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We believe that neither statement was true. Warren Buffett, CEO of Cokes largest
shareholder, Berkshire Hathaway, said the plan was excessive, too much,
and quite different from past plans. Major shareholders voted against it or
abstained from voting. In fact, less than half of Coca-Colas total outstanding
shares supported the 2014 Equity Plan.
But Cokes fizzy math doesnt end there. Coke announced in October that it had
adopted what it called Equity Stewardship Guidelines in an attempt to address
investors concerns. At first we were optimistic that Coke got the message. But as
we looked more closely, it appeared to us that the guidelines did nothing to correct
the worst excesses of the 2014 Equity Plan and could actually make things worse
for Coke shareholders.
Coke does not intend to pay less compensation to top management under the
new guidelines. Instead, it will change the mix of stock and option awards, and
pay out substantially more cash over a ten-year timeframe. If Coke expects to
pay the same amount of compensation to its top executives, how is that better
for shareholders?
Coke hasnt explained the details of how the new guidelines will be implemented,
but as we have previously noted, by our estimates it appears that the cash
compensation required to meet the Guidelines will cost shareholders between
$1 billion and $3 billion per year in what we view as excessive management
compensation. That is cash that comes directly out of shareholders pockets
and reduces Coca-Colas earnings by a proportionate amount. After taxes, that
$1 billion to $3 billion per year is worth between $0.17 and $0.51 in annual per
share net income, assuming a 25% corporate tax rate.
At Coca-Colas current valuation of 20x earnings, that excessive cash
compensation costs shareholders between $3.40 and $10.20 of per share value.
Cokes 50-Year Record of Dividend Increases is at Risk
We believe Cokes excessive pay plan also carries another risk for its
shareholders. Under the new guidelines, Coke expects to use more cash to pay
top management. At the same time, Coke has announced it will cut its workforce
by several thousand next year to pare costs, which could result in a significant
cash charge for severance and other restructuring expenses.
Putting Cokes
record of annual
dividend growth
at risk would be
irresponsible.
Whats more, Coke has been routinely outspending its cash flow in recent years
and funding the gap with debt. Additional spending on executive bonuses and
severance charges threatens to make this problem even worse. We believe the
companys excessive pay practices, combined with slowing profit growth, could
threaten Cokes 50-year record of dividend increases.
In 2010, Coca-Colas spending on capital expenditures, dividends and share
repurchases totaled $9.2 billion, which was covered by $9.4 billion in cash flow
from operations. But the following year, Cokes spending topped $11.7 billion
against just $9.5 billion in cash flow from operations. Coke borrowed to fill the
gap, and has done so every year since.
Source: Bloomberg. Calendar year data for 2010-2013; 2014 data is from 9/30/13 - 9/30/14.
Last year, Coke generated net income of $8.6 billion and paid $5.0 billion in
dividends. Thats a dividend-coverage ratio of 1.7x, which is far below that of
the average company in the S&P 500 Index, which stands at 5.0x.i
If we look ahead to next year, we believe Coke is likely to generate $9.2 billion of
net income,ii but could take a cash charge of $1 billion or more for employee
layoffs and other restructuring costsiii. And if Coke pays an additional $1 billion in
cash bonuses to the top 5% of management under the new Equity Plan Guidelines,
cash available for dividends, capital expenditures and share repurchases falls to
$7.2 billion.
That would result in a dividend coverage ratio of just 1.4x.
Could the Coke board fail to increase, or even reduce, the dividend and still
pay the top 5% of management outsized bonuses? Thats what worries us.
Putting Cokes record of annual dividend growth at risk would be irresponsible.
Cokes
managers have
been paid
handsomely
even as the
companys
performance
has lagged.
Coca-Cola management and its defenders will say that the Equity Plan isnt a
problem because Muhtar Kent and his team wont be paid unless they perform.
Well, that sounds comforting, but if you look at the facts, Cokes managers have
been paid handsomely even as the companys performance has lagged.
According to Cokes financial reports, annual equity grants to top management
have risen steadily over the past four years, while Cokes profit growth has stalled.
How can shareholders have any confidence that the Coke Board will hold
management accountable in the future if they havent done so in the past?
High pay for poor performance? Thats fizzy math. And its a bad deal for
Coca-Cola shareholders.
