. Earnshaw Dangerous Tendency rule. Evangeslista was a Communist leader (CPP)
while Earnshaw was mayor of manila.
Primicias vs. Fugoso Clear and Present danger rule. Fugoso was a mayor and Primicias was a
communist leader.
Question:
Which rule is more in keeping with the spirit of the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of
peaceful assembly, and petition?
o Not answered.
o Opinion: The Clear and Present Danger rule gives more guarantee to the constitutional

right than the dangerous tendency rule.

Section 5:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
1st sentence meat of section 5 (non-establishment clause and free-exercise clause)

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 provides that Catholicism was the States religion. It was also
the State religion in the Philippines, but one of the immediate effects of the American constitutionalism in
the Philippines was the denial to the Catholic Church of the Privilege position it held under the Spanish
Sovereignty. The free exercise of religion was first guaranteed under the 1935 Constitution.
Question:
How did this provision get into the 1935 Philippine Constitution?
o It was guaranteed under Section 10 of the Treaty of Paris, which guaranteed that the
territories ceded to the U.S. by Spain shall be secured of a free exercise of religion.
The non-establishment and the free-exercise clauses express an underlying relational concept of
separation between religion and secular government (related to this is Article II section 5).
Question:
What is the basis for the free exercise clause?
o It is the respect for the inviolability of human conscience. There must be free exercise of
religion because no law can be passed to regulate the free exercise of religion. The exercise
of religion is an exercise of human conscience. People must be free to exercise their
religion because their religion is a manifestation of their conscience.
o Cantwell vs. Connecticut, the constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of
religion has a double aspect. On the one hand it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any forms of worship. Freedom of conscience
and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual
may choose cannot be restricted by law, on the hand; it safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion. Once a person has chosen his religion then the government must
ensure that this person has the freedom to exercise his chosen religion. It safeguards the
free exercise of the chosen religion thus the amendment embraces two concepts, freedom
to believe and free to act. The first, which is the freedom to believe, is absolute but the
second, the freedom to act, cannot be absolute.
Can the State impose civic obligations that might conflict with a persons religious beliefs?
o In Gerona vs. Secretary of Education the government said that religion must give way to
law, but in 1993 the Gerona case was abandoned in favor of Ebralinag vs. Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu were the Court held that the freedom of religion
requires that protesting members be exempt from the operation of the law. Ebralinag and
Gerona had something to do with Jevohas Witnesses not wanting to salute the Philippine
Flag.
What is the non-establishment clause?
o The non-establishment clause means that the State cannot establish or sponsor a State or
official religion. The non-establishment clause prohibits the State to:
1. From passing laws which aid one religion;
2. Aid of religion;
3. Prefer one religion over another.
o Austria vs. NLRC, a pastor who could not account for the tithes collected in his church was
dismissed by his church. The case reached the NLRC then the Supreme Court. Austria
claims that the NLRC does not have jurisdiction because the case concerned his religion, the
Court said no. The subject of the case had something to do with the employer-employee
relationship between Austria and his church and had nothing to do with religion.
What is the condition for the exemption for realty taxes for religious property?
o The property should be used:
1. Actually;
2. Directly;
3. Exclusively for the purposes of religion, charity and/or education.
What is the purpose for prohibiting religious test?
o The purpose is to render the Government powerless to restore the policy of probing
religious beliefs by test or limiting public offices to persons who have or profess their
beliefs to some or particular kind of religious concept. To allow religious test would have
the effect of formal or practical establishment of a particular religious faith with

consequent burdens imposed on the free exercise of the faith of non-favored believers
(Torcaso vs. Watkins)
Can the State compel a person to bear arms in defense of the Country when bearing arms is
contrary to the persons beliefs?
o NOT ANSWERED
o Opinion: Yes, the urgency of the situation calls upon the citizens to defend their nation.

Section 6:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
General rule = the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired.
Exception = upon lawful order of the court.
Question:
Is the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law absolute?
o No it is not, it admits of an exception which is the lawful order of the court.
2nd sentence deals with the right to travel.
Question:
Is the right to travel absolute?
o No, it may be impaired if it is for the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health as may be provided by law.
In both instances, the exceptions involve the judiciary. The first instance the liberty of abode and
changing the same may be restrained by lawful order of the court and the second instance of traveling
also includes national security, public safety and public health in accordance with an existing law.
The freedom of movement involves two rights:
1. The liberty of abode includes the freedom to choose and change once place of abode within the
limits prescribed by law and maybe impaired only upon lawful order of the court (e.g. of lawful
order of the court would be a condition imposed in connection with the grant of bail. In a bail, it is
always imposed there that the accused cannot leave the jurisdiction of the court thus it impairs the
accuseds freedom of abode).
2. The liberty of travel include the freedom to travel within the country and outside the country. It
may be impaired even without a court order, but the appropriate executive officer can only
impose these limits on the basis of national security, public safety, and public health as maybe
provided by law (e.g. passports, passport officers, there is a law that you must have a passport
before you can leave the country).
a. Gloria Arroyo vs. De Lima, former president Arroyo wanted to leave the country but De
Lima stopped her, the Supreme Court issued a restraining order against De Lima and DOJ.

