Overcoming Strategic Weakness:

The Egyptian Deception and the

Yom Kippur War1
YIGAL SHEFFY

Analysis of the Egyptian deception on the eve of the October 1973 (Yom
Kippur) War serves to illuminate operational rationale, which may
guide future strategic deception models and processes. The Egyptians
used deception to neutralize two Israeli strong points that might
jeopardize the crossing of the Suez Canal: the capacity for a
preemptive strike and deployment in strength in the Canal region.
The deception aimed to minimize Israels early warning space,
delaying the moment of decision-making and slowing down the IDFs
operational response. Implementing a dual technique of concealing and
misleading, the deception lulled the Israeli early warning system, the
linchpin of its security doctrine, into accepting the (wrong) alternative
option. The deception gained the upper hand because it corresponded
even if unintentionally with the fundamental perception maintained
by the victim, contributing to winning the rst round of the surprise
attack.

The contribution of Egyptian deception to the total surprise experienced by

Israel at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War (the Ramadan War for the
Arabs) has been discussed in almost every work published on the subject of
the war.2 Although it is generally conceded that deception made a signicant
contribution to Israels surprise, their judgement on the place of deception in
Egyptian planning and the professional merits of this specic instance of
deception covers a spectrum, ranging from the sole element [in the war]
that was intelligently constructed and implemented with great skill3 to of
middling quality and even rather primitive.4
This diversity of opinion is nourished by the fact that even after 33 years,
the precise nature of the deception remains cloaked in mystery. No archival
documentation has been released so far on Egyptian decision-making, or
Intelligence and National Security, Vol.21, No.5, October 2006, pp.809 828
ISSN 0268-4527 print 1743-9019 online
DOI: 10.1080/02684520600957746 2006 Taylor & Francis

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on the part played by deception at the stages of conceptualization and

planning, and even less on the deceptions actual implementation. The only
available high-level sources presenting the Egyptian version are memoirs by
Egyptian politicians and senior ofcers; these generally exalt the deception
operation, but contradict one another regarding its nature, its component
parts and its relative weight in the war plans.5 Additional information about
events on the Egyptian side has been culled from documents captured
by the Israelis during the war. However, they relate primarily to the
operational and tactical levels; hence they shed little light on strategic
decision-making.6
The problematic nature of sources is one of the factors motivating the
academic debate in Israel over the contention that deception originally played
a minor role in Cairos planning. According to proponents of this position,
Egyptian historiography is inaccurate with respect to the deceptions salience
and signies post facto attempts to exaggerate its importance as a belated
response to Israeli publications, which had enlightened Egyptians about the
deceptions practical impact on the battleeld.7
Stumbling blocks to an in-depth study of the affair are not limited to the
Egyptian side. In Israel as well, much information remains unavailable
publicly. The 1974 state commission of inquiry appointed to investigate the
wars events (the Agranat Commission) dwelled on the issue of deception,
devoting ten pages of its report to the subject. However, when the report was
made public in 1995, all the relevant pages remained condential.8
In response to further attempts to gain access to the material, the Israeli
Defence Forces (IDF) Archive, which holds the condential report, stated:
After careful re-examination of the report [we have concluded] that it is
still impossible to open for review those portions of the report that have yet
to be publicized, given that their exposure may still endanger national
security. Those same sections therefore remain hidden from public scrutiny
to this day.9
This veil of secrecy has also hampered comparison of the event with other
notable acts of deception that attest to the role and ingenuity of such military
stratagems in the twentieth century. These include, for example, General Sir
Edmund Allenbys operations during the Palestine Campaign in World War I
(commonly known as the haversack ruse); German deception prior to
Barbarossa, 1941; British deception during the Western Desert Campaign,
194042; the man who never was affair, 1943; the double-cross system
that culminated in Fortitude and the Normandy invasion, 1944, and
the Coalitions hail-Mary manoeuvre in Desert Storm, 199091. When
compared to these glamorous operations, the seemingly lacklustre Egyptian
deception has failed to attract the attention of intelligence historians and
theoreticians, who have been, in any case, more intent on studying the

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1973 traumatic surprise from the victims perspective. They therefore

focused on Israeli errors in defensive actions, to the neglect of Egypts
offensive rationale.
One aspect of this war of wits, though, greatly whets the historians
appetite and may eventually become the smoking gun prompting a revised
evaluation of the cunning behind the Egyptian deception. For years,
intelligence veterans, followed by journalists and recently by academics,
have been involved in an argument over the reliability of the Mossad
crown jewel asset, which had regularly supplied Israel with Egyptian
operational war plans and had warned of the wars outbreak 36 hours in
advance. The argument focuses on whether he had indeed worked for Israel
or had been, in fact, an Egyptian double agent. Had he misinformed Israels
intelligence community for ve years, and thus drugged it into drowsiness
and skewed its perception? Had he delivered his warning at a time
considered by the Egyptians to be too late for an effective Israeli
operational response? Should this spy (lately claimed to be no less than
Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nassers son-in-law) indeed turn out to
be a double agent, who walked in and supplied information under
Egyptian guidance, it may very well become one of the most successful
cases of strategic deception in modern history. However, the paucity of
historical evidence necessitates that any conclusion reached with respect to
this issue be treated as pure conjecture. Therefore, the present discussion
ignores the entire affair; should the double-cross theory be substantiated in
the future, it will only add to, and in no way detract from, the Egyptian
success.10
Considering the lack of reliable evidence, it would be bold not to say
impertinent to claim to have made a detailed reconstruction of the
deception from the Egyptian perspective, especially regarding its planning,
development and execution on all its levels. Nevertheless, the existing
information is sufcient to put forward two reasonable arguments irrespective
whether the Egyptians actually planned all the aspects of the deceptions
process in advance or whether some of its success was unintentional,
resulting primarily from Israeli errors and miscalculations, to the point of
taking the Egyptians themselves by surprise.
a. On the historical level, this article argues that the Egyptian deception
was the decisive even if not exclusive factor to affect IDF readiness
and its faulty response to the specic threat on the eve of the war.
b. On the conceptual level, the article argues that the deceptions proven
success in the eld points to the methods appropriateness as a model,
worthy of doctrinal emulation in the preparation of similar deception
operations.

