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Trauma, History, Philosophy (With Feature Essays by Agnes Heller and Gyrgy Mrkus),
Edited by Matthew Sharpe, Murray Noonan, and Jason Freddi
This book first published 2007 by Cambridge Scholars Publishing
15 Angerton Gardens, Newcastle, NE5 2JA, UK
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Sharpe, Murray Noonan, and Jason Freddi and contributors
All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
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ISBN (10): 1-84718-378-6, ISBN (13): 9781847183781
TABLE OF CONTENTS
vi
Table of Contents
vii
Appendices
Appendix One.......................................................................................... 303
Freuds 150th: Beyond the Party Poopers
Jason Freddi
Appendix Two ......................................................................................... 308
To Rupture the Matheme with a Poem: A Remark on Psychoanalysis
as Anti-Philosophy
Justin Clemens
Appendix Three ....................................................................................... 313
Neuropsychoanalysis and the Future of Psychoanalysis
Matthew Sharpe
List of Contributors ................................................................................. 325
Works Cited............................................................................................. 329
INTRODUCTION
WHY TRAUMA NOW?
MATTHEW SHARPE, DEAKIN UNIVERSITY
The topic of trauma was raised to the centre of twentieth century European
thought by the work of Sigmund Freud. Trauma is central to Freuds
work at both its beginning and its end. Trauma appears as a pivotal
concept in his 1890s case studies on hysteria. It returns, at the basis of the
later metapsychology, in Freuds works written after the First World War.
Yet the last century as a whole was arguably a century of traumas: the
traumas of total war, of global economic crises, of state-sanctioned
genocides, of displaced and stateless peoples, the Cold War and the
shadow cast by the mushroom cloud. A sense of trauma, unsurprisingly,
pervades much of twentieth century European thought, especially that
written in the centurys middle decades. The younger Heidegger, adapting
Kierkegaardas Larrea examines in her essay in this collection1
elevated angst to a privileged phenomenological instance in Being and
Time. Heideggers later work, and such darker 1930s essays as
Overcoming Metaphysics, meditate on how the gods have fled the
modern epoch, and how only their unfathomable return might save us from
the most consummate nihilism. Heideggers student, Levinaswhile
sometimes refusing so much as to write his teachers namealso assigns a
central place throughout his career to trauma. In Levinas earlier work, it is
the uncanny il y a that threatens to re-engulf the fragile world of sense.
After the war, it is the traumatism that would attend and upset our
everyday encounter with Other(s). Within the Marxian orbit, Adorno and
Benjaminotherwise distant from the phenomenological tradition which
Adorno lampoonedeach conceived of history as importantly one single
catastrophe, from the Stone Age to the age of total war. In the
psychoanalytic field, Lacans linguistic re-conception of the Freudian
subject sees it as founded upon a properly traumatic exigency; the event of
1
Chapter 4 below.
Introduction
castration wherein the child comes to know it cannot be the mothers fully
satisfying Thing. Lyotard and Jameson, later in the century, each tried to
document the changes in the cultural dominant in the first world since
the wars by pointing to the centrality of the sublime in postmodernism or
the postmodern conditionan aesthetic notion which responds, as Kant
stressed, to the overpowering, unlimited, or even monstrous.2 Post-war
French thought came to address itself more and more to what is
exceptional, sublime or differentthat which, when it is not expressly
traumatic, would be inassimilable to metaphysical, political, or
administrative calculation. In the 1960s and 1970sin the wake of the
decline of Marxismuncovering the irreducible and (quasi)transcendental status of such exceptional instances was charged with the
ethico-political task of pointing us beyond the embrace of modernist
universalism. In the more recent work of Slavoj Zizek and Alain Badiou,
by contrast, the valorisation of a rupturous Event or Act is being invoked
as the way towards a different universalism to come.
Within philosophy as outside of it, then, trauma remainsfor better
or for worseparticularly contemporary at the start of the new century. As
both Deutscher and Markus point out in their essays3, the term trauma
came to psychoanalysis, and thereby to European philosophy, from the
medical sciences. Freud first used the term to describe the pivotal causal
events that the free associations of his first analysandshysterics like
Anna Oseemed to always return to, whose conscious recollection
proved to have therapeutic effects. These events, Freud aimed to suggest,
are as fractious in the fabric of individuals self-understandings as the
puncturing of skin or breaking of bones in physical traumas. Yet in the
wake of the events of the twentieth century, and with renewed force after
2001, trauma has taken on a wider currency. As in Freuds Moses and
Monotheism4, commentators and historians today talk widely about
collective traumas. The example that primarily comes to mindone which
both Joanne Faulkners and Daniel Rosss essays differently address
here5is the 11th of September 2001 attacks on the United States. It was
Jacques Derrida who pointed out how the naming of this event as 911
almost before the footage of the attacks and falling towers had ceased
being repeatedreflected a deeper bewilderment. Around the world, we
recited 911 as a mantra to name what had previously been as
geopolitically unthinkable as it had been uncannily anticipated in myriad
2
big budget disaster films. In this way, even the political claim that on
that day, everything changed is surely insufficient, when it is not
politically motivated. There was a violence done also to the Wests very
sense of what was possible and impossible, what the future might bring,
and whether anyone could either anticipate or prevent the very worst.
It is remarkable, however, that manifold other examples of
contemporary, collective traumas, historical or imagined, could be cited:
the Asian tsunami of December 2004, the terrorist attacks in London,
Spain and Bali, Hurricane Katrina, the periodically-renewed panics about
global pandemics, new immigrants, fears about ecological collapse, peak
oil, and nuclear proliferation. Multiple commentators have observed that
today the haunting sense that some catastrophic trauma might be just
around the corner seems to be the uncanny flipside of the convergence of
parliamentary politics in the first world, and the invariably glowing
accounts of the world economy. As quickly as the worlds and nations
economies grow, so too seemingly does the widespread sense that
somehow, something, radically unforeseeable is about to be visited upon
us. From risk theorywith its unanticipatable but potentially overwhelming,
human-caused dangersto the actual rolling back of civil liberties
because of the possibility of future terrorist attacks, todays conjuncture
seems already traumatised or else to be preparing itself, Stoically, against
the inevitable. As Slavoj Zizek once put it, the end of the world as we
know it has become much easier to envisage today than any more modest,
social democratic or other political reform.6 In the meanwhile, there will
be acrimonious culture wars fought about peoples sexual and religious
choices, how to come to terms with the violences hidden in nations
origins and histories7, and the rapidly advancing biomedical technologies
that seem indeed to be ushering in a set of new, if not post-human
(Fukuyama), possibilities. The political, far from giving up the ghost, will
instead colonise the cultural realm, trailing advertisements as it goes. And
while all this makes for enlivening newspaper copy and big box office
takes, Susan Sontag was also surely right when she commented:
that even an apocalypse can be made to seem part of the ordinary horizon
of expectation constitutes an unparalleled violence that is being done to our
sense of reality, to our humanity.8
***
6
Introduction
Introduction
PART I: TRAUMA
CHAPTER ONE
THINKING TRAUMA
MAX DEUTSCHER, MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY
Dreaming traumata
Trauma, from a Greek word meaning wound, now summons up
internal and emotional injury more immediately than it does a laceration or
broken bone. A trauma unit in a hospital treats, not simply those with
injuries, but those whose injuries have placed them in a state of shock,
requiring intensively supervised recuperation. It is a bad trip that has you
sent to the trauma unit. You are liable to be left with emotional wound
nightmares. Traumatic stress syndrome means the emotional aftershock
of serious bodily wounds. Like the original breaks themselvesthe
traumatait is a serious state, involving patterns of repeated thoughts and
feelings that centre upon the occasion of those wounds.
Since Freud, at least, trauma has been brought alongside traum
(dream)a word with an utterly different etymology. Robert Schumanns
Traumerei (Dreaming)1, in its steady sonorous gravity places, for the
night, firm borders against the days traumataangry words from the ones
you love, collisions with miscomprehension. In the psychoanalytic sense
(not restricted now to Freudian theory) trauma is a condition that derives
from the distress and disturbance caused by some sort of wound, physical
or emotional, and then becomes repressed rather than lived through and
lived out. When we fail to work our way out of some acute distress and
disturbance, trauma, the wound, originates inhibitions, fears and behaviour
that are inappropriate to what prompts them. Our thinking is a bad
dreaming. This traumerei of the trauma is closely related, I shall argue, to
thinkings own trauma.
Trauma is a live term. Medical and scientific concepts of trauma
continue to interact with the emotional or psychoanalytic tones of the
1
No. 7 in the series of piano pieces by Robert Schumann (Kinderscenen
(Childhood Scenes) Opus 15.
Thinking Trauma
11
See Jacques Derridas Given Time, for a story about what the gift and time have
to do with each other.
3
I evoke the heydays of that brand of conceptual philosophy that had an ear for
what we would normally say.
4
...from the moment I could speak, I was ordered to listen... (Cat Stevens, Cats in
the Cradle).
12
Chapter One
Thinking Trauma
13
appear so cold and straind that I cannot find it in my heart to enter into
them any farther.8
Like Orpheus, whose Eurydice relapses into Hades when he turns back to
look at her (Life of the Mind, 86), such thinking is gone in the blink of an
eye when I turn back towards it to write it down in a public gesture. Only
thought can traverse the indefinitely extended temporal distances of a
time continuum that stretches from the nearby into the distant .. past or
future.11 But it is thought itself that converted the no longer and the not
yet into the far distant.
14
Chapter One
[T]he thinking ego .. summon(s) into its presence whatever it pleases from
any distance in time and space ..(from this point of view its everywhere)
is a nowhere. (A) nowhere .. by no means identical with the twofold
nowhere from which we suddenly appear at birth and into which .. we
disappear at death.12
Arendt reads this figure of the thinking ego into Valrys epigram
Tantt je pense et tantt je suis; when we think, the thinking ego places
us as anywhere and thus nowhere. In the same figure, the thinking ego
travels instantly to whatever region it thinks ofthe ego is no-when.13 By
thinking we wound the temporal and causal order, but to think is not to
step out of that order. To proceed, I would say that freedom in relation to
time is a power of temporal thinking, which is, itself, an event ordered in
time like any other event. It is our power to bring before the mind events
from any location in time and space. This freedom involves a dualism of
thinking ego and human bodya figurative one. By metaphor we
describe our escape from a strict temporal and causal order. Our
descriptions build up, as a phenomenology, a world of thought.
Arendt writes that the site of thought is a precious place where the
ungraspable whole of ones existence from birth to death can be
pondered. This site has to be occupied as if by an enduring presence in
the midst of the worlds ever-changing transitoriness, she says. It is when
we dwell in these lands of intellectual dreams (territories and dwellings
not to be despised) that we need the fiction of a sheer continuity of the Iam. If this ever-present I think is itself but an Augenblick it is,
nevertheless, within that blink that I position myself with respect to past
and future. I must accept the disappearance of that position itself when, in
the instant of blindness necessary to my use of past and future, I turn to do
what falls to me at that very moment.
12
Ibid., 200.
In Kants time [as] the form of inner sense of the intuition of ourselves and of
our inner state, time is our apprehension of events as in the future, happening
now, and as long ago. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B49, B50, cited in
Arendts The Life of the Mind, Vol I, p.201. There is no immediate sensory
intuition of the unchangeable historical relations of earlier and later, but the old
flow of time from future towards the past and a fixed relation of all events
ordered by earlier than and later than take on a different slant within Arendts
frame. Ones changing relation to an event as future, then dealt with and finally
recalled, is itself a series of events ordered as earlier or later than each other.
13
Thinking Trauma
15
In Reports from a Wild Country, Deborah Bird Rose elaborates the notion of
wild country. Aborigines said that James Cook and those with him, as they
settled the land, turned it into wild country.
15
I am thinking of how Heidegger intensifies the sense of the word in Building,
Dwelling, Thinking, in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Krell,
Routledge, London 1977, 343-363.
16
We have to make our best judgement about what concept to choose in this
context.
16
Chapter One
trauma is enacted upon the landscape, switch in size as the story requires,
and form a country within what early (neo-) Australian explorers described
as an empty land.
Like the people themselves, the inscribed country is from the
Dreaming (tjukurrtjanu), the ground of being.17 Dreaming may refer
both to the specific stories and to the whole creative epoch. When they
describe events, Pintupi contrast The Dreaming (tjukurrpa) with those
events and stories said to be yuti, which signifies visibility or some other
form of sensory presentation to a subject. Directed to an axe, someone
says There it is over there, visible (yuti). A kangaroo emerges from the
bushes, becomes visible (yutirringu). Or a person listening for an
approaching car says the sound of the motor has become yuti. They
question and make clear whether they are talking about the Dreaming.
Not tjukurrpa, but what really happenedmularrpa. Mularrpa has its
standard or usual most everyday meaning as real true actual as
opposed to untrue, fictitious or lie, but though strictly contrasted with
it, the Aboriginal word tjukurrpa (the Dreaming) is not its negation.
The Dreaming as Law exists within its form of life.18 Singing is an
essential element in most ritual performances19 because the songline
follows in most cases the direction of travel of the beings concerned and
highlights, if cryptically, their notable as well as mundane activities. Most
songs then, have a geographical as well as mythic referent, so by learning
songlines men become familiar with literally thousands of sites even
though they have never visited them: all become part of their cognitive
17
Thinking Trauma
17
map of the desert. The importance of the Dreaming in dealing with the
land can be gauged from some notes from an explorers journal which
conveys what an abyss of nothingness that land appears to be, without that
poetic, inspired and yet also practical imagination, by means of which
aborigines see and move in the land, in terms of its sung/dreamed
significance: Words can give no conception of the ghastly desolation and hopeless
dreariness of the scene which meets ones eyes from the crest of a high
ridge.20
Through the songlines of the Dreaming, the word (name, mark and law)
creates the difference between a desolate nothing and a world within
which one can be at home. Myers discusses at length the complex word
20
18
Chapter One
Thinking Trauma
19
story as dancing with or pursuing human beings, having much the same
dimensions as us. But then their dimensions change as they engage in their
traumatic acts so that, in their death, these ancestral figures occupy the
space of rock-pools, fissures, or mountains. In their agonistic finality they
attain the dimension of landforms:
Native Cat opens up a huge hole with his throwing stick. Many of the
Tingarri young men are killed. The remaining Tingarri men come up his
throwing stick like ants.26
Native Cat is sitting on the edge of the hole, crying because of having
blasted the young Tingarri men away.27
Native Cat takes the remaining Tingarri men and women to Lake
MacDonald, hunting and performing ceremonies along the way.28
There, the remaining Tingarri are killed by hail and lightning produced by
Native Cats two sons. But, exhausted in this production of the elements,
Native Cats two sons die. They turn into snakes.
Stricken with grief, Native Cat bashes himself in the forehead with a stone
axe, and his body becomes a stone formation still visible in the lake.
This lake of tears might signify the permanent grief of a powerful figure at
his destructiveness. We find the figure of the personalised force that forms
the landscape, presented as overcome with remorse and loss, striking
himself in the head with his own axe and bringing himself to earth.29
In comparison with Native Cat, the Dreaming figure of Blind Snake30
is presented as frail physically and emotionally. Eventually, as a figure
of blindness, as one who must live out that trauma, Blind Snake achieves a
kind of power.
26
It is as if the storyteller had regarded ants crawling up his throwing stick and
imagined them as men, so that the narrator himself is suddenly immense.
27
The figure of this Dreaming takes no satisfaction in revenge. He grieves at the
results of his excess of anger.
28
Here, the song provides further details of getting from one place to another.
29
These figures are neither like the Greek gods nor like the Christian One. They
are not perfect not even exemplars. They act violently, destroying young
initiates, and then are overcome with remorse. The Yahweh of the Hebrews, who
repents after sending the devastation of the Flood, is most akin to what we read
here.
30
A songline of the Ngalia and Walbiri, described by Charles Mountford in
Winbaraku and The Myth of Jarapiri (Rigby, Adelaide, 1968) p.14-15.
20
Chapter One
The blind snake, Jarapiri Bomba, usually stayed in the camp of his wives
and children who cared for him and provided him with food. Whenever the
snake-man heard any of the other Winbaraku people performing a
ceremony, he would find his way to their dancing ground. He would cause
confusion by trying to take part in the rituals.
As time went on, the various Winbaraku people left their individual
dancing grounds. They assembled on an open plain to the northeast of the
present hill of Winbaraku to perform their ceremonies together. But the
blind Jarapiri Bomba could not be persuaded to return to his camp. He was
always getting under their feet. The Winbaraku people sneaked away from
the dancing ground, leaving Jarapiri Bomba behind.
Becoming aware of the silence the blind snake-man groped his way
from place to place searching for his wives, his children and his old
companions, realizing after a long search that he had been deserted, he sat
down on the plain and mourned from loneliness. The body of Jarapiri
Bomba is a large spherical boulder at the foot of a low bluff.
Again, the vulnerability of the ancestor is the theme, but here the
weight of the ancestral figure that forms the centre of the story is reversed
in relation to those at whose social margins he lives. For Native Cat,
vulnerability arrives at the end of the action. In contrast, Blind Snake is a
figure of vulnerability from the start. Like a child trying to join the games
of the others but blind to the rules they already know, he finds himself
always on the outer edge a primordial story of marginalisation. His final
power upon the land is achieved without violence, and yet it is
significant and permanent. He becomes a memorial, beyond erasure, at
the foot of a low bluff - at that point where one might begin to ascend into
the dramatic terrain raised up by other more obviously powerful ancestors.
The blindness of the stumbling figure that lived on the margins of society
is matched by the social blindness of those ancestors endowed with sight.31
For all that the story lends itself to interpretation as a sort of morality play, the
spirit of such stories is very different from the Greek idea of the Fates that
determine the course of events even while we humans, in hubris, take ourselves to
be working out our own destiny.
Thinking Trauma
21
descendants of the arrivistes, the trauma not only of the inhabitants but
also of those arrivistes themselves, and thus of our inheritance of it. We
live in the consciousness of being the dispossessors, and can hardly,
hardily, possess the land.
For neo-Australians to possess the land is a trauma for them/us the
dispossession must be continually repressed even as it is enacted and reenacted. In Dancing with Strangers, Inga Clendinnen describes one of the
sweeter of the traumerei of the arrivistes. A dream of reciprocal enjoyment
of each others difference while in their company is expressed in the figure
(as trope) in the fact of the dance. They were dreaming of their arrival as
an act of innocence. Perhaps the Australians (the as-from-the-origin-al
ones) were not dreaming in that way. They are more likely to have been
already uneasy about what was going to happen. Or they simply did not
know. Perhaps they could not have imagined the extent of the designs
upon their land that lay within the bodies of the dancers who for the time
were in reciprocity with them. As to the arrivistes, perhaps their dancing
was a dreaming of a new world that would escape the material conflict
their settlement was bound to precipitate.
It is a thought whose status is dangerously commonplace that waking
life may be lived as the enactment of a dream. We do have such an idea of
living ones dream as the object of life is not yet degraded biodegradable
as it is bound to be.32 To live out ones life in the dream of finding or
achieving something, sustains and structures life even when nothing of the
dream is realised and one scarcely can hope that anything might be
achieved. To live life as framed within such a dream is to risk degrading
the specificity of whatever one does and experiences. Yet, to the dreamer,
those specificities are raised up as if to a higher level. Within such a lived
dream, the gritty details of what one actually does and experiences must be
bracketed out if the dream is to retain its eminence. At the same time, that
awkward actuality is given a glow, a reliably recurrent evanescence, as we
live towards the object within the framework of the dream.
One might hesitate to judge that this living out of a dream is bound
to be a traumatic life. Visibly and sensibly it may be lived without constant
anguish or shock, depending on the luck of the game. If a trauma is the
permanent mark left from an experience, a mark that generates a living
dream, then a traumatic life is not essentially a bad dream. In acting out
ones life as a kind of dream, one is liable to become unable to take life
seriously and to fail to feel either the pleasure or the hurt caused by what
32
22
Chapter One
one does or by what happens. Such a life, though still the expression of
trauma, is not therefore defined as one of suffering or shock.
There are resolved and resolving ways of rendering a trauma into life.
When he was seven years old, a child who was to become the painter
Frank Auerbach was sent from Germany to England. His parents he was
never to see again murdered by the Nazis. In a videotaped interview he
says, in even tones, that he has never felt anything much about that. He
became a painter whose life turned out to consist of a certain iterated
practice. On each of a number of days each week he would paint a
different person; the person who came on that day would continue to come
each week for thirty years or more. He produced, not obsessive or fixated
results, but paintings that are extraordinary both as explorations in
paintings possibilities and as portraits. The paintings are layered traces of
the years of painting, scraping back and repainting, and of the growth and
changes in his subjects over the years. Such is one possible response of
thought to trauma to embed separation and loss into something that gains
a life and impetus of its own.33
One may think more lightly about living a dream. One of the
characters in David Williamsons Emerald City, a Sydneysider knows the
meaning of life to live in a house with a waterfront. His life is his living
out of this dream. Less dangerous, perhaps, than the older one that the
Marxist living-ly dreamed.34 Traumata of social injustice become a
Dreaming of the emergence of a classless society. Less drastic than our
contemporary religious devotee who living-ly dreams too, but of a selfexplosion that would catapult him to bliss, and project the living remnants
of his adventure to realise the degradation of their life.
These ways of dreaming living-ly also connect trauma with traumerei,
but in a direction opposed to resolution or catharsis. Daydreaming may be
despised as useless activity. But Auerbachs painting like aboriginal
tjukurrpa is closer to the daydream than to acting out in response to a
wound. Even Williamsons more benign neo-Australian who lives out the
33
If this dreaming-in-life is far removed from what we experience in sleep, it has
even less to do with daydreaming that it does to does thinking. A revolutionary
who lives out the dream of an ideal society will despise daydreaming about ideals
becoming reality. Our contemporary member of a terrorist cell will not spend his
or her precious time in daydreaming of murder by self-immolation as the ultimate
form of social criticism.
34
It is not enough to say lived and dreamed. The suggestion that for all the
practical sound and political reality of Marxist practice, it was the living out of a
dream. Perhaps it would read better as that the Marxist dreamed, livingly.
The livingly then becomes a punning neologism for lovingly.
Thinking Trauma
23
24
Chapter One
wound, old or new, implicit in the enjoyment from which we have made
our exit into thought. Otherwise one cannot explain why we shift, if
momentarily, from enjoyment to thinking. Thinking is not on the same
plane, down on all fours with eating, playing sport, or joking with friends.
There would appear to be no common scale on which to rate the
enjoyment of thinking as greater than the activities from which we made
our exit. But at least some of the facts of life appear to be simpler.
Sometimes we escape from what we are doing, if only for moments, even
though enjoying what we did, because also we enjoy taking the time to
think. It remains a haunting thought, though, that a wound occasions our
every deep reflection our retreat to that private conversation. As if the
need to think implies that our contentment, satisfaction or happiness with
what we do actively is always less than completed. As if thought might
complete what the world lacks.
Perhaps I associate traumerei with thinking and that with traumata
primarily because thinking is its own trauma, even when not unpleasant or
troubling in itself and not simply an escape from a world that seems
nasty, brutish and short, either. I am motivated towards making those
connections for reasons that involve Arendts comparison of thinking as
hiding or dying what I would describe as a cadence. In a dying fall,
thinking is the opening up of a fissure within everyday normalcy. We gain
access to an underside of life. To think is to act like Lewis Carroll when he
opened up the ground beneath Alice so that she descended in free fall, into
a crevasse with no base. As in every free descent, Alice is unable for the
moment to do anything about it. Since the fall gives her nothing to do,
however, she is capable of recovering from the shock. She begins to take
note of what she passes in the fall, and might start to wonder what else
passes her by during her subterranean flight.
CHAPTER TWO
TRAUMA, TRUTH AND REALITY
IN FREUDS THOUGHT
JASON FREDDI, DEAKIN UNIVERSITY,
UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE
26
Chapter Two
27
28
Chapter Two
validation of psychic reality. This being so, the paper also lights upon
certain conclusions which follow from Freuds revised theories.
In this first part we look at why Freud rejected the materialist view of
mind to posit the existence of a psychical reality (mind) and an
unconscious. Freuds rejection of the materialist conception of mind
followed from his reflections upon the empirical facts, including the use of
a quasi-experimental method and a statistical analysis though crude of
the facts. Thus, the usual starting point for the psychoanalytic
investigation of psychic reality is Freuds rejection of the seduction theory
of hysteria.7 This is indicated in a now famous letter of 21 September
1897 to his friend and sometime mentor, Wilhelm Fliess, in which he
wrote, ...there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one
cannot distinguish between the truth and [the] fiction that is cathected with
affect.8 But let us turn firstly to Freuds even earlier work in which he
posits the dissociation theory of trauma as the aetiology of hysteria.
See Freud, The Hereditary and Aetiology of the Neuroses; Freud, The
Aetiology of Hysteria.
8
Freud, Extracts From the Fliess Papers, p. 260.
9
See Freud, Early Studies on the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical
Phenomena, 27-8.
10
Ibid., 30.
11
Freud & Breuer, Studies in Hysteria.
12
e.g., Freud 1894, The Defence Neuro-Psychoses, 62: Such unbearable ideas
develop in women chiefly in connection with sexual experiences and sensations...
29
In these statements, we see how Freud has moderated his position from a
belief in seduction as the critical fact, to the resurrected memory of a
seduction as the critical fact. When the memory recurs during puberty it
arrives charged with a sexual force that was not present when the memory
was made. He only has a step further to position a motivating force (i.e., a
drive) behind the resurrected memory.
He achieves this firstly, via the theory of repression. On the basis of
clinical observations, Freud invents the theory of repression to explain the
hysterical mechanism. He had already expressed the opinion that the
13
Freud, The Hereditary and the Aetiology of the Neuorses, 149; also Freud,
The Aetiology of Hysteria, 194-96.
14
e.g., The letter to Fliess of 30 May, 1896, in Freud, Extracts, 229-30.
15
See Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex. Freud thought at the time
that, The last word on the subject of traumatic aetiology was spoken later by
[Karl] Abraham, when he pointed out that the peculiarity of the sexual constitution
in children is precisely calculated to provoke sexual experiences of a certain kind,
namely, traumas (Freud, On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement,
300).
16
Freud, The Hereditary and the Aetiology of Hysteria, 149.
17
Ibid., 151.
30
Chapter Two
Freud soon found that the experience of a memory from the time of
puberty onwards as traumatic had a relation to social and moral strictures
against the auto-erotic activities of childhood. He saw that one of the
major challenges of latency and adolescence is the managing of guilt
associated with the persistence of these activities. So the fantasies of
seduction reported by his patients, were interpreted as projections of the
active component in the autoerotic activites onto a loved one in the childs
immediate vicinity.
Predisposition and experience were here linked up in an indissoluable
aetiological unity; impressions which were entirely commonplace, and
would otherwise have had no effect, became exaggerated by the
predisposition into traumas giving rise to excitation and fixation; while
experiences stimulated factors in the predisposition which, without them,
might have remained long dormant and perhaps never have awakened.21
This passage is quoted from a 1914 paper in which Freud reflected back
on his early studies in hysteria. It highlights the problem of psychic reality
and external reality, which has dogged the trauma debate ever since.
Historically speaking, the decisive revelation occurred during the writing
of the Interpretation of Dreams (1900), begun during 1896, wherein Freud
discovered that the dream is a wish-fulfillment. But this idea lay dormant
while Freud continued with his attempts to formulate a mechanistic theory
18
31
of the neurosis, a task which preoccupied him intensely for the period
roughly 1894 to 1897/98.
We get an inkling of the problem and its solution in the Fliess
correspondence. Freud tries to tease out the relation between (a.) fantasy
(as an infantile form of wish-fulfillment), (b.) traumatic memory of the
primal scene of seduction, and (c.) impulses which he says are derived
from the memory. And we can see in this early formulation that it is the
memory that has precedence over the impulse. So he talks of protective
fictionsi.e., sublimations of the factsproduced by the neuroses to
provide a structural protection to the self, that must avoid contact with the
pathogenic memory. In his treatment he has to work through these
protective structures to retrieve the pathogenic memory into
consciousness. These protective fictions will later be formally explicated
as screen memories in the context of a drive theory.22
Importantly for the development of psychoanalysis, we see Freuds
shift towards a drive theory in, for example, the letter of 2 May 1896.
Freud says he has learnt that, in hysteria, it is not the memories themselves
that are repressed, but impulses derived from primal experiences:
...the psychical structures which, in hysteria, are affected by repression are
not in reality memories since no one indulges in mnemic activity without
a motivebut impulses which arise from the primal scenes.23
Freud is then not yet at a theory of the drive (Trieb), but we see clearly the
germ of the dynamic unconscious of 1899.24 Furthermore, it leads
inevitably to an assumption about the psychological causation of
psychological effects. Consider the following statement by Freud:
Whether any reality is to be attributed to the unconscious wishes, I cannot
say. Reality must of course be denied to all transitory and intermediate
thoughts. If we had before us the unconscious wishes, brought to their final
and truest expression, we should still do well to remember that psychic
reality is a special form of existence not to be confounded with material
reality.25.
22
32
Chapter Two
26
33
The second is that an idea which is unconscious may be psychical, but that
these unconscious ideas have a somatic concomitant.37
These assumptions, in themselves quite commonplace among
scientific thinkers of the last two centuries, seem to preclude any
transcendent ground of being. Whether Freud held this to be the case is
difficult to answer, because he has openly stated that psychoanalysis is
presupposed on two assumptionsnot truthsand Freud has made
clear, as I showed earlier, the mythical origin of psychoanalytic
metapsychology, even of the biological re-orientation Freud began in
35
Freud Introductory Lectures, 598. See also, The Case History of an Infantile
Neurosis, 603n: It is a matter of indifference whether we choose to regard it as a
primal scene or as a primal phantasy.
36
Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, 145.
37
Ibid., 158.
34
Chapter Two
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). In that paper Freud reconceptualised the notion of instinct in association with a new definition
of trauma, linking trauma with the mythical.
He observed that, in events of acute trauma, no memoryin the sense
of a perceptof the event is retained in mind. Now if we hold, as Freud
did, that the functions of apperception and memory are apportioned to the
ego, then trauma must be an overwhelming of the ego. If the ego-id
system is regulated by the pleasure principle and, in its modified form, the
reality principle, then how is the psyche regulated during the instant of
trauma, in which the system is exposed to extreme pain and then seeks to
repeat that pain? It became necessary to introduce a new regulating
principle which he labeled the repetition-compulsion. This is beyond the
pleasure principle in that it does not conform to the law of constancya
kind of psychical homeostasis, or inertial principal. Rather, the repetitioncompulsion insists upon reinstatement of some earlier condition of
stimulation.
This revision required a formulation of psychical conflict at a level of
abstraction higher than that of the dual instinct theory, which set ego
drives (aimed at self-preservative) against sexual drives (aimed at
preservation of species).38 The highest order of conflict now takes place
between death instincts and Eros; both pursuing the aim to reinstate an
earlier condition.39 The conflict between self-preservation and
preservation of the species was now seen as falling within Eros. The death
instinct seeking to reinstate a condition of inorganic rest. Freud thinks the
new formulation of so fantastic a kind as to qualify as a myth rather than a
scientific explanation (Freud 1920, p. 660). This is one reason why many
scientifically minded psychoanalysts of a positivist persuasion have
maintained the earlier definition of instinct (see footnote 9). But to do so is
to conflate the psyche-soma distinction that has created so much debate
(and confusion) when talking of the mind, and typically leads to
reductionist inventions, such as the reducing the mind to neurology or
brain-chemistry. The revised trauma theory of 1920, via the notion of
38
35
e.g., Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Freud, The Ego
and the Id; Freud, Civilization.
41
e.g., Freud, Beyond; and, Freud, Moses and Monotheism.
