THIRD DIVISION

SPOUSES ARLEEN and LORNA A.M. No. RTJ-07-2050

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2563-RTJ)
OLIVEROS,
Complainants,
Present:
- versus -

HONORABLE DIONISIO C.
SISON, Acting Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 74,
Antipolo City,
Respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 27, 2007

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

This administrative case stems from a verified complaint [1] filed by spouses
Arleen and Lorna Oliveros and received by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) on November 15, 2006 charging Judge Dionisio C. Sison, Acting Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 74, with Grave
Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, and Gross Ignorance of the Law.
The Oliveros spouses filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Deed with
Damages and Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
against spouses John and Susana Mallett before the Antipolo City RTC. The

subject of the case is a parcel of land located at No. 25 Gen. Luna

St., Antipolo City.
In an Order[2] dated July 13, 2006, respondent Judge denied complainants
prayer for a TRO and preliminary injunction for lack of merit, thus:
The plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence to prove their allegation that the Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by plaintiffs father Mario C. Oliveros in favor of the
private defendants is a falsified document or that the sale was simulated.
Moreover, the subject property is titled in the names of the private defendants.
Indubitably, the alleged long physical possession of the subject property by the
plaintiffs cannot prevail over the clear title of the private defendants as far as the
question of ownership is concerned. Consequently, there are no rights or interests
to be protected or preserved during the pendency of the instant case. A writ of
preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be resorted
to by a litigant to protect or preserve the rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the action. It should only be granted if the party
asking for it is clearly entitled thereto.[3]

A few days later, the defendants filed a motion for the issuance of a TRO
and/or preliminary injunction against complainants, to prevent the latter from
occupying or entering the property. The motion was granted.[4]
Complainants then filed a motion for reconsideration. While waiting for the
ruling on their motion for reconsideration, complainants filed an ex-parte motion
for the judges voluntary inhibition,[5] as they were convinced that Judge Sison was
partial to the defendants. Complainants also allege that on October 3, 2006, while
they were securing certified copies of documents in their case, they saw Fulgencio
Oliveros, brother of defendant Susana Mallett, come out of Judge Sisons private
chambers.
On the same day, respondent Judge issued an Order [6] denying the motion for
reconsideration and the motion for voluntary inhibition.
Complainants then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
on October 18, 2006. On the same day, defendants paid the P100,000.00 injunction
bond. Judge Sison approved the bond and ordered the issuance of the writ of
injunction on October 23, 2006.[7]

On November 8, 2006, defendant Susana Mallett filed a Motion to Cite

Plaintiffs in Contempt.[8] She alleged that despite the courts order, complainants
continue to ingress, egress and occupy the property. Moreover, Susana alleged
that the plaintiffs acts of harassing, vexing, and annoying her had become worse
as there were more wastes being dumped on the premises, the karaoke sessions of
the plaintiffs and their friends had become more frequent during unholy hours, and
the threats of bodily harm had become more serious.
Complainants claim that they did not receive a copy of the motion, and
consequently, did not appear at the hearing on the motion on November 13, 2006.
[9]
This notwithstanding, Judge Sison considered the matter submitted for
resolution, and on the same day issued an Order,[10] the pertinent portions of which
read:
After going over the allegations in the instant motion, this Court finds that
indeed the act of plaintiffs in continuously entering/occupying the subject
premises despite the courts lawful Order dated August 16, 2006, constitutes an
indirect contempt which is defined under Section 3, Rule 71 and penalized under
Section 7, Rule 71 of the [R]ules of [C]ourt. In view thereof, the plaintiffs for
their failure to stop entering/occupying the subject property are hereby adjudged
guilty of indirect contempt and imposed the penalty of imprisonment for a
maximum period of six (6) month[s] against them.
In order to implement the penalty of imprisonment against the plaintiffs
for being guilty of indirect contempt, let a warrant of arrest be immediately issued
against them.
SO ORDERED.

Two days later, on November 15, 2006, the Oliveros spouses filed the
verified complaint under consideration. They argue that respondent Judge
manifested bias and partiality in granting defendants prayer for TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction. They also assert that they should not have been cited for
indirect contempt because defendants should have filed a separate petition for
indirect contempt and paid the docket fees thereon. The respondent Judge should
not have entertained the motion and set the same for hearing.

In an Indorsement Letter[11] dated December 14, 2006, Court Administrator

Christopher O. Lock referred the complaint to Judge Sison for comment. In his
Comment[12]dated January 15, 2007, Judge Sison refuted the charges and prayed
that the complaint against him be dismissed. He attached a copy of the
Order[13] dated July 13, 2006 in which he denied the complainants prayer for a
TRO and writ of preliminary injunction pointing out that the same sets out clearly
all the legal bases for the Order. Judge Sison further asserted that Fulgencio
Oliveros entry into his chambers was not on his invitation. He cited separate
instances when Carolyn Alvaran, sister of complainant Lorna and an employee of
the Antipolo RTC, Branch 71, and a sister of complainant Arleen, came into his
chambers to convince him to resolve the motions in favor of complainants. He said
all of them went to his chambers uninvited.
As to his Order finding complainants guilty of indirect contempt, he
disagreed that the charges should have been filed as a separate and independent
petition because that would be favoring multiplicity of suits. He averred that
complainants remedy is an appeal and not the filing of an administrative complaint
against him.
After a review of the complaint and respondent Judges comment, the OCA
submitted its evaluation and recommendation.[14] The OCA found no basis to hold
respondent Judge administratively liable for Grave Abuse of Authority and Gross
Misconduct. There is no proof that he invited Fulgencio Oliveros and Carolyn
Alvaran inside his chambers.[15]
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, the OCA found, as to the
issuance of a TRO and the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction:
It is an established rule in administrative cases that complainant bears
the onus of establishing or proving the averments in his complaint by substantial
evidence. (Fr. Michael Sinnot, et al. v Judge Recaredo P. Barte, 372 SCRA 282)
In the instant case, no evidence was presented to show that the acts of respondent
Judge in the exercise of his judicial functions were committed in bad faith, malice
or ill will.
Thus, anent the alleged erroneous decision of the respondent Judge, it is
the considered view of this Office that the contention of the complainant cannot
be given credence considering that such is judicial in nature. Moreover, a Petition

for Certiorari questioning the assailed order is now pending before the Court of
Appeals.[16]

However, relative to the Order finding complainants in indirect contempt of

court, the OCA said:
In the instant case, there is no question that the defiance of complainants
to the lawful order of the court issued by respondent Judge constitutes indirect
contempt. However, as can be gleaned from the records of the case, movant
initiated the indirect contempt proceedings through a motion instead of a verified
petition as required under Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Rule 71,
Section 4 provides that except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu
proprio, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full
compliance of the requirements for initiatory pleading.
Hence, respondent Judge completely disregarded the basic procedural law.
Notwithstanding the mistake of movant in filing a charge for indirect contempt by
mere motion, respondent Judge gave due course to it, set the motion [for] hearing
and ordered the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest implementing the penalty of six
months imprisonment.[17]

Thus, the OCA recommended that (a) the instant case be REDOCKETED as
a regular administrative matter; and (b) respondent Judge be FINED in the amount
ofP10,000.00.[18]
We agree with the OCA.
Since complainants have already brought the matter of Judge Sisons Order
granting defendants prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction to the CA on a
petition forcertiorari, we cannot as yet rule on the propriety of such Order. Any
inquiry into the judges administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be
made only after other available remedies have been settled.[19]
As to the Order citing complainants for indirect contempt, while we are
disposed to accept Judge Sisons good faith in issuing the same, we have already
held in the past that good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment and does not apply where the
issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be

beyond permissible margins of error.[20] When the law is so elementary, not to

know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[21]
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure explicitly sets out the
requirements for instituting a complaint for indirect contempt. Section 4 thereof
states:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect
contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt
was committed by an order or any formal charge requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced
by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal
action pending in court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but
said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the
court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and
the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (emphasis supplied)

This provision is couched in plain and simple language. The procedure

prescribed therein is clear and unmistakable. The defendants motion obviously
does not conform with this Rule; accordingly, it should not have been entertained
and the warrant of arrest should never have been issued. The argument that filing
the contempt charge as a separate and independent petition would favor
multiplicity of suits is too lame an excuse for violating the Rules.
Moreover, complainants should have been given the opportunity to be heard
and to defend themselves against the contempt charge, involving as it does such a
dire consequence as imprisonment for six months. The Court notes that the motion
to cite complainants in indirect contempt was set for hearing on November 13,
2006, that complainants did not appear (because they allegedly never received a
copy of the motion or any notice of hearing), that the matter was deemed
submitted for resolution, and that on the same day an Order granting the motion
and directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the complainants was

issued. The undue haste in disposing of this procedurally infirm motion deprived
complainants of one of mans most fundamental rights, the right to be heard.
These circumstances amply overcome the presumption of good faith that
Judge Sison enjoys in his favor.
Under the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law or procedure
constitutes a serious charge.[22] However, we find the OCAs recommendation of
a P10,000.00 fine appropriate.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we find respondent Judge
Dionisio C. Sison GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and impose on him
a FINE of P10,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

[1]

[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]

[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]

Rollo, pp. 7-9.

Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 15-18.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 26-29.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31-33.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 1-5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Caguioa v. Lavia, 398 Phil. 845, 854 (2000).
Poso v. Mijares, 436 Phil. 295, 314 (2002).

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

[21]

Espaol v. Mupas, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1358, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 14, 44, citing Ricafort v.
Judge Gonzales, 437 SCRA 549 (2004). See also DBP v. Judge Llanes, Jr., 334 Phil. 186, 196 (1997).
[22]
Rules of Court, Rule 140, Section 8(9).

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

OFFICE OF THE COURT

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2022

ADMINISTRATOR,
Complainant,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, JJ.

JUDGE REYNALDO M. ALON,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 40,
Silay City,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

June 27, 2007

x-------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Before the Court is an administrative charge against Judge

Reynaldo M. Alon (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
40, Silay City for Gross Misconduct and Gross Negligence.
The present administrative case is an offshoot of the
administrative complaint of Lina Lim Tan against Homero L.
Robles, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 69, Silay City and docketed as A.M.
OCA IPI No. 01-1167-P.
In its Resolution of July 1, 2002, the Court referred the said
administrative complaint to respondent for investigation, report,
and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the
records. Respondent submitted his investigation, report, and
recommendation on May 13, 2005 or almost three years from the
date of the Resolution requiring him to do so. The Court directed
respondent to explain the unreasonable delay in rendering his
report.

Explaining the delay in the submission of his report,

respondent avers that he has not given much thought about the
case and among several causes of such delay was his being
replaced as executive judge in 2003 and being re-appointed only
in April 2005, in addition to his tasks as judge designate of Branch
63, La Carlota City.
The Court, in its Resolution in A.M. OCA IPI No. 01-1167-P
dated September 13, 2006 resolved, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the complaint against Homero L. Robles, Sheriff
IV, RTC, Branch 69, Silay City is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Judge Reynaldo M. Alon, is DIRECTED to show cause within ten

(10) days from receipt hereof, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with for Gross Misconduct and Gross Negligence. Let the case against
Judge Alon be given a regular administrative docket number and raffled
for assignment.[1]

In his Compliance dated October 11, 2006, respondent

avers: He had been in the service for 31 years. The delay in the
disposition of the administrative case was not done on purpose
but by reason of the delay on the part of the complaining party
who requested that the same be held in abeyance until such time
as the affidavit of retraction shall have been available. He admits
that he failed to submit a partial report to the Honorable Court
about the status of the case. Upon discovery of the fact that the
original record of the administrative case was misplaced, he went
out of his way and took pains to locate the same and even
reconstituted the documents just to comply with the requirement

of the Honorable Court. The RTC of Silay has two branches,

Branch 40 and Branch 69, and one Administrative Office of the
Clerk of Court with only three rooms inclusive of the court rooms
and staff room. The court personnel from the two branches and
the staff of the OCC commonly occupy the room where court
records are usually filed. There is therefore the possibility that
said rollo might have been misplaced unintentionally. Having in
mind his duty to swiftly dispose cases referred to him, he
immediately prepared his report and proper documentations after
the affidavit of retraction was executed. The delay in the
submission of the original records was not intentional on his
part. It was a result of some facts not attributable to him, not
only by reason of the loss of the original records, but more
importantly, the delay of the parties to the case who failed to
submit their persons for investigation until such time as the
affidavit of retraction shall have been filed. He could not possibly
ignore all directives of this Honorable Court. He had religiously
complied with all orders and directives of this Honorable Court to
the best of his ability and in utter respect of the Rules of Law. Not
even for a single time did he neglect his duty as a judge.
We find respondents explanation unacceptable.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct, provides that
a judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that any delay
in the rendition of judgments diminishes our peoples faith in the
judiciary. If, for some valid reason, a judge cannot comply with

the required deadline, he should seek an extension to avoid

administrative sanctions.[2] In this case, respondent admitted his
failure to submit a partial report on the status of the
case. Moreover, he failed to ask for any extension within which to
submit
his
investigation,
report
and
recommendation. Records show that the administrative case was
forwarded to respondent on July 1, 2002 with specific instruction
to submit his investigation, report, and recommendation within 60
days from receipt of the same. However, respondent submitted
his investigation, report and recommendation only on May 13,
2005 or almost three years after the same had been assigned to
him and after the OCA required him to submit a status report
on April 12, 2005.
Respondents asseveration that the delay in the disposition
of the administrative case was due to the request of the
complainant that the investigation be held in abeyance until the
affidavit
of
retraction
shall
have
been
filed,
is
untenable. Respondent should have known that an affidavit of
desistance does not operate to divest this Court of jurisdiction to
determine the truth behind the matter stated in the complaint.
[3]
The Courts disciplinary authority cannot be dependent on or
frustrated by private arrangements between parties. An
administrative complaint against an official or employee of the
judiciary cannot simply be withdrawn by a complainant who
suddenly claims a change of mind. [4] Respondent should have,
therefore, met the issue head-on without any further delay. The
delay of almost three years in the submission of his report and
recommendation clearly shows that respondent was remiss in his
obligation to act promptly and expeditiously on his official duties.

