Andhra High Court

Raidurg Co-Operative House ... vs Government Of A.P. And Anr. on 21 March, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003 (3) ALD 2, 2004 (3) ALT 221
Author: V Rao
Bench: V Rao
ORDER V.V.S. Rao, J.
Introduction
1. The core question in all the five writ petitions is whether the Government of Andhra Pradesh,
the first respondent herein, committed any error apparent on the face of the record in passing the
orders in Memo No. 39408/SS.1/1994-42, dated 13-11-2001 justifying the prayer made in the
writ petition to declare the same as illegal, unauthorized, against the principles of natural justice
and void. All the writ petitions were heard together and are being disposed of by this common
order. Shorn of the details, by the impugned order, the Government has concluded that the land
admeasuring Acs. 279.22 gts. comprised in Sy.No. 66 of Raidurg Village in Ranga Reddy
District is Government land and, therefore, there is no need to order implementation of
supplementary Sethwars (See Glossary of Revenue terms in the footnote*), which are incorrect
and unwarranted. It is a decision not to implement the supplementary Sethwars and nothing else.
Why then, the petitioners are aggrieved? They allege that by reason of alleged agreement of sale
or tenancy, or by reason of alleged long standing occupation, they have ownership rights in the
land and the non-implementation of Sethwars might affect their claim that they are owners
having title to the land.
Background facts/allegations WP No. 5177 of 2002
2. The petitioner is a society registered in 1972 under the provisions of A.P. Cooperative
Societies Act, 1964, having membership of 293 persons. In 1981, the society entered into
agreement of sale with the owner for an extent of Acs. 29.00 in Sy.No.66/3 of Raidurg
Noukhalsa Village. It claims to have prepared a layout dividing the land into 280 plots of 300
Sq.yds. each. As the land is covered by the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULC Act), they applied for exemption. They also claim that the Special
Officer passed orders under Section 8(4) of the ULC Act recommending to the Government for
giving exemption. The members of the petitioner society appeared to have purchased the plots
and got them registered in their names from the land owners and protected tenants Jointly. After
the formation of Serilingampally Municipality in 1987, the members were granted permission to
construct buildings and the Municipality, it is alleged, provided B.T. roads, street lights and water
tap connections. Be that as it is, when the layout was submitted to the Municipality, by resolution
dated 31-1-1991 the Municipality requested the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority
(HUDA) to regularise the layout sanctioned by the Raidurg Gram Panchayat in 1973. The layout
was forwarded to the HUDA for regularisation. The Government by G.O. Ms. No. 367,
Municipal Administration Department, dated 12-7-1989 authorised HUDA to take necessary
action for regularisation of the layout pending change of land use. As no action was taken by
HUDA, the society filed WP No. 8858 of 1999 seeking a direction to give effect to the letter of
the Government dated 6-2-1999 whereby the Government requested HUDA to take necessary
action subject to certain conditions.

3. The Revenue records in the year 1954-55 till 1996, it is alleged, show the vendors of the
petitioner society as pattadars of the land. They also filed necessary declaration under the ULC
Act and order under Section 9 thereof was also issued. The R.D.O., Chevella, by letter dated 3011-1985 addressed the Assistant Director, Survey and Land Records, Ranga Reddy District,
stating that the land of the vendors of the petitioner society was identified and on the basis of the
records the petitioner society can be said to have pattedar rights.
4. It is also stated in the affidavit that ignoring the Revenue records, the Joint Collector issued a
notice on 21-6-1999 calling upon the petitioners to explain as to why the land in Sy. No. 66/3
should not be declared as Government land. As the petitioners and their vendors perfected their
title under the law of prescription, the Joint Collector could not have issued such a notice. The
land owners filed WP No. 28619 of 1999 before this Court seeking quashing of the said notice.
This Court disposed of the writ petition giving liberty to the land owners to make a
representation before the District Collector and to participate in the proceedings. It is alleged that
in spite of representation made along with necessary documents, the Joint Collector passed
orders on 21-6-1999 declaring the land as Government land. The petitioners filed WP No. 17411
of 1999 questioning the orders of the Joint Collector and the said writ petition was allowed.
5. The impugned order is challenged on very limited grounds as found from paragraph 18 of the
affidavit accompanying the writ petition which reads as under:
It is respectfully submitted that since the impugned orders were passed without making the
petitioner as party and without any notice to the petitioner and their vendors and since they are
the affected and aggrieved parties and since their rights are being taken away in the land they are
filing this writ petition to establish their rights. The impugned orders passed by the first
respondent Government are highly illegal, arbitrary and without any authority besides being
mala fide, and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Under the
circumstances, there is no other alternative, effective and adequate remedy except to approach
this Honourable Court invoking the special original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
Be it noted that in the earlier round of litigation, the petitioner society filed W.P. No. 17411 of
1999 challenging the orders of the Joint Collector dated 21-6-1999 cancelling the patta (more
about this infra). The said writ petition was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of this Court
following the judgment in W.P. No. 22516 of 1999, dated 5-6-2000.
WP No. 5181 of 2002
6. The five petitioners in this case are respondents 15 to 19 before the Joint Collector in the case
under Section 166-B of the Telangana Revenue Act and petitioners in W.P. No. 17425 of 1999. In
brief their case is that all of them purchased an extent of Acs. 25.00; (Acs. 5.00 each) in Sy. No.
66/2 of Raidurg Noukhalsa Village out of the total extent of Acs. 45.00 under different registered
sale deeds from the sons and legal heirs of pattadar Chandni Begum. They allege that M.R.O.,
granted pattadar certificates under the ROR Act and that in the pahanis for the years 1992 and
1993, the names of the petitioners were entered in the column dealing with possession. It is also
stated that in 1990 a supplementary Sethwer was issued to an extent of Acs. 45.00 in Sy. No.

66/2 of Raidurg Noukhalsa Village and a tonch plan was also prepared and furnished by Survey
and Land Records Department, Ranga Reddy District. All other averments and allegations in the
affidavit accompanying the writ petition are on similar lines as in the other cases and hence it is
not necessary to repeat the same.
WP No. 5182 of 2002
7. One Shamlet Yellaiah was respondent No. 3 before the Joint Collector in the proceedings
under Section 166-B of the Telangana Revenue Act. The petitioners in this writ petition are the
legal representatives of Shamlet Yellaiah. It is their case that their ancestors were in possession
of an extent of Acs. 25.00 in Sy. No. 66/3 of village Raidurg Panmaqta since long. In the khasra
pahanis for the year 1951-55, the names of the petitioners' ancestors were shown. The land was
known as Madigi Gutta. In the year 1966, when third parties tried to encroach the land, a suit
being O.S. No. 68 of 1966 was filed on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Hyderabad.
The said Court granted injunction in favour of the plaintiffs and petitioners and their ancestors
have been in possession of the same. The petitioners submitted a layout plan for the said land to
the Gram Panchayat by paying layout charges of Rs. 20,000/-. The layout was sanctioned on 2011-1986 after formation of Serilingampally Municipality and it was forwarded to the HUDA for
regularisation. However, as per the zonal development plan notified in G.O. Ms. No. 479,
Municipal Administration Department, dated 2-9-1994, the land use was changed to public and
semi-public use and, therefore, construction of houses has been stopped. In view of the
development of layout, the Vice-Chairman, HUDA requested the Government to change the land
use. The Government authorised HUDA to take necessary action to regularise the layout and
action is pending.
WP No. 7418 of 2002
8. The seven petitioners filed the writ petition making the following allegations. Sonabai was
owner and pattadar of the land admeasuring Acs. 15.00 in Sy. No. 66/2 of Raidurg Panmaqta
Village. Sonabai died in September, 1978. During her lifetime, she executed a Will dated 25-111976 bequeathing the said property in favour of her four sons namely, G. Ramachander Rao, G.
Hanumantha Rao, G. Nagabhushan Rao and G. Krishna Murthy. They became joint owners and
pattedars, each having Acs. 3.30 gts. Petitioners 1, 2, 5 and 6 purchased Ac. 1.05 gts. out of Acs.
3.30 gts. from G. Krishna Murthy during his lifetime under five registered sale deeds registered
during 1981-85. Subsequently, petitioners 1, 3, 4 and 7 also purchased the land from other sons
of Sonabai under registered sale deeds. The land admeasuring Acs. 4.10 gts. is allegedly in
possession of the petitioners and the M.R.O., Serilingampally issued a certificate under the ROR
Act and tonch plan has been prepared. The Revenue records earlier to 1952 show the land as
patta land of late Sonabai.
9. The petitioners constructed poultry farm, three sheds, servant quarters and dug a bore well.
They have been paying municipal tax to the Municipality. The Joint Collector issued notice
under Section 9 of the ROR Act and some persons filed writ petitions. Without considering the
evidence placed by the petitioners, the Joint Collector gave a decision that the land is
Government poramboke. The petitioners filed W.P. No.17430 of 1999. The same was allowed on
30-10-2000 following another judgment in W.P. No. 22516 of 1999.

