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Cuenco vs.

CA
FACTS: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing
in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage,
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died
intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the
probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on
the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper
venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to
dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUEs:

Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition


Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceeding.

HELD: The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court
from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its
admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
On Venue and Jurisdiction. Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is
not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the
prompt administration of justice. The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of
the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Uriarte vs CFI
Facts: Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain and he left reasonable properties in thePhilippines. Vicente Uriarte, who is
claiming to be the son and sole heir of thedeceased, filed a petition for the intestate settlement of the estate of the
deceased inthe Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. However, said petition was opposed bythe nephews of Juan
stating that there is a valid will left by the deceased in Spain, acopy of which is being requested. Then, the nephews filed
a settlement of the estate inthe court of Manila, on the basis of the alleged will of the deceased.Vicente filed an
opposition to the settlement of estate in the court of Manilastating that the court of Negros Occidental has already
acquired original jurisdiction over the case. The opposition of Vicente was dismissed together with the intestate
settlementIn the CFI of Negros.Hence, Vicente filed a petition for certiorari questioning the dismissal of theintestate
settlement in the CFI of Negros.
Issue: Whether or not the intestate settlement should be dismissed.
Ruling of the Case: The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is proper.Under the Rules on
the settlement of estate of the deceased person, testateproceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

Therefore, in case intestatesettlement was filed prior to the finding of the will of the deceased, then the
intestateproceedings shall be dismissed to give priority to the testate proceeding.
HEIRS OF DORONIO vs. HEIRS OF DORONIO
Facts: Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante deceased,were the registered owners of a parcel of land located.
Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, deceased, were the children of the spouses and the parties in this
case aretheir heirs.
Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio.
Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico filed before the RTC inUrdaneta,
Pangasinana petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation"docketed as Petition Case No. U-920.
No respondents were named in the said petition although notices of hearing were posted on the bulletin boards
of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen. During the hearings, no one interposed an objection
tothe petition. After the RTC ordered a general default, the petition was eventually granted on September 22, 1993.
This led to the registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of anew
TransferCertificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico. Thus, the entire
property was titled in the names of petitioners predecessors.
On April 28, 1994,the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of a petition in the
samePetition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered
theregistration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that an order be issued declaring null
andvoid the registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be cancelled. However, the petition
wasdismissed on the ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become final as it was not
appealed.
Issue: Can respondents be bound by the decision in Petition CaseNo. U-920 even if they were not made parties in the
saidcase?
Held: Petitioners cannot use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as a shield against the verification
of thevalidity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said final decision is one for quieting of title. In other
words, it is acase for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules of Court. Suits to quiet title are not
technically suits in rem,nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res,
these proceedings arecharacterized as quasi in rem. The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties. Thus, respondents arenot bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not made parties in the
said case.The rules on quieting of title expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice
persons who are not parties to the action.That respondents filed a subsequent pleading in the same Petition Case No. U920 after the decision there had become final didnot change the fact that said decision became final without their being
impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading wasdismissed onthe ground of finality of the decision
Carreon v. Agcaoli
Facts: Sps. Bonifacio and Celerina Carreon purchased the land subject of this case. When Bonifacio died, Celerina
adjudicated to herself the land declaring herself as the sole heiress of her husband for which a transfer certificate was
issued in her name on Sept 28, 1946 with an annotation that it was subject to Sec. 4 Rule 74 of the RoC. She then
borrowed money from the PNB secured by a REM on of the land. To pay for the loan, was sold to Rufo Agcaoili
hence a new TCT was issued in his name. In Feb 1955, the children of Celerina sought to have a deed of sale executed by
their mother be declared as one of mortgage and to recover the tract of land. The court ruled in favor of Agcaoli hence
this appeal. It was alleged that Agcaoili was a buyer in bad faith and that a trust relationship existed.
Issue: W/N Agcaoli was a buyer in good faith
Held: YES!
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There is no clear proof the Agcaoli knew of any flaw in the title of Celerina. The mere fact of being a townmate is not a
sufficient basis to conclude that he knew she had children. It was shown that he rarely came home since he was an
enlisted man in the Phil. Constabulary hence he cannot be expected to know the relatives and children of this vendor.
Fraud cannot be presumed. It must be established by clear and sufficient evidence. If fraud was committed, such was
perpetrated by Celerina. Agcaoli is only charged with notice of the burdens which are noted on the face of the title and
nothing more.
On the title was an annotation that it was subject to Rule 74, Sec. 4 which is effective only for 2 years. From Sept. 28
1946 when a TCT was issued in Celerinas name until the time when the deed of sale was issued to Agcaoli, more than 2
years had elapsed. Agcaoli had the right to have such lien cancelled.
Hernandez v. Andal
Facts: Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez are sisters who inherited from their father a parcel of land. They
partitioned the land verbally. Afterwards Maria and Aquilina sold their share to Zacarias Andal. Cresencia tried to
repurchase the land sold at P150 but Andal did not agree. In her supplemental complaint she alleged that she offered to
repurchase it for P860 but Andal asked for an extension but later on sold the land back to Maria and Aquilina for P970.
During trial, counsel for plaintiff contended that the best evidence was the document of partition. The trial court ruled
that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court and Art. 1248 of the CC, parol evidence of partition is inadmissible
hence the resale of Andal to the Hernandezes was null and void. Hence this appeal.
Issue: W/N a contract of partition can be proved by parol evidence
Held: YES!
There are 2 conflicting views as to whether an agreement of partition should be in writing under the statute of frauds.
Partition is excluded from the operation of the statute of frauds for the reason that partition is not a conveyance but
simply a separation and designation of that part of the lands which belongs to each tenant in common.
Rule 74 Sec. 1 provides that when there are no outstanding debts the heirs may divide the estate by means of a public
instrument. Although it is contended that a verbal partition is entirely void and cannot be validated by any acts short
of the execution of a public document, there are no indications in the phraseology of the rule to justify an affirmative
answer. Where the law intends a writing or other formality to be the essential requisite to the validity of the
transaction it says so in clear and unequivocal terms. Sec. 1 Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that
the required public instrument is to be constitutive of a contract of partition.
Likewise, the Rules of Court promulgated by the Judicial department deals with matters of procedure exclusively. For the
Court to prescribe what is to be a binding agreement between co-heirs in the settlement of their private affairs which in
no way affect the rights of 3rd parties would be to transcend its rule-making power.

