CONTENTS

1.0

Introduction

2.0

Causes Of Flare Load

3.0

Design Guidelines

3.1 Radiation
3.2 Noise
3.3 Glc Of Toxic Combustion Products
4.0

Types Of Flares

4.1 Elevated Flares

4.2

Ground Flares

5.0

Flare System Components And Concepts

6.0

Design Of Flare Systems

6.1 Flare Load

6.2 Flare Header
6.3 Flare Stack
6.4 Knock Out Drum
6.5 Blow Down Pump
6.6 Water Seal Drum
6.7 Purge Gas Requirement
6.8 Smokeless Operation Of Flare

7.0

Inhouse Software Available For Design Of Flare System

8.0

Sample Calculations

9.0

Comparative Study Of Flare Systems Of Different Refineries

10.0

Flare Load Reduction Based On Interlocks

11.0

Flare Gas Recovery Systems

11.1

Introduction

11.2

System Description

11.3

Comp. Selection & Suction Control

11.4

Operating Feedback

11.5 Attachments
12.0

Umoes Concept Of Flare Gas Recovery

1.0

INTRODUCTION
Primary function of Flare is to convert flammable, toxic or corrosive vapours to less
objectionable components by combustion. Disposal of combustible gases, vapours and
liquids by burning is accomplished in flare. This serve as an emergency disposal system to
eliminate excess hydrocarbons coming to it due to:
a)
Release from safety valves because of an equipment failure or because of major
plant emergency such as a power failure, cooling water failure or a plant fire.
b)
Leakages from safety valves or control valves.
c)
Disposal of flammable liquid-vapour products or by products which can not be
marketed.
Process flares are used primarily in the oil and petrochemical industries from initial
production through transportation, storage, refining and processing. Flares are also used
for other process applications where hydrocarbon emissions must be controlled. A few
examples include: Sewage digestors, coal gasification and liquefaction, rocket engine
testing and heavy water plants.
The main objective of the flare has been to discharge flammable and waste gases at a safe
location and burn them in order to protect the environment from pollution and hazards.
Flaring, being a critical operation in many plants its design must be governed on strict
safety principles.
The various problems associated with flare are:
a)
Glare:
The flare generates a considerable amount of glare particularly during emergencies. This
causes inconvenience to the surrounding population and also gives the impression of
unnecessary waste of resources.
b)
Smoke:
Smoke from flares causes a considerable amount of environmental pollution. The smoke
does occur in most of the flare system due to incomplete combustion of gases.
c)
Noise:
High noise levels are created by flare system during plant upset conditions. This again
causes inconvenience to the surrounding population. Prolonged exposure to excessive
noise may cause mental irritation, fatigue and even deafness. Now sophisticated design of
flare tips have greatly reduced the noise pollution.
d)
Radiation:
During peak flare, the radiation level from the flame could be high. This affects the
surrounding vegetation and habitation.
e)
Ground level concentration (GLC)
High GLC of combustion products or unburnt hydrocarbons causes damage to human
health, deterioration of materials and structures or creation of an area where plant/animal
species cannot survive. With the growing consciousness of people in every country
regarding environmental protection, there is a lot of pressure to come up with better flare
systems to eliminate the problems mentioned above.
ATMOSPHERIC VENTING:
Another widely used disposal method is venting or direct discharge to atmosphere. There
is some difference of opinion on the question of what may and what may not be vented to
atmosphere. It is usually considered safe to vent hydrocarbon vapours or gases lighter
than air, except hydrocarbon vapours or gases lighter than air, except hydrogen. Some
designers recommend venting of vapours even as heavy as propane, provided it is vented
from an elevated vent stack at a high velocity. The vent stack height is selected so that the

concentration of vapour at grade is well below the lower flammable limit of the vapours.
The reliability for estimation of ground level concentrations is questionable and therefore
flaring is the only satisfactory method for safe disposal of hydrocarbons heavier than air.
2..0

o
o

CAUSES OF FLARE LOAD:

Pressure Vessels, Heat Exchanges, operating equipments and piping are designed to
contain the system pressure. The design is based on the normal operating pressure at
operating temperature, the effect of any combination of mechanical loadings that is likely
to occur, and the differential between the operating and set pressures of the pressure
relieving device. Overpressure results because of an unbalance or disruption in normal
flows of material and energy that causes accumulation or loss in certain part of the system.
The process system designer must define the relief required to prevent
the pressure in
any piece of equipment from exceeding the maximum allowable accumulated pressure.
The causes of over pressures are listed below:
Closed outlet on Vessels
The inadvertent closure of a block valve on the outlet of a Pressure Vessel while the plant
is on stream may expose the vessel to a pressure that exceeds the maximum permissible
working pressure. If closure of valve results in Overpressure, a Pressure Relief valve
system is required.
Inadvertent Valve Opening:
In advertent opening of any valve from high pressure system to low pressure system may
cause an Overpressure in connecting lines or receiving system. A pressure relief valve is
required to protect the system.
Check valve malfunction:
The failure of check valve to close the reverse flow must be considered where potential of
back flow of high pressure fluid exists.
Utility Failure:
Loss of any utility service, whether unitwide or local may cause overpressure. A potential
failure may also lead an equipment to overpressure. In most of the case the utility failure
governs the maximum failure load. Possible utility failure & equipment affected are listed
below:
Utility Failure
Electric
Cooling Water
Inst. Air
Steam
Fuel (Oil, Gas)
Inert Gas

Partial Failure:

Equipment Affected
Pumps for circulating cooling water, boiler feed water,
quench or reflux. Fans for air cooled exchanges, Cooling
towers or combustion air.
Condensers for Process or Utilities Service coolers for
Process fluids, lubricating oil or seal oil.
Transmitters and Controllers, Process regulating valves,
Alarm and shutdown system
Turbine drivers for Rotating Equipment, Reboilers,
Reciprocating
pumps, Ejectors
Boilers for Process steam, Reboilers, Gas Turbines,
Compressors
Seal, Catalytic reactors

o
o
o

o
o
o

3.0

be
3.1

Partial preotectice credit can be taken for normally operating parallel equipments or stand
by services that have two unrelated source of energy to the drivers. Standby services
cannot be considered totally reliable hence it does not suffice insurance against
overpressure.
Electrical or Mechanical Failure:
The failure of electrical or mechanical equipment that provides cooling or condensation in
process streams can cause overpressure in process vessels.
Reflux Failure:
Reflux failure causes condensers flooding or loss of coolant resulting in an overpressure.
Heat exchanger tube failure:
When tube side pressure of an exchanger is much lower than the shell side, rupture of tube
will overpressure the tube side. Thermal shock, vibration, corrosion may also cause tube
failure. This must be protected with a pressure relief valve.,
Chemical reaction:
Over pressure may occur because of unbalance reaction in a reactor. Sophisticate safety
valves are used in these cases.
Hydraulic Expansion:
Thermal relief valves are provided to overcome overpressure because of rise in
temperature.
Plant Fires:
Any process equipment in an operating plant that handles or processes fluid may get
exposed to fire. Continuous vapour generation will lead to over pressure in system.
Pressure relief valve is required to protect the vessels releasing the generated vapor.
Local Power Failure:
There might be local power failures in units/equipments which will cause disturbances to
local equipments. This may result in over pressure in system.
DESIGN GUIDELINES
The permissible limits on pollution, radiation and other effects on environment have
been laid down considering various aspects. Although there is no definite quantitative
limit on flare and smoke emission from flare, most authorities demand that these should
minimum.
For thermal radiation, noise and ground level concentrations following guidelines should
be followed:
Radiation:
Maximum permissible level is a function of the length of exposure, factors involving
reaction time and human mobility. Following limits of heat intensity radiations
should be observed:
Permissible Design Level (K) Conditions
KW/m2
Btu/Hr- ft2
1.58
500
Continuous exposure with appropriate clothing
4.73
1500
Emergency action lasting for several minutes for personnel
with proper clothing but without shielding.
6.31
2000
Emergency action lasting upto one minute without
shielding but appropriate clothing.
9.46
3000
Radiation level at any location where people have access.