10. The Government passed orders on 30-11-2001 behind the back of the petitioners without any
notice and without affording any opportunity of being heard. The Government without following
the procedure declared the land as Government land. The Government also directed the District
Collector, Ranga Reddy District to take necessary action in the matter. The petitioners apprehend
that the District Collector might take coercive steps to dispossess them from the land. Therefore,
they filed the writ petition.
WP No. 8452 of 2002
11. The petitioner is son of G. Hanumantha Rao, who had earlier filed W.P. No. 17428 of 1999
challenging the orders of the Joint Collector, dated 21-6-1999. It is alleged by him that his
grandmother Sonabai was the pattadar of the land in Sy. No. 66/3 admeasuring Acs. 29.30 gts.
situated at village Raidurg Noukhalsa and the land in Sy. No. 66/2 admeasuring Acs. 15.00 in
village Raidurg Panmaqta. The other averments and allegations need not be referred to as they
are on same lines as in the other writ petitions.
Government's case as pleaded in counter-affidavits
12. The first respondent i.e., the Government of Andhra Pradesh filed separate counter-affidavits
in all the writ petitions. While tracing the earlier events leading to passing of the impugned order
on 13-11-2001, the Government denied all the averments in the writ petitions. The allegation that
all the petitioners have been in possession of the land has been also specifically denied. It is
stated that all the material and evidence placed by the petitioners in support of their case for
implementation of supplementary Sethwars has been considered and an order was passed. It is
not an ex parte decision. It is further contended that as there is a serious question of title of the
petitioners the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is not proper and the Civil Court
alone is competent to decide the issue of title. In the additional counter-affidavit filed in WP No.
7418 of 2002, while denying the claim of the petitioners and reiterating that Raidurg Village was
escheated to the Government and that the petitioners filed the writ petitions with unfounded
apprehensions that the Government would resort to coercive steps for evicting them, the District
Collector deposed as under:
In regard to para 13 the averment that the Collector, Ranga Reddy District is taking steps to
dispossess the petitioner from the residential buildings, servant quarters, sheds etc., is baseless.
As already submitted most of the area is in the possession of the Government. It is a vacant land,
full of rocks and mushrooms. The petitioners appear to have built a house. No effort is being
made to dislodge them from any illegal process. Indeed, due to the status quo order no
proceedings have been commenced to evict the petitioners. His contention merely being voiced
mala fide to secure interim orders. As already submitted this Court has clearly indicated that the
petitioner should take appropriate proceedings to secure their own legal rights such as they might
be. I state that the Government has no intention for adopting any measures de hors the
procedures laid down by law to secure possession of any lands or houses which are in the actual
possession of the petitioners. It may be noted that the survey number in question is a vast extent
and the petitioners only claim to be in possession of some small extents, even that assertion is not
correct.

Submissions made on behalf of the petitioners

13. Sri N. Narsing Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioners in WP Nos. 5177, 5181, 5182 and
8452 of 2002 made the following submissions. The writ petition is not one seeking declaration of
title of the petitioners. By reason of the Revenue records, the correspondence among the
Revenue officials and the correspondence between the Revenue Officials/Government and
statutory authorities like HUDA, title of the petitioners over the land cannot be doubted and,
therefore, the writ petitions are maintainable. When the petitioners or their predecessors are in
possession of the land for several decades the Revenue authorities cannot invoke the jurisdiction
under Section 166-B of the Telangana Revenue Act and declare title of the Government. The
petitioners or their predecessors are in possession since long time and when the Government
claims right and title, they cannot resort to passing an executive order setting up title in
themselves and/or resort to action for evicting the petitioners under the provisions of the A.P.
Land Encroachment Act, 1905. The petitioners have perfected their title by adverse possession
and, therefore, the Government cannot resort to evict them by following the provisions of the
Land Encroachment Act. The Government has to seek proper declaratory relief in a Civil Court.
He placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Govt. of A.P. v. T.Krishna Rao, , and
two decisions of this Court in Shivalingappa v. State of A.P., 1988 (1) ALT 716, and Special
Deputy Collector v. Konda Lakshman Bapuji, 1984 (1) APLJ219 (DB). He contends that the
impugned order is illegal and improper, for on the principle or res judicata the Government is not
entitled to declare their title. In support of this, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the
judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 22516 of 1999 dated 5-6-2000 wherein the orders of the Joint
Collector were challenged. The Government passed orders without issuing any notice and,
therefore, the same is unsustainable.
Sri E. Ayyapu Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P. No. 7418 of 2002,
submits that the Government misdirected itself in thinking that the petitioners are alienees of
Chandni Begum and that the impugned order is vitiated by non-compliance of the principles of
natural justice. He also submits that in the guise of the impugned order, the District Collector and
his subordinate officials are threatening to dispossess the petitioners from the land forcibly and
the same cannot be permitted.
Submission of the respondents
14. Sri T. Anantha Babu, learned Advocate-General for the State of Andhra Pradesh, submits that
when the petitioners and various other persons made a representation to the Government to
implement the supplementary Sethwars issued in 1954 and 1958, the Government has conducted
a detailed enquiry and considered voluminous records of more than fifty years. The Government
also considered all the documents submitted by the petitioners and rejected the claim for
implementation of supplementary Sethwars. The petitioners had ample opportunity and all of
them gave representation to the Government. The decision taken by the Government and
communicated by the impugned order is not an ex parte decision nor does it violate principles of
natural justice.
15. The learned Advocate-General further submits that in respect of the Government poramboke
land, a Sethwar or a supplementary Sethwar need not be implemented. In the context, the