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The underlying assumption shared by the two arguments is that the

deception should be judged by its outcome much more than by its methods.
That is, a deception, however creative and sophisticated should be discounted (or worst, may be judged counterproductive), if it fails to achieve its
goals. Conversely, a successful deception, even if simple and primitive in
its design, is entirely laudable. Thus, the truth may eventually lie with those
who believe that deception originally played a secondary role in the Egyptian
planning and with those who contend that its fruits were less the labour of
Egyptian wisdom than of Israels self-deception. Nevertheless, all this is
insufcient in itself to measure the signicance of the lesson to be learnt: the
path taken by the Egyptians is a paradigm that initiators of deception should
embrace and against which potential victims must guard.
THE DECPTIONS OBJECTIVES

Egypt went to war in order to achieve three strategic objectives: (1) to restore
its national honour and pan-Arab prestige, forfeited in public eyes after its
military defeat and Israels capture of the Sinai Peninsula in the 1967 Six Day
War; (2) to exploit military success as a lever to end the stalemate and
revitalize the diplomatic process, which would bring international pressure on
Israel to return to the bargaining table; (3) to force Israel to soften its stubborn
stance regarding the return of the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty.11
These goals were dened by Anwar Sadat (who had inherited the Egyptian
Presidency from Gamal Abd al-Nasser in 1970) and had reached maturity by
late 1972. They replaced previous war objectives, aimed at recapturing the
Sinai Peninsula but since recognized as unobtainable. In order to achieve
the new limited objectives of what may be called a strategic compromise,
Egypt discovered it no longer needed to occupy the entire peninsula by force,
or gain control over the 4050 kilometre strip (as the crow ies) lying
between the Suez Canal on the west and the Gidi and Mitla Passes in the
mountainous ridge on the east, as previously intended. Crossing the Canal
and capturing a foothold along an expanse as narrow as 912 kilometres east
of the waterway (four inches . . . a foothold, pure and simple according to
Sadats picturesque description), was now considered sufcient. Such an
accomplishment would regain prestige on the one hand and accelerate
renewal of the political process on the other.12
For the Egyptians, these new strategic goals and operational objectives
were not, perhaps, ideal; they would undoubtedly have preferred to retake the
entire Sinai territory (up to the pre-1967 border) by their own efforts.
However, in the face of existing international, political and military constraints, an examination of which goes beyond the scope of this article, the
Egyptian president decided on a strategic compromise.

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The Egyptian army undertook a process of re-evaluation after the war of

1967, which was accelerated after the end of the War of Attrition in 1970.
This process meant that Egypts military leaders located or thought they
had located appropriate doctrinal and technological responses to almost all
of the operational and tactical strengths enjoyed by Israel Defence Forces.
This assessment was based on a rigorous Egyptian effort to identify potential
weaknesses in any future conict on the basis of past experience. This
contributed to the fact that, in the 1973 war, Egypt achieved initial military
success by means of the rectication of certain of these weaknesses. Thus, for
example, the advancement of their dense air defence system eastwards to the
Suez Canal severely limited the Israeli air forces freedom of action in the
Sinai; the development of a water jet technique for breaching the high
berms13 Israel had constructed along the canals eastern embankment
facilitated the crossing of Egyptian armour; and the reinforcement of infantry
with anti-tank missiles far above establishment provided an immediate
response to the blitz tactics used by Israeli tanks.
However, the Egyptians found neither doctrinal nor technological countermeasures to overcome two operational weaknesses that, in fact, threatened
the wars strategic objectives. The rst was a classic weak point of any
amphibious operation, namely, the failure to gain or hold a beachhead the
most critical phase of the operation. A strong Israeli defence along the eastern
bank of the Suez Canal might frustrate the crossing and prevent the capture of
bridgeheads, pushing the attackers back to the opposite bank. The second
weak point was the IDFs ability to launch a pre-emptive counteroffensive
against Egyptian forces still gathering on the west bank of the Canal during
the operations preparatory phase. Such a spoiling attack could delay or even
totally prevent the Egyptian attack.
These threats could materialize if the Israelis were to learn in advance of
the Egyptian decision to go to war and of its timing. This would allow
the Israelis to mobilize their reserve formations (the IDFs main combat
component) in time, deploy in force along the canal and react in tune with
their established security doctrine. This doctrine, intensively studied by the
Egyptians since 1967, called for the launching of a pre-emptive counteroffensive and thus rapidly transferring the battle to enemy territory before the
latter could begin its own offensive moves.14 To thwart such threats with any
efciency, it was essential to surprise the Israelis over any Egyptian decision
to go to war and the prospective date of any such war. Surprise would thus
kill two birds with one stone: slow up IDF defensive deployment and prevent
an Israeli pre-emptive strike. It was this strategic surprise that the Egyptians
sought to achieve by means of deception.
Conceptually, deception is a consciously initiated process in which the
initiator transmits false information or impressions to his victim, causing him