For example at grade below the flare or a service platforms

nearby tower) exposure should be limited to a few seconds
sufficient for escape only.
15.77
5000
Radiation level on structure and in areas where operators
are not likely to be performing duties and where shelter
from radiating heat is available (for example behind
equipment).
Note: On towers or other elevated structures where rapid escape is not possible, ladders must be
provided on side away from flare when K is greater than 6.31 KW/m2.(Reference API RP - 521,
Fifth edition).
The heat radiation level for personnel are with account taken of reaction time and human
mobility time of between 8 and 15 seconds from the onset of heat radiation. In emergency
release, a reaction time 3 - 5 seconds may be assumed and 5 - 10 seconds would elapsed
before individual could seek cover or deport from the area, which would result exposure
time 8 - 15 seconds.
Exposure time necessary to reach the Pain threshold.
Radiation intensity
Time to pain threshold
BTU/hr-ft2
KW/m2
Seconds
550
1.74
60
740
2.33
40
920
2.90
30
1500
4.73
16
2200
6.94
9
3000
9.46
6
4700
11.67
4
6300
19.87
2
The radiation levels take into account the influence of clothing, but excludes the
contribution of wind chill factor, ability of personnel to face away from the radiation
source and lack of large open areas on offshore platforms.
The heat radiation figures are exclusive of an allowance for solar radiation. In our country
solar radiation would account for about 350 Btu/Hr ft2 heat and it is recommended that
for continuous exposure solar radiation should be taken into consideration. In that case
allowable heat radiation by combustion should be taken as 500 - 350 = 150 Btu/Hr - ft2.
For other conditions for calculations solar radiation should not be subtracted.
3.2

Noise:
The exposure 1 minutes for noise prescribed in some of the well accepted standards
are given below:
Daily exposureOSHA Noise Regulations
NIOSH Noise Regulations
Hrs
dBa
dBa
8
90
85
4
95
90
2
100
95
1
105
100
0.5
110
105
0.25
115
110

3.3

GLC of toxic combustion products:

Threshold limits of GLC for certain toxic substances (gases and vapors) are as follows:
Gas or Vapor
PPM
Gas or Vapor
PPM
Acetaldehyde
200
Acetic acid
10
Acetic anhydride
5
Acetone
1,000
Acrolein
0.5
Acrylonitire
20
Ammonia
100
Amyl acetate
200
Amyl alcohol
100
Aniline
5
Arsinic
0.005
Benzene
35
Benzyl chloride
1
Bromide
1
Butadiene
1000
Butyl alcohol
100
Butylamine
5
Carbon dioxide
5000
Carbon disulfide
20
Carbon monoxide
100
Carbon tetrachloride
25
Chlorine
1
Chlorobenzene
75
Chloroform
100
Cresol (all isomers)
5
Cyclohexane
400
Cyclohexanol
100
Cyclohexanone
100
Gas or Vapor
Cyclohexene
Diacetone alcohol
1,1 Dichloroethane
Diisobutyl ketone
Dimethylsulfate
Ethyl acetate
Ethylamine
Ethyl bromide
Ethyl ether
Ethylenedramine
Ethylene dichloride
Fluorine
Gasoline
Hydrogen selenide
Isodine
Isopropylamine
Methyl acetate
Methyl alcohol
200
2-Methyloxyethanol

PPM
400
50
100
50
1
400
25
200
400
10
100
0.1
500
0.05
0.1
5
200
25

Gas or Vapor
Cyclopropane
O-Dichlorobenzene
Diethylamine
Dimethylaniline
Diethylene dioxide
Ethyl alcohole (ethanol)
Ethylbenzene
Eltyl chloride
Ethylene chlorohydrin
Ethylene dibromide
Ethylene oxide
100
Formaldehyde
Hydrazine
Hydrogen sulfide
Isophorene
Mesityl oxide
Methyl acetylene
Methyl bromide
20
Methyl chloride

PPM
400
50
25
5
100
1000
200
1000
5
25

Methylyclohexane
Methylcyclohexanone
Methyl amyl alcohol

500
100
25

Methylcyclohexanol
Methyl formate
Methylene chloride

100
100
500

Naphtha (coal or tar)

pNitroaniline
Nitrobenzene
Nitrogen dioxide

200
1
1
5

Naphtha (petroleum)
Nickel carbonyl
Nitroethane
Nitromethane

500
0.001
100
100

5
1
20
25
50
1000
100

Nitrotoluene
Ozone
Gas or Vapor
Propyl ketone
Phenylhydrazine
Phosphine
Propyl acetate
Propyl ether
Pyridine
Stbine
Sulfur dioxide
Sulfur monochloride
1,1, 2,2-Tetrachloroethane
Toluene (toluol)
Trichloroethylene
4.0

4.1

5
0.1
PPM
200
5
0.05
200
500
10
0.1
10
1
5
200
200

Octane
Pentane
Gas or Vapor
Phenol
Phosgene (carbonyl chloride)
Phorphorous trichloride
Propyl alcohol
Propylene dichloride
Quinone
Styrene
Sulfur hexafluoride
Sulfur pentafluoride
Tetranitromethane
o-Toluidine

500
1000
PPM
5
1
0.5
400
75
0.1
200
1000
0.025
1
5

TYPE OF FLARES
The ideal flare is a device that burns hydrocarbons completely. The combustion should
be smokeless, least noisy and with minimum inconvenience to community in
terms
of radiation and luminosity aspects of flare.
Based on specific requirements various flaring concepts have emerged and are being
practised. Various types of flare are:
Elevated flares:
Conventional pipe flare:
Conventional flare consists of a pipe stack with a burner on top. Pilot burners remain lit
near the burner, which ensure burning of hydrocarbons from the flare stack during upset
conditions. Some of the common features of conventional pipe flares are problem like
smoke, flame lift off and high purge requirements.
This type of flare systems are simple, proven and suitable for varying loads. The noise
level is also very less due to low exit velocities.
Coanda Effect Flares:
Skin-adhesion effect, discovered by Henri Coanda, is used in this type of flares. This
effect introduces both air and turbulence in the flame area, which ensures complete
combustion. High pressure gas ejected from a narrow slot follows a profile of curved
surface. The Coanda profile aids in formation of a hollow cylinder of a gas and entrains
air upto twenty times the gas volume.
The main feature of this type of flare systems are shorter flame length, stable, flame,
smokeless combustion and gives lower heat emissivity. The other advantage is that these
can handle small quantities of liquid droplets. However, this requires high pressure gas,
having low turndown capabilities, gives higher noise level and requires higher
maintenance.
Jet Mix Flares:
These are available in various configurations. Multiple nozzles with several holes, wings
with slotted openings or double angle drilled nozzles produce swirling action to enhance
air entrainment. Instead of air going to the gas, the flared gas is spread out into ambient

air at high velocity, promoting rapid, turbulent mixing with air and thus
ensuring
smokeless combustion.
The advantages of this type of flares are, giving short, stable, smokeless flame and low
emissivity. These are provided with wind shielding and hence are less affected with wind
velocity and direction. However, the problems associated are of having complicated
configuration, having limited turndown capabilities, noisily combustion and higher
pressure drops.
Air-Assisted Flares:
These flares incorporating special mixing heads that increase gas to air interface. Air is
blown into the central duct allowing unrestricted passage for the low pressure relief gas
flowing up the annular duct. The air is blown with the help of a axial fan. The only utility
required are power for the fan and fuel gas for the pilot burner.
Air assisted flares can handle heavier gases, gives low radiation and glare and having
longer tip life. The disadvantages of this type of flare are, it requires utility source, having
high operating cost and complex controls are required for efficient operation.Inclusion of a
rotating equipment to supply combustion air reduces the system reliability.
Steam Assisted Flares:
These flares achieve their smokeless capabilities by mixing steam with the flare gases. The
steam is introduced at one or several points to induce secondary air and turbulence to
improve mixing. In addition to rendering the flame smokeless, steam reduces the flame
temperature, thus reducing thermal radiation.
Steam assisted flares also can handle heavier gases and have longer tip life. The steam
requirement would depend on flare gas molecular weight. The operating costs are higher
due to steam consumption.
Multi-burner flares:
The gas stream is split and burnt in multiple burners installed on common stack. This
reduces flame length and thickness while increasing the flame surface and helps air or
steam to penetrate the flame easily, ensuring efficient and improved flame characteristics.
4.2

Ground Flares:
In ground flares, combustion occurs at grade, typically inside refractory lined steel
enclosures of circular or rectangular section.
Flaring load is staged and each stage comprises of multiple jets. Due to high cost and
capacity limitations, these are often used in conjunction with elevated flares. There are
essentially designed to dispose off small continuous loads with smokeless, invisible and
less noisy combustion. Ground flare is basically installed for:
Concealing combustion of continuous load
Small load from cost considerations preferred.
The use of ground flare requires a clear distance of about 150 M from any processing unit
or storage facility. The flow rates which can be handled by a ground flare are generally
constructed of fire brick or of carbon steel lines with refractory material.

5.0

FLARE SYSTEM COMPONENTS AND CONCEPTS:

The essential elements of any flare system are:
o
Flare header
o
K.O. Drum
o
Water seal drum

o
Flare gas seal
o
Flare tip
o
Ignitor
The basic scheme with components is shown in sketch 5.1. The flare header collects
the material relieved by safety valves for safe discuarge to the flare.The maximum
allowable back pressure would be:
10% of the set pressure for conventional safety valves
50% of the set pressure for balance bellow type safety valves
70% of the set pressure for pilot operated safety valves
(Maximum allowable back pressure and set pressure are expressed as
gauge pressures).
The number of flare headers required is decided based on temperature, allowable pressure
drop, properties of hydrocarbon, moisture content etc.
If there is a possibility of liquid discharge into the flare system a K.O. Drum is provided
immediately adjacent to process unit. For process plant handling light hydrocarbons like
C1, C2, C3, C4 the liquid blow down is also sent to Flare I.S.B.L. knock out drum. A
suitable Vaporizer Armstong type or indirect methanol is used for vaporizing the liquid
hydrocarbon. In case, very low temperature gases from a particular unit is put to a
common flare header in offsites due to economic reasons, a flare gas superheater on the
low temperature header may be required to heat the gases. In addition to this a K.O.
Drum is needed near the flare stack to trap any liquid condensed en route to the flare.
This is provided to prevent hazards associated with burning liquid droplets escaping from
the flare stack. Considerable quantities of liquids can accumulate in flare systems because
of the dew point characteristics of the complex mixture of vapours discharged at high
temperatures. As the high temperatures vapours move through the system, there is drop
in temperature due to heat loss to system and surroundings. When these vapours cools to
their dew point,
liquid droplets are formed, K.O. Pot is designed for removal of
liquid and also adequate space is provided for removed liquid.
A water seal drum is provided at or near the base of the flare stack as a safeguard against
ingress of air in the flare system. Air upon entering the flare system mixes with the
combustible gases within the system and mixture may be with in the explosive range
resulting in some serious explosion. There are numerous sources of entry of air to the
flare system. When the flare system is fairly static and flow is either very small or non
existent and flares stack is filled with either low molecular weight gases or gases at high
temperature the draft would exist at the base of the stack. With this state of less than
atmospheric pressure with the flare system it is obvious that air will leak into the system if
there is opportunity for it to do so. The water seal prevents damage to the system
upstream of the water seal drum.
For protection of flare system downstream of the water seal, i.e. flare stack itself, entry of
air from the flare outlet is prevented by:
Continuous purge with oxygen free gas and
Use of gas seal.
To avoid a static condition of flow through the flare stack, continuous purge is maintained.
Purge gases may be any oxygen free gas which would not reach its dew point under any
condition of flare operation. Natural gas, inert gases and nitrogen are commonly used, but
steam is not at all satisfactory as a purge gas. Calculated volumes of purge gas should
enter the flare system to ensure sweeping of the system. There is divergent opinion as to
the volume of purge gas which may be required. The use of gas seals installed