Government observed that it is a Government land and the same does not in any manner bind the
petitioners. If the petitioners feel that they are bound or that they are divested of their alleged
right and title, they have to seek appropriate relief from the Civil Court and a writ petition for
declaration of title is not maintainable. Even this Court in W.P. No. 22516 of 1999 observed that
setting aside the order of the Joint Collector does not amount to declaring possession or divesting
possession on anybody and whoever seeks such declaration must approach the Civil Court. The
learned Advocate-General placed reliance on various decisions of the Supreme Court in Jai
Singh v. Union of India, , Parvatibai Subhanrao Nalawada v. Anwarali Hasanali Makani, , State
of Rajasthan v. Bhawani Singh, , Balkrishan v. Satyaprakash, (2001) 2 SCC 498, and Konda
Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, . Elaborate submissions were also made pointing
out the infirmities and illegalities committed by the Patwari and the Secretary of jagirdar in
making incorrect entries showing Raidurg as two villages though there was no such bifurcation.
He also pointed out that patta granted to Chandni Begum was already cancelled and she
challenged the same before this Court unsuccessfully in WP No. 165 of 1957.
Points for consideration
16. Background facts and rival submissions, give rise for these points for consideration(1) Whether the impugned order is illegal and unsustainable for want of issue of notice to the
petitioners by the Government?
(2) Whether the impugned order of the Government amounts to adjudication of title of the
Government as well as the petitioners?
(3) Whether the order of this Court in W.P. No. 22516 of 1999 dated 5-6-2000 operates as res
judicata including the Government to pass the impugned order? and (4) Whether the second
respondent namely, the District Collector, Hyderabad, can evict the petitioners, if they are in
possession as alleged, de hors the provisions of law?
In Re Point No. 1 Principles of natural justice
17. The A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 F. ('Telangana Revenue Act' for brevity)
deals with various aspects of land administration including land revenue. Section 24 of the Act
declares that all lands, rivers, streets, bunds and roads etc., together with appurtenant structures
thereof are the property of the Government except the land belonging to persons legally capable
of holding the property and to the extent the rights are established. The land in respect of which
any order is given under any law ceases to be Government land. It is within the power of the
District Collector to dispose of the Government land in his discretion without divesting the right
of title vested in any person or public. All lands whether applied to agriculture or any other
purpose and wherever situated shall be liable to payment of land revenue to the Government in
accordance with the provisions contained in Chapters IV, VII and IX of the Telangana Revenue
Act (See Section 48).
18. If any person desirous of taking unoccupied land has to submit a petition to the Tahsildar and
obtain permission. Under Section 57 of the Act, if any person unlawfully occupies any khalsa

(Government land) and uses the land without any title shall pay the Government the land revenue
for the entire period of unlawful occupation. It shall be lawful to the District Collector to
summarily evict any person having unlawful occupation and attach the crop raised on such land.
Similarly, if any building is constructed on the land unlawfully occupied, the Collector shall have
power to summarily demolish the building and evict the person after giving reasonable
opportunity of giving cause. Section 58 lays down that occupancy rights (under Section 54 read
with Section 57) are heritable and not transferable. That is to say, a person who has been given
permission by the Tahsildar to occupy the land and who is paying land revenue for such
occupation, cannot transfer his right without prior permission of the Collector under Section 58A of the Act, but such right is heritable.
19. Chapter VII of the Telangana Revenue Act contains provisions for settlement and assessment
area. The revenue survey is to be ordered by the Government for the purpose of settlement and
assessment (See Section 77). Under Section 78, the Survey Officer is required to give a general
notice to all landholders to appear before him with necessary documents. Under Section 86, the
Survey Officer shall prepare a separate register for each village showing the area and assessment
of each number showing the name of the pattadar in the register. The Settlement Officer is also
empowered under Section 87 to correct clerical errors or mistakes. After preparation of
settlement records, the same are made over to the District Collector, who, under Section 88, is
required to cause village records to be prepared. Section 89-A deals with division of survey
numbers into new survey numbers in the event of any portion of cultivable land is permitted to
be used for non-agricultural purposes. The settlement record prepared by the Survey and
Settlement Officer under Sections 86 and 87 and made over to the District Collector (under
Section 88) contains the details of cultivable or arable land belonging to a village. (The same is
colloquial termed as Sethwar). When once Sethwar is prepared showing the land in a village
which is cultivable, it is for the District Collector to cause the village records prepared in
accordance with the same. As noticed, if there are any mistakes or clerical errors, the Settlement
Officer can make necessary correction and issue supplementary record or Sethwar for the land
which is arable.
20. Raidurg which is a jagir village was surveyed in the year 1317-F (1907 A.D.) and settlement
of the village was made in 1321-F. (1911 A.D.) and the village maps were printed in 1323-F
(1913 A.D.) presumably in accordance with Sections 87 and 88 of the Telangana Revenue Act.
The file produced before the Court contains a report submitted by the District Collector. It shows
that as per original survey and settlement records, Sy. No. 66 admeasuring Acs. 279.22 gts. was
classified as Government poramboke land. That means that the land was not arable and there was
no question of the District Collector making village records showing the occupants of the land.
Be that as it is, law requires the Survey Officer to issue a general notice requiring attendance of
all landholders and all persons interested in such land in person or through an authorised agent
before preparing settlement record. It is nobody's case that at the time of survey and preparation
of settlement records in 1911 A.D. such procedure was not followed. At the time of
implementation of Sethwar or preparation of settlement record by the District Collector who is
required to cause village records prepared, the law does not require any notice. Even where
survey numbers are sub-divided, no notice is contemplated under law.

21. The case of the petitioners is that in 1954, supplementary Sethwar was prepared for Sy. Nos.
17, 19 and 66/2 in favour of Chandni Begum and in 1958, another supplementary Sethwar was
prepared in respect of Acs. 122.22 gts. of land of Raidurg Village in Sy. Nos. 66/1, 66/3 to 66/13
in favour of Chandni Begum. These supplementary Sethwars were not implemented. It is also
their case that the Patwari entered the name of his mother Sonabai. According to the petitioners,
Chandni Begum was granted patta to an extent of Acs. 15.30 gts.in Raidurg Noukhalsa Village
and Acs. 15.00 of Raidurg Panmaqtha Village. The case of the Government, on the other hand, is
that after the death of Dilwarbee, jagirdar of Raidurg, Chandni Begum's efforts to get succession
failed and her patta itself was cancelled by the Revenue Minister, that the Patwari was not
competent to bifurcate Raidurg Village and show his mother Sonabai as pattadar in two villages.
22. The petitioners have been contending that supplementary Sethwars were not implemented
though they were validly prepared in favour of Chandni Begum and Sonabai. When this Court
decided W.P. No. 22516 of 1999, it was brought to the notice of this Court that they made a
representation to the Government to implement supplementary Sethwars, in vain. Therefore, this
Court observed that the Government may take appropriate decision on the application filed by
the petitioners for implementation of supplementary Sethwars. When a person approaches for
implementation of Sethwar or supplementary Sethwar, no notice is required if the competent
authority decides to implement it or not to implement it. The Government decided not to
implement supplementary Sethwars for the reason that they were incorrect and brought into
existence contrary to the settlement records prepared during 1907 to 1913 A.D. Further, as
rightly contended by the learned Advocate-General, the decision of the Government not to
implement supplementary Sethwars is altogether different from the right claimed by the
petitioners that they are absolute owners of the land. In the record produced before this Court, the
Government considered all the representations and all the documents produced by various
persons seeking implementation of supplementary Sethwars. Therefore, the submission that due
to non-issuance of notice, the impugned order is vitiated cannot be accepted.
In Re Point No. 2 Declaration of title?
23. During the reign of Nizam, Paigah nobles who were closely related to the Nizam were
granted jagirs liberally. Abdul Khair Khan, a Paigah noble was granted jagir. After his death, his
son Abdul Fateh Khan and his grandson Fakhruddin Khan were granted jagirs at different stages
through various sanads, parwanas. After the death of Nawab Fakhruddin Khan, the entire jagir
and estate was partitioned and three separate units came into existence. These were Asman Jahi
Paigah, Khurshid Jahi Paigah and Vicarel Umara Paigah. Nawab Moinuddowlah Bahadur got
Asman Jahi in the partition. After his death, by a parwana No. FM. D. 2nd/Ramzan, 1360 Hizri,
Nawab Zahir Yar Jung was appointed as Amir Paigah Asman Jahi. In the year 1948 jagirs were
abolished by Jagir Abolition Act, 1358 F. (1948 A.D.).
24. After abolition of the jagirs, all the waste, unarable and community (porambokes) vested in
the Government. The Jagir Abolition Act provided for payment of compensation to the jagirdars
as determined by the Court of Nizam-e-Atiyat, which was constituted under an enactment. Along
with other Paigah nobles, Nawab Zahir Yar Jung, who was jagirdar of Asman Jahi Paigah
submitted a claim petition on 11-9-1959 claiming compensation for 377 villages.