42
Stimuli from external or internal sense organs of a certain relative magnitude
create a mental drive that is its representative. As representations, the concept
could not adequately account for structure (i.e., repetition), because the psychic
structure keeps collapsing to a somatic concomitant that is real because not
psychic.
36
Chapter Two
43
37
In the early 1890s, Freud had made use of the therapeutic method (the
cathartic method) devised by his elder colleague, Dr. Josef Breuer.45
The theory behind this practice held that pathogenic memories of
traumatic experiences were kept out of consciousness by dissociation
(later this is replaced by the concept of repression). The treatment
required an abreaction (catharsis) of the energy invested in the traumatic
memory. This was achieved by bringing the memory into consciousness,
variously by hypnosis, hands-on therapy, and later by a kind of verbal
provocation. In some cases the treatment was successful, though it was
found generally not to be sufficient for a lasting cure. Even when modified
by advancements in technique including free association method and
theorization of the transference, etc., Freud found that something always
remained that was unanalyzable; something intractable in the psyche over
which insight held no sway. And it was this remainder that stimulated
Freuds reflections on the clinical technique of psychoanalysis.
Initially, he described this intractability of the symptom as resistance
to analysis resulting from the analysands erotic attachment to his/her
symptoms.46 He soon found cases, like melancholic depression, in which
the eros was attached to a painful, instead of a pleasure-seeking
structure.47 This did not conform to the model of humans as pleasureseeking animals; some humans were irreversibly attached to painful
experiences (masochism). He later refined the theory to identify the
elements which contributed to the resistance.48 Of chief interest to the
present discussion on trauma was the notion of a repetition compulsion as
a key element of the resistance.49 This would later be characterised by
Freud in different contexts as inertia of the id50 and inertia of the
libido, and otherwise as the manifestation of the death drive in the
psyche.51
A whole range of clinical data brought to his attention this problem in
the closing years of World War I and after. There was the failure of the
analysis of the Wolf Man, the discovery of intractable depression in
45
38
Chapter Two
39
See Freud, On Narcissism; also Freud, Civilization, Chapter 1. Note that Freud
used the word ego in various ways. At times it designates the whole psyche,
other times just the self representation. Genetically, he sometimes spoke of an
undifferentiated ego-id matrix being the psyche at birth, see Freud, Outline.
see also Hartmann, The Development of the Ego Concept in Freuds Work, or
Rapaport, An Historical Survey of Psychoanalytic Ego Psychology for historical
reviews of Freuds use of ego; and Lacan, The Ego in Freuds Theoyr and in
the Technique of Psychoanalysis for a clinical perspective.
57
Freud, Beyond, 641.
58
Freud, Inhibitions, 751.
40
Chapter Two
Ibid..
See e.g. Rangell, On the Psychoanlytic Theory of Anxiety, and, A Further
Attempt to Solve the Problem of Anxiety; and Schur, The Ego and the Id in
Anxiety.
61
Freud, Ibid., 752.
62
Freud, Beyond, 641.
63
Ibid., ch. IV.
60
41
This paper led Freud to question whether in fact we have any memories at
all from our childhood: Memories relating to our childhood may be all
that we possess.66 In conclusion, and in a way which reflects his notion
of retroactivity (Nachtrglichkeit), Freud wrote:
Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as they were but as
they appeared at the later periods when they were revived. In these periods
of revival, the childhood memories did not, as people are accustomed to
say, emerge; they were formed at that time. And a number of motives,
which had no concern with historical accuracy, had their part in thus
forming them as well as in the selection of the memories themselves.67
64
42
Chapter Two
43
44
Chapter Two
events in the primeval history of the human family and that...they are
effective on human beings by force of the historical truth of their content.73
In the Moses book he makes the claim that the Mosaic inheritance only
achieved force, when after an extended period of idol worship,
corresponding to the latency period of individual development,
repressed guilt associated with the murder of Moses returned with great
force, initiating acts of atonement and the (re)instatement of the Mosaic
Law. Thenceforth, any misfortune befalling the people of Moses was
73
45
Jan Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, in a recently translated work, has
made interesting reflections upon Freuds work in relation to memory, guilt and
the burden of revelation (see esp. Chapter 2)
78
Freud, Civilization, 771. In its place, Freud quotes the words of Goethe, He
who has Science and has Art, / Religion, too, has he; / Who has not Science, has
not Art, / Let him religious be!
46
Chapter Two
reality. This follows Freuds 1923 formulation (in The Ego and the Id)
that the ego is subject to drives on three fronts: from the id, the superego
and reality. The task for the ego is to find the best adapted solution for the
satisfaction of these often conflicting structures. When the adaptation
fails, neurosis or psychosis result.79
He further elaborated this concept by depicting the course of illness as
two stages. The first being a loss of reality; the second, an attempt at
recovery. By this means he was able to compare the course of illness in
neurosis and psychosis. Thus, the ego, confronted by a situation of
frustration will, for a neurosis, reject the instinctual demand of the id; and,
for a psychosis, reject the demand of reality (i.e., the social norm, or the
objective physical facts of realitythe superego may be involved in this
psychic dynamic as a mediator between the social [external] reality and
the ego). The neurotic represses a part of the psychic reality that is the
instinctual demand; the psychotic denies the external reality of the
situation. Abstracting these concepts to a higher level, one can see that
both the psychic reality and the external reality, are both psychical frames
of reference, and the distinction between repression and denial begins to
blur. Though he went some way to a clarification of this point in his paper,
On Negation:
...the subject matter of a repressed image or thought can make its way into
consciousness on condition that it is denied. Negation is a way of taking
account of what is repressed; indeed, it is actually a removal of the
repression , though not, of course, an acceptance of what is repressed.80
79
47
Ibid., 185.
Ibid.
83
Freud here associated the function of negation with his earlier developmental
model which views the progress from a pleasure-ego to a reality-ego as being
founded on the possibility of negation. negation is thus prior to, and alternative to,
repression. see Freud, On Narcissism, for the exploration of early ego
development.
84
Freud, Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis, 279.
82
48
Chapter Two
Ibid., 282.
Freud, The Unconscious, 133.
87
Ibid., 133-136.
88
See Freud, Loss of Reality, 183.
89
Freud, Moses, 130.
90
Freud, Constructions, 268.
91
Freud, The Unconscious, 136.
86
49
A passage which goes some way to explaining Freuds general disdain for
philosophical thought of the system building kind. He sought to ground
his own thinking in a scientific approach, orientated towards empirical
validation. But the problem remained of finding an adequate language to
speak of the different kinds of realityor truthpresent in a.) the
delusion of the psychotic or Freuds philosopher from the construction
of the analyst; and, b.) the illusion of a religious system of belief from a
scientific theory of reality.
This problem was further complicated by Freuds discussions of
illusion in Civilization and Its Discontents where Freud talked of
civilization as the neurosis of mankind not distinguishing at all between
civilization and culture.92 He could do this by nominating the
superego as the inheritor of the cultural norms which enforce upon the ego
of every individual a compromise between satisfaction of his own desires
(aggressive and sexual) and the demands of the group (culture). This
conflict between superego and id is just that which makes possible
neurosis.93 So for Freud, a pathological solution is the norm for
civilization, and the culture all but forces upon us substitute-gratifications
for our frustrated instinctual needs. The situation remains dynamic,
because this culture that is the compromise between the drives of the
individual and the demands of the culture, is itself a product of the same
forces.
The argument becomes very fine herein, as Freud attempts to tease out
the space between the neurotic and psychotic solutions. He says
ultimately, we are each trying to avoid the neurotic solution, because this
is renunciation of instinct, and instinct is insatiable, yet the psychotic
solution is just as dangerousif not more soas it leads the creation and
belief in imaginary worlds that are not subject to rational interventions.
Freud offers us only the notion of sublimation as the single enlightened
means of consolation. The chief forms of which are the artists
enjoyment in creation and the scientists in solving problems or
discovering truth.94 This is very important in understanding what Freud
later does with the Jewish religion. These two activities seem to Freud
higher and finer, though he acknowledges a difficulty in quantifying such
92
The word culture describes the sum of the achievements and institutions which
differentiate our lives from those of our animal forebears and serve two purposes,
namely, that of protecting humanity against nature and of regulating the relations
of human beings among themselves (Freud, Civilization, 776a).
93
See Freud, Neurosis and Psychosis.
94
Freud, Civilization, 773.
50
Chapter Two
a qualitative reading. For the majority of mankind, who are not gifted with
the capacity and circumstance to sublimate the drives to this extent, there
is two alternatives (setting aside the non-psychological solutions of
chronic intoxication and diversionary interests, i.e., work): flight into
illusion or acceptance of delusion i.e., neurosis or psychosis .95
The two possibilities are further complicated by their relation to a
societal contexta set of norms enforced unconsciously via the superego
structurebecause some illusions and some delusions are normal, that
is, they are culturally acceptable. Indeed, they are actually foundational to
culture. Religious symbolism is one such example. But this does not stop
Freud from identifying the pleasure in viewing an artwork as an illusory
satisfaction; nor does he avoid the conclusion that the religions of
humanity too, must be classified as delusions:
The whole thing is so patently infantile, so incongruous with reality, that
to one whose attitude to humanity is friendly it is painful to think that the
great majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view of
life.96
Ibid., 771-772.
Ibid., 771.
97
Freud, Future of an Illusion, 27-28. We must be careful here in not reading this
as Freuds rejection of science of the mind, for psychoanalysis is literally thatan
analysis of the structure of the unconscious (silent) mind. Consider the following
citations: As a specialized science, a branch of psychologydepth psychology
or psychology of the unconsciousit is quite unsuited to form a Weltanschauung
of its own, Freud New Introductory Lectures, 218; And on the scientific
Weltanschauung: [Science] asserts that there is no other source of knowledge of
the universe, but the intellectual manipulation of carefully verified
observations...and that no knowledge can be obtained from revelation, intuition or
inspiration, Ibid. He goes on to attack philosophyfor the illusion that it can
produce a complete and coherent picture of the universe, though in fact that
picture must needs fall to pieces with every new advance in our knowledge...Its
96
51
But surely Freud will not argue against the existence of God merely
on grounds of proof? Well, to a point he does. It is clear that the preceding
statement leads to a mistaking of a psychological fact or proof, for an
epistemological one. It is something of fallacy to have proved god does
not exist because you have proved that he is an illusion based on infantile
fantasies, for indeed God may exist and our image of him be a fantasy.
But we need to be careful with our use of terms, because clearly God does
not exist in any kind of existential way provable by scientific experiment.
Freuds method is a science of the mind; an analysis of the psyche, and
Freuds science was of the differentiation of the parts of the psyche
between the two poles of the natural (empirical) and the mythological
(transcendental) ground. Let us reflect upon these notions in the context of
some of Freuds own final observations on his science:
In our science as in the others the problem is the same: behind the
attributes (qualities) of the object under examination which are presented
directly to our perception, we have to discover something else which is
more independent of the particular receptive capacity of our sense organs
and which approximates more closely to what may be supposed to be the
real state of affairs...Reality will always remain unknowable.98
52
Chapter Two
as a physicist makes use of experiment...In this manner we infer a number
of processes which are in themselves unknowable and interpolate them
in those that are conscious to us.100
Ibid., 197.
It seems to me that there is the possibility of dialogue between Freud and the
ancients if one were to see Freuds notion of illusion as if it were the psychic
source of the early Christian/Stoic libido dominandi. This would require us to see
psychical illusion as a problem of concupiscence rather than a problem of gods
and the realm of ideas. This may be distorting Freuds own project. But from this
interpretation, the political philosopher may see something in Freuds diagnosis
that would clear the way for political philosophy to begin; a point admitted by Leo
Strauss in an early review of Freuds Future of an Illusion. Strauss, Sigmund
Freud, Future of an Illusion, 208.
102
Freud, Civilization, 800.
101
53
conflict and is thus, the sum of the achievements and institutions which
differentiate our lives from our animal forebears.103 Furthermore, with
his native skepticism, Freud cannot legitimize any notion that might
address eternal truths his science is a progressive one of open-ended
discovery. So he attacks also the truth claims of religion and applies a
scientific justification to the material question of the existence of God.
When he finds the answer is noit too is an infantile intrusionhe is in a
position to add that the religious belief system is, therefore, a delusion
which papers over the denial of that part of reality which says, God does
not exist; or, stated positively: Providence has no bearing upon human
affairs.104
Freuds attempt on the Moses question, and the attempt of analysts
everywhere to engage publicly in historical and political contexts, can be
seen to have the effect of destroying the private sphere which makes the
analytic investigation possible. The independence from objective reality
(i.e. a shared social reality) that allows the investigation of psychic reality
to proceed on its own ground. This is the pre-condition for the analytic
situation to occur and for the discovery of a private realm in the revelation
of an individuals psychic reality distinct from his (imaginary) cultural
inheritance.
Is it justified for this sciencepsychoanalysisthat has as its truth
criteria the subjective experience of the individual, to make claims about
the nature of material reality? Whilst one can prove in the analytic
situation the infantile nature of belief in god; one cannot prove, nor
disprove, the material reality of God in the analytic setting. In fact the
proof of an analytic construction is perhaps not to be established on any
objective groundsin the sense it is not accessible to the unanalyzed
observer, much in the way the philosopher cant communicate his message
to the uninitiated. Aspects of the system of meta-theory (meta-psychology)
supporting the construction in analysis may receive objective confirmation
from other scientific (objective) approaches, but the analytic construction
itself, being based on the explication of fantastical (imaginary) relations
does not seem to permit conclusions accessible to objective confirmation,
simply because fantasy exists in a reality (id) closed off from the objective
(interpersonal) reality of a social and material existence, except in the
psychoanalytic partnership, which is interpreted through a theory of Eros.
The sole basis of Freuds claim for science (and art) as something
higher than religion, because of its sublimated nature, is its adaptation to
103
104
Ibid., 778.
See Ibid., 771.
Chapter Two
54
55
method has opened up mans psychic reality and brought us closer to the
great problems of truth, belief and political necessity.
CHAPTER THREE
THE QUESTION OF A WELTANSCHUUNG:
FREUD, STOICISM, AND RELIGION
DOUGLAS KIRSNER, DEAKIN UNIVERSITY
57
58
Chapter Three
59
60
Chapter Three
61
Freuds ethic is Stoic: he believes that the clash between inner nature and
external reality is essential to the human condition. There is no preestablished harmony between the structure of the world and the nature of
our desires. Like all stoics from Zenon through Seneca to Spinoza he
points out the extent to which we are able to influence fate is extremely
limited. Hence he believes that the one way we have to live a more or less
decent life is to curtail our own desires. Freud does not believe that
happiness is something we can reasonably strive for.11
62
Chapter Three
Ibid, 93.
Ibid, 4.
18
Loewenberg, The Pagan Freud, 27.
19
Ibid, 28.
17
63
64
Chapter Three
discard or even reject emotions and passions but believed it best for us not
to be subject to them and to be guided by reason.
The term Stoic is often used today for someone who can suffer pain
without displaying feelings or complaining. It derives from the Stoa
Poikile, the Greek term for the painted porch that the ancient schools
founder Zeno spoke from in the Athens Agora in 308 BCE. Not being
dominated by emotion, the Stoic can make level-headed decisions based
on reason in a clear, logical, and unbiased way that relies on reality rather
than being distracted by wishes and emotion. Pursuing the truth was seen
as a major virtue without the distraction of anguish and suffering which
stood in the way of clear and sound judgment. Although detachment from
the passions was prerequisite, this did not preclude suffering from being
an intrinsic part of life. Nonetheless, it meant that it did not rule or
dominate the individuals life. Attachments were to be chosen, not
determined. The Stoics promotion of apathy derives from the original
meaning of the Greek term apatheia, relating to a-pathos, without feeling,
suffering or emotion. Pathos originally meant what befalls one. This
relates to a basic Stioc sense that the idea of suffering involves passively
(as in the word patient) being victim to control by suffering. Apathy,
then, involves overcoming such control and putting some agency into the
human being. Notably, this approach clearly has resemblances to
important aspects of religions such as Buddhism.
Notably, Sterba has suggested that Freuds values as well as his
attitude and behavior seem in many features to be shaped according to
what the Romans designated as virtus.
Virtus comes from vir, the Latin word for man designating masculinity,
referring to personal emotional fortitude, self-discipline, endurance in
defeat, and restraint in victory. But the Roman virtus is more than this.
Its essence is the devotion to a cause far beyond ones personal interest.
For the Roman citizen of antiquity, virtus implied before anything else
the devotion to the Roman state, the public cause, the res publica. It was
this devotion which expressed itself in the constantia, a main feature in
the complex of attitudes comprised by the term virtus. What strikes
me is that Freuds devotion to his cause, his res, the scientific edifice
which he built, is comparable to the virtus of the Roman expressed in his
23
devotion to the res publica.
65
Keep your cool if things get tough. It is this endurance and constantia
that we admire so much in Freud. In this he followed the great examples of
antiquity which his humanistic education had made alive for him.24 The
values are clear in a letter Freud wrote to James Jackson Putnam on March
30, 1914: The great ethical element in a work is truth and again truth and
this should suffice for most people. Courage and truth are of what they are
mostly deficient.25 Notwithstanding that Freud is often regarded as being
interested in the pursuit of pleasure, we see again then that Freuds views
owe more to the Stoics than to Epicurus or the utilitarians.
The special role Freud grants to reason in ethics was of course scarcely
the most ringing or unqualified endorsal of it that the modern age has seen.
But Freud at least granted the quality of insistence: The voice of the
intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing.
Finally, after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of
the few points on which one may be optimistic about the future of
mankind. . . . The primacy of the intellect lies, it is true, in a distant,
distant future, but probably not an infinitely distant one.26 The double
negative of the not infinitely distant demonstrates how little hope Freud
had in the short or even medium term for mankind. He regarded our best
hope for the future as lying in the intellect or reason being able to
establish in time a dictatorship in the mental life of man. Freud
postulated the crucial role for such a domain of reason that it would
prove the strongest uniting bond among men and lead the way to further
unions. In contrasting this liberating role, which would bring people
together with that of religion, Freud shows us why he saw religion in such
a negative light. Whatever, like religions prohibition against thought,
opposes such a development, is a danger for the future of mankind.27
Reason was for Freud in a battle with the passions and needed at least
clear sight to have a chance of prevailing over them. As is evident from
this quotation, according to Freud, the role of the passions was so great
that a very long battle was necessary to put them in place to some extent.
That for Freud was the human condition. Freud suggested in his
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, delivered in Vienna during the
dark days of World War I, that psychoanalysis was the most wounding of
the three great blows to human narcissism he lists therethat the earth
moves around the sun, that we are descended from the apes and not the
angels and that of psychoanalysis that the ego is not even master in its
24
Ibid, 176.
Hale, (ed.), James Jackson Putnam and Psychoanalysis, 171.
26
Freud, The Future of an Illusion. 53.
27
Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, 171172.
25
66
Chapter Three
own house.28 This final blow was hardest to take because it committed us
to the greatest change in our attitudes and behavior with, not surprisingly,
the least chance of success. It is interesting that Copernicus, Darwin, and
Freud were scientists who saw themselves as using a rational scientific
method. The fact that there are other great blows to human narcissism that
Freud did not mention such as earthquakes, illnesses, or many religious
doctrines demonstrates that Freuds emphasis was on the scientific
dethroning of the ego.
The scientific approach that Freud adopted was a matter of
temperament that fitted with his Stoic morality. His particular mood of his
investigation was Stoic: a Stoicism mixed with the scientific, heuristic
assumption that everything is determined was mixed with a Stoic outlook
or perspective. Why Freud adopted the natural scientific umbrella in the
first place may indeed have been connected with his Stoic outlook. One
can think here of the latters unbiased, impartial, objective, distant, even
muted indifference to the outcomes of reasoning from a disinterested
perspective. Of course, many later developments including those of
Ferenczi, British object relations schools and self psychology explicitly
went beyond Freud in their assumptions and mood in their approach to
human experience. Freuds famous statement about the importance of
psychoanalysts modeling their treatment on that of the surgeon abundantly
illustrates the issue of Stoic detachment at least as much as that of
science. Freud insisted with force, I cannot advise my colleagues too
urgently to model themselves during psycho-analytic treatment on the
surgeon, who puts aside all his feelings, even his human sympathy, and
concentrates his mental forces on the single aim of performing the
operation as skillfully as possible.29 Note Freuds analogy with the skill
required for an operation in the context of setting aside all feelings for the
success of the psychoanalytic operation. Freud emphasized this further:
Under present-day conditions the feeling that is most dangerous to a
psycho-analyst is the therapeutic ambition to achieve by this novel and
much disputed method something that will produce a convincing effect
upon other people.30 Here he was again Stoical in the resolution about
performing the function itself no matter what its impact on popularity.
Freud explicitly recognizes requiring this emotional coldness in the
analyst which he justifies by saying that it creates the most advantageous
conditions for both parties.31
28
67
Ibid, 115.
Ibid, 117118.
34
See Freud, Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis; Lipton, The
Advantages of Freuds Technique as shown in his Analysis of the Rat Man. Int. J.
Psycho-Anal, 58, 1977, 255273.
33
68
Chapter Three
the scientific method, this in itself did not mean moral coldness and
indifference any more than Stoicism did. Detachment is not indifference,
and Freud saw detachment as ethically and therapeutically efficacious. We
can see this further by examining his approach to religion, a decisive issue
for Freud, we would argue, exactly for the reason thatalthough he
denied thisFreud aimed to set up his own Stoic Weltanschaung in the
remains of old Europe.
In his lecture The Question of a Weltanschaung35 and elsewhere,
Freud contrasted the religious Weltanschaung with the scientific approach
as polar opposites. For Freud, the religious Weltanschaung was built on
wish and illusion, which had its basis in the mainsprings of childhood
emotion whereas, in contrast, the scientific approach was built on real
issues and how best, without illusion, we can deal with them. Religion, for
Freud, primarily involves consolations, the fantasized fulfillment of
childish needs and drives, the need for protection and the need for a
greater force to protect us:
Religion is an attempt to master the sensory world in which we are
situated by means of the wishful world which we have developed within
us as a result of biological and psychological necessities. But religion
cannot achieve this. Its doctrines bear the imprint of the times in which
they arose, the ignorant times of the childhood of humanity. Its
consolations deserve no trust.36
69
Did Freud get it right? Religion was surely a major competitor for a
Weltanschaung for anyone like Freud prone to discussing the big
questions Freud poses in such works as Cilization and Its Discontents.
Psychoanalysis and its institutions have themselves been compared to
religious denominations.41, I have elsewhere termed the manner of much
38
70
Chapter Three
71
43
44
72
Chapter Three
73
One portion allows itself to be diverted from its immediate aims and thus
to be of service to sublimated aims. (How exactly a culture is a living
entity that can do any such thing Freud never explains). However, another
part persists in the unconscious and still seeks satisfaction directly. The
point is that the civilized part of the drives, through sublimation, does not
directly seek pleasure as such. Civilization is beyond pleasure.
Although Freud collected icons and clearly loved literature and art,
then, he was not enamoured of civilization itself. Who could blame him?
His lifelong experience in Vienna went from trenchant anti-semitism
through the war to end all wars of 1914 to 1918 followed by the collapse
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Great Depression, the rise of Nazism,
and the Anschloss. Dynamic intrinsic conflict within culture itself
produces progress while maintaining, even increasing, some problematic
modes of dissatisfaction as evidenced in war. However, it would be wrong
to conclude here that this is simply a war between instincts that demand
satisfaction. The higher results of sublimation are not simply a delayed
form of instinctual pleasure, they are real human achievements that relate
to their origins as the cooked transcends the raw or the Mona Lisa goes
beyond just paint and canvas. Although Freud deplored so much about
civilization, its achievements differed in kind from the elemental forces
that produced it.
The New Introductory Lectures were written in 1933, in the still darker
period soon after the end of Worlod War I. The contrast between the
attractions of religious and ideological Weltanschaungen as opposed to a
scientific approach was understandably uppermost in Freuds mind. But in
contrasting these approaches and putting psychoanalysis clearly into the
category of science, he arguably stopped his critique too soon. Freud did
not inquire into what happens to a science that has become a movement,
51
74
Chapter Three
52
75
55
Freud to Hendrik de Man on December 13, 1925 (cited in P. Gay, Freud: A Life
for our Time, 310 n).
56
See Kirsner, Psychoanalysis and its Discontents. In Psychoanalytic Psychology,
21, 2004, 339352.
CHAPTER FOUR
ANXIOUS RESPONSIBILITY:
DERRIDAS APPROPRIATION
OF KIERKEGAARDIAN FEAR AND TREMBLING
ANNETTE LARREA
77
Maurice Blanchot, quoted in Waldenfels, Response and Responsibility in Levinas in Adriaan T. Peperzak (ed), Ethics as first philosophy: the significance of
Emmanuel Levinas for philosophy, literature, and religion, 50.
5
Milbank, The Sublime in Kierkegaard in Phillip Blond (ed) Post-secular philosophy: between philosophy and theology, 141-2.
6
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition.
7
Derrida, Writing and Difference, 111. Derrida writes: From [Kierkegaards]
point of view, the ethical moment is Hegelianism itself, and he says so explicitly.
Which does not prevent him from reaffirming ethics in repetition, and from reproaching Hegel for not having constituted a morality.
8
Derrida, however, will substantially diverge from Kierkegaard concerning what
ethics repeated looks like in his analyses. See below, Fn.10.
78
Chapter Four
79
Gasch, European Memories: Jan Patoka and Jacques Derrida on Responsibility in Critical Inquiry 33 (Winter 2007), 309
12
In fact, at perhaps some of the most crucial points, Derrida substantially disagrees with Kierkegaard and seeks to rewrite the moral of the story in his appropriation. The clearest point of difference is that for Kierkegaard, Abrahams faith
and hope that he will receive Isaac back and then his subsequent return to the
ethical (i.e. not having to go through with the sacrifice) is of the utmost importance. Abrahams ordeal is thus understood to teach him important things about
God, for example that God does not require human sacrifice but provides an animal substitute and eventually in Christian analogical interpretations, that God will
in fact sacrifice himself, ultimately leading to the end of the sacrificial system and
the prioritising of self-sacrifice over the sacrificing of others (whether human or
animal). For an excellent interpretation of Kierkegaards transfiguration of the
ethical along these lines, see Stephen Mulhalls Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001). Now, while
Derrida hints on occasion at these aspects of the story, he ultimately diverges in
finding the first movement of giving Isaac up (Abrahams infinite resignation)
to be the crucial ethical step. For him, a return or reward (receiving Isaac back)
only muddies the purity of the gift. In spite of this, Derrida believes he is able to
replicate the essential structure of Kierkegaards analyses in his own nondogmatic doublet. He acknowledges however that his appropriation will have the
effect of both diluting the implications of Kierkegaards arguments but also, he
contends, of reinforcing their most extreme ramifications. This essential movement
which Derrida seeks to appropriatea movement which he believes is able to radically transform our concept of responsibilityis that of imposing a supplementary
condition upon ethical generality (Derrida, Gift of Death, 79); an everlasting
impression such as only anxiety can leave.
80
Chapter Four
namely, that of the relation between the universal and the singular; and
parallel to this, the question of the relation between the theoretical (knowledge) and the practical (the instant of decision and action). Derridas
analyses of responsibility can thus be read as an extended meditation on
the scope and depth of these problems for ethics. Is the category of universality sufficient to respond adequately to the question of what it means to
be responsible? Have we yet considered the dangers and limits of ethics
as the universal; of a responsibility which, as Derrida suggests, is all
knowledge, justifications, calculation, and rationally certified good conscience? Are there any limits, any moments of exemption, exception, or
suspension when it comes to this universality? Is there any room for the
claims of singularity? Derrida turns to Kierkegaard in order to think
through these questions because he finds in him the ammunition for rethinking more than a few modern philosophical assumptions concerning
ethical and political responsibility13.
81
many distractions of the hooting carnival crowd who deafen one another
with their noise and clamor, keep anxiety away with their screeching.16
According to de Silentio, taking a moment out to contemplate the anxiety
of the knight of faith who walks alone in his dreadful responsibility
might be just the therapy ethics as the universal is in need of.
But what exactly is this anxiety, this fear and trembling? Are the two
terms synonymous, and furthermore are they substitutable with other similar terms: distress, trauma, fear, anguish, and so on? Ostensibly it would
seem that Kierkegaard does indeed use some of these terms interchangeably within Fear and Trembling. For example, he often uses the term anxiety or the phrase the anxiety, the distress, the paradox to refer to
Abrahams ordeal of fear and trembling. Here anxiety seems to refer to the
experience of undergoing a trial which may involve pain, hardship and the
isolation of being misunderstood.17 However, at another level, further
definitional clarification is required, especially considering that anxiety
is a central topic of Kierkegaards corpus, receiving its own book-length
treatment in The Concept of Anxiety (written under the pseudonym of
Vigilius Haufniensis)18. Yet even within this text, anxiety is described in a
number of different and specific ways19. For our purposes, however, it
may be best to begin with a working definition of anxiety in its broadest
Kierkegaardian sense. Here we must note firstly that anxiety in Kierkegaards work does not refer to a merely psychological phenomenon (although it certainly is this). Rather, anxiety is analysed by Kierkegaard as a
definitive structure of human personality and indeed rationality20. In a way
which underscores the measure of the young Heideggers debt to Kierkegaard, anxiety is for Kierkegaard the mood which reveals our freedom and
our essential relationship to possibility and the future21. It is thus altogether different from fear and similar concepts that refer to something
definite22; it is an inexplicable, indeterminate nothing the anxious pos16
Ibid., 80.
Ibid., 64-67.
18
Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, Reidar Thomte (trans), Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1980. All quotes in text from this edition.
19
A glance at the contents page of CA with its complex titles and elaborate schema
is by itself enough to confirm this point.
20
George Pattison, The Philosophy of Kierkegaard, Acumen Publishing, Chesham,
2005, p.47.
21
Gordon D. Marino, The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, Alastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino (eds), Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998, p.320.
22
Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 42.
17
82
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Ibid., 44.
Ibid., 61.
25
Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 157.
26
Ibid., 155.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid., 162.
29
Ibid., 158-159.
24
83
Anxiety is thus presented as having a purgative effect, purifying the individual through the intense experience of its ordeal and leaving one healed,
liberated, and free. Thus Kierkegaard writes: When salvation is posited,
anxiety, together with possibility, is left behind. This does not mean that
30
Ibid., 159.
Here it is possible to identify a parallel with certain therapeutic conceptions of
trauma in (Lacanian) psychoanalysis. Consider for instance the affinities between
Kierkegaards account of anxiety and the description given below by Marcus
Pound detailing the role of trauma in the clinic: Psychoanalysis does not just
resign us to the trauma or real of existence, it uses it. Indeed, this is the analysts
job: to traumatise the analysand, breaking through the analysands neurotic defences by confronting him with the trauma of his unconscious desire, destabilising
the ground of the analysands experience. Yet precisely because the point of
trauma brings ones symbolic supports and neurotic defences into question, the
event is, as Kirby Farrell puts it, always supercharged with significance and always profoundly equivocal in its interpretative possibilities. Like traditional religious-conversion experience, it can signify rebirth and promise transcendence, or it
can open onto an abyss Once again, trauma is not seen as an impediment, but
the positive condition of experience (Marcus Pound, Eucharist and Trauma,
New Blackfriars 88 (1014), 187194, 191) Despite many differences, a basic comparison presents itself as obvious: like Kierkegaards anxiety, Lacans trauma is
not only a negative state but can also have a positive or useful function. Both
function to destabilize the subject, making it uneasy and disturbed by pulling away
its supports; both contain the greatest risk and the greatest promise.
32
Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, 159.