immediately below the flare tip are capable to restrict entry of the air into the flare system.
Various types of seals are available as discussed below:
The fluidic seal consists of a series of fixed baffles shaped like open ended cones (Ref. Fig
- 5.2) within a flare tip. Each succeeding baffle encountered by waste or purge gas
traveling aperture than below it. The resultant effect is similar to that of venturi with little
drop in gas pressure. To force the air into the flare stack about 4 to 5 times the pressure
of purge gas is required and hence atmospheric air can not enter the stack through the
fluidic seal.
The molecular seal is shown in fig. 5.3. The purge gas is forced to make two 180 o bends
as it flows through the seal. The air thus encounters a trap caused by the difference in
molecular weight between air and the purge gas. If the purge gas is lighter than air, the
trap forms in the upper portion of the inverted cylinder. If the purge gas is heavier than
air, the trap is formed in the lower portion of the outer cylinder. The seal is effective even
when nitrogen is used as a purge gas.
The molecular seal is heavier and large as compared to the fluidic seal because of the
complexity of its internal passage. This necessitates a stronger and costlier support
structure to carry the additional weight and wind resistance. Molecular seal operates at
reduced efficiency if its baffles are partially filled with water or pieces of refractory from
the flare tip. A drain is used for water removal, but the refractory removal could require
costly maintenance. Fluidic seal due to its simplicity of construction, light weight and
lower initial cost, is preferred. However for very large diameter flare stacks (48" and
higher) there is a belief that molecular seal reduces oxygen ingress in flare stack.
Flare tip a proprietary item, made of heat resistant alloy steel is specially designed to
provide a stable and quiet flame of the desired smokeless capacity.

6.0

DESIGN OF FLARE SYSTEM

6.1

Flare Load:
There are various reasons due to which hydrocarbons and/or other materials will be
relieved to the flare system. During each such emergency, its quantity and is not
necessarily the largest number of Kg/Hr., but it is the flow which imposes the
greatest
head loss while flowing thru the system. Pressure drop through the header is proportional
to the square of the mass flow rate and inversely proportional to the density. It is also
possible that during various emergency conditions different safety valves discharge and
hence the back pressure allowable may be different.
Flare load from one plant:
Flare load from one plant is estimated considering:
Flare load
Temperature and molecular weight of gases
Permissible back pressure
The load is estimated for various emergencies and to arrive at design flare load, one
emergency is considered at a time in one plant.
Flare Load for a Complex:
To define the system load, the simultaneous occurrence of two or more unrelated
contingencies need not be assumed. For example, it is generally not necessary to assume

blocked outlets on process systems under fire conditions. However, under some
arrangements of process equipment, a fire could possibly result in a failure of local wiring
or instrument air piping, leading to the closure of valves that block off the process system.
Each individual contingency should therefore be reviewed for possible resultant effects.
Particular study is required for cases of failure of major utilities, such as power or cooling
water. Complete failure of electrical power, cooling water, or steam to an entire plant
should be considered. Where utility sources are believed to be unreliable or are not
backed up by a spare unit, the effect of complete failure should be studied. This type of
study, with reference to electrical power failure, commonly results in a design based on the
failure of one bus, although loss of an entire distribution center or of the incoming line is
occasionally used as a basis for design.
The capability of steam system to pick up standby turbine loads should be reviewed in
conjunction with the overall installed boiler capacity and the normal standby capacity
immediately available.
The most common basis for analyzing water or steam failure is the failure of one lateral
rather than the entire supply. Instrument air failure is commonly considered to be a plant
wide failure unless automatic makeup from an uninterrupted source is provided. Failure of
the power supply to electronic or electrical instruments may also be considered plant wide
unless proper standby power supplies are provided.
To define the combined relieving loads under fire exposure, the probable maximum extent
of a fire should be estimated. This may be done on the basis of the actual layout of
facilities, considering the location of sources of combustibles, the provision of drainage,
and the effects of natural barriers. Facilities that handle only gaseous fluids may be
assumed to generate more localized fires than those that handle liquid combustibles. In
the absence of any other governing factors, consideration of a fire incident is frequently
limited to 230 square meters to 460 square meters.

6.2

Flare Load Reduction in a Complex:

Flare load in a plant can be considerably reduced based on following concepts:
Cooling water segregation in plant so that simaltaneous cooling water failure in
different units can be avoided.
Segregation of Power Distribution through various Sub-Stations.( Refer design
basis of HPCL Mmbai.)
Flare load reduction based on INTERLOCKs. ( Refer section 10.0 )
( ex. When Cooling water failure occurs in a column , steam supply to col. Bottom
reboiler will stop immediately.)
Flare Header:
The flare header must be sized so that the built-up back pressure at the outlet of relief
valves does not exceed the maximum permissible value. In some cases if allowable back
pressure is governed by less load and for major flare load higher back pressure is allowable
then two parallel headers one LP and other HP are run if it is economical.
Flare piping system
1)
Individual discharge lines from PSVs.
2)
Subheaders in each area connecting to discharge lines.
3)
Main flare header leading to KOD.
4)
Final header connecting the vapour line to flare stack.
Sizing Flare Headers
1)
Back pressure i.e. 10% of set pressure in psig for conventional type and
40% for balance type valve.

2)
To avoid noise problem, velocity is limited. General practice (.2 - .5) Mach
number is selected.
Sonic velocity Vc = 223 / KT/M
Vc in ft/sec K = Cp/Cv normally
T = oR
M = Mol. Wt.
When dia of KOD exceeds 12 ft, split flow arrangement is economical
For estimating back pressure at safety valves the following losses are to be added:
Stack exit loss
Gas seal loss
(Take p = three 90 o bends of diameter equivalent to flare stack)
Static head due to stack heights
Entry loss to stack
Entry/exit loss to water sealdrum
Seal height in water seal drum
Entry/exit loss to K.O. Drum
Flare header drop
The emergency discharge is normally at high temperatures and flare header runs many
hundred meters. This results in drop in flare gas temp due to heat loss to metal and
surroundings. In order to estimate pressure loss through flare headers, the total header
length is divided into a number of sections and pressure drop should be calculated for each
section separately for each section.
A check should be made to ensure that the maximum velocity in the flare header is well
below sonic velocity. Generally maximum velocity is (0.4 - 0.5) of sonic velocity is
acceptable. Sonic velocity is estimated as follows:
Sonic velocity = 39.3 (gkt/M) ft/sec
Where,g=
Acceleration due to gravity 32.2 ft/sec2
K
=
cp/cv for the flare gases
T
=
Temperature of gases oR
M
=
Avg. Molecular weight of flare gases.
R
=
1.8 K
R
=
460+ F
In some cases corrosive gases like H2S or explosive gases like acetylene are to be handled
which should not be connected to the common header. For such gases a separate header
is run to the flare stack area. A separate water seal drum is provided with separate stack
and is joined with the main stack below the gas seal.
6.3

Flare Stack :
Flare stack is located on downwind pile and at a remote place from operating zones.The
sizing of the flare stack requires the determination of stack diameter, height of stack and
flare length. Hence one simple approach for flare sizing is described:
Height of flare stack depends upon following:
1)
Heat released by the flare gas in KW.
2)
Characteristics of flame and flame length
3)
Emissivity of flame
4)
Reduction intensity of flare
5)
GLC of toxic gases