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(or her) to adopt or adhere to an erroneous opinion or belief and to

consequently construct an unrealistic picture of the prevailing situation.
In abiding by this illusion, the victim serves the deceivers interests.
Operationally, however, the meaning of deception goes beyond these
boundaries. Deception is not conned to xing the victims perception and
manipulating his judgement alone; it goes one step further, causing the victim
to act (or to abstain from acting) in a way that will create or reinforce his own
(actual or mental) weakness, thereby allowing the deceptions initiator to
exploit the stratagem on the practical level.
To realize deceptions mission in to do or not to do terms (rather than
instead of only to think or not to think terms), Egyptian planners were
required to cause the Israelis not to take those operational steps that, in the
formers view, would perpetuate Egyptian weaknesses or at least cause the
Israelis to tarry in taking them, a delay that would neutralize their effectiveness during the critical rst phase of the offensive. The specic Israeli
steps the Egyptian were so concerned about were the timely full mobilization
of reserves, completion of defensive deployment, and launching a preemptive counteroffensive. The message embodied in the deception was thus
meant to state that all three operational steps were utterly unnecessary.
For the message to reach its objects Israeli decision-makers and
convince them to accept its false content, it had to survive initial scrutiny by a
buffer, namely Israeli intelligence, and lull, rst and foremost, the early
warning system that was and continues to be a cornerstone of Israels national
security doctrine. Maintaining a small standing army, with most of its
strength resting on reserve forces, Israel grounds its security on four core
elements: (1) deterrence; (2) early warning (in case deterrence fails and
hostile attack is contemplated) to allow reservists to mobilize on time,
decision-makers to make decisions and the IDF to react (in other words, to
provide adequate time for an effective response to specic threats); (3) a
strong standing air force (the prime component of defence) meant to stop or
frustrate any attack, even under conditions of surprise, until arrival of reserve
formations; (4) rapid resolution of the battle by means of pre-emptive strikes
or counteroffensives that transfer the battleeld to enemy territory at the
earliest possible moment, thus compensating for Israels limited territory and
short operational breath.
Three pillars upheld this early warning structure: rst, an intelligence
collection system aimed at penetrating the enemys (i.e. Arab) intimate
decision-making circles and learning about intentions, especially the decision
to launch a war; second, a collection and analysis capacity to locate and
identify early warning indicators during a wars preparatory stages. The basic
assumption governing this rationale was that although it was possible to
conceal intentions and decisions, it was difcult if not impossible to hide

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815

preparations and unusual activity from a well-tuned intelligence collection

system; third, existence of an adequate early warning space dened as the
span of time required for intelligence to reach conclusions regarding an
impending war and raise the alarm; for the leadership to make decisions; and
for operational elements to initiate and complete counter-steps (e.g.,
mobilization, deployment, pre-emptive strike or spoiling attack). An early
warning space is considered adequate if all its components are completed
prior to the enemy attack; and inadequate if the enemy opens hostilities
before the defender completes its preparations. Therefore, creation of an
adequate early warning space is not conned to the province of intelligence
alone; it is a process that incorporates the components of intelligence,
decision-making and operations alike.15
The working assumption common to the entire Israeli security apparatus
from the early 1950s onwards postulated that the Intelligence Community
would be able to provide warnings of war early enough for the
IDF to prepare itself in timely fashion, whether for defence or offence.
Early warning and its centrality in Israels defence perception therefore
became one of the main obstacles to the Egyptian intention to surprise the
Israelis.
To minimize that threat, Egyptian planners had to narrow Israels early
warning space, thus allowing successful conclusion of what they perceived to
be the most critical phases of the operation concentration of Egyptian
forces along the west bank of Suez, crossing of the canal and establishment of
beachheads along the east bank all free of Israeli interference. Stated
differently, the Egyptians aimed to shorten the time span between the
moment that the Israelis nally realized that war was imminent and the
moment that the Egyptian army had completed establishing sufcient
bridgeheads to make any IDF response irrelevant.
CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH DECEPTION

The initial obstacle to the deceptions success was the very transition from
the state of lull that had reigned along the Suez Canal since 7 August 1970,
the date the IsraeliEgyptian ceasere agreement came into effect at the close
of the War of Attrition, to the new state of war. Such an acute change offered
the deceptions planners a basic advantage but also a disadvantage in relation
to their victim.
The deceivers advantage lies in the fact that the victims immersion in a
state-of-lull mindset interferes with his ability to psychologically adjust to the
diametrically different situation instigated by the new situation of war.
Therefore, because such a dramatic transition deviates from the orderly
functioning of the human mind, as well as from collective-organizational

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thought patterns, the capacity to recognize change and respond appropriately and in good time declines.
Without entering into a detailed discussion about cognitive bias, perceptual
deviations, or rational versus intuitional judgement, it is sufcient to note that
experience has shown that when individuals and organizations consciously
decide to avoid the initiation of change, which placed them in a passivedefensive position they exhibit two types of mental bias. Those exhibiting
loss aversion prefer continuation of the prevailing situation irrespective of
actual events. Attempts to maintain the status quo (status quo bias) therefore
steers towards mirror-image distorting, that is, a belief that the other side
inclines to the status quo too, or, at the minimum, intends to refrain from
taking any risk sufcient to introduce such meaningful change. This type of
the status quo seeker usually disregards the possibility that for the opponent,
in this case post-1967 Egypt, sustaining the current situation may entail
losses. Hence, it may well be worthwhile for the aggressor (in this case,
Egypt) to take the risks required to change the status quo or, as in the present
case, to reinstate the status quo ante bellum.16
These two biases outlined above can signicantly contribute to the success
of strategic surprise. On the intelligence level, they are likely to steer toward
interpretation of information and signals indicating undesirable changes on
the enemy side as unreliable. On the operational level, they may cause the
defender to hesitate and delay providing the required response (e.g.,
mobilization or pre-emptive attacks) from fear that such moves per se will
prompt deterioration in the status quo.
In contrast to this advantage, the disadvantage inherent in the initiators
position during the transition from lull to war rests on the fact that the process
entails noticeable, highly irregular and unavoidable activities. Under such
conditions, the risk of detection by the victim is much greater than, for
example, during a state of war or active operations, situations already
saturated with activity, which make the differentiation between regular and
irregular events quite problematic.
A marine metaphor demonstrates the distinction between the two states. In
calm seas, the smallest ripple catches the eye; in rough seas, however, even
truly threatening waves may be noticed only in the wake of comparison
their height, density and direction with all the other high waves in the
vicinity. Stated differently, the mere observation of a threats presence may
be ineffective as an indicator of that threat.
Detection of those acute changes associated with the transition from peace
(or lull) to war stood, as stated, at the core of Israels war indicators theory
and early warning doctrine. Yet analysis of the nature of the transitions
characteristics may have led the deceptions planners to the following
conclusions. First, the longer it took the Israelis to recognize the demise of