31
84
Chapter Four
anxiety is annihilated, but that when rightly used it plays another role.33
This is Kierkegaards vision of a right relation to anxiety, where anxiety
plays a positive function. One finds confirmation of this attitude to anxiety
in a journal entry where Kierkegaard writes: Fear and Trembling (see
Philippians 2:12) is not the primus motor in the Christian life, for it is
love; but it is what the oscillating balance wheel is to the clock it is the
oscillating balance wheel of the Christian life.34 Here fear and trembling
is put in its place, it has a circumscribed role rather than being the central
driving force. Nevertheless, it still performs a positive tempering function:
it checks and balances the extremes of confident self-assurance, reminding
one to be vigilant and to work out ones salvation with due seriousness and
awe before God. Therefore the Christian for Kierkegaard is not driven by
fear and a desperate, dark enthusiasm as Kant worried35, but rather by
love. Fear and trembling or anxiety helps one avoid complacent good
conscience at best and at worst arrogant hypocrisy.
This positive or redeeming function of anxiety is only dealt with in
the final and shortest section of The Concept of Anxiety. Yet it is just this
aspect which has most often been seized upon by subsequent thinkers. As
we indicated above, later authors have attempted an ontologisation (e.g.
Heidegger)36 or secularisation (e.g. Sartre) of Kierkegaards analyses37,
33
Ibid., 53.
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 259; see Ibid., also de Vries, Religion and
Violence, p.150
35
Kant writes, concerning Phil. 2:12 where Saint Paul commends his readers to
work out your salvation with fear and trembling, that this is a hard saying,
which, if misunderstood, is capable of driving one into the darkest enthusiasm.
Quoted in Ibid., de Vries, Religion and Violence, p.156
36
That Heideggers analyses draw on this sense of anxiety is seen even more
clearly in some of his early lectures where he seeks to give Phenomenological
Explication of Concrete Religious Phenomena in Connection with the Letters of
Paul (see Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, Matthias
Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (trans.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2004.) Here he draws out the role of anxiety in the expectation of the early
Christians for Christs return (the parousia). Heidegger describes their awaiting and
hope as an absolute distress, an entering-oneself-into anguish.(Heidegger, The
Phenomenology of Religious Life, 67) He notes that Paul doesnt offer any objective determinations to their question of when Christ will return, but rather urges
his readers to be awake and sober, to ignore the lulling comforts of those who
speak of peace and security and instead remain vigilant (73-4). Anxiety here
then goes hand in hand with expectation and hope; its temporality is an eager, impatient awaiting.
34
85
86
Chapter Four
the fact that Abraham remains for the most part silent; that he cannot
speak, cannot make himself understandable to anyone and cannot explain
why he is willing to do this terrible thing42. Derrida follows de Silentio in
that he finds these concerns of hiddenness and concealment to be the most
interesting and crucial insights into Abrahams position. As a result, he
writes that both his and de Silentios are discourses intent on linking the
question of secrecy to that of responsibility (GD 58).
Not surprisingly then, Derridas first quotation from and comments on
Fear and Trembling in The Gift of Death are from Problema III. Derrida
reports that in this Problema, Kierkegaard reflects on the double secret
operating in the story of Abraham: that between God and Abraham but
also between the latter and his family (GD 59). Of Abrahams situation of
responsibility Derrida writes:
To the extent that, in not saying the essential thing, namely, the secret between God and him, Abraham doesnt speak, he assumes the responsibility
that consists in always being alone, entrenched in ones own singularity at
the moment of decision. Just as no one can die in my place, no one can
make a decision, what we call a decision in my place. But as soon as one
speaks, as soon as one enters the medium of language, one loses that very
singularity. One therefore loses the possibility of deciding or the right to
decide. Thus every decision would, fundamentally, remain at the same
time solitary, secret, and silent. Speaking relieves us, Kierkegaard notes,
for it translates into the general.43
This quote reveals exactly what it is that makes Abraham a figure of such
exemplary significance for Derrida in his genealogical rethinking of responsibility. It is because Abraham shows that responsibility demands
irreplaceable singularity.44 This singularity refers to a certain solitude but
also and more importantly it alludes to the essential non-substitutability of
the individual: in both death and decision no one can take my place45.
42
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 71, 77, 80, 113. Needless to say, this represents a highly stylized account of the biblical story on the part of both de Silentio
and then also and perhaps even more so with Derrida. It is not the case that Abraham does not speak at all and Derrida acknowledges this (Derrida, Gift of Death,
59). Furthermore, the story is considered in isolation from the context of Abrahams ongoing relationship with God as narrated in Genesis.
43
Derrida, Gift of Death, 60.
44
Ibid., 44. My italics.
45
In the second chapter of GD, Derrida frames the notion of singularity within an
analysis of the Heideggerian notion of irreplaceability and the non-substitutability
of ones death. He says: Yet only death or rather the apprehension of death can
give this irreplaceability, and it is only on the basis of it that one can speak of a
87
responsible subject (GD 51). Singularity it seems is deaths gift to us. Explaining Heideggers account, Derrida writes, It is in the being-towards-death that the
self of the Jemeinigkeit is constituted, comes into its own, that is, comes to realise
its unsubstitutability, i.e., its irreducibly different singularity (GD 45). Derrida
goes so far as to claim that the various arguments of Heidegger, Patoka, and Levinas on this point intersect in spite of their differences in that they all ground
responsibility, as experience of singularity, in this apprehensive approach to
death. (GD 43).
46
Derrida, Gift of Death, 60-61. My italics.
47
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 54, 68, 82.
48
Derrida himself points this out in his essay Violence and Metaphysics, see
above Fn.4.
88
Chapter Four
49
89
ceive Isaac back.55 Thus his sacrifice could fittingly be called an antisacrifice56 since it defies the usual justificatory logic accompanying
sacrifices of the individual to the universal. Abrahams faith is precisely
this paradox that the single individual is higher than the universal.57
Johannes de Silentio thus concludes that Abrahams act is totally unrelated to the universal; the only point of contact being that Abraham
transgressed it.58 Or put slightly less dramatically, he determines his
relation to the universal by his relation to the absolute.59 This, however,
leaves Abraham in the anxious situation of being destined to endure the
martyrdom of misunderstanding.60 He cannot speak, because to speak is
to express the universal, to explain ones actions, to make oneself understandable to others, and hence to be publicly justified. This is why it is
glorious to belong to the universal, to enjoy the wonderful security of
being understood in its friendly abode. If only Abraham could have partook in the glorious expression of the universal, in a kingly sacrifice of his
son to the universal in order to save the state61, then he would have found
rest from anxiety and approval of his deeds. But his failure to accomplish
anything for the universal62, his silence, secrets, and singular responsibility
is an offence to ethics, which demands disclosure.63 It is now clear why
the issue of secrecy and of Abrahams not speaking is so important to both
de Silentio and then to Derrida: it is because it is the most fundamental
expression of his exclusion from the ethical realm when defined as the
universal. Thus Derrida writes: Because, in this way, he doesnt speak,
Abraham transgresses the ethical order and he summarises Abrahams
situation as follows: By keeping the secret, Abraham betrays ethics.64 Of
course by now it should be clear just what kind of ethics is being betrayed.
However, it is not only Hegelian philosophical conceptions of ethics
which Abraham is guilty of transgressing, but also simple commonsense
notions of the ethical which on the whole define responsibility in terms of
a speaking and answering for oneself; a justifying of ones actions in public. Derridas emphasis on the singularity and secrecy of Abrahams situa55
90
Chapter Four
65
Ibid., 60.
Ibid., Gasch, European Memories: Jan Patoka and Jacques Derrida on Responsibility, p.306.
67
Thus he writes: Absolute responsibility is not a responsibility, at least it is not
general responsibility or responsibility in general. It needs to be exceptional or
extraordinary, and it needs to be that absolutely and par excellence It must remain inconceivable, indeed unthinkable (Derrida, Gift of Death, 61). Derridas
treatment here hinges on a methodological approach which is repeated many
times in his work with various topics such as hospitality, gift, forgiveness, friendship, mourning and so on. These analyses are usually structured in terms of Derridas notorious possible-impossible aporia.
66
91
However, to stop here after having simply offered two opposing conceptions of responsibility would hardly constitute much of a philosophical
achievement. What has still been left unasked is the crucial question of the
relation between the two terms the general and the absolute. Derrida,
although, does go on to problematise any easy separation. He develops the
aporetic nature of the relation between the two contradictory demands by
explicating the way in which absolute responsibility in the same instant
both betrays and yet also paradoxically upholds ethical generality. In
Abrahams case this is the point that, as Kierkegaard had already argued,
[Abraham] must love Isaac with his whole soul and only then can he
sacrifice him.68 Derrida articulates the paradox as follows:
Abraham must assume absolute responsibility for sacrificing his son by
sacrificing ethics, but in order for there to be a sacrifice, the ethical must
retain all its value; the love for his son must remain in tact, and the order of
human duty must continue to insist on its rights.69
68
92
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6. Alterity
The simple concepts of alterity and of singularity constitute the concept of duty
as much as that of responsibility
Derrida, Gift of Death, 68.
Derridas conception of alterity constitutes the heart of his concept of responsibility. As such, it is also the presupposition that drives and shapes
his appropriation of Kierkegaards Fear and Trembling. Derrida claims
that to understand this story and accept the moral of morality which he
derives from it does not require one to come from a particular religious
faith or to believe in the wholly other God or necessarily that the Genesis
22 story is anything more than a myth. It does however require a certain
point of view77, which is introduced by Derrida in the elliptical formula
Tout autre est tout autre (every other (one) is every (bit) other). It is
73
Ibid.
Note: Derrida is using this term very differently here from the way Levinas employs it to speak of our responsibility for the other. Levinas usage of the term
substitution is aligned with the singular other (rather than generality).
75
Derrida, Gift of Death, 66.
76
Ibid., 67.
77
Derrida, Gift of Death, 78.
74
93
this quasi-tautology concerning absolute alterity which serves as the interpretive key for Derridas analyses, functioning as the point at which he
sees himself as both displacing Kierkegaards own emphasis and yet reinforcing its most extreme ramifications.78
Kierkegaards own emphasis, according to Derrida, is on the alterity or
otherness of God alone, as Kierkegaard put it, on the infinite qualitative
distance between God and man. Certainly this theme attracted Derrida
along with many others to Kierkegaards work, a point which Derrida
suggests to Levinas in Violence and Metaphysics: Kierkegaard had a
sense of the relationship to the irreducibility of the totally-other in the
direction of a certain Abraham79. But the problem for Derrida is that with
Kierkegaard, absolute alterity stops with God. With Kierkegaard the absolute uniqueness of Jahweh doesnt tolerate analogy.80 Yet such analogy is precisely where Derrida wants to go, or rather, he wants to go
further, envisioning what we could call a structural or formal identity
between every Other and God as Absolute Other. This is the point of the
formula Tout autre est tout autreevery other, each one, is wholly other
in the way God is. Structurally then there is no longer any way to distinguish between the infinite alterity of God and the same infinite alterity of
every human, or of the other in general.81
As such, in Derridas appropriation of the Abraham story, the name
God simply becomes a place-holder for the absolute other82; the most
appropriate word we have for designating the meaning of infinite alterity
and absolute singularity. This then is the basis on which Derrida sees the
extraordinary story of Abraham as revealing the very structure of what
occurs everyday83. Since for him each of us is infinitely other in our absolute singularity, then what can be said about Abrahams relation to God
can be said about my relation without relation to every other (one) as
every (bit) other, in particular my relation to my neighbour or my loved
ones who are as inaccessible to me, as secret and transcendent, as Jahweh.84 Thus, when read from the point of view of every other as wholly
other, Fear and Trembling [t]hrough its paradox speaks of the respon78
Ibid., 79.
Ibid., Derrida, Violence and Metaphysics, p.111.
80
Derrida, Gift of Death, 79.
81
Derrida, Gift of Death, 84.
82
Caputo, John D., Instants, Secrets, and Singularities: Dealing Death in Kierkegaard and Derrida in Kierkegaard in post/modernity, Martin J. Matust k and
Merold Westphal (eds), Bloomington : Indiana University Press, c1995, 201.
83
Derrida, Gift of Death, 78. My italics.
84
Ibid.
79
94
Chapter Four
sibility required at every moment for every man and woman.85 The concept of absolute responsibility, which Abrahams faith exemplifies for us,
concerns how to respond to the singularity of the wholly other. And who
is the wholly other to whom I must respond in this unconditional fashion?
The answer for Derrida is everyone; every other.
At this point it seems hard to know whether what is being claimed is
something radically new (as well as something potentially heretical and
blasphemous in the eyes of traditional orthodoxy), or on the other hand,
something entirely common, even somewhat ordinary and obvious, which
is simply being thrust before us in a provocative and startling manner. To
suggest such a reading is not too far from the spirit of some of Derridas
own comments and his general approach in Gift of Death of juxtaposing
the extraordinary with the quotidian. Put crudely, perhaps the point is just
simply that it doesnt make sense to debate degrees of infinite alterity.
Everything here though would seem to hinge on what Derrida means by
alterity, and in particular, by its being complete, absolute or pure (i.e. not
available in quantitative differences of degree)86. Derridas formulations
certainly provoke questions. Does he mean that the other is transcendent,
exterior, inaccessible, unknowable, separate? And even if these extreme
words are used what do they then mean? In particular, what do they precludeis immanence, relationship, communication, or transformative interaction necessarily ruled out?87.
85
Ibid.
In fact, I would suggest that this is perhaps the key question which commentators on the Derrida-Levinas-Kierkegaard debate (especially concerning the relation
between the ethical and religious) must face. In order to understand what is at stake
in claiming that there can be only one absolute other or in maintaining that
there are in fact a multiplicity of absolute others, it would be essential to clarify
just what is meant by the wholly other in each thinkers system. What kind
of distinction (ontological or ethical) is being made and what particular point is
each trying to articulate in appealing to this notion? There are important differences here which cannot simply be ironed over. Derrida himself weighs into this
debate in chapter four of Gift of Death with his own synopsis of where Levinas and
Kierkegaard stand with relation to each other (see Derrida Gift of Death, 82-4).
87
Derridas frequent comments that separation, distance and non-knowledge are in
fact the condition of the social bond and the element of hospitality should be
enough to give us pause here before jumping to conclusions. In one place, he goes
so far as to declare that the absolute transcendence of the other is not an obstacle
but the condition of love, of friendship, and of war, too, a condition of the relation
to the other. (Jacques Derrida quoted in Deconstruction in a Nutshell: a conversation with Jacques Derrida, John D. Caputo (ed.), New York, Fordham University
Press, 1997, 14.
86
95
The Gift of Death however does not give easy answers to such questions, mainly because in it Derrida seems to give a much more extreme
view of alterity bereft of the many nuances which are central to his approach to this question in other texts, particularly to his earlier critique of
Levinas in Violence and Metaphysics. Are we to consider this a weakness of the text or can any coherent account be given of the role absolute
alterity plays in Gift of Death? Based on the key issues that have been
brought out, it is clear that one of the key meanings of Derridean alterity
and singularity in their co-constituting of Derridas concept of responsibility lies in Derridas interest in the notion of the exceptioni.e., not a particular subsumed under the universal category and dealt with according
merely to rules and lawbut rather something unique, singular, other. But
how can one express this in the generalising language of philosophy?
Levinas move was to borrow the predicate infinite, usually used for
Gods transcendence, and to apply the formal design of this idea to the
other. His intention here was neither to make humans God nor to reject
finitude but rather to suggest that the other, like God, cannot be reduced to
and synthesised into a higher dialectical unity. The otheryou, in the second personare infinite, absolute, i.e. you exceed totality, and your principle relation to universality is not that of being a particular instance of the
genus, but rather of being an interruption; a singular unexpected disruption. And if every other is wholly otheri.e. if each one is defined by singularity and alterity then here we seem to have ironically stumbled across
a new universal, which Derrida fittingly calls the universal exception or
the law of the exception.88
To say then that the simple concepts of alterity and singularity constitute the concept of responsibility amounts to saying that the category of
universality or generality is never by itself enough to respond adequately
to the question of what it means to be responsible. Unless, that is, the universal law becomes precisely the law of the exception. Tout autre est tout
autre signifies that each one is singular, an exception to the universal,
hence capable of interrupting its laws with its singular and anxietyinducing call to responsibility. In this way it is, as Derrida puts it, proposition that seals the contract between universality and the exemption of
singularity.89 A contract, a paradox, an aporia, which according to Derrida must be recognised as lying at the heart of our concept of responsibility, constantly to be negotiated, if responsible is indeed what we want to
be.
88
89
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90
As Derrida puts it: As soon as I enter into a relation with the absolute other, my
absolute singularity enters into relation with his on the level of obligation and duty.
I am responsible to the other as other, I answer to him and I answer for what I do
before him. (GD 68).
91
Derrida, Gift of Death, 68. My italics.
92
Ibid., 70.
97
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which, as Gasch puts it, is the invention, each time anew, of a rule according to which both contradictory demands could be met simultaneously97. On the one hand, the responsible person must act on the basis of
knowledge and universal ethical norms; she must be able to give an account of her actions and justify herself by virtue of reasons acceptable to
the public ethical generality. But this demand alone fails to capture what is
perhaps most vital to our concept of responsibility. Responsibility also
entails a calling to relate to the other beyond the universalisable sense of
the law, in a singular manner and in the excessive terms of absolute responsibility, sacrifice and gift98. It is the negotiation of these two impossible demandsin theory and in practicethat constitutes for Derrida the
task of responsibility. Significantly, this structure of negotiation also parallels quite closely Derridas analysis of the relation between law and justice
in Force of Law.99 Absolute responsibility, like justice, is an impossible
passion which calls one forth in the task of responsibility. It is in the name
of justice that one deconstructs the law and is open to the possibility of
more just revisions. Likewise, the impossible demand of absolute responsibilitythe originary moment of responsibility such as it exposes me
to the singular other, the one who appeals to me100constitutes an interruption to any ethical generality, i.e. any closed context designating my
duties and responsibilities to others. In Gift of Death Derrida seeks to
elaborate over and again the way in which this interruptionthe sublime
suspension of the ethical continuum by the call of the othercan be an opportunity for transforming our ethical practices and institutions to new and
unique situations.
So where then should we say that the philosophical dividend and critical weight of Derridas approach to the question of responsibility lies? If
for critical eyes his introduction of aporia, paradox and contradictory demands hadnt appeared promising at first sight, our argument would be
that, itself paradoxically, this is in fact where the merit lies. It is precisely
by elucidating the two demands which structure our concept of responsibility that Derrida is able to expose in an incisive manner the dangers
which face us in all our responsibility-talk. He has room in his account to
examine the limits and risks inherent in this concept (rather than only unending praise for a new modern virtue); repeatedly warning us that irre97
Ibid., Gasch, European Memories: Jan Patoka and Jacques Derrida on Responsibility, p.310.
98
Derrida, Gift of Death, 63.
99
Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority in
Deconstruction and the possibility of Justice, 3-67.
100
Derrida, Gift of Death, 71.
99
sponsibility is never far from insinuating itself in everything that goes under the name of responsibility (whether in philosophy or the newspaper).
Derridas risk-analysis of our attempts to thematise responsibility can
thus be drawn out according to responsibilitys two demands. Firstly then,
what would be the danger and risk inherent in absolute responsibility and
its demand of singularity, exclusivity and secrecy? Well, this practically
goes without sayingit is not hard to come up with a myriad of examples
of pseudo-Abrahams claiming a higher voice commanded them to commit
some horrible crime. Our media nearly daily relates widespread, presentday fears of terrorist acts which are often associated with a religious extremism that deceptively resembles absolute responsibility. The danger
here would be to demand no account of such a higher call; secrets here
one could easily argue would be a recipe for the worst possible irresponsibility. Nevertheless, given the emphases of Gift of Death, one might conclude that Derrida considers his readers to have more than enough
awareness of such dangers, since he barely focuses on themalmost without a word he alarmingly passes them over. The danger he does focus on,
one that we rarely have drawn to our attention, is that of general responsibility.
The risk of this form of responsibility is embodied for Derrida, in those
absolutely sure of their moral rectitude. Derrida labels them the knights of
good conscience, parodying their knighthood against Kierkegaards
calling Abraham the knight of faith, and evoking other famous critiques
of good conscience morality such as those found in Nietzsche and Sartre.
Responsibility Derrida observes is a word that has caught the attention of
good consciences everywhere today. They consider it to be the prime
virtue, the Good itself101, they are the defenders of responsibility before
mentell us your reasons, justify yourself before us. It would thus seem
that the great justificatory project of our time is no longer Theodicy102 but
rather egodicy, which Derrida defines as the autobiography that is always auto-justification.103 Derrida articulates the extent to which this concerns him in fairly extreme terms, at one point, identifying this incessant
demand for accounts and justifications as a kind of violence. Rodolphe
Gasch expresses this concern acutely:
As Patoka's analyses of the decadence of modern Europe seek to show, it
takes very little for such a democratic model of responsibility and of rendering reason to become totalitarian. Indeed, the legitimate demand intrin101
100
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sic to the concept of responsibility to publicly account for oneself and one's
deeds can easily turn into a means of oppressionas has amply been demonstrated under Stalinism and Zhdanovism in the former Soviet Union, but
examples of which can also be found in the U.S. with its obsession with
public confession...104
The problem Derrida points to here is not the legitimate demand for
reasons but rather the incessantness of it; its being everywhere (including
in philosophy105). Derrida is thus making a point about how, underlying
this enthusiasm for giving an account which generates the incessantness of
the demand, there is a philosophical misunderstanding of what reasons and
accounts can accomplish; a failure to recognise the limits of general responsibility. Derrida variously designates this limit: absolute responsibility, the secret, and the right not to respond, and Abraham appears to him
as the narrative incarnation of this paradox. Derridas claim then is that a
respect for this limitan acknowledgement of the claims of singularity
must always remain part of our concept of responsibility, since, as Gasch
puts it, it is the necessary antidote to a conception of responsibility that,
based on knowledge, can always become a tool for the benefit of the
worst.106 One might thus suggest that where the virtue of being unconditionally confident in ones moral and religious position overshadows
and makes unrecognizable the virtues of constant self-questioning, unease,
and anxiety107, there responsibilitythe ability to respond and be responsive to othersmay well be seriously impaired (a condition to which democracies as much as individuals are susceptible108). Hannah Arendt
makes a similar point in the context of discussing the possibility of re104
Ibid., Gasch, European Memories: Jan Patoka and Jacques Derrida on Responsibility, 307.
105
Derrida describes this situation as follows: Let us insist here on what is too
often forgotten by the moralising moralists and good consciences who preach to us
with assurance every morning and every week, in newspapers and magazines, on
the radio and on television, about the sense of ethical or political responsibility.
Philosophers who dont write ethics are failing in their duty, one often hears, and
the first duty of the philosopher is to think about ethics, to add a chapter on ethics
to each of his or her books and, in order to do that, to come back to Kant as often
as possible.(Derrida, Gift of Death, 67).
106
Ibid., Gasch, European Memories: Jan Patoka and Jacques Derrida on Responsibility, 307.
107
Ibid., Mahn, Jason A., Felix Fallibilitas: The Benefit of Sins Possibility in
Kierkegaards The Concept of Anxiety, 254.
108
Ibid., Mahn, Jason A., Felix Fallibilitas: The Benefit of Sins Possibility in
Kierkegaards The Concept of Anxiety, 275 fn.2.
101
sponsibility after the Holocaust. She argues that only those who do not
content themselves with the hypocritical confession God be thanked I am
not like that but rather in fear and trembling have finally realized of
what man is capable can there be any reliance today when it comes to
fighting fearlessly, uncompromisingly, everywhere against the incalculable evil that men are capable of bringing about.109 It is this fear and
trembling, which is intimately linked to responsible action, that Arendt
claims is indeed the precondition of any modern political thinking.110
To return then to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter:
what has Derridas suspension of responsibilityhis exposing it to the
anxiety of absolute responsibilityachieved? How is responsibility reaffirmed and transformed in the repetition? Derrida states the conclusion
dramatically: there is no longer any responsibility which does not fall
prey to the paradox of Abraham111, since the singularity and alterity of the
other imposes a supplementary complication upon ethical generality112.
In each responsible decision we are all asked at every moment to behave
like knights of faith, that is, to assume our responsibility with a certain
fear and trembling before every other as wholly other. Derridas interpretive appropriation of Kierkegaards Fear and Trembling is thus most fundamentally an appropriation of a certain mood or mode of approach to
questions of ethics and responsibility, which are of course never merely
questions of theory but always imply an involvement in action, doing, a
praxis, a decision that exceeds simple theoretical understanding113.
Following Kierkegaard, Derrida attempts to draw out the kind of anxious
concern (earnestness) which is the very precondition and momentum of
responsibility. Derridas is an attempt to grasp the benefit of anxiety in its
ability to interrupt the perpetual slide of responsibility towards delusions
of infallibility, unperturbed good-conscience and obsessions with selfjustification. Thus for Derrida, the aporia remains to haunt good conscience, responsibility is anxious or it is nothing at all.
109
FEATURE ESSAY
THE SHAME OF TRAUMA,
THE TRAUMA OF SHAME
AGNES HELLER, NEW SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
RESEARCH, BUDAPEST
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structural, as in case of the Oedipal trauma. But there are several typical
non-structural personal traumas as well. Being typical and being personal
do not contradict one another. Indeed, the most frequently discussed
personal traumas are frequently discussed just because they are considered
typical today, such as the trauma of the battered child, the trauma of being
raped, the trauma of the battlefield, the Holocaust trauma. The latter is a
special case for it is deeply related not to a structural, but to a historical
trauma. I will talk about these traumas later in relation to shame.
But let me first return to and repose the previous question. Is there such
a thing as trauma, as personal, structural or historical trauma, beyond the
somewhat tentative propositions we have given hitherto? In answering the
question it is best to follow Foucaults footsteps in his famous History of
Sexuality. There was no sexuality before the Victorian age, says
Foucault. In the same sense, I rejoin, there was no trauma. That is,
certain phenomena or experiences which we now consider as constituents
of trauma were in other periods, and in other cultures even today
understood and interpreted as constituents of another syndrome, or other
narratives. When someone had irrational fears he was perhaps diagnosed
as having been possessed by demons or bewitched by a rival. When
someone committed suicide she was perhaps called to Heaven to assist her
dead mother. A strong traumatic experience could and has also been
interpreted as a kind of revelation impossible to verbalize. Several typical
responses to trauma like depression, distrust, fits of anger, or self-isolation
are portrayed by Shakespeare in the character of Hamlet. Some symptoms
of a traumatic experience were perhaps less evident or less strong in
persons who were less sensitive than their modern successors. I guess that,
eminently, this is why Hamlets figure strikes us as utterly modern.
Trauma is thus part of a specifically modern narrative or narratives.
Its symptoms and syndromes appear clearly in the 18th century, the age of
reason, perhaps just because it is supposed to be an age of reason. Yet they
appear in the romantic or post-romantic school then among men of
enlightenment. There are exceptions. I mentioned trauma syndromes,
although every trauma is a set of two such syndromes. First comes the
syndrome of the trauma experience itself, and afterwards, not even soon
afterwards, the trauma syndrome as a neurotic syndrome .The trauma
experience cannot be directly diagnosed, only the Nachtraegliche (Freud)
neurotic symptoms which form in its wake. It is from those later
symptoms that one can make learned guesses, so says psychoanalysis,
about the triggering trauma experience itself. There is then no strict causal
relation between the experience and the symptoms of the neurotic
syndrome. The relation is rather between the conditioning and the
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even nowadays more frequently than we might expect. Although the kind
of shame elicited by a trauma is just a special case within the general
shame phenomenon, it will turn out that a few typical figures of shame in
general can be observed in cases of trauma-elicited shame. Let me then
enumerate types of trauma-elicited shame. One can be ashamed of oneself
because of (1) being a victim, (2) because the act committed against you or
by you is normally considered shameful, (3) because you are what you are
(4) because of your guilt or seeming guilt for some crime, the so called
witness guilt included; or (5) because you are ashamed for others,
relatives, friends, or even strangers, and especially for the ones by whom
you are victimized.
A few among the five enumerated types can be combined, although not
all. It is among other reasons because you are ashamed or afraid to be
ashamed that you cannot talk about your trauma and try to erase it even
from your memory. This kind of shame can be alleviated either by a
trusted friend or by a collective trauma narrative, which inserts the
personal trauma into the fibers of collective identity. One is ashamed to be
a victim. One is generally ashamed by being defeated, by losing
something, be it a position, wealth, business, love, trust, election or
anything. One is ashamed for being refused by a publisher, by a lover, by
parents or children. Jealousy, vanity and envy, the three most ridiculous
vices are also connected to the fear of being or becoming victims.
Indeed, trauma is experienced first and foremost as the extreme
experience of being victimized. Trauma sufferers can be victims of abuse,
victims of rape, victims of a terrorist act, Holocaust victims and so on. Yet
most them are victims. And it is shameful to be a victim. Why? People
can quote, together with Hannah Arendt, that victrix causa deis placuit
sed victa Catoni, and perhaps for some this sentence might ring true, yet,
even if it does, we are still ashamed of being victimized. The cause of
victims can please us more than that of the victors, yet we do not want to
be seen as victims unless we want to penalize the person(s) who
victimized us, whom we hate and on whom we desire to take revenge.
A person who is victimized, especially without showing strong
resistance, experiences herself in a position of passivity, immobility,
helplessness, orbrieflythe position of total loss of freedom. In a
situation of loss of freedom, of minimum autonomy, the victim feels her
identity broken into pieces and her self-respect shattered. She can also feel
herself guilty. Guilt feelings, in the situation of a total loss of control, also
seem paradoxical. On the one hand such affects lack all rational
foundation; on the other hand they create or imply the illusion of freedom.
If someone feels guilty in the situation of being victimized, she denies the
109
possibility of the total loss of her autonomy, and in this way never loses
entirely either identity or self-respect. If I feel guilty I experience myself
as a person who has always been at least up to a minimal degree in charge.
The feeling of guilt in the aftermath of a trauma experience is rooted in the
very trauma experience, yet it is also the sign of resistance, of the sole
possible resistance against the trauma experience, a kind of Abwehr
Mechanismus, just like fever in the case of a serious infection .Thus the
sense of guilt performs a double function. I believe that it follows from a
psychological misreading of the significance of the victims feeling of
guilt to persuade her of being entirely innocent, Surely, I do not mean that
a rape victim asked for it or that a battered child should justify the brutal
acts of his torturers. I do not mean that they should accept coresponsibility with their victimizers. A Holocaust victim is certainly not
co-responsible for the gas chambers and mass murders. He is not
responsible for the crimes committed by the slightest degree. Yet a
survivor can still feel guilty for surviving while others were murdered.
Lucretia, a model Roman matron, committed suicide after she has been
raped, yet not because she was traumatized but because she knew that she
brought shame on her husband. As a contrast we could consider the case
of Donna Anna from Mozarts opera Don Giovanni. It is a modern case
and a far more complex one. Don Giovanni is a story which begins with
attempted rape. Don Giovanni climbs into the bedroom of Donna Anna,
who mistakes him for a moment in the darkness of night for Don Ottavio,
her fiance. Donna Anna defends herself, resists, cries out for help. Don
Giovanni, seeing himself to be this time defeated, then tries to escape, with
Anna following him, crying out for assistance in halting him. At this
moment Annas old father appears, and challenges the rapist for a duel.
Yet Don Giovanni, young and strong, easily kills the old man.
Mozart and Lorenzo da Ponte portray here a very serious and typical
trauma experience. We may speak even of an accumulated trauma. That a
strangers climbs into Annas bedroom and tries to rape her is itself
traumatic. The trauma is then accentuated by the murder of Annas father.
The beloved father is killed by the rapist. And in addition, Donna Anna
experiences a strong feeling of guilt. It was she who mistook Don
Giovanni for Don Ottavio, and it was because she cried out against him
that her father entered the duel which would take his life. This aggravating
trauma, the murder of Annas father, is visible. Annas grief is
overwhelming. So is her passion for revenge. Yet the loud grief, the
passionate call for revenge covers up another silence. Anna remains silent
about the attempted rape. She cannot speak about it, she is so ashamed.