As for the loss of the original records of the case, the Court
held
in Bernardo
v. Fabros,[5] citing Office
of
the
Court
Administrator v. Villanueva,[6] to wit:
A judge x x x is expected to keep his own record of cases so
that he may act on them promptly without undue delay. It is
incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system
in his court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and
their speedy disposition. x x x Proper and efficient court management
is as much his responsibility. He is the one directly responsible for the
proper discharge of his official functions. [7]

Judges are charged with exercising extra care in ensuring

that the records of the cases and official documents in their
custody are intact. They must adopt a system of record
management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business. [8] There is no
justification for missing records, save fortuitous events. [9] The loss
of records in his office indicates gross negligence on his part. [10]
We find respondent judge administratively liable for gross
negligence in misplacing the records of the case for his
investigation, report, and recommendation. It is of no moment
that respondent reconstituted the records of the case just to
comply with the requirement of the Court because it is his duty to
ensure that records of such nature be properly kept and disposed
of promptly and expeditiously, bearing in mind that the Court
prescribed a 60-day period within which to comply; and absent
any request for an extension, the investigation, report, and

recommendation must be submitted on time together with the

original records of the case. It was bad enough that respondent
failed to submit his investigation, report, and recommendation
within the prescribed period, but to also lose the records of the
case is unjustifiable.
As administrative officers of the courts, judges should
organize and supervise court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, as well as the observance of high
standards of public service and fidelity at all times. [11] Respondent
should have adopted a system of records management, so that
files are kept intact despite the cramped situation in Branches 40
and 69, and failure to do so makes him administratively liable for
infidelity in the custody of official documents. There are cases on
record where court personnel like the clerk of court have been
called to task and penalized for their failure to safely keep court
records.[12] Judges should be no exception.
Judges are called upon to comply with the directives of the
OCA, which is mandated to assist this Court in the exercise of its
power of administrative supervision over all courts. [13] When the
judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is
sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages
disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary itself.[14]
In Tugot v. Coliflores,[15] the Court found respondent judge
guilty of negligence and violation of a Supreme Court Rule and
imposed a fine of P20,000.00. Likewise, inImbang v. Del Rosario,

the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Supreme Court

directives and was fined P21,000.00.
[16]

Respondent's gross negligence and violation of a Supreme

Court Rule and directive are less serious charges that may be
sanctioned by suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months,
or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
[17]

As this is respondents first offense of this nature and taking

into account his 31 years of service in the judiciary, the penalty of
fine in the amount of P10,000.00 is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Reynaldo M. Alon of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Silay City GUILTY of gross
negligence and violation of a Supreme Court Rule and directive,
for which he is FINED P10,000.00, with stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice

[1]

Rollo, p. 5.

[2]

Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1737, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 1,
3.

[3]

Go v. Achas, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1564, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 189, 196.

[4]

Id.

[5]

366 Phil. 485 (1999).

[6]

344 Phil. 677 (1997).

[7]

Id. at 683.

[8]

Jacinto v. Layosa, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1743, July 11, 2006, 494 SCRA 456, 465.

[9]

Id..

[10]

Tolentino v. Cabral, 385 Phil. 631, 648 (2000).

[11]

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.09.

[12]

Office of the Court Administrator v. Carriedo, A.M. No. P-04-1921, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 443,
446; Legaspi, Jr. v. Montero III, A.M. No. P-05-1986, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 137, 143.

[13]

P.D. No. 828, Creating the Office of the Court Administrator in the Supreme Court and Providing
Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes, November 18, 1975.

[14]

Dela Cruz v. Vallarta, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1531, March 6, 2007.

[15]

467 Phil. 391, 403 (2004).

[16]

A.M. No. 03-1515-MTJ, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 79, 86.

[17]

RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, Sec. 11(b).

FIRST DIVISION
ATTY. REX G. RICO,
Complainant,

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1822

Present:

-versus-

JUDGE ANASTACIO C. RUFON

(RTC, Bacolod City, Branch 51),
Respondent.

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
June 25, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This case involves a Complaint dated January 6, 2003, filed by Atty. Rex G.
Rico charging respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon, Acting Presiding Judge, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Bacolod City with gross ignorance of the law,
incompetence and violations of the Code of the Judicial Conduct, particularly
Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02; Canon 2, Rule 2.01; and Canon 3, Rules 3.01 and
3.02.
The complainant alleged that:
1.

He was the counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 32482 entitled
Dos Amigos Branch IV, Teodoro Ko and Carmelina B. Suplido vs.
Rachel J. Akol pending before RTC, Branch 155, Pasig City. In the
decision dated April 26, 1983, the Pasig court decided in favor of the
plaintiffs. Defendant Rachel Akol appealed the case but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision. Some of the properties in the name of
Claudio Akol as spouse of Rachel Akol which were located in Bacolod
City where thereafter levied in execution by the Bacolod City Sheriff who
annotated a Notice of Embargo dated May 16, 1989 on the TCTs;

2.

On June 7, 2000, as counsel for the plaintiffs, he filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution with RTC, Branch 155, Pasig City. The
motion was granted and the Branch Sheriff of Bacolod City was directed
to implement the writ of execution on the properties of defendant Akol
in Bacolod City;

3.

On September 7, 2000, Claudio G. Akol, Jr., filed a petition for

Cancellation of Notice of Embargo (CAD Case No. 00-1204) at the RTC,
Branch 51, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental presided over by Judge
Anastacio C. Rufon in an acting capacity. In an Order dated October 27,
2000, Judge Rufon granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of the
Notice of Embargo on the ground of prescription;

4.

On the other hand, the RTC, Branch 155, Pasig City issued an Order
dated November 29, 2000 holding in abeyance the enforcement of the writ
of execution. It was only on January 2, 2001 that the said court directed
the implementation of the writ;

5.

Subsequently, Judge Rufon issued another Order dated March 21, 2001
directing the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to comply with his
October 27, 2000 Order by canceling the Notice of Embargo on the
TCTs. On April 25, 2001, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch
51, Bacolod City issued a Certification that the court Order dated March
21, 2001 had become the final and executory.

Complainant claimed that Judge Rufon exhibited gross ignorance of the law
and incompetence when he (1) violated the principle of judicial stability of taking
cognizance of the Petition for Cancellation of Notice of Embargo on Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-469321, Y-19969 and T-19968; (2) failed to
notify plaintiffs Dos Amigos Branch IV, Teodoro Ko and Carmelina Suplido on
the October 27, 2000 hearing on the petition for Cancellation of Notice of
Embargo; and (3) issued an Order dated October 27, 2000 in the nature of a
judgment without adequate legal and factual basis.
On the first issue of violation of the principle of judicial stability, the
following positions were taken by the parties:
1.

Complainant stated that the RTC, Branch 155, Pasig City issued the writ
of execution pursuant to which the Bacolod City Sheriff annotated a
Notice of Embargo on the titles of the conjugal properties of Claudio and
Rachel Akol. Accordingly, any challenge on the effectivity, enforceability
or legal effects of the writ of execution upon the rights and interests of the
parties involved should be addressed exclusively to the court which issued
it. The complainant cited Pajarito v. Seeris, et al. (87 SCRA 275,
283[1978] ) which held that, There is no question that the court which
rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process
of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every
question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution;

2.

Judge Rufon, however, claimed that his court has special and limited
jurisdiction as a cadastral court to take cognizance of the petition pursuant
to Section 112 of Act 496 (the Land Registration Act) now found in Sec.
108 of P.D. No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree). He cited the last
paragraph of Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 which expressly provides that,
all petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other
provision of this Decree after original registration, shall be filed and
entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was
entered. Moreover, Judge Rufon claimed that he relied in good faith on
the verification and certification on non-forum shopping in taking
cognizance of the case;

3.

Complainant would refute Judge Rufons reliance on Section 112 of Act

496 by explaining that the method for amendment or alteration outlined in
this section is summary or administrative in nature. He claimed that the
power of correction is subject to the limitation that there must be
unanimity among the parties or there is no adverse interest otherwise the
case becomes controversial and must be threshed out in an ordinary case
or in the case wherein the incident belongs (Martinez vs. Evangelista, G.R.
No. L-26399, January 31, 1981). Complainant argued that the Petition for
Cancellation of Notice of Embargo is not cadastral in nature but an action
to quiet title and/or remove clouds under Articles 476, 478 and 481 of the
new Civil Code. Hence, Section 112 of Act 496 is off-tangent and,
moreover, it has been repealed by Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. Judge
Rufons claim of good faith would therefore fall. Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.

On the second issue of failure to notify the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
32482, the following contentions were put forward:
1.

Complainant stated that the judgment creditors (plaintiffs Dos Amigos

Branch IV, Teodoro Ko and Carmelina Suplido in Civil Case No. 32482)
were not given actual notice of the 27 October 2000 hearing on the
Petition of Cancellation despite the fact that they are parties in interest as
clearly indicated in the Notice of Embargo. Thus they were deprived of
their right to due process. He cited Southwestern University v.
Laurente (26 SCRA 52, 55 [1968] ) which held that, The cancellation of
the annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered without giving notice
to the parties annotated in the certificate of title itself.

2.

Respondent judge asserted that the Petition for Cancellation of Notice of

Embargo is a proceeding in rem, hence it may be instituted and carried to
judgment without need of personal service upon the claimants. He states
that the Sheriffs Return dated September 18, 2000 showing that the Order
dated September 13, 2000 setting the date, time and place of the hearing of
the petition was duly posted in three (3) conspicuous public places for at
least three(3) weeks before the scheduled October 27, 2000 hearing and
that this is a constructive notice.

3.

Complainant would refute this by stating that since the petition for the
cancellation challenges the notice of embargo issued in Civil Case No.
32482, this would nullify the rights of the adverse party, namely Dos
Amigos IV, Teodoro Ko and Carmelina Suplido. Clearly, the Petition for
Cancellation of Notice of Embargo is an action in personam, not directed
against the whole world, but only against the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
32482, although it concerns the right to a tangible thing (res).

On the third issue of granting an order in the nature of a judgment without

basis:
1.

Complainant alleged that the records of the petition show that respondent
judge did not require reception of evidence to prove that prescription had
set in, which is a question of fact. Judge Rufons Order dated October 27,
2000 granting the petition grounded on the alleged prescription does not
state the facts and the law upon which it is based. A perusal of the Order
shows that it is not interlocutory but one in the nature of a judgment hence
it is required by the Constitution and the Rules of the Court to state the
facts and the law upon which it is based.

2.

Judge Rufon argued that considering that the time that has lapsed from
the annotation of the Notice of Embargo on May 16, 1989 until the filing
of the petition on September 11, 2000was more than ten (10) years, the
Notice of Embargo has become stale, void, and ineffective by sheer lapse
of time or by prescription. As such, cancellation of the entry of the Notice
of Embargo was in order, pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.