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817

the status quo and the cessation of the ceasere, the greater would be the gap
between their perceptions and the reality and, therefore, the slower would be
their response. Second, the deception should avoid the operational level of the
imminent campaign and aim at the strategic level only. This conclusion was
inevitable, as the objectives associated with operational deception (such as
misleading the victim with respect to direction, strength or time of an
offensive) were not only ill-suited to overcome the Egyptian strategic
weaknesses, they might very well exacerbate them. That is, the very talk of
any kind of military operations (irrespective of its direction, strength or date)
or intentions of war might turn out to be the single irregular wave capable of
waking the comatose IDF and triggering an Israeli reaction.
Responses to these strategic weak points were rooted in the Egyptian
ability to conceal their decision to attack more than in the attempt to deceive
the Israelis with respect to the offensives operational components. Hence,
the Egyptians forsook, apparently by conscious choice, operational deception
in favour of safeguarding their strategic objectives. Doing so reduced the risk
of transforming the deception into a double-edged sword instead of a force
multiplier. In effect, historians who have stated that the Egyptians did not
include operational deception within the arsenal employed during the war
were correct.17 However, the present study argues that instead of categorizing
this state of affairs as an outcome of the deceptions poor quality (implied by
some), the Egyptian process should in fact be lauded for avoiding this
tempting but under the specic circumstances risky track of operational
deception.
Egypts deception was strategic in nature because its message was targeted
at those Israeli national leaders responsible for decision-making regarding
actions general mobilization, full alert and combat preparedness, and
the launch of a pre-emptive counteroffensive crucial for the success of
Egyptian strategy. The deceptions message, rooted therefore in the strategic
layer, was thus crystal clear: Egypt has no intention of going to war in the
near future. Even the use of tactical deception means was employed
exclusively to support their strategic goals by transmitting an identical
message. Thus, for example, the situation was portrayed as business as
usual at every level possible, starting with the Egyptian presidents tranquil
policy declarations, and ending with groups of half-naked soldiers leisurely
shing along the Suez Canal (labelled idle bands by the Egyptians).
To convey the core message, the Egyptians employed two classic methods
identied with the logic of deception. The rst and earlier tack, apparently
nested in President Sadats decision as to the new wars objectives and
character, was meant to totally conceal the very fact of the decision, its
planning and preliminary preparations for as long as possible. Concealment
(or cover in American terminology) was particularly effective in these early

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stages: when most of the activity conducted was enacted behind closed doors,
involving a miniscule number of senior ofcials and ofcers. Nevertheless, it
was obvious that as D-day approached, activities related to the upgrading of
military capacity would accelerate and participants would grow in numbers to
the point where it would no longer be possible to hide their existence. Any
attempt to continue concealing such activity was not only doomed to failure,
it would likely boomerang and arouse the suspicions of the victim. Assuming
that such indicators would eventually attract the defenders attention, the
deceivers introduced a second method, what I call a warning denier, meant
to provide an alternative explanation for the slice of threatening reality being
slowly exposed. Such an explanation would have to be sufciently logical
for the Israelis to accept and sufciently substantive to allay any of their
suspicions.
The Egyptian deceptions rationale was, therefore, twofold. First, a
fundamental deception, lasting several months at the least, was meant,
according to testimony by Sadat and other senior ofcials, to freeze the
victims perception, specically that Egypt has still renounced the military
option, intending to sustain the diplomatic negotiations with regard to future
Israeli withdrawal.18 This was accompanied by a follow-up situational
deception, shorter in length, that by presenting a plausible explanation
aimed at eliminating any Israeli suspicion aroused by the inevitable
discrepancy between its erroneous perception (supported by the fundamental
deception) and the evolving reality once open activity had begun.19
All the methods applied contributed to the deceptions coherence: its
closely melded political, diplomatic, civil and military components, and
unied message and two-pronged cover story. The rst of these elements,
concealment of the decision to go to war and its initial preparations, was
constructed with a story conrming Egypts continuing commitment to a
political solution. So long as diplomatic talks continue, the story read, there
would be no alteration of the military stance and no deviation from the
business as usual attitude characterizing Egyptian behaviour. The second
element involved misleading the victim by relating his interpretation of any
irregular activity discovered to another story, that of an innocent, large-scale
military exercise, unworthy of concern.
The deceptions core message that war was not imminent marks it out
as a channelizing deception (or misleading-type deception, according to
Daniel and Herbigs denition), aimed at focusing the victims entire
attention on a single and false option while convincing him to deny the
plausibility of all other courses of action available to his opponent. The
Egyptians apparently preferred this method to its alternative, an ambiguityincreasing deception. The latter option necessitates that the deceiver offer
several explanations for the observed action in order to intensify the victims

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819

doubts, confront him with the horns of a dilemma and thus hinder the victims
ability to reach a decision even if he is not entirely duped. This approach does
not, however, t a situation of sharp transition from peace-like calm to actual
war, because the mere mention of armed alternatives will alert the watchdog
instead of letting him lie still.
An important advantage of channelizing deception is ability to intensify
the victims condence in the (false) messages veracity. This is accomplished by being clear, reducing uncertainty and preventing the weighing of
alternative explanations that might lead to the correct conclusion, even if by
chance. The main disadvantage of this type of deception lies in the deceivers
having to stake all on one alternative that might be rejected by the victim or,
even worse, jeopardize the real mission if exposed. Posteriori, however, it
becomes clear that the Egyptians were correct in the choice of the singular
and focused message that was so appropriate to the contemporary Israeli
mindset.20
The specic methods and means adopted by the Egyptians have been
intensively detailed in other studies, and need not be reviewed here.21 It
would be sufcient to note that throughout the entire period the Egyptians
employed all three traditional methods of deception in conjunction with each
other: misleading (by real or notional activities); concealment (acts and
communications meant to conceal the existence, identity and substance of
objects, processes and activities); and disinformation (verbal transmission of
false messages). They used a variety of physical, visual, communicational
and verbal mechanisms to take advantage of the avenues entailing political,
diplomatic, civil and military leaks. In the end, all were integrated within a
tight contexture.
No deception can succeed without employing concealment lies propagated to obscure the truth. In the summer and autumn of 1973, the
Egyptians adopted concealment apparently in order to overcome what they
considered their own knowledge gaps about the penetration of Israeli
intelligence into Egypt. The more a country lacks precise detailed and
concrete information on the success of foreign efforts in breaching its own
security, the more difcult it will be for it to completely neutralize the
specic cracks. Therefore, instead of wasting efforts to seal known Israeli
collection channels or use them to feed bogus information an ideal method
where it is possible to guarantee that all channels are controlled the
Egyptians, uncertain about the scope of Israeli coverage, chose to tread
another path. This path would potentially seal possible breaches of security,
while facilitating transmission of deceptive messages through unknown
cracks, which might not be sealed irrespective of Cairos efforts.
So, the Egyptians rst directed the deception at their own forces by
concealing the truth and feeding them the very same exercise cover story.