Section 7:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The FOI (Freedom of Information Bill) is based on this Section. The restriction on the FOI bill can
be found on administrative issuances which are existing restrictions. Without the FOI bill there is already
a mandate on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern (this is the subject
matter of Section 7).
The two rights guaranteed by the provision are:
1. The right to information on matters of public concern and;
2. The corollary right to access to official records.
These rights are subject to limitations as may be provided by law.
These rights are political rights available only to citizens, and are the exception to the general rule that the
bill of rights are applicable to everyone within the Philippines, even foreigners.
Chavez vs. Pea-Amari (2002) answers the question on when a bid proposal may be accessed by
the public.
Recognized limitations on the exercise of the right to information that existed even before the FOI bill are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

National Security matters;

Criminal Matter or classified law enforcement matters;
Diplomatic correspondence;
Close door Cabinet meetings;
Executive sessions of either houses of Congress and;
Internal Deliberations of the Supreme Court.

Section 8:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Deals with the rights of the people, including those employed in private and public sectors, to form
unions. Before the 1987 Phil Constitution, the right of government employees to form unions is not
specifically mandated/protected.
There is an exception, while the right of government employees to form unions and associations,
societies and organizations is protected/mandated, government employees still do not have the right to
strike. Only private employees are allowed to go on strike.
Section 8 means the right to form associations shall not be impaired without due process of law.
Question:
What if Section 8 was not included in the Constitution? Can employees in the private and public
sector form associations?
o Yes they can.
The right of association involves litigations on two areas of associational activity:
1. Labor unionism;
2. Communist organization.
In the case of Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Secretary of Labor, in contention in this
case is section 23 of the Labor Code, requiring the registration of Labor Unions. This was challenged as a
violation of the Constitutional provision to form associations. The Supreme Court ruled that it (section 23)
is not a violation of the constitutional provision. The particular provision is not preventing the
organization of associations and labor unions, it mere requires them to register.
In People vs. Hernandez (1956), the case revolved around the question of whether mere membership
in a communist organization is already punishable as a criminal offense. The Court said no, mere

membership is not criminal because there is no overt act committed yet. Membership in the Communist
party of the Philippines is not criminal but membership in the HMB is considered illegal because the HMB
has already announced that their purpose is to overthrow the Philippine Government through radical
means. This case gave way for Congress to enact RA 1700 (Anti-subversion law), this law declared the
Communist party as illegal. Section 4 of its provision provides that whoever, knowingly, willfully, and by
overt acts, affiliates himself with the Communist party of the Philippines and becomes a member thereof
shall be punished (this law is no longer in effect).

Section 9:
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Question:
Does Section 9 provide for the basis for the power of Eminent Domain?
o No, the power of eminent domain is inherent and exists even without the Constitution.
Section 9 merely regulates the power and does not provide for it.
Section 9 provides that for the exercise of eminent domain there are two constitutional requirements:
1. The land shall be used for public purpose;
2. Just compensation should be paid.
In Article XII (National Patrimony), public lands when declared alienable and disposable shall be
given to private person either by sale, by award or etc. and thus they become private property. This
private property is now the subject matter of eminent domain. The process is from an originally public
land to a private land to a public land.
The constitutional provisions on eminent domain:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Section 9, Article III;