25. Nizam-e-Atiyat, Hyderabad took up the inam enquiry and its Assistant Nizam Atiyat issued a
notification inviting objections to the claim made by Nawab Zahir Yar Jung. The said notification
was published in the A.P. Gazette No.29, dated 28-7-1960. In Appendix A of the relevant
notification produced before this Court, at page Nos. 1134 to 1137, Raidurg Village is mentioned
at Sl. No. 312. In Case No.1/56/1959, after conducting enquiry, the Court of Nizam-e-Atiyat
pronounced orders on 28-10-1968 in relation to the villages which were in possession of Paigah
Asman Jahi, and in relation to other grantees, showing different villages in different categories.
Insofar as the villages which were not found to be in possession of Paigah, at the time of
abolition of jagir, the Court of Nizam-e-Atiyat ordered that these villages be escheated to the
Government. These villages are included in Appendix B of the order. Raidurg Jagir Village is
mentioned at Sl. No. 89. Apart from this, land admeasuring Acs. 279.22 gts. in Sy. No. 66 of
Raidurg Jagir village was shown as Government poramboke in survey and settlement records.
The land is described as rocky in nature not fit for cultivation. The Government claims to be
absolutely in possession of the property. The Jagir village of Raidurg was surveyed in 1317 F.
(1907 A.D.) and settlement of the village was made in the year 1321 F. (1911 A.D.). As per the
records, Sy. Nos. l to 109 formed Raidurg Jagir admeasuring Acs. 1163.11 gts. Sy. Nos. l to 49
admeasuring Acs. 212.11 gts. were included in Raidurg Paigah and Sy.Nos.l to 16 admeasuring
Acs.22.14 gts, were in Raidurg Khalsa. The land in Sy. No. 66 was classified as Poramboke
Sarkari.
26. In respect of Raidurg Jagir, Smt. Dilwarbee was the Jagirdar (probably sub-grantee). Even
while the Jagirdar was alive, the Secretary issued orders for grant of patta in the name of his wife
Smt. Chandni Begum and directed the Patwari of Raidurg Jagir to deliver possession and make
entries accordingly in the Jamabandi record for the year 1345 F. (1935 A.D.), Smt. Dilwarbee
died issueless in 1938. Smt. Chandni Begum, alleging that she is adopted daughter, applied to the
Deputy Commissioner (Inam Subha Bidar Sharief) for grant of succession of the mash (inam or
grant) held by late Dilwarbee. The application for succession was rejected by the Deputy
Commissioner on the ground that no proper evidence was produced with regard to her
relationship to the Jagirdar. The entire mash or Jagir of Dilwarbee and her husband Noorul Aziz
was declared as Khalsa on 8-6-1942. Chandni Begum filed an appeal before the Court of Nizame-Atiyat. Pending the appeal, the inam held by her was taken over under the Government
supervision in 1350 F. Aggrieved by this, she filed another appeal before Nizam-e-Atiyat. By its
judgment No. 65/87 made in 1354 F., Nizam-e-Atiyat rejected both the appeals of Chandni
Begum. She again filed another appeal before the Government, which referred the matter to
Nizam-e-Atiyat for detailed enquiry. After enquiry, the Nizam-e-Atiyat circulated a file to Nizam
recommending approval of the succession. Nizam, however, did not take any final decision.
27. When the appeals of Chandni Begum to get a succession certificate to the mash were pending
before various authorities, it appears that Patwari without any authority allegedly created two
new village records namely Raidurg Panmaqtha and Raidurg Nou-Khalsa in the place of Raidurg
Jagir. As noticed, there were 109 survey numbers in Raidurg Jagir. The land in dispute in Sy. No.
66 along with others was included in Raidurg Panmaqtha as well as Raidurg Noukhalsa. As per
the Sethwar and settlement records of Raidurg Jagir, Sy. No. 66 admeasuring Acs. 279.22 gts. is
recorded as Government poramboke. In spite of this, Patwari split Sy. No. 66 into two parts: an
extent of Acs. 129.30 gts. was entered in the records of Raidurg Noukhalsa and the balance Acs.
149.32 gts. was included in Raidurg Panmaqtha. The land admeasuring Acs. 149.32 gts. was

again subdivided in the names of those two persons without any orders of the competent
authority. Acs. 100.00 (Sy. No. 66/1) was recorded in the name of Chandni Begum and Acs.29.30
gts. was recorded in the name of G. Sonabai, who is none other than Patwari's mother. Chandni
Begum was also brought on record as pattadar in respect of Sy. No. 66 of Raidurg Noukhalsa
Village without any valid order.
28. Some of the villagers of Raidurg made a representation to the District Collector (Awal
Taluqdar) for cancellation of patta in favour of Chandni Begum, By an order dated 2-2-1358 F.
Awal Taluqdar rejected the application and directed the subordinate officials to implement the
patta granted by the Secretary of jagirdar. An appeal was preferred to the Board of Revenue by
the villagers, which by an order dated 29-6-1950 upheld the orders of the Awal Taluqdar and
patta in favour of Chandni Begum. The villagers carried the matter by way of appeal to the
Deputy Chief Minister (Revenue Minister), who by an order dated 31-7-1956 passed orders of
cancellation of patta to Chandni Begum and all entries in the Revenue records. Chandni Begum
filed a writ petition before this Court challenging the orders of the Revenue Minister. The result
of W.P. No. l66 of 1956 filed by Chandni Begum is not known, for the record of the said case is
not traceable in the Registry of this Court. The fact remains that the patta as granted by the
Secretary to the Jagirdar in favour of Chandni Begum was cancelled even by July, 1956.
29. As per the orders of the Revenue Minister dated 31-7-1956 in Case No. 126, the entries in the
Revenue records showing Chandni Begum as pattadar ought to have been deleted, but they were
not deleted. Therefore, the District Collector, Hyderabad, by order dated 11-12-1958, suspended
the Patwari of Raidurg Village. In the meanwhile, ignoring the orders of the Revenue Minister, a
supplementary Sethwar was got prepared in the year 1954 for Sy. Nos. 17, 19 and 66/2 in favour
of Chandni Begum. The same was, however, not implemented. Again in the year 1958, another
supplementary Sethwar was got prepared in favour of Chandni Begum by the Land Records
Branch in respect of Acs. 122.22 gts. in Sy.Nos. 66/1, 66/3 to 66/13 of Raidurg Village and the
same was not implemented.
30. Chandni Begum died in 1981 leaving behind four sons, namely, Habeeb Sadiq, Habeed Alvi,
Habeeb Mohammed. Habeeb Ahmed who died sometime before 1997. Be that as it is, the GPA
holders of these persons submitted a petition to the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District on
15-11-1993 and another petition to the Revenue Minister on 29-11-1993 requesting
implementation of supplementary Sethwar in respect of the land in Sy. Nos. 66/1, 66/3 to 66/13
of Raidurg Panmaqta Village.
31. The matter was referred to the Mandal Revenue Officer, Serilingampally and the Revenue
Divisional Officer, Chevella. They reported that the land in Sy. No. 66/1 admeasuring Acs.
109.32 gts. is shown as Government land in the Revenue records, that certain extents of land was
already alienated in favour of Cement Research Institute, Weaker Section Housing Colony and
Indian Council of Social Welfare leaving a balance of Acs.74.32 gts. and that the entire land in
Sy. No. 66 of Raidurg Village is a vast extent of Government land. They also reported that
supplementary Sethwar issued by the then Assistant Director in the year 1958 in respect of the
land in Sy. No. 66/1 and 66/3 to 66/13 admeasuring Acs, 122.02 gts. in favour of Chandni
Begum was not implemented due to rival claims. A few other persons also filed similar
applications for implementation of Sethwars alleging that they are protected tenants on the land.