Fleumer vs. Hix54 Phil 610


Facts:The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latters will wasexecuted
in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction,and that the laws of that
state govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia
Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 andas certified to by the Director of National Library.The Judge
of the First Instance however denied the probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and301 of the Code of Civil
Procedure were not complied with. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in West Virginia as a prerequisiteto the
allowance and recording of said will.
Held: Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of thePhilippine Islands
are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various states of theAmerican Union. Such laws must be
proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not met.There was no showing that the book from which an
extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Nor wasthe extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the
original, under theseal of the State of West Virginia as provided in Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing that
theextract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time alleged will was executed.The court therefore did not
err in denying the probate of the will. The existence of such law in WestVirginia must be proved.

BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ


64 SCRA 452
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and six legitimate children. Felix Balanay, Jr.
filed a petition for the probate of his mothers notarial will, which was written in English. In thatwill, Leodegaria declared
that it was her desire her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their
legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. She devised andpartitioned the conjugal lands as if they
were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets. Felix Balanay, Sr.
and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will. Thereafter, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument waiving and
renouncing his right in Leodegarias estate in favor of their 6 children.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on
itsallowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
RULING: The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formalvalidity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears tobe intrinsically void
.But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into anintestate
proceeding.The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the
creditors andimpair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix
Balanay, Sr. In themeantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.

Rodelas v. Aranza Digest


Rodelas v. Aranza
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
Relova, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla in 1977. The petition was
opposed by the appellees on the ground that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.
2. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will was lost, a photostatic copy
cannot stand in the place of the original.
Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy

RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.

Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals


Facts:
1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It
was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.
2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was
procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.
3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will
invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the
petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.
Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will
RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain
provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.
The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand
the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not
ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage
at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

RODRIGUEZ v RODRIGUEZ532 SCRA 642, September 11, 2007


FACTS:Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment. On October 27, 1983, he executed a Huling Habilin at
Testamento giving petitioner Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez, his live-inpartner, apartments D and E and his children
Benjamin Rodriguez (the deceasehusband of respondent Evangeline Rodriguez), apartment A, respondent
BuenaventuraRodriguez, apartment B, and respondent Belen Rodriguez, apartment C. However, onJune 14, 1984,
Juanito executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of petitioner.Petitioner filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against the respondents, alleging thatshe was the lawful and registered owner of the property and she
only allowed therespondents Evangelin, Buenaventura and Belen, out of kindness and tolerance, tooccupy units A, B and
D, respectively. However, without her knowledge and consent,respondents separately leased the units to lessees, who
despite repeated demands,failed and refused to vacate the premises and to pay rentals.Respondents, on the other
hand, claimed ownership over the subject property bysuccession and alleged that the petitioner is not the lawful owner
because the Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated and void. Also, they maintained that petitioner exertedundue
influence over their father, who at that time was seriously ill, to agree to the saleof the property for only P20,000.00
after knowing that only two apartments were given to her in the Huling Habilin at Testamento. Morover, they alleged
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that petitioner has nocause of action against them for being a party to thePartition Agreement wherein theyrecognized
each other as co-owners and partitioned the property in accordance with theprovision of the last will and
testament.MTC rendered a judgment on favor of the respondents and held that the Deed of Sale
was simulated. The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC and held that petitioners
certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the subject property. Also, itwas held by the RTC that MTC
erred when it relied heavily on the
Huling Habilin at Testamento
, which was not probated hence has no effect and no right can be claimed
therein. The Partition Agreement which was allegedly entered into pursuant to the
Huling Habilin at Testamento
should not also be considered. CA reversed the decision of the RTC further held that he
Huling Habilin at Testamento
transmitted ownership of thespecific apartments not only to the respondents but also to the petitioner; and pursuant
thereto, the parties executed the Partition Agreement in accordance with the wishes of the testator.ISSUE:Whether the
respondents have right of possession over the subject property in theabsence of probate of the will.HELD:NO.
Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the
Huling Habilin at Testamento
and the Partition Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not beenprobated. Before any will can have force or
validity it must be probated. This cannot bedispensed with and is a matter of public policy. Article 838 of the Civil Code
mandates
that
[n]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed inaccordance with the Rules of Court
.
As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto can not be given
effect. Thus, the factthat petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue
of possession.

Francisco Cuizon et al. vs. Hon. Jose R. Ramolete


May 29, 1984 | Gutierrez, Jr.
Facts:
As early as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land in Mandaue City docketed as L.R.
Case No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his property between his two daughters, Rufina and Irene, to whom the salt
beds subject of the controversy was given. In 1971, Irene executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving
the said salt beds in favor of petitioners Franciso et al.
Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1972, the decree of registration and the
corresponding O.C.T. was issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same year, T.C.T No. 10477
covering the property in question was issued to Irene. The latter died in 1978.
During the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, Rufina, the mother of Francisco et al., adjudicated to herself all the
property of Irene including the salt beds in question. She then executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein she
confirmed and ratified the 1971 deed of sale and renounced and waived whatever rights and interests and participation
she may have in the property in question in favor of the petitioners. The deed was annotated in T.C.T. No. 10477.
Subsequently, T.C.T. No. 12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners.
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In 1978, Domingo Antigua, who allegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene to act as administrator, was appointed
administrator by the CFI of Cebu. Antigua included the salt bed in the inventory of Irenes estate and asked the Cebu CFI
to order petitioners to deliver the salt to him. The Cebu CFI granted the same.
Issue: Whether a court handling the intestate proceedings has jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT
issued in favor owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said parcels of have been?
Held: No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to
belong to outside parties. All said court could do is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is dispute, then the administrator and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because
the probate court cannot do so.
In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it was sold seven years before the
death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to the proceedings.
In Bolisay vs. Alcid, the Court held that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action.
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was covered by a TCT issued in the name of third parties,
the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in
question from the inventory of the property of the estate.
Doctrine: Probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally
claimed to belong to outside parties.
LORENZO BERICO and VISITACION SANCHEZ, petitioners,
G.R. No. 96306
vs.
August 20, 1993
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Ninth Division),
CIRIACO FLORES and FELISA BAREJA, respondents.
Facts:
A certain Jose de los Santos owned a 98,254 square-meter parcel of land designated as Lot No. 785, PLs-32 located at
Balo-Andang, San Ramon, San Pascual (now Claveria), Masbate; the property is specifically described in Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-671 issued on 31 May 1956. On 31 October 1961, Jose sold, in a private document, a 2
1/4 hectare portion thereof to the private respondents. On 26 November 1963, however, he executed another deed of
sale which he acknowledged before a notary public. Private respondents took possession of the portion sold to them
immediately after the 1961 sale and declared the same for taxation purposes in the name of private respondent Ciriaco
Flores; private respondents likewise paid the taxes thereon.
On 3 January 1963, Jose de los Santos sold one-half of Lot No. 785 to petitioner Lorenzo Berico. Thereafter, or on 30
March 1963, Jose's minor children sold to the same petitioner the remaining half. Jose de los Santos represented his
children in this transaction.