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The story stated that all the vast military preparations and activities were
but part of a large-scale all-arms exercise, named Tahrir [freedom] 41, in
which all military headquarters and staffs as well as a signicant proportion
of the eld armies would take part during the rst third of October 1973.
The logic behind this step was clear: the more the cover story took root
among Egyptian troops and the greater the number of individuals acting as
unwitting agents for the deception, the greater the likelihood that Israeli
intelligence sources would be convinced of the tales veracity. The latter
would then all deduce from the deceptive message that what was taking
place was an exercise, and not the launching of a war and the Israeli
intelligence community would then pass this on to decision-makers in
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.
The successful planting of such a cover story inside Egypt itself was
meant, at least in theory, to ensnare not only human sources, but likewise
thwart intelligence collection systems rst and foremost signal intelligence considered to be even more reliable by their handlers. By adopting
the tactic of an all-embracing cover story, Egypt could assume that it would
reach the headphones of Unit 848, Israels signal intelligence agency (the
central early warning component in the DMI armoury22). The Egyptians thus
had no need to establish dedicated wireless nets (more vulnerable to exposure
as fakes) for deception. Nor did they need to identify the specic communications channels thought to be monitored by the Israelis in order to
utilize them as well for the deception. Instead, the tactic adopted enabled the
spread of the false message by means of genuine, regular communication
networks, passed along by innocent and unwitting operators and users (those
few in the know, it became clear post factum, were extremely careful in the
conduct of their communications). After the war, the Egyptians claimed that
they had established, and indeed used, wireless networks for deception
purposes only, but the evidence available is, unfortunately, murky and
lacking in concrete references.
In truth, none of these measures would have been impervious to a spy
placed close to the inner circle and those privy to the secret, as was
demonstrated by the albeit belated warning conveyed by the said top agent
about the impending war (unless the warning, like its delay, were also
intentional, the argument proffered by supporters of the double agent
theory). However, considering the constraints that the Egyptians faced, such
as inadequate information on Israeli intelligences penetration and the
difculties in allocating substantial forces to the deceptive exercise, the
course of action chosen (the misleading of the enemy by concealing the truth
and planting the lie among their own people) appears the correct one. On the
eve of the war the Egyptians acted on two levels, with the majority believing
that they were involved in an exercise at the same time that they were

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preparing for war. Egyptian memoirs, the most prominent among them being
a book by the then Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Saad al-Din
Shazly, demonstrate just how few were in the know. According to Shazly, the
commanders of the Egypts Second and Third Armies were ofcially
informed about the moment of truth only ve days before D Day, divisional
commanders were enlightened only 72 hours before H hour, brigade
commanders 48 hours earlier and battalion COs only 24 to 12 hours in
advance. Egyptian POWs stated that most troops belonging to the rst assault
echelon were told they were at last heading for a real war only minutes before
they entered their rubber dinghies.23
THE DECPTIONS ABSORPTION

Israels fundamental beliefs and perceptions regarding its position vis-a`-vis

the surrounding Arab countries, as well as its concrete intelligence
assessment on the eve of 6 October 1973 (popularly called the concept
after the war), are among the most widely discussed in the literature. For our
purposes we briey summarize their essence as follows:
1. Egypt and Syria are preparing for open war in order to regain the
territories lost during the Six Day War.
2. Egypt is interested in retaking western Sinai (a territorial objective that,
as stated, was dramatically modied toward the end of 1972 without the
change being discovered by Israeli intelligence) whereas Syria wishes to
occupy the entire Golan Heights.
3. Syria is not, however, prepared go to war without Egypt, while the latter,
on its part, will refrain from initiating an armed confrontation until it has
found an appropriate response to Israeli air superiority and the ability to
threaten deep into Egyptian territory.
4. The new USAUSSR detente discourages the war option for the near
future.
5. Egypts leadership, headed by a weak and indecisive president and aware
of the countrys vulnerability and Israeli military superiority, is unwilling
to risk a premature war that Egypt is sure to lose.
The explicit intelligence assessment, conducted during the summer and
autumn of 1973 by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (the DMI was and
still is responsible for the states national intelligence assessment for war)
was unequivocal: the Arab states would not open war in the near future.24
The implicit operational conclusion also derived from the intoxication of
power syndrome experienced by Israeli society at the time and was likewise
unmistakable: even if the Arabs overestimated their power and launched a