On July 18, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required
respondent judge to manifest in writing whether he is willing to submit this case
for resolution on the basis of the evidence at hand. In response, respondent
manifested in a letter dated July 30, 2003 that he is submitting the case for
resolution.
After considering the Report of the OCA, the Court finds that the allegations
of gross ignorance of the law are substantiated by the evidence. As shown on the
face of TCT Nos. T-469321, T-19968 and Y-19969, the titles were issued in the
name of Claudio G. Akol, Jr., married to Rachel J. Akol. Furthermore, at the back
of the titles, Entry No. 159694 states that there is a Notice of Embargo in Civil
Case No. 32482 issued by the Ex-Officio City Sheriff, entitled Dos Amigos, et al.
vs. Rachel J. Akol. The inscription is dated May 16, 1989.
Respondent judge should have caused actual service of notice to the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 32482. The petition for the cancellation of notice of
embargo is not cadastral in nature but is an action to quiet title and/or remove
cloud therefrom, under Articles 476, 478 and 481 of the Civil Code. The petition
challenged the notice of embargo issued in Civil Case No. 32482 and prayed that
the annotations on the TCTs be cancelled. This would nullify the rights of the

adverse parties, specially the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 32482. Clearly, the
petition for the cancellation of the notice of embargo is an action in personam. It is
not directed against the whole world but only against the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 32482 although it concerns their right to a specific property.
In Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.,[1] this Court clarified the
concepts of a real action, a personal action, a proceeding in rem and a
proceeding in personam, thus:
A real action is not the same as an action in rem and a personal action is
not the same as an action in personam.
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property,
the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of the damages. In a real action, the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section 2 (a) of
Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery
of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on, real property.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his
personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself,
instead of against the person (1 C.J.S. 943-4). Hence, a real action may at the
same time be an action in personam and not necessarily an action in rem.[2]

Following these concepts, Claudio Akol, Jr.s petition for cancellation of

notice of embargo is a real action as it seeks the recovery of real property; but it is
also an actionin personam because it is directed only against the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 32482. Thus, there is a need for personal service upon the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 32482 who would be adversely affected by the cancellation of the
notice of embargo on the TCTs.
In his Order dated September 13, 2000, respondent judge Rufon merely
required posting in three (3) conspicuous public places for three weeks prior to the
scheduled hearing. This is not the notice required in an action in personam. Since
the plaintiffs Dos Amigos, et al. were not notified, they were deprived of the
opportunity to be heard during the hearing scheduled on October 27, 2000.
Respondent judge Rufon also exhibited gross ignorance of the law when he
failed to require the parties to present evidence to prove or disprove prescription as

a defense at the October 27, 2000 hearing on the Petition for Cancellation of
Notice of Embargo. Instead, he immediately issued the Order of October 27, 2000,
as follows:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
6TH Judicial Region
BRANCH 51, BACOLOD CITY
-o0oLOT 2, BLOCK 21 SUBD. PLAN
PSD-37776, BEING A PORTION
OF LOT NO. 1468-C-2; LOT NO.
249 AND 250, OF THE SUBD. PLAN
PSD-12396, BEING A PORTION OF
LOT NO. 410-B ALL SITUATED IN
BACOLOD CITY, G.L.R.O.
CADASTRAL RECORD NO. 55,

CAD. CASE NO. 00-1204

FOR: CANCELLATION OF
NOTICE OF EMBARGO

CLAUDIO G. AKOL, JR,

Petitioner.
x-------------------------------------------------x
ORDER
There being no opposition to the petition filed by the petitioner, the
petition is GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, cancellation of notice of embargo is
hereby ordered.
SO ORDERED.
Bacolod City, Philippines, 27 October 2000.
(Sgd.) ANASTACIO C. RUFON
Pair Judge

Clearly, this Order not merely interlocutory but is in the nature of a final
judgment or decision. As such, it does not comply with the requirement under the

Constitution to state the facts and the law upon which it is based.[3] It also confirms
that respondent judge did not require evidence to show that prescription had set in.
Respondent judges lack of familiarity with the rules undermines public
confidence in the competence of the court. His failure to follow basic legal
commands embodied in the law and the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law
for which he should be subjected to disciplinary action.[4]
Although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for
every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license
to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory
prerogatives.[5]
In Villa Macasasa, et al. v. Judge Faustino H. Imbing,[6] this Court found the
respondent judge guilty of ignorance of the law and ordered him to pay a fine of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for issuing an Order which gratuitously included
the astronomical amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,200,000) as incidental expenses.
Similarly, in Evelyn De Austria v. Judge Orlando D. Beltran,[7] the
respondent judge was fined Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for gross ignorance of
the law in failing to comply with Sec. 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which requires submission of a certificate of cash deposit and a written
undertaking before an accused may be released on a cash bail.
Also, in German Agunday v. Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles,[8] this Court imposed
a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) on the respondent judge after finding that
he had shown gross ignorance of the law when he failed to deny outrightly a
Motion to Quash despite the fact that it is a prohibited pleading under the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.
Considering the foregoing and the fact that this is respondent judge Rufons
first infraction in his six (6) years of service in the Judiciary, the Court deems the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as a reasonable fine.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon, Acting Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Bacolod City, is hereby FOUND
GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000), with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same
will be dealt with more severely.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chairperson
Chief Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

[1]
[2]
[3]

G.R. No. L-29791, January 10, 1978, 81 SCRA 75.

Id. at 84. Emphasis supplied.
Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

[4]

[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]

Lalaine O. Apuya v. Judge Tranquilino V. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1353, December 13, 2001, 372
SCRA 198, 202.
Jonathan Vilea v. Judge Bienvenido Mapaye, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1424, 24 April 2002, 312 SCRA 385.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1470, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 385.
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1406, September 1, 1999, 313 SCRA 443.
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1236, November 25, 1999, 319 SCRA 134.

SECOND DIVISION
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 7298

[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]

Present:
- versus -

ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO,

Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
June 25, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule
19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand
letter the contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal
cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.

Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C.

Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August 2005, complainant Fernando Martin O.
Pena, as President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice from the
Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation
conference. In the conference, respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a claim
for separation pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant rejected
the claim as being baseless. Complainant thereafter sent notices to Hufana for the
latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to work
notice, respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his clients claim for
separation pay. The letter also contained the following threat to the company:

BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and
claim bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under
established precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges
like:
1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the
government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.

These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts
as settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[1]

Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical
standards, complainant filed an administrative complaint[2] with the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed
an Answer with Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaims) [3] claiming that
Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainants legal counsel, also played an important
part in imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges against him.
Respondent also pointed out that the complaint had no certification against forum
shopping and was motivated only to confuse the issues then pending before the
Labor Arbiter. By way of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the
disbarment of Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the
prosecution of Atty. Jocson for Usurpation of Public Functions [4] and for violation
of the Notarial Law.[5]
A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent
failed to appear.[6] Both parties were thereafter required to submit their position
papers.
The Report and Recommendation[7] of Investigating Commissioner Milagros
V. San Juan found that complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply
with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring a certificate against forum
shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[8] On 10 July
2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court the
notice of said Resolution and the records of the case. [9] Thereafter, on 18 August
2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for
Modification of Decision)[10] reiterating his claim of damages against complainant
in the amount of four hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in
dollars, for filing the false, malicious, defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal

fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a groundless and

false suit.[11]
Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline) [12] alleging that he personally submitted
and filed with the IBP his position paper, after serving a copy thereof on
respondent by registered mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his right
to due process when the IBP dismissed his complaint without considering his
position paper and without ruling on the merits thereof.
Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26
May 2006 Resolution[13] of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case
to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition
on the merits.
Based on the records, there is truth to complainants assertion that he filed
his position paper on 21 December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to
respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page of said document shows that it was
received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The registry receipt attached to the
same document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to respondent on the
same date. [14]
Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition
before this Court for his failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in
his complaint against respondent.
The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally
required by Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for
every petition filed with the Court or the Court of Appeals. Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification
requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this
Court and the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and
(2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[15] Said rule states that a violation thereof would
constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both
petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel
of the party concerned.[16]
The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took
against complainant his failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to
his complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however,
disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to
the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.
The Courts determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of
disbarment proceedings, the reasons for the certification against forum shopping
requirement, complainants subsequent compliance with the requirement, and the
merit of complainants complaint against respondent.
The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,[17] dwelt on the sui generis character
of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, thus:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.[18] [Emphasis supplied]

In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against

forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such

proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary proceedings

against the same respondent, because such other proceedings or action is one that
necessarily involves the same issues as the one posed in the disbarment
complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.
Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum
shopping is to apprise the Court of the pendency of another action or claim
involving the same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and
thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or
complaints constitutes abuse of court processes,[19] which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds
to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. [20] Furthermore, the
rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among
lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote
the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other
party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the
embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting
resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.[21]
It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a
certification against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that
the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the
possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints
considering that said proceedings are either taken by the Supreme
Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person.[22] Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case
fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another
disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease.
We have previously held that the rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to
accompany every initiatory pleading, should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective or
the goal of all rules of procedurewhich is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.[23]
At any rate, complainants subsequent compliance with the requirement
cured the supposed defect in the original complaint. The records show that

complainant submitted the required certification against forum shopping on 6

December 2006 when he filed his Comment/Opposition to respondents Motion to
Dismiss the present petition.
Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainants case against respondent justifies
the grant of the present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the
threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that the
letter is unethical.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer
shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law, reminding legal
practitioners that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. [24] In
particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate
in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Under this Rule, a lawyer should
not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against
the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries
to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyers client.[25]
In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule
proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail
to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger
amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion,
falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to
violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but
they also amount to blackmail.
Blackmail is the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation
or exposure or opposition in the public prints,obtaining of value from a person
as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing
some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice. In common parlance and in
general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction
of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the

exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating

on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the
weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.[26]
In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,[27] we held that [a]n accusation for
blackmail and extortion is a very serious one which, if properly substantiated,
would entail not only respondents disbarment from the practice of law, but also a
possible criminal prosecution.[28] While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated
for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case for
he admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote,
dismissing the same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law
by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that a lawyer is under obligation
to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by
the State.[29] He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard
practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of
disputes.
Respondents assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that
respondents threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure
some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his clients demands. It was not
respondents intention to point out complainants violations of the law as he so
gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to keep
silent about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date
indicated.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in
this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent
relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of
his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his clients claim and to take
all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring
payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more
than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges
against complainant which have nothing to do with his clients claim for separation
pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant

to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged
communication rule under which a private communication executed in the
performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter
was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from
the latter compliance with the demands of his client.
However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we
hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent,
considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his clients
interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May
2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found liable for violation of
Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE
TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

(On Official Leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

O.

Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 10-11.

[2]

Id. at 1-5.

[3]

Id. at 21-27.

[4]
Respondent claims that Atty. Jocson signed the administrative complaint against him without indicating
his Roll of Attorney Number.
[5]

Respondent claims
his notarial commission.

that Atty. Jocson

notarized

[6]

Rollo, p. 49.

[7]

Id. at 103-105.

[8]

Id. at 102. See Resolution No. XVII-2006-291.

[9]

Id. at 101-105.

[10]

[11]

Id. at 170-177.

Id. at 175.

[12]

Id. at 106-115.

[13]

Id. at 102.

the

complaint

despite

the

expiration

of

[14]

Id. at 76-88.

[15]

Said provision states:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof;
and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to
the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

[16]

Land Car, Inc. v. Devt Bachelor Express, Inc., 462 Phil. 796, 801 (2003), citing Administrative Circular
No. 04-94, April 1, 1994; Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 614; Prubankers
Association v. Prudential Bank & Trust Company, 302 SCRA 74.
[17]

No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562.

[18]

Id. at 600-601.

[19]

Wee v. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, 11 August 2004, 436 SCRA 96, 108-109, citing Zebra Security Agency
v. NLRC, Phil. 200, 209.
[20]

Id. at 109, citing Nacuray v. NLRC, 336 Phil. 749, 756.

[21]

Id., citing Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 605, 616.

[22]

RULES OF COURT, Rule 139-B, Sec. 1.

[23]

Supra note 19, at 110, citing Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, G.R. No. 143016, 30 August 2000, 339 SCRA 306,
309 citing Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112547, 18 July 1994, 234 SCRA 192, 198.
[24]
See E.L. PINEDA, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1995 Ed.), p. 210, citing Maglasang v. People,
190 SCRA 306.
[25]

Id. at 213.

[26]

See AM. JUR. 2d, Vol. 5, citing Hess v. Sparks, 24 P. 979, 980, 44 Kan. 465, 21 Am.St.Rep. 300.

[27]

449 Phil. 664 (2003).

[28]

Id. at 674-675.

[29]

Rollo, p. 132.

EN BANC

NELSON P. VALDEZ,

A.M. No. CA-07-21-P

Complainant,
Present:

Puno, C.J.,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus -

Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario,
Garcia,

Velasco, Jr., and

Nachura, JJ.
ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON
M. DABON,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
June 22, 2007

x
x

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a complaint for Gross Immorality, Gross Violation of

Administrative Matter No. 99-12-08-SC and falsification and/or
misrepresentation, filed by Nelson P. Valdez against Atty. Antolin
Allyson M. Dabon, Jr., then Division Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals. Complainant is the husband of Sonia Valdez, then a
Court Stenographer IV at the Court of Appeals, with whom Atty.
Dabon allegedly had an illicit relationship.

The administrative case was subsequently assigned to

Court of Appeals Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente for
investigation who issued an Order dated June 5, 2006 directing
the parties to attend a preliminary conference on June 28, 2006.