Section 18, Article XIII;
Section 4 on Land Reform;
Section 22, Article XVIII (idle or abandoned agricultural lands);
Section 18, Article XII says if it entails expropriations it is, it is required that transfer of ownership
can only be upon payment of just compensation and;
6. Section 4, Article XIII deals with just distribution of agricultural lands subject to the payment of
just compensation.
The right of eminent domain is understood to be the ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate not only for public but also for the private property of all citizens for public purposes.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is by tradition lodge with the executive although the
power must be granted by the legislature. The executive cannot exercise this power without the mandate
from the legislature. Once authority is given to exercise the power of eminent domain the matter ceases to
be legislative, the executive may then decide whether the power will be invoked and to what extent. The
power of eminent domain may also be conferred upon municipal governments and other government
entities also to private entities operating public utilities. As to the legislature, the power (eminent domain)
is inherent, but for government agencies, local government and public utilities it is only a delegated
power. In the hands of congress the scope of the power is like the scope of legislative power itself, it is
plenary, it is as broad as the scope of police power, it can thus reach every form of property which the
State might need for public use. The delegated power of eminent domain of local governments is not a
power of eminent but of inferior domain, a share, merely in eminent domain.
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, the city of manila wanted to expropriate the
Chinese cemetery to build the Rizal avenue extension. The Court reached the Supreme Court, the Court
said, it could not be expropriated because it had already been expropriated. The Court further said that
the City of Manila did not have any authority because there was no legislative mandate to exercise the

power of eminent domain. The City of Manila then went to Congress and secured an authority to
expropriate the Chinese Cemetery and thus it was expropriated.
The requisites for the exercise of the power of eminent domain are:
1. There is taking of private property;
2. The taking must be for public use public use does not mean or equate to use by the public, it
means public usefulness, utility or advantage or what is productive of the general benefit; The
concept of public use is as broad as public welfare, the scope of the power of eminent domain has
become broad as the expansive and ever expanding scope of police power. The taking of private
property for subdivision and resale for land reform is for public use because land reform is
mandated by the Constitution, that fact already establishes the public purpose of the taking
(Mataas na Lupa vs. Dimayuga). Expropriation for socialize housing is for public use (Sumulong
vs. Guerrero). Expropriation for the construction of irrigation canals (Cosculluela vs. Court of
Appeals).
a. In Manosca vs. Court of Appeals, the non-establishment clause of the Constitution came
into play.
3. There must be just compensation it is the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the
owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. It is the
compensation given to the owner is just if he receives for his property a sum equivalent to its
market value.
a. Market Value the price which the property will command if the seller is not bound to sell
and the buyer is not bound to buy. This is the definition of the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission. A statutory determination (a determination of congress or a
legislative authority) of just compensation would only be prima facie assessment. In the end,
the final determination of just compensation will have to be made by the court.
Question:
Who are entitled to just compensation?
o Not only the owner of the land to be expropriated but also include all those who have
lawful interest in the property to be condemned including a mortgagee of a registered
mortgage, a lessee, a vendee, or every person having an interest at law or in equity in the
land taken is entitled to share in the award.
When may the expropriator enter into the property expropriated?
o Entry may be made by the expropriator even prior to actual payment of just compensation.
What is merely required is that a deposit is made of the provisional value of the property.
As a general rule, the value of the property expropriated is determined during the time of the
taking of the property expropriated.
In Republic vs. Serabia, there may be instances that there will be taking before the filing of an
expropriation complaint. When both happen simultaneously then there is no problem. But when the
taking comes first before the filing then an issue rises. Compensation for property expropriated must be
determined as of the time the expropriating authority takes possession.
Question:
May just compensation and expropriation for land reform be less than the market value?
o Yes, because land reform is both an eminent domain act and a police power act. The
Guido(Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration)-Baylosis(Republic vs. Baylosis) cases under
the 1935 Phil Constitution (expropriation of large landed estates were guided by the
Guido-Baylosis cases). The guideline is that expropriation for housing to be resolved to
landless must be of big landed estates. This was amended in the case of Tuason vs. Land
Tenure Administration where the area test in the Guido-Baylosis cases was rejecting in
favor of the States quest for social justice and peace. The Tuason Doctrine was carried in
the 1973 and 1987 Phil Constitution. Therefore, even if it was not a large landed estate
even if it is lesser it can be expropriated for resale to the landless.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is always subject to judicial review. There are two
cases/situations that may be reviewed by the courts.
Two Situations:
1. Compensation it must always be determined by the Court;
2. Exercise of eminent domain.
Question:

Is the exercise of eminent domain subject to judicial review?

o It depends. When expropriation is done not directly by Legislative authority but by another
government agency or by a municipal corporation in virtue of an authorizing statute
which neither specifies the purpose of the taking nor the property to be taken it is always
subject to judicial review. If it is an exercise of a delegated eminent domain then it is
always subject to judicial review. When the legislature itself specifies the purpose of the
taking and singles out the property to be taken, the judgment made by the legislature is not
reviewable by the Courts.