Petitioner Berico was aware of the 1961 sale of a portion of the lot to the private respondents and of the latter's
possession thereof.
Despite such knowledge and recognition of the sale in favor of and the possession of the property by the private
respondents, petitioner Berico registered on 5 June 1968 the two deeds of sale in his favor and caused the cancellation
of OCT No. P-671; the latter also secured the issuance in his name of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1346. He
paid the appropriate taxes thereon only from 1973 to 1986. It appears, however, that he declared the property for
taxation purposes in his wife's name in 1968.
On the other hand, it was only on 8 November 1978 that the private respondents registered the deed of sale in their
favor after discovering the cancellation of OCT No. P-671 and issuance in favor of petitioner Berico of TCT No. T-1346.
On 14 December 1978, private respondents filed against the petitioners a complaint for "Annulment of Title" with the
then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Masbate.

Issue:
In the double sale of an immovable property under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, does prescription bar an action by the
first vendees, who are in possession of the said property, against the second vendee for the annulment of a transfer
certificate of title over the property procured by the latter who has knowledge of the first sale and who recognizes the
first vendees' possession?
Held:
Lorenzo Berico's act in causing the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-671 and securing a new Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1346, knowing that his transfer certificate included a property not his but belonging to plaintiff
Flores makes him a holder in bad faith of a certificate and is not to be accorded the protection of the law.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered annulling Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1346 in the name of Lorenzo
Berico, and ordering the Register of Deeds for the Province of Masbate to cancel said transfer certificate of title and in
lieu thereof, issue a new transfer certificate of title in the name of Lorenzo Berico et. al.
In a more real sense, and insofar as prescription is concerned, petitioners may only acquire ownership of the questioned
property assuming that they did not register the deed of sale in their favor through extraordinary acquisitive
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, and not by ordinary acquisitive prescription since they cannot claim
just title or good faith.
Finally, the complaint for annulment of title filed by the private respondents is substantially one for the quieting of
title to quiet their title against a cloud cast by the claim of the petitioners. It is settled that an action to quiet title
does not prescribe.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.
Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524 December 29, 1998
Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524
FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of
Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of
Isabel. Isabels father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as null and void. Federico anchors his
oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation
as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federicos Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari.
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Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabels
parents null and void be upheld.
ISSUE:
In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should prevail? Related
thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?
HELD:
Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its
judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be declared null and void, the
body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85
enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive
portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void
and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages,
with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of
such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in
good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects,
until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children
conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also
called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of
Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of
annulment shall be considered legitimate.
Nittscher vs. Nittscher
FACTS: Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the probate of his holographic
will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales. After hearing and with
due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic will. Later, Dr.
Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the
deceased. Dr. Nittschers surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said
petition. However, the court denied petitioners motion to dismiss, and granted respondents petition for the issuance
of letters testamentary. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. Atty. Nogales
was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that
respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process.Petitioner contends that respondents petition
for the issuance of letters testamentary lacked a certification against forum-shopping.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not certificate of non-forum shopping is required? (2) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction
over the case? (2) Whether or not petitioner was denied due process?

HELD: (1) Revised Circular No. 28-918 and Administrative Circular No. 04-949 of the Court require a certification against
forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in court. However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr.
Nittschers will. Hence, respondents failure to include a certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition.

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