On June 8, 2006, Process Server Fernando Sia made a

report that he failed to serve a copy of the Order upon the
respondent because the housemaid at respondents address in
Pandacan, Manila refused to receive the same. Sia proceeded to
respondents provincial address at Greenfields Subdivision in San
Fernando, Pampanga, but the guard did not allow him to enter. In
both instances, the housemaid and the guard informed Sia that
respondent had left for the United States.

Thus, in an Amended Order dated June 16, 2006, the

Investigating Justice cancelled the scheduled preliminary
conference and directed the respondent to submit his Answer
within 15 days from notice, otherwise, the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution. A copy of the Amended Order was sent
by courier service to respondents address in the United States.

On June 23, 2006, Pamela Ann B. Antonio, Trace Services

Manager of Federal Express, informed Clerk of Court Tessie L.
Gatmaitan that they failed to deliver the documents to Atty.
Dabon at his address in the United States because he is always
out during delivery attempts.

Meanwhile, on June 28, 2006, complainant filed an Ex Parte

Motion to Refer for Question Documents and Fingerprint
Examination Attached Exhibits. Complainant alleged that on June
24, 2006, he received a parcel from a certain Nenita Palupayon of
Quezon City containing two computer printed nude photos of his
wife, Sonia Valdez, together with a compact disk showing the
same photo. According to the complainant, this is a form of
harassment which should not be countenanced.

On November 14, 2006, complainant filed an Ex-Parte

Manifestation and Motion claiming that respondent has
successfully held in abeyance the proceedings in the instant case
by his stubborn refusal to receive and comply with the processes
of the court.

On November 28, 2006, the Investigating Justice again

directed the respondent to file his answer within 15 days from
receipt of notice, failing which, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision.

In his report, Process Server Sia narrated that on November

30, 2006, he went to Pampanga but was informed by the guards
at Greenfields Subdivision that Atty. Dabon is no longer residing
thereat. He then went to Pandacan but the housemaid refused to
receive the notices. She also informed him that respondent is still
in the United States.

Thus, in an Order dated January 12, 2007, the Investigating

Justice directed Sia to re-serve the envelope addressed to Atty.
Dabon at his two aforesaid addresses and in case of refusal, to
leave the same in the premises with a person of sufficient age
and discretion residing thereat.

That same day, Sia went to respondents Pandacan, Manila

address and noticed that the house was locked. So he left the
envelope underneath the door in the presence of a certain
Pamela, who lives next door. On January 16, 2007, Sia went to
Greenfields Subdivision in San Fernando, Pampanga and left the
envelope with the guard on duty.

However, both envelopes were later returned to the Court

of Appeals via LBC. An examination of the envelopes revealed
that both had been opened.

Thereafter, the Investigating Justice deemed the case

submitted for resolution.

In his complaint, Nelson alleged that his wife, Sonia,

admitted to him that she engaged in an adulterous and immoral
relationship with Atty. Dabon since November 2000. In March
2006, she decided to end the relationship but respondent would
not agree. He started harassing and threatening Sonia. In one
instance, respondent brought Sonia to a motel against her
will. Their arrival caused a commotion which forced Atty. Dabon
to drive back to the Court of Appeals. In another occasion,
respondent forcibly boarded Sonias car and refused to alight
despite her pleas. Respondent likewise used members of his staff
to deliver messages or packages to Sonia.

In his supplemental complaint, Nelson alleged that on May

16, 2006, or one day after the complaint was filed, respondent
surreptitiously left for the Unites States without securing a travel
authority from the Supreme Court. He likewise averred that in his
Embarkation Card, Atty. Dabon indicated that he is a lawyer
without disclosing that he is also a government employee.

On the basis of the complaint and the evidence submitted by

the complainant, the Investigating Justice found as follows:

In his sworn letter-complaint dated May 15, 2006, complainant

alleged that respondent had an adulterous and immoral relationship
with his wife, Sonia Valdez, for a span of five years; that he only came
to know of the said adulterous relationship on April 18, 2006 from an
anonymous text message; that Sonia admitted that the relationship
started sometime in November 2000 and continued until March of
2006; that Sonia, bothered by her conscience, decided to break off
with respondent who, however, persisted communicating with her,
threatening and harassing her through phone calls and handwritten
messages; that Sonia, in her effort to stop said harassment, decided to
speak with respondent one last time aboard respondents car
somewhere along Roxas Boulevard, however, respondent instead took
her into a motel; and that Sonia parried respondents advances by
being hysterical, which prompted respondent to drive her back to the
office.

In another incident on March 13, 2006, respondent forcibly

boarded his wifes car at the Court of Appeals parking lot; and that it
was only upon pleas of Sonias officemates, Atty. Heiddi Barroso and
Atty. Aileen Ligot, that respondent alighted from the car. Complainant
also alleged that respondent continuously made threats to reveal their
illicit relationship if Sonia would not reconcile with respondent, thus,
Sonia was forced to shun respondents calls in her office and to change
their house phone number.

On May 4, 2006, complainant allegedly received text messages

from respondents wife, Atty. Joy Dabon and from respondent himself,
apologizing and asking forgiveness for the incident. Said messages
read as follows:

A)

Text message from Atty. Joy Dabon:

Nelson, Jun and I were separating I will file an annulment

anytime soon, although Im in great pain, I ask for your apology
and forgiveness for everything he is leaving for US and I hope he
evolves into a strong and mature person there. D. cya
masamang
tao,
just
emotional
and
easily
manipulated. Sana dont blame entirely bec. he is the type that
never initiate things. He is passive and tame. He was honest
with me and I hope Sonia would find the courage to tell d truth

to you. I just pray for peace and a fresh start for all of us. I just
want to go on with my life and use above all of these for my
sons sake. I love jun and I appeal to you na sana wala ka
maisip
sa
atin
lahat. Just
as
I
have
accepted
everything. Salamat sa panahon and pangunawa. God bless.

B)

Text message from respondent:

Nelson alam ko wala akong pwedeng sbhin at dis pt. na

makakagaan mo o makapagbabalik ng nakaraan. I did the
terrible n hurtful things. I did thinking only of my selfish desire
to hurt Sonia. Naisip ko kasi nun she just used me for her own
personal reasons at nung nasa ere na ako, bigla niya ako
binitawan.

In his Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit dated May 19, 2006,

complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously left the country on
May 16, 2006 to evade the administrative complaint filed against him;
and that respondent committed acts of falsification and/or
misrepresentation when respondent deliberately omitted to disclose
that he is a government employee to avoid presenting the required
Authority to Travel, which he did not have at that time, in violation of
Administrative Matter No. 99-12-08-SC.

Complainants allegations are corroborated by the following:

1.
Atty. Heiddi Venecia Barrozo and Atty. Aileen T. Ligot,
Court Attorney IV of this Court, who executed a Joint Affidavit alleging
that sometime in March 2006 at around 5:00 in the afternoon, Sonia
asked them to accompany her to the parking lot of the Court of
Appeals because respondent refused to disembark from her car; that
upon arriving at the parking lot, they saw respondent sitting in front of
Sonias car; that Sonia shouted and demanded that respondent get out
of the car but the latter refused and insisted on talking with Sonia; that
the commotion started drawing attention so they begged respondent
to alight from the car, who then obliged.

Atty. Barrozo and Atty. Ligot further alleged that they received a
text message from respondent the next day requesting them to see
him in his office; that respondent told them that alam ko na malaki
and kasalanan ko kay son, at alam ko na imposible na nya akong
mapatawad and begged them to convince Sonia to talk and settle
things with him; that respondent kept sending them text messages
such as: musta na sya?, nakakakain ba sya?, pumunta ba sya sa
gym ngaun?, Sana mapatawad na nya ako, mahirap para sa akin
ito., Hindi ko na kaya, sana naman maconvince nyo sya na kausapin
na ako; that they told respondent that Sonia refused to talk with
him; and that on May 10, 2006 at 11:00 in the morning, Atty. Ligot
received another text message from respondent which reads: Gud am
aileen. Alam ko na kahit papaano kapakanan pa rin ni sonia nasa isip
nyo, na gagamitin kayo to testify against me. Pero kung talagang
mahalaga pa rin si sons sa inyo, isipin nyo twice if wat u wil do wud
help her or makakahirap pa sa kanya

2.
Virginia D. Ramos, Court Stenographer IV in the Office
of the Presiding Justice, who executed an Affidavit alleging that
sometime in the third week of April 2006, she received some telephone
calls at the local line from respondent expressing his desire to speak
with Sonia but the latter refused to speak with him; that sometime in
the fourth week of April 2006, respondent went to their office located
at the third floor of the Court of Appeals main building, supposedly to
inquire about some court matters from her officemate, Mr. Raul
Yumang; that respondent also proceeded to Sonias working area who
was surprised and infuriated upon seeing respondent; that Sonia asked
respondent Ano kailangan mo dito? and the latter replied May
kukunin lang ako kay Mang Raul., then Sonia said Dun ka lang sa
labas, huwag kang lumapit sa akin!; and that respondent hurriedly left
their office after the confrontation.

3.
Marie Iris Magdalene Minerva, Executive Assistant II at
the Office of the Presiding Justice, who alleged in her Affidavit that she
received some telephone calls from respondent requesting to speak
with Sonia who deliberately refused saying Pakisabi na ayoko
makipagusap sa kanya at pinagbabawalan na ako ni Nelson.; that
Sonia had been receiving letters sealed in brown envelopes and hand
carried by some of respondents staff; that one time when Sonia was
not around, respondent himself personally placed a sealed brown

envelope on Sonias table; and that upon her suggestion, Sonia tore
the letter into pieces to prevent anybody from reading it.

4.
Complainants allegation that respondent left the
country on May 16, 2006 for the United States way ahead of his
approved leave from June 3, 2006 up to August 25, 2006 and without
the requisite Authority to Travel from the Supreme Court is supported
by complainants evidence, namely, (1) Northwest Airlines, Inc.s
Passenger Manifest which includes the name DABON/ANTOLINAL; (2)
Application for Leave; (3) letter requesting permission to travel; (4)
Embarkation Card; and (5) Certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration.

Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Justice found

substantial evidence showing that respondent maintained an illicit
relationship with complainants wife, thus:

In the present case, this Investigating Justice finds that there is

substantial evidence showing an amorous relationship between
respondent and complainants wife. Respondent failed to refute
complainants allegation that Sonia admitted having a relationship with
him sometime from November 2000 until March 2006. Complainants
unrebutted evidence consisting of the affidavits of Sonias officemates
lend credence to complainants allegation that such amorous
relationship existed between his wife and respondent. Moreover,
respondents abrupt and unauthorized trip to the United States and
eventual resignation from office are telltale proofs of the existence of
such illicit relationship between respondent and Sonia and of
respondents desperate attempt to avoid facing the consequences of
his indiscretion.

Clearly, respondents act of maintaining an illicit relationship

with Sonia, while being married to his wife Atty. Joy Dabon,
unmistakably constitutes gross immoral conduct. Such act is in
complete travesty of the sacred and inviolable institution of marriage,
which definitely warrants an administrative sanction.

The Investigating Justice likewise noted that respondent

violated Adm. Matter No. 99-12-08-SC when he left for the United
States before his travel authority could be issued.

Anent the charge of falsification, it was noted that

respondent did not act with malice when he indicated in the
embarkation card that he is a lawyer without stating that he is
also a government employee.

In view of respondents resignation last August 12, 2006,

the Investigating Justice recommended that he be ordered to pay
a fine equivalent to his salary for six months, which may be taken
from whatever sums due him as accrued leaves or other benefits.

We adopt the factual findings of the Investigating Justice;

however, we find the recommended penalty not commensurate
with the offense committed.

There is no dispute that respondent engaged in an

unlawful, dishonest and immoral conduct. The illicit relationship
which spanned a period of five years was committed under
scandalous circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency. As a Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals,
respondent occupied a position of great responsibility. As such,
he is expected and required to comport himself with dignity and
propriety at all times. Unfortunately, respondent miserably failed
to comply with the demands of his office. Despite the apparent
refusal by Sonia Valdez to continue with their illicit affair,
respondent refused to let go and even continued to harass the
former. In one instance, he forcibly boarded Sonias car which

was parked at the Court of Appeals parking lot and insisted on

talking with her. His refusal to alight from the car elicited shouts
from Sonia which in turn drew the attention of other persons in
the vicinity. Despite being rejected in view of Sonias apparent
intention to end the affair, respondent persisted in his lustful
quest by bringing Sonia to a motel against her will. Not only did
he transgress the norms of decency expected of every person but
he failed to live up to the high moral standard expected of a court
employee.[1] The exacting standards of ethics and morality upon
court employees are required to maintain the peoples faith in the
courts as dispensers of justice, and whose image is mirrored by
their actuations. Thus, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of
everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as
a true temple of justice.[2]

What further aggravates respondents offense is that he

took advantage of his official position in continuing to harass
Sonia. In one occasion, he summoned lawyers Barrozo and Ligot
to his office and asked for their intervention in a purely personal
affair. At other times, he sent members of his staff to Sonias
office to deliver his messages.

