14081658

HIST7334A

TO WHAT EXTENT DOES HOBBES SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY PROVIDE A

SUCCESSFUL REFUTATION OF POLITICAL NATURALISM?

14081658

1
Introduction

Thomas Hobbes De Cive (On the Citizen) opens with a clear rejection of classical
political tradition, stating, The majority of previous writers on public Affairs either assume or
seek to prove or simply assert that Man is an animal born fit for SocietyThis axiom, thought
very widely asserted, is nevertheless false. Referencing the zon politikon (political animal) of
Aristotles Politics, Hobbes rebukes the political naturalism that characterises the philosophy of
his intellectual predecessors.1 While earlier writings on the origins of government claim that civil
society (interchangeably referred to by Hobbes as the commonwealth) existed as a product of
nature, his philosophy instead argues for the artificiality of its creation.
Hobbes famously describes the life of man outside society as nasty, brutish, and short,
a perilous state in which every person must defend themselves against one anothers self-serving
desires.2 The mutual fear that exists between all men in the state of nature then motivates the
creation of the commonwealth.3 Central to Hobbes theory is the idea of the social contract as a
mechanism by which man may leave nature and achieve security under the protection of a
sovereign. However, within his writings I have identified two prominent flaws that undermine
his refutation of political naturalism.
Section I of this paper analyses the role of justice and injustice in forming covenants,
arguing that Hobbes notion of the social contract necessitates the existence of both in nature.
Section II addresses the idea of tacit consent inherent in social contract theory and examines its
shortcomings as a philosophical basis for Hobbes writings. Throughout, I will outline the

1. Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorn. Cambridge Texts in the
History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 21. Kindle edition.
2. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), []. Kindle edition.
3. Hobbes, On the Citizen, 24.

14081658

implications of these issues on Hobbes attempts to discredit the work of earlier political
philosophers. Ultimately, I argue that Hobbes inability to reconcile the contradictory premise of
the initial social contract indeed weakens his argument against political naturalism, leaving him
incapable of successfully rejecting the classical political tradition.
I: Natural In/justice as a Requisite for Contract Formation
To successfully assess the notion of civil society as separate from the state of nature, we
must first understand the role of contract in forming the state. The foundational law of nature
dictates that man seek peace when possible; to achieve this peace and escape the state of nature,
man must surrender his natural right to all things either by renouncing individual rights or
transferring them to another.4 The reciprocal transference of rights among two or more
individuals subsequently comprises a contract.5 Civil society therefore arises from the largescale agreement of several men to subject their individual wills to the will of a single authority
and ceding their natural right to resist sovereign power.6
Often unmentioned in overviews of Hobbes social contract theory, justice and injustice
play an integral part in his ideas of state formation. Here, we begin to uncover some fundamental
challenges to the validity of his philosophy. Hobbes defines injustice as an act or failure to act
that causes the breaking of a valid agreement, while justice entails the upholding of an
agreement; moreover, everything that is not unjust must necessarily be just.7
We must now examine the relationship between justice/injustice and the formation of
civil society. In my analysis, I reference opposing passages identified by Hobbesian scholar
4. Ibid., 33.
5. Ibid., 36.
6. Ibid., 73.
7. Ibid., 46.

14081658

Michael J. Green, though explication of their logical contradictions is my own. First, Hobbes
asserts that justice and injustice do not exist in the state of nature:
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can
be Unjust. The notions Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place.
Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no InjusticeThey
are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude.8
As injustice entails breaking a valid agreement (also called a covenant), it logically follows that
if injustice does not exist in the state of nature, valid covenants cannot precede the existence of
the commonwealth. Based on evidence provided in Hobbes writings to support this conclusion,
we can derive the following:
(1) A covenant becomes invalid if either party has reason to fear its conditions will not be
upheld; 9
(2) Injustice by definition requires a valid covenant to exist;
(3) Therefore, injustice cannot exist until this fear is removed.
(4) However, in the state of nature this fear derives from the inability to enforce
agreements;
(5) Given (4), this fear cannot be removed in the state of nature; 10
(6) Therefore, no covenants made in the state of nature are valid; and
(7) Therefore, injustice cannot exist in the state of nature.
As Green observes, however, Hobbes in fact does allow for the existence of valid
covenants in nature, stating Covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer Nature, are