Number of other representations were made to other officials including the Hon'ble Chief
Minister and it is not necessary to refer to the same.
32. After obtaining report from the M.R.O., the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, issued
notices on 20-8-1998 purporting to be under Section 166-B of the Telangana Revenue Act read
with Section 9 of the A.P. Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 ('the ROR
Act' for brevity). In the notices it was mentioned that the then Patwari made wrong entries in the
relevant Revenue records showing the land as patta land which is a Government land.
Challenging the same, Bandaru Narayana Swamy and others (petitioners in W.P. No. 5188 of
2002) and G. Hanumantha Rao (father of petitioner in W.P. No. 8452 of 2002) and Shamlet
Narasimha and four others filed writ petitions before this Court. This Court by orders passed on
various dates directed the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, to consider the objection
petition filed by all of them pursuant to the show-cause notice dated 20-8-1998 and pass
appropriate orders.
33. The Joint Collector declared that the land in Sy. No. 66 admeasuring Acs. 149.32 gts. situated
at Raidurg Panmaqta Village and Sy. No. 66 admeasuring Acs. 129.30 gts. situated at Raidurg
Noukhalsa Village are poramboke sarkari lands as per the survey and settlement records and that
nobody has any right and title to the same. Aggrieved by the orders of the Joint Collector, the
legal representatives of Chandini Begum filed W.P. No. 22516 of 1999. Similarly, other persons
before the Joint Collector filed separate writ petitions being W.P. Nos. 17411, 17425, 17427,
17428 and 17430 of 1999 seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of the Joint Collector
dated 21-6-1999 purported to have been passed under Section 166-B of the Telangana Revenue
Act and Section 9 of the ROR Act.
34. Hon'ble Sri Justice B. Sudershan Reddy considered W.P. No. 22516 of 1999 and by an
elaborate order dated 5-6-2000 allowed the writ petition holding that the order of the Joint
Collector suffers from incurable legal infirmity and jurisdictional error. The other writ petitions
filed by others including the petitioners in W.P. No. 5177 of 2002 were allowed by another
learned Judge, Hon'ble Sri Justice G. Bikshapathy following the judgment in W.P. No. 22516 of
1999. It is necessary to refer to the judgment of Hon'ble Sri Justice B. Sudershan Reddy in some
detail at appropriate stage. Suffice to mention here that the learned Judge having noticed that the
question relating to implementation of supplementary Sethwar issued in the year 1954 is under
consideration by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, observed that it is for the Government to
take appropriate decision in the matter. The Government filed writ appeals against the orders of
the learned Single Judge. All the writ appeals being W.A. Nos. 1588, 1760, 1761 of 2000 and 18,
68 and 91 of 2001 were disposed of as unnecessary by an order dated 8-3-2002.
35. After the decision of the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 22516 of 1999, the Government
considered the representations of various claimants including the legal representatives of
Chandni Begum for implementation of supplementary Sethwars and passed orders on 13-112001.
36. In the impugned order, the Government concluded that (i) as per the settlement record of
Raidurg Village for the year 1323 F. (1913 A.D.), the land in Sy. No.66 admeasuring Acs. 279.22
gts. is poramboke sarkari (Government land); (ii) after abolition of the jagir, the Government

issued G.O. Ms. No. 1106, Revenue Department, dated 6-6-1959 to conduct enquiry into the
properties held by Khursheed Jahi Paigah and Asam Jahi Paigah under Atiyat Enquiry Act; (iii)
the Nizam-e-Atiyat conducted enquiry and by its order dated 28-10-1968 declared Raidurg
Village as one of several villages escheated to the Government; (iv) after 1968, Chandni Begum
could not claim any rights in any of the villages forming part of Raidurg and the Government
never gave any patta assigning any numbers. As per Circular No.22/1321 F. under the authority
of Nizam, no Government land could have been assigned without any survey numbers; (v) the
sub-division numbers for Sy. No. 66 were assigned without valid assignment and without prior
permission of the Government and all the entries made by the Patwari in the Revenue records are
not genuine. It is not competent for the Patwari or the Jagirdar to create Revenue Villages and
prepare settlement records which can only be done under the orders of the Government There is
no bifurcation of Raidurg Village into two villages by the Government; (vi) the Patwari without
any valid orders from the competent authority recorded the name of Chandni Begum in respect
of an extent of Acs. 45.00 in Raidurg Noukhalsa Village and the name of the Patwari's mother, G.
Sonabai for an extent of Acs. 29.30 gts, in Raidurg Noukhalsa and Acs. 15.00 in Raidurg
Panmaqtha Village; (vii) after the death of Jagirdar, Dilwarbee, Chandni Begum sought
succession and the same was dismissed by the concerned Deputy Commissioner. The same was
ultimately referred to Nizam-e-Atiyat who submitted to the Nizam recommending for grant of
succession, but no final decision was taken by the Nizam till the merger of jagirs into Diwani in
1358 F.; (viii) on a representation made to the Revenue Minister, the patta granted to Chandni
Begum was cancelled and she challenged the same in W.P. No. 166 of 1957 and no orders are
produced before the Government as to the result of the said writ petition; (ix) Chandni Begum
filed a suit for declaration of title and possession and ultimately filed Second Appeal No. 469/4
of 1354 F. unsuccessfully; (x) though Chandni Begum died in 1981, her legal representatives did
not file any appeal, but only sought implementation of supplementary Sethwars; (xi) the land in
Sy.No. 66 is a Government land and there is no necessity for implementation of supplementary
Sethwars which are incorrect and unwarranted.
37. The learned Advocate-General for the State contends that the decision of the Government
does not amount to adjudicating title. He submits that the land in question is a Government
poramboke land and for that reason the Government decided not to implement supplementary
Sethwars, When the land is Government land and there are encroachers or occupants claiming
the same land, the Government has an option to evict the encroachers and unauthorised
occupants. By merely deciding not to implement supplementary Sethwars, the Government, in
any manner, has not determined the alleged title of the petitioners. If the petitioners are aggrieved
by the finding that it is a Government land and still they claim title by reason of adverse
possession, protected tenancy etc., the petitioners' remedy is before a Civil Court to file a suit for
a declaration. In support of this plea, he relies on the observations made by this Court in the
judgment in W.P. No. 22516 of 1999.
38. It is axiomatic that while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution, this Court would not decide disputed questions of title (See State of Rajasthan v.
Bhawani Singh (supra), Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria, , and Parvatibai Subhanrao
Nalawada v. Anwarali Hasanali Makani (supra). Whether or not a person has title to the land?
Whether or not the Jagirdar validly granted patta in favour of Chandni Begum? and whether or
not the persons have been in possession of the land, are disputed questions of fact. When the