It has not also escaped our attention that respondent tried

to evade and continue to defy the processes of the court. After he
was formally charged with a complaint for gross immorality
on May 15, 2006, respondent immediately left the following
day, May 16, 2006, for the United States. Although the Personnel
Division of the Court of Appeals certified that he filed an
application for leave of absence from May 8 to June 2, 2006, the
application however remained unacted upon. This proves that
Atty. Dabon left for theUnited States before the approval of his
application for leave by the authorized official of the Personnel
Division. Moreover, respondents application for leave did not

indicate the type of leave he is taking, whether vacation or sick

leave, or whether the leave will be spent here or abroad. In short,
respondents absence was unauthorized. As correctly observed
by the Investigating Justice:
Moreover, respondents abrupt and unauthorized trip to
the United States and eventual resignation from office are telltale
proofs of the existence of such illicit relationship between respondent
and Sonia and of respondents desperate attempt to avoid facing the
consequences of his indiscretion.

Respondent likewise violated the resolution in Adm. Matter

No. 99-12-08-SC requiring employees of the judiciary to obtain a
travel authority from this Court before traveling abroad. For such
infraction, respondent should be held administratively liable.

Finally, we agree with the Investigating Justice that

respondent cannot feign lack of knowledge about the instant
administrative case filed against him. He abruptly left the country
one day after the case was filed. In his text messages sent to
Atty. Barrozo and Atty. Ligot, he acknowledged the possibility that
the former would be used to testify against him. Respondents
housemates or even the guards stubbornly refused to receive any
mail matter from the Court of Appeals. But when the process
server eventually left the envelopes at respondents last two
known addresses in the Philippines, the envelopes were sent back
to the sender although they have been opened. When the Court
of Appeals sent copies of the orders to respondents address in
the United States, the courier reported that respondent was out
during
the
several
instances
when
delivery
was
attempted. Furthermore, when respondent resigned last August
12, 2006, there is no way that he could not have known of the
instant administrative complaint. Yet, he continued to avoid and

defy the courts orders. This is reprehensible considering

respondents position as Division Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals.

Disgraceful and immoral conduct is a grave offense,

punishable by suspension of six months and one day to one year
for the first offense, and for the second offense, by dismissal. [3] In
this case, respondents offense is aggravated by his continued
refusal to receive and comply with the court processes. His leave
was unauthorized and he went abroad without the requisite travel
authority.

In Re: Judge Cartagena,[4] the Court found respondent judge

guilty of gross misconduct when he departed abroad without the
knowledge and permission of the Court and was ordered
dismissed from service with forfeiture of all benefits and with
prejudice to re-employment in any other branch, instrumentality
or agency of the government, including government owned or
controlled corporations.[5]

In Reyes v. Bautista,[6] respondent Bautista was found guilty

of violation of Supreme Court administrative circular for traveling
abroad without securing the necessary permission for foreign
travel. She was likewise found guilty of dishonesty when she
indicated in her application that her leave would be spent in
the Philippines, when in fact the same was spent abroad. For
those infractions, Bautista was dismissed from service with
forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave
credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government owned
or controlled corporations.[7]

In Ansa v. Musa,[8] respondent judge was found guilty of

gross immorality and was dismissed from the service with
prejudice to re-employment.

In the instant case, respondent should have been meted the

penalty of dismissal from service. However, he could no longer
be dismissed or suspended from service in view of his resignation
on August 12, 2006.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we find Atty. Antolin

Alysson M. Dabon, Jr. GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and
Violation of Adm. Matter No. 99-12-08-SC and is hereby ordered
to PAY a fine equivalent to his salaries for one year, which may be
taken from whatever sums due him as accrued leaves, with
forfeiture of all benefits. Further, he is barred from any
employment in all government branches, including government
owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVALAssociate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

Associate

Justice

PRESBITERO
NACHURA

J.

VELASCO,

Associate Justice
Justice

JR.

ANTONIO

EDUARDO
Associate

B.

[1]

Ansa v. Musa, 400 Phil. 19, 23 (2000).

[2]

Navarro v. Navarro, 394 Phil. 226, 235 (2000).

[3]

Id. at 235.

[4]

A.M. No. 95-9-98-MCTC, December 4, 1997, 282 SCRA 371.

[5]

Id. at 376.

[6]

A.M. No. P-04-1873, January 13, 2005, 448 SCRA 95.

[7]

Id. at 105.

[8]

Supra note 1.

FIRST DIVISION

JUDGE
DOLORES
*
ESPAOL, Presiding
Judge,
Regional
Court,
Branch
Dasmarias, Cavite,

L.

G.R. No. 150949

Trial
90,
Present:
Petit

ioner,

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
- versus -

AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

ATTY.
BENJAMIN
S.
FORMOSO and SPOUSES
BENITO SEE and MARLY
SEE,
Re
spondents.

Promulgated:

June 21, 2007

x
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the

Decision[1] dated September
12,
2001 and
Resolution
dated November 15, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 65652.

The facts are:

On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc.

(Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece of land
consisting
of
33,130
square
meters
in
Paliparan,
Dasmarias, Cavite. The property is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-278479 issued in her name by the
Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.

Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswindas name was

cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-511462 was issued in the
name of Sharcons. However, when the latters workers tried to
fence and take possession of the lot, they were prevented by the
caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker
claimed that spouses Mapua are the owners of the
land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found that TCT
No.
T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of spouses
Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.

On January 25, 2000, Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite a complaint for
quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 2035-00. Impleaded
as defendants were spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the
Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.

In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that

all the documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and
falsified.

In the course of the proceedings, or on July 9, 2001, Judge

Dolores L. Espaol, petitioner, issued an Order stating that Benito
See and Marly See, president and treasurer, respectively, of
Sharcons, and its counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso, respondents,
have used a spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when
it (Sharcons) filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of
title. Consequently, petitioner declared respondents guilty of
direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for ten
(10) days in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite.

Petitioners Order is partly reproduced as follows:

From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view and

so holds that the instant case is a callous and blatant imposition of
lies, falsehoods, deceptions, and fraudulent manipulations, through
the extensive use of falsified documents by the plaintiff corporation
and its former counsel, Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant
Evanswinda C. Morales and even the Geodetic Engineer who connived
with this private group on one hand, and some officials and
employees of the government agencies responsible for the processing
and issuance of spurious or falsified titles, on the other. Unless these
fraudulent operations are put to a complete and drastic halt, the
Courts are at the mercy of these unscrupulous people for their own
personal gain.

Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user

of falsified document is the forger thereof (Gamido v. Court of
Appeals, 25 SCRA 101 [1995]), let the appropriate falsification charges
be filed against Benito See and Marly See together with Evanswinda
C. Morales. Thus, let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the National
Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice for their
appropriate action. As regards Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, let a copy of
this Order be forwarded to the Bar Confidants Office, Supreme
Court. Manila.

Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer of

Sharcons Builders Phils. Inc., respectively, and Atty. Benjamin S.
Formoso, counsel for Sharcons until March 13, 2001, are declared and
held in contempt for foisting falsehoods and using falsified and
spurious documents in the pursuit of their nefarious activities
pursuant to the instant case filed before this Court. Let the
corresponding Warrants of Arrest be issued against the aforesaid
respondents who should serve ten (10) days of detention at the
Dasmarias Municipal Jail, Cavite.

Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc.,

under TCT No. T-511462 allegedly issued on November 11, 1994,
being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been derived from
another spurious title with TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to
Evanswinda C. Morales on December 29, 1989. The Declaration of
Real Property No. 4736 is likewise hereby cancelled for being spurious.
Let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Registry of Deeds for its
implementation with respect to the two (2) titles for cancellation and
to the Assessors Office of the Municipality of Dasmarias, Cavite, to
stave off the proliferation of these spurious instruments.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, whereas, the private defendants
counterclaims, which need further substantiation, are likewise
dismissed. However, the said private defendants are not precluded
from pursuing their rightful course(s) of action in the interest of
justice.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons'

complaint for quieting of title, she stumbled upon Civil Case No.
623-92 for cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC,
Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle.
[2]
Petitioner then took judicial notice of the judges Decision

declaring that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents are

falsified and that respondents are responsible therefor.

On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest

against respondents. They were confined in the municipal jail of
Dasmarias, Cavite. That same day, respondents filed a motion
for bail and a motion to lift the order of arrest. But they were
denied outright by petitioner.

Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
65652. On July 19, 2001, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition.

On September 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated

its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the instant

petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. Respondent
judges July 9, 2001 Order, insofar as it declared herein petitioners in
direct contempt and ordered their incarceration for ten (10) days, as
well as the Warrant of Arrest, dated July 12, 2001, and the Order of
Commitment, dated July 13, 2001, which the respondent judge issued
against the persons of the herein petitioners, are hereby NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Espaol erred in

taking cognizance of the Decision rendered by then Judge Tagle in
Civil Case No. 623-92 since it was not offered in evidence in Civil
Case No. 2035-00 for quieting of title. Moreover, as the direct
contempt of court is criminal in nature, petitioner should have
conducted a hearing. Thus, she could have determined whether
respondents are guilty as charged.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of

Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of November 15, 2001.

Hence, this petition.

The basic question before us is whether petitioner erred in

ruling that respondents are guilty of direct contempt of court for
using falsified documents when Sharcons filed its complaint for
quieting of title.

The early case of In re Jones[3] defined contempt of court as

some act or conduct which tends to interfere with the business of
the court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or
some act of disrespect to the dignity of the court which in some
way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of
the court and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same. It
has also been described as a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority
and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with
or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during
litigation.[4] Simply put, it is despising of the authority,
justice, or dignity of the court.[5]

The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time

in England when all courts in the realm were but divisions of
the Curia Regia, the supreme court of the monarch, and to
scandalize a court was an affront to the sovereign. [6] This
concept was adopted by the Americans and brought to our shores
with modifications. In this jurisdiction, it is now recognized
that courts have the inherent power to punish for
contempt on the ground that respect for the courts
guarantees the very stability of the judicial institution.
[7]
Such stability is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the very
administration of justice.[8]

Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,

provides:

SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty

of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect
toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to
be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily
adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten
(10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos or imprisonment, not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a
lower court.

In Narcida v. Bowen,[9] this Court characterized direct

contempt as one done in the presence of or so near the court or
judge as to obstruct the administration of justice. It is a
contumacious act done facie curiae and may be punished

summarily without hearing.[10] In other words, one may be

summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or at
the very instance of the commission of the act of contumely.

Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and

hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as
may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or by counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:

(a)

Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his

official duties or in his official transactions;

(b)

Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,

or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after
being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the
judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction,
enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon
such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c)

Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes

or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt
under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d)

Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to

impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e)

(f)

(g)

Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting

as such without authority;

Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in

the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a
court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent

the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or
from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.

Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one

perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include
misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command
of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse
or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct
tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.[11]

We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged

documents is a contumacious act. However, it constitutes
indirect contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to the above
provision, such act is an improper conduct which degrades the
administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance
of Cebu, Branch VI,[12] we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified
document, more so where the falsity of the document is not

apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt,

and as such is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise
in the proper proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule
71, a contemner may be punished only after a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused
to be heard by himself and counsel.[13] Moreover, settled is the
rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a
separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court
exercises limited jurisdiction.[14] Thus, the modes of procedure
and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are
assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal
prosecutions.[15] Perforce, petitioner judge erred in declaring
summarily that respondents are guilty of direct contempt and
ordering their incarceration. She should have conducted a
hearing with notice to respondents.

Petitioner, in convicting respondents for direct contempt of

court, took judicial notice of the Decision in Civil Case No. 623-92,
assigned to another RTC branch, presided by then Judge
Tagle. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take

judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government, and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts
of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.

In Gener v. De Leon,[16] we held that courts are not

authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of
other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in
the same court. Hence, we reiterate that petitioner took judicial
notice of the Decision rendered by another RTC branch and on the
basis thereof, concluded that respondents used falsified
documents (such as land title and tax declaration) when
Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting. Verily, the Court of
Appeals did not err in ruling that respondents are not guilty of
direct contempt of court.

Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of

the Court of Appeals granting the writ of habeas corpus in favor of
respondents has become moot. We recall that respondents were
released after posting the required bail as ordered by the Court of
Appeals. A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a
person who is not actually restrained of his liberty. And a person
discharged on bail is not restrained of his liberty as to be entitled
to a writ of habeas corpus.[17]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the

petition. The
challenged
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
65652 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Retired.

[1]

Rollo, pp. 26-35. Penned by Associate Justice Candido V. Rivera (retired) and concurred in by Associate
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Fuentes, Jr.

[2]

Now Justice of the Court of Appeals.

[3]

9 Phil. 347 (1907).

[4]

Heirs of Trinidad De Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138660, February 5, 2004, 422
SCRA 101, 114, citing Halili v. CIR, 220 Phil. 507 (1985).