She does not trust anyone with her experience. And she feels guilty. Yet
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precisely her guilt cannot find a direct, only an indirect expression. She
pretends to herself as much as to Don Ottavio that she grieves only and
exclusively for her father, and that her troubled emotional state is due to
the feeling heart of a devoted daughter. Don Ottavio senses the
irrationality of Annas grief, but in his love he never judges her.
How well Mozart and da Ponte understand a trauma and the trauma
expressions! We do not know how much time elapsed between the trauma
and the trauma narrative: Era gia alquano We know only that some
time had elapsed after the traumatising experience, when Donna Anna one
day recognized Don Giovannis voice. Under the impact of recognition,
and the attendant reinforcement of the trauma, she only at this point starts
to speak, overcoming her shame and confessing also her guilt to the only
man whom she trusts. Anna tells Don Ottavio the whole story as she can
recall it.
One may believe that whenever the story is remembered and told to a
trusted Other that the trauma neurosis disappears. Yet Mozart and da
Pointe were better psychologists. Donna Anna was not in fact raped, but
the attempted rape left a terrible wound on Annas psyche: a frigidity or
phobia of sexuality. The same girl who before the rape attempt, was
willing to embrace her fiance in her bedroom, becomes terrified even by
the thought of marriage. She cannot, she dare not make love: she is too
afraid. And this is what even the good and loving Don Ottavio does not
understand. He believes that Anna is just mourning, that she is cruel and
unloving in denying him their mutual happiness, when the truth is that
Anna is not cruel so much as incapacitated. Crudele? Ah no giammai,
mio ben she answers with her love, yet not with her ability to overcome
the trauma. She asks for time, and again and again for time, just for one
year more. Yet the traumatic scar will never disappear.
All trauma narratives, be they told in life, in a drama or in a novel,
require a listener. This will be someone whom the trauma victim trusts
absolutely, and who for their part believes in the victim and her
truthfulness absolutely. Thus Don Ottavio would have never reproached
Anna for the situation she found herself in. Unconditional mutual trust
annuls shame. One can strip ones soul naked and be ashamed of nothing.
Yet still one feels oneself guilty. When the attempt to strip the soul naked
is made, yet at the end fails, one is thrown back into shame and life comes
to an end.
Or consider the case of Rebecca and Rosmer in Ibsens Rosmersholm.
Contrary to the story of Donna Anna, we only come to know about
Rebeccas original trauma close to the very end of the play. She, as a
young girl, perhaps even as a child, was sexually abused by her stepfather
111
who, as it turned out, was her real father She becomes dependent on him
and cares for him as long as he lives. Rebecca shows many typical
neurotic trauma symptoms, for example the impoverishment of her
emotional life. But her narrative or confession was not so much a
confession of psychological trauma, but a confession of moral guilt and
responsibility. No trauma acquits anyone from moral guilt and
responsibility. Ibsen believes up to a point in the healing power of
goodness and love. But only up to a point. The scar, again, remains there
where it was.
Fear of shame can make trauma victims postpone telling their story
even if they wouldperhapsbe otherwise able to tell it. Yet fear of
shame can close the soul forever. If one does not speak of a trauma for
years, he will finally lose his capacity to talk. The experience, which was
not entirely repressed becomes after a while entirely suppressed, perhaps
for good. When I was recently reading the autobiography of Amos Oz I
was struck by the authors literary, and not just literary, strategy of a
traumas narrative postponement. The mother of Amos Oz committed
suicide when the boy was 12 years old. The suicide was preceded by
several episodes of deep depression. The boy felt betrayed, unloved,
abandoned by the mother and understood nothing. AndWell, the author
of the autobiography begins his narrative almost directly with the mothers
suicide, but then he tells other stories. Later on he returns to it, but he
evades continuing to tell, before the episode returns in scattered narratives
again, after his having written some further 580 pages in the English
edition. Thus he finally ends with the suicide narrative. In one or the other
episode he describes vividly the trauma of the little boy who made himself
believe that had he been a good boy and fulfilled his mothers
expectations, she would have never committed suicide. The guilt was in
him, he, the boy is the embodiment of guilt.
Yet this is not the most astonishing thing in this autobiographical
novel. What is most astonishing is that, in this novel, written close to the
authors seventies, Oz talks for the first time about the suicide of his
mother and his trauma! He had previously never talked to anyone about it:
neither to his beloved wife, nor to his children, whom he unconditionally
trusted: indeed to no one. Why not then? And why now, why after more
than fifty years? What role, in particular, did the factor and feeling of
shame play in this continuous silence?
The boy is brought up in Jerusalem at a time when the self-image or, in
psychoanalytic parlance, the ego ideal of an Israeli boy was that of the
strong, muscular, healthy, laboring and constantly happy youth. When Oz
joined a kibbutz at the age of 15, he adored the type, at the same time as he
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realized that he could never be like them ,because he felt deeply inferior.
To speak of a mother who suffered from depression and committed suicide
would have been impossible. Indeed, his mothers suicide itself had to be
hidden as the greatest secret, because it was the deepest shame. The
teenager Oz tried to forget it, and having remained silent for so long he
believed that he had entirely forgotten it. Now he tells it to us, his readers,
yet one can feel his effort to overcome tremendous internal obstacles: not
only the obstacles of the failing memory of a now-elderly man, but also
the obstacles of dried-out emotions and of a life of silence. Oz is no more
ashamed. The case of Amos Oz is then a good exemplification of a special
type of shame. Oz is ashamed for himself, yet he was a trauma victim. Yet
he was not only ashamed about himself, but also about his mother: indeed,
he was ashamed because of her mother. In addition he was victimized not
by any enemy, and not by any violence pr threat directed at himself, but by
a person who loved him and never willed him any harm. His behavior was
not shameful. If anything, what was shameful was the action of his
mother.
The case of Oz in this way leads us back to shame as an original,
innate, primitive and general affect and to the archaic expression of shame.
One is not ashamed only of what oneself is doing, but also for the acts of
ones parents, children, and countrymen, or for what they are. Of course,
every case of trauma is different. Yet the characteristic of shame to reach
beyond the person experiencing it to others is typical in the traumatic
experiences of victimized children. In Truffaus s film, Finally Sunday
for example one of the boys gets panic-stricken because of the prospect of
a medical examination at school. He tells crazy stories and enumerates
mad excuses in order not to be examined. It turns out that his body is full
of ugly scars, that he has been battered for years. He wants to avoid being
seen, because he is deeply ashamed. Not just of the ugly scars, yet of his
family. He loves those who in an alcoholic fit of rage keep beating him to
take revenge on him for their own ruined lives. One is in this way
victimized by someone in whom one, as victimized, can yet also see to be
a victim. This is also often the case with battered wives. People are
ashamed of both of their own victimization as well as for the victimization
of those close to us.
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can still be devastating for the victims, yet it is not shameful. The victims
can speak. And precisely because this sharing of the experience of being
victimized is not shameful, the devastating experience can not properly be
described as a trauma. The victims can and will still feel helpless,
passively exposed to the powerful and the strong. Of course, they
experience the loss of freedom. Yet if one knows that everyone in their
place is exposed to the same or similar cruel treatmentthat there is a
common fateone will not experience the total loss of ego-control, the
abuse and annihilation of ones personality characteristic of trauma. In
such cases one can rightly expect psychological scars, yet not the kind of
scars, traumatic scars, which cannot disappear.
I referred to this common observation to emphasize the psychological
factors behind the already mentioned historical circumstance that
traumathe concept and the narrative of traumais a modern
phenomenon. It has to do something with the so-called civilizing process
and with the modern declarations that all human being are of equal worth
and to be treated accordingly. For every deed or act which contradicts the
surface values of our world becomes shameful and must remain hidden.
Nowadays, our urbane enlightenment implies also the awareness that those
civilized norms are very often not followed, and that it is much more
frequent than we think that people, especially family members, are not
treated without the minimum respect philosophical modernisms prescribe,
but are abused and misused. It in fact belongs to the process of modern
enlightenment to be able to talk to and about battered women or abused
children, so as to make them understand that their suffering and the cruelty
of their beloved ones is not an unprecedented exception ,but quite
frequent. And this knowledge that there are others who became victimized
the same way, that their case is not isolated, alleviates the terror of shame.
If there is no shame, one of the obstacles of remembering and talking will
be removed
Collective trauma narratives work in another way than this type of
therapeutic enlightenment, and their essential features are also different
and unique. But one of their functions is shared. Both alleviate shame. But
collective traumas can do even more. They can turn shame into pride.
What does it mean then let us ask, that a people or a community undergoes
a trauma experience?
Traumatic experience is psychological, and thus usually held to
personal. Let me refer to the experience of defeat and abandonment of the
young boys of the Australian Army at Sebastopol in World War 1. What
they underwent was a trauma. The survivors of the trauma must have felt
guilty, and must have exhibited many of the symptoms and psychological
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after-shocks associated with their trauma. But they died a long time ago.
What remained is Anzac Day, and the trauma narrative. It is the trauma
narrative which is inherited by future generations. In this case shame, the
shame of the victimization, of being abandoned and finally defeated has
been transformed by a collective narrative into pride, a position more
usually associated only with victors. The narrative then influences also the
psychological and ethical character of the collective. It creates a certain
framework for experiencing the world in individuals in later generations,
as when Australian soldiers today are described and describe themselves
as diggers, like the men at Gallipoli.
By contrast, if collective trauma stories reinforce shame rather then
turning it into pride, hatred and aggression follows. Let me refer here to
the famous German narrative of Dolchstossthe knife thrust in the
backthat contributed greatly to the growing influence of Nazism in the
1920s and 1930s. (I mention as an aside that shame is often acted out in
hatred and aggression. In this essay, unfortunately, I do not have time to
address this angle. I can only instead advise you to turn to one of the
greatest psychologists ever, Fyodor Dostoyevski.)
Let me briefly elucidate the relation between personal trauma
experience and collective trauma by reflecting on the example of
Holocaust trauma. In the aftermath of the holocaust trauma two of the
most serious after-effects of trauma in particular appear in the psyches of
the survivors, depending on their age at the time of the trauma. Among
those who were over 13 at that time, suicidefollowing episodes of
depression was frequent. To cite only writers: Amery, Borowski, and
Primo Levy all committed suicide. This is significant, for they were
writers who have broken through the wall of silence, and according to the
book, the ability to talk should have eased their burden of guilt and horror.
But it did not. The same people whose wound was aggravated by telling
their story to the point that they suicided were among those who started to
write the Holocaust trauma as a collective narrative, and so present and
preserve the testimony which keeps the memory of the Shoah alive and
traumatic in the soul of those who never lived through the trauma in
person, including those who were not yet born when the Holocaust
happened. Very soon there will be no single survivor of the Holocaust
alive, yet the Holocaust narrative as collective trauma will not die.
The Holocaust trauma is the most telling exemplification of the
victimization of every single member of a people, without any
understandable reason. Victimization went here to the furthest possible
extreme, the premeditated attempt at total extermination. Every Jew, from
the newborn to the oldest, was sentenced to death by the Nazis without
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animated the Nazis genocide. To deny this difference from the other
victims is a specific case of the fear of shame. These Jews were not
ashamed for having been in Auschwitz, but they pretended that they had
been there not as Jews.
The third group of survivors, who evinced a third type of response to
the trauma, consisted mainly of Zionists. They were not ashamed to be
Jews. But they were ashamed to be the kind of Jews who let himself
slaughtered like sheep. The Jews should have resisted. They should have
revolted. They became victims without resistance, and this is what is truly
shameful and unbearable. The shame was brought upon the Jews because
of the Diaspora, because of their life in ghettos, or because they became
too pliantly adjusted to being the maltreated pariah or other. The Jews of
Auschwitz in this way became for these Jews the shame of European
Jewry itself.
All the three previous reactions belonged to the aftershocks of the
Holocaust trauma itself. They are symptoms, manifesting at a conscious
level what were meant to hide, to cover, to misplacenamely, aftershocks
working underneath or on the unconscious level. But there was a fourth
reaction evident among many survivors, which I would call the authentic
one that combated the shame of trauma, and won over it. These survivors
worked though the trauma, their own trauma, in exercising their memory,
in breaking though the internal resistance the protective mechanisms of
their psyche. This was their greatest moral victory. Because only in this
lonely labor of working through their memories, the memories of their
trauma, could they remain true to those who were murdered instead of
them. I would mention here the names of four further writers: Amery,
Levy, Borowski, and Kertesz, although there are several others, less
important maybe yet not less brave. The collective Holocaust trauma is
very largely built on the testimonies of these brave witnesses.
As every collective trauma, this trauma is also built on a collective
experiences, that is on the personal but shared experiences of a generation
of individuals. They tell their stories, which representand not only
present the personal and also general cases of traumatic victimization.
Of course, there are statistics too, and there are histories. Yet in a trauma
narration no one can replace the survivors, those who were there and bear
witness. I repeat then that very soon no single Holocaust survivor will be
alive, yet the collective trauma will live on. I do not mean it will live on
just in collective remembrancealthough it should and willyet also in
repeated re-living, every year, in a non-codified, even religious sense. The
function of a collective trauma narrative is to outbalance and perhaps even
extinguish shame. The more the collective traumatic experience becomes
117
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background. It is common observation that after the fall of the Nazi system
most Germans claimed to have been victims of the regime in order not to
be regarded as perpetrators. This observation may seem to contradict the
opening gambit of this paper, that victimhood is always shameful. Yet this
formulation needs qualifications. It is shameful whenever the victims are
in minority, and the perpetrators are in the position of overwhelming
power. Yet in cases like the German one, of a systemic change, the former
victims or alleged victims are of course the victors. The psyches agency
of censorship is, however, in operation in almost all survivors. Not to
remember, to erase memory is just one step. Replacing memory with more
flattering, less traumatic or shameful, memories is the other. These are
normally empowering memories of resistance, even of heroism: poetic
fantasies. Just like the feeling of guilt, the retouching memory also helps
to built up lost self-respect. But it can be dangerous. For one can be found
out. And if one is found out, the almost-erased shame reaction appears
again in full force and, often, becomes traumatic.
Without mentioning names let me refer to two recent episodes from
Hungary. Due to the newly opened archives of the secret police and
public access to the old files, it has been proven that several well known
Hungarian intellectuals served for a time as police spies. Most of them
have not exhibited traumatic shame. I speak about two of them, who did
I mention in advanceaccept the role of the informer a half a century ago,
in 1957, in very dark times, when many people were hanged in Hungary
without any reason whatsoever. They were both released from the hire of
the secrete police in the early sixties. The first of them spied on his
colleagues, his own sister and brother-in-law. For 4O years he then
conducted a normal life as a professor. As he said before the television
camera, the only thing he hoped in life was that he will die before the
shame of his past came to light. He was stricken by the fear of exposure,
of the trauma of shame. With the public disclosure of his complicity with
the secret police, he said, he now feels totally annihilated. The
overwhelming feeling he has is shame. He accepts now the worse
punishment. He understands if his sister, with whom he entertained the
best familial relations in all those years, will never forgive him.
The second intellectual I will mention reported about film directors,
and their loyalty or disloyalty to the regime. When after 5O years he was
confronted with his own files, he first declared that becoming an informer
was the most heroic deed of his life, that he was proud of it, for he had
saved thereby a friends life. The interesting thing is not that no witness,
document or else verified his story. Indeed, all available evidence pointed
to its falsity. This was obviously a story he invented for himself and that
119
he had come to believe in; a fairy tale which he had carried with him
perhaps for the whole 5O years since his time as an informant. He
repressed his memories; the psychological censorship then created a
cover-up narrative, yet stillsymptomaticallythe truth possessed him.
He became professionally obsessed by the character of the parvenu, who
betrays his dreams, principles, friends and sells his soul to the highest
bidder, builds up a successful career, yet at the end loses himself and
collapses, or else justifies their betrayals in their work. He punished
himself though the fate and the fraudulent arguments of his own creatures.
But the very moment that he himself became the hero of his own stories,
he as it were wrote the worst possible script. Belatedly now he also
realizes that the heroism saga was just a humbug: that he was simply
terrified and feared for his own future on the basis of his repressed past.
I note that the common reaction to his case was that his false step is
indeed pardonable, for he was a young man living in a tyrannical regime,
and hence potentially under deadly threat. What is hardly pardonable
however is not the mans guilt but his silence. Nothing would have
happened to him, not even strong disapproval had he come out with a truer
statement at the time of the system change. And why did he not do this?
He did not, for the fear of his shame. The typical trauma reaction, namely
silence and the impossibility to talk, is then typical not only in the cases of
post-traumatic illnesses and syndromes, but also in what we might call the
pre-traumatic state of mind: in the desire to postpone the shame trauma,
avoid it, never experience it before oneself or others.
Earlier in this paper I argued that the sense of guilt, in cases of trauma,
is a factor that can go towards maintaining ones personality or identity in
its wake. The guilty one, as guilty, is never entirely dispossessed of
freedom: s/he remains always a personality, if only in shambles. Yet this is
not the case when the sense of guilt expresses moral guilt. For moral guilt
means also responsibility. Trauma victims can feel guilty, yet they are not
morally responsible for their victimization. And this is an essential, if not
absolute, difference in the two types of cases. There is no katharsis for
trauma victims. The survivor cannot move on and become another
person, because the wound never heals and the scar will always remain.
Still, I believe that katharsis is possible whenever shame itself becomes
traumatic, if with the help of the regard of others one can reach the
repressed memories of moral guilt and conduct ones life accordingly. The
skeptics will say, with Claudius in Shakespeares Hamlet, that repentance
is not orderly, if one still possesses everything for whose sake the crime
was committed. Yet there is no final judgment. None of us is or can be the
final judge. Yes, there is essential difference between neurotic guilt feeling
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of trauma neurosis on the one hand, and guilt following a crime which has
been committed and the fruits of which one still enjoys. But, I would add,
this difference is not absolute.
Just read Kertesz. The syndromes of trauma neurosis can make a
person unbearable, unfeeling, raging, irrational. But even if one cannot
control ones psychical state, one can still know oneself to the degree
necessary to act decently, or at least to not enter situations where one will
not be able to control oneself. Trying to outbalance our psychical, moral
and intellectual character with one another to the degree that none of them
should be oppressed or even seriously hurt, is perhaps the most difficult
task in life.
CHAPTER FIVE
TERROR, TRAUMA, AND THE ETHICS
OF INNOCENCE
JOANNE FAULKNER, ALBERTA, LA TROBE
George Bush. Address to the Nation. 8:30 p.m. EDT, 11 September 2001. See
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html.
accessed July 2006.
2
Coady, Terrorism and Innocence. The Journal of Ethics 8 (2004): 3758;
Primoratz, Civilian Immunity in War. The Philosophical Forum 36, no. 1
(2005): 41-58; Fullinwider, Terrorism, Innocence, and War in War after
September 11.
3
Noam Chomsky, 9-11.
123
With these words, Fisk articulates his sense of guilt in terms of a denial
of trauma. Despite what some theorists after 9/11 have called vicarious
traumaincurred through proximity to those who suffer5Fisk insists that
he is not traumatised. He of all people, whose very function is to witness
others suffering, and to place himself in a reckless proximity to the
consequences of Western involvements in the Middle East. Through this
gesture of self-effacement, Fisk resists the urge to colonise others trauma.
Rather, he pays respect to the profound suffering through which we are
separated from peoples in the third world; and in this way he renders their
dignity for our Western eyes.
4
Fisk, The Great War for Civilization: The Conquest of the Middle East, xxiii.
Alexander, "Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma." In Cultural Trauma and
Collective Identity; Kaplan, Trauma Culture: The Politics of Terror and Loss in
Media and Literature.
5
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Chapter Five
This essay addresses itself to two key questions. First, how are we to
assess recent applications of the term trauma operative after 9/11 in the
context of other global events, and our guilt or innocence with respect
to them? Opening this question out, we might ask with Robert Fisk after
the correctness of the use of trauma to describe the state of Western
culture in relation to terrorism. After all, who ultimately bears the burden
of this trauma: the Western citizen, or the outsider whom they exclude
and fear? Those who position themselves alongside Chomsky and Fisk
would suggest that this attribution of trauma to Western subjectivity is
entirely inappropriate, serving only cynical political ends; that it invokes,
rather, a reinvention of history that sets the geopolitical clock back to zero
precisely at ground zero, the wound6 left by the felling of the twin
towers. The political efficacy of trauma in this context consists in its
association with innocence: because trauma results from an unforeseen
(and uncalled for) event, for which the community is justly unprepared.
Setting aside the question of the political propriety of invoking cultural
trauma in this connection, I would argue that this emphasis upon
innocence presupposed by this notion of trauma fosters an inward looking,
pathological response to 9/11and one which ignores the experiences of
others affected by terrorism. The essays second question, then, is how
might the model of trauma be used productively, to heal wounds between
the West and the Middle East? Fisk denies trauma in the face of his guilt:
yet, according to Cathy Caruth,7 trauma represents precisely the guilt of
having survivedguilt, indeed, characterises survival for Caruth.8 For it
6
125
I Automaton
The impact of the attacks of September 11 continues to reverberate as the
uncanny commonplace about which much Western political rhetoric is
now organised. This date marks the beginning of what is apparently a new
public discourse about the relation of the Western subject to the foreigner,
accessed July 2006.
9. Kelly Oliver also writes of the possibility of a mode of attentiveness, or
witnessing, in response to what she perceives as the impoverishment of concepts
of otherness received through post-structuralism and psychoanalysis. Informed by
this approach, trauma might be utilised to foster a sense of responsibility to the
other, rather than to reify ones own innocence and imperviousness to blame. See
Oliver, Witnessing: Beyond Recognition. 2001.
10. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of
Jacques Lacan Book XI.
126
Chapter Five
127
128
Chapter Five
Dylan and Jason. Loose Change (2nd Edition). Directed by Dylan Avery. 2006.
Freud, The Uncanny.
21
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
22
The Jivaros, or Shuar, were a Native American tribe best known for shrinking
the heads of their enemies. It was believed that through this practice the victims
soul was appropriated, and that in turn this enabled the Jivaro to control and
harness the labour of the enemys wives and daughters. In this context, Lacan
20
129
from him while still remaining his, still retained. It is the repetition of
the mothers departure as cause of a Spaltung [splitting] in the subject.23
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Chapter Five
that was only to be cut off by George W. Bushs famous response, they hate us
because of our freedoms. The closing of this question represents a lost
opportunity for communication and for learning, making way instead for the
interpellation of an identity as citizen, according to a new world order already
at work in neo-conservative literature.
25
Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, 283.
26
Neiman differentiates 9/11 from Auschwitz by characterising the latter as a
modern evil, whereas the first is decidedly old fashioned (hence, she argues,
our surprise at encountering it): Banal evil [i.e., after Arendt, that of Auschwitz]
emerges from the fabric of ordinary life that September 11 ripped through. At
ibid., 283.
27
According to Sophocles rendering of the original Greek myth from which
psychoanalysis has taken so much nourishment, Oedipus guesses the answer to the
Sphinxs riddle (what starts the day with four legs, has two at midday, and at the
end of the day has three) as a manand the essence of the riddle is that man is
mortal.
131
132
Chapter Five
133
II Tuch
Those attuned to what was happening in the Middle East prior to
September 11 may attest to having already expected something of that
kind to occur. According to Robert Fisk, for instance, 9/11 was not so
much a disorienting and wounding spectacle, as an event that made sense
of the things he had witnessed over the past thirty years. It was an event
that rendered more palpable something that beforehand had only been
implicit. Viewed from this perspective, perhaps 9/11 merely coordinated
(or, in Lacans parlance, quilted) a set of circumstances that could only
be apprehended in the light of this eventmuch like a film might be
reinterpreted with respect to a twist of plot. This relation to September 11
may still be understood as traumatic. But following Zizek, the historical
event shifts the grid that organises experience: it does not denote the
inauguration of experience per se.30 In this light, 9/11 might represent a
jolt that opens us to the question of the others mortality, rather than
binding us to a solipsistic resolve not to pose such questions. For such a
resolve is caught in the movement of automaton, thus leading only to the
repetition of errors rather than insight. This section brings psychoanalysis
to bear upon the essays central question: how the understanding of 9/11 in
terms of cultural trauma might be used more productively. My aim is to
adapt the potential of the trauma model, not only to help heal the wounds
of those Americans affected personally by the eventbut more precisely
as a vista through which to appreciate a different trajectory of suffering:
one that preceded, and perhaps even precipitated, the attacks on the United
States. In particular, I will develop the notion of trauma as a place of
30
134
Chapter Five
135
within the dream (or the fantasy, or the transference) for us to catch up to
it (this is what Lacan proposes here is meant by Freuds enigmatic refrain
wo es war, soll Ich werden).32 The Real calls out to be understood in the
trauma, but is continually missed by consciousness: the Real is that
which always comes back to the same placeto the place where the
subject in so far as he thinks, where the res cogitans, does not meet it.33
We thus find in the trauma both an unbearable pathology, expressed
through the automaton (the compulsion to repeat the painful experience),
and something that lies beyond repetition, and beyond the scope of the
self-same subject of experience. This otherness of the beyond afforded
by the trauma addresses us, and we are beholden to respond to it. Lacan
dramatises this ethical dimension of the trauma with reference to a fathers
dream of his recently deceased son, first recounted by Freud in The
Interpretation of Dreams.34 The interpretation concerns not so much a plot
within the dream itself, as the manner of awakening from it. For the father
is woken by his sons reprimand in the dream, only to find that the one
relieving his post at the death bed in waking reality has fallen asleep, and
that his sons body has caught alight from a nearby candle. Within this
oneiric allegory of slumber and wakefulness, Lacan focuses his analysis
upon the reproachful voice that awakens the father: Vater, siehst du denn
nicht, dass ich verbrenneFather, cant you see that I am burning? Lacan
writes:
This sentence is itself a fire-brandof itself it brings fire where it falls
and one cannot see what is burning, for the flames blind us to the fact that
the fire bears on the Unterlegt, on the Untertragen [that which underlies, or
awaits attention], on the Real.35
Chapter Five
136
The father can only be addressed as such in the dream, because the
unconscious is the theatre in which identity is assembled. Lacan forges his
connection to the father, Freud: in this instance, a grandfather observing
the tormented game of fort-da.
I, too, have seen with my own eyes [] the child, traumatized by the fact
that I was going away despite the appeal, precociously adumbrated in his
voice, and henceforth more renewed for months at a timelong after,
having picked up this childI have seen it let his head fall on my shoulder
and drop off to sleep, sleep alone being capable of giving him access to the
living signifier that I had become since the date of the trauma.37
36
37
Ibid., 59
Ibid., 63.
137
138
Chapter Five
What this dream thus articulates is the integral connection between the
dead and those who survive them, in the case of fathers and their children,
but also more generally, in the sphere of culture and historyand between
cultures that share a history, or whose histories happen to collide.43
As much as Caruth is inspired for her understanding of the fathers
dream by Lacanand especially, his appeal to an otherness, or beyond,
that calls to the fathershe departs from him significantly when it comes
to the conclusion each draws from it. After his discussion of the beyond
that the boys voice indicates, Lacan attempts to interpret (reductively) the
uncanny element of the dream, or the trauma. And precisely here, in the
attempt to interpret the dream, his account of the trauma falls back into its
fated solipsism. For according to Lacan, that to which the encounter bears
witness is not the othereven in so far as they are deadbut rather the
separation that brings into being the split subject. Lacan negotiates this
passage, from difference and otherness to sameness and the splitting of the
I, first by returning to a discussion of repetition, as that which not only
obscures otherness (the new) but also engenders it:
41
Ibid., 91 112.
Ibid., 1001.
43
As Len Gutkin points out, Caruths analysis appears merely rhetorical, and even
fatuous, to the extent that this historical and political dimension is not observed.
Caruths account of the fathers personal trauma connects to the geo-political when
she discusses, in a separate chapter, her reading of Moses and Monotheism in terms
of trauma, as the foundation of the Jewish civilisation.
42
139
The adult, and even the more advanced child, demands something new in
his activities, in his games. But this sliding-away (glissement) conceals
what is the true secret of the ludic, namely, the most radical diversity
constituted by repetition in itself. It can be seen in the child, in his first
movement, at the moment when he is formed as a human being,
manifesting himself as an insistence that the story should always be the
same, that its recounted realization should be ritualised, that is to say,
textually the same.44
140
Chapter Five
belies the fact that the other resists our subjection, or domestication. To
paraphrase Bataille,45 communication demands an attempt to move outside
ones own sacred hearth, and to risk oneself for the sake of forming a
relation with the other. Our history with the Middle East is marked by the
reduction of its people to caricatures, first as the infidel, then through
orientalism, and more recently through the spectre of the terrorist. And
while actual terrorists might present us with our own, monstrous and
distorted image,46 beyond the terrorist dwell people who do not
approximate this ideal, but who continue to be materially affected by the
war against terror.
To reflect again upon the example of trauma given by Lacan and
Freud, through the refrain Father, cant you see Im burning, we might
ask ourselves what our own fire-brand, the twin towers, conceals. What
awaits us beneath this spectacle, and to what secret realisation do its
flames blind us? And with Freud and Lacan, we might also ask: does this
dream of two burning towers prolong sleep, or incite wakefulness?47 And
to what should we now be waking? Or, would it be better to remain asleep,
thus perpetuating a dream of sameness, innocence, and victim-hood?
Beyond the dream, the fantasy, and the construction of our own identities,
what demands to be witnessed is the others sufferingor the other in
their humanity. With September 11 the trauma manifests as an autistic
mode of repetition, or automata: in Americas official response, the
building of monuments, the conspiracy theories, and even the terrorist act
itselfperpetrated by those who, in a feat of pathological sacrifice, live up
to our own worst nightmares. Beyond this repetition, and beyond the
concern for identity and sameness, the traumas hidden capacity abides in
45
141
CHAPTER SIX
THE TRAUMA OF CHOICELESS CHOICES:
THE PARADOX OF JUDGEMENT
IN PRIMO LEVIS GREY ZONE
ADAM BROWN
With this duly vague definition, Special Squad, the SS referred to the
group of prisoners who were entrusted with the running of the crematoria.
It was their task to maintain order among the new arrivals (often
completely unaware of the destiny awaiting them) who must be sent into
the gas chambers; to extract the corpses from the chambers, pull gold teeth
from jaws, cut the womens hair, sort and classify clothes, shoes, and the
contents of the luggage; transport the bodies to the crematoria and oversee
the operation of the ovens; extract and eliminate the ashes.
Primo Levi on the Sonderkommandos, from The Grey Zone1
143
See several of the essays in Bemporad, Pawlikowski, and Sievers, eds., Good and
Evil After Auschwitz: Ethical Implications for Today; Patterson and Roth, eds.,
After-Words: Post-Holocaust Struggles with Forgiveness, Reconciliation, Justice.
4
See Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political;
Cooper, Ideology, Moral Complicity and the Holocaust, in Moral Philosophy and
the Holocaust; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, The Nazi Myth, Critical Inquiry 16,
no. 2 (Winter 1990); Rosenberg and Marcus, The Holocaust as a Test of
Philosophy, in Echoes from the Holocaust: Philosophical Reflections on a Dark
Time.
5
For recent publications on the nature of evil, see Ophir, The Order of Evils:
Toward an Ontology of Morals; Kekes, The Roots of Evil; Patterson and Roth,
eds., Fire in the Ashes: God, Evil, and the Holocaust; Katz, Confronting Evil: Two
Journeys; Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy;
Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation; Katz, Ordinary People and
Extraordinary Evil: A Report on the Beguilings of Evil.
6
For ethical discussions concentrating on perpetrators, see Roth, Ethics During
and After the Holocaust: In the Shadow of Birkenau; essays by Fasching and
Askanasy in Frey, ed., The Genocidal Temptation: Auschwitz, Hiroshima,
Hiroshima, Rwanda and Beyond; Koonz, The Nazi Conscience; Haas, Morality
After Auschwitz: The Radical Challenge of the Nazi Ethic; Burleigh, Ethics and
Extermination: Reflections on Nazi Genocide. For ethical discussions relating to
bystanders, see Barrett, Bystanders, Conscience and Complicity During the
Holocaust; Freeman, Is Limited Altruism Morally Wrong? in Moral Philosophy
and the Holocaust.