Radiation Intensity
Emissivity valve

for peak load

.1
Normal operation
.3
2
2
2
D =x +H
x = 20 te
20 ft/s = velocity of escape
te = time of escape to a safe location
For a high temp system, a separate subheader may be required upto the point, where
the temp drops down to the allowable limit. A heat loss of 10 BTU/hr/ft2 may be taken as
thumbrule for heat loss calculations.
For low temp system, flare subheaders may similarly combined into a single low temp
flare headers and piped all the way to flare stack. Here, a heat gain calculation is done
to find out, whether subheader can be connected to main header or not.
SIMPLE APPROACH FOR FLARE STACK SIZING
Basic data
Material flowing is HC vapour
W
=
Flow rate (kg/hr)
MW
=
Avg molecular weight
T
=
Temp. Of fluid flowing (K)
Z
=
Compressibility factor (Generally z = 1.0 is taken)
P2
=
Pressure at the tip
d
=
Flare diameter (m) (inside)
K
=
Ratio of specific heat
H
=
Heat of combustion (Kj per kg)
Calculation of Diameter
Mach No.
=
3.23 * 10-5 ( W / ( P2 * d2 )) (Z *T )/ ( K*MW)) 0.5
Flare stack dia is generally sized on velocity basis , although pressure drop should be
checked. Velocity upto 0.5 Mach may be permitted for peak load and short term. 0.2
Mach is maintained for more normal and possibly more frequent conditions for low
pressure flares, which depends on following criteria:
a)Volume ratio of maximum conceivable flare flow to anticipated average flare flow.
b) The probable timing , frequency, and duration of those flows.
c) The design criteria adopted for the project to stabilize flare burning.
However , for high pressure flares, a higher Mach no. can be taken.
Calculation of flare length
The heat liberated, Q is calculated as follows:
Q
=
Flow rate x heat of combustion
=
(W/3600)* ( H)
From Fig. A flare length L (m) can be found out.
Calculation of Required Flare Stack:
Basis: See Fig. C for dimensional reference.
Sizing of flare stack is based upon the effects of radiation.
The following equation by Hazen and Ludwig can be used to determine min distance from
a flare to an object whose exposure to thermal radiation must be limited:

( *F*Q / (4* *K))

min distance from the mid point of flame to object being considered
(in meters)
=
fraction of heat intensity transmitted
F
=
fraction of heat radiated
Q
=
heat release (lower heating value) (KW)
K
=
Allowable radiation (KW/m2)
For initial calculation
may be assumed 1.0
According to Brzustowbsui & Summer, use of the fraction of heat intensity transmitted,
to correct the radiation impact.
=
0.79 ( 100 / r ) 1/16 (30.5 / D) 1/16
=
fraction of heat intensity transmitted through the atmosphere.
r
=
relative humidity, percent
D
=
Distance from flares to illuminated area (m) ( see fig. C)
Above equation satisfy most of flare gases except H2 & H2S which burn with little or no
luminous radiation.
The F factor allows for the fact that not all the heat released in a flame can be transferred
by radiation. Measurement of radiation from frames indicate that the fraction of heat
radiation (radiant energy per total heat of combustion) increases towards a limit, similar to
the increase in the burning rate with increasing flame diameter.
For
peak flare load F = 0.1
normal flare load F = 0.3
Estimate flame length from Fig A indicates flame radiation center being at the flame mid
point. A flame under influence of wind will tilt in the direction of wind is blowing. The
lateral wind effect can be estimated from Fig.B which relates horizontal and vertical
displacement of flame center to the ratio of lateral wind velocity to stack velocity.
Flame length varies with emission velocity and heat release.
Flow in (m3/s) Can be estimated based on ideal gas law:
U
=
Wind velocity
Uj
Flare tip velocity
Uj
=
Flow (m3/s) (( *d 2 )/4)
Another method to calculate the tip exit velocity
sonic velocity = 91.2 ( k* Tj / M j ) 0 . 5 ; U j = jet Mach no. * sonic velocity
From Fig. B
Y/ L &

Y/L

can be estimated

Where L is flame length

From Hazen and Ludwig equation , D is calculated.
Now corresponding to desired Mach No. stack height, H , is calculated as follows:
H

H+

R-

D2

(R) 2 + (H) 2

R is estimated as per design basis. This corresponds to maximum allowable radiation

K at
particular distance from flare stack.
From above equations H is calculated.
6.4

Sizing a Knockout Drum

Sizing a knock out drum is generally a trial and error process. The first step is to
determine the drum size required for liquid entrainment separation. Liquid particles will
separate (a) when the residence time of the vapor or gas is equal to or greater than the
time required to travel the available vertical height at the dropout velocity of the liquid
particles, and (b) when the vertical gas velocity is sufficiently low to permit the liquid
dropout to fall. This vertical height is usually taken as the distance from the liquid surface.
The vertical velocity of the vapor and gas should be low enough to prevent large slugs of
liquid from entering the flare. Since the flare can handle small liquid droplets, the
allowable vertical velocity in the drum may be based on that necessary to separate droplets
from 300 micrometers to 600 micrometers in diameter. The dropout velocity (9) of a
particle in a stream is calculated using Equation 30 as
follows:
Uc

Uc
g
D
p1

=
=
=
=

1.15 {g D( l -

)}/ ( v *C)

dropout velocity, (meters per second)

acceleration due to gravity, (9.8 meters per second per second).
Particle diameter, (in meters)
density of the liquid at operating conditions, (kilograms per cubic
meter)
Pv
=
density of the vapor at operating conditions, (kilograms per cubic
meter)
C
=
drag coefficient (see Figure 20).
The basic equation is widely accepted for all forms of entrainment separation.
The second step in sizing a knock out drum is to consider the effect any liquid contained
int he drum may have on reducing the volume available for vapor/liquid disengagement.
This liquid may result from (a) condensate that separates during a vapor release, or (b)
liquid streams that accompany a vapor release. The volume occupied by the liquid should
be based on a release that lasts 20 to 30 minutes. Any accumulation of liquid retained
from a prior release (from pressure relief valves or other sources) should be added to the
liquid indicated in items () and (b) to determine the available vapor disengaging space.
However, it would usually not be necessary to consider the following volumes relative to
vapor disengaging in the following situation that in which the knock out drum is used to
contain large liquid dumps from pressure relief valves from other sources where there is no
significant flashing and the liquid can be removed promptly.

Economics of vessel design in selecting a drum size, which may influence the choice
between a horizontal and a vertical drum. When large liquid storage is desired and the
vapor flow is high, a horizontal drum is often more economical.
Although horizontal and vertical knockout drums are available in many designs, the
differences are mainly in how the path of vapor is directed. The various designs include
the flowing:
a.
A horizontal drum with the vapor entering one end of the vessel and exiting at the
top of the opposite end (no internal baffling).
b.
A vertical drum with the vapor inlet nozzle on a diameter of the vessel and the
outlet nozzle at the top of the vessels vertical axis. The inlet stream should be
baffled to direct the flow downward.
c.
A vertical vessel with a tangential nozzle.
d.
A horizontal drum with the vapor entering at each end on the horizontal axis and a
center outlet.
e.
A horizontal drum with vapor entering in the center and exiting at each end on the
horizontal axis.
f.
A combination of a vertical drum in the base of the flare stack and a horizontal
drum upstream to remove the bulk of the liquid entrained in the vapor. This
combination permits the use of large values for the numerical constant in the
velocity equation.
The following sample calculations have been limited to the simplest of the design. Items a
and b. The calculations for items d and e would be similar, with one-half the flow rate
determining one half the vessel length. The normal calculations would be used for item c
and d will not be duplicated here.
The following formula can be used for sizing horizontal drums for separation of 400
particle:
W
=
360* D2 [ (eL - eG)* M*P/ T ]
where,
W
=
lbs/hr of vapour
eL
=
liquid density lbs/cu ft
eG
=
gas density lbs/cuft
M
=
mol. Wt. Of the vapor
T
=
temperature of the vap in oR.
P
=
psia,
D
=
drum diameter in fit
Similar expressions are available for vertical knock out drums. A practical formula for the
vapor velocity is:
V
=
0.4 * (eL - eG) /eG ft/sec.
6.5

BLOWDOWN PUMP
A blowdown pump is provided to transfer liquid from K.O. Drum. The pump capacity is
put equal to the maximum possible condensation rate during peak flaring. However, the
minimum pump capacity should be 5 m3/hr. The pump should have provision to start and
stop automatically through level switches on K.O.D. The blowdown pumps selected
should have minimum NPSH requirement and KOD should be elevated suitably to meet
the NPSH requirement. The condensate in the KOD should be considered as subcooled
for the NPSH (available) calculations. Typical NPSH (available) for the condensate pump
is 2.0m and the KOD shall be elevated at .5m (min) from the grade. Higher elevation of

the KOD results in increased elevation of the flare header, thus increasing the system
costs.
6.6

6.7

Water Seal Drum

Seal is provided at the base of flat stack to prevent any flash back. In absence of seal
a continuous entry of gas may be bled to flare.
Seals are two types
Liquid seal
Gas Seal
Liquid seals are further classified a Seal Drum & Seal pipe. In seal drum liquid seal
is located. Pipe is an integral part of the stack.
The purpose of seal drum is to maintain a seal of several inches on inlet flare header,
not exceeding six inches otherwise, it may cause back pressure on KOPD. Water is
normally used on sealing liquid in cold climate some extra provision is needed either
water is heated or water is replaced by alcohol, kero etc.
For designing water seal drum, Shell method is used. Refer attached fig.
PURGE GAS REQUIREMENT
It is essential to prevent air ingress into the flare system. The most acceptable safety
measure is to ensure a positive flow thru flare system. It is normal practice in industries to
supply gases to the flare system constantly to avoid a static condition of flow. These gases
are referred to as purge gases.
The quoted values of the minimum required purge gas velocity vary from as low as
0.06 to 3 ft/sec. However, there is general agreement that a commercially
available gas seal installed immediately below the flare at the top of the stack establishes
perfect safety to the flare system when the purge volume admitted is capable of
maintaining stack velocity from 0.05 to 0.10 ft/sec. To be safer side it is recommended to
use purge gas to have 0.1 ft/sec, stack velocity.
Purge gas requirement in the flare header:
With seal 0.1 ft/sec
Without seal 1 ft/sec