8. Hobbes, Leviathan, 71.

9. Ibid., 79.
10. Ibid.

14081658

obligatory.11 For example, a prisoner of war receives life from his captor in exchange for a
ransom; thus, fear of death obliges him to pay. Unlike covenants previously described, these
remain valid, as a covenant can only become void if the reason for fear appears after it has
already been made.12 Failure to uphold an obligatory covenant would constitute an act of
injustice, thus indicating the existence of injustice (and, therefore, justice) within the state of
nature.
Here, we see a major incongruity within Hobbes theory of the social contract. If we
maintain that injustice does not exist within the state of nature, it must follow that valid contracts
also do not exist; however, we therefore have no way of legitimating covenants predating the
commonwealth and cannot explain how the covenant that created civil society and brought man
out of nature could be established in the first place. But if we accept the possibility of valid
covenants within the state of nature, we must also accept the existence of injustice in nature.
Either justice and injustice are not, as Hobbes claims, products of society, or civil society itself is
natural.
Aristotles philosophy of political naturalism easily circumvents this issue through its
claims that man is a naturally political and social being and that the state is a product of nature.13
A natural urge incites man to form associations with others on an increasingly larger scale,
from the unity of man and woman for procreation to the establishment of households, villages,
and finally, the state.14 Thus, the states existence does not depend upon a covenant; simply
being born into nature comprises the sole prerequisite for mans innate ability to participate in
11. Michael J. Green, Justice and Law in Hobbes, in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 1
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 111. PDF.
12. Hobbes, Leviathan, 77.
13. Aristotle, The Politics, trans. T.A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (N.p.: Penguin Classics, 1981), 59.
14. Ibid., 56-59.

14081658

and receive the security guaranteed by civil society. For Hobbes, however, covenant enables the
creation of the commonwealth, and as such the fundamental premise of his political philosophy
hinges upon the existence of valid covenants in the state of nature. This inherent contradiction
within Hobbes work weakens the plausibility of his social contract theory and impairs his
attempt to disprove political naturalism.
II: Tacit Consent
In On the Duty of Man and Citizen, Hobbes intellectual successor Samuel Pufendorf
introduces the concept of tacit consent regarding the authority of parents over their children:
this authority rests also on the tacit consent of the child. One may rightly assume that if
the infant had had the use of reason at the time of birth, and had been able to perceive that
he could not survive without his parents care and the government implied by that care,
he would gladly have agreed to it, and stipulated in return that they give him a good
upbringing.15
According to this idea, the child does not consciously decide to submit to the authority of its
parents when born; rather, its submission is assumed based on its need of parental care to
survive.
Hobbes appears to rely upon this notion of implied consent in his formulation of the
social contract theory. He asserts in his writings on the state of man in nature that associations
between men are voluntary encounters, formed in the interest of self-preservation; thus the
commonwealth, a macro realisation of this pursuit of security, entails a volitional submission of
ones will and right of resistance to a sovereign authority.16 Here we see another deficiency in
Hobbes theory of the social contract: despite the voluntary nature of society, men do not agree
to take part in this society at birth.
15. Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law, ed. James Tully.
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 124. PDF.
16. Hobbes, On the Citizen, 23.