144
Chapter Six
In addition to the work of Lawrence Langer to be discussed later in the paper, see
chapter 5 of Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust and several of the essays in
Cargas ed., Problems Unique to the Holocaust. Also Maclean, You leaving me
alone? The persistence of ethics during the Holocaust, Studies on the audiovisual testimony of victims of the Nazi crimes and genocides, no. 12 (June 2006);
Kamm, Harming some to save others from the Nazis, in Moral Philosophy and
the Holocaust; Guiliani, Abberant Freedom and Impious Heroism: Observations
on Conscience and Suspension of Ethical Evaluation in the Auschwitz Case, in
Good and Evil After Auschwitz: Ethical Implications for Today; Jones, Moral
Responsibility in the Holocaust: A Study in the Ethics of Character; Rosenthal,
The right way to act: indicting the victims, in Echoes from the Holocaust:
Philosophical Reflections on a Dark Time. Most of these ethical discussions focus
on Jews in ghettos rather than camps, much less the experiences of the
Sonderkommandos.
8
Most of the controversy has centred on criticism of the pre-war and wartime
Jewish leadership in various European countries, and a prime example of this is
Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. For a critique of
Arendts judgements, see Robinson, And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight: The
Eichmann Trial, the Jewish Catastrophe, and Hannah Arendts Narrative. Another
key figure in this controversy is historian Raul Hilberg, whose work Arendt draws
heavily on. See Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews.
9
See Langer, Versions of Survival: The Holocaust and the Human Spirit.
10
Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive.
145
The concept of the grey zone is a crucial part of Levis final book, The
Drowned and the Saved. It proved fundamental to his understanding of his
Auschwitz experience, and has since been appropriated, often uncritically,
in the fields of Holocaust studies, philosophy, law, history, theology,
feminism and popular culture.12 Tim Blake Nelsons recent feature film,
The Grey Zone (2001), is inspired by Levis essay.13 Levi addresses the
troubling issue of prisoners who, in response to dehumanising and life11
146
Chapter Six
Here, the notion that simplification results from passing moral judgement
in and through representation is clear. Indeed, Levi opens his essay by
stressing the prominenteven necessaryplace of simplification in
human affairs: What we commonly mean by understand coincides with
simplify: without profound simplification the world around us would be
an infinite, undefined tangle that would defy our ability to orient ourselves
and decide upon our actions.16 To put the problem Levi evokes briefly:
understanding requires representation, which involves moral judgement,
resulting in simplification. While Levi focuses primarily on the Auschwitz
concentration camp, he and many others argue that the grey zone and the
associated problems of judgement and representation apply more widely to
other Nazi camps, the ghettos, and perhaps further.17 Nonetheless, the
14
147
148
Chapter Six
149
Agamben holds that while Auschwitz is, indeed, the very aporia of
historical knowledge, an attempt to understand such extreme
circumstances is still paramount. He disagrees with Lewentals comment
that the Sonderkommandos will not give historians much work to do.25
However, reflecting on Levis grey zone, Agamben notes a crucial
obstacle to any attempt at understanding, namely, the problem of
judgement: The unprecedented discovery made by Levi at Auschwitz
concerns an area that is independent of every establishment of
responsibility, an area in which Levi succeeded in isolating something like
a new ethical element.26 Despite this statement, Agamben connects the
perceived breakdown in ethics more with the Muselmnner than with the
Jewish prisoners Levi represents in his essay on the grey zone, such as
those in the Sonderkommandos. Positioning the Muselmann as the guard
on the threshold of a new ethics, an ethics of a form of life that begins
where dignity ends,27 Agamben connects the grey zone inextricably
with the concepts of the threshold of indistinction and state of
exception developed in his earlier work.28 However, generalising Levis
concept to the extent that Agamben does arguably takes the grey zone
out of its historically specific context. As Dominick LaCapra points out,
the gray zone in its historical sense is not so much a threshold of
indistinction or even a state of exception as a condition of extreme
equivocation that is created largely through the practices of perpetrators
150
Chapter Six
151
152
Chapter Six
handled the gas, and were therefore not involved in the actual killing
process. In describing the Nazis policy of co-opting prisoners to do their
dirty work, Arendt herself seems close to blurring the fundamental moral
distinctions that would be in play here when she states: the distinguishing
line between persecutor and persecuted, between the murderer and his
victim, is constantly blurred.40
Above all, Levi holds that the distinction between victim and
perpetrator must be maintained.41 Furthermore, while perpetrators were
seldom born sadists, and some exhibited moments of hesitation and even
humanity, they must still be judged.42 Indeed, Agamben seldom
mentions the SS, much less their role in bringing about the moral
quandaries at the core of the grey zone. It is only the victims trapped in
impossible situations, such as the members of the Sonderkommandos, for
whom moral judgement must be suspended. Levis grey zone is not an
area where the categories of victims and perpetrators are irrevocably
blurred; where, as Agamben suggests, victims become executioners and
executioners become victims. Indeed, there seems nothing more
inherently judgemental than this statement.43 Echoing a sentiment
expressed by many survivors, Levi writes that it must be clear that the
40
153
Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 28. See also Langbein, People in Auschwitz,
519-20; Lengyel, Five Chimneys: The Story of Auschwitz, 196.
45
Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 41 & 43.
46
Ibid. 49.
47
Levi uses the grey band and grey, ambiguous persons in his essay, The Grey
Zone. See Ibid. 33 & 40. Levi refers to a vast zone of grey consciences in his
earlier discussion of Chaim Rumkowski, published as Story of a Coin. See Levi,
Moments of Reprieve, 171. The phrase grey man is taken from Risa Sodis
interview with Levi, during which he spoke of Austrian collaborator Kurt
Waldheim as uomo grigia (grey man), which Sodi translated as grey zoner. See
Sodi, An Interview with Primo Levi, Partisan Review, no. 3 (1987): 365.
154
Chapter Six
48
155
156
Chapter Six
157
the Jewish Councils and their police forces in the ghettos in mind,
however it is equally applicable to the camps, and the Sonderkommandos
are no exception. The actions of the Special Squads, influenced by an
almost unimaginable degree of coercion, can only be described as forced
cooperation, not collaboration. Furthermore, after Levi states that no
Sonderkommando members have spoken willingly subsequent to their
liberation, he contradicts this by drawing on the testimony of Filip Mller
several pages later.63 Indeed, Levis attitude towards the
Sonderkommandos is further revealed when he inaccurately suggests they
were in a permanent state of complete debasement and prostration due to
the alcohol they had access to.64 While there was much drinking among
the Sonderkommandos as a coping mechanism, they had to be both
physically and mentally fit in order to endure the gruelling work shifts,
which often lasted twelve hours or longer. Levi also makes a disparaging
claim regarding the Sonderkommando testimonies written with utmost
care amidst the inferno and buried for posterity at Birkenau. He argues that
from men who have known such extreme destitution one cannot expect a
deposition in the juridical sense of the term, but something that is at once a
lament, a curse, an expiation, and an attempt to justify and rehabilitate
themselves.65 While the memoirs and manuscripts of the
Sonderkommandos do sometimes contain elements of self-justification,
they also provide detailed statistics and descriptions of the extermination
process and those involved. In any case, Levis statement seems to suggest
that the members of the Special Squads need to justify and rehabilitate
themselves.
Perhaps the most telling indicator of Levis judgement of the
Sonderkommandos, however, is his literary analogy with the monatti of
Alessandro Manzonis canonical Italian work, The Betrothed. A constant
intertext throughout Levis writings, Manzonis historical novel depicts
the city of Milan ravaged by plague in the mid-Seventeenth century. The
figures of the monatti are based on those men who removed the corpses
from the houses and streets to mass graves, transported the sick to the
lazaretto (containment area), and burned or fumigated any potentially
infected matter. Manzonis characterisation of the monatti is
overwhelmingly negative. He writes that:
63
158
Chapter Six
The only men who generally took on the work of the monatti were those
more attracted by rapine and licence than terrified of contagion or
susceptible to natural feelings of revulsion They entered houses as
masters, as enemies, and (not to mention their thieving or treatment of the
wretched creatures reduced by plague to passing through their hands) they
would lay those foul and infected hands on healthy people, on children,
parents, wives, or husbands, threatening to drag them off to the lazaretto
unless they ransomed themselves or got others to ransom them with
money [They] let infected clothes drop from their carts on purpose, in
order to propagate and foster the plague, for it had become a livelihood, a
reign, a festival for them.66
66
159
160
Chapter Six
of the Jewish prisoners: You are like us, you proud people, dirtied with
your own blood76 On the other hand, Clendinnen interprets the
situation as men being allowed to recognise each other, even if briefly, as
human beings.77 Both Levis and Clendinnens interpretations of the
football match are clearly underpinned by their moral judgements.
Interestingly, Agamben also reflects briefly on this match, which he calls
the perfect and eternal cipher of the gray zone.78 He quotes Levis
description (and judgement) without consulting the original source,
dismisses the notion that the soccer game signifies, as Clendinnen asserts,
a brief pause of humanity, and confirms that I, like the survivors, view
this match, this moment of normalcy, as the true horror of the camp.79 As
noted earlier, Agambens use of the concept of the grey zone is highly
generalised, and his concerns here rest more with the event itself, hence he
does not linger on the members of the Sonderkommandos.80 This is
perhaps indicative of Agambens own emphasis on the impossibility of
judgement, although it is nonetheless noteworthy that Levis judgement of
the Sonderkommandos remains unquestioned.
Clendinnen reiterates Levis warning against judgement and goes to
great lengths to emphasise the inappropriateness, if not impossibility, of
moral evaluation. Claiming to lack any footing from which to judge the
Sonderkommandos, Clendinnen nonetheless moves towards absolving
them of any responsibility.81 As Robert Gordon notes however, Levis
grey zone is not a plea for mitigation. Its power lies precisely in its
76
161
162
Chapter Six
163
wants to live because one lives, because the whole world lives. And
all that one wishes, all with what one is, if only slightly, bound [] is
bound with life first of all, without life [] such is the real truth.89
89
Bezwinska and Czech, eds., Amidst a Nightmare of Crime: Manuscripts of
Prisoners in Crematorium Squads Found at Auschwitz, 136 & 139.
90
Ibid. 139. Curiously, Langer views Lewentals statement as description, not
judgment. See Langer, The Dilemma of Choice in the Death camps, in Echoes
from the Holocaust: Philosophical Reflections on a Dark Time, 125.
91
I would like to sincerely thank Justin Clemens, Pam Maclean and Matthew
Sharpe for their invaluable suggestions throughout the writing of this paper.
CHAPTER SEVEN
RESISTANCE AND RECONCILIATION,
ANTINOMIES OF POST-TRAUMATIC JUSTICE
PHILIPA ROTHFIELD
Ragged tears in walls, roofs, and floor structures created by explosions and fires
are complex forms and figurations, unique in their history and meaning. No two
are alike, yet they all share a common aspect; they have resulted from the
unpredictable effects of forces released in the calculated risks of war. They are the
beginnings of new ways of thinking, living and shaping space, arising from
individuality and invention.
Lebbeus Woods1
There are concepts that have gained an entirely new meaning because of the
ghetto. Revenge. Irreconcilability. One must reorient, just as the ghetto dwellers
were forced to experience the world in a new way. The Christian ethic is no more
adequate for this purpose than the Jewish ethic. A new philosophy of history
would have to be written, or rather; it is already in the making. It was the people in
the ghetto who recorded its first sentences.
Jean Amry2
Introduction
Kill Bills Beatrix Kiddo is the most deadly woman in the world.3
Dragging herself from the brink of destruction, Kiddo proceeds to wreak
havoc upon all those who attempted to destroy her. Beatrix epitomizes
unforgiving revenge. She is the vengeful God, Nietzsches creditor in On
the Genealogy of Morality who seeks retribution as his due, nay pleasure
1
165
166
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that we might be a blessing to others. Quite improbably, we as South
Africans have become a beacon of hope to others locked in deadly conflict,
that peace, that a just solution is possible. If it could happen in South
Africa, then it could certainly happen anywhere else.10
Tutu, Forward, 2.
The following remarks occurred during a conference entitled, Pathways to
Reconciliation and Global Human Rights, held at UNITEC, Sarajevo, August
2005. It was organised by the RMIT Globalism Institute, in conjunction with the
Global Reconciliation Network (of which I am a Founding Member), and was
sponsored by the United Nations Development Program.
12
To date, the International Criminal Tribunal of former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has
indicted and charged 161 persons, and convicted 47. A Bosnian War Crimes
Chamber (WCCP) was established in Sarajevo in 2005. It has jurisdiction over the
whole of Bosnia. It held 20 trials in 2005, and began its first genocide case in
2006 (11 have been accused in relation to the Srebrenica massacres). It is hoped
the WCCP will take over the work of the ICTY when it runs its term in 2010.
Human Rights Watch has expressed concerns about the limited resources available
to the WCCP in the face of complicated indictments which are being transferred
from the ICTY, Human Rights Watch World Report 2006, pp. 342-3. These
convictions and their indictments can only address a fraction of the cases
associated with the disappearance of thousands during the conflict. The
International Commission on Missing Persons has estimated between 15,000 and
20,000 missing persons are unaccounted for. Their initial work is being continued
by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovinas Federal Commission for Tracing
Missing Persons (FCTMP) which identifies human remains through DNA
identification matching the tissue of living relatives. So far, 12,000 have been
identified in this way (personal communication with Amor Maovi, Chairman
FCTMP, August 2005). These figures indicate the breadth and extent of the
missing, their painstaking identification and subsequent burial, in face of the 47
plus convictions attained so far (supra). Subai is the head of the Movement of
Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa Enclaves. She is involved in the group burials of
identified victims, established a memorial centre in Potoari near Srebrenica, and
11
167
made alongside a comment by another that: I want to know who the war
criminals are and to see them brought to justice, so that I can have a coffee
with a Serb person, sit on a bus next to someone, without thinking this
man may be a war criminal, someone who might have killed my sons.13
For Subai, who lost 26 members of her family in the Srebrenica
massacres, there can be no reconciliation without justice, no (re)integration
without accountability.14
A different expression of resistance came from Ranko MilanoviBlank, a Bosnian journal editor, who rejects reconciliation as a barbaric
practice which divides people so as to contrive to bring them together in
conditions which he cynically describes as the bare fact that people from
different ethnic groups attended an event or were in the same project.15
Milanovi-Blank posits the singularity of individuals against the binarism
of group-imposed ethnic identity, the twin terms of Bosnian reconciliation.
His professedly monadic ontology obviates the need for reconciliation
inasmuch as individuals do not have to reconcile with anybody because
they were and are not against anybody.16
Each of these figures represents a certain kind of resistance or refusal.
By enacting her own brand of justice, Beatrix Kiddo is the unreconciled
victim who achieves just revenge (or just achieves revenge) outside state
forms of justice or reconciliation. Munira Subais purported division of
Bosnia into the good and the bad implicitly refuses reconciliations notion
of reintegration, projecting a division of her own choosing, until justice
can achieve its own reckoning. Milanovi-Blank rejects the mannered
binarism of reconciliation in the name of creativity.17
has organized yearly commemorations of the losses associated with the massacre.
She lost her teenage son and husband.
13
Cited in: Editorial, Halilovich, Phipps, Adams, James and Bakalis, Pathways
to Reconciliation, 5.
14
This is not a rare sentiment but was expressed by numerous signatories to a
statement coming out of the Pathways to Reconciliation conference:
http://www.sourcesofinsecurity.org/events/outcomes.html. Accessed July 2006.
15
Milanovi-Blank, Creativity, Openness and Reconciliation, 8.
16
Milanovi-Blank, Stvaralatvo Naspram Pomirenja, 105. A related rejection of
ethnically differentiated identity is performed by those who prefer to say they are
from former Yugoslavia rather than identify in ethnic terms as, say, Bosnian Serb
or Serbian Croat.
17
Milanovi-Blank is editor of the Hard-core multi journal for literature and
culture Album, which has produced 23 editions since 1997. He sees the work of
Album as fostering creativity and openness between individuals rather than a
collectivized totality.
168
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The reference to the anti-Oedipal evokes Deleuze and Guattaris project in AntiOedipus, where the anti-Oedipal stance represents a resistance to the normalized
subject of psychoanalysis, in particular, via the passage of the individual through
the structures of the Oedipus complex, see Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus,
Capitalism and Schizophrenia.
19
Jacob Finci, the driving force behind legislation to establish reconciliation in
Bosnia promotes reconciliation over the impossible calculations of justice. He
argues that, like so many Nazi war criminals, Bosnias numerous perpetrators may
never be brought to justice, and that it is impossible to calculate an appropriate
tariff for the many atrocities committed during the conflict. In Fincis view,
reconciliation is able to achieve something that the criminal justice system cannot,
including setting a common, historical record for future generations. Finci,
President of La Benevolencija, Vice President of the coordinating body of Bosnian
NGOs, interviewed by P. Komesaroff and P. Rothfield, August 2005. See also his
speech in Pathways to Reconciliation. Finci, Keynote Address: Truth and
Reconciliation CommissionsPerspectives and Experiences.
169
If he is to live, man must possess and from time to time employ the
strength to break up and dissolve a part of the past: he does this by
bringing it before the tribunal, scrupulously examining it and finally
condemning it; every past, however, is worthy to be condemnedfor that
is the nature of human things: human violence and weakness have always
played a mighty role in them. It is not justice which here sits in judgment;
it is even less mercy which pronounces the verdict: it is life alone, that
dark, driving power that insatiably thirsts for itself.20
170
Chapter Seven
171
172
Chapter Seven
173
31
Ibid., 145.
Ibid., 153
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid., 155.
32
174
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Transitions of Victimhood
Mutual identification and collective survivorship requires the victim to
relinquish his/her individual identity. The voice of the victim cannot be
heard to the extent that it returns us to the identities of the past. The
victim, then, is an historical figure who threatens to return, whilst being
repressed (that is, transformed) through the mechanism of reidentification. Victims must settle for whatever benefits peace, progress
and reconstruction may bring, for tomorrow rather than yesterday. It is
not that rebirth represses historical memory but that historical subject
positions are transformed so that the group can now remember the past
together. For example, African National Congress (ANC) member of
parliament, Johnny de Lange, writes that the TRC was a means to enable
35
This is not to say that the argument cannot be made that all liberal democratic
societies are grounded in violence, on a traumatic past (for example, Derrida, On
Forgiveness). The point is rather that not all liberal democracies see themselves
in this way, for example, Australia. The focus of this paper is therefore on the
transitional processes by which a nation state self-consciously establishes itself as
a liberal democracy via historical forms of acknowledgement.
36
See also Der Spiegel interview with German historian, Professor Hans UlrichWehler on the introduction of the legislation and its application to Irving. UlrichWehler, Pity for this Man is Out of Place. Ulrich-Wehler makes quite clear the
historical weight of Nazi genocide in framing the legislation outlawing Holocaust
denial within Germany and Austria.
175
37
176
Chapter Seven
Perpetrators made full disclosure of their crimes (in return for amnesty
from prosecution).42
According to Meister, there are key differences between South Africa
and the US Civil War, the main being that South Africas reconciliation
produced a remainderan outsidercalled the unreconciled victim rather
than the all inclusive survivor. In Meisters view, the reason for this was
two-fold. Firstly, victims needed to achieve a sense of winning, of
defeating apartheid; and secondly, its beneficiaries needed to be reassured
that the revolutionary struggle is actually over, that South Africa will not
become another Zimbabwe. Since apartheid was not overthrown in socioeconomic terms, apartheids victim needed to feel a sense of victory
beyond material gain. This is where the notion of winning arises, for it
provides a form of victory outside the domain of economic redistribution,
occurring in a moral rather than material register. The moral victory
accorded to victims through reconciliation legitimates their experience
with respect to a past evil under which they suffered.43
Winning is an alternative to revolutionary notions of success:
On the threshold of power, the ANC understood that in revolutionary
justice the victim is to become victor; the problem with this concept is that
nothing counts as winning except continuing the fight.44
If the TRC were to claim victory for the reconciled victim alongside
the defeat of Apartheid, revolutionary struggle needed to be made
redundant; a thing of the past. For Meister, it marked that end through
identifying an outside to its deliberations. The unreconciled victim
signifies what was relinquished in the peaceful transition to liberalism, an
outside now represented in terms of moral damage: that is, committed to
an ongoing cycle of violence.45 This is the cost of being located outside
reconciliation. Unlike survivorship, this trajectory of reconciliation
produces a stubborn remainder, that is, an obstinate outsider who refuses
42
More than 7000 perpetrators applied to the Amnesty Committee of the TRC. 849
were granted amnesty in exchange for their giving full disclosure of their human
rights violations under apartheid.
43
The reconciled victim is represented as morally undamaged (did no wrong), able
to take public office and receive reparations.
44
Meister, Ways of Winning, 84.
45
Meister writes of the unreconciled victim, the victim-as-revolutionary as a key
actor in twentieth century political theory: ...the unreconciled victim of
revolutionary theory is not depressed, because the war is never over. His initial
victory against the active perpetrators of oppression is just the beginning of the
struggle against the passive beneficiary of oppression., Ibid., 83-4.
177
Ibid., 86. See also TRC Commissioner, Alex Boraines account of Mandelas
evidence in A Country Unmasked, Inside South Africas TRC, Chapter 7.
47
Meister, loc cit., 90. This controversial point is important for many of those
involved in the politics of reconciliation. Johnny de Lange writes of the need for
the TRC to achieve both justice and reconciliation, de Lange, The historical
context, legal origins and philosophical foundation of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, Ibid., 23. He writes of a forward looking justice
rather than retribution or vengeance, detailing the balance between justice and
reconciliation as twin aims of the TRC: its investigation of human rights violations
on the one hand (doing justice to victims) and the amnesty process on the other
(allowing perpetrators to confess and move on/reintegrate). According to de
Lange, this latter issue was a delicate matter that needed to occur in a morally
acceptable manner. By way of context, it is worth acknowledging here that many
transitional societies inaugurated truth commissions on the basis of a blanket
amnesty given to all past perpetrators. In requiring full disclosure, South African
amnesty demanded something more from perpetrators who needed to apply for
amnesty, and had to satisfy a number of conditions, including the requirement to
make a full and public disclosure of all offences. De Lange calls this process a
restorative form of justice on the basis of the distinction between qualified and
blanket forms of amnesty. de Lange, Ibid., 24-5.
178
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constituency who must be persuaded that the past was evil.48 These two
factorsconcerning victims and beneficiaries coalesced in the production
of the reconciled victim and its resistant other, the unreconciled victim. If
the reconciled victim has a sense of winning, of defeating Apartheid, he or
she can identify with its passive beneficiary, moving toward a national
future, on the basis of a human rights culture and the rule of law.
Acknowledging that human rights violations occurred in the past
reassures non-victims that the rule of law will hold in the future. This is a
crucial feature of the transition to liberalism, for the rule of law
individualizes responsibility, thereby obstructing the logic of collective
responsibility (and reprisal). If beneficiaries believe victims are morally
damaged, they will fear revenge. If, however, the reconciled victim with
whom they identify relinquishes revenge (for moral victory), then all is
well. For Meister then, the establishment of a human rights culture is not
based on past suffering so much as the transcendence of suffering.49
Indeed, Charles Villa-Vicencio claims the TRCs enabling legislation
asked the nation as a whole to transcend resentment, retribution, fear
and indifference.50
What can transcendence possibly mean here? Villa-Vicencio is very
clear that the TRC had political aims, which asked the victim to give
priority to his or her obligations as a citizen rather than a violated person
in the creation of a new and different society.51 The deal is to privilege a
new social identity over that of victimhood on behalf of the nation.
Priscilla Hayner is not alone in distinguishing between individual and
social forms of reconciliation.52 Yet there is nevertheless a tendency on
the part of many authors to insert stories of individual reconciliation whilst
maintaining that the process is primarily political.53 This is all too likely
because the very stuff of national reconciliation is victim testimony. Truth
commissions could not operate but for victim testimony. It is easier to
justify that process if giving testimony is believed to be therapeutic,
cathartic, liberating and empowering for victims.54 Unfortunately, for
48
179
Ibid., 107.
Ibid.
57
Scarry, The Body in Pain, The Making and Unmaking of the World.
58
Das, Language and the Body, Transactions in the Construction of Pain,
Mourning Rituals Conducted by women in India, 67 (25).
59
Ibid.
60
Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 5.
56
Chapter Seven
180
which at the same time, turns that suffering to its own (social) ends.
Klossowski writes:
How can the attributes of power, health and sovereignty be restored
to the singular, to the unexchangeable, to muteness since language,
communication and exchange have attributed what is healthy,
powerful and sovereign to gregarious conformity? For it is
gregariousness that presupposes exchange, the communicable,
language; being equivalent to something else, namely, to anything
that contributes to the conservation of the species, to the endurance of
the herd, but also to the endurance of the signs of the species in the
individual.61
Conclusion
According to Meisters account, the unreconciled, revolutionary victim of
South Africas TRC was constructed as morally damaged and a thorn in
the side of the nations rebirth. If Munira Subai refuses to participate in
some future Bosnian truth and reconciliation commission will she be
criticized for thwarting reunification? If Milanovi-Blank spurns the
group affiliation necessary for reconciliation, will he too damage Bosnian
prospects for peace? I have two responses here, corresponding roughly to
the tension between social and singular need. On the one hand, public
acknowledgement of the traumatic past is important, whether achieved
61
62
Ibid., 59-60.
Ibid., 60.
181
See Cohen, Human Rights in the Haitian Transition to Democracy. Thus, the
establishment the War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia referred to earlier was
considered important, both to try war criminals still at large but also to stage such
trials in Bosnia, for this involves establishing a transparent, fair process of
indictment, witness support and protection, proper defense, conduct of trials and
the like that can support the development of an equitable legal infrastructure.
64
Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness.
65
See Amry, The Time of Rehabilitation, The Third Reich and Historical
Objectivity, 63-70.
182
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wound. Emotions? For all I care, yes.
enlightenment must be free of emotion?66
183
Survival Guide Sarajevo embodies what Woods calls new tissuea fluid
architecture that emerges from the flux, seeking persistence in a world of
the eternally perishing.77 Mobile, strategic and inventive, new tissue
works with the scab and the scar, the inevitable registers of war.
Whilst reconciliation embodies laudable even necessary goals of nation
building, national consensus regarding past atrocity, and the end to cycles
of conflict, there will exist scabs and scars that refuse to gel with its norms
of therapeutic closure. Thus, lest we forget in our teleological zeal, the
likes of Amry attest to the indelible character of suffering amidst the
creation of new territories, of history in the making.78 Although a key to
reunification, Meister acknowledges that the survivor story is one
interpretive approach towards post-war reconstruction. Like South
72
184
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There are also those who will not assume the moniker, victim, but who
nevertheless critique reconciliation, preferring to engage destruction in
untold ways, through the generation of new tissue. It is not a question of
either/or, but rather, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, of either.or.or.80
They prefer to talk of a productive series, whose accumulation does not
seek commensurability but which instead rise from and sink back into
fluidity, into the turbulence of a continually changing matrix of
79
80
185
81
82
CHAPTER EIGHT
SUPPOSING HISTORY WERE A WOMAN,
WHAT THEN? SOME TIMELY MEDITATIONS
ON TYRANNY
MATTHEW SHARPE
Is it impossible for truth to become the product of know-how (savoirfaire)? No, its not. But then it will only be half-said (mis-dire) ... It is a
question of Eve who has ever been undeniably possessed, and this for
having eaten of the fruit of the forbidden tree, the tree of knowledge Eve
is therefore not mortal, no more than Socrates. Woman, who is in question,
is another name for God, and it is in this respect that she does not exist
You can see here the cunning of Aristotle, who is unwilling to admit the
singular into his logic. Now, contrary to what is admitted into [Aristotles]
logic, it has to be said that Socrates is not a man, since he is willing to die
so the city can live. He is ready to. Its a fact. It must be said, moreover,
that on this occasion, he does not want to hear his wife
Jacques Lacan, Seminar XXIII, 18/11/1975 (trans. Russell Grigg)
Strauss, Note on the Plan of Nietzsches Beyond Good and Evil, 174, no. 1.
See Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Part VI, We Scholars, pp. 129-146.
3
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Preface, pp. 31-32.
2
187
188
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In the back of Strauss mind, moreover, as literally the last words of his
Restatement on Xenephons Hiero to Kojeve bear witness (Strauss,
Restatement, p. 212), was lasting dismay that Heidegger, whom he considered
the unquestionably greatest philosopher of the last century, had early in 1933:
submitted to, or rather welcomed as a dispensation from fate, the
verdict of the least wise and least moderate part of the nation while it was
in the its least wise and least moderate mood, [while] at the same time,
speaking of wisdom and moderation (Strauss, What is Political
Philosophy?, pp. 23-24)
10
ibid.
11
Strauss, Restatement, p. 177.
12
Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. 21-31.
189
regime much closer to what the classics understood by tyrannis and so, we
might expect, to Strauss if not Kojeves political philosophy.
The following, necessarily brief meditations upon history, philosophy
and their tyrannical uses and abuses, then, have an avowedly timely
intention. As a meditation on these topics as they are debated by Kojeve
and Leo Strauss, the paper will necessarily have as its ultimate object the
nature of desire or eros, and its relation to ta politika. As a reflection on
eros, in turn, the essay will be in its own way a reflection on sexual
difference, and philosophers continuing inability to get right this
apparently most natural of all human things. Hegel once famously
remarked (in The Phenomenology of Geist) that Woman represents the
eternal irony of political community.13 Taking this comment as an
inspiration, my paper will highlight two commonalities that might not
strike us at first glance from On Tyranny between Strauss, the
representatives of classical natural right, and Kojeve, the proponent of
modernist historicism. The two commonalities are these: on the one hand,
there is the acceptance of the possibility that history and/or human eros
could find a complete and determinate end in what Kojeve called a
universal and homogenous world state.14 On the other hand, there is the
philosophical legitimation of extra-legal forms of political action to
actively promote or prevent this end of history from coming into being.15
The timely nature of the paper comes from the following contention,
which I proffer to readers here at our beginning: these two poles form the
invariant parameters of the theoretical impasse we still find ourselves in
today, and which accordingly bring together post-structuralism with neoconservatism in brawling love or loving hate. Todays emerging
postmodern conservatisms are principally distinguished from their
predecessors at the level of political ideas, that is, insofar as they oppose
philosophical and political modernity not only because it supposes,
prudently, that modern secularism must fail, given the unchanging nature
of human things. For todays ironically more radical conservatives
mirroring their postmodernist enemiesthe more basic fear is that
modernism is all-too-inevitable, but deeply undesirable.
So, to be clear: for those who would like a denunciation of Strauss as a
contemporary Machiavel, I will offer about as much as I will offer those
who would see in him the prophetic founder of new sects or orders.
Paraphrasing Strauss What is Political Philosophy?, I would maintain
that Strauss is probably about as much responsible for todays neocons as
13
190
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Nietzsche was for the National Socialists, which also means that he is as
little responsible for them too. Happily for both sides, as I will argue both
with and despite Strauss in his Restatement, the difference between
philosophy and politics remains. For disciples of Kojeveif there ever
were anylet us only recall that, when Kojeve would tell his secretary
that, despite appearances, he really was a God, and hencewe can
probably add beyond good and evil, she had the profound,
Aristophanic wisdom to see the irony of this ignoble hubris. It is not just
because of what Hegel had to say concerning heroes and their secretaries
or valets, that is, that we should insist that Kojeve really should have
known better.
