Supreme Court: Johan Persons and Family Relations 1 1 - 0 4 - 1 4

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and
TEODORA AYSON, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for
damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 19504. In said complaint,
petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz,
as shown by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate. Appellate Court, dated
April 12, 1984, which modified the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, dated January 23, 1975,
in a land registration case 1 filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros; that petitioners were deprived
of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case; that such income consisted of
rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00
per year thereafter; and that private respondents filed the land registration case and withheld possession of
the land from petitioners in bad faith. 2
In their answer, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that private respondent
Hontiveros was a widower while private respondent Ayson was single. They denied that they had deprived
petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, they alleged that possession of the
property in question had already been transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of
possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Capiz,
Mambusao, the return thereof having been received by petitioners' counsel; that since then, petitioners
have been directly receiving rentals from the tenants of the land, that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers; that the decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court in Land Registration Case No. N-581-25 was null and void since it was
based upon a ground which was not passed upon by the trial court; that petitioners' claim for damages was
barred by prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that there were no rentals due since private
respondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good faith and for value; and that private respondent Ayson had
nothing to do with the case as she was not married to private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not
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have any proprietary interest in the subject property. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to private respondents by way of
counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private respondents. 3
On May 16, 1991, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an allegation that "earnest
efforts towards a compromise have been made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful."
In due time, private respondents filed an Answer to Amended Complaint with Counterclaim, in which they
denied, among other things, that earnest efforts had been made to reach a compromise but the parties was
unsuccessful.
On July 19, 1995, petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private
respondents' answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the
complaint. 4 Private respondents opposed the motion alleging that they had denied petitioners' claims and
thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only be resolved after
trial. 5
On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. At the same time, however, it dismissed
the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and,
therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise. The order of the
trial court reads:6
The Court, after an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both
parties, is of the opinion and so holds that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not
only for the fact that the defendants in their answer, particularly in its paragraph 3 to the
amended complaint, specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also
because of the ruling in De Cruz vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 27759, April 17, 1970 (32 SCRA
307), citing Rili vs. Chunaco, 98 Phil. 505, which ruled that the party claiming damages
must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof and that though the rule is that failure to
specifically deny the allegations in the complaint or counter-claim is deemed an admission
of said allegations, there is however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegations
refer to the amount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. This ruling is in
accord with the provision of Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
That while the plaintiffs in their amended complaint alleged that earnest efforts towards a
compromise with the defendants were made, the fact is that their complaint was not
verified as provided in Article 151 of the Family Code. Besides, it is not believed that there
were indeed earnest efforts made to patch up and/or reconcile the two feuding brothers,
Gregorio and Augusto, both surnamed Hontiveros.
The submission of the plaintiffs that, assuming no such earnest efforts were made, the
same is not necessary or jurisdictional in the light of the ruling in Rufino Magbaleta, et al.,
petitioner, vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Ganong, et al., respondents, No. L-44903, April 22, 1977,
is, to the mind of this Court, not applicable to the case at bar for the fact is the rationale in
that case is not present in the instant case considering these salient points:
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a) Teodora Ayson, the alleged wife of defendant Gregorio Hontiveros and allegedly not a
member of the Hontiveros Family, is not shown to be really the wife of Gregorio also
denied in their verified answer to the amended complaint.
b) Teodora Ayson has not been shown to have acquired any proprietary right or interest in
the land that was litigated by Gregorio and Augusto, unlike the cited case of Magbaleta
where it was shown that a stranger to the family acquired certain right;
c) In the decision rendered by the appellate court no mention was made at all of the name
of Teodora Ayson as part-awardee of Lot 37 that was adjudged to Gregorio other than
himself who was therein described as a widower. Moreover, Teodora was never
mentioned in said decision, nor in the amended complaint and in the amended motion for
judgment on the pleadings that she ever took any part in the act of transaction that gave
rise to the damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs for which they now claim some
compensation.
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing premises, the Court orders, as it hereby
orders, the dismissal of this case with cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their motion was denied. 7 Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contend:
I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THAT IT DOES NOT ALLEGE
UNDER OATH THAT EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARD A COMPROMISE
WERE MADE PRIOR TO THE FILING THEREOF AS REQUIRED BY
ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT
DENYING THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND
ORDERING A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.
Private respondents raise a preliminary question. They argue that petitioners should have brought this case
on appeal to the Court of Appeals since the order of the trial court judge was actually a decision on the
merits. On the other hand, even if petition for certiorari were the proper remedy, they contend that the
petition is defective because the judge of the trial court has not been impleaded as a respondent. 8
Private respondents' contention is without merit. The petition in this case was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. As explained in Atlas Consolidated Mining Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals: 9
Under Section 5, subparagraph (2)(e), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme
Court is vested with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
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or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. A similar
provision is contained in Section 17, fourth paragraph, subparagraph (4) of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Act No. 5440. And, in such cases where only
questions of law are involved, Section 25 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in conjunction with Section 3 of Republic Act No.
5440, provides that the appeal to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition
for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court from the trial court on questions of
law have to be through the filing of a petition for review on certiorari. It has been held that:
. . . when a CFI (RTC) adjudicates a case in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, the correct mode of elevating the judgment to the Court of
Appeals is by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error, involving merely
the filing of a notice of appeal except only if the appeal is taken in
special proceedings and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed
under the law, in which even the filing of a record on appeal is additionally
required. Of course, when the appeal would involve purely questions of
law or any of the other cases (except criminal cases as stated hereunder)
specified in Section 5(2), Article X of the Constitution, it should be taken to
the Supreme Court by petition for review oncertiorari in accordance with
Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court.
By way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of law, this Court issued on March
9, 1930 Circular No. 2-90, paragraph 2 of which provides:
2. Appeals from Regional Courts to the Supreme Court. Except in
criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the
Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of
the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by
petition forcertiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that herein
petitioner adopted the correct mode of appeal in G.R. No. 88354 by filing with this Court
petition to review oncertiorari the decision of the Regional Trail Court of Pasig in Civil Case
No. 25528 and raising therein purely questions of law.
In Meneses v. Court of Appeals, it was held: 10
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It must also be stressed that the trial court's order of 5 June 1992 dismissing the
petitioner's complaint was, whether it was right or wrong, a final order because it had put
an end to the particular matter resolved, or settled definitely the matter therein disposed of
and left nothing more to be done by the trial court except the execution of the order. It is a
firmly settled rule that the remedy against such order is the remedy of appeal and
not certiorari. That appeal may be solely on questions of law, in which case it may be
taken only to this Court; or on questions of fact and law, in which case the appeal should
be brought to the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Murillo v. Consul, the appeal to this Court
should be by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
As private respondents themselves admit, the order of November 23, 1995 is a final order from which an
appeal can be taken. It is final in the sense that it disposes of the pending action before the court and puts
an end to the litigation so that nothing more was left for the trial court to do. 11 Furthermore, as the
questions raised as the questions of law, petition for review on certiorari is the proper mode of appeal.
These questions are: (1) whether after denying petitioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial
court could dismiss their complaint motu proprio for failure to comply with Art. 151 of the Family Code which
provides that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it appears from the
complaint, which must be verified, that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but the
same have failed; and (2) whether Art. 151 applies to this case. These questions do not require an
examination of the probative value of evidence presented and the truth or falsehood of facts asserted which
questions of fact would entail. 12
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint when no motion
to that effect was made by any of the parties. They point out that, in opposing the motion for judgment on
the pleadings, private respondents did not seek the dismissal of the case but only the denial of petitioners'
motion. Indeed, what private respondents asked was that trial be held on the merits.
Of course, there are instances when the trial court may order the dismissal of the case even without a
motion to that effect filed by any of the parties. In Baja v. Macandog, 13 this Court mentioned these cases,
to wit:
The court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without violating the plaintiff's right to be
heard, except in the following instances: if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial;
if he fails to prosecute his action for unreasonable length of time; or if he fails to comply
with the rules or any order of the court; or if the court finds that it has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the suit.
However, none of these exceptions appears in this case.
Moreover, the trial court itself found that "judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact
that [private respondents] in their answer . . . specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but
also because of the [rule] . . . that the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof.
. . . " Necessarily, a trial must be held.
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Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: 14

Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegation of the adverse party's pleadings, the court may, on
motion of the party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed, the trial court
has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party. 15 When there
are actual issues raised in the answer, such as one involving damages, which require the
presentation of evidence and assessment thereof by the trial court, it is improper for the judge to
render judgment based on the pleadings alone. 16 In this case, aside from the amount of damages,
the following factual issues have to be resolved, namely, (1) private respondent Teodora Ayson's
participation and/or liability, if any to petitioners and (2) the nature, extent, and duration of private
respondents' possession of the subject property. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied
petitioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings.
However, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint on the ground that, although it alleged that
earnest efforts had been made toward the settlement of the case but they proved futile, the complaint was
not verified for which reason the trial court could not believe the veracity of the allegation.
The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the
allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the same family, it could simply
have ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court has already ruled, the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the
ends of justice may be served. 17Otherwise, mere suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial court as to the
truth of the allegation that earnest efforts had been made toward a compromise but the parties' efforts
proved unsuccessful is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown that such efforts
had not really been exerted would the court be justified in dismissing the action. Thus, Art. 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed. It if is shown that no such efforts were in fact made,
the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is
not exclusively among the family members. Citing several cases 18 decided by this Court, petitioners claim
that whenever a stranger is a party in the case involving the family members, the requisite showing the
earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue that since private respondent Ayson is
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admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of
the Family Code.
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision,
the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants
and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. 19 As this Court held in Guerrero v.
RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI: 20
As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of
"brothers and sisters" as member of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law."
In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also
"brother-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the
same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration
of "members of the family," we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the mater.
Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-inlaw of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a
compromise before filing the present suit.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this
jurisdiction. 21Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the
spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of
Art. 151.
Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in effect
amends the Rules of Court. This, according to them, cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in
favor of the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the
conclusion we have reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon this
question. Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the very lis mota of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order, dated November 23, 1995 of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25 is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Hontiveros vs RTC
Hontiveros vs. RTC
GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999
FACTS:
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Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of
a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the
land registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that
Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of
and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the
property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial
court denied petitioners motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts
towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.
ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a
compromise as stated in Article 151.
HELD:
SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as
petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase members of the
same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and
brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not
given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros are regarded
as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.
APRIL MARTINEZ, FRITZ DANIEL MARTINEZ and MARIA OLIVIA MARTINEZ, petitioners, vs.
RODOLFO G. MARTINEZ, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59420 setting aside and reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30,
in Civil Case No. 00-96962 affirming, on appeal, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Manila in Civil Case No. 164761 (CV) for ejectment.
The Antecedents
The spouses Daniel P. Martinez, Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel
of land identified as Lot 18-B-2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 54334, as well as the
house constructed thereon.[2] On March 6, 1993, Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament [3] directing
the subdivision of the property into three lots, namely, Lots 18-B-2-A, 18-B-2-B and 18-B-2-C. He then
bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr.; Manolo was
designated as the administrator of the estate.
In May 1995, Daniel, Sr. suffered a stroke which resulted in the paralysis of the right side of his body.
Natividad died on October 26, 1996.[4] Daniel, Sr. passed away on October 6, 1997.[5]
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On September 16, 1998, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September
15, 1996, where the latter appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2 to Manolo and his wife Lucila.[6] He also
discovered that TCT No. 237936 was issued to the vendees based on the said deed of sale. [7]
Rodolfo filed a complaint[8] for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT No. 237936 against
his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. He also filed a criminal complaint
for estafa through falsification of a public document in the Office of the City Prosecutor against Manolo,
which was elevated to the Department of Justice.[9]
On motion of the defendants, the RTC issued an Order[10] on March 29, 1999, dismissing the
complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action
since there was no allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had been admitted to
probate. Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA.[11]
On October 4, 1999, Rodolfo filed a Petition with the RTC of Manila for the probate of the last will of
the deceased Daniel Martinez, Sr.[12]
In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate
the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that they were the
owners of the property covered by TCT No. 237936, and that pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1508, the matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement, but none was reached. They
appended the certification to file action executed by the barangay chairman to the complaint.
In his Answer[13] to the complaint filed on October 11, 1999, Rodolfo alleged, inter alia, that the
complaint failed to state a condition precedent, namely, that earnest efforts for an amicable settlement of
the matter between the parties had been exerted, but that none was reached. He also pointed out that the
dispute had not been referred to the barangay before the complaint was filed.
On October 20, 1999, the spouses Martinez filed an Amended Complaint in which they alleged that
earnest efforts toward a settlement had been made, but that the same proved futile. Rodolfo filed his
opposition thereto, on the ground that there was no motion for the admission of the amended complaint.
The trial court failed to act on the matter.
The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise had
been made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile. [14] No amicable settlement was,
likewise, reached by the parties during the preliminary conference because of irreconcilable differences.
The MTC was, thus, impelled to terminate the conference.[15]
On February 21, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Martinez. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff. The defendant, including
any person claiming right under him, is ordered:
1)
2)
To vacate the subject premises;

To pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 a month starting July 17,
last demand until he vacates the same;
3) To pay the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
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1999, the date of
4)
Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[16]
The trial court declared that the spouses Martinez had substantially complied with Article 151 of the
Family Code of the Philippines[17] based on the allegations of the complaint and the appended certification
to file action issued by the barangay captain.
Rodolfo appealed the decision to the RTC. On May 31, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment affirming
the appealed decision. He then filed a petition for review of the decision with the CA, alleging that:
1. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND WITHOUT
MERIT THE DEFENSE OF PETITIONER THAT THERE IS NO ALLEGATION IN THE
COMPLAINT THAT PETITIONER HAS UNLAWFULLY WITHHELD POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY FROM RESPONDENTS A REQUIREMENT IN [AN] UNLAWFUL DETAINER
SUIT.
2. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT
PETITIONERS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IS BY MERE TOLERANCE OF
RESPONDENTS.
3. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THE
RESPONDENTS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
4. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH DID NOT
RESOLVE THE SIXTH ISSUE, TO WIT, Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction over this case
considering that the allegations in the complaint makes out a case of accion publiciana.
5. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF CONCILIATION HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH.
7. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY
LAW.
PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. 98-91147 AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 99-95281,
INVOLVING THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS AND INVOLVING THE SAME
PROPERTY DID NOT DIVEST THE MTC OF AUTHORITY TO DECIDE THE CASE.
9. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH GRANTED THE
RELIEF PRAYED FOR BY THE RESPONDENTS.
10. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC.[18]
On November 27, 2003, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and reversing the decision of
the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the spouses Martinez had failed to comply with Article 151 of the
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Family code. The CA also held that the defect in their complaint before the MTC was not cured by the filing
of an amended complaint because the latter pleading was not admitted by the trial court.
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration of the said decision, the spouses Martinez filed the
present petition for review on certiorari, in which they raise the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION TO FILE ACTION AND THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
COMPLAINT THAT THE CASE PASSED [THROUGH] THE BARANGAY BUT NO SETTLEMENT WAS
REACHED, ARE SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE TO PROVE THAT, INDEED, EARNEST EFFORTS WERE,
IN FACT, MADE BUT THE SAME HAVE FAILED PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE
151 OF THE FAMILY CODE, CONSIDERING THAT ONE OF THE PARTIES TO A SUIT IN THIS CASE IS
NOT A MEMBER OF THE SAME FAMILY.[19]
The petitioners alleged that they substantially complied with Article 151 of the Family Code, since they
alleged the following in their original complaint:
2.
In compliance with P.D. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay, this case
passed [through] the Barangay and no settlement was forged between plaintiffs and defendant as a result
of which Certification to File Action was issued by Barangay 97, Zone 8, District I, Tondo, Manila. xxx
(Underscoring supplied)[20]
Further, the petitioners averred, they alleged in their position paper that they had exerted earnest
efforts towards a compromise which proved futile. They also point out that the MTC resolved to terminate
the preliminary conference due to irreconcilable difference between the parties. Besides, even before they
filed their original complaint, animosity already existed between them and the respondent due to the latters
filing of civil and criminal cases against them; hence, the objective of an amicable settlement could not
have been attained. Moreover, under Article 150 of the Family Code, petitioner Lucila Martinez had no
familial relations with the respondent, being a mere sister-in-law. She was a stranger to the respondent;
hence, there was no need for the petitioners[21] to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code.
The petition is meritorious.
Article 151 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were, in fact, made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
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The phrase members of the family must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family Code, to
wit:
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule.
Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration.[22]
As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle
than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made
toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and it is known
that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. [23]
Thus, a partys failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against a
family member would render such complaint premature.
In this case, the decision of the CA that the petitioners were mandated to comply with Article 151 of
the Family code and that they failed to do so is erroneous.
First. Petitioner Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law, was one of the plaintiffs in the MTC.
The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent:
As regards plaintiffs failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of
our Civil Code provides:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in Article 2035.
It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits filed or maintained
between members of the same family. This phrase, members of the same family, should, however, be
construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which:
Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiffs sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 which should be construed strictly,
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it being an exception to the general rule and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in
the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiffs failure
to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.[24]
Second. The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the Family Code
because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for
unlawful detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with P.D. No. 1508; and that, after due
proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at, resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a
certificate to file action.[25] The Court rules that such allegation in the complaint, as well as the certification
to file action by the barangaychairman, is sufficient compliance with article 151 of the Family Code. It bears
stressing that under Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, no complaint involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon shall be instituted or filed directly in court for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation between the parties and no settlement was reached.[26]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59420 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, as affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, in Civil Case No.
164761(CV) is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Martinez vs Martinez
Martinez vs Martinez
GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005
FACTS:
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. The former
executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots bequeathed to each of
his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the estate), and Daniel Jr. In October
1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September
1996 where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to them.
Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of the deed
of sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property which
the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement but none was
reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses that earnest efforts toward a compromise had
been made but the same proved futile.
ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.
HELD:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have failed.
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Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The petitioner is
not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent. Her relationship
with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be noted that the
petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 because they alleged in their complaint
that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the katarungan
Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was
arrived at resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.
Martinez vs. Martinez G.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005
Facts: The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon.
Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. He
then bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr. Manolo was
designated as the administrator of the estate.
Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father, where the latter appears to have sold to
Manolo and his wife Lucila. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT
against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. RTC dismissed the complaint for
annulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since there
was no allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had been admitted to probate.
Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA.
In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the
property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that they were the
owners of the property. The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile. No amicable
settlement was, likewise, reached by the parties during the preliminary conference because of
irreconcilable differences.
Issue: Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations in the complaint that the case
passed through the barangay are sufficient compliance to prove that earnest efforts were made.
Ruling: The petition was granted. As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder
and more tragic spectacle than litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every
effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the
family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers
Thus, a partys failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against a
family member would render such complaint premature.
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185920
July 20, 2010
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA R. ROTHMAN,
SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P. MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
DANILO PANGILINAN, RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and ROLANDO
ANTENOR, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint1 for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company
owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. By Decision 2 of April 15, 2005,
the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the company to pay the aggregate
amount ofP1,661,490.30 representing their backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive
leave pay.
The Decision having become final and executory and no settlement having been forged by the parties, the
Labor Arbiter issued on September 8, 2005 a writ of execution3 which the Deputy Sheriff of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos name covered by TCT
No. 38978, situated in Pandacan, Manila (Pandacan property).
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the
judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution.4 Respondents, however,
averred that the Pandacan property is not the Ramos family home, as it has another in Antipolo, and the
Pandacan property in fact served as the companys business address as borne by the companys
letterhead. Respondents added that, assuming that the Pandacan property was indeed the family home,
only the value equivalent to P300,000 was exempt from execution.
By Order5 of August 2, 2006, the Labor Arbiter denied the motion to quash, hence, Ramos and the
company appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiters Order.
Ramos and the company appealed to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died and
was substituted by herein petitioners. Petitioners also filed before the NLRC, as third-party claimants, a
Manifestation questioning the Notice to Vacate issued by the Sheriff, alleging that assuming that the
Pandacan property may be levied upon, the family home straddled two (2) lots, including the lot covered by
TCT No. 38978, hence, they cannot be asked to vacate the house. The Labor Arbiter was later to deny, by
Decision of May 7, 2009, the third-party claim, holding
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that Ramos death and petitioners substitution as his compulsory heirs would not nullify the sale at auction