822

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

war, they would be trounced on the battleeld and therefore fail to achieve
their goals.
Egypts deceptive message tted these basic preconceptions and ensuing
intelligence assessment like a glove, either by intention or by sheer accident,
conrming the one conclusion shared by all students of deception and
surprise: the more a deception story ts the victims perceptions and beliefs,
the more readily is the story accepted, absorbed, and acted on, courtesy of
cognitive biases, heuristic judgement and xed mindset. The misleading
message was, therefore, absorbed in Israel lock, stock and barrel during what
turned to be a critical period for both protagonists.
What, one may wonder, had occurred to the early warning system designed
to detect Arab attempts at surprise? According to accepted opinion, the
systems fail-safe mechanism was based on detection of signals that
would indicate, rst and foremost, actual changes in the capabilities and
preparedness of enemy forces, whether or not detrimental to Israel.
Recognition of such signals would almost automatically initiate operational
countermeasures, either defensive or offensive, regardless of intelligence
assessments about the other sides motives, intentions and decisions. In
theory, therefore, the very fact of detecting irregular Egyptian and Syrian
activity, detached from any interpretation, was sufcient to cause an alert and
activate operational response. In practice, however, the Israeli alarm was
heard (and even then only partially) with respect to Syria exclusively, but
total silence resounded on the Egyptian front. Some have consequently
concluded that it was not a decient early warning rationale that should be
blamed for the failure, as rst argued by practitioners and academics, but
the departure from its fundamentals, observed in the consideration of the
enemys intentions rather then his capabilities.25 However, once the evidence
is examined more closely, it becomes evident that in October 1973 the Israeli
reaction was not a deviation from doctrine at all. Contrary to the accepted
beliefs and educated theories, ever since the Sinai Campaign (1956) and
perhaps even earlier, Israels early warning system, incorporating intelligence
and operational components, has been in effect based on assessments (or
knowledge) of the enemys intentions and decisions not less, and sometimes
more, than his capabilities, readiness and preparedness.26
Considered from this stance, the Yom Kippur War was no different. This
may explain why the early warning system failed to discover the truth despite
the many capability signals it detected. It thus appears that the deception
story was able to manipulate the one element that, again contrary to accepted
views, turned out to be most inuential in completing the intelligence puzzle:
assessment of the enemys intention. By placing the Tahrir 41 exercise on a
fallacious footing Egyptian willingness to continue the political process
and explaining any irregular activity as an exercise, the Egyptians managed

THE EGYPTIAN DECEPTION AND THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

823

to deactivate Israels capacity to comprehend the signicance of activity and

events that could no longer be concealed and, once detected, should be
treated as warning signals. They thus coaxed the victim into adopting a
soothing interpretation that was completely swallowed, as it so beautifully
harmonized with the existing assessment.
Intelligence reports regarding the exercise began to arrive in Israel on 25
September 1973, 11 days before the wars outbreak. A Special Intelligence
Summary, disseminated by the DMIs Production and Assessment Division
ve days later, clearly demonstrates the impact of the process:
Between 17 October, a large-scale joint staff exercise on the
occupation of Sinai is going to take place . . . Because of the exercise
the state of alert will be raised (as of 1 October) to the highest in the air
force, and all the units, which are to participate in the exercise, and all
leaves will be cancelled. As noted, it was reported of the advance of a
division from Cairo to the Canal Zone, with additional reports on [other
movements] . . . The information about the expected exercise and the
call of reserve soldiers for limited time, implies, therefore, that the
advancement of forces and additional preparations that are underway or
will be done in coming days, such as completion of fortications,
mobilization of civilian shing boats, and check of state of readiness of
units, which, at rst sight, can be seen as alert signals, are, in actuality
solely connected to the exercise.27
A day later, the Daily Intelligence Summary stated that the joint command
exercise has begun and connected the highest level of alert within the entire
Egyptian armed forces as well as mobilization of reservists to the exercise.28
A reading of intelligence summaries and meeting protocols at the decisionmaking level, since made public, demonstrates that from that very moment
the exercise cover story starred as the ultimate explanation, thus serving to
nullify the true signicance of all the early warning signals that had in fact
been detected. Even more, this tranquillising interpretation about Egyptian
intentions affected the IDFs reading of what was happening in the Syrian
boarder. That is to say notwithstanding the alarming signals recognized as
coming from Syria, no large-scale offensive is to be expected from Damascus
either, as the Syrians will not go to war without the Egyptians and Cairo is
currently busy only with its preparations for an exercise.
Had the exercise explanation appeared rst only in September 1973, in all
likelihood it would not have been so readily accepted, even given the
concept. After all, experience had shown that untested channels of
information, especially qualitative ones, or messages arriving out of the blue
arouse scepticism, if not suspicion, and are often rejected by the victim as

824

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

unveried, unreliable or false. Moreover, the Director of Military Intelligence

and his senior staff had duly noted the Soviet use of an exercise cover story
within the Maskirovka they conducted prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. They also noted that going to war from a peacetime exercise
was rooted in Soviet doctrine, adopted by the Arab armies. The DMI thus
issued a warning as early as 1970 that the Arabs might launch a sudden attack
under a similar pretext.29 However, in 1973 the exercise explanation did not
appear out of nowhere because over the six years preceding the war the
Egyptian army had repeatedly conducted similar exercises. Time and again,
Israeli intelligence had learned that the irregular Egyptian military activity
observed and treated with alarm at rst was actually simple preparations for
these exercises. At that time the DMI was perfectly on the mark as the series
of genuine exercises (under a similar name: Tahrir a consecutive uneven
number, such as Tahrir 13, 15 . . . 33, 35, etc.) conducted from 1968 onwards,
had nothing to do with deception or accustomization. Only as the war
approached, probably in mid-1973, did Egypt decide to take advantage of this
established pattern to the benet of deception.
Just how great was the inuence of the bogus exercise on the Israeli
decision-makers? And how much did the deception, even if indirectly,
contribute to the Israeli surprise? Answers to these questions can be
suggested following a comparison of the positions taken by the leadership in
SeptemberOctober on the one hand and during a previous alert in April
May 1973 on the other, when information was received (and not for the rst
time) about imminent Egyptian intentions to go to war. Despite the lower
volume of early warning signals received in April and their weaker intensity,
no reassuring explanation was then forwarded. Contrary to the belittling of
the DMIs stance, the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General David
Elazar and the Minister of Defence, Moshe Dayan, took the April reports and
the early warning signals much more seriously than they did in October, as
shown by the IDFs decision to take several steps to improve readiness and
increase preparedness.30
Proof of the paralyzing effect of the assuaging explanation appears in the
DMIs assessment about the frantic evacuation of Soviet advisers families
from Egypt and Syria. The Soviet airlift was rst observed on the night
between 4 and 5 October. For the rst time, intelligence analysts were
required to contend with a clear strategic early warning signal that appeared
totally divorced from the exercise. Also, for the rst time, the Director of
Military Intelligence, Major General Eli Zeira, informed his superiors that he
had no logical explanation for the hasty Soviet move and even proposed the
idea (immediately withdrawn) that this evacuation indicated an impending
war.31 Unfortunately for the Israelis the event, as an isolated piece of
information, arrived too late to shake the conceptual outcome of the lethal

THE EGYPTIAN DECEPTION AND THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

825

combination of xed mindset and deceptive messages, both accepted as real.