Government contends that the land in question is rocky terrain and not fit for cultivation and has
been continuously in possession of the land, is it permissible for this Court to go into the
question of title?
Though the learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that the petitioners are not seeking
declaration of title, in my considered opinion, while praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the
impugned order, they are, in effect, seeking for declaration of title. The effect of quashing the
orders would be setting at naught the observation of the Government that the land in question is
Government poramboke land as per survey and settlement records.
39. In Parvatibai v. Anwarali Hasanali (supra), the Supreme Court observed as under:
................. Before closing this judgment we would, like to emphasise that in cases relating to
immovable properties which are governed by the ordinary civil law the High Court should not
exercise its special jurisdiction under the Constitution unless the circumstances are exceptional.
This aspect has been discussed by this Court earlier on several occasions.
40. In State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani Singh (supra), the Supreme Court again observed thus:
Having heard the Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the writ petition was
misconceived insofar as it asked for, in effect, a declaration of writ petitioner's title to the said
plot. It is evident from the facts stated hereinabove that the title of the writ petitioner is very
much in dispute. Disputed question relating to title cannot be satisfactorily gone into or
adjudicated in a writ petition.
41. The question of adverse possession cannot be gone into in these proceedings. A person who
sets up adverse possession is required to prove the factum that his possession has been open and
hostile and adverse to the title of the real owner and seek a declaration from a Civil Court. In a
writ petition, such declaration cannot be given. To prove acts of possession and show that prima
facie petitioners have title, reliance is placed on the letter dated 30-11-1985 addressed by the
R.D.O., Chevella to the Assistant Director, Survey and Land Records, Ranga Reddy District. In
the said letter the R.D.O. requested the Assistant Director to take up sub-division work of Sy. No.
66 of Raidurg Panmaqtha Village and also Raidurg Noukhalsa Village to avoid confusion. It
reveals that the R.D.O. refers to a report of the Tahsildar in which it is stated that in 1954, Sy.
No. 66 of Raidurg Noukhalsa village was divided into two bits; one bit of Acs. 100,00 was
shown to be in occupation of Chandni Begum and another extent of Acs. 29.30 gts. was shown to
be in the name of Sonabai, that in 1954, the land in Sy. No. 66/1 was further divided and
sanctioned by the Nizami Jamabandi and pote numbers were carried out in the village records.
As per the report of the Tahsildar though pattas were given in Sy. No. 66/1, on the spot, there is
no clear identification of the land as no coding was done in the village map. The land is
identified only with the name of the field by the villagers. Reliance is placed on this
communication by Sri Narsing Rao, learned Counsel to show that in the Revenue records, the
names of Chandni Begum as well as Sonabai were shown as landholders. I am afraid, I cannot
agree with the same. As per the Telangana Revenue Act, the survey and settlement record is to be
prepared in the first instance, based on which village records are prepared leading to preparation
of Sethwar showing actual cultivable/arable land which is recorded in favour of an occupant.

Even according to the letter of the R.D.O., dated 30-11-1985, Sethwar for Sy. Nos. 66/1, 66/2
and 66/3 was never implemented and it was not possible to identify the land on the spot.
42. Learned Counsel also placed reliance on a communication from the Principal Secretary to the
Government in Municipal Administration Department to the Vice-Chairman, HUDA, dated 6-21999.
This letter refers to a letter of the HUDA dated 6-11-1996 wherein it was stated that the land
admeasuring Acs. 29.00 in Sy.No. 66/ 3 is abutting 60 ft. wide B.T. road connecting Old Bombay
Road and Khajaguda Village road, that the site is developed with WBM roads and provided with
street lighting and that twenty houses have already come up. Having regard to this, the
Government authorised HUDA to take action to regularise the layout pending change of land use
subject to certain conditions. It is not denied before me that even as on today, HUDA has not
regularised the layout and a writ petition was already filed before this Court challenging such
action. These two documents would show that a layout was prepared for Sy. No. 66/3. This does
not, in any manner, belie the contention of the Government that the land in Sy. No. 66 is
Government poramboke land and that Raidurg jagir village was never bifurcated.
43. In my considered opinion, these two letters do not confer any title on the petitioners or others
who purchased property from them. This Court has referred to the above letters to show that the
petitioners' title prima facie is not established except to some extent showing that some houses
have come up in the land. The petitioners have not placed any material before this Court in
support of various allegations made in the affidavits accompanying the writ petitions. I may,
however, hasten to add that considering the material relied on by the learned Counsel, this Court
cannot adjudicate any title and these prima facie observations are made with regard to yet
another submission made by the learned Counsel that long standing occupation of the petitioners
would disable the Government to resort to summary proceedings for eviction.
44. In Govt. of A.P. v. T. Krishna Rao (supra), it was laid down that where there is genuine
dispute of title, the Government cannot resort to summary eviction under the A.P. Land
Encroachment Act, 1905. The question of title in such cases must be decided in a properly
constituted suit. It was held:
The conspectus of facts in the instant case justifies the view that the question as to the title to the
three plots cannot appropriately be decided in a summary enquiry contemplated by Sections 6
and 7 of the Act. The long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in-title of these
plots raises a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title,
remembering especially that the property, admittedly, belonged originally to family of Nawab
Habibuddin from whom the respondents claim to have purchased it. The question as to whether
the title to the property came to be vested in the Government as a result of acquisition and the
further question whether the Nawab encroached upon that property thereafter and perfected his
title by adverse possession must be decided in a properly constituted suit.
45. In Special Deputy Collector v. K.L. Bapuji (supra), a Division Bench of this Court observed:

........... The occupation of the property by the writ petitioners being open and for an appreciable
length of time as observed by the Supreme Court can be taken prima facie to have a bona fide
claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure
of law. Since there is a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the writ petitioners
it must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary Courts of Law. The Government cannot decide such
questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict them summarily on the basis of such
decision..............
46. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Shivalingappa v. State of A.P. (supra), considered the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Govt. of A.P. v. T. Krishna Rao (supra) and another decision
of this Court in Special Deputy Collector v. K.L. Bapuji (supra) and observed that these two
decisions do not lay down any general law that whenever the persons sought to be evicted from
the land claim their possession to be not unauthorised, the Government should be compelled to
go to a Civil Court. It was also observed that when there is evidence that Government is in
possession of the land, the Court must not conclude that the petitioner raised a bonafide claim
about the possession.
47. I have referred to the above three decisions only because Sri Narsing Rao contends that by
reason of the impugned order the authorities are visiting the land and threatening to dispossess
summarily and that having regard to the ratio of the Supreme Court in Govt. of A.P. v. T. Krishna
Rao (supra), the Government has to contest the title in a Civil Court and they cannot resort to
summary eviction. As rightly contended by the learned Advocate General, the State has an option
to avail any of the remedies available under law including the Land Encroachment Act. When the
land was surveyed as Government poramboke land and Revenue records show as such, the
petitioners cannot allege long standing occupation when pattas given to Chandni Begum and
Sonabai are not genuine and incorrect. Merely placing reliance on some communications among
various officials, it cannot be said that there is a bonafide and genuine dispute of title. In a given
case even if there is evidence of showing the possession of a person, it cannot be said that there
is bonafide dispute. Long standing possession is one of the factors and the same cannot be the
only factor to compel the Government to go and avail remedy of civil suit. It must be
remembered that by a catena of decisions it is well settled that only entries in the Revenue
records do not confer any title. Nonetheless, if revenue survey is conducted as required under
law and in accordance with the provisions, Sethwar can itself be evidence of title. I may refer to
a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Vasavi Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd., (DB). The Division Bench, after referring to various precedents, summarised in
paragraphs 56 and 96 as under:
It is thus clear that the pattadar means a person, who possess a title to the land. Whether he is in
possession of the land or not is responsible for the Government for payment of land revenue.
Pattadar is one whose title to the land has been recognised. The statute recognises the pattadar as
a person possessing a title to the land......... A careful analysis of the decisions referred to
hereinabove of this Court as well as of the Apex Court would make it clear that the entries made
in the record of rights carry with them a very great evidentiary value, provided the record of
rights is prepared and maintained under the provisions of the relevant statutes or the regulations,
as the case may be, and further provided that the entries therein are made after holding public
enquiries. Sometimes, they constitute the only evidence available in order to establish one's title

to the lands. The entries made in Columns 1 to 19 of the pahani patrikas shall be deemed to be
the record of rights prepared and maintained by a public servant in discharge of his official
duties.
48. In none of the cases before me the petitioners have produced any Revenue records nor it is
their case that after the alleged bifurcation of Raidurg jagir village into Raidurg Noukhalsa and
Raidurg Panmaqtha, the competent authority entered the petitioners' names in the relevant
columns of pahanis and that they or their predecessors paid land revenue to the Government. In
this background, whether the Government should be compelled to file a civil suit or take such
necessary action as is required and permissible, cannot be a subject-matter of mandamus. When
the Government had choice and options under law, it is for the Government to choose one such
option for protecting their land in public interest having regard to constraints of time, litigation
expenditure and the nature of evidence the Government have with them. Point No.2 is answered
accordingly.
In Re Point No. 3 Question of Res judicata
49. The learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that the judgment of this Court in WP No.
22516 of 1999, dated 5-6-2000 operates as res judicata and, therefore, the finding recorded by
the Government that the land in question is a Government poramboke land is unsustainable. This
submission is devoid of merit. Firstly, this Court, in W.P. No. 22516 of 1999, did not declare the
title of the petitioners herein, much less anybody. Secondly, this Court made it very clear that the
effect of allowing the said writ petition is not declaring the title of anybody. I will deal with these
two aspects in some detail.
50. The doctrine of res judicata is based on nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa,
interest repitblicae ut sit finis litium and res judicata pro veritate occipitur. These doctrines are
based on public policy that no man should be vexed twice for the same cause (first maxim); that
it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to the litigation (second maxim); and
the judicial decision must be accepted as correct (third maxim). The doctrine applies to all
judicial proceedings whether civil or criminal. In the field of public law, it is well settled that the
doctrine applies to the proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution.
51. In Satyadhyan v. Smt.Deorajin Debi, , the Supreme Court held that the general principle of
res judicata applies even to writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. In Dayarao v.
State of U.P., , the Supreme Court considered the question of applicability to writ proceedings
and held thus:
............. Now, the rule of res judicata as indicated in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure
has no doubt, some technical aspects, for instance the rule of constructive res judicata may be
said to be technical; but the basis on which the said rule rests is founded on considerations of
public policy. It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding
decisions pronounced by Courts' of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest
that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. If these two
principles form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata they cannot be treated as

irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with fundamental rights in petitions filed under Article
32.
The Supreme Court further observed:
..................There can be little doubt that the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain applications
under Article 32 which are original cannot be confused or mistaken or used for the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court which alone can be invoked for correcting errors in the decisions of
High Courts pronounced in writ petitions under Article 226. Thus, on general considerations of
public policy there seems to be no reason why the rule of res judicata should be treated as
inadmissible or irrelevant in dealing with petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. It is
true that the general rule can be invoked only in cases where a dispute between the parties has
been referred to a Court of competent jurisdiction, there has been a contest between the parties
before the Court, a fair opportunity has been given to both of them to prove their case, and at the
end the Court has pronounced its judgment or decision. Such a decision pronounced by a Court
of competent jurisdiction is binding between the parties unless it is modified or reversed by
adopting a procedu re prescribed by the Constitution. In our opinion, therefore, the plea that the
general rule of res judicata should not be allowed to be invoked cannot be sustained.
52. In Amalgamated Coalfields v. Janapada Sabha, , the Supreme Court laid down that in the writ
petition filed by a person before the High Court is considered and dismissed, the decision thus
pronounced would continue to bind the parties unless the decision is modified or reversed in
appeal. Relevant observations are as follows:
..............Therefore, there can be no doubt that the general principle of res judicata applies to writ
petitions filed under Article 32 or Article 226. It is necessary to emphasise that the application of
the doctrine of res judicata to the petitions filed under Article 32 does not in any way impair or
affect the content of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of India. It only seeks to
regulate the manner in which the said rights could be successfully asserted and vindicated in
Courts of law.
53. As noticed, the sons and/or other legal heirs had filed W.P. No. 22516 of 1999 questioning the
orders of the Joint Collector dated 21-6-1999 cancelling the patta given to Chandni Begum. The
petitioners in all the writ petitions also filed various writ petitions challenging the same order of
the Joint Collector. His Lordship Sri Justice B. Sudershan Reddy considered W.P. No. 22516 of
1999 elaborately and delivered the judgment on 5-6-2000. When other matters were listed for
hearing before His Lordship Sri Justice G. Bikshapathy, following the judgment in W.P. No.
22516 of 1999, those writ petitions were also allowed. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the
question whether the judgment in W.P. No. 22516 of 1999 precludes the Government from
passing the impugned order?
54. By order dated 21-6-1999, the Joint Collector, purporting to exercise powers under Section
166-B of the Telangana Revenue Act, set aside the patta granted to Chandni Begum holding that
the Jagirdar could not have granted patta to Chandni Begum. The Joint Collector recorded three
conclusions; (i) that the legal heirs of Chandni Begum failed to produce the conclusive evidence
regarding the manner in which Chandni Begum became landowner of Sy. No. 66 of Raidurg