6.8

SMOKELESS OPERATION OF FLARE

Because of increasing stringent air pollution laws, smokeless flare operation is process
plants has been preferred in the interest of good public relations. In the flaring of gaseous
hydrocarbons, the tendency for smoke production as the gases burn is governed by the
weight ratio of hydrogen to carbon in the gases but is not directly proportional to the H/C
ratio by weight.
There have been numerous approaches to the problem of smokeless burning of waste
process gases. Since the principle means for suppression of smoke involves the various
chemistries associated with reaction of water vapours with the components of the flared
gas stream, there have been various schemes for delivery of the water to the burning zone
as either steam or as water spray in one form or another.
There has been certain limited success with water injection for smoke suppression due to
the great nuisance of a spray of unvaporized water to grade in normal operation of the
flare. Due to this reason steam is almost universally used for suppression of smoke in flare
operation. Use of steam increases the burning rate by the creation of turbulence in the

reaction gases and the inspiration of air, thereby reducing the formation of soot. Soot
formation is also reduced by the water gas reaction C = H2O = CO + H2, promoted by
the addition of steam.
The amount of steam for smokeless operation can be computed from:
W steam = W HC (0.68 - 10.8/M)
Where W steam
=
Steam rate lbs/hr
W HC
=
Hydrocabron rate, lb/hr
M
=
Molecular weight of hydrocarbon
It is normally not possible to attain smokeless operation of flare at peak flaring loads, as
the steam rates would be prohibitively high. The normal practice is to design the flare
system for smokeless operation for any of the following reasons.
1.
Normal flaring loads
2.
Start-up or shutdown of a process plant, or
3.
For any other situation which involves prolonged flaring.
Flares for suppression of smoke are commercially available of proprietary designs., The
manufacturer should be consulted on the minimum necessary steam rate. The stem for
smokeless consumption can be put through a manual remote control valve or through an
automatic smoke detector, located at the ground level, sending signal to the steam control
valve.
Total flare load is sum of governing loads from different units based on governing factor
of respective units.
7.0
INHOUSE SOFTWARE AVAILABLE FOR FLARE SYSTEM SIZING
Following programmes are available in LOTUS-123 in dir D:\FLR_MAN for
variouscalculations.
Name of file
Function
stak_cal.wk4
kod_cal.wk4

Stack dia calculation , press drop from flare tip to main

KOD
Horizontal KOD sizing

p_drop.wk4

Pressure profile calculation

T_drop.wk4

Temp. Profile calculation

Apart from above programs, Designer may refer to various packages available on
PRODES.
In a large chemical plant or Refineries having a very reliable power supply. Cooling
water failure mostly governs the maximum flare load. In the following example, system
has been segregated into two parts. Cooling Tower one supply CW to U-01, U-02, U-03,
U-04 and CT-2 supplies to U-05, U-06, U-08. Cooling water failure is the governing
case in each unit. Maximum fire load comes from CT-1 failure. So far design of flare
header & stack maximum load corresponding to CT-1 is the governing load.
According to governing load, flare stack dia and KOD have been sized. Individual unit
location is specified based on plot plan. Accordingly, unit back pressure is calculated
moving from KOD to individual units. Various headers & sub-headers sizes are optimized
meeting the unit back pressure requirement.
8.0

Sample Calculation
seets are attached herewith.

9.0

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FLARE SYSTEMS OF DIFFERENT REFINERIES

HPCL (M)

IOCL (Panipat)

Power substation
Cooling water failure is the
MSS-5 failure is the governing governing case for flare
case for Flare system design.
header sizing. Only single
largest local power failure is
considered for checking the
Governing load = 449 TPH
flare header sizing.
Governing load = 457 TPH
Maximum allowable back
pressure at unit B/L = 0.61
Max allowable back pressure
kg/cm2g
= 1.5 kg/cm2g at unit B/L
Max. Allowable back press at
PSV outlet = 0.71 kg/cm2g
Flare header 48" (after WSD
54")
Stack height = 100m
Smokeless flaring capacity =
2 Tons/hr

MRPL-II
For main flare header sizing
and flare stack design, general
electric power failure is
considered.
Governing load = 750 TPH.
Max allowable back press. At
unit B/L = 1.0 kg/cm2g

Max allowable back pressure

= 1.7 kg/cm2g at PSV outlet

Max allowable back press at

PSV outlet=1.2 kg/cm2g

Flare Header 54"

Flare header 54"

Stack height = 100m

Stack height = 100m

Length of Flare header= 3m

Smokeless flaring capacity:

Smokeless flaring capacity =

110 TPH

15% of maximum load

Water seal drum is an integral
part of flare stack.

Water seal drum is an integral

part of flare stack.

Horizontal water seal drum

separate from flare stack.

Plant

Total
governing
load

Temp
o
C

Stack
Dia/Ht
(m/m)

WSD
L/Dia.
(M/m)

Main
KOD
L/Dia
(m/m)
23/5.6

MW

Remarks

MRPL-II

750,000

133

1.7/100

8.4/2.8

43

Ref. attached
DB for
details

MRPL-I

284733

12.5/4.5

15.6

449100

50-100 1.37/
8/4.5
100
112
1.37/100 7.2/4.8

HPCL(M)

10.8/3.6

63.2

-do-

457323

80

1 37/100 NA/4.5

13.5/4.5

34

-do-

43300

50

0.61/100 7.2/2.4

7.8/3.6

4.0

BPCL(M)
IOCLPanipat
CRL
(DHDS)

DESIGN BASIS
MRPL - II
FLARE SYSTEM

10.

FLARE SYSTEM

10.1

INTRODUCTION
Flare system shall be installed to burn the flammable, toxic or corrosive vapors safely
which is discharged during startup, shutdown, normal operation and emergency cases.
Dedicated flare system for Phase-2 is provided.

10.2

DESIGN CONSIDERATION

10.2.1 System Configuration

Two flare collecting systems are provided. One is main (LP) flare header and the other is
sour flare header. Hydrocarbon and sour flares released from the following units are
discharged to the main (LP) flare header.
(Note):

CDU/VDU/NSU
Visbreaker unit
Merox units
Hydrocracker unit
Hydrogen unit
GO-HDS unit
CCR/NHT unit (future)
HP flare from Hydrocracker unit which is discharged independently in
phase I shall be integrated with main (LP) flare header in phase 2.

Sour flares released from the following units are discharged to the sour flare header.
-

Amine treating unit

Sour water stripping unit
Sulfur recovery unit

These two flare headers are connected at main flare knockout drum which is located near
the flare stack.
10.2.2 Design Flare Load
For flare system design, following cases are studied. Flare load for the various cases is
summarized in the attached sheet.
-

Cooling water failure

General electric failure

Fire case
Blocked outlet

Reflux failure

Emergency Depressure

For the main flare header sizing and flare stack design, general electric power failure case
is considered.
Individual flare outlet from each units are sized as listed below.
CDU/VDU

As per EIL Package. (General electric failure)

VBU

As per Phase-I (Reflux failure)

CCR + NHDT

General electric failure

GO+HDS

Fire case + Emergency depressure

MEROX

Fire case

HCU

As per Phase-I (Fire case + Emergency depressure)

ATU

Fire case

SWS

General electric failure

SRU

As per phase-1 (Fire case)

Hydrogen

As per phase-1 (PSA trip case)

Pressure profile and velocity for the flare header design shall be as follows.
-

0.3 kg/cm2g at main flare KO Drum located near flare stack.

1.0 kg/cm2g at each unit BL
1.2 kg/cm2g at each SV back pressure

Velocity is less than Mach No. 0.4.

Pressure profile for the main (LP) flare header at general power failure case and for the
sour flare header at ATU fire case is shown in the attached sheets.
10.2.3 Knock Out Drum
Five (5) Nos. Of Flare Knock out drums are provided in phase-2 as per following
groupings:
1)

Knock out drum in VBU area is receiving flare gas from

-

VBU
VBU/BLENDER
MEROX

GO-HDS
NHDT
CCR

2)

Knockout drum in CDU/VDU/NSU area

3)

Knockout drum for HCU

4)

Knockout drum in SWS area is receiving flare gas form

-

5)

ATU
SWS
SRU

Main knock out drum is receiving flare gas from all of above knock out drums.

Flare knock out drums are sized as per API RP 521. Design load for each KO drum is
summarized as below:
Knock out drum

Mol. Wt.