of the Pandacan property. And the NLRC6 would later affirm the Labor Arbiters ruling, noting that
petitioners failed to exercise their right to redeem the Pandacan property within the one 1 year period or
until January 16, 2009. The NLRC brushed aside petitioners contention that they should have been given a
fresh period of 1 year from the time of Ramos death on July 29, 2008 or until July 30, 2009 to redeem the
property, holding that to do so would give petitioners, as mere heirs, a better right than the Ramos.
As to petitioners claim that the property was covered by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains and as
such only Ramos share can be levied upon, the NLRC ruled that petitioners failed to substantiate such
claim and that the phrase in the TCT indicating the registered owner as "Ernesto Ramos, married to Juanita
Trinidad, Filipinos," did not mean that both owned the property, the phrase having merely described
Ramos civil status.
Before the appellate court, petitioners alleged that the NLRC erred in ruling that the market value of the
property was P2,177,000 as assessed by the City Assessor of Manila and appearing in the documents
submitted before the Labor Arbiter, claiming that at the time the Pandacan property was constituted as the
family home in 1944, its value was way below P300,000; and that Art. 153 of the Family Code was
applicable, hence, they no longer had to resort to judicial or extrajudicial constitution.
In the assailed Decision7 of September 24, 2008, the appellate court, in denying petitioners appeal, held
that the Pandacan property was not exempted from execution, for while "Article 1538 of the Family Code
provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence, [it] did not mean that the article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code."
The appellate court went on to hold that what was applicable law were Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code,
hence, there was still a need to either judicially or extrajudicially constitute the Pandacan property as
petitioners family home before it can be exempted; and as petitioners failed to comply therewith, there was
no error in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution.
The only question raised in the present petition for review on certiorari is the propriety of the Court of
Appeals Decision holding that the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a
particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his
heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. 9
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.10 lays down the rules relative to the levy on execution over the family
home, viz:
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No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such.
There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an
unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on
which it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on the
property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the
time of its constitution, the amount ofP300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family
homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by
operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to
August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or
extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied)
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based
on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then
it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231
and 233 of the Civil Code.11 Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition
before the courts and the registration of the courts order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the
property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 12 of the Civil
Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of
Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor
from availing of the privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 15413 actually resides therein. Moreover,
the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one
spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain
amounts depending upon the area where it is
located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 15514 for
which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988.1avvphi1
And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is not sufficient that the person
claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be
set up and proved.15
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In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or
as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely
no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos family home,
the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the records show that the
sheriff exhausted all means to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos bank accounts 16 were
already closed while other properties in his or the companys name had already been transferred,17 and the
only property left was the Pandacan property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 185920
July 20, 2010
Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company
owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the
company to pay the respondents back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave
pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos name
situated in Pandacan.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy
the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued
that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually
the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.
Ruling:
Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law
applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment
debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home
was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been
constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil
Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial constitution.
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On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time
it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein.
Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if
exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not
exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which
the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable
must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3,
1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being
absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos
family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan
property valid.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO
CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA respondents.
Josefina Brandares-Almazan for petitioner.
ABC Law Offices for private respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages
may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.
The facts are undisputed.
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On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218
entitled"Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive part of which read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby, reversed and set
aside. Judgment is hereby rendered finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and
Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth.
Accordingly, defendants-appellees are ordered to pay jointly and severally to:
1. Plaintiffs-appellants, the Salinas spouses:
a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death of their son Audie
Salinas;
b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of said Audie Salinas;
c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas; and
d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:
a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan; and
b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.
3. Both plaintiff-appellants Salinas and Culan-Culan, P7,000.00 for attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.
All counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed. 1
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose
Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur.
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del
Sur containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of
P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of
the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan,
Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and assessed
value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the
office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging
therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969
prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
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under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and
that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those
enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the agricultural land although it is declared in the
name of defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original
possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper
government agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration thereof
was filed by defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on September 2, 1988.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is alleged that the trial court erred and acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to quash and/or to set aside levy on the properties
and in denying petitioner' motion for reconsideration of the order dated August 26, 1988. Petitioner
contends that only a question of law is involved in this petition. He asserts that the residential house and lot
was first occupied as his family residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family home under the
Family Code which took effect on August 4, 1988. Thus, petitioner argues that the said residential house
and lot is exempt from payment of the obligation enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code; and that the
decision in this case pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular accident took place on March 16, 1976
and which became final in 1988 is not one of those instances enumerated under Article 155 of the Family
Code when the family home may be levied upon and sold on execution. It is further alleged that the trial
court erred in holding that the said house and lot became a family home only on August 4, 1988 when the
Family Code became effective, and that the Family Code cannot be interpreted in such a way that all family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupancy prior to the
effectivity of the said Code and that they are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred
before the effectivity of said Code; and that it also erred when it declared that Article 162 of the Family
Code does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and
the land on which it is situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent
of the value allowed by law.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as
required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest
before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
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Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others
who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as
such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only
under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on
August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that
"the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does
not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No. The debt or
liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on
March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January
29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under
the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by
the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
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SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.
OSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS,
G.R. No. 86355
May 31, 1990
Facts:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July
1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong
Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to quash was filed by the
petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article
152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be
enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is
alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a
family home by operation of law under Article 153.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
Ruling:
The petitioners contention that petitioner and his family should consider it a family home from the
time it was occupied in 1969 is not well taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the
provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.
It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred
before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the
time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The debt and liability, which was the basis of
the judgment, was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions
from execution provided in the Family Code.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
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THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 97898 August 11, 1997

FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC., respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code
be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of said Code?
State of the Case
This is the principal question posed by petitioner in assailing the Decision of Respondent Court of
Appeals 1in CA-G.R. SP No. 18906 promulgated on February 21, 1990 and its Resolution
promulgated on March 21, 1991, affirming the orders issued by the trial court commanding the
issuance of various writs of execution to enforce the latter's decision in Civil Case No. 53271.
The Facts
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop 2 and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-squaremeter residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. 3 The property, located in
Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 174180.
On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner
and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to
collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company
entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent, the salient portion of which
provides:
c. That defendants will undertake to pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their
means permit, but expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be collected. (sic)
On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise
agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986,
private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted on September 23,
1986. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several
vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt,
24 | J o h a n
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these chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued
by the sheriff.
On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution
and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet
executory. They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet matured as there was no
showing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact been
collected. They buttressed their motion with supplements and other pleadings.
On August 11, 1989, private respondent opposed the motion on the following grounds: (a) it was
too late to question the September 23, 1986 Order considering that more than two years had
elapsed; (b) the second alias writ of execution had been partially implemented; and (c) petitioner
and his company were in bad faith in refusing to pay their indebtedness notwithstanding that from
February 1984 to January 5, 1989, they had collected the total amount of P41,664,895.56. On
September 21, 1989, private respondent filed an opposition to petitioner and his company's
addendum to the motion to quash the writ of execution. It alleged that the property covered by TCT
No. 174180 could not be considered a family home on the grounds that petitioner was already
living abroad and that the property, having been acquired in 1972, should have
been judicially constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution.
On September 26, 1989, the lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution and the
prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his company. Finding that petitioner and
his company had not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables amounting to
P57,224,319.75, the lower court held that the case had become final and executory. It also ruled
that petitioner's residence was not exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a family
home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
Hence, petitioner and his company filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing
the lower court's Orders of September 23, 1986 and September 26, 1989. On February 21, 1990,
Respondent Court of Appeals rendered its now questioned Decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari. The appellate court quoted with approval the findings of the lower court that: (a) the
judgment based on the compromise agreement had become final and executory, stressing that
petitioner and his company had collected the total amount of P57,224,319.75 but still failed to pay
their indebtedness and (b) there was no showing that petitioner's residence had been duly
constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution. On the second finding, the Court of
Appeals added that:
. . . . We agree with the respondent judge that there is no showing in evidence that
petitioner Maacop's residence under TCT 174180 has been duly constituted as a family
home in accordance with law. For one thing, it is the clear implication of Article 153 that the
family home continues to be so deemed constituted so long as any of its beneficiaries
enumerated in Article 154 actually resides therein. Conversely, it ceases to continue as
such family home if none of its beneficiaries actually occupies it. There is no showing in
evidence that any of its beneficiaries is actually residing therein. On the other hand, the
unrefuted assertion of private respondent is that petitioner Florante Maacop had already
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left the country and is now, together with all the members of his family, living in West
Covina, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Petitioner and his company filed a motion for reconsideration of this Decision on the ground that
the property covered by TCT No. 174180 was exempt from execution. On March 21, 1991, the
Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Resolution denying the motion. It anchored its ruling
on Modequillo v.Breva, 4 which held that "all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity
of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code."
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to this case, the Court of Appeals explained:
The record of the present case shows that petitioners incurred the debt of P3,468,000.00
from private respondent corporation on February 18, 1982 (Annex "A", Petition). The
judgment based upon the compromise agreement was rendered by the court on April 18,
1986 (Annex "C", ibid). Paraphrasing the aforecited Modequillo case, both the debt and the
judgment preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Verily, the case
at bar does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided under Article 155 of the
Family Code.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari arguing that the Court of
Appeals misapplied Modequillo. He contends that there was no need for him to constitute his
house and lot as a family home for it to be treated as such since he was and still is a resident of the
same property from the time "it was levied upon and up to this moment."
The Issue
As stated in the opening sentence of this Decision, the issue in this case boils down to whether a
final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the
Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the said Code.
The Court's Ruling
We answer the question in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. On
the contrary, its Decision and Resolution are supported by law and applicable jurisprudence.
No Novel Issue
At the outset, the Court notes that the issue submitted for resolution in the instant case is not
entirely new. In Manacop v. Court of Appeals, 5 petitioner himself as a party therein raised a similar
question of whether this very same property was exempt from preliminary attachment for the same
excuse that it was his family home. In said case, F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. filed a complaint for a sum of
money. As an incident in the proceedings before it, the trial court issued writ of attachment on the
said house and lot. In upholding the trial court (and the Court of Appeals) in that case, we ruled that
petitioner incurred the indebtedness in 1987 or prior to the effectively of the Family Code on August
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3, 1988. Hence, petitioner's family home was not exempt from attachment "by sheer force of
exclusion embodied in paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family Code cited in Modequillo," where the
Court categorically ruled:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially
or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises,
it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or
head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborer, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who
have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the
family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a
family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family
home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed
constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not
August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988
being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1960 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the
Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles
152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences
are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.Article 162 simply means that
all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
27 | J o h a n
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home under the Family Code, Article 162 does not state that provisions of Chapter 2, Title
V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited?
No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the
time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising
therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code. 6(Emphasis supplied.)
Article 153 of the Family Code
Has No Retroactive Effect
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that his residence was not exempt from
execution in view of his failure to show that the property involved "has been duly constituted as a
family home in accordance with law." He asserts that the Family Code and Modequillo require
simply the occupancy of the property by the petitioner, without need for its judicial or extrajudicial
constitution as a family home. 7
Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988, 8 the subject property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in
Article 153 of said code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family Code
does not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated
by the Civil Code 9 had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There being
absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home, it follows that the law's protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner. Since the debt
involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3,
1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family Code.
List of Beneficiary-Occupants Restricted
to Those Enumerated in the Code
In view of the foregoing discussion, there is no reason to address the other arguments of petitioner
other than to correct his misconception of the law. Petitioner contends that he should be deemed
residing in the family home because his stay in the United States is merely temporary. He asserts
that the person staying in the house is his overseer and that whenever his wife visited this country,
she stayed in the family home. This contention lacks merit.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by
"any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is "actual" is something real, or actually
existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive. 10 Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically.
Rather, the property may be occupied by the "beneficiaries" enumerated by Article 154 of the
Family Code.
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Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:

(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of the family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship
be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the
head of the family for lead support.
This enumeration may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the
husband and wife. 11 But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the
beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. Consequently, occupancy of a family home by an
overseer like Carmencita V. Abat in this case 12 is insufficient compliance with the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit. This Decision is immediately
executory. Double costs against petitioner.
Manacop vs CA
Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located
in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed
between petitioners corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint
for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former.
Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment
of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter
insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972
and is therefore exempt from attachment.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of
the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is
therefore not exempt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 177703
January 28, 2008
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA, petitioners,

vs.
JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
November 30, 2006 Decision1 and April 30, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
93570.
The relevant facts are culled from the records.
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-0010 with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 254, Las Pias City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for
judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent Fidel). Respondent is the son of
decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel
with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.
On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714
(84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma
G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice
to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any;
2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS is hereby awarded to
be reimbursed by the defendants to the plaintiff;
3. Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.3
The decision became final on March 15, 2004.4
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As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject
land), respondent sought its sale through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it. 5 Accordingly, the
RTC ordered the public auction of the subject land.6 The public auction sale was scheduled on May 31,
2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house (subject house)
standing on the subject land.7This prompted respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and
Motion for Contempt of Court,8praying that petitioners be declared in contempt.
The RTC denied the motion in an Order9 dated August 30, 2005, for the reason that petitioners were
justified in refusing to have the subject house included in the auction, thus:
The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or improvement erected on the
property should not be included in the auction sale.
A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the evidence adduced during the ex-parte
hearing clearly show that nothing was mentioned about the house existing on the land subject
matter of the case. In fact, even plaintiff's [respondent's] initiatory Complaint likewise did not
mention anything about the house. Undoubtedly therefore, the Court did not include the house in
its adjudication of the subject land because it was plaintiff himself who failed to allege the same. It
is a well-settled rule that the court can not give a relief to that which is not alleged and prayed for in
the complaint.
To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered accessory to the land on which it is built is
in effect to add to plaintiff's [a] right which has never been considered or passed upon during the
trial on the merits.
In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise, only the land should be partitioned in
accordance to[sic] the aforementioned Decision as the house can not be said to have been
necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus, plaintiff can not be declared as a co-owner of the same
house without evidence thereof and due hearing thereon.
The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly pointed out, judgment must stand
even at the risk that it might be erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court filed by plaintiff is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC, in its Order dated January 3, 2006, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.11
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari12 where he sought to have the RTC Orders set aside,
and prayed that he be allowed to proceed with the auction of the subject land including the subject house.
In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari, to wit:
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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated August 30, 2005 and January
3, 2006 issued by the RTC, in Civil Case No. SCA 03-0010, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the sheriff is ordered to proceed with the public auction sale of the subject lot covered
by TCT No. 383714, including the house constructed thereon.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution14 of April 30,
2007.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the CA erred in holding that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion for contempt of court.
The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be modified for reasons other than those advanced by
petitioners.
The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for indirect contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court prescribes the procedure for the institution of proceedings for indirect contempt, viz:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu
proprioby the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal
charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition
with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for
civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a
principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition
shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
(Emphases supplied.)
Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for initiating an indirect contempt
proceeding are a) that it be initiated by way of a verified petition and b) that it should fully comply with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. In Regalado v. Go,15 we held:
As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that has complied
with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory x x x:
This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for commencing
contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as special civil action
under the former Rules, the heterogenous practice tolerated by the courts, has been for
any party to file a motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefore and without
complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the
second paragraph of this amended section.
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xxxx
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by order of or a
formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition
with full compliance with the requirements therefore and shall be disposed in accordance
with the second paragraph of this section.
xxxx
Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court
already acquired jurisdiction, the rules direct that the petition for contempt be
treated independently of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary
prerequisites for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified
petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of
the necessary docket fees, must be faithfully observed.
xxxx
The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical language. In case where the
indirect contempt charge is not initiated by the courts, the filing of a verified petition which fulfills the
requirements on initiatory pleadings is a prerequisite. Beyond question now is the mandatory
requirement of a verified petition in initiating an indirect contempt proceeding. Truly, prior to the
amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion without complying with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings was tolerated by the courts. At the onset of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, however, such practice can no longer be countenanced.16 (Emphasis
ours.)
The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceeding initiated by respondent. The
latter did not comply with any of the mandatory requirements of Section 4, Rule 71. He filed a mere Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, and not a verified petition. He likewise did not conform
with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings such as the submission of a certification against
forum shopping and the payment of docket fees. Thus, his unverified motion should have been dismissed
outright by the RTC.
It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked the infirmities in respondent's unverified motion for
contempt, in the end, it dismissed the motion, albeit on substantive grounds. The trouble is that, in the CA
decision assailed herein, the appellate court committed the same oversight by delving into the merits of
respondent's unverified motion and granting the relief sought therein. Thus, strictly speaking, the proper
disposition of the present petition ought to be the reversal of the CA decision and the dismissal of
respondent's unverified motion for contempt filed in the RTC for being in contravention of Section 4, Rule
71.
However, such simplistic disposition will not put an end to the dispute between the parties. A seed of
litigation has already been sown that will likely sprout into another case between them at a later time. We
refer to the question of whether the subject house should be included in the public auction of the subject
33 | J o h a n