191
192
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Kojeve, Tyranny and Wisdom, pp. 163-165. The dichotomy of patrimony and
procedural forms of bureaucracy of course is Weberian. To cite Kojeves writing
directly: On the one hand, the philosopher-advisor is, by definition, in a great
hurry [and] if he wants to succeed quickly, he has to address himself to the tyrant
rather than to the democratic leader. Whenever there has been a powerful and
effective tyrant contemporary with the philosopher, it is [hence] precisely on him
that the philosopher lavished his advice, even if the tyrant lived in a foreign
country. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine a philosopher himself (per
impossible) becoming a statesman, except as some sort of tyrant. how could
he implement his reform programs, which are necessarily radical and opposed to
the commonly received ideas rapidly without resorting to political procedures that
have always been taxed with being tyrannical? At ibid., pp. 164-165.
28
Pippin, Being, Time, and History, pp. 247-248.
29
Strauss, On Tyranny, p. 64.
30
Kojeve, Tyranny and Wisdom, p. 167.
31
Ibid., p. 139.
32
Kojeve, Tyranny and Wisdom, p. 142. Victorious in battle against the others,
whom he has bested by his heroic willingness to stake his life in the desire to be
recognized, the tyrant or master can only be recognized by slaves who are in his
eyes not truly human beings. Hiero above all desires that his subjects should
willingly give way in the streets to his authority, Kojeve observes .As we
193
Yet the thing is, as Lacan once put it, for Kojeves way of seeing things,
the idle classical master is the great cuckold of human history. Political
men like Hiero, Kojeve asserts, can only be fully satisfied if they are
recognized universally, by all people worthy of the recognition.33 We will
return to this in III below. Yet, in order for such non-slavish subjects to
come into being, the entire work of history must be undertaken and
completed. And the heroes of this tale are less men like Hiero than Hieros
slaves. For it is they who, by arduously transforming nature in service of
their masters, eventually transform themselves from slaves into the type
of self-conscious bourgeois who ideally could people a universal and
homogenous State, in which eachs eros for recognition would be
reciprocated by all.34 Now: if a modern tyrant should then act in the name
of achieving this, the end of history, Kojeves thought is:
Then personally I do not accept Strauss position in this matter, because in
my opinion the Simonides-Xenephon utopia has been actualized by
modern tyrannies (by Salazar, for example).35
shall see below, at the heart of his malaise is indeed Hieros complaint that, as
things stand, even the natural act of love is colored for him by his suspicion that
his partners are only giving themselves to him out of fear. At Kojeve, Tyranny
and Wisdom, pp. 143-144).
33
ibid., p. 145.
34
Ibid., p. 168.
35
To cite: It may be that what was utopian in Xenephons time could be
actualized because the time needed to conclude the [necessary] current business
has [now] elapsed, and the measures needed to actualize the ideal advocated
by Simonides could be taken.; Kojeve, Tyranny and Wisdom, p. 139.
36
Smith, Reading Leo Strauss, p. 143.
37
Strauss, Restatement, p. 182, pp. 198-199, pp. 201-202.
194
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wisdom.38 If this assertion holds, Strauss observes, since the desire for
wisdom is an eros which wholly transcends the strictly mundane desire
for recognition, the Kojevan dialectic is tripped no less effectively than
others have argued it is by Antigone.39 As such, Strauss contends,
Kojeves attempt to miraculously synthesize the aristocratic morality of
the classical Greeks with the Judeao-Christian morality of the working
slaves only effects the miracle of producing an amazingly lax morality
out of two moralities both of which made very strict demands on selfrestraint. 40 More than this, says Strauss, this modern synthesis loses sight
of the highest human ends altogether since, as he agrees with Kojeve,
there could be no real need and scant political prospect for philosophic
eros after universal human satisfaction has been achieved.
Now: when Strauss describes Kojeves position in Tyranny and
Wisdom as more than Machiavellian41, my point would be, we need to
hear this as more than simply a statement of moralistic outrage. The
connection between the modern inability to call tyranny by its name and
Machiavellis work has already been announced to us in Strauss opening
statements in On Tyranny.42 Machiavelli marks the point of closest contact
between pre-modern and modern political science, Strauss argues.43 Not
only is The Prince modeled on Xenephons Education of Cyrus.
Xenephons Hiero itself is the only earlier work on tyranny to which
Machiavelli emphatically refers in all of his oeuvre.44 Yet this proximity
with Xenephon should not blind us to how Machiavelli both aimed to, and
succeeded, in putting political science on a new, post-Xenophontic or
post-Socratic footing, Strauss argues. And this is a new grounding given
which, as in Hobbes, the very distinction between tyranny and legitimate
rule was bound to progressively disappear.45
Long before Kojeve, as Strauss argues most systematically in his
Thoughts on Machiavelli, it was Machiavelli who first turned his back on
all the utopian schemes of all the earlier Simonides of Western history
and philosophy. Long before either Kojeve or Hegel, it was Machiavelli
who prioritized merely political honor (or Kojeve will say recognition)
as the highest human good. In this way, he lowered his sights on the
38
Ibid., p. 209.
For example, Derrida. See ibid. p. 191.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid., p. 185.
42
Strauss, On Tyranny, pp. 24-26.
43
Ibid. p. 25.
44
Ibid., p. 24.
45
Ibid.
39
195
whole within the limits set by the city qua closed to philosophy.46 For
Strauss in Thoughts on Machiavelli, that is, Machiavelli is nothing short of
the prophetic bringer of a new code which disastrously inverts almost all
the terms of the classics teaching.47 At the heart of the new code, to
emphasize, is the supposition that, although God is not dead, he is a
womanto be precise, the dame fortuna invoked in the closing
exhortation in Il Princip.48 Once this supposition was posed, so Strauss
contention runs, the political slope that leads from unselfish patriotism to
criminal tyranny49 is slippery indeed, if it is not a veritable fall. For once
the highest human ends are conceived as the result neither of grace nor of
a coincidence between philosophy and politics for which one can [only]
wish or hope50, but as a common good humans can bring about through
their will or art alone51, virtue tends irrevocably to gravitate towards the
most efficient means to such an end.52 As Kojeve only avows in extremis,
history itself in its turn must come in this new mode or order to take on
all the unprecedented importance it has duly done after the eighteenth
century, becoming the only remaining court to measure the worth or virtu
of human actions or art. Finally, once Machiavellian princes have turned
their backs on the religious and classical moorings of the ancient regimes
of their times, Strauss argues that they can only have recourse to the
tyrannical means Machiavelli describes so shockingly in The Prince:
namely, the terror of the lion and the deceitful ruses of the fox. The reason
is that it is only by winning over the multitude53 that the new princes can
hope to create their new modes or orders. And yet, argues Strauss, the
multitude can at best provide sound judgment on particular issues. For
the rest, they must be treated to a propaganda that proceeds by way of
appearances alone, with a tyrannical disregard for wisdom or truth.54
We will return to these matters in our third meditation below.
46
196
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197
like condemnation, much less like identifying a political cancer for what it
is 57
57
198
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In Persecution and the Art of Writing, Strauss asserts that the esoteric writers
always concealed their most important thoughts for the very centre of their
writings, as far as possible from shallow readers. At Strauss, Persecution and the rt
of Writing, p. 32, p. 36.
62
Strauss, Note on the Plan of Beyond Good and Evil, paragraphs 3, 4, and 7; p.
175, p. 176.
63
Ibid., p. 182.
64
Ibid., pp. 181-182; see the 6th paragraph, at p. 176.
65
Ibid., p. 181.
66
Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil, p. 99.
199
More than this, however lastingly Aristophanic this might seem for us last
men, the Platonic echoes that haunt Nietzsches entire distinction between
philosophers and scholars that structures Book VI are very present, unless
we allow the text wholly to disappear beneath our interpretations68:
Actual philosophers, however, are commanders and law-givers; they say
thus it shall be, it is they who determine the Wherefore and Whither of
mankind they reach for the future with creative hand, and everything
that is or has been becomes for them a means, an instrument, a hammer.
Their knowing is creating, their creating is law-giving - are there such
philosophers today? Must there be such philosophers? 69
200
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201
recommends it, not as an end, but as a means, no less than the Eleatic
stranger recommends it to young Socrates in the Statesman..79 It is true
that Strauss classicism does insist that the rule of the wise is merely a
theoretical paradeigma whose improbable realization will always
depend on chance. Nevertheless, Pippins riposte is certainly more noble,
and in what follows I will argue also more true:
[this] is a position that, however theoretical, has many practical
implications, some of them notorious. It might lead the young to look
down with contempt on the political order established in Athens; it might
be embarassing for its supporters in almost every city and might have
had something to do with the real difficulties experienced by Socrates and
Xenephon (76).80
Ibid., p. 93.
Pippin, Being, Time, and Politics, p. 241.
81
Zuckert, Postmoedrn Platos, pp. 104-200.
80
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It is at this point, to invoke Beyond Good and Evil one last time, that I
want to wheel out the golden ass of my contention.83 As in Nietzsche,
and as will become evident, what it concerns is ultimately the issue of
woman as such Nietzsche raises at fragment 231 of Beyond Good and
Evil.84 For it seems to me that Strauss critique of Kojeves end of history
might well or even should have been taken him in a quite different
direction than he does finally move in On Tyranny. People might
remember Raymond Chandler writing of a femme fatale, one twentieth
century figuring of the woman as such: from thirty feet away, she
looked real class. From up close, she looked like someone who was
supposed to be seen from thirty feet away. Well might Nietzsche say, in
this vein, that his views concerning the eternal womanly85 are above all
others (with his italics) my truths.86 What Nietzsche surely means, and
what we should surely take him to be expressing, is exactly that woman
as such is a figure in whom eros as such, and not least his own, is in play.
This is one reason why Nietzsches ensuing remarks about the
democratic enlightenment of women87 are so famously ascerbic. But
82
203
they are scarcely consistent for all that: Nietzsches woman condenses
coquettecharm, play, the banishing of care88; motherstupidity in the
kitchen, woman as cook89; with whore or worse:
So much reason for shame so much pedanticism, superficiality,
schoolmarmishness, petty unbridleness and petty immodesty but she
does not want truth: what is truth to a woman! From the first nothing has
been more inimical to woman than truthher great art is the lie, her
supreme concern is appearance and beauty 90
204
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those murderers of Jason who survived were honored in most of the Greek
cities Hiero asserts that the tyrants know well that all their subjects are
their enemies; Xenephon, however, tells us that the subjects of the tyrant
Euphron considered him their benefactor 95
The question Strauss bids us to ask here is, hence: what is it that draws
Hiero to slip here so subtly from the range of more qualified and true
appraisals of political things to the telltale, exaggerated and untrue
insistence on the universal quantifiers here (all the cities , all subjects
)? Strauss in response is clear. There is a politics in play here, Strauss
argues. And, as Hiero himself frankly tells us, it is a politics, specifically,
of fear.96 Hiero does not know what the wise want. So he is anxious that
Simonides might contrive something against him, unless Hiero can
convince Simonides that tyranny is much worse than the many usually
suppose.97
In the same way, since Strauss has ably demonstrated the impossibility
of Kojeves end state ask, my proposal is that we should ask in the same
way Strauss asks of Hiero: what is in play when Strauss nevertheless finds
himself at the end On Tyranny speculating at length upon the possibility of
the end of history? Despite his earlier philosophical arguments, Strauss by
the end of his reply to Kojeve finds himself declaring it is perhaps
possible to say that the universal and homogenous state is fated to come98,
a thought which leads Strauss into absurdly enjoining the warriors and
workers of all countries, [to] unite, while there is still time, to prevent the
coming of the realm of freedom [and to] defend, if it needs to be
defended, the realm of necessity?99
With these remarks, I would agree with Meier, there is ironically a
proximity between Strauss and Schmitts thoughts in the notorious text
Concept of the Political. For it is in this text, above all, that Schmitt
presents the contention that liberalism does not necessarily fail to deliver
the more peaceable world it promises. Rather, he proposes that liberalism
ought to be opposed because it may succeed in delivering such a world. In
this way, it would eliminate what Schmitt calls the political, and in this
way the humanitas of human beings, by pacifying any friend-enemy
distinctions, predicated on the real possibility of physical killing. The
irony here is that, in his brilliant 1932 Comments on Schmitts text,
95
205
young Strauss had pointed out how Schmitt, animated by his own fears,
oscillated between naming the political as the inescapable humanitas of
human beings and as something under threat by liberal neutralization or
in need of active affirmation.100 Invoking young Strauss, then, I would
argue that in the end of On Tyranny Strauss clearly gives way to the same
species of cultural malaise which not only informed Schmitts Weimar
project of leaving the horizon of liberalism.101 Hannah Arendt in Origins
of Totalitarianism identifies such an aspiration, common among interwar
intellectuals, as a decisive precondition for the rise of fascism in central
Europe.102 If Kojeve mostly argued that the end of history occurred some
time in 1806, it is also worth commenting that the only contemporaries of
Hegel who seem to have been struck, with him, by this epochal event were
throne and altar conservatives like de Bonald, who perceived ths fate in
apocalyptic fear and trembling. De Bonald for example wrote to de
Maistre in 1817:
There are for me absolutely inexplicable things, whose outcome does not
seem to me to be within the grasp of the powers of men, insofar as they are
guided by their own light and under the sole influence of their will: in
truth, what I most clearly see in all of this is the Apocalypse 103
100
206
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may be the only action that is possible once the universal and
homogenous state has become inevitable 104
104
Strauss, Restatement, p. 209; cf. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last
Man, pp. 330-336.
105
Xenephon, Hiero, paragraph 7 [12], p. 15.
106
Strauss, Restatement, p. 209.
107
Strauss, City and Man, p. 69.
108
Strauss, On Tyranny, pp. 93-102.
207
more than the commutative justice governing what is called free trade
(72), and so is in no way inconsistent with beneficent tyranny. (70)
The shocking nature of these assertions comes when we consider how,
as Aristotle argues in Nichomachean Ethics VIII, one defining mark of
political tyranny is its complete eradication of things which would be
common between subjects, and as such might found civic-spiritedness. Yet
certain it is that the account of eros Strauss develops in this text finally,
very contestably, reduces all love except philosophical love to selfinterestedness.109 It is in this way that the political desire for admiration
can be privileged over love, Strauss argues:
Each man loves what is somehow his own, his private possession;
admiration or praise is concerned with the excellent regardless of whether
it is ones own or not To express this somewhat differently, love has no
criterion of its relevance outside itself, but admiration has. 110
The problem is that this admiration, like the proverbial ladder kicked
away once it is climbed, in fact stands in Strauss account as something of
a vanishing mediator between the city and the philosophical man as such
. In Kojeves Hegelian theory of eros, we recall, woman is aligned with
love of the particular being of individuals. In this way, she and love per se
stand tangentially vis--vis, or threaten to halt, what we might term the
universalizing momentum of the desire for mutual recognition. Strauss, as
we have seen in our third meditation, does not contest this Kojevean sense
that the political desire tends with the inevitability of a fate towards a
universal and homogenous state. The difference between a private and a
political man, Strauss says in his Restatement, is that:
The political man is consumed by the erotic desire, not for this or that
human being, but for the large multitude, for the demos. (Plato Gorgias
401d1, 513d7; Republic 573e6-7, 574c2, 575a1-2)111
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208
For our part, we can only conclude that to conceive society, even
analogically, as one big happy family is a profoundly problematic, not to
say tyrannical, way of seeing ta politika. Indeed, this is what Strauss
commentary on the Politeaia in City and Man, amongst many other texts
and political things, might surely have warned us against. What then
becomes in this account of the entire relation of sexual eros to the nomoi,
as that daimonic force which creates new families, and which lures young
men away from the love of their mothers? It threatens to disappear here
under the philosophical gaze. Or this at least seems equally evident in the
preceding passages from Strauss. It is not for nothing that Aristotle,
despite the tyrannical strains of the closing chapters of Book X of the
Ethics, tells us in the opening book of Politics that humans are by nature
political beings, and that:
there is one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another
over subjects who are by nature slaves. The rule of a household is a
112
Ibid., p. 199.
Ibid.
114
Ibid.
113
209
monarchy, for every house is under one head: whereas the rule of a
statesman is the government of freemen and equals.115
So perhaps, in this light, with and against Strauss, we must after all agree
concerning the need to reconsider the relationship between philosophy,
eros, and tyranny. But more broadly than this, we should attend to the
difference between politics and the philosophical way of seeing.
115
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FEATURE ESSAY
TRAUMA AND THE COUNTERSTRATEGIES
OF PHILOSOPHY
GYRGY MRKUS
211
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the actual object of moral evaluation? Since actions take place in the
external world, their direct consequences are outside the agents control,
subject to a strict, all-embracing determinism as the mechanism of divine
Providence. This would suggest an intentionalist moral theory. The Stoics,
however, did not have our, post-Kantian concept of intentions: they lacked
a clear concept of the will and possessed a theory of virtues, but not of
universal moral norms.
Without getting into the intricate details, this difficulty resulted in the
course of the development of the doctrine in two different conceptualisations
(often both present in the same writing) of the desired state of wisdom. On
the one hand, the sage was seen as always acting with a mental
reservation, distancing his autonomous self from his own actions that are
in a sense always external to him. This is expressed in the frequent simile
likening the agent to an actor in a play. Wise is the one who plays
excellently, without any mistake the role assigned to him by Providence
(which seems rather to undermine the idea of autonomy). But even more
frequently the sage is characterised as the person who in his wisdom can
apprehend the working of the Providence, and thus act with full success
also in the realisation of his own ends. It is therefore not merely a
rhetorical excess if he is told to be like God in all, save his mortality.
Partly under the impact of this strain in later Stoicism the idea of the
sage essentially acquired the character of a transcendent moral ideal. Its
realisation is in principle not beyond our powers, but if it ever were
achieved, then it was by some semi-legendary figures of the past. This is
not a practicable end for us today and later teachers of Stoicism usually
made clear that they themselves raise no such claim. What remains then
from the very idea of psychotherapy as moral education, if its very end is
just made unachievable?
Facing this difficulty in the evolution of Stoicism a practical division
occurred between the expositions of the normative content of the doctrine
(the dogmata) together with its strict philosophical justification, on the one
hand, and, a whole array of writings assuming this background, but
operating with it in a conceptually less strict and morally less demanding,
popular form, aiming at distinct therapeutic effect, on the other hand.
From the dogmatic standpoint there can be no intermediary stages
between the morally good and bad, between being a sage or a fool.
Writings that either exemplify or aim at the general guidance of
therapeutic practice deal however with specific, particularly destructive
forms of foolishness, not to immunise against, but to mitigate the power
of passions, offering remedies, advises and mental exercises to make us
less foolish.
215
It is among these writings that one finds some of the most attractive
examples of a Stoic practice of moral education. What is particularly
striking is the way they present the therapeutic relation itself. It is a deeply
personal connection between the therapist-philosopher and his (or her)
patient or disciple, based on trust and at the same time a functional
relationship aiming at its own dissolution. It consists not of some
authoritative exposition of rules, but always addresses itself to the personal
situation and particular concerns and problems of the disciple. It leads
him/her to self-reflection, the results of which are then consolidated by a
set of well-designed spiritual exercises. It is an unequal, but at the same
time mutual relation of self-enlightenment.
For this more restricted and at the same time more relaxed form of
psychotherapy the problem of trauma (in our sense) emerges anewnot in
terms of how to prevent its occurrence, but how to heal its most
pathological symptoms. And there has been a particular sub-genre of this
literature that from our standpoint addressed itself just to this task: the
consolations. They generally dealt with the deeply traumatogenic event of
the loss of the closest and dearest person to the addressee (or a disastrous
misfortune suffered by such a person), resulting in a seemingly
interminable, compulsive and all-consuming grief. The best known
examples of such writings available to us are the three Consolations of
Seneca.
In Senecas description of this particularly pathological form of the
passion of grief, there are observations pointing towards the
symptomatology of trauma. Seneca not only describes the obsessive return
of the memory-image of the beloved at quite different occasions, but also
emphasises the resistance of this grief against all verbal articulation and
communication. I have been told by some contemporary psychotherapeutic
practitioners that reading Seneca is very useful for anyone engaged today
in grief-counselling. Be this as it may, I personally think that these
eloquent works are from a theoretical standpoint rather disappointing.
They are disappointing from a philosophical point of view: for these
writings are eclectic in the worst sense of conceptual incoherence.
Although their overall Stoic background is unmistakable, the concretely
presented consolatory arguments are rather of an Epicurean character,
interspersed with some clearly Platonist considerations, irreconcilable
either with the doctrine of Epicurus or with the Stoa.
They are, however, disappointing also from a therapeutic viewpoint,
since they lack what I just referred to: the deeply individualised character
of this practice, as it emerges from the best Stoic writings (not the least
from the long cycle of Senecas letters to Lucilius). What Seneca offers
216
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beyond a list of exemplary figures who met such a loss in a rational (and
socially appropriate!) wayare generalities: the irresistible power of
unforeseeable fate over all of us, equally unable to defend ourself against
mental pain and suffering. This is, however, not the authors fault. To deal
concretely with the personal situation of the addressee would demand to
help this person to comprehend the irreplaceable place the lost beloved
occupied in his/her life and to lead him/her toward understanding the
necessity of its deep reorganisation. This is, however, just what a Stoic
cannot accept in principle: nothing external and outside our power can be
truly irreplaceable: so find somebody else or just go on with your normal
life.
Thus we can say that at least as psychotherapy Stoicism fails, both in
the radical enterprise to immunise us against all forms of harmful and
humanly destructive experiences, and in the more moderate end to
mitigate their most irrational effects. We should not, however, forget how
much it has contributed not only to our general moral culture, but also to
our own conception of psychotherapy. This concerns partly the alreadycharacterised comprehension of the end and character of a genuinely
therapeutic relationship. It offered, however, also basic theoretical
insights. First of all it emphasised that no event as such is (in our parlance)
traumaticwhether it has such effects this always depends on the mental
state and concrete situation of the individual, but also (and the Stoics made
this completely clear) on expectations determined by its social-cultural
environment. And the revival of Stoicism in early modernity provided new
ideas of great importance for the emergence of psychoanalysis itself. At
this point one should speak in detail first of all about the moral psychology
of Spinoza. Instead I shall try, even in a more sketchy way, to indicate
another philosophical counter-strategy: not the Stoic anaesthetisation, but
the aesthetisation of what may threaten us in such a way.
That literaturesome works of great literaturemay have such
benevolent effect has been recognised from very early on, amongst others
by some Stoics. This is an idea that was accepted and elaborated in respect
of art in general also by Freud. Artistic creativity and to some degree also
aesthetic experience are for him the most important forms of sublimation,
the only spontaneous form of defence reactions against trauma to which he
ascribes a both psychologically and socially productive or positive effect.
This sublimating function of works of art was usually connected with their
inner, constructive harmony, with their beauty. I would like to speak here,
however, about the aesthetic counter-concept of beauty, not about art as
sublimation, but about the idea of the sublime. More concretely I would
like to evoke here, in a very sketchy way, the Kantian theory of the
217
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219
respect that alone is sublime in the full and adequate sense of this term.
Everything else, be they persons or natural events, can evoke the feeling of
sublimity only in so far as they are connected with this supreme supersensible law in us, are related to its actualisation. In what way can the
experience of the dynamically sublime, an experience that is aesthetical,
that is subjective-emotive, play such a role, this is the question to be
elucidated, if we want to understand its practical significance in Kant and
its possible relevance to the problem that interests us - trauma in the
classical tradition of philosophy. This demands, however, a more detailed
reconstruction of the Kantian analysis of this experience as a complex
emotion, a double, antithetical mental movement.
When we are directly involved in, physically subjected to an actual
manifestation of an irresistible power of nature, our natural reaction to
such a situation is all-consuming fear. However, when we are confronted
with such phenomena merely as spectacles, knowing that they cannot
harm us, we are not afraid of them. Their mere sight still invokes a painful
feeling; they first appear to us as frightening. This is the necessary
consequence of the way how such phenomena can be apprehended
aesthetically, that is without the explicit involvement of concepts. For we
can conceive the power of any object solely by imagining the kind and
magnitude of a resistance able to check it. But faced with manifestations
of an irresistible power imagination fails in this task. Such a power is in a
direct sense unimaginable, it can merely be felt in and due to the very
collapse of our power of imagination which in facing an abyss, is thrown
back upon itself. It is this, only emotively registrable impotence of our
highest faculty of sensibility, its blockage, felt limitationwhich
corresponds to the limitation of our powers as sensuous-bodily beings
that makes even the spectacle of such natural catastrophes painfully
frightening.
But in a person of moral cultivation ,this experience of the limits of our
sensibility in general, depraving our imagination of its freedom
immediately evokes the idea of another power and another freedom in us,
that of our super-sensible practical reason. It is not the case that reason
with its supreme law becomes directly involved in such a virtual situation.
As a power commanding our free will to the morally appropriate way of
action, it cannot directly intervene, since there is no way to act rationally
in face of a power that cannot be resisted. But the ideas of reason disclose
in and for us the possibility of a resistance of a quite different kind4, not
through actions that always take place in the sensuous world, but through a
4
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221
222
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223
objects of the most resolute criticism in the writings of this school: anger,
despair and grief.
There is of course no inconsistency here in Kant. While he regards the
Stoic ideal as admirable and noble (not a strictly moral predicate in Kant),
Kant definitely refuses the identification of what is morally right with such
noble conduct, or with what in the Second Critique he calls the supermeritorious (berverdienstliche) actions.5 Rigorous or not, Kants moral
theory does not demand some exceptional wisdom or heroism even in its
ideal. It is the morality of common human decency, demanding the
observance of common and everyday obligations out of duty as it is
determined and known in the habitual use of common human reason.
This disagreement between the Stoics and Kant is based in their
fundamental theoretical premises. Kant rejects the Stoic identification of
the mind with reason. His dualism is not reducible to the relation between
the body and the mind. It extends to this latter as well, to the relation
between the empirical and noumenal self, between the sensible and the
intelligible, between the prudential and the pure practical reason. It is a
theory of radical human finitude. Kant knowsas he reminds us in the
discussion of the sublimethat human nature does not of itself
harmonise with the moral good.6 For we are beings with feelings and
sensuous inclinations that we cannot (even should not) radically extirpate.
We necessarily strive towards happiness as the maximum satisfaction of
present and future needs based upon our inclinations to which passions,
in the Kantian sense of this word, belong. And no person, be he or she the
wisest and the most noble, can be happy on the rack.
These fundamental theoretical differences cannot but radically
influence what philosophy can at all claim to offer in counteracting those
mental suffering, emotive conflicts that can paralyse the exercise of our
reason. Stoicism promised psychotherapy through philosophical
enlightenment, bolstered by particular techniques of mental exercises,
capable of preventing their very occurrence. Nothing could be farther from
Kant.
Transcendental philosophy can only point out that it is in general
within the resources of our rational nature to prepare us imaginatively to
resist the most disastrous mental consequences of the occurrence even of
the most disastrous physical events. The analysis of the dynamically
sublime in no way offers any kind of prescription or at least counsel, it
merely discloses a human possibility. The actual experience of sublimity
5
6
224
Feature Essay
225
226
Feature Essay
227
CHAPTER NINE
POLITICS, TERROR,
AND TRAUMATYPICAL IMAGERY
DANIEL ROSS
231
232
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233
significance.2 And this obvious fact presents Freud with a serious problem
when it comes to understanding the origin of psychic trauma: how are we
to understand the concept of psychic intensity without presupposing some
innate, pre-existing sense of normal experience, the difference and
distance from which would constitute the possibility of psychic trauma?
Freud was utterly aware of this problem, which surfaced and resurfaced in
his work as his perpetual ambivalence about whether psychic life includes
a phylogenetic component.
Freud is of course not unaware of the temporality of the phenomenon
of psychic trauma, indicated already in the above quotation by his
description of trauma as unleashing an attempt at mastering the stimulus
in order to dispose of it. What makes this account temporal is that it
describes a process, reflecting Freuds general understanding of
psychology in terms of psychic and biological processes and tendencies.
And the complexity of this temporal description is indicated by the role he
attributes to anxiety, as a form of preparation for trauma:
It will be seen, then, that preparedness for anxiety and the hypercathexis of
the receptive systems constitute the last line of defence of the shield
against stimuli. In the case of quite a number of traumas, the difference
between systems that are unprepared and systems that are well prepared
through being hyper-cathected may be a decisive factor in determining the
outcome; though where the strength of a trauma exceeds a certain limit this
factor will no doubt cease to carry weight.3
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first place, of how anxiety is able to process in advance what it has not yet
experienced, unless it is on the basis of prior experience (hence the
deferral of the question of origin). In the end, the theoretical discomfort
engendered by the resort to an originary significance (phylogenetic
imagery, inherited memory-traces or, as Laplanche and Pontalis call it,
originary fantasy5) is covered by Freuds continuing to think of psychic
trauma, in spite of himself, as an intensity of psychic reception, as though
the self-evidence of the effect of intense experience makes his account of
psychic trauma indubitable. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Traumatypical Experience
The way beyond this theoretical cul-de-sac is shown by Bernard Stiegler,
who recognizes that psychic trauma can only be explained through an
account of the temporality of human sensibility. Whenever we undergo a
fresh piece of experience, it is added to the sum of the experiences we
have had. Each of these prior experiences, in their turn, have contributed
to the fund of experiences constituting our finite, fallible memories.
Equally, this new experience is destined to become a part of that fund,
insofar as it is remembered. Thus the processing of experience is that work
of the brain by which present experience ceases to be present and becomes
memory. And what will determine the form of that processing can be
nothing other than the sum of the experiences we have had, a sum adding
up to who we are at the time of the experience.
There are two ways in which this process may operate. The first of
these occurs when an experience tends to conform to the expectations we
have, expectations themselves the result of accumulated experience
processed into memory. Such experiences are stereotypical, and thus tend
to reinforce existing expectations, and to add to the sense of the
individuals synchrony, that is, to their stability. The second form of the
processing of new experiences occurs when the new experiences defy
established expectations, and thus cannot be incorporated into the stock of
memory without work, that is, without transforming the individuals
psychic economy. These experiences are traumatypical, rather than
stereotypical. Traumatypical experiences are diachronic rather than
synchronic, inaugurating an individuating movement rather than
reinforcing apparent stability, and amount to the possibility of the
experience of significance. The difference between the stereotypical and
5
Laplanche & Pontalis, Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality, in Burgin, Donald
& Kaplan (eds.), Formations of Fantasy ,167.
235
6
Stiegler, Dsir et connaissance: le mort saisi par le vif: Elments pour une
organologie de la libido, Revue d'intelligence artificielle 19 (2005), 13-29.
7
Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893
1917), 24.
8
Ibid., p. 37.
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237
238
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what the unconscious is, then, means understanding that which is older
than the distinction between consciousness and the body. Or, in other
words, it means understanding that consciousness has a history, consisting
in the evolution of the nervous system and the development of increasing
perceptual and retentional capacity. Human beings invent systems
enabling an increasing potential to learn from accumulated experience, an
increasing capacity for anticipation, which amounts to an increasing
liberation of behaviour from predetermined responses. The chimpanzee
displays greater freedom in its behaviour than the frog, which displays
greater freedom than the protozoa. Such freedom is to an extent
measurable as the degree to which a dog or a chimp is capable of being
trained, that is, capable of being induced through various techniques to
behave contrary to its natural inclinations (compared, say, to an ant). In
the case of human evolution, this process of liberation consists not only in
the increasing size and efficiency of the memory processes of the nervous
system, but also in all the supplementary forms of retention, that is, the
technical evolution of all the forms of tertiary retention. In other words,
the taking up of tools sets off a new technico-biological dynamic,
contributing to the further evolution of the nervous system itself, as it
undergoes the process of corticalization.15
The Freudian account of the human unconscious has conventionally
been derived by artificially (if not metaphysically) separating the
psychosexual drives, however broadly these are understood, from those
rhythms and processes more directly related to maintaining bodily
consistency. Respiration and digestion, for instance, do not often enter into
consideration as biological processes when the unconscious is under
interrogation, even though they are no less under the command of the
nervous system (but here we could, on the other hand, cite Friedrich
Nietzsches prototypical account of the subterranean aspects of human
being, in which digestion was something more than a metaphor).16 But if
we do not permit ourselves these artificial distinctions, then the
15
Andr Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, trans. Anna Bostock Berger;
Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, part 1, ch. 3. According
to Stieglers account, this technological maieutic between cortex and equipment is
nothing less than the process of the invention of the human as such.