Source: Bloomberg, Coca-Cola Company 10-K filings. Calendar year data for 2010-2013; 2014 data
is from 9/30/13 - 9/30/14.
Coca-Cola and
its shareholders
deserve a firstrate, shareholderfocused board
of directors.
Cokes EBITDA margin of 28% falls far short of the profit margins of comparable
global beverage companies such as ABI InBev and SABMiller, which average
37% EBITDA marginsv. If Coke were able to achieve even a 37% EBITDA margin
though significant cost cuts at all levels of the company, the company would
generate an additional $4 billon of EBITDA per year. At Cokes current valuation
of 15x EBITDA, that $4 billon of incremental profit would be worth $60 billion of
shareholder value, or nearly $14 per share.
Recently announced cost-cutting initiatives of $3 billion per year fall far short of
what we believe can and should be done, and wont be fully realized until 2019.
On top of that, a meaningful portion of these cost savings may end up in the
pockets of the top 5% of management because of increased cash bonuses,
rather than in the pockets of shareholders.
Because of what we view as terrible compensation practices, bad management
decisions, and poor corporate governance, we believe that Coca-Cola stock trades
at a massive discount to its intrinsic value.
This chart represents Wintergreen Advisers LLCs subjective belief and is a projection. It is neither an
assurance nor an opinion as to the price at which the securities of The Coca-Cola Company will trade at
any time in the future.
We estimate that the discount placed on Cokes shares because of these issues is
between $30 and $38 per share. Removing these discounts would put Cokes
share price at $74 to $82 per share, in line with the $90 per share Nomura analyst
Ian Shackleton believes Coke shares could be worth in an LBO scenariovi.
We believe that resolving most of these issues is quite possible under the
leadership of a new and capable management team along with getting rid of bad
compensation plans, getting expenses and overhead under control, and replacing
the current long-serving directors with a truly shareholder-focused board.
About Wintergreen Advisers
Established in 2005, Wintergreen is an independent global money manager that
employs a research-driven value style in managing global securities. As of
September 30, 2014, Wintergreen Advisers had approximately $2.0 billion under
management on behalf of individuals and institutions through its mutual fund and
other clients, and is based in Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. Wintergreens clients
own over 2.5 million shares of The Coca-Cola Company, and have owned
Coca-Cola shares for over five years.
For further information on Wintergreen Advisers, please call 973-263-4500 or visit
www.wintergreenadvisers.com. Additional information regarding what we view as
the issues at The Coca-Cola Company may be found at www.FixBigSoda.com.
For information, forms and documents regarding our U.S. mutual fund, please
visit www.wintergreenfund.com
_________________________________________________________________
THIS REPORT INCLUDES INFORMATION BASED ON DATA FOUND IN FILINGS WITH THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INDEPENDENT INDUSTRY PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER SOURCES.
ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THAT THE DATA ARE RELIABLE, WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT, NOR HAVE WE
RECEIVED, PERMISSION FROM ANY THIRD-PARTY TO INCLUDE THEIR INFORMATION IN THIS PAPER.
MANY OF THE STATEMENTS IN THIS PAPER REFLECT OUR SUBJECTIVE BELIEF.
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS INVESTMENT
ADVICE, AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO BE AND DOES NOT EXPRESS ANY OPINION AS TO THE PRICE
AT WHICH THE SECURITIES OF THE COCA-COLA COMPANY MAY TRADE AT ANY TIME. THE
INFORMATION AND OPINIONS PROVIDED HEREIN SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS SPECIFIC ADVICE ON
THE MERITS OF ANY INVESTMENT DECISION. INVESTORS SHOULD MAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS
REGARDING THE COCA-COLA COMPANY AND ITS PROSPECTS BASED ON SUCH INVESTORS OWN
REVIEW OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND SHOULD NOT RELY ON THE INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN. NEITHER WINTERGREEN ADVISERS, LLC NOR ANY OF ITS AFFILIATES ACCEPTS
ANY LIABILITY WHATSOEVER FOR ANY DIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS HOWSOEVER ARISING,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, FROM ANY USE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN.
Source: Bloomberg
ii
iii
Source: Wintergreen estimates based on forecast layoffs and continued restructuring expenses
iv
Source: Bloomberg
Source: Bloomberg
vi