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land. Until this question is finally resolved, there will be no end to litigation between the parties. We must
therefore deal with it squarely, here and now.
The RTC and the CA differed in their views on whether the public auction should include the subject house.
The RTC excluded the subject house because respondent never alleged its existence in his complaint for
partition or established his co-ownership thereof.17 On the other hand, citing Articles 440,18 44519 and
44620 of the Civil Code, the CA held that as the deceased owned the subject land, he also owned the
subject house which is a mere accessory to the land. Both properties form part of the estate of the
deceased and are held in co-ownership by his heirs, the parties herein. Hence, the CA concludes that any
decision in the action for partition of said estate should cover not just the subject land but also the subject
house.21 The CA further pointed out that petitioners themselves implicitly recognized the inclusion of the
subject house in the partition of the subject land when they proposed in their letter of August 5, 2004, the
following swapping-arrangement:
Sir:
Thank you very much for accommodating us even if we are only poor and simple people. We are
very much pleased with the decision of Presiding Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., RTC Br. 254,
Las Pias, on the sharing of one-third (1/3) each of a land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 383714 (84191) in Las Pias City.
However, to preserve the sanctity of our house which is our residence for more than twenty (20)
years, we wish to request that the 1/3 share of John Nabor C. Arriola be paid by the defendants
depending on the choice of the plaintiff between item (1) or item (2), detailed as follows:
(1) Swap with a 500-square meters [sic] lot located at Baras Rizal x x x.
(2) Cash of P205,700.00 x x x.
x x x x.22
We agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition for reasons postulated by the CA.
We qualify, however, that this ruling does not necessarily countenance the immediate and actual partition
of the subject house by way of public auction in view of the suspensive proscription imposed under Article
159 of The Family Code which will be discussed forthwith.
It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically alleged in the complaint for partition.
Such omission notwithstanding, the subject house is deemed part of the judgment of partition for two
compelling reasons.
First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part
of the subject land. The Court quotes with approval the ruling of the CA, to wit:
The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August 30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the house
constructed on the subject lot was not alleged in the complaint and its ownership was not passed
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upon during the trial on the merits, the court cannot include the house in its adjudication of the
subject lot. The court further stated that it cannot give a relief to[sic] which is not alleged and
prayed for in the complaint.
We are not persuaded.
To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC will in effect render meaningless the pertinent rule on
accession. In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on
the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the improvements including the house
were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which
they stand, following the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of judicial
partition in this case includes the house which is permanently attached thereto, otherwise,
it would be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is
permanently attached thereto.23(Emphasis supplied)
Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by the deceased. 24 Petitioners
never controverted such claim. There is then no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the
deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties herein,25 any one of whom,
under Article 49426 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject
house.27 Therefore, respondent's recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of
all by the mere technical omission of said common property from the complaint for partition.
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as part of the
co-ownership of the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by public auction at
this time. It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases: first, the declaration of the
existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership
through the segregation of the common property.28 What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject
house is under the co-ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition among them.
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely different
matter, depending on the exact nature of the subject house.
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive
property.29 Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years. 30 Taken together, these
averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the contemplation of the
provisions of The Family Code, particularly:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried
head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it
is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
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execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home
from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial
processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the
dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these
concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are
deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began
occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.31
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the
deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family
Code, viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. To
this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing
the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of
10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer
period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially
partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling
reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition
of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale
as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home
regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the coownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family
home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the
individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to
the beneficiaries of the family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it
stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the
parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003.32 Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March
10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he
constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise
set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property.
36 | J o h a n
11-04-14
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals33 that a claim for exception from execution or forced sale
under Article 153 should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject house although for a different
reason.
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject house is part of the judgment
of co-ownership and partition. The same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the portion
of the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and
his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period
of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.
It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of
the portion of the subject land covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of the
family home.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006 Decision and April 30,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-ownership of the parties John Nabor
C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction
within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.
No costs.
Case Digest:
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA, Petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C.
ARRIOLA, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008]
Facts:
Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John Nabor Arriola (respondent) ,his son with his first
wife , and Vilma G. Arriola, his second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioners).
On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by TCT
No 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola,
Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to
the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any.
However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the above mentioned property and so the respondent
proposed to sell it though public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refused to include in the auction
the house standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for
Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.
37 | J o h a n
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When a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, the respondent elevated the case to the CA
with a petition for certiorari and prayed that he be allowed to push through with the auction of the subject
land including the house built on it. The CA granted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of the
subject lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied
the said motion. Hence this petition for review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgement of partition
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition but in view of the
suspended proscription imposed under Article 159 of the family code, the subject house immediately
partitioned to the heirs.
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a
family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as
a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on
which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the
moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)
PERLA G. PATRICIO,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 170829