Nevertheless, the DMIs treatment of this episode indicated a more
inquisitive trend in assessing warning signals lacking calming explanation,
even given cognitive dissonance. Had there not been an easy albeit
misleading answer readily available, the Soviet evacuation might have
stimulated attempts to overcome the so-called concept in time, causing
decision-makers, though perhaps not intelligence analysts, to question its
validity (which they eventually did on 5 October, when the alarm signals
inexplicably multiplied).
CONCLUSION

The Egyptian deceptions objectives did not require it to continue beyond

H-hour. Therefore, the deception completed its role with the opening
shots of the Bader operation on the early afternoon of Saturday, 6 October
1973.
Were this deception to stand its main test, it would be that of the outcome.
The deception undoubtedly was among the fundamental generators of the
Israeli surprise (on the relative weight of these generators, a good deal of ink
has yet to be spilt). Although deception did not create the faulty concept
(unless, as said, the double agent theory is substantiated), it no doubt
reinforced it. The greatest benet for Egypt of the deception was retardation
of any cognitive transformation among Israeli decision-makers. In consequence, the IDFs military response was delayed to a date that was, by itself,
irrelevant to Egypts war aims.
The Egyptians succeeded in achieving the deceptions three goals:
(1) reduction of Israels early warning space; (2) a delay in decision-making
by the Israeli leadership; (3) a delay of IDF operational responses in the eld.
Although the available information is far from complete, it would not be too
far-fetched to conclude that had deception not been in force, it is highly
probable that decision-makers would have questioned the validity of the
intelligence assessment at an earlier date. This conclusion would probably
hold even if DMI analysts had held fast to their basic assessment until the last
moment (as some in fact actually did). At that point they might have decided
that the possible risk was much too high not to react, as they indeed had
decided in AprilMay 1973. In reality, they did question the concepts
validity, but only hours before the sirens began wailing.
The Egyptian deception on the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur War thus
provides an excellent example for planners of strategic deception operation,
because its success can be attributed to it being unpretentious, sober, realistic
and synchronized with its environment. Whether intentionally or accidentally, the Egyptians were able to select a deceptive path that narrowed the

826

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

magnitude of their own weaknesses on the one hand, while intensifying

Israeli weaknesses on the other.
Even if the debate over who deserves a larger portion of the credit the
Egyptian deception planners or the Israeli followers of their own selfdeception remains unresolved, the methodological-doctrinal lesson to be
learned remains the same: the rationale framing the Egyptian deception is a
highly appropriate model for the conduct of other strategic deceptions in the
future.

NOTES
1 An earlier version of this article was published in Hebrew in: Haggai Golan and Shaul Shai
(eds.), milhama ha-yom: hikrai milhemet yom ha-kipurim [War Today: Yom Kippur War
Studies] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot 2003) pp.15372.
2 Most studies on the 1973 war are in Hebrew or Arabic only. Those which specically
examine the Egyptian deception will be referred to individually in the relevant notes below.
The most comprehensive and updated academic study on Israeli intelligence and the war is
Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources
(New York: State University of New York Press 2005). Overview of the wars military
aspects in English include: Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973 (Tel Aviv:
University Publications Project 1974); Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1975); Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The ArabIsraeli Wars,
19471974 (New York: Harper & Row 1978); Hanoch Bartov, Dado. 48 Years and 20 Days
(Tel Aviv: Maariv Books 1981); Donald Neff, Warriors Against Israel (Battleford: Amana
Books 1988); John Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders (London: Robinson 1999);
P.R. Kumaraswamy (ed.), Revisiting the Yom Kippurim War (London: Frank Cass 2000);
Kenneth Pollack, Arabs and War: Military Effectiveness, 19481991 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press 2002); Howard Blum, The Eve of Destruction: The Untold Story of the Yom
Kippur War (New York: HarperCollins 2003).
3 Eli Zeira, milhemet yom kippur: mitos mul metsiut [The October 73 War: Myth against
Reality] (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot 1993) p.126 (in Hebrew). Zeira served as Director of
Military Intelligence, IDF between 1972 and 1974.
4 Bar-Joseph, The Watchman (note 2) p.31.
5 The two main opponents in this debate are the late Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat and the
then Egyptian Chief of Staff, General al-Shazli. See Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity: An
Autobiography (New York: Harper & Row 1977) and Saad el Shazli, The Crossing of the
Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research 1980).
6 Main Egyptian sources on the deception, translated into English are: Hasan el-Badri et al.,
The Ramadan War, 1973 (New York: Hippocrene Books 1978) pp.4552; Mohamed Heikal,
The Road to Ramadan (Glasgow: Fontana 1976) pp.1415ff; Sadat, In Search of Identity
(note 5) pp.2414; Shazli, Crossing of the Suez (note 5) pp.323, 20211; Mohamed
Mohamed Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy, The October War: Memories of Field Marshal Gamasy of
Egypt (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press 1993) pp.192202.
7 For example, see Zvi Lanir, ha-haftaa ha-besisit: modiin be-mashber [Fundamental
Surprise: The National Intelligence Crisis] (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad 1983) p.81
(in Hebrew); Bar-Joseph, The Watchman (note 2) p.25.
8 Israeli Government, State Inquiry Commission, The Yom Kippur War, Additional Partial
Report: Reasoning and Completion to the Partial Report of 1 April 1974 (Jerusalem: GPO
1974), Vol. I, pp.11423 (in Hebrew).
9 Director of the IDF Archives, to the author, 15 April 2001. During the nal proof-reading of
this article (September 2006), the IDF Archives announced that the Agranat Report has been
released in full and would be available to readers from October onwards.