[5]

Villavencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 809 (1919).

[6]

Re Caruba, 139 NJ Eq 404, 51 A2d 446, affd 140 NJ Eq 563, 55 A2d 289.

[7]

Mercado v. Security Bank Corp., G.R. No. 160445, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 501, 518.

[8]

In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944, 950 (1916).

[9]

22 Phil. 365 (1912).

[10]

Medina v. Rivera, 66 Phil. 155, 156 (1938); Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., G.R. No. 162704, July
28, 2005, 464 SCRA 572, 574.

[11]

Patricio v. Suplico, G.R. No. 76562, April 22, 1991, 196 SCRA 140, 146.

[12]

G.R. Nos. 57190-91, 58532, May 18, 1990, 185 SCRA 472.

[13]

Ruiz v. How, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1805, October 14, 2003, 413 SCRA 333, 340, citing Wicker v.
Arcangel, 242 SCRA 444 (1996).

[14]

In re Mison, Jr. v. Subido, G.R. No. 27704, May 28, 1970, 33 SCRA 30, 33.

[15]

Lee Yick Hon v. Collector of Customs, 41 Phil. 548, 552 (1921).

[16]

[17]

G.R. No. 130730, October 19, 2001, 367 SCRA 631, citing People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25
(1996); US v. Ckaveria, 29 Phil. 527 (1915).
Tan Me Nio v. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil. 944, 947 (1916).

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

MANUEL B. ARCENAS,
Complainant,

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1642

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1735-MTJ]

Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and

JUDGE HENRY B. AVELINO,

NACHURA, JJ.

Presiding Judge, Municipal

Circuit Trial Court, PontevedraPanay, Pontevedra, Capiz,

Promulgated:
June 15, 2007

Respondent.

x-------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Before us is a complaint[1] dated April 14, 2005 of Manuel

B. Arcenas (complainant)
charging
Judge
Henry
B. Avelino (respondent), Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC), Pontevedra-Panay, Pontevedra, Capiz with Gross
Inefficiency and Gross Neglect of Duty for delay in resolving Civil
Case
No.
391
entitled Demetrio B.Arcenas,
et
al.
v.
Spouses Manolo Amador
and
Rosemarie
Amador for
Unlawful Detainer.

Complainant alleges: He is the attorney-in-fact for the

plaintiffs. On May 7, 2004 respondent dismissed Civil Case No.
391 for lack of jurisdiction. He filed a Notice of Appeal and the
case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
16, Roxas City, Capiz. On September 24, 2004, a decision was
rendered setting aside respondents decision and remanding the
case to the lower court for further proceedings. However,
respondent failed to render a decision thereon in violation of the
Rules on Summary Procedure. He filed an earlier complaint
against respondent docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-05-1583. In the
Decision of March 11, 2005, we found respondent guilty of gross
inefficiency for his failure to decide the case within
the reglementary period and was fined P20,000.00 with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
In his Comment[2] dated July 26, 2005, respondent contends
that complainant went on media hype after the RTC reversed his
decision in Civil Case No. 391 and after the judgment of the
Supreme Court in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1583; that in his belief that
complainant is utilizing the press in order to influence his decision
on the case, he inhibited himself from conducting further
proceedings over the case; and that the case was subsequently
assigned to Judge Hannibal R. Patricio and a decision was
rendered on July 4, 2005. Respondent concludes that he cannot
be charged with gross inefficiency as he inhibited himself from
hearing the case.
In a letter[3] dated August 12, 2005, complainant denied
using the media to influence respondent as the latter had nothing

to do except to render judgment in accordance with the decision

of the appellate court reversing his own decision and respondent's
rendition of the mandated decision is ministerial on his part. He
avers that respondent inhibited himself from rendering the
decision only on April 18, 2005 or at least six months after the
complete records were remanded by the appellate court and after
the instant administrative case was filed against respondent.
In the Agenda Report[4] dated June 14, 2006, the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent guilty of undue
delay in violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary; and recommended that
respondent be suspended from office without salary and other
benefits for three months on the ground of gross inefficiency.
On July 19, 2006, the Court required the parties to manifest
their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings filed. On September 20, 2006, complainant complied in
the affirmative. However, respondent failed to comply with the
Resolution of July 19, 2006. Thus, the Court, in its Resolution
of February 26, 2007, resolved to dispense with the filing of said
manifestation.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the
OCA.
Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary[5] mandates judges to perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness.

Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a

judge within the reglementary period of 90 days fixed by the
Constitution and the law, is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency.[6]
Record shows that on appeal, the RTC of Roxas City
rendered a Decision[7] in Civil Case No. 391 and remanded the
case subject of the present complaint to the court of origin for
further proceedings. However, for reasons only known to
respondent, he sat on the case, so to speak, and reasoned that he
already inhibited himself from the case, seeing complainant's lack
of faith and bias in his (respondent's) action.
Further, Section 21, Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
provides:
Sec. 21. Appeal. x x x The decision of the Regional Trial Court
in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to
a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. x x x

It is clear from the aforecited provision that the decision of

the RTC in the appealed decision, in this case Civil Case No. 391,
is immediately executory. Therefore, respondent's lackadaisical
attitude in sitting on the case for more than five months only to
thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, to the detriment and
prejudice of the complainant, clearly shows his utter disregard of
settled rules and jurisprudence. It must be stressed that the Rule
was enacted to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive

determination of cases falling within its coverage. [8] It is therefore

not encouraging when it is the judge himself who occasions the
delay sought to be prevented by the Rule.[9]
It bears stressing that the publics faith and confidence in
the judicial system depends, to a large extent, on the judicious
and prompt disposition of cases and other matters pending before
the courts.[10] Failure to decide a case or resolve a motion within
the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the
erring magistrate.[11] The delay in resolving motions and incidents
pending before a judge within the reglementary period of 90 days
fixed by the Constitution and the law is not excusable. It
constitutes gross inefficiency warranting administrative sanction
from this Court.
As aptly observed by the OCA, it is unfortunate that despite
having been earlier fined by the Court for delay in the disposition
of Civil Case No. 391, respondent still failed to promptly act on the
case. Respondent should be reminded that his assumption of
judicial office casts upon him duties and restrictions peculiar to
his position.[12] Courts exist to dispense and promote
justice. Judges are the visible representations of law and justice.
[13]
One of their principal duties is to have an adequate grasp of
the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Indeed, they must be
the embodiments of competence, integrity and independence.
[14]
They owe it to the dignity of the court over which they preside,
to the public who depend on them, and to the legal profession to
which they belong, to know the very law they are supposed to
interpret and apply.[15] Party litigants will have great faith in the

administration of justice only if judges can demonstrate their grasp

of legal principles.[16]
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, delay in rendering a
decision or order is classified as a less serious charge and is
punishable with (a) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for a period of not less than one month but not
more than three months; or (b) fine of more than P10,000.00 but
not exceeding P20,000.00.
In our Decisions dated March 11, 2005 in A.M. No. MTJ-051583,[17]
entitled Arcenas v. Avelino; and December 9, 2005 in A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1606,[18] entitled Office
of
the Court Administrator v. Avelino, respondent
was
fined P20,000.00 forgross inefficiency with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
Considering that this is the third time that respondent is
found guilty of gross inefficiency, the maximum penalty of
three months suspension without salary and other benefits is in
order.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Henry B. Avelino,
MCTC, Pontevedra, Capiz, guilty of gross inefficiency and
is SUSPENDED from office for three months without salary and
other benefits, effective upon receipt of herein Resolution, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 1-7.

[2]

Id. at 45-46.

[3]

Id. at 40-41.

[4]

Id. at 47-50.

[5]

A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, June 1, 2004.

[6]

Perez v. Concepcion, 378 Phil. 918, 923 (1999).

[7]

Penned by Judge Delano F. Villarruz, September 24, 2004.

[8]

[9]

Office of the Court Administrator v. Avelino, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1606, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 9,
15.
Cuevas v. Balderian, 389 Phil. 580, 583 (2000).

[10]

Dumaua v. Ramirez, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1546, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 1, 4.

[11]

Id.

[12]

Rollo, p. 49.

[13]

Community Rural Bank of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Inc. v. Talavera, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1909, April 6, 2005,
455 SCRA 34, 43.

[14]

Id.

[15]

Id.

[16]

Id.

[17]

Penned by Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario.

[18]

Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia, supra note 8.

THIRD DIVISION

Aurora E. Balajedeong,
Compl

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1662

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-1858-P)

ainant,
Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, C.J.
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

Judge Deogracias K. Del

Rosario,
MCTC,
Patnongon, Antique,

CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

Respon
dent.
Promulgated:

June 8, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint [1] filed by Aurora E.

Balajedeong (Balajedeong), against Judge Deogracias K. Del
Rosario (Judge Del Rosario), Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Patnongon, Antique, for Grave
Misconduct; Conduct Unbecoming a Judge, and Delay in the
Disposition of a Case, relative to Civil Case No. 367
entitled, Paterno Colago v.
Sps. Willy and Salvacion
Odi, pending before said court.

Complainant Balajedeong is the attorney-in-fact of Paterno

Colago, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 367, filed against the
Spouses Odi for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order before the MCTC, Patnongon,
Antique, presided over by respondent Judge Del Rosario. She
narrated that after a preliminary conference was held on 12 May
2003, the parties were ordered by respondent Judge Del Rosario
to submit their respective position papers within 10 days. Colago,
through his representative and herein complainant Balajedeong,
allegedly filed his position paper on 24 June 2003, while Spouses
Odi failed to do so. On 13 February 2004, Colagos counsel filed a
Motion for Early Decision, but despite said motion, respondent
Judge Del Rosario never entertained his plea.

In his Comment[2] dated 26 July 2006, respondent Judge Del

Rosario claims that Spouses Odi submitted their memorandum on
2 June 2003, while Colago through his representative and herein
complainant Balajedeong, submitted his position paper on 30 June
2003. Respondent Judge Del Rosario admits that the delay in the
disposition of the subject case is due mainly to his failing health
as he claims that sometime in July 2003 and September 2003, he
had been hospitalized due to heart ailment and was advised to
undergo by-pass operation. Thereafter, he was hospitalized
several times more. Respondent Judge Del Rosario further states
that there was a time when he was assigned as Presiding Judge of
the 4th MCTC, Barbaza, Antique where he reported twice a week to
conduct trial and preliminary examination. Respondent Judge Del
Rosario further informs this Court that Civil Case No. 367, subject
matter of this instant administrative complaint, was already
decided on 15 June 2006.

On 24 November 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator

(OCA) submitted its report,[3] recommending that -

This instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular

administrative matter, and respondent Judge, in view of the previous
cases where he was sanctioned to pay fines, be penalized to pay a
FINE in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) with a
stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with even more severely.

On 15 January 2007, we required[4] the parties herein to

manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing to submit
the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed.

On 16 February 2007, complainant Balajedeong submitted

her manifestation[5] stating that she was submitting the case for
resolution based on the pleadings filed.

Respondent Judge Del Rosario failed to file

manifestation despite notice sent to and received by him.

his

Resultantly, the case is submitted for decision based on the

pleadings filed.

We agree with the recommendation of the Court Administrator except in the

penalty imposed.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory.[6]

The office of the judge exacts nothing less than faithful

observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of
official duties.[7] Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution,
mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must
be decided or resolved within three months from the date they
are submitted for decision or resolution. Moreover, Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to
dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods. Judges must closely adhere to the Code of
Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the integrity, competence,
and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of
justice more efficient.[8] Time and again, we have stressed the
need to strictly observe this duty so as not to negate our efforts
to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of
congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. Finally,
Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics exhort judges to
be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases
and matters pending before their courts, to wit:

6. PROMPTNESS

He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,

remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.

7. PUNCTUALITY

He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties,

recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of
value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad
example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice.

Also relevant is Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28

January 1988, which requires all magistrates to observe
scrupulously the periods prescribed in Article VIII, Section 15, of
the Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions and
interlocutory matters pending before their courts.

With respect to cases falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure, firstlevel courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and
position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to
render judgment.[9]

Section 10 of the Rules on Summary Procedure explicitly provides:

SEC.10. Rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and
position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render
judgment.

Clearly, respondent Judge Del Rosario failed to decide the aforementioned

case within the thirty-day period prescribed by the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. Herein complainant Balajedeong, on behalf of her principal Colago,
and the Spouses Odi, parties in Civil Case No. 357, allegedly filed their position

papers in June 2003; thus, respondent Judge Del Rosario had thirty days thereafter
to render a decision. But the decision was rendered only on 15 June 2006 or
almost three years later. Respondent Judge Del Rosarios act is contrary to the
rationale behind the Rules on Summary Procedure which was promulgated for the
purpose of achieving an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases.[10] For this reason, respondent Judge Del Rosario should be
administratively sanctioned. As held in Sanchez v. Vestil[11]:

This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases
promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice
denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with
dispatch. Their failure to do so constitute gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction on them.