Temp. oC

Case

In VBU Area

Flow rate
kg/hr
189684

37.54

175.4

General power failure

For HCU

108180

8.8

303

In SWS area

86600

50

123

Fire + Emergency
depressure
Fire case in ATU

Main knock out drum

741274

43

133

General power failure

10.2.4 Flare Stack

Flare stack shall be designed based on the general power failure case of 750 t/h. Diameter
and height of the flare stack shall be determined considering the ground level heat intensity
in accordance with API RP 521. Maximum heat intensity at ground level shall be less than
4,000 kcal/m2.hr excluding solar radiation.
Flare tip shall be designed considering smokeless capacity of 110 t/h which is
corresponding to 15% of maximum flare load.
10.3

MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION
- Sour flare header
- Main (LP) flare header
- All the knockout drum
- Water seal drum
epoxy cement coating
- Flare stack

:
:
:
:

Stress relieved killed carbon steel with 6mm CA

Stress relieved carbon steel with 3mm CA
Stress relieved killed carbon steel with 6mm CA
Stress relieved killed carbon steel with 6mm CA and

Stress relieved carbon steel with 3mm CA

FLARE LOAD SUMMARY (PHASE-II REFINERY)

Unit Name

Crude
Distillation
Unit (#41000)
Vacuum Dist.
Unit
(#411000)
Visbreaker
Unit (#41200)
Visbreaker
Unit (#51200)
Sulfur
Recovery Unit
(#41400)
Sulfur
Recovery Unit
(#51400)
LPG Merox
(#41500)
Kerosene/Jet
Merox
(#41600)
Hydrocracker
(Rx Sect)
(#42000)

Cooli
ng
Wate
r
Pum
ps
Rate M
W
Kg/h
207, 50.
280
6

Gener
al
Electr
ic
Failur
e
Tem Rate
M
p
W
o
C
kg/h
81
283,6 69.
30
3

Tem Rate
p
o
C
kg/h
122 248,0
02

MW Tem Rate
p
o
C
kg/h
72
129 23,0
00

10,6
03
10,6
03

117

1,680

18

156

132

212

117

1,680

18

156

12,43
5
12,43
5
12,00
0

132

212

145/
133

12,00
0

145/
133

23,89
4
140,0
28

50

99

Capacity s

162

344

Capacity s

60,01
0

205

427

27,
4
27.
4

17,40
8

139

M
W
68

Tem Rate
p
o
C
kg/h
207

19,21
4
19,21
4

8,31
6

2.1

146

M
W

Tem Rate
p
o
C
kg/h

M
W

Tem
p
o
C

Eject steam
kg/hr
100 oC, M
VDU & N
CDU
According
007)
61

284

61

284

48,1
70

149

Hydrocracker
(Frac.Sec)
(#42100)
Poly Arom
Adsor )
#42200)
Amine
Treating
(#42200)
Sour Water
Stripper
(#42600)
Hydrogen plant
(#42300)
Gas Oil HDS
(#45500)

17,4
04

19,4
50

49

18

71

222,7
71

73.
3

14,9
49

45.
5

106

150
27,78
1

8,00
0

73

150

17,60
7

18

25.
1

157

119

Naphtha Merox
(#45700)
Naphtha
Hydro-treater
(#41700)
CCR Platformer
(#42400)
25,9
23

26.
1

71

59,46
6

10
0

227

109,2
51

30.
6

157

87,85
4

142

317

47,73
4

180

427

86,60
0

50

123

2,102

18

140

48,10
0

26.2

32,59
8

13.6 190

20,00
0
52,08
3
39,37
4

3308
7

57.
7

118

42,4
00

32

117

45415 77.
9

102

Based on P

Based on P

PSA trip c
41,500 kg
40,0
00

4.6

60

Pre estima
Depress.

Pre estima
97.5 236

Pre estima
for future

42.8 179

Preestimat
for future
External

Fire Total

937,249 kg/h
General Power
failure
741.274 kg/hr
MW

43.0
133 oC
CW failure total
314,212
Local power failure of HYC
288.349 kg/h

Temp.

DESIGN BASIS
FOR
IOCL - PANIPAT
FLARE SYSTEM

FLARE SYSTEM
9.1

INTRODUCTION
The flare system will be provided for safe disposal of combustible, toxic gases which are
relieved from process plants and offsites during start-up, shutdown, normal operation or in
case of an emergency such as:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

9.2

Cooling water failure

Power failure
Combined cooling water and power failure
Instrument air failure
External fire
Blocked outlet/an open inlet
Any other emergency

UNIT CAPACITY
The flare loads from the following plants have been considered for the design of flare
system:
Process Unit
Capacity, MMTPA
1.

CDU
6.0

2.

VDU
3.3
3.

OHCU
1.7

4.

FCCU

5.

H2 UNIT

6.

CRU

0.7
0.038
0.5
7.

VBU

8.

BBU

0.4
0.5
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Kerosine Merox
SR LPG Merox
FCC LPG Merox
FCC Gasoline Merox
Sulphur Block

9.3

FLARE LOADS

9.3.1 CDU/VDU
For this Unit the flare loads are given below:
Cooling
Water
System

Load
kg/hr
207280

Local
Power
Failure

Mol
wt.
65.04

Temp
o
C
81.09

Load
kg/hr
501600

Mol wt. Temp

o
C
85.9
196

These loads have been taken from the package.

9.3.2 OHCU
The flare loads for this unit is given below:

Fire Case
(Atm
col+ Stab
+ MTO
strip Ref
Drum)
Load
kg/hr
112447

Mol
wt.
67.08

Temp
o
C
141

Coolin
g
Water
Failure
Load
kg/hr
69872

Mol Tem.
o
wt
C
55.9 98.4

Genera
l
Electri
c
Failure
Load
Mol
kg/hr
wt
33414 56.25
7

Tem
o
C
240

Emerg
ency
Depres
surizati
on
Load
Mol
kg/hr
wt
12661 3.62
2

Fire Case (Separator +

Flash Drum)

Tem Load
o
C
kg/hr
55
110585

Mol wt Temp
o
C
186.46 427

The loads given above are taken from safety valves relief summary for the OHCU given by
UOP.

9.3.3 FCCU
Cooling
Water
System
Load
Mol
kg/hr
wt.
40000
40.0

Temp
o
C
110

Local
Power
Failure
Load
kg/hr
90000

Fire Case
Mol wt. Temp
o
C
50
210

Load
kg/hr
40000

Mol
wt.
376

Temp
o
C
427

The flare loads are taken from the preliminary estimates available form the licensor.
9.3.4 H2 UNIT
The loads given below are taken from hydrogen unit flare load summary for GHP and the
flare loads are prorated.
Cooling
Water
System
Load
Mol
kg/hr
wt.
61231
13.65

Temp
o
C
50

Local
Power
Failure
Load
kg/hr

Fire Case
Mol wt. Temp
o
C

Load
kg/hr

Mol
wt.

Temp
o
C

The flare load for different contingencies shall be updated when data from the hydrogen
unit licensor M/s., HTAS is available.
9.3.5 CRU
The data for the following contingencies is taken from the package:
Cooling
Water
System
Load
Mol
kg/hr
wt.
70000
23.5

Temp
o
C
74

Local
Power
Failure
Load
kg/hr
105000

Fire Case
Mol wt. Temp
o
C
83.8
133

Load
kg/hr
51710

Mol
wt.
40

Temp
o
C
105

9.3.6 VBU
The following are the flare loads given for Visbreaker Unit and are taken from the process
package.
Cooling
Water

Local
Power

Fire Case

System
Load
kg/hr
8940

Failure
Mol
wt.
44

Temp
o
C
79.5

Load
kg/hr
17100

Mol wt. Temp

o
C
58
199

Load
kg/hr
23960

Mol
wt.
64

Temp
o
C
125.8

9.3.7 BBU
The offgases from this unit shall be incinerated in the incinerator provided near the unit.
This unit shall not be connected to the flare system.
9.3.8 MEROX
These unit are not considered to add-on to the flare load in the contingencies considered
above. The flare load for these units will be furnished when data from the respective
licensors are available.
Cooling
Water
System
Load
Mol
kg/hr
wt.
Hold

Temp
o
C

Local
Power
Failure
Load
kg/hr
Hold

Fire Case
Mol wt. Temp
o
C

Load
kg/hr
Hold

Mol
wt.

Temp
o
C

9.3.9 SULPHUR BLOCK

The flare loads given below for this block for different contingencies are as per the
estimates available for this block (consisting of ARU, SWS unit and sulphur unit). The
flare gases from the block shall be routed to the sour flare. The estimated flare loads are
as follows:
ARU.
Cooling
Water
System
Load
Mol
kg/hr
wt.
25000
20.0

SWS Unit

Temp
o
C
150

Local
Power
Failure
Load
kg/hr
Hold

Fire Case
Mol wt. Temp
o
C

Load
kg/hr
Hold

Mol
wt.

Temp
o
C

Cooling
Water
System
Load
Mol
kg/hr
wt.
1284.2 24.23

Temp
o
C
86.85

Local
Power
Failure
Load
kg/hr
13250

Fire Case
Mol wt. Temp
o
C
18.01
160

Load
kg/hr
5685

Mol
wt.
46.2

Temp
o
C
140

Sulphur Unit
The unit shall have its own incinerator and shall not be connected to the flare header.

9.4
S.N
o

FLARE LOAD SUMMARY

Tem
p oC
81.0
9
98.4

Load
kg/hr
50160
0
15787
0

Mol
wt.
85.9

Temp
o
C
196

Load
kg/hr
112447

Mol
wt
67.08

Tem
p oC
141

Mol
wt

Tem
p oC

2.

Mol
wt
65.0
4
55.9

Load
kg/hr

CDU/VD
U
OHCU

Cooli
ng
Water
Failur
e
Load
kg/hr
20728
0
69872

128.4

234

110585

186.4
6

427

12661
2

3.62

55

3.

FCCU

40000 40.0

110

90000

30

210

40000

376

427

4.

H2 Unit

50

5.

CRU

61231 13.6
5
70000 23.5

83.8

133

51710

40

105

6.

VBU

8940

79.5

10500
0
17100

58

199

23960

64

125.
8

50

55

46.2

140

1.