THE EGYPTIAN DECEPTION AND THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

827

10 On the agent, his contribution and possible identity: Ahron Bregman, A History of Israel
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) pp.1428, 15052; Ronen Bregman and Gil Meltzer,
zeman emet: milhemet yom kippur [Moment of Truth: The Yom Kippur war] (Tel Aviv:
Yedioth Ahronot 2003) pp.413ff. (in Hebrew); Zeira, milhemet yom kippur (note 3) pp.119
25; Bar-Joseph, The Watchman (note 2) pp.56, 4951ff; Haaretz [Israeli daily], 17 and 24
January 2003, 29 and 30 September, 9 and 13 October 2004.
11 Dani Asher, li-shebor et ha-konseptsiyah [Breaking the Concept] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot
2003) p.69 (in Hebrew). The book examines the Egyptian perception of the 1973 war. Also:
Yossef Katarivas, Tsat ha-bitahon shel yisrael be-ene medinot arav [The Arab States
Perception of the Israeli Security Doctrine] (in Hebrew), in Golan and Shai, milhama
ha-yom (note 1) pp.949.
12 Sadat, In Search of Identity (note 5) p.244.
13 Military term for an articial barrier made from earth.
14 For example: Egyptian War Ofce, Military Intelligence Directorate, Information
Branch, Periodical Intelligence Summary, No. 45: Israel (July 1973) pp.1819 (in Arabic).
In authors possession.
15 For a discussion of the essence of early warning se: Efraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The
Victims Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard UP 1988) pp.784; with respect to the Israeli
concept of early warning see: Yigal Sheffy, Our First Line of Defense: Intelligence and the
Israeli National Security Perception, in Lars Christian Jenssen and Olav Riste (eds.),
Intelligence in the Cold War: Organisation, Role and International Cooperation (Oslo:
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 2001) pp.87102.
16 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk in Paul Moser (ed.) Rationality in Action: Contemporary Approaches (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1990) pp.14070; Jack levy, Prospect Theory and the
Cognitive-related Debate in Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz (eds.) Decision Making on
War and Peace: the Cognitive-Rational Debate (Boulder: Westview 1997) pp.349; Richard
Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency 1999) part 3.
17 Asher, li-shebor et ha-konseptsiyah (note 11) p.146.
18 Sadat, In Search of Identity (note 5) p.244.
19 The author has adopted the conceptual framework of fundamental surprise and
situational surprise proposed by Zvi Lanir with respect to the victims perspective. See:
Lanir ha-haftaa ha-besisit (note 7) pp.4047.
20 On the theoretical characteristics of the two methods see: Donald Daniel and Katherine
Herbig, Propositions on Military Deception, The Journal of Strategic Studies 5/1 (1982)
pp.1579.
21 Egyptian deceptions methods and means are discussed in the following publications: Aharon
Zeevi, tochnit ha-honaah ha-mitsryyt [The Egyptian Deception Plan] in Zvi Ofer and Avi
Kober (eds.) modiin u-bitachon leumi [Intelligence and National Security] (Tel Aviv:
Maarachot 1987) pp.4318; idem, hebetim mediniyim be-tochnit ha-mitsryyt le-honaah
be-milhemet yom ha-kipurim [Political Aspects of the Egyptian Deception Plan in the
Yom Kippur War], Maarachot 338 (1994) pp.49; Shmuel Bar, milhemet yom ha-kipurim
be-ene ha-aravim [The Yom Kippur War in the Eyes of the Arabs] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot 1986)
pp.3842; Asher, li-shebor et ha-konseptsiyah (note 11) pp.14654 (all in Hebrew); Michael
Handel, Perception. Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War (Jerusalem:
Leonard Davies Institute, Hebrew University 1976); John Amos, Deception and the 1973
Middle East War in Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig (eds.) Strategic Military Deception
(New York: Pergamon Press 1982) pp.31734; Janice Gross Stein, Military Deception,
Strategic Surprise and Analysis of Egypt and Israel 19711973 in John Gooch and Amos
Perlmutter, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise (London: Frank Cass 1982) pp.94121;
Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York:
Vintage Books 1991) pp.95131; Bar-Joseph, The Watchman (note 2) pp.2530.
22 Yoel Ben-Porat, neila [Locked-on] (Ramat Hashron: Idanim 1991) (in Hebrew). Brigadier
General (ret.) Ben-Porat was Unit 848s commander in the war. Quotation taken from the
books jacket.

828

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

23 Shazli, Crossing of the Suez (note 5) p.211; Zeevi, tochnit ha-honaah ha-mitsryyt (note 20)
pp.4345; Herzog, War of Atonement (note 2) p.39.
24 State Inquiry Commission, The Yom Kippur War (note 8) pp.6067.
25 For example, Yisrael Tal, ha-hatraah ke-markiv be-tsat ha-bitahon shel yisrael [Early
Warning as an Element in the Israeli Security Concept], Hamanit 12 (1987) pp.67
(in Hebrew). Major General Tal was Deputy Chief of the General Staff in the 1973 war.
26 Yigal Sheffy, tsat ha-hatraah shel yisrael, 19571973 [Israeli Early Warning Perception,
19571973], work in progress (in Hebrew).
27 Quoted in Bar-Joseph, The Watchman (note 2) p.97 (emphasis added).
28 Quoted in Arie Braun, Moshe Dayan be-milhemet yon ha-kipurim [Moshe Dayan and the
Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Edanim 1993) p.48 (in Hebrew).
29 Private knowledge.
30 Bartov, Dado. 48 Years and 20 Days (note 2) pp.198202.
31 State Inquiry Commission, The Yom Kippur War (note 8) pp.7880.