Indeed, we have consistently impressed upon judges the

need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the principle
that justice delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve cases
submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a
serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a
speedy disposition of their cases. [12]

We cannot overstress this policy on prompt disposition or

resolution of cases. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in
the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the
lowering of its standards. [13] Failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reason,
constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of
administrative sanction on the defaulting judge. [14]

Respondent Judge Del Rosario ascribes the delay in the resolution of Civil
Case No. 367 to his failing health, as he was hospitalized several times due to heart
ailment. Even if he was stricken by an illness which hampered the due
performance of his duties, still it was incumbent upon respondent Judge Del
Rosario to inform this Court of his inability to seasonably decide the cases
assigned to him. His illness should not be an excuse for his failure to render the
corresponding decision or resolution within the prescribed period. While we
sympathize with his woes, the demands of public service cannot abide by his
illness.[15] In case of poor health, the Judge concerned needs only to ask this Court
for an extension of time to decide cases, as soon as it becomes clear to him that
there would be delay in his disposition of his cases. [16] We note that respondent
Judge Del Rosario made no such request. Also, if his health problems had indeed
severely impaired his ability to decide cases, respondent Judge Del Rosario could
have retired voluntarily instead of remaining at his post to the detriment of the
litigants and the public.

Respondent Judge Del Rosario also presented as an excuse to the delay in

deciding Civil Case No. 367 the additional work given to him when he was
assigned as Presiding Judge of the 4th MCTC, Barbaza, Antique, where he reported
twice a week to conduct trials and preliminary examinations. This will not
exonerate him. His failure to decide the case on time cannot be ignored. As we
ruled in Espaola v. Panay,[17] if the case load of the judge prevents the disposition
of cases within the reglementary periods, again, he should ask this Court for a
reasonable extension of time to dispose of the cases involved. This is to avoid or
dispel any suspicion that something sinister or corrupt is going on. The records of
this administrative matter do not show that any attempt was made by respondent
Judge Del Rosario to make such a request. Instead, he preferred to keep the case
pending, enshrouding the same in his silence.

Respondent Judge Del Rosario should have known that if his caseload,
additional assignments or designations, health reasons or other factors prevented
the timely disposition of his pending cases, all he had to do was to simply ask this

Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of his cases. The Court,
cognizant of the heavy case load of some judges and mindful of the difficulties
encountered by them in the disposition thereof, is almost always disposed to grant
such requests on meritorious grounds.[18] But for all his excuses, respondent Judge
Del Rosario failed to file any motion for extension despite the availability of this
remedy.

It must be noted also that respondent Judge Del Rosario was already
penalized for his first offense involving undue delay in A.M. No. MTJ-961091. He should have known better than to simply let the reglementary period
pass by again in another case.

All told, we find respondent Judge Del Rosario guilty of undue delay in
rendering a decision in Civil Case No. 367 which, under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of
the Revised Rules of Court, is classified as a less serious charge. Under Section
11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months,
or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

In the Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 29 and
59, Toledo City,[19] the Court observed the following factors in the determination of
the proper penalty for failure to decide a case on time:

We have always considered the failure of a judge to decide a case within

ninety (90) days as gross inefficiency and imposed either fine or suspension from
service without pay for such. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending
chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and
other factors, to wit: the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances- the
damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the
judge, etc. x x x.

As may be gleaned from the case above-quoted, several factors

shall be considered in imposing the proper penalty, such as: the
presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage
suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age
of the judge, etc.

In the present case, the delay for which respondent Judge Del Rosario is
being found liable pertains to only one case, Civil Case No. 367. There are the
mitigating circumstances of his admission of his fault to decide the case on time,
and his failing health. While we recognize respondent Judge Del Rosarios heavy
case load and his poor health, such factors cannot exonerate him from his
administrative liability. They can only serve to mitigate the imposable penalty.

As heretofore cited, records show that he was previously penalized in A.M.

No. MTJ-96-1091,[20] and was fined P8,000.00 with warning, for not deciding a
criminal case despite the lapse of three years, despite his reason for the inaction
being that he personally believed that he could not decide a case which was heard
by another judge.

In A.M. No. MTJ-03-1515-MTJ,[21] respondent Judge Del Rosario was found

administratively liable for his unjustified failure to comment on an administrative
complaint against him, and was fined P21,000.00. In A.M. No. MTJ-94-949,[22] he
was fined P5,000.00 with warning for Gross Misconduct and Negligence for his
refusal to comply with the directives of the OCA and of the Commission on Audit.

In the present case, the fine of P30,000.00 recommended by the OCA is, to
our mind, too severe. We find the amount of P20,000.00 reasonable under the
premises.

As we have often stressed, the judge is the visible representation of the law
and, more importantly, of justice. Thus, he must be the first to abide by the law
and weave an example for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful to
avoid committing even the slightest infraction of the Rules.[23]

WHEREFORE, Judge Deogracias K. Del Rosario is found guilty of undue

delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 367 and is hereby ordered to pay
a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy
of this decision be attached to his personal records. The Court Administrator is
directed to furnish all concerned copies of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA MARTINEZ

NACHURA
Associate Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 4-5.

[2]

Id. at 15.

[3]

Id. at 1-3.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.

Associate Justice

[4]

Id. at 21.

[5]

Id. at 22.

[6]

Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, 20 June 1997, 274 SCRA 540, 548-549, citing Cf. Valdez v.
Ocumen, 106 Phil. 929, 933 (1960) and Alvero v. De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 434 (1946).

[7]

City,

[8]

Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1737, 9 September 2004,

438

SCRA 1, 14.

[9]

Section 10, Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of the Cases in RTC-Br. 138, Makati
325 Phil. 111, 118 (1996).

[10]

Gachon v. Devera, Jr., supra note 6 at 549.

[11]

A.M. No. RTJ-08-1419, 13 October 1998, 298 SCRA 1, 17; Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Butalid, 355 Phil. 337, 349 (1998); Atty. Ng v. Judge Ulibari, 355 Phil. 76, 84-85 (1998); Grefaldeo v.
Judge Lacson, 355 Phil. 266, 272 (1998).

[13]

Re: Report of Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferada Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the
RTC, Branch 26, Argao, Cebu, A.M. No. 00-4-09-SC, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 125, 133.

[14]

Celino v. Judge Abrogar, 315 Phil. 305, 312 (1995).

[15]

Office of the Court Administrator v. Butalid, supra note 11 at 350.

[16]

Office of the Court Administrator v. Quizon, 427 Phil. 63, 76 (2002).

[17]

A.M. No. RTJ-95-1325, 4 October 1995, 248 SCRA 684, 687, citing Cruz v. Basa, A.M. No. MTJ91- 598, 9 February 1993, 218 SCRA 551, 557.

[18]

Gonzalez-Decano v. Siapno, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1279, 1 March 2001, 353 SCRA 269, 278.

[19]

354 Phil. 8, 21 (1998).

[20]

Navarro v. Judge Del Rosario, 337 Phil. 1, 6 (1997).

[21]

Imbang v. Del Rosario, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 79.

[22]

Office of the Court Administrator v. Del Rosario, 13 December 1994, 239 SCRA 135.

[23]

Castillo v. Cortes, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1082, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 398.

FIRST DIVISION
P/SUPT. ALEJANDRO GUTIERREZ, PCI
ANTONIO RICAFORT, SPO4 RICARDO
G.
ONG,
and
SPO1
ARNULFO
MEDENILLA,
Complainants,

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1628

Present:
*

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

**

- versus -

JUDGE GODOFREDO G. HERNANDEZ,

SR.,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
June 8, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:
This administrative case stems from a joint complaint-affidavit [1] dated April
18, 2005 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by complainants
P/Supt. Alejandro Gutierrez, PCI Antonio Ricafort, SPO4 Ricardo G. Ong, and
SPO1 Arnulfo Medenilla, all of the Criminal Investigation and Detective Division
(CIDD) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), against then (now retired) Judge
Godofredo G. Hernandez, Sr. of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro charging the latter with:
1.

Gross ignorance of the law;

2.

Impropriety;

3.

Grave misconduct;

4.

Conduct unbecoming of a judge; and

5.

Lack of integrity to continue as a member of the judiciary.

The joint complaint-affidavit alleged that on August 9, 2004, Gus Abelgas of

ABS-CBN's Private Eye TV program accompanied one Ernesto Cruz to Camp
Crame, Quezon City to file a complaint involving Cruz's minor daughter who was
allegedly recruited in Malabon, Metro Manila to work in a KTV bar in
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.
The next day, August 10, 2004, complainants, as CIDD officers and agents,
conducted a rescue operation accompanied by Ernesto Cruz, Gus Abelgas and
other ABS-CBN TV crew members who took footage of the operation. The CIDD
team was able to rescue five (5) young girls, namely, Joahna Cruz (daughter of
Ernesto Cruz), Imelda De Vera, Amylene De Vera, Jackielou Garcia, and Rosalyn
Payawal, from the house of a certain Salvador Napolitano in Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro who claimed that PO2 Jose Ringor, allegedly a member of the Provincial
Mobile Group of the PNP, Oriental Mindoro, brought the women to him for
safekeeping.

As a result of the rescue operation, a complaint for violation of Republic Act

(RA) 9208 in relation to RA 7610 was subsequently filed before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Malabon against PO2 Ringor, his recruiter wife Imelda and a
certain Bebang. Thereafter, the rescued minors were brought and turned over to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development. Later, the corresponding
Information was filed and warrants of arrest with no bail recommended were then
issued against PO2 Ringor, et al.
Several weeks thereafter, complainants were surprised to discover that cases
for grave coercion and qualified trespass to dwelling had been filed against them,
Gus Abelgas and Ernesto Cruz in the MTC of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,
before the sala of the respondent judge. Apparently, the rescued girls, except
Joahna Cruz, had retracted their complaint against PO2 Ringor, et al. and had,
instead, filed charges of grave coercion and qualified trespass to dwelling against
the members of the CIDD rescue team.
It was in connection with said charges, docketed in respondent judge's court
as Criminal Case Nos. 6149 to 6156, that the instant administrative complaint
arose. In their joint complaint-affidavit, complainants sought to hold the
respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law in
1.

Issuing warrants of arrest in inordinate haste, forgoing the mandatory

conduct of preliminary examination and personal determination of
probable cause in contravention of the provisions of the Rules of Court
and in denial of complainants' constitutional rights to due process; and

2.

Setting the said criminal cases for arraignment without the requisite
Informations having yet been filed in court.

The same complaint-affidavit also contains factual allegations which, if true,

would constitute impropriety, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a
member of the judiciary, to wit:
x x x On August 17, 2004, Rosalyn Payawal, Amylyn de Vera, Imelda dela
Rosa, and Jackielou [four of the rescued girls] were taken by SPO2 Arnulfo
Balacana, PO2 Jose Ringor and a certain Atty. Cabugoy with two others at their
respective residences and brought to Pasig City, and thereafter to La Taberna
beach resort at Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro where they were threatened and
coerced to sign a complaint for grave coercion and qualified trespass to dwelling

against herein complainants including Gus Abelgas and Ernesto Cruz. They were
likewise threatened and coerced into signing a retraction of their complaint against
PO2 Ringor, et al.
[At the said beach resort,] Judge Godofredo G. Hernandez arrived and
conferred with PO2 Ringor, SPO2 Balacana and Atty. Cabugoy relative to the
retraction of the complaint of the minors against PO2 Ringor, et al. and the filing
of the case against herein [complainants], Ernesto Cruz and Gus Abelgas for
qualified trespass to dwelling and grave coercion. The conference was allegedly
followed by a drinking spree with the group of SPO2 Balacana, PO2 Ringor, Atty.
Cabugoy, and Judge Hernandez who was seen being entertained by two (2) GROs
given by SPO2 Balacana.[2] [Words in brackets added]

In his Comment[3] dated May 31, 2005, the respondent judge denies the
accusations against him and dismisses the same as pure harassment calculated to
cast doubt on his character and integrity as a retiring judge. He then puts forth his
unblemished record in the government service since 1956.
To respondent judge, there was nothing anomalous nor irregular in the
procedural steps he undertook relative to the subject criminal cases. He maintains
that his act of setting said criminal cases for the arraignment of the complainants,
as accused therein, even without any information having yet been filed, and issuing
warrants of arrest despite the absence of any such information, were all pursuant
to a valid exercise of his judicial function as the presiding judge of Pinamalayan.
He asserts that, contrary to the complainants allegation, he conducted a
preliminary investigation and then issued the corresponding warrant of arrest there
being a motion filed by the private offended parties for the early issuance
thereof. He further claims that the determination of probable cause for the
purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest is his sole prerogative as a judge.
As for the imputation of his having coerced and manipulated the private
offended parties, the respondent judge counters that there is no showing that he has
a personal interest in those cases. He vehemently denies his purported participation
in a drinking spree while being entertained by two GROs, stressing that he had
never set foot in La Taverna Beach Resort which has apparently been nonoperational since 2003 as attested to by the Certification issued by the Municipal
Treasurer of Gloria, Oriental Mindoro. In any event, respondent points to the lack
of evidence substantiating the alleged entertainment accorded him.