Present:
- versus -
MARCELINO G. DARIO III and

THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Second Division,
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),

Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
Promulgated:
38 | J o h a n
11-04-14
Respondents.
November 20, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 9, 2005 [1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680, which
dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner for being contrary to law and evidence.
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among
the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon
situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering an area of
seven hundred fifty five (755) square meters, more or less.[2]
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the
estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled and TCT No. R213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private respondent and Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to
partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the
property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
On October 3, 2002,[3] the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the following
manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court
39 | J o h a n
11-04-14
also ordered the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may put up their
bids. In case of failure, the subject property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner. [4]
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on August
11, 2003,[5] hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied the same on October 19,
2005. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent on December 9, 2005, the
appellate court partially reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of
merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as
there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private
respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor
beneficiary of the family home.[6]
Hence, the instant petition on the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITS
EARLIER DECISION OF OCTOBER 19, 2005 WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED 03 OCTOBER 2002 GRANTING THE
PARTITION AND SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II.
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF THE FAMILY CODE ON
FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN RELATION TO ARTICLES 495 AND 498
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON CO-OWNERSHIP.[7]
The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse
to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by
spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein
40 | J o h a n
11-04-14
namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is
living in the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private
respondent insists that even after the expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July 5,
1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject property continues to be considered as the family home
considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said family home,
still resides in the premises.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family home of the
surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997, which was the 10 th year from the date
of death of the decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private respondent
Marcelino III were already of age at the time of the death of their father, [8] hence there is no more minor
beneficiary to speak of.
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that
last during ones lifetime.[9] It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a
family, reside, including the land on which it is situated.[10] It is constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family.[11] The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. [12]
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any
of its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or actually existing, as
opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual
occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be
occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the inlaws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes
maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.[13]
41 | J o h a n
11-04-14
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The
husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in
the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the
relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the
death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long
as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family
home.
Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death occurs to persons who constituted
the family home. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino comments on the effect of death of one or both spouses or the
unmarried head of a family on the continuing existence of the family home:
Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the
family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate
property as family home, the property will remain as family home for ten years or for as
long as there is a minor beneficiary living in it. If there is no more beneficiary left at the
time of death, we believe the family home will be dissolved or cease, because there
is no more reason for its existence. If there are beneficiaries who survive living in
the family home, it will continue for ten years, unless at the expiration of the ten
years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues
until that beneficiary becomes of age.
After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by the heirs. May the
heirs who are beneficiaries of the family home keep it intact by not partitioning the property
after the period provided by this article? We believe that although the heirs will
continue in ownership by not partitioning the property, it will cease to be a family
home.[14] (Emphasis supplied)
42 | J o h a n
11-04-14
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this manner:
The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both spouses or
of the unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its continued existence
is dependent upon whether there is still a minor-beneficiary residing therein. For as
long as there is one beneficiary even if the head of the family or both spouses are
already dead, the family home will continue to exist (Arts. 153, 159). If there is no
minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years and within this period, the heirs
cannot partition the same except when there are compelling reasons which will
justify the partition. This rule applies regardless of whoever owns the property or who
constituted the family home.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are
beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the
expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that
beneficiary becomes of age.
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the family home may be
preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who
constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate
property as family home. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be
preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to
safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be
capable of supporting himself. However, three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled
to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in
the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private
respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code.
43 | J o h a n
11-04-14
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers
and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term descendants contemplates all
descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must
necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family
home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should
not distinguish. Thus, private respondents minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V.
Dario satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of
the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private
respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since
1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his
paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support
falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent
who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the
shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his
father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154
because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is
his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home
separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
44 | J o h a n
11-04-14
Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. [16] Legal support has the following
characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is
intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or
execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount.[17]
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting
them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. [18] We agree with this
view.
The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the closer the relationship of the
relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines
the order of liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their
default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there
any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her
grandsons legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of the property which
shows an intention to dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for its existence after the 10year period ended in 1997.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property.
The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it results in inequitable
situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners should be afforded every available opportunity to divide
their co-owned property to prevent these situations from arising.
45 | J o h a n
11-04-14
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos,[19] no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership

indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at any time. An action to demand partition
is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the common property.[20]
Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the court a quo should have ordered a
partition by commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Not more than three
competent and disinterested persons should be appointed as commissioners to make the partition,
commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the
property as the court shall direct.
When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be
divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court may order it assigned to one of the
parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the
commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of
being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public
sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly.[21]
The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance with the rule embodied in Art.
996 of the Civil Code.[22] Under the law of intestate succession, if the widow and legitimate children
survive, the widow has the same share as that of each of the children. However, since only one-half of the
conjugal property which is owned by the decedent is to be allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs (the
other half to be given exclusively to the surviving spouse as her conjugal share of the property), the widow
will have the same share as each of her two surviving children. Hence, the respective shares of the subject
property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1) Perla Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc
G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.
In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals,[23] we held that an action for partition is at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties
46 | J o h a n
11-04-14
involved. If the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may
and should order the partition of the properties in the same action.[24]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 80680 dated December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY
COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical partition of the subject property, as well as the
improvements that lie therein, in the following manner: Perla G. Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6
and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent
and disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and bounds of the property and the
proper share appertaining to each heir, including the improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court. When it is made to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be
divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court a quo may order it assigned to one of
the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as
the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold
instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate
at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and thereafter distribute the
proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just share of each heir. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Patricio vs Dario
G.R. No. 170829
Topic: Family Home
____________
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last
during one's lifetime
Facts:
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their
two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III.
He left a residential house and a pre-school building situated at Cubao, Quezon City.
47 | J o h a n
11-04-14
Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extra judicially settled the estate of Marcelino V.
Dario.
Petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the
subject property and terminate the co-ownership.
o Private responded refused to partition the property.
o Petitioner and Marcelino Marc filed an action for partition before RTC Quezon City
Trial court ordered the partition of the property.
o Private respondents motion for reconsideration denied.
Appeal to the Court of Appeals denied:
o Upon motion for reconsideration, CA dismissed the petitioners motion for partition.
It held that family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses
as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the
property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. [Son of the
private respondent was a minor beneficiary of the family home]
Issue: Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such
partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
Held: Petition granted as the minor son does not satisfy all the requisites to be considered as a beneficiary
of the family home.
Ratio:
Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the
relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
On the first requisite:
o The beneficiaries of the family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate.
o Descendants- contemplate all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family
home without distinction. It includes the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who
constitute a family home
On the second requisite:
48 | J o h a n
11-04-14
o The grand son has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of
the decedent
On the third requisite [fail! Did not satisfy!]:
o Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has
parents who are capable of supporting him.
o Marcelino IV is dependent on the legal support of his father and not his grandmother.
o Hence, no legal impediment in partitioning the property.
*No co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on
the common property at any time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by
laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property.
49 | J o h a n
11-04-14

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: 14

To vacate the subject premises;

1999, the date of

Republic of the Philippines

July 20, 2010

July 20, 2010

Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:

May 31, 1990

G.R. No. 97898 August 11, 1997

Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:

Republic of the Philippines

January 28, 2008

VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA, petitioners,

G.R. No. 170829

MARCELINO G. DARIO III and

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),

November 20, 2006

As we ruled in Santos v. Santos,[19] no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership

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