14081658

One might seek to rationalise our seemingly involuntary entrance into the social contract
at birth following the logic employed in Pufendorfs writings on parental authority. Applying
Pufendorfs framework to Hobbess political philosophy thus produces the following claim:
Mans participation in civil society is unstated, not overt. If man had possessed the ability to
reason in infancy, he would have recognised the danger inherent in the state of nature and his
inability to defend himself in nature, and therefore would have agreed to submit to sovereign
authority in return for his self-preservation. Indeed, Hobbes makes reference to this idea in his
writings on contracts. One indicates their acceptance of a contract either through verbal
agreement or through inference, which Hobbes identifies as the consequences of either words
and actions or a lack thereof.17 As man does not verbally confirm his participation in society
upon birth, his compliance is thus implied. But such an argument for mans tacit consent in
entering the social contract ultimately proves insufficient, relying purely on the hypothetical
assumption of what he would do, if he were capable of exercising his reason from birth.
Hume explicitly attacks the notion of tacit consent in his Treatise of Human Nature,
stating:
A tacit promise is, where the will is signified by other more diffuse signs than those of
speech; but a will there must certainly be in the case, and that can never escape the
persons notice, who exerted it, however silent or tacit. But were you to ask the far
greatest part of the nation, whether they had ever consented to the authority of their
rulersthey would be inclined to think very strangely of you; and would certainly reply,
that the affair depended not on their consent, but that they were born to such an
obedience.18
In other words, the idea of tacit consent implies that those who have entered into such an
agreement may have done so without conspicuous confirmation, but nevertheless retain
17. Hobbes, Leviathan, 74.
18. David Hume, Of the Passions. Vol. 2 of A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce
the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (London: 1740), T.3.2.8.9.
http://davidhume.org/texts/thn.html.

14081658

knowledge of their participation. Hume argues that within civil society, most individuals are
unaware of their purported agreement to submit to sovereign power; rather, they are more likely
to view the authority of the state as an immutable aspect of their very being.
Aristotle, like Hume, maintains that entrance into society comprises an intrinsic aspect of
human existence, specifically by asserting that the state derives from nature. He further upholds
this claim by stating that anyone who somehow existed outside the state by his nature would
be either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman.19 Thus according to political
naturalism, to deny the state is to deny ones basic humanity; moreover, this denial can only
result from the circumstances of ones birth and not through a voluntary rejection of society. As
with my prior discussion of injustice and the covenant, we see that political naturalism once
again succeeds in avoiding the logical pitfalls that undercut Hobbes theory. Given the
hypothetical nature of his argument, Hobbes philosophy fails to provide an adequate refutation
of Aristotle and Humes assertions, and thus calls into question the supposedly voluntary nature
of the social contract.
Conclusion
As I have shown, two major weaknesses exist within Hobbes theory of the social
contract: his contradictory assertion of the nonexistence of justice and injustice within nature and
the existence of valid contracts in nature, and his inconclusive idea of tacit consent. These
shortcomings ultimately diminish the effectiveness of his ideas of an artificially created state,
thereby rendering him unable to successfully reject classical traditions of political naturalism.
Ultimately, we have no way of determining the validity of either political naturalism or
social contract theory beyond examining the logical bases of both philosophies and weighing the
soundness of each. Nevertheless, there exists significant merit in critically examining Hobbes
19. Aristotle, The Politics, 59.

14081658
political thought, as many of his ideas on government continue to influence and inform
contemporary political science. In questioning his theories, we enhance our capability to
understand and assess the conceptual foundation of modern government and its subsequent
pragmatic applications.

14081658

9
Bibliography

Aristotle. The Politics. Translated by T.A. Sinclair. Edited by Trevor J. Saunders. Rev. ed.
Penguin Classics. N.p.: Penguin Classics, 1981.
Green, Michael J. Justice and Law in Hobbes. In Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy
1, 111-138. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003. PDF.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge Texts in the History
of Political Thought. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Kindle edition.
On the Citizen. Edited by Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorn.
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1998. Kindle edition.
Hume, David. Of Morals. Vol. 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to
Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. London, UK,
1740. http://davidhume.org/texts/thn.html.
Pufendorf, Samuel. On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law. Edited by James
Tully. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1991. PDF.