Res Judicata is a principle which says that once a case has become final it can never be opened. It
is a principle necessary to the judicial system so that there be end to litigations. The very nature of
eminent domain as an inherent power of the State dictates that the right to exercise the power is absolute;
it is unfettered by prior judgment or res judicata. Res judicata does not affect the power to exercise
eminent domain.
Difference between regulation and taking:
Regulation police power that is involved. In police power, property is regulated; there is no transfer of
ownership. Regulation is not compensable.
Taking with just compensation then it is eminent domain. In eminent domain, property is taken; there is
transfer of ownership. Taking must be compensated.

When a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose there is compensable
taking.
When property interest is merely restricted, the cause continued on restricted use would be
injurious to public welfare or where the property is destroyed because continued existence to the
property would be injurious to public interest there is no compensable taking, it is the exercise of
police power.
When the entry into private property is not just a simple right of way, which is ordinarily allowed
by court under the civil code, but is for purposes of conducting mining activities such as
exploration and extraction, there is already compensable taking. All these will definitely oust the
owners or occupants of the affected areas (Didipio Earth Savers vs. Secretary).
When the right of way enforced by the State results in making the adjoining property unusable,
just compensation is due (Republic vs. Andaya)
Where the nature of an effect of an installation of a 230 kilovolts transmission line results in the
imposition of limitation against the use of the land for an indefinite period, there is compensable
taking (National Power Corporation vs. San Pedro)
When the Municipal property is taken by the State, compensation is required if:
o It is patrimonial property of the municipality (property acquired by it with its private funds
in its private capacity). If it is any other property such as public buildings, held the Local
Government for the State in trust for its inhabitants, the State is free to dispose of it at will
(Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga).

The power of eminent domain under the Local Government Code has been given to Local
Governments.
Question:
What are the essential requisites for the practice of eminent domain for Local Governments?

o There must be an ordinance authorizing the expropriation. The power must be exercised
for public use;
o It must be with just compensation;
o There must be an offer previously made and the same was not accepted.

Section 10:
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
This particular section of the Bill of Rights is directed to the Legislative bodies because of the
phrase: no law shall be passed.
Section 10 speaks of the obligation of the contract or the meat of the contract. The essence of a
contract is the obligation itself.
Not all changes are prohibited, just because a contract already exist does not mean that laws can
no longer be passed. To fall within the prohibition, the change must impair the obligation of the existing
contract and the impairment must be substantial and a remedy is provided for the impairment of the
contract then the law is not considered violative of Section10 (Manila Trading Company vs. Reyes).
The power of the Legislature to change remedies and modes of procedure rest on police power,
meaning the obligation of contracts may be impaired.
Question:
On what basis may be the obligation of contracts be impaired?
o Through Police power. If it is for the general welfare that the obligation of a contract must
be impaired then it will be so using police power.

Jurisprudence has established that a valid exercise of police power is superior to obligation of
contracts. With the acceptance of the superiority of police power over contract, the contract clause has
very limited usefulness and may even be removed from the Constitution without substantial loss. The nonimpairment clause is a superfluity. It has accomplished nothing which the due process clause could not
have accomplished. It has prevented nothing which the due process clause could not have prevented.
There has been a distinct acknowledgement of the expansiveness of police power which the contract
clause alone cannot curtail Fr. Bernas.
Even if the non-impairment clause is removed contracts will still be protected under the due
process clause.
La Insular vs. Machuca, to come under the constitutional prohibition, the law must affect the
rights of the parties with reference to each other. Example, A and B entered into a contract of sale of
cigars. The government imposed additional taxes in the selling of cigars , therefore the transaction that is
covered by the contract has changed.
Question:
In the situation given, was it an impairment of the obligation of the contract?
o No, because the impairment of the obligation of contracts must affect the parties to the
contract and not by virtue of a third person that is coming in to the contract.
The non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial power. It is a limit on the exercise by legislature, by Congress, of its legislative power. It is
not a limit on the exercise by the Courts of its power, so that when a court nullifies or interprets a
contract in such a way as to affect the contractual relation of the parties to the contract, there is no
impairment of the obligation of contracts in the Constitutional sense (Lim vs. Secretary).
There is a reservation clause (Section 11, Article XII) in the grant of franchises. When Congress
believes that general welfare dictates the need to change the franchise given then it shall do so.
Question:

 What if there is no reservation clause for non-impairment? May Congress still pass a law that
would impair the franchises?
o Yes it may. Under the exercise of Police Power. With or without the reservation clause,
franchises are subject to alteration through a reasonable exercise of police power.

Section 11:
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.
This section is the basis for legislative acts or statutes that provides for pauper litigants. Although
Statutes (RA 6033, RA 6034 and RA 6035) that are crafted on the basis of this provision is being enforced,
the efforts are not enough to meet the mandate of section 11.