Unit

Local
Power
Failure

44

74

Others

Contingency

Fire

MEROXE
S
8.
OFFSITE
62400
S (Note-1)
9.
ARU
25000 20
150
HOLD
HOLD
SWS
13250 18.01 160
5685
Sulphur
Unit
10. TOTAL(2) 45732 -34
-80
3
Figures in this block represents governing flare load from the respective units.

Emergency
Depressurizati
on

7.

LPG Sphere
1284.2

24.2
3

86.8
5

SRU down

Note 1:

In case of fire at MT bullets or Hydrogen bullets they shall also discharge to flare.

9.5

FLARE PHILOSOPHY

9.5.1 The cooling water failure becomes the governing load for the flare header sizing.
9.5.2 Only single largest Local Power failure shall be considered for checking the flare header
sizing.
9.5.3 For different units the General electric failure shall not be considered as governing load as
the feed to the furnace/feed pumps shall also cease leading to a low flare load. The only
exceptions are OHCU and CRU, releasing high load. However this load is not governing.
9.5.4 There shall be two separate flare headers. One carrying the discharges from equipments
handling high H2S contents hydrocarbons i.e. Sour flare header (carrying reliefs from the
sulphur block) and the second one carrying rest of the hydrocarbon reliefs i.e. Main flare.
9.5.5 A maximum allowable back pressure of 1.5 kg/cm2g at unit battery limit shall be
considered for sizing the flar header. However a maximum allowable back pressure of 1.7
kg/cm2g shall be considered at PSV outlet.
9.5.6 For sour flare a maximum allowable back pressure of 0.5 kg/cm2g shall be considered at
Sulphur Block battery limit for SRU down case, however for Local power failure case and
fire case a back pressure of 1.5 kg/cm2g shall be considered at sulphur block battery limit.
9.5.7 EIL had suggested routing all H2S bearing streams to the sour flare but IOCL decided to
route only the Sulphur block reliefs to the sour flare header.
9.5.8 Smokeless Capacity: The flare shall be designed for a smokeless capacity equivalent to
15% of maximum anticipated fuel gas production (i.e. 15% of 12.3 TPH mol wt. 8.95) i.e.
- 2 TPH.
9.5.9 Flare header shall be purged by all units maintaining a purge velocity of 0.1 fps in
respective unit headers with fuel gas.
9.5.10 For monitoring flare losses, metering instrument will be provided in each unit block area
and also on the main flare header. Type of instruments will be decided during P&ID stage.
9.6

THE SYSTEM
The main flare header shall collect the emergency hydrocarbon reliefs from all the
equipments (except equipment discharging to the sour flare header) and shall route it to
main flare stack. The size of this flare header works out to be 54". To take care of the
short term H2S rich reliefs the flare header shall be post weld heat treated and hardness of
200 BHN maintained. The flare stack diameter shall be 54" and height 100m. This Flare
system shall have its own dedicated set of flame front generators and flame pilots.
The length of this flare header is ~3 KM. To keep the height of flare header within
reasonable limits and to reduce the cost of associated flare header structure, it is proposed
to have one knock out drum enroute flare stack. The knock out drum shall be located

near BBU. It shall have second knock out drum near flare stack. A vertical water seal
drum shall be provided at the bottom of the stack. The water seal drum is an integral part
of the flare stack. It is not possible to take water seal drum under maintenance without
shutdown of entire complex. Thus to avoid any such situation all the internals of water
seal drum shall be of SS-304.
The sour flare header shall have a knock out drum in the Sulphur block. The gases will
then be routed to the flare area. The gases shall be burnt alongwith the main flare gases
through a separate header near the tip of the main flare.
Sour flare header shall be post weld heat treated and shall have minimum 200 BHN
hardness. This flare header shall have a KOD near flare stack. This will not have any
water seal drum. A separate fluidic seal, separate Flame Pilots shall be provided for this
flare. The flame front generators shall be common for two flares.
A schematic for flare gas collection header is given under Annexure 1.

DESIGN BASIS
FOR HPCL, MUMBAI
FLARE SYSTEM

8.0

FLARE SYSTEM

8.1

INTRODUCTION
At present several safety valves from existing units are venting to atmosphere. The
existing flare system is incapable of handling this additional load.
A new flare system is envisaged to handle safety valve reliefs from the existing units
presently connected to flare as well as venting to atmosphere and DHDS block.

8.2

FLARE LOADS
Safety valve discharges for cooling water failure case from various units are given below:
Units
FRE APS

220

70

150

FRE VPS

7.8

20.3

150

HMU

36.5

70

100

T-1701

27.3

70

150

FR-APS

272

70

150

FR-VPS

7.8

20.3

150

FCCU

139

70

100

Propane Unit

35
50
32.2

50
50
77.7

T-801 (Deeth)

5.5
11.6
15.2

T-802 (Debut)

85

50.5

68.1

MEA Regeneration*

4.5

22.5

125

T-701 (PG VPLG)

52

70

150

DHDS

2.7

37

75

Hydrogen

19.2

12.32

35

3.5

31.5

65

Lean oil failure

SWS*
ARU*
SRU*
*

Sour gases being routed through a separate acid header.

Notes: 1.
For Blocked outlet/fire case flare load details refer flare study
report (dated Sept 1996) submitted to HPCL - Mumbai.

8.3

GOVERNING FLARE LOAD

Power is distributed in different units in the fuel refinery & FR cooling towers through
various substations viz. MSS-1, MSS-4 & MSS-5.
After MS maximisation, total flare loads envisaged for MSS-1, MSS-4 & MSS-5 failure
are as follows:
MSS-1 FAILURE
MSS-1 supplies power to FR APS, FR VPS, T-701 (PG VLPG) units & 3 pumps of FR
cooling tower. Therefore, MSS-1 failure will result the power failure in the above said
units & three FR cooling water pump trip. Since there is only one common CWE supply
header from FR cooling tower, due to trip of three CW pumps the pressure in the header
will be so low that the other pumps will also trip leading to FR cooling water system
failure.
UNITS
(oC)

LOAD, (TPH)
MW Temp.
Remarks

FRE CT
Not
affected
FRE APS
affected
FRE VPS
-

Not

Not

affected
HMU
affected
T-701 (BH VLPG)
affected
FR CT

Not

Not

FR CWS will trip

FR APS
Both
CW & unit power
failure
FR VPS
-doFCCU
139
43.7
failure
PROPANE UNIT
5.5
35
50
11.6
50
50
T-801 (DEETH)
15.2
32.2
oil failure
T-802 (DEBUT)
85
50.5
MEA REGEN.

failure
4.5
125
T-701 (PG VLPG)
51.5
70

93
CW

77.7
Lean

68.1
CW
22.5

150
Both
CW & Unit power
failure*.

Total (for HC flare)

307.8

MSS-4 FAILURE
MSS-4 supplies power to FR APS, FR VPS, HMU, T-1701 (BH VLPG). Propane units,
one pump in FR cooling tower. Therefore, MSS-1 failure will result the power failure in
the above said units & all pumps in FR cooling tower. Therefore MSS-4 failure will
result in power failure in the above said units & FRE cooling water system failure. Since
only one pump in FR cooling water system will trip it will not affect the FR cooling water
system.
UNITS
(oC)

LOAD, (TPH)
MW Temp.
Remarks

FRE CT
FRE
CWS will trip
FRE APS
Both
CW & Unit power
failure
FRE VPS
-doHMU
100
70
100
-doT-701 (BH VLPG)
27.3
70
150
-doFR CT
Not
affected
FR APS
affected

Not

FR VPS
-

Not

affected
FCCU
affected
PROPANE UNIT
T-801 (DEETH)
affected
T-802 (DEBUT)
affected
MEA REGEN.

Not

Not

Not
-

Not affected
T-701 (PG VLPG)
Not
affected
Total (for HC flare)

127.3

MSS-5 FAILURE
MSS-5 supplies power to FCCU, T-801 (Deethaniser), T-802 (Debutaniser), MEA Regenerator &
Two pumps of FR cooling water system. Therefore, MSS-5 failure will result the power failure in
the above said units & two FR cooling water pump trip. Since there is only one common CW
supply header from FR cooling tower, due to trip of two CW pumps the pressure in the header
will be so low that the other pumps will also trip leading to FR cooling water system failure.
UNITS
(oC)

LOAD, (TPH)
MW Temp.
Remarks

FRE CT
Not
affected
FRE APS
affected
FRE VPS
-

Not

Not

affected
HMU
affected
T-701 (BH VLPG)
-

Not

Not

affected
FR CT
FR
CWS will trip
FR APS
272

70

150
CW

failure
FR VPS
7.8
20.3

150
CW

failure
FCCU
-

Both
CW & Unit power
failure
PROPANE UNIT
5.5
35
50
11.6
50
50
T-801 (DEETH)
15.2
32.2 77.7
Lean
oil failure
T-802 (DEBUT)
85
50.5 68.1
Both
CW & Unit power
failure*
MEA REGEN.
4.5
22.5
12.5
T-701 (PG VLPG)
52
70

150
CW

failure
Total (for HC flare)

449.1

*Since steam will be on in the reboiler, over pressurisation will be there. Therefore load
should be considered.
It is evident from the above load distributions that MSS-5 failure is the governing case for
flare design.