16
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Second essay: Guilt, bad
conscience and related matters, 1. This reflects the degree to which the
Nietzschean account of the genealogy of the human psychic economy is a matter
of processes, and of struggles between tendencies and countertendencies. Such also
is the degree to which Stieglers thought can be considered Nietzschean.
241
unconscious can be nothing other than what, between the body and
consciousness, composes and regulates the relation between them.17
In the case of human beings, this separation of body and consciousness
has reached a point whereby it is clear that what motivates behaviour is far
enough from bodily drives that we can speak of desire as essentially
adoptive. This does not mean that there is no relation between desire and
the drives. Rather, it means precisely that it is a relation, and that human
desire, in its difference from and deferral of the drives, is an adoptive
process which is not only psychological, but psychosocial, and technical.
If the audiovisual techniques employed by capitalism to influence
behaviour are able to work, it is only because of the adoptive character of
human desire. Only on this basis are advertisers able to invent campaign
strategies based on the belief that sex sells beer, sex sells cars, and sex
sells detergent. In other words, by conditioning primary and secondary
retention through the (repetitive) techniques of tertiary retention, desire
can be influenced to adopt certain ends. Thus the body can be motivated to
behave in certain ways, that is, to purchase and consume.
As Stiegler points out, however, if these techniques operate by
presupposing and improving the calculability of the way in which they
performatively affect desire, in the end this system, while certainly
currently effective, will be forced to confront two facts. Firstly, it will
confront the fact that desire is not quantifiable, and therefore that these
techniques are devised on a flimsy understanding of the human
behavioural process. Secondly, it will encounter the fact that the
unconscious, if susceptible, is nevertheless the definition of that in us
which cannot finally be controlled. There are, therefore, unintended
consequences of the global attempt to reduce all human behaviour to a
calculable product purchasable in a mass market of desire.
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18
243
244
Chapter Nine
the fact that his suicidal or homicidal behaviour will be broadcast. The
suicide bomber and the hostage-taker-decapitator share the thought not
only that the mortiferous images resulting from their behaviour will have
consequences, but that these consequences are somehow calculable. Only
to the degree that they share this thought does such behaviour amount to a
strategy. To this extent these enemies of the contemporary technical
system share with the advocates of that system the faith that industrial
technical objects and audiovisual techniques targeting the unconscious
influence desire and have calculable consequences for the behaviour of
individuals and audiences. These calculations may be fanciful, but this is
more or less beside the point, given that the strategic options of the
terrorist are that much more limited than those of advertising and political
campaigners, and given that the most expensive and calculated advertising
campaigns are still based on the false notions that desire is quantifiable
and the unconscious finally controllable. What it is more important to
understand is that the particular method preferred by terrorists amounts to
an appeal not to stereotypes but to traumatypes. The thought is that by
providing the world with what it consciously represses but unconsciously
expects, a transformation of desire resulting in a change of behaviour will
result. Specifically, the terroristic auteur triesby presenting a sequence,
stretching from a period before the inflicting of physical trauma to the
moment of that trauma and its aftermathto place the audience within the
situation, to involve and affect them temporally, hence to induce a feeling
of responsibility for the situation.23 And when he decides to wield a sword
rather than a gun, he intends this as a deliberate contrast to the tendency
[in recent centuries] towards the concealment and anonymity of the person
doing the killing, and towards dishonour.24 What this auteur creates are
23
Cf. Michael Ignatieff, The Terrorist as Auteur, New York Times Magazine
(14 November, 2004), 50. I criticize Ignatieffs reading of these traumatypical
industrial temporal objects in Traumas of the Image, 96.
24
Javier Maras, Your Face Tomorrow, Volume Two: Dance and Dream, trans.
Margaret Jull Costa (New York: New Directions, 2006), p. 331. Near the end of
this novel, Maras offers something like a phenomenology of the sword in
contemporary life, one which relates in a precise way to the distinction between the
stereotypical and the traumatypical. Beginning with the fact that if I draw a gun or
a knife on someone, theyre bound to be scared, but only in a conventional way,
and taking note that what makes this fear conventional is that the situation is
predictable, and has therefore been anticipated (say, in fantasy: such thoughts are
pure fantasy; but at least youre one step ahead, and, more importantly, youre not
quite so terrified or so surprised [3289]), the argument he constructs goes on to
point out that the sword, on the contrary, is probably the weapon that instils the
most fear in people, precisely because it seems so out of place in a day and age
245
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CHAPTER TEN
STARTING FROM THIS UNCERTAIN
TERRAIN
JESSICA WHYTE, MONASH UNIVERSITY
In his short story, In the Penal Colony, written in 1919, Kafka describes
a machine, the apparatus, in which a condemned man is to be executed.
This apparatusas lovingly described by the officer who supervises it
works in the following way: firstly, the condemned man is laid naked on a
bed, stomach down; next he is strapped in by his hands, his feet and his
throat, while a piece of felt is stuffed into his mouth to keep him from
screaming and biting his tongue.1 Above the bed is that part of the
apparatus known as the inscriber, and attached to that, the harrowa
word that signals not only to the sharp teeth of the ploughing instrument it
resembles, but also to the distress and torment it produces. Once the
condemned man is firmly strapped to the machine, the work of sentencing
begins. While the idea that a sentence would be produced by the same
machine that is to carry out the punishment seems unusual, this blurring of
sentence and punishment, of judgement and execution is precisely what is
at stake in Kafkas story. When the machine kills a man, it does so by
inscribing a sentencein this case the sentence is Honour Your
Superiorsonto his body, writing deeper and deeper into the flesh, until,
after approximately twelve hours, the man is killed.
In Idea of Prose, Agamben discusses Kafkas story in a way that seeks
to illuminate the ambiguity whereby the linguistic sentence blurs into the
penal sentence. What Kafka reveals to us, Agamben suggests, is that the
machine of torture in the penal colony is language itself. The apparatus,
Agamben tells us, is primarily a machine of justice and punishment. This
1
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means that on earth and for men, language is also such an instrument.2
Agamben discusses the horrific ending to Kafkas story, in which the
officer, who had previously supervised the machine, straps himself into it
and attempts to have the machine inscribe the sentence Be Just into his
own flesh. The attempt to have the machine inscribe this particular
sentence, however, produces a result quite unlike the calculated penal
procedure the officer himself had described in such detail: once the officer
is strapped into the machine, it begins to malfunction; cogs and wheels spit
out at random, the harrow doesnt write but merely jabs violently into the
officers body again and again. [T]he machine was obviously going to
pieces; the explorer realises its silent working was a delusion.3 While the
officer had desired a form of redemption that would come from
understanding the meaning of the sentence as it was inscribed into his
body, what is produced is not redemption nor justice but, in the words of
the explorer, plain murder.4 In Agambens view, the redemption that the
machine produced was a product of its revelation of the meaning of
language, which is contained in language only as punishment. Here
Agamben establishes an essential relation between logos and law: logic, he
suggests, has its exclusive realm in judgement: logical judgement is, in
truth, immediately penal judgement.5 In this vein, Agamben offers an
interpretation of the destruction of the machine in which the officer inserts
the injunction Be Just into the machine with the precise intent of
destroying it. In this way, Agamben suggests, the tale presents the ultimate
meaning of language as precisely this injunction, Be Just. And yet, it is
precisely this injunction that language cannot make us understand. Or,
rather, Agamben writes, it can do it only be ceasing to perform its penal
function, only by shattering into pieces and turning from punisher to
murderer.6
The relation between language and law signalled here is one that
occurs throughout Agambens works, and is essential to an understanding
of his more recent, and more overtly political, Homo Sacer series. What
does it mean then to suggest that language is a penal machine? And what
is the implicationfor a philosophy of law and a politics that desires
justiceof Agambens account of the shattering of this penal machine?
Another of Agambens essays, which also bears the title The Idea of
Language, can provide us with some signposts here. In this essay,
2
249
250
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blurring of law and life and to the generalisation of a juridical model with
all the hallmarks of Kafkas penal settlement.
In Kafkas story, we see a perfect illustration of the blurring of law and
life. In The Penal Colony we witness the collapse of the distinctions
between judgement, sentence and punishment, and between law and fact.
In the world of the colony, it is no longer possible to distinguish where life
ends and law begins, as the body itself becomes a parchment on which a
sentence is violently inscribed. Similarly, it is no longer possible to
distinguish between the factual situation to which a particular law would
apply, and law itself. Those are the facts, the Officer tells the explorer
after outlining the allegations against the man he is about to have
executed: The captain came to me an hour ago, I wrote down his
statement and appended the sentence to it. Then I had the man put in
chains. That was all quite simple. If I had first called the man before me
and interrogated him, things would have got into a confused tangle. He
would have told lies, and had I exposed these lies he would have backed
them up with new lies, and so on and so forth. As it is, Ive got him and I
wont let him go.10 The violence of this indistinction of law and life is
clearly illustrated in Kafka, in the startling image of an unconstrained,
arbitrary power, which can kill without appeal. The apparatus does not
merely execute the condemned man howeverit tortures him for six
hours, until he has no more energy for screaming, then tortures him for
six more hours until his death. This death by torture appears, in Kafka, as
the ultimate result of the eradication of the boundary between law and life.
251
through its absolute exposure to death at the hands of the sovereign. Bare
life is the politicization of natural life and the state of exception is the
place in which biopolitics and sovereign power come together with deadly
results.
Central to Agambens theorization of the exception is the notion that
the violence of the state of nature or anomie is the excluded presupposition
of law. While law presupposes the juridical reference, this reference must
in fact be created through an articulation, which is simultaneously a
discontinuity, between law and life. Thus, in Agambens view, there can
be no absolute demarcation between law and a non-juridical outside, as
anomie, or life itself, is always presupposed by law as a constitutive
outside, which must be captured within law in the form of the state of
exception. The exception, in Agamben, is an individual case that is
excluded from the rule. However, what properly characterizes an
exception is that what is excluded in it is not, for this reason, simply
without relation to the rule. The rule applies to the exception in no longer
applying, in withdrawing from it.11 The exception then, is a limit relation
between law and anomie. The state of exception is the presupposition of
the juridical reference in the form of its suspension12: that is, it is not the
state of nature as outside to law, but is both a presupposition of law and a
product of its suspension. What this demonstrates, in Agamben, is nothing
but the intimate and irrevocable connection between law and the state of
exception. In the exception we see the reappearance of what was assumed
to lie outsideanomieon the inside, thus Agambens assertion that
there is nothing outside the law.
In Agamben, the point of indistinction between law and violence,
juridical and factual order, is marked by the sovereign, whofollowing
Carl Schmitts theory of sovereigntyexists in an undecidable position
with relation to the juridical order and enables the internalisation, within
this order of anomic violence. The sovereign decision, Agamben writes,
represents the inscription within the body of the nomos of the exteriority
that animates it and gives it meaning.13 Following Schmitt, Agamben too
understands sovereignty as a borderline concept: The sovereign, Schmitt
argued, stands outside the normally valid legal order and nevertheless
belongs to it, for he decides whether the constitution is to be suspended in
its entirety.14 This status by which the sovereign is legally outside the law,
11
Agamben, The Messiah and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in Walter
Benjamin, in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, 162.
12
Agamben, Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life,, 21.
13
Agamben, Homo Sacer, 26.
14
Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty,, 14.
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252
253
the pure form of law, the transcendence of form itself. This pure form of
law in which law remains in force without being applied, is a law that has
become indistinct from life, but that maintains itself despite its very lack
of content. Force of law, writes Agamben, in which potentiality and act
are radically separated, is certainly something like a mystical element, or
rather a fictio, in which law seeks to annexe anomie itself.17
The reliance of the law on the exception and on the possibility of its
own suspension was a central preoccupation of Schmitts: In Political
Theology, Schmitt grounds his theorisation of the state of exception in the
conviction that there is no norm that is applicable to chaos, and thus the
factual existence of a normal situation is not a mere superficial
presupposition that a jurist can ignore but a properly juridical question.18
In State of Exception, Agamben glosses Schmitt in the following way: In
the decision on the state of exception, the norm is suspended or even
annulled; but what is at issue in this suspension is, once again, the creation
of a situation that makes the application of the norm possible.19 In
Schmitts view, jurisprudence responds to the lack of internal nexus
between law and life, by presupposing this reference. As Dyzenhaus puts
it, the fundamental presupposition of liberalism and positive law is that
the problem of how social order is in the first place possible has largely
been solved.20 By presupposing laws reference to life, liberalism
obscures the necessity for this reference to be violently created through the
suspension of law, that is, it obscures laws non-legal conditions of
possibility. In contrast, Schmitt asserts that this reference cannot be
presupposed but must be created through the suspension of law and the
non-legal production of a normal situation. The sovereign is the figure
who ensures an articulation between this anomic production of a factually
normal situation and the law by deciding on both the exception and the
norm itself. This decision enables an articulation between law and life,
precisely by creating a zone in which they can no longer be distinguished.
In Agambens words:
Sovereign violence opens a zone of indistinction between law and nature,
outside and inside, violence and law. And yet the sovereign is precisely the
17
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one who maintains the possibility of deciding of the two to the very degree
that he renders them indistinguishable from each other.21
Life
To understand laws application requires us to understand how it is that
sovereign power is first able to refer to life, that is, to understand how the
political sphere is first constituted. From Aristotle onwards, Agamben
points out, the political realm has been predicated on a caesura in the
human, manifested in the division between zoe, or natural life, and bios, a
qualified form of life. For the Greeks, it was the exclusion of zoe from the
polis that enabled a political life: zoe, Agamben argues has the peculiar
privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men.24 The
possibility of an articulation between natural and political life is predicated
on the creation of a zone in which human and animal, zoe and bios can no
longer be distinguished. In attempting to understand this zone, Agamben
points to the ancient Roman category of homo sacer, and finds in it the
21
255
originary figure in which law refers to life precisely by excluding it. Homo
Sacer, as Agamben points out, was a figure who could be killed with
impunity but not sacrificed, and was thus defined by a double exclusion:
while the unpunishability of his killing removed homo sacer from the
sphere of human law, the ban on sacrifices excludes him from the realm of
divine law. In this paradoxical status, Agamben identifies a limit concept
of the Roman juridical order, an originary political structure that is
located in a zone prior to the distinction between sacred and profane,
religious and juridical.25 In the homo sacer, the fathers right over the life
of his son, the vitae necisque potestas, is extended to all free male citizens,
revealing the original sinister meaning of the term father of the people.26
This power over life is situated at the limit of the home and the city: thus,
if classical politics is born of the separation of these two spheres, life that
may be killed but not sacrificed is the hinge on which each sphere is
articulated, and the threshold at which the two spheres are joined in
becoming indeterminate.27
Agamben uses the term ban, borrowed from Jean-Luc Nancy, to
signify the exposure through which life is at once excluded from the
political community and captured in the realm of sovereign power. In his
essay Abandoned Being, Nancy highlights the double meaning of the term
banthe one who is banned is both abandoned and held in a ban. The
destitution of abandoned being, he writes, is measured by the limitless
severity of the law to which it finds itself exposed. The law to which one
is abandoned is not to be subpoenaed to present oneself before a court, or
to be held within the jurisdiction of a particular law. Rather, it is a
compulsion to appear absolutely under the law as such. To be abandoned
is to be held in a ban, and also to be banished. Turned over to the absolute
of the law, writes Nancy, the banished one is thereby abandoned
completely outside its jurisdiction. The law of abandonment requires that
the law be applied through its withdrawal. The law of abandonment is the
other side of the law, which constitutes the law.28
It is not difficult to see the step from Nancys theorisation of the ban,
to Agambens conception of the exception, in which bare lifethe figure
in which the status of the homo sacer is both modernised and
generalisedis irrevocably exposed before a law that has become
indistinguishable from life. We see the force of this abandonment to the
law clearly in Kafkas story in which the condemned man exists purely as
25
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naked life, absolutely deprived of rights or legal statusto the extent that
it is deemed unnecessary either to inform him of his sentence or to allow
him to prepare a defenceand yet is nonetheless utterly exposed to the
violence of an indeterminate law. Kafkas condemned man, or [h]e who
has been banned, to use Agambens words, is not, in fact, simply set
outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that
is exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside
and inside become indistinguishable.29 This ability to hold life in a ban by
abandoning it is, in Agamben, the originary force of law. The ban is the
fundamental structure of the law, which expresses its sovereign character,
its power to include by excluding.30
Here Agamben undertakes a fundamental reversal of liberal political
theory. It is not the social contract, but the ban, not an identity or a
belonging but an originary exclusion, not the rule of law but the state of
exception that founds sovereign power, and constitutes a political
community. The ban, in which inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion
blur into each other, is the originary political relation. The ban is the
structure in which exteriority is inscribed within law, in order to constitute
the law. Law is made of nothing, Agamben argues, with reference to
Savigny, but what it manages to capture inside itself through the
inclusive exclusion of the exceptio: it nourishes itself on this exception and
is a dead letter without it. In this sense, law truly has no existence in
itself, but rather has its being in the very life of men31 It is here that
Agambens analysis of the presuppositional structure of law coincides
with his analysis of bare life and where law and ontology become
indistinct: that which is exterior to law is nothing but human life itself, and
the ban is the original structure in which law refers to life by capturing it
(just as language captures being by presupposing its own sayability).
Agamben uses the term inclusive exclusion to define this limit relation,
in which people are included in the political community purely by virtue
of their exclusionan exclusion which leaves them utterly exposed to
sovereign violence. The sovereign ban is the limit form of relation, but at
this limit it remains a relation between the sovereign and that bare life that
it includes only by excluding.32
29
257
Language
This account of law and sovereign power, Agamben suggests, finds its
model in language. Just as there is no logical passage from law to
application, neither is there a logical passage between language and world.
Meaning is not contained in words themselves: like law, language secures
its reference to the world through the possibility of its own suspension,
through its ability to subsist as an abstract body of rules independently of
any act of discourse. It is this split between langue and parole, in
Saussures terminology, which, Agambens suggests, exclusively and
fundamentally characterizes human language.34Roman Jakobson has
suggested langue and parole stand in opposition to each other as potential
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259
and about which something is said.40 Like law, language has also
responded to the evacuation of foundations by presupposing itself, and its
own reference to the world. This self-presuppositional structure of
language is clearly elaborated by Roland Barthes in his discussion of The
Death of the Author. The position of the author, Barthes suggests, was an
essentially theological one: the author provided the past, the foundation
and the meaning of the text (just as, in the theory of divine right, God is
the past, the foundation and the meaning of sovereign power.) The death
of the author then, in Barthes, reveals the self-presuppositional structure of
language: in place of the buried author, is the modern scriptor, for whom
the hand, cut off from any voice, borne by a pure gesture of inscription
(and not of expression) traces a field without originor at least, which has
no other origin than language itself, language which ceaselessly calls into
question all origins.41 In Agambens view however, it is precisely the
presupposition of the origin that maintains its obscurity. In describing
langue as the social side of language, Saussure writes that langue exists
only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members of the
community.42 And yet despite this contractualist languagewhich finds
its model in that social contract on which liberalism sought to ground
laws authority, in the wake of the death of God and the evacuation of
transcendental foundationslangue lacks any internal reference to the
world, and thus relies on the possibility of its own suspension and on a
practical act of application, or enunciation, to secure this reference. In
order to apply a norm, Agamben writes, it is ultimately necessary to
suspend its application, to produce an exception.43
This practical act of enunciation of course, ultimately presupposes a
voice, which could anchor language in instance of discourse. The problem
of deixis is therefore the problem of the relation of language and voice:
only the voice enables the shifters to anchor language in an instant of
discourse, an instant that is only identifiable as such through the voice.
And yet here, once more, just as we believe we have identified the figure
through which an articulation becomes possible, we find, instead, a hiatus,
a zone of indistinction. While there is a necessary presupposition of
voice in every instance of discourse, the voice that is presupposed is, like
zoe, presupposed as removed.44 Agamben makes this connection quite
explicit: The living being has logos, he writes in Homo Sacer, by taking
40
260
Chapter Ten
away and conserving its own voice in it, even as it dwells in the polis by
letting its own bare life be excluded, as an exception, in it.45 No longer
animal phone, which must be excluded to enable human language, and not
yet language itself, that which indicates the taking place of language is a
removed voice, or as Agamben terms it, a Voice. This Voice is the taking
place of language itself, a taking place that occurs in a no mans land
between sound and signification.46This Voice, which Agamben identifies
as the supreme shifter as it enables language to indicate its own taking
place, is the ontological dimension, the dimension of pure being. By
presupposing its own sayability, language captures being within itself,
holding it in a ban.
We should by now be in a position to identify the common structural
features in Agambens accounts of law, life and language. In each case, we
see that Agamben: 1) begins with the problem of reference, of how an
abstract body of rules, whether langue or law can refer to life; 2) traces
this problem to a separation, in which the immanence of praxis has been
separated from itself: (not only language and law but all social
institutions have been formed through a process of desemanticization and
suspension of concrete practice in its immediate reference to the real47);
3) identifies a figurethe state of exception, homo sacer, Voicein
which an articulation of these separated terms occurs; demonstrates that
this articulation in fact relies on its own presupposition and thus the
mechanism of articulation is obscured; 5) reveals that the possibility of
reference is in fact predicated on the creation of an zone of indistinction,
in which the separated terms constitute each other precisely to the extent
that they blur into each other and become indistinguishable.
This structure, Agamben would suggest, has been illuminated by a
number of thinkers, amongst them Schmitt, Nancy and Derrida. Where
Agamben differs from these thinkers however, is in his belief that this
structure, the structure of the sovereign ban, can be overturned, and that
the unveiling of this presuppositional structure creates the possibility of
the eradication of all presuppositions and separations. While Agambens
theory of the ban owes much to Nancy then, Agamben ultimately goes
much further in proposing the possibility that life could be freed from the
ban. In Nancy, abandonment does not have the brutal characterisation of
Agambens sovereign ban, but opens on a profusion of possibilities.48 As
Benjamin S. Pryor points out, in Nancy, there is no being freed from the
45
261
What this means is that no longer are we faced with two categories, norm
and exception, which blur into each other, but are nonetheless
distinguished via the sovereign decision. When the exception becomes the
49
Pryor, Law in Abandon: Jean-Luc Nancy and the Critical Study of Law, Law
and Critique 15 (2004), 284.
50
Agamben, Homo Sacer, 64.
51
Agamben, Homo Sacer, 187.
262
Chapter Ten
263
264
Chapter Ten
officer tells the explorer, may tempt one to get under the harrow oneself,
when the officer is finally strapped into the apparatus there is no
redemption but only the destruction of the machine, which murders the
officer as it shatters. Precisely by asking the machine to inscribe that idea
of language, which is presupposed in language, the idea itself was freed
from language. That the officer does not find in the machine what others
have found is now perfectly understandable, writes Agamben: at this
point there is nothing left in language for him to understand.57
This pure sayability that is presupposed and captured in languageand
which Agamben reads as being freed with the destruction of the apparatus
in Kafkais the model for those whatever beings, which would
constitute Agambens coming communitya community that presupposes
nothing, that is without substance, belonging or identity, and thus without
exclusions and separations. This coming community is a community
beyond the operation of the sovereign ban. If there is a positive side to
Agambens assessment of the era of accomplished nihilism it is that, by
evacuating all substantive categories of relation, leaving in place only the
empty form of relation of the sovereign ban, this era makes possible a
common being without substancewhatever being, a being together in
shared communicability without presupposition. The expropriation of
every substance and identity, the evacuation of content and signification,
for the first time makes our linguistic being accessible to us as such and
provides us with the possibility for a community which presupposes
nothing, a community without the divisions of particular languages or
specific peoples: Now at last we can understand each other, Agamben
writes, because you too have gone bankrupt..58
So if the task with which we are faced is that of formulating a politics
capable of overcoming the sovereign ban, how should such a politics
respond to the normalisation of the exception if we have ruled out the
possibility of a return to purified form of law? In his Theses on the
Philosophy of History, Walter Benjamin writes, with a clear reference to
Schmitt, the state of emergency in which we live is not the exception
but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping
with this insight. At this point we can see that much of Agambens work
constitutes an attempt to develop a theory of history that takes seriously
Benjamins prescription. What then, does Benjamin propose as the correct
response to such a realisation? Then, he writes, we will clearly see that
it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency59 This real state of
57
265
266
Chapter Ten
62
63
CHAPTER ELEVEN
AGAINST POLITICAL THEOLOGY
GEOFF BOUCHER, DEAKIN UNIVERSITY
268
Chapter Eleven
Wolin, The Frankfurt School Revisited And Other Essays on Politics and
Society.
4
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political; see also Political Theology: Four Chapters
on the Concept of Sovereignty..
269
270
Chapter Eleven
deep distrust of popular sovereignty and discursive will formation) and its
rejection of political pluralism (through the advocacy of cultural
homogeneity). That Schmitt (if not Strauss) are now regarded by the Left
as important and challenging springs from a renewal of antiEnlightenment hostility to liberalism amongst the postmodern Left. Here,
postmodern Left and neo-conservative Right converge. For instance,
according to Tracey B. Strong, an editor for Telos, Schmitt is the
rightwing Lenin, a figure who proposes that politics is antagonism (a
remnant of the doctrine of class struggle).11. Additionally, the postmodern
Left tends to reject universal legislation and cosmopolitan
internationalism. This combines with the postmodern Lefts embrace of
the notion that every society has an arbitrary foundation generated through
violent revolution, a conception of social transformation that readily
accommodates Schmitts decisionist voluntarism.
Before moving on to examine the Hobbesian roots of Schmitts
doctrine, it is worth scrutinising the view that Schmitt is the rightwing
Lenin, and redeemable on these terms. Notice the balance sheet of gains
and losses here. What has been gained is a doctrine of the authority of
the sovereign that licenses military dictatorship and a connection between
the cohesiveness of a form of life and perpetual conflict with internal and
external enemies. This is vaguely reminiscent of Lenins trenchant
insistence that liberal democracy is merely the best form of capitalist rule,
because it most effectively conceals the class dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie; and that forms of life are in actuality founded on class
conflict. Hence, a link exists between bourgeois morality and the
prosecution of the class struggle against the proletariat (and conversely).
The gain of figuring Schmitt as a rightwing Lenin then is that this
doctrine has apparently been restated in terms that avoid the now-widelydiscredited dialectics of class struggle, since the structure of antagonism is
now arbitrary. But what has been lost is the other side of the Marxist
doctrine of class struggle. This is the dialectical view that under certain
historical conditions, bourgeois morality enjoys ethical legitimacy as an
instrument of human emancipation. It sits with the conviction that politics
is not simply the management of the state or administration of things, but
popular mobilisation against illegitimate (in Marxian terms) state forms
and class rule. In other words, the existential doctrine of the political
erases the connection between popular sovereignty and ethical legitimacy
at the heart of Marxism. And it does so in terms that are, from the Marxist
standpoint, resolutely bourgeois: Schmitt, like his teacher Weber, insists
11
271
272
Chapter Eleven
Contradictions of Hobbes
The central assumption of Hobbesian logical rationalism is that the human
being is characterised by a drive towards individual self-preservation,
linked to a calculating rationality. Following Gregory Kavka, I take
Hobbes to be arguing for a form of a psychological egoism, which is
supported by postulates of mechanical materialism.14 According to
Hobbes, given this conception of human nature it can be demonstrated that
the state of naturehuman beings lacking social order and legal
14
273
274
Chapter Eleven
275
276
Chapter Eleven
theory to secure the states stability and for the possibility of perpetual
peace; (3) and, Hobbes can be interpreted as unsuccessfully attempting to
square materialist science with religious belief through a split between
knowledge and faith.
Recent Hobbes scholarship by S. A. Lloyd and Aloysius Martinich
vindicates the 1950s thesis of Howard Warrender16 which I am drawing on
here, and that proposes that Hobbes indeed proposed a dual perspective
theory on both human nature and political community, so that sovereign
authority can be grounded on both natural right and natural law.17 This is
not confusion. Hobbes is proposing that the different perspectives respond
to distinct theoretical problems: Gods command lends the laws of nature
normative force; but, the desire for self-preservation motivates a person to
obey these laws of nature. According to Warrender, there exists a
considerable gulf between these laws [of nature] and the principles upon
which Hobbess natural man is motivated.18 Indeed, Hobbes has two,
complementary systems: a system of motives and the system of
obligations. The system of motives ends with the supreme principle of
self-preservation the system of obligations ends with the obligation to
obey natural law regarded as the will of God.19 Accordingly, there is in
Hobbess system an initial discrepancy between the duty and the interest
of the individual, and again, between public and private interest. This
discrepancy is overcome only if divine rewards and punishments are
posited, and without the sanction of salvation (or ultimate destruction)
Hobbess theory is incomplete.20 Consequently, and with perfect
consistency, Hobbes proposed to expel atheists from the political
community, for the reason that they cannot be trusted to keep their
promises.21
Political Theology
Doesnt all of this mean that Schmitt, and his political theology, is right
about Hobbes? Certainly, Hobbes has a theological politics. But to see
why Hobbess dual perspective theory of sovereignty is the opposite of
Schmitts notion of political theology qua sectarian politics, we need to
16
277
consider the critique of Schmitt by his most famous critic, Leo Strauss.
The argument revolves upon the significance of Hobbes for modern
liberalism and the authoritarianism of the sovereign as the
repressed/forgotten support of the rights-bearing individual. Where
Schmitt regards Hobbes as the modern representative of political theology,
Strauss considers him an atheist liberal. For Schmitt and Strauss, God is
central to the problem of modern politics. This is to say, theology is the
repressed internal connection between the impasses of liberal democracy
and the resort to the authority of force. Both Schmitt and Strauss see
liberalism as leading to relativism, historicism and nihilism. Therefore
both consider that liberal democratic regimes organically tend to issue into
forms of dictatorship. But the dialectical relation between liberalism and
dictatorship is seen by Strauss as evidence of the instability of a secular
regime. For Schmitt, by contrast, it reveals the return of the repressed
foundational premise of modern statehood. Strauss denounces the death of
God, whereas Schmitt thinks that dictatorship represents his political
resurrection.