Village and that the extracts of Sethwar and other related documents show that the land is
Government land; (ii) that the other respondents/ claimants are relying on Revenue entries which
were made in a fraudulent manner which require rectification; and (iii) that mere Revenue entries
made in the records do not confer any valid title and the claim for title has to be substantiated by
valid documents like patta certificate and other relevant documents.
55. The learned Judge considered the jurisdiction of the Joint Collector under Section 166-B of
the Telangana Revenue Act and held that the notice issued to all the persons interested suffers
from fundamental legal errors. After referring to State of Gujarat v. P. Raghav, , Kodanda Rao v.
Govt. of A.P., 1981 (2) ALT 280 (DB), Mirza Muzamdar Hussaih v. D. Bhaskara Reddy, 1987 (2)
ALT 383 (DB), I.T. Vyavasaya Coolie Sangam v. K.S. Reddy, 1996 (2) ALD 945 (DB) and
Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records v. G. Padmavathi, 1994 (4) ALD 61
(DB), the learned Judge concluded that the exercise of suo motu revisional powers by the Joint
Collector after a long lapse of time is not valid, that it is not permissible for the Joint Collector to
exercise the revisional powers in relation to an order passed by the Collector (Awal Taluqdar)
and that the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation are unsustainable insofar as Chandni
Begum is concerned.
56. The learned Judge also concluded that the Joint Collector could not have exercised power
under Section 9 of the ROR Act after a long lapse of time. A submission was made on behalf of
the petitioners (legal heirs of Chandni Begum) that the petitioners therein are entitled for
implementation of supplementary Sethwars at least to an extent of Acs. 47.02 gts. This was
rejected observing:
......... In my considered opinion, the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners
as well as the learned Government Pleader in this regard are totally misconceived. This Court, in
the instant case is not concerned with any question as to what is the extent of the land to which
the petitioners are entitled to retain as owners thereof. This Court cannot grant any such
declaration. This Court is merely consumed with legality of the order passed by the Joint
Collector, which is impugned in this writ petition. Nothing more.
57. The learned Judge, while observing that it is for the Government to take appropriate decision
on the question of implementation of supplementary Sethwar issued in 1954 so as to enable the
legal representatives of Chandni Begum to claim an extent of Acs. 47.02 gts. in Sy. No. 66/I,
made it clear that this Court is not deciding title or setting aside the title of anybody. The
following observations are apt:
This order setting aside the impugned order passed by the Joint Collector shall not confer any
additional right, title or interest upon any extent of land which may not be in possession of the
petitioners herein, nor this order can take away the existing right, title or interest of the
petitioners and others in whatever extent of the land that may be available on ground. This order
has nothing to do with (he extent of the land, which is already stated to be alienated by the
Government. It is for the petitioners to work out their remedies elsewhere,
58. This Court in W.P. No. 22516 of 1999 has not decided the title of private persons or title of
the Government. The Court considered only the legality of the orders passed by the Joint

Collector and set aside the same on the grounds noticed hereinabove. Indeed, liberty was given
to the Government to pass appropriate orders on the question of implementation of
supplementary Sethwars while observing that the Court order setting aside the order of the Joint
Collector shall not confer any additional title, title or interest upon any extent of land which may
not be in possession of the petitioners and that the order does not amount to taking away any
existing rights. Liberty was given to the petitioners also to work out their remedies elsewhere.
Therefore, the conclusion is irresistible that all those who were claiming title in relation to the
land in Sy. No. 66, which is recorded in the settlement record as Government land, have to seek
appropriate remedies before the Civil Court. Hence, on Point No. 3 it is held submission that the
impugned order is barred by res judicata is wholly misconceived.
59. The sovereign has absolute right over soil. A person who occupies the land and whose
occupation is regularised by grant of a necessary patta gets a right to cultivate the land subject to
payment of land revenue. Even after giving grant to the occupier, the sovereign is not divested of
the entire right to the property/land. The right of an assignee or an occupier can always be
brought to an end by the sovereign by exercising the power of eminent domain. Whenever the
land is not under the direct control or management of the sovereign, the sovereign has a right to
demand revenue in the shape of produce from the land. However, so far as waste lands, rivers,
streets, pathway and other common lands, the right vests in the sovereign. This right is even
recognised by enacting law.
60. As already pointed out, Section 24 of the Telangana Revenue Act lays down that all public
roads, lanes, paths, bridges, ditches, dikes, rivers, streams, tanks, ponds, canals, lakes and
flowing water and all lands are property of the Government excepting the land belonging to a
person to the extent his rights are established. A reference may also be made to Section 2 of the
A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905, which extends to the State of Andhra Pradesh. According to
the said provision, all lands, wherever situated and all public roads, streets, lanes and paths,
bridges, ditches, dikes and fences, bed of the sea and of harbours and creeks below high water
mark and of rivers, streams, nallas, lakes and tanks, flowing water etc., are property of the
Government. Section 3 of the Estates Abolition Act also declares that after abolition of the
estates, all lands, the sub-soil, water belong to the Government and the Government may dispose
of the property in accordance with law laid down therein. Unless and until the title to the
property is established by reason of a grant by the Government or assignment by the
Government, the law presumes all waste lands, forests etc., belong to the Government and
nobody has right to encroach upon the same. Indeed, encroaching upon Government land and
grabbing or attempting to encroach or attempting to grab is made an offence by the State
enactment under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (See Konda Lakshamana Bapuji v.
Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, ). It was laid down therein that even an attempt to grab the land is
attracted by the provisions of the Land Grabbing Act.
61. The law also recognises that a person who alleges to be in possession of the Government land
and who allegedly put the land to use either for agricultural purpose or non-agricultural purpose,
cannot be affected without considering his claim to the land, by reason of the long settled
principle in Indian law that the first occupant of the land gets a right to claim the land. Indeed,
under the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, the competent authority can evict persons whose
occupation is objectionable and if the occupation is unobjectionable as per the relevant

Government policy, the same can be regularised. Umpteen times, the Government came forward
for regularising the objectionable as well as unobjectionable occupations or encroachments after
collecting certain amount as consideration. These factors are being pointed out to show that
summary eviction by coercive steps is not authorised by law. I may, however, hasten to add that
what action is to be taken by the District Collector or the Government cannot be decided by this
Court. As rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate-General, the Government has option and it
is the best Judge to decide as to what necessary action is required for protecting the valuable
Government land.
62. The petitioners' claim that they have been in occupation since long by reason of pattas or by
reason of agreements of sale and therefore, it is not a Government land requiring implementation
of supplementary Sethwars, was rejected by the Government. The reason for rejecting the
representation for implementation of supplementary Sethwars is that the patta claimed is
incorrect and supplementary Sethwars are incorrect and not according to law. In such a case, it is
for the petitioners to prove their title to the land in view of the earlier settlement record showing
the land in question as Government land. It does not, however, mean that the Collector can evict
the petitioners without issuing any notice and without due process of law. It is for the District
Collector or other competent authority either to follow such method as is best suited in public
interest. In this connection, an additional counter-affidavit filed by the District Collector in WP
No. 7418 of 2002 may be referred to wherein it is stated that no effort is being made to dislodge
the petitioners from the land in question illegally and that the Government has no intention for
adopting any measures de hors the procedure laid down by law to secure possession of any lands
or houses which are in the actual possession of the petitioners. It is for the Government to take
appropriate decision in the matter in accordance with law. There is no presumption in law that
the Government would not adhere to law. The point is answered accordingly.
63. In the result, for the above reasons, I hold that the impugned order does not suffer from any
infirmity or illegality requiring interference in exercise of power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The observations made during the course of the judgment would
sufficiently safeguard the interests of those persons who are allegedly in possession of part of the
land.
64. The Writ Petitions, subject to the above observations, are dismissed. There shall be no order
as to costs.