8.4

PROPOSED SYSTEM

8.4.1 Hydrocarbon & sour flare headers will be segregated. Sour flare header will be steam
traced.
8.4.2 Separate H/C flare KODs will be provided for FRE Unit (88-D-01); Combination Unit
(88-D-02), LEU (88-D-03), DHDS Unit (By licensor) and Hydrogen Unit (By licensor).
8.4.3 A main H/C flare KOD (88-D-07) will be provided at flare stack area.
8.4.4 A common sour flare KOD (88-D-08) will be provided at the flare stack area.
8.4.5 A vertical water seal drum (88-D-09) for H/C flare will be provided.
8.4.6 No water seal drum is provided for sour flare to avoid corrosion problem caused by moist
H2S/NH3.
8.4.7 Flare stack will be mounted on water seal drum.
8.4.8 Hydrocarbon flare stack will have a molecular seal and sour flare riser will have a fluidic
seal.
8.4.9 A 36" H/C flare header is taken from FRE Unit. This is joined by a 30" H/C flare header
from LEU. A 42" H/C flare header is taken from combination unit which expands to 48"
just before the joining of 36" H/C flare header from FRE Unit to it. A 24" H/C flare
header from DHDS Block is joined to the 48" main header running upto main flare KOD.
It exits the KOD as 54" header before it enters the water seal drum.
A 10" sour flare header will be provided from LEU, which will be connected to the 10"
sour flare header from DHDS unit. The flare header runs upto sour flare KOD. After
KOD the line runs upto the top of the flare stack through fluidic seal.
Refer flare system P&IDs for detail.

UPPC - AURAIYA CASE STUDY

Main Flare System

The flare load for various units is enclosed as Annexure-1. The flare load for the
controlling
case i.e. cooling water & power failure is 777 T/hr. An attempt has been made to
reduce the
load.
The detailed analysis for the controlling case has been done with respect to
instrumentation
provided and rationalization of flare loads in event of simultaneous release
from several columns in a unit. The details are as under:
GCU
As per SWEC flare load during electrical power/cooling water failure is as follows:
Flare
load,
kg/Hr MW
Temp.
C
Hot/Wet flare header
315390
33.75
2.
Intermediate
Flare
Header 68855
42.08
3.
Low temperature flare
header 86503
28.86
TOTAL LOAD
470748
33.67
Being a complex unit with inbuilt margins for instrumented trips, total flare load has been
considered for the design of flare system.
CSU/C2-C3 Uunit:
Control scheme has provided a number of shutdown valves at different locations to close
during power/cooling water failure. The details are as follows:
Two quick shutdown valves (one redundant) on inlet feed gas to UPPC. Actuation is due
to high high/low low pressure and power failure. The gas will be diverted to lean gas
despatch header.
Shutdown valve upstream of GSU absorber to close during power failure due to tripping
of lean amine pump. During power failure, GSU shutdown valve shall close and this in
turn will close the feed gas shutdown valve due to upstream line pressurization.
Shutdown valve in C2/C3 plant on suction line of lean gas compressor. The shutdown
valve will actuate during power failure due to low low pressure in the suction side/high
high pressure in the discharge/high high temp in the discharge.
There is a remote possibility of failure of all shutdown valves to actuate during power
failure situation. Still the possibility of pressurization upto 14 kg/cm2a has been
considered. For lean gas suction line normal operating pressure is 12 kg/cm2a and PSV is
set at 15 kg/cm2a. The estimated flare load due to pressurization is 2 T/Hr. For flare
design, conservative figure of 5 T/hr has been considered.
o

1.

o
o
o

LLD/HDPE
Flare load summary by licensor proposal is as under
Kg/Hr
1.
Comonomer Column
2.
High boils column

159849
149690

3.
Low boils columns
64242
4.
FE column
4850
TOTAL
378631
The flare load from various columns is for the conditions when unit power has failed but
steam/BFW is continuous.
During complex power failure, steam generation/.BFW shall also trip. Supply of steam to
unit reboilers shall be limited to the system hold up/surge available.
With the limited steam holdup the simultaneous release of hydrocarbons from various
columns is not envisaged. For the flare design the single largest PSV release from CM
Column and 10% of balance PSV release has been considered as follows:
Flare load, kg/Hr
MW
Temp.
o
C
1.
CM Column
159849
51.9
89.6
2.
HB Column
14969
108.4
241.0
3.
LB Column
6424
58.1
146.0
4.
FE Column
485
58.1
138.1
Total
181727 Avg.
54.46

GUJARAT REFINERY FLARE SYSTEM

The existing flare system of Gujarat Refinery is integrating GR, GREP and GRSPF in a
single flare system due to separate dedicated cooling water systems. GHP is having its
dedicated flare system. GR flare is connected to GHP for flexibility of using GHP flare
system when GR flare is under maintenance.
Recently IOCL has given a study to connect atmospheric vents of various crude units,
incorporating new units viz AU-V, DHDS, H2 Unit, Sulphur block , MTBE unit and
Butene1. Several alternatives were studied. The least cost option has emerged by
considering the
following basis:
Stagger GR cooling water system with dedicated substations so that cooling water failure
of AU-V, DHDS, H2 Unit and sulphur block can be considered separate from existing AUI, AU-II, CRU, PDF and Food Grade Hexane unit.
Use GHP flare system for GR atmospheric vents etc by following the philosophy of single
cooling water failure at a time.
Provision of GHP to GR side flexibility to take GHP flare system under maintenance.
Use of shell philosophy by considering tripping of source of heat whenever pressure of
cooling water supply header is very low.

11.0
11.1
11.2

11.3

12.0

FLARE GAS RECOVERY SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION
Excess hydrocarbons being wasted to flare system can be recovered by using a simple but
effective flare gas recovery system.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Flare gas recovery system in its most basic form is simply a compressor to compress the
flared gases for its subsequent use at fuel gas in the refinery/petrochemical complex. The
objective of the system is to recover excess hydrocarbons being flared and also
reduction/containment of radiation, light and glare, smoke and noise in the adjoining areas.
The critical aspect of the system is selection of appropriate capacity for compressor and to
set its operating specifications so that it can safely and efficiently handle as wide a range of
possible compositions and rates as practical. Apart from this, designed system should
maintain the integrity of existing flare lines/flare stack system. To achieve this, flare
system must be left as it had been. No valves automatic or manual should be place din the
flare lines to divert gas from flare stack to compressor. Such mechanical devices can fail
to operate when required during emergency. Experience shows that they will fail
eventually then we will have no operable emergency system. Recovery system should be
controlled so that it does not lower flare system pressure to that level at which air could
ingress into the system. For this, suction pressure of the compressor is maintained with
compressor capacity control backed up by discharge recycle control.
DESCRIPTION OF RECOVERY SYSTEM
Typical recovery system is shown in figure-1. Part of flared gases from main flare header
downstream of stack area flare gas knock out drum are diverted to compressor through a
compressor suction knock out drum to prevent any liquid which may condense in the
intake line or entrained liquid from being pulled into the compressor. The knock out drum
is provided with mist eliminator to allow only liquid free gases to compressor suction. For
noise suppression, silencers are installed at both the suction and discharge ends of the
compressor. As the gases get heated up in the compressor, these are cooled in the
compressor after cooler before being led to the fuel gas header. The liquid condensate if
any is removed in the knock out vessel.
Design of suction and discharge knock out drum and also of after cooler are simple and
will not pose any problem due to fluctuation in flared gas composition and temperature.
Critical area of the flare recovery system is the selection of compressor and the scheme to
maintain suction pressure.

Umoes concept for Flare Gas Recovery

The new concept of flare gas recovery eliminates the need of continuous flaring of gas.
The total hydrocarbon gas is recovered from the flare system and routed to the fuel gas header
after compression.
The flare line is closed during recovery of the flare gas by means of a on/off valve installed
downstream of the flare knock out drum. For safety reasons a bursting disc is installed in
parallel with the isolation valve. The compression facility is designed to handle normal gas
leakage rates, with a spare capacity to manage smaller releases form blowdown
valves/PSVs. During large releases the valve in the flare line will open (typically, the opening
time for the valve is less than 2 secs) and the recovering equipment will be isolated. In case of
malfunctioning of the valve in flare line, the rupture disc will open and the gas will be
flared.
The flare gas ignition system will ignite the flare gas. The flare gas ignition system
consists
of a compressed nitrogen driven launcher contained in a stainless steel cabinet at
the deck
level. In addition a target plate is located below the flare tips to ignite the specially
designed
ignition pellet being automatically launched from the launching unit. Standard
launching
range 125m, Launching medium N2, Launching pressure 150 - 220 bar, Muzzle
velocity 430 m/sec (free) / 320 m/sec (guided), ignition pellet dia 20 mm/wt - 43 gram). When
hitting the
target plate, the pellet will explode and generate a shower of sparks, each igniting
along its
entire path. The system launches two pellets, the first 15 seconds and the second
30 seconds
after the opening of the valve in the flare line. Experience shows the gas is ignited
by 9 out
of 10 pellets.
System Failure Scenario
The following two main safety scenarios need to be considered:
1)
Both the flare valve and the rupture disc fail to open.
2)
The flare gas is not ignited.
Scenario (1) has an extremely low probability of occurrence, sufficiently low to be
ignored.Two rupture disc in parallel can be used to lower its probability further.
Scenario (2) is not much different from a continuously burning flare where a sudden
emergency release or strong winds can extinguish the flame. However, the safety of
aviation
traffic should be considered particularly and procedures in this context, should be
made.
This new concept of flare gas recovery reduces the emission of Nox & CO2 to a large
extent.
This technology has been installed in several projects in Norway and patented by
M/s. UMOE Oil & Gas.