Schmitts notion of the persistence of political theology in modern
sovereignty is totally different to Hobbess reliance on God, before any
civil contract, to guarantee covenants. For Hobbes, the sovereign is
literally and openly the lieutenant of God on earth: the Hobbesian state is a
theocracy. For Schmitt, by contrast, sovereign decisionism is conditioned
by the states hidden theological role. The state is both genetically and
structurally a proxy for the divinity. Schmitts genetic or genealogical
argument is that theological concepts have historically been sublimated
into secular equivalents: Hobbes Leviathan, based on the formidable
monster in Job is incidentally the most clear and distinct case. Structurally,
Schmitts contention is that these apparently secular categories perform
identical social functions to those formerly played by theological
concepts. According to Schmitt, modern liberalism depends on a
secularisation of Christian theology. Schmitt thinks that the neutrality of
the state and a system of rights designed to preserve life depend upon a
secularised faith (in human mastery of nature) with cultic features (around
worship of technology) and a providential doctrine (the notion of
progress). Secularisation therefore means a transcription of categories
and practices based in religious faith and divine providence into the
categories of a secular society without any substantive alteration. This
argument by analogy is apparently designed to prove that the categories
of modern politics have hidden theological referents, rather than being
openly grounded in a system of faith. Because the theological provenance
of liberal legitimacy is repressed, Schmitt contends, the society suffers
278
Chapter Eleven
279
280
Chapter Eleven
Hobbes could claim that the problems with his prudential model of social
peace are fixed through recourse to a theological politics. I maintain that
this is exactly what Hobbes canand mustclaim. Hobbess discussion
of private conscience and public faith is instructive. Most of the time,
Hobbes proposes that religion is a question of private conviction and that
public profession has no impact on salvation.23 Accordingly, Christian
citizens must obey a Muslim sovereign (for instance). Yet he admits the
existence of situations where public rituals violate fundamental tenets of
private conscience. The telling example he gives is where a Christian
teacher is required to do external honour to an idol for fear. In these
situations, he proposes that subjects must not rebel but must cheerfully
resign themselves to martyrdom. He must expect his reward in heaven
and not complain of his lawful sovereign; for he that is not glad of any
just occasion of martyrdom, has not the faith that he professeth.24
So sometimes, Hobbes subjects can desire death rather than wanting
to preserve life. And these times are connected to the impossibility of
doing honour to that which does not deserve honour, in the eyes of the
ultimate arbiter of such questions. This strongly suggests that the
motivation in question is connected to esteem. And indeed, Hobbes does
propose that a cause of the state of nature is glory, which drives men to
go beyond what is necessary for survival. In other words, for glory men
risk death, and they risk it not in self-defence, for the sake of selfpreservation, but because they desire something else (say, honour). But
Hobbes does not really account for glory in the transition from the state
of nature to civil society. For that transition is motivated by fear of death,
not by a psychological drive that might cause persons to risk, or even to
desire, death.
For Hobbes, glory and honour are quantitative rewards for the value
of a person that can be measured by peers and the sovereign in the
marketplace of merit. But they are actually qualitative too. Hobbes also
endorses private conscienceconsistent with Calvinist doctrine
concerning salvationbeyond public displays of loyalty to the state
religion; and he rejects self-incrimination under duresswhich implies
that glory is worth dying for. The problem with self-esteem is that every
subject evaluates themselves differently to the evaluation of their peers.
Satisfactory evaluation is only possible in the light of an absolute judge.
Indeed, it is pernicious for the state to let men judge themselves. It follows
that the problem of glory, leading to the state of nature, cannot be solved
23
24
281
CHAPTER TWELVE
MISRECOGNITION AND MORAL INJURY:
REFLECTIONS ON HONNETH AND BERNSTEIN
ROBERT SINNERBRINK,
MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY
The relationship between critical theory and psychoanalysis has a long and
interesting history. The first generation of Frankfurt School philosophers,
particularly figures such as Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse,
embraced psychoanalysis in order to explain why, given seemingly
propitious historical circumstances (the Russian revolution, the socialist
struggles of the 1920s, and the stock market crash of 1929), the masses
opted for fascism rather than communism during the 1930s.1 Following
the rise of Nazism and the horrors of Auschwitz, Freudian psychoanalytic
theory once again proved important, as evinced in Adornos account of the
authoritarian personality and Adorno and Horkheimers earlier analysis
of Nazism and anti-Semitism in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. Marcuses
famous critique of the domination effects of repressive desublimation is
another example of the productive appropriation of psychoanalytic theory
as a key element of the critical theory of modernity.2
The next generation of critical theorists, however, with the exception
of Jrgen Habermas hermeneutic reading of Freud, tended to avoid
psychoanalysis in favour of other forms of social and developmental
psychology.3 Habermas use of Kohlberg and Piaget in the Theory of
Communicative Action is a case in point (1984). Axel Honneths bestknown work, The Struggle for Recognition (1995), provides another
1
See Wiggerhaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political
Significance.
2
See Marcuse, One Dimensional Man; Eros and Civilization.
3
See Habermas discussion (1971) of Freudian psychoanalysis as a form of depth
hermeneutics.
283
284
Chapter Twelve
285
286
Chapter Twelve
experience an impairment of what we can call their moral expectations
not as a restriction of intuitively mastered rules of language, but as a
violation of identity claims acquired in socialization.9
287
Ibid., 92-130.
Ibid., 160-170.
288
Chapter Twelve
289
Ibid.
Ibid.
18
Ibid., 133.
19
Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World.
20
Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 133.
21
Ibid.
17
290
Chapter Twelve
291
27
Ibid.
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., 315.
31
Ibid., 315-316.
32
Here the Lacanian resonance noted above (fn. 3) is particularly striking.
28
292
Chapter Twelve
moment in which prematurity is suffered and the recognitive process of
coming to have the body it always already is begins.33
Ibid., 316.
Ibid.
35
Ibid., 316.
36
Ibid., 318.
37
See Honneth, The Work of Negativity. A Psychoanalytical Revisioning of the
Theory of Recognition, trans. Robert Sinnerbrink. Critical Horizons, vol. 7: 101111.
34
293
38
39
294
Chapter Twelve
295
296
Chapter Twelve
the colonial master, to such an extent that he or she does not consciously
experience this demeaning self-image as a form of suffering. Indeed, as
Fanon has argued43, the subjugated Negro may seek the approval or
recognition of the White colonial master in order to overcome the
unconscious sense of shame precipitated by the negative self-image he has
interiorized. Indeed, the traumatized subject may well repress or
rationalize the violence or oppression he or she is made to suffer. The
battered wife may not perceive that she is being treated unjustly,
claiming that her beatings are deserved and that her husband really loves
her. Such phenomena are common in cases of childhood abuse, sexual
trauma, and so on. By contrast, the violent racist might justify his beatings
of foreigners (indeed will typically tend to so) on the grounds that he feels
misrecognised. He perceives the presence of foreigners as a threat to his
bodily and psychic integrity, and hence reacts with violence against this
threat to his social (and racial) self-identity.
In Fanons case of black skins, white masks (oppressed Negroes who
internalize the way they are seen by their oppressors) as with the battered
wife syndrome, we have particular cases of misrecognition, with or
without attendant feelings of suffering. In such cases, we might want to
say that misrecognition can occur even if subjects do not experience
themselves as misrecognised or as disrespected. Conversely, if we take the
case of the individual who justifies his racism on grounds of perceived
suffering, an injurious threat to individual and group self-identity, we
might well argue that this subjective sense of misrecognition does not
warrant the title misrecognition in the normative sense. Though the racist
might feel that he is experiencing social disrespect or even an injury to his
sense of psychic integrity, we would probably not want to call this a
genuine case of misrecognition as a moral injury, let alone one that
motivates a justifiable form of social struggle. As is clear, however, racist
political movements both past and present (Nazism, the Ku Klux Klan, the
National Front, and so on) have often been motivated by such perceived
forms of injury or threat, and have indeed frequently availed themselves
of such rationalisations in order to justify their existence. It thus remains
an important question to ask how the theory of recognition accounts for
the motivation behind these distorted forms of misrecognition, which are
not normatively significant in Honneths or Bernsteins sense of
constituting a moral injury. I shall return to this question presently.
(2) For all its brilliance, Bernsteins account does not fully address the
possibility of there being a constitutive dimension of misrecognition that
43
297
Not only for Lacanians, however; as Jessica Benjamin has argued (1988),
drawing on relational psychoanalytic theory focused on the infant-carer
relationship, intrapsychic phenomena such as aggression cannot be entirely
eliminated from human life.
45
Konpridis, 2007: 287.
46
Ibid.
298
Chapter Twelve
sway. But can one maintain the view that misrecognition entails psychic
regression, as an ever present possibility of the vulnerable subject, while at
the same time arguing that it can, in principle, be overcome? Moral norms
may well serve to protect vulnerable human subjects precisely because
such subjects always remain vulnerable to violations of their bodily and
psychic integrity, a point that Bernstein makes plain. But this does not
mean that all disruptions or bodily and psychic integrity are therefore
normatively significant forms of misrecognition. Nor does it mean that
every instance of misrecognition that might befall an individual constitutes
a moral injury requiring some form of social, legal, or political redress.
Some kinds of misrecognition are regrettable, even tragic, without being
normatively significant in the sense that Honneth and Bernstein intend
(growing up in an unhappy family, being in a loveless marriage, being at
odds with prevailing ideological or political views).47 And we have even
not touched upon the traumatic dimensions of sexuality, whether infantile
or adult, which is the psychoanalytic locus par excellence of disruption to
our physical and psychic integrity. If psychoanalysis teaches anything, it is
that human beings must contend with constitutive forms of negativity,
with the inherent possibility of misrecognition, of aggression and the will
to domination, of the irreducible limits to the integrity and transparency of
autonomous subjectivityin short, that the human subject, as Freud
famously quipped, is not master in his or her own house.
This raises again the question I mentioned earlier: what motivates the
attempts to dominate or subordinate others through misrecognition? Here
we might return to Hegels fascinating account of crime in his early Jena
lectures.48 Hegel argues there that the socially excluded subjects
provocation of the other through a violent or criminal act is a desperate
attempt to force the other to recognize him or her, or to force recognition
of the inadequacy of formal law or of social normativity as such. We can
elaborate Hegels point by saying that it provides a way of revivifying the
despised or excluded subject, who is condemned to social death, through a
47
Elaborating upon a point that Robert B. Pippin made in response to an earlier
version of this paper presented at the Australasian Society for Continental
Philosophy conference, Deakin University, Geelong Waterfront campus, July
2006. We must of course distinguish between these cases of regrettable but not
morally injurious misrecognition and the more obvious cases of normatively
significant misrecognition that would constitute cases of moral injury in the proper
sense (abusive family situations or interpersonal relationships, discrimination and
persecution based upon religious, moral or political views, and so on).
48
See Honneths illuminating account of Hegels conception of crime (in Honneth,
The Struggle for Recognition, 52-56.
299
violent passage la acte that brutally forces his existence upon the other.
In this case, the desire to misrecognise others, to subordinate others
through social disrespect, is motivated by the sense of incompletion
inherent to being a social subject. It is a distorted attempt to force the other
to recognize ones sense of (injured or inadequate) self-identity, whether
in the petty form of humiliation or in the brutal form of crime or deliberate
violence.
This reactive assertion of a distorted will to recognition, can also, on
the other hand, become a genuinely political act in the sense of
precipitating a social movement or a political revolt: a form of struggle
that aims to confront the dominant other or unjust social order with an
impossible claim to justice, universality, recognition of singularity, and
so on. Thus the will to recognition, driven by our constitutive
incompletion as human subjects, can serve either the destructive ends of
deliberate and harmful misrecognition, or else it can be harnessed towards
the affirmative ends of engendering social, cultural, and political
transformation.
Indeed, misrecognition can have positive and negative dimensions
depending upon the context of social interaction and the historical forms
of normativity and sociality at issue. It is worth reminding ourselves that
not all cultures and societies obviously valorize Western concepts of
individual freedom as autonomy in the ways sometimes presupposed by
theorists of recognition (including Honneth). Social recognition might also
take the form of conforming to social role or cultural tradition, eschewing
individual self-expression in favor of collective belonging or obedience to
moral or religious code, or even sacrificing ones bodily and psychic
integrity for religious or political reasons.49 This is not to deny the force of
claims that misrecognition can imply, in different contexts, certain kinds
of injustice demanding moral, social, and political redress. Rather, it is a
matter of underlining that the circumstances in which recognition and
misrecognition occurs can be decisive in determining whether we are
dealing with a reactive form of injustice or an active demand for justice.
Only then can we begin to determine whether particular cases of
misrecognition warrant redress through social struggle, legal reform, or
political transformation.
I conclude with the observation that Bernstein overstates the case for
construing misrecognition as a way of capturing all forms of moral injury.
49
300
Chapter Twelve
50
Jean-Philippe Deranty has argued (in Deranty, The Loss of Nature in Axel
Honneths Theory of Recognition. Re-reading Mead with Merleau-Ponty) for the
importance of Merleau-Pontys phenomenology to supplement Honneths theory
of recognition. Jessica Benjamins psychoanalytical reading of recognition, as
mentioned, is exemplary, while Joel Whitebrooks Perversion and Utopia still
provides one of the best accounts of the intersection between critical theory and
psychoanalysis.
51
Iris Marion Youngs famous study (Throwing Like a Girl. A Phenomenology
of Feminine Comportment, Motility, & Spatiality, 141-179) of the
phenomenological differences in gendered embodiment would be interesting to
examine from the perspective of Honneths theory of recognition, modified in the
manner that Bernstein suggests and further supplemented by psychoanalytical
insights.
52
Joel Whitebrook makes a good start in this direction in his essay on Lacan and
Adorno. See Whitebook, Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and
Critical Theory.
53
Judith Butlers work makes an important contribution in this regard, drawing
upon Hegelian accounts of recognition and Lacanian psychoanalysis. See Butler,
The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection; and Precarious Life: The
Powers of Mourning and Violence.
301
54
APPENDIX ONE
FREUDS 150TH: BEYOND THE PARTY POOPERS
JASON FREDDI, UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE,
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY
Psychoanalysis draws its inspiration from many sources. 1 Not the least of
these is the theatre and poetry of ancient Athens. During one period in its
history, the festival of Dionysus consisted of a three-part tragedy and a
fourth part comicor satyrplay. The leader of the chorus was awarded
a special privilege of ancient origin, in which he was required to deliver a
course of invective. He did so with immunity. A serious purpose is
indicated behind this seemingly absurd practice. We need only think of the
role of the medieval fool or jester and of satirical verse, which both derive
from this ancient institution.
And so, on this festive occasion, the 150th birthday of Freud, after
nearly one hundred years of seriousand sometimes tragicanalysis of
Freuds legacy, I herein want to claim the ancient privilege of chorus
leader to deliver a course of invective against the Freud bashers. I trust
the reader will receive my polemic, granting me the ancient immunity.
In speaking of the Freud bashers, I mean primarily those who have a
particularly heavy axe to grind. This distinguishes them from the
dissenters and from the genuine critical and comparative commentators.
One might call them Freud haters. Perhaps party-poopers might be most
appropriate at an affair celebrating Freuds birthday. But I really ought to
call them the beyond the party poopers in deference to the compulsive
repetitiveness of much of their criticism. Every fashion in thought invents
its own way of telling us Freud is Dead. Every fashion is ignorant of the
1
This paper was given as a talk in celebration of Freuds 150th birthday at the 2006
conference of the Australian Society for Continental Philosophy. The present text
was first published in Psychotherapy In Australia, vol. 13 (2), February 2007.
304
Appendix One
305
10. At reason number ten I have placed the, All he is interested in is sex
argument. This was in part Jungs rationalisation for leaving Freud. It is
mindlessly recited by university undergraduates, typically with an
expression of disgustonly a psychoanalyst could explain that!
9. Reason number nine for hating a Freud hater is the three bears
argument or the, Freud was too much of this or not enough of that
argument. This position usually allows for a Janus-faced orientation, such
as: He was too scientific or He was not scientific enough; He was too
cultural; He was not cultural enough; too biological, not
biological enoughI think you get the picture.
So here we have the, Freud was not scientific, and I know what
science is argumentchampioned by the doyens of positivist psychology.
This reason has lead to other reasons why we should hate the Freud haters,
such as the, if Freud had have known what we know now argument, with
its case for the relentless march of progress. This position is even
advocated by some self-proclaimed Freudian analysts. Adherents to this
ideology compromise the analytic approach to accommodate
psychoanalysis to the dictates of academic psychology. A Faustian
bargain!
A variation on this theme, sometimes thought mistakenly to represent
an opposite trend, is the Never mind all that complicated theory, we know
what works argument. Like the previous argument it lauds ignorance as
virtue. Never mind the ethical consequences of not knowing what you are
doingit works! Well, not according to Adolph Grunbaum, who has
checked the numbers. However, some analysts are very interested in the
theory of what they are doing. So interested are they in fact that, not long
ago, someone in the analytic establishment, troubled by the many different
clinical approaches, proposed a treatment manual. This, he argued, would
ensure practitioners keep up with best practice and, incidentally, it would
allow classification and statistical analysis of the best practice. This way
we could prove that psychoanalysis works. If only we knew what it was!
8. At reason number eight to oppose the Freud bashers, we have the
colloquial form of the There is no evidence argument, usually put as the,
Freud had some great ideas, but we now know he was wrong argument.
This might also be put in the form of the, Freud was right, but...
argument. I even saw it put recently as the Freud was a genius, but...
argument. Why dont they talk about Hegel like this, or Shakespeare?
Maybe they do. A genius is only a genius after all.
Appendix One
306
I also draw your attention here to the, Freud had his own problems
argument, which sometimes manifests as the, Freud was addicted to
cocaine argument. The inference here is that a.) Freud is morally evil;
and, b.) we should therefore ignore anything he thought or wrote. The
claim, of course, is a parody of the reality; and even if true, would have no
bearing on the truth of Freuds teachings.
7. At number seven I propose the, magic bullet argument. It is a
sophisticated case and a favourite of the academically inclined, in which a
convoluted argument proves the end of Freudianism by disproving a single
element of the entire system.
6. Number six in the top ten reasons to oppose the Freud bashers is an
argument distilled from the halls of the cultural elite. It is the science is
politics argument which informs us that penis-envy is discriminatory and
one simply shouldnt say such things. This is more typically a problem in
the United States.
The psychoanalysts themselves are not immune from intellectual
fashions. They bring us the, it was libidinal-cathexis last decade;
separation-individuation this decade; and, infant-attachment next decade
argument. We hate these haters because they proliferate terms and
meaningless jargon which explain in a less precise manner what Freud had
articulated previously, more clearly.
From the world of high academe, note that we also we have the,
Freud was wrong, I am right Dont let on its the same idea argument;
and the, I can quote Freud too argument, in which a citation taken out of
context is used to prove that Freud believed the opposite of what he said.
5. At number five I present the, Freud tried to explain everything
argument. Newsweek provided me a sample of this reductio ad adsurdum:
Freud concluded that Napoleons rivalry with his brother Joseph was the
driving force of his life, accounting for his infatuation with a woman
named Josephine and his decision to invade Egypt.4
307
doubt...though I cant prove it. They tell us that one in six Australian
males and one in four females experience depression. What does this
prove?
Returning to the analytic establishment, I can report the, I already
know what Freud has to say argument, usually put by those afraid of
Freuds writings. Often recited by psychoanalytically orientated
psychotherapists, this argument is often put in a form such as, Freud
helps us find deep meanings. It has the effect of downplaying the radical
nature of Freuds teaching.
In the modern cultural landscape we often hear the, Freud really had
something to say, but only for the study of literature argument. Peter
Craven, art critic for the Melbourne Age Newspaper, pronounced this
recently. He was parroting earlier remarks by the usually erudite Harold
Blooma much more convincing writer when addressing other thinkers
than Freud.
2. At number two I give you the, Freud seduced me with his literary
writing style argument, which is sort of an admission of mindlessness, or
could it be psycho-neurosis?
Perhaps its a variation of the, Freud seduced his patients argument,
which Freud definitely did not do.
In contradistinction, Jeffrey Masson (1984)perhaps the greatest of
the Freud hatersproposed, in an emotionally charged thesis, the Freud
did not seduce his patients, but they were seduced argument. This is an
argument that entangled Freud unwarrantably in the debates over
recovered memory syndrome during the 1980s and 1990s.
1. Finally, at number oneit was a hard choice but the times in which we
live decided itI give you the social-constructivist argument, Freud was
a product of his times. It is usually followed by some gormless comment
on Victorian-Era morality and the observation that Thankfully, we dont
think like that anymore.
Enough said. Happy birthday Sigmund.
come!
APPENDIX TWO
TO RUPTURE THE MATHEME WITH A POEM:
A REMARK ON PSYCHOANALYSIS
AS ANTI-PHILOSOPHY
JUSTIN CLEMENS,
UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE
Psychoanalysis is an anti-philosophy. This name, this concept, of antiphilosophy is quite precise. Emerging in Tristan Tzaras Dadaist rantings
as kind of heteronym, then taken up by Jacques Lacan in the course of a
polemic against the imaginary captivations of philosophers, it has recently
been given its definitive conceptual freighting by a philosopher, Alain
Badiou. For Badiou, anti-philosophy is, in general, defined by the
following features:
1) a subordination of philosophical categories to language, and the
concomitant destitution of philosophys pretensions to truth and
system;
2) the diagnosis of such pretensions as evidence of a philosophical
will to power;
1
309
Freud, who begins as a scientist trained in the best institutions of his day,
can only continue to practice if he radically forces the volatile linguistic
inventiveness of literature into the world of science. This is precisely so
that he is able to adequately listen to the complaints of suffering women,
to their accounts of pain that are at once physiologically inexplicable yet
absolutely real. Suffering is at the heart of the psychoanalytic experience,
where trauma is constitutive of existence. But this suffering cannot be
heard and the trauma cannot be captured by any existing means. Not by
science, not by philosophy, not by literature. But by something genuinely
new, by a discourse that interrupts science with literature.
Science cannot do it alone: local diagnosis and electrical reactions are
incapable of unlocking the secrets of hysteria, precisely because of the
2
See Badiou, Silence, solipsisme, saintet: Lantiphilosophie de Wittgenstein,
Barca! No. 3 (1994), 13-53; Who is Nietzsche?, Pli, No. 11 (2001), 1-11;
Lantiphilosophie: Lacan et Platon, Conditions, ed. F. Wahl (Paris: Seuil, 1992),
306-326.
3
Breuer and Freud, Studies in Hysteria, 160-161.
310
Appendix Two
Lacan, The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud, in
Ecrits (2006), 413.
311
Appendix Two
312
Full stop.
See, for example, A. Badiou, The Adventure of French Philosophy, New Left
Review, No. 35 (2005), 67-77; J. Lear, Freud.
APPENDIX THREE
NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE FUTURE
OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
MATTHEW SHARPE, DEAKIN UNIVERSITY
314
Appendix Three
315
flourish only in France (where there are approximately 5000 analysts) and
South America (particularly Argentina), whereprincipally Lacanian
psychoanalysis has continued to play an active role in public institutions
like schools and hospitals, and to contribute to public culture and debates.5
Eli Zaretsy, in his recent work Secrets of the Soul, has presented an
intriguing hypothesis to explain the rise and decline of institutional
psychoanalysis in the century since the Traumdeutung. Psychoanalysis
golden age, he argued, lasted until the 1960s. It corresponded to what
Zaretsy calls the second industrial revolution. This revolution, associated
with the advent of mass, Fordist production and consumer culture, led to
a decisive separation of peoples work from their home and family lives.
In this context, Zaretsky contends that Freuds discovery of a personal
(versus collective) unconscious spoke to a widespread lived sense of
disjuncture between the public and the private, the outer and the inner, the
socio-cultural and the personal.6 Psychoanalysis more recent decline, by
contrast, reflects a third industrial revolution that has swept the world.
This revolution dates from the 1960s. It involves the emergence of the
new, counter-cultural social movements, like second wave feminism, and
civil rights movements. These movements politicizations of the private
sphere reflected a debt to psychoanalysiswhich is perhaps one reason
why Freud bashing is such a part of todays culture wars, particularly
in the USA. Yet these new social movements also challenged the
psychoanalytic focus on the personal unconscious. They shifted the focus
of public debate and intellectual inquiry onto groups, culture, and
institutions. From around the same period, meanwhile, breakthroughs in
neuroscience, cognitive behavioural psychology (or CBT), and psychiatric
drugs have seen the advent of shorter and cheaper treatments for mental
illness. The psychiatric treatments associated with these changes have
been much more successful than psychoanalysis in retaining public
funding, despite the worldwide rolling back of the welfare states of the
middle of last century. As psychoanalysis was to Fordism, as we might
speculate, so the faster, one-stop drug treatments might be for todays
post-Fordist, flexibilised culture.
In this context, the emergence in the last decade of the
neuropsychoanalytic movement presents arguably the most exciting
development in psychoanalytic thought since the emergence of the
continental, Lacanian school in the 1950s and 1960s. The
neuropsychoanalytic movement is led by a group of recognised
5
316
Appendix Three
317
rarely been so in its methods: it has failed over the years to submit its
assumptions to testable experimentation.11 Unlike both Nagel and
Popper, however, Kandel and other neuropsychoanalysts believe
psychoanalytic hypotheses both can and should be submitted to scientific
testing, if its institutional decline is to be arrested. The failure of
psychoanalysis to provide objective evidence that it is effective as a
therapy can no longer be accepted, Kandel writes.12 What then do Kandel
and the other neuropsychoanalysts propose for psychoanalysis to move it
beyond its present unbehagen?
Well: the proponents of neuropsychoanalysis might well direct
psychoanalysis friends to recall again how both Kleins and Lacans
developments of psychoanalytic theory after Freud were based on the
latest scientific observations of infants behaviour, ethology, linguistics,
and the other social sciences.
Kandel et als position is that
psychoanalysis, in this vein, should shed its pretences to disciplinary
autonomycertainly if the discipline of choice is one in the interpretive
humanities. In Kandels telling formulation in A New Intellectual
Foundation for Psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis must recognise that if it
is to have a future, it lies in the context of empirical psychology, abetted
by imaging techniques, neuroanatomical methods, and human genetics.13
As Kandel sees things, this will involve psychoanalysis in a two-way
exchange with empirical biology and psychology. On one hand, the
psychoanalytic notions of the unconscious, psychical causality,
psychopathology, etc. should each be tested, and where necessary revised,
against the most advanced data furnished by the experimental sciences.14
As the neuropsychoanalyst and philosopher Jim Hopkins concurs:
if psychoanalytic claims about motivation are correct we should be able
to relate them to those of other disciplines, such as social psychology,
developmental psychology, evolutionary psychology, and neuroscience.15
11
318
Appendix Three
The neuropsychoanalysts are aware that, for all the recent advances in
psychopharmacology, these practical advances have run far ahead of the
current theoretical bases of neuroscience. While we know that many of
the most recent anti-psychotics work, we do not yet have a comprehensive
logos as to why, a fact reflected in the side effects these medications
invariably produce. Psychoanalysis, Kandel argues, still provides by far
the most coherent and intellectually satisfying view of the mind.16 At the
very least, its scope as a theory of the mindreaching from an account of
the structure of the mind, to theories of psychopathology and symptom
formationfar exceeds other materialist philosophies of mind. At the
most, its contents provide a remarkably prescient account of what we are
only now coming to learn about the brains functioning. For this reason,
Kandel suggests, psychoanalysis can play an important role in the future of
neuroscientific research, if not one equivalent to the one played by
Darwins theory of evolution in relation to molecular genetics, as Solms
claimsas a [theoretical] template on which emerging [neuroscientific]
details can be coherently arranged.17
Alongside Kandels, Mark Solms work is at the vanguard of the
neuropsychoanalytic movement. In his Neuropsychology of Dreams,
Solms has scientifically corroborated Freuds hypothesis concerning
dreams function to preserve sleep. The Neuropsychology of Dreams
shows that patients with brain lesions which prevent their dreaming also
typically suffer from abnormally disturbed sleeping patterns.18 Perhaps
more significantly, alongside Karen Kaplan-Solms, Solms has used
neurological mapping to broadly corroborate what Freud could only
promise or anticipate: namely, a material or neurological bases for the
metapsychological agencies (ego, superego, id) his later metapsychology
identified. To quote Solms 2004 article, Freud Returns in Scientific
American:
Recent neurological mapping generally correlates to Freuds conception.
The core brain-stem and limbic systemresponsible for instincts and
drivesroughly correspond to Freuds id. The central frontal region,
which controls selective inhibition, the dorsal frontal region, which
controls self-conscious thought, and the posterior cortex, which represents
the outside world, amount to the ego and the superego.19
16
319
320
Appendix Three
321
Appendix Three
322
can make you better; you must see some inconceivable beauty in me If
then you spy it there and if you are trying to do a deal and exchange beauty
for beauty [so that] instead of an opinion of beauty . you want to
exchange the truth that would mean nothing other than exchanging gold
for bronze. But dont be deceiving yourself, examine things more
carefully and you will see that Iproperly speakingam nothing the
eye of the mind begins to see sharp when the sight of the eyes is losing its
keenness, and you are far from that still. (Symposium, 219a) 23
Or as Freud put things, in a similar register: where the It was, there the I,
as a divided subject, must come to be. No one, and no body of knowledge,
however splendid, can elide the subjects responsibility in this process.
So the note of caution concerning psychoanalysis relation to
neuropsycho-analysis here is this. Invoking the gospels: psychoanalysis
should beware that in winning so much from the neuroscientific regrounding of its metapsychology that it does not lose its clinical soul
thereby. What for instance are the implications for psychoanalysis as a
practice if, as Kandel suggests, psychoanalysis was to be re-figured as
solely an adjunct of empirical psychology, abetted by imaging techniques,
neuroanatomical methods, and human genetics? Kandel is clear. If
psychoanalysis is to regain its place as a valued component of the modern,
scientific Weltanschaaung, it must forego its clinical basis.24 It is true that
Freudian psychoanalysis has taught us a new way of listening to the
mentally ill, Kandel writes in Biology and a New Intellectual Basis for
Psychoanalysis. However:
One hundred years after its introduction, there is little new in the way of
theory that can be learned by merely listening carefully to individual
patients. We must, at last, acknowledge that at this point in the modern
study of mind, clinical observation of individual patients, in a context like
the psychoanalytic situation that is so susceptible to observer bias, is not a
sufficient basis for a science of mind ...25
Accordingly:
Psychoanalysis will need to adopt new intellectual resources, new
methodologies, and new institutional arrangements for carrying out its
research.26
23
323
CONTRIBUTORS
Feature Authors
Agnes Heller is one of the leading thinkers to have come out of the
tradition of critical theory. Her vast intellectual output covers a broad
range of subjects, including ethics, political philosophy and philosophy of
history. Born in Budapest in 1929, Heller studied philosophy at The
University of Budapest under the guidance of Gyrgy Lukcs, and later
became an assistant professor in the department. Expelled from the
University in 1956 due to her political commitments, Heller was a
researcher in the Institute of Sociology in Budapest between 1963 and
1973. In 1977, having been prohibited from teaching in Hungary by the
communists, she migrated to Melbourne, Australia, where she taught
sociology at La Trobe University for nearly a decade. In 1986, she moved
to New York, where she is now Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy at
the New School for Social Research. Heller currently teaches also in
Budapest and Szeged. Her major works have been published in English,
German, French, Spanish, Italian, Hungarian, Danish, Swedish,
Portuguese, Turkish, Japanese, Greek and other languages. In 1981, Agnes
Heller was awarded the Lessing Prize of Hamburg. Since the political
events of 1989, she now spends half of the year in her native Hungary
where she has been elected to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In
1995, she was awarded the Szchenyi National Prize in Hungary and the
Hannah Arendt Prize in Bremen and she received the honorary degree
from the La Trobe University, Melbourne in 1996, and from the
University of Buenos Aires in 1997. Agnes Hellers formidable list of
publications includes her Immortal Comedy: The Comic Phenomenon in
Art, Literature, and Life (forthcoming); The Concept of the Beautiful
(forthcoming); The Time Is Out of Joint: Shakespeare as Philosopher of
History (2002); A Theory of Modernity (1999); An Ethics of Personality
(1996); General Ethics (1988); Beyond Justice (1987); The Power of
Shame (1986); Radical Philosophy (1984); Everyday Life (1984); Lukcs
Revalued (editor, 1983); A Theory of History (1982); A Theory of Feelings
(1979); Renaissance Man (1978); The Theory of Needs in Marx (1976).
326
Contributors
Other Contributors
Geoff Boucher lectures in English literature and psychoanalytic studies at
Deakin University. He is the coeditor, with Matthew Sharpe of Traversing
the Fantasy: Critical Essays on Slavoj iek (Ashgate, 2005), several
articles on the politics of post-marxism and, with Matthew Sharpe, of the
forthcoming book on the local variant of neoconservatism, Postmodern
Conservatism in Australia (Allen & Unwin).
Adam Brown teaches history and literary studies at Deakin University.
He is currently completing a PhD on Holocaust representation, focusing
on the moral judgements inherent in portrayals of privileged Jews in
Holocaust memoir, history and film.
327
328
Contributors
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