To bolster his assertion of good moral standing in the community, respondent

filed a Supplemental Comment[4] on June 16, 2005, therein attaching a recent
recognition of his good character, and the various honors and citations conferred
upon him.
In its report of October 19, 2005, the OCA came out with its findings that the
respondent judge was guilty of gross ignorance of procedural rules. Seeing,
however, that this is the only administrative complaint filed against the respondent
and that he had compulsorily retired last July 15, 2005, the OCA recommended
that respondent be merely fined in the amount of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
We agree with the OCAs findings and recommendation.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court requires preliminary investigation
in cases cognizable by the municipal trial courts for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without
regard to the fine.
Section 3 of Rule 112 explicitly provides for the procedure to be followed in
the conduct of a preliminary investigation, thus:
Sec. 3. Procedure. - The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in
the following manner:
(a)

The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and

shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to
establish the probable cause. x x x

(b)

Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the
investigating officer shall either dismiss it if
he finds
no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the
complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.

xxx
(c)

xxx

xxx

Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the
respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his
witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for
his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and
sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of his
section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the
complainant. The respondent shall be allowed to file a
motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is apparent from the facts on record that the complainants were never
issued any subpoena to accord them the opportunity to file their counter-affidavits
to adduce evidence controverting those alleged in the criminal complaints against
them before the respondent judge issued the warrants of arrest. Moreover, the
warrants of arrest were issued without complying with the requisite conditions
therefor.
It was on August 23, 2004 that the complaints for qualified trespass to
dwelling and grave coercion were filed against Ernesto Cruz and five (5) John
Does before the salaof respondent judge. On August 24, 2004, a motion for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Ernesto Cruz was filed. Respondent
immediately granted said motion and issued a warrant for his arrest that same day.
On September 8, 2004, a Motion to Amend Criminal Complaint was filed by
Amylene, Imelda and Jackielou identifying the names of the
members of the CIDD rescue team including Gus Abelgas. Again, on the very
same day, warrants of arrest were hastily issued against herein complainants and
Gus Abelgas.
Indubitably, there was no preliminary investigation conducted as requi
red by the rules since no subpoena was issued to herein complainants for them to
file counter-affidavits. Furthermore, the inordinate haste attending the issuance of
the warrants of arrest against complainants, Ernesto Cruz, and Gus Abelgas belies
the conduct of preliminary examination and personal determination of probable

cause, in contravention of the provisions of the Rules of Court, and constituting a

denial of due process.
Section 6, par. (b) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. - When required pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling
under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be
conducted by either the judge or the prosecutor. x x x When the investigation is
conducted by the judge himself, he shall follow the procedure provided in section
3 of this Rule. If his findings and recommendations are affirmed by the provincial
or city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman or his deputy, and the corresponding
information is filed, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. However, without waiting
for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if
he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and
his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable
cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. [Emphasis
supplied]

From the foregoing provision, there are three (3) conditions that must concur
for the issuance of the warrant of arrest by the municipal judge during a
preliminary investigation. The investigating judge must:
1.

Have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses by searching questions and answers;

2.

Be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and

3.

That there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in

order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

The issuance of the warrants of arrest in this case was clearly irregular
since, not only did it lack a preliminary investigation, but the order granting

such issuance did not show any finding of a need to place complainants under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.[5]
Even if the judge finds probable cause, it is not mandatory for him to issue a
warrant of arrest. He must further determine the necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
[6]
It is improper for a municipal judge to issue a warrant of arrest without any
finding that it was necessary to place the accused in immediate custody to prevent
frustration of the ends of justice.[7]
The procedure described in Section 6(b) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court is
mandatory and failure to follow the same would amount to a denial of due process.
[8]
Thus, in the case of Sps. Arcilla v. Judge Palaypayan and Clerk of Court Bajo,
[9]
the Court held:
While respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation on the same
day the complaint for estafa was filed, however, he did not notify the accused to
give him an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and evidence in his defense.
Worst, on the same day, respondent judge issued the warrant of arrest. Clearly, his
actuations manifest his ignorance of procedural rules and a reckless disregard of
the accused's basic right to due process.

Worse still, in a clear display of gross ignorance, respondent set Criminal

Case Nos. 6149 to 6156 for arraignment and hearing knowing fully well that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted and no informations had yet been
filed before his court. This clearly violates complainants' right, as accused in those
cases, to due process, to be informed of the accusation against them and to have a
copy of the Information before arraignment. As record shows, complainants, as
accused in those cases, had already received subpoenas way back on February 11,
2005, commanding them to appear before the court on March 4, 2005 for
arraignment without the corresponding Informations having as yet been filed.
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and
to simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the
law.[10]Newly appointed judges are required to have a working knowledge of the
Rules of Court before they assume their judicial post. And after years of service in

the judiciary, judges are expected to have become already conversant with the
Rules, which they apply and rely on everyday in court. Years of service in the
bench simply negate any notion that a judge could be grossly ignorant of
procedural laws. It is thus completely inexcusable for the respondent who had been
with the judiciary for the last twelve (12) years to have acted the way he did in this
case.
Be that as it may, compassion works in respondents favor, what with the fact
that this is his first administrative case after more than a decade of judicial service,
let alone the circumstance that he has already compulsorily retired. OCAs
recommended penalty of FINE appears in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Godofredo G. Hernandez, Sr. is
found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and is ordered to
pay a FINE of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On official leave)

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

*
**
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]

On official leave.
Acting chairperson.
Rollo, pp. 1-12.
Joint Complaint-Affidavit; id. at 3.
Id. at 101-111.
Id. at 199-222.
Oktubre v. Judge Velasco, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1444, July 22, 2004, 434 SCRA 636.
Bagunas v. Fabillar, A.M. No. MTJ-97-1128, April 22, 1998, 289 SCRA 383.
Mantaring v. Roman, A.M. No. RTJ 93-064, February 26, 1996, 68 SCRA 670.
Cabilao v. Sardido, A.M. No. MTJ-93-818, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 94.
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1344, September 5, 2001, 364 SCRA 464.
Creer v. Fabillar, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1218, August 14, 2000, 337 SCRA 632.

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

ROSA YAP-PARAS,
Petitioner
,

A.C. No. 4947

Present:

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -

CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.

ATTY. JUSTO PARAS,

Responde
nt.

Promulgated:

June 7, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

For resolution is this Motion for Contempt and/or

Disbarment[1] dated April 11, 2005, filed by herein petitionermovant Rosa Yap Paras against respondent Atty. Justo Paras, for
the latters alleged violation of a suspension order earlier meted
upon him by the Court. The motion alleges:
4.

That the respondent in this case admits that he has continued

his practice of law and in fact filed pleadings in court after the
receipt of suspension on the ground that the alleged filing of his
motion for reconsideration suspends or interrupt (sic) the
running of the period to appeal,

and prays that for his violation of the suspension order, the
respondent be declared in contempt of court and be disbarred.

Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows:

On September 9, 1998, herein petitioner-movant filed a

verified Petition[2] praying for the disbarment of her estranged
husband respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras alleging acts of deceit,
malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and
violation of oath as a lawyer committed by the latter.

On February
14,
2005,
the
Court
issued
a
[3]
Resolution finding Atty. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in
violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, the Court resolved to suspend Atty. Paras
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a
warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the
future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Per records, the aforesaid Resolution was received by Atty.

Paras on March 18, 2005. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 28, 2005.[4]

During the pendency of Atty. Paras motion for

reconsideration, complainant-movant filed with the Court the
instant Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, alleging
thereunder, inter alia, that Atty. Paras violated the suspension
order earlier issued by the Court with his continued practice of
law.

In time, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 18, 2005,

denying for lack of merit Atty. Paras motion for reconsideration,
to wit:
[5]

Administrative Case No. 4947 (Rosa Yap Paras vs. Atty. Justo
Paras) Acting on the respondents motion for reconsideration dated
March 28, 2005 of the resolution of February 14, 2005 which
suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
the Court Resolves to DENY the motion for lack of merit.

The Court further Resolves to NOTE:

(a)

the complainants opposition dated April

11,
2005 to
the
said
motion
for
reconsideration with leave of Court;

(b)

the respondents motion dated May 6,

2005 for immediate resolution of the motion
for reconsideration; and

(c)

the complainants motion for contempt

and/or disbarment dated April 11, 2005,
praying that respondent be declared in
contempt of court and ordered disbarred and
to REQUIRE the
respondent
to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days
from notice.

In the same resolution, the Court required Atty. Paras to

comment on petitioner-movants Motion for Contempt and/or
Disbarment.

After more than a year, or on September 12, 2006 Atty.

Paras filed with the Court a Manifestation [6], stating that he had
completely and faithfully served his one (1) year suspension from

the practice of law from August 25, 2005, the day after he
received the denial resolution on his motion for reconsideration,
to August 24, 2006.

It appearing that Atty. Paras failed to file a comment on the

Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, the Court issued another
Resolution dated November 27, 2006requiring Atty. Paras to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for such
failure and to comply with the said resolution within ten (10) days
from receipt.

Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and

Explanation on Failure to Timely File Required Comment [7] was
filed by Atty. Paras denying all the allegations in petitionermovants Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment. He likewise
claimed that he had never done nor made any conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice, nor undermine or put to naught or
violate any of the pertinent causes enumerated in Section 3, Rule
71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Here, we are called upon to impose on Atty. Paras the

highest punishment to an erring lawyer disbarment or to hold
him in contempt for his failure to comply with this Courts
resolutions.

In a number of cases,[8] we have repeatedly explained and

stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a
punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is
rather intended to protect the courts and the public from
members of the bar who have become unfit and unworthy to be

part of the esteemed and noble profession. Likewise, the purpose

of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard
the functions of the court to assure respect for court orders by
attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly
administration of justice.

We find no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movants

allegation that Atty. Paras violated the Courts suspension order,
what with the fact that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative to
inform the lower courts of his one- year suspension from law
practice.[9]

It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to

recognize the authority of the Supreme Court and obey its lawful
processes and orders. Despite errors which one may impute on
the orders of the Court, these must be respected, especially by
the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts.
It is well to emphasize again that a resolution of the Supreme
Court is not be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. [10] Court
orders are to be respected not because the justices or judges who
issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of
the government. This is absolutely essential if our government is
to be a government of laws and not of men. [11]

Here, Atty. Paras admitted that he had been less than

prudent, and indeed fell short, of his obligation to follow, obey
and comply with the specific Order of the Honorable Supreme
Court contained in Its Resolution dated July 18, 2005 due to his
deteriorating health condition which required him to undergo a
coronary angiogram and bypass graft[12]. He likewise expressed

his profound and immeasurable sorrowness amidst regrets for his

delayed compliance with the Courts order.

Given the above, the Court takes this opportunity to remind

the parties in the instant case, as well petitioner-movants
counsels, to avoid further squabbles and unnecessary filing of
administrative cases against each other. An examination of the
records reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between
Atty. Paras and petitioners counsels as evidenced by the number
of administrative cases between them. It is well to stress that
mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations between
attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will
not receive sympathy from this Court. [13] Lawyers should treat
each other with courtesy, fairness, candor and civility. [14]

All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as

a sufficient sanction for Atty Paras failure to promptly comply
with its directives. The imposition of this sanction in the present
case would be more consistent with the avowed purpose of a
disciplinary case, which is not so much to punish the individual
attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the
judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of
officers of the court.[15]

ACCORDINGLY,
the Motion
for
Contempt
and/or
Disbarment is DENIED.
However,
Atty.
Justo
Paras
is
hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to observe the respect due
the Court in not promptly complying with this Courts resolution,
with WARNING that a more drastic punishment will be imposed
upon him for a repetition of the same act.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 1062-1065.

[2]

Rollo, Vol. I at pp. 3-9.

[3]

Id. at pp. 1000-1009.

[4]

Id. at pp. 1021-1028.

[5]

Id. at p. 1132.

[6]

Id. at pp. 1139-1141.

[7]

Id. at pp. 1165-1173.

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

Geeslin v. Navarro, Adm. Case No. 2033 and 2148, May 9, 1990, 185 SCRA 230;
citing Diaz v. Gerong, Adm. Case No. 2439, January 16, 1986, 141 SCRA 46
and Daroy, et al. v. Legaspi, Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 304
and Mariano Y. Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission and Elena Embang, G.R.
No. 158971, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 154.
Rollo, p. 1136.
Ong v. Grijaldo, Adm. Case No. 4724, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 1 and Guerrero v. Deray, A.M. No.
MTJ-02-1466, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 591.
Luis N. De Leon v. Joey Y. Torres, 99 Phil 462.

[12]

Rollo, p. 1166.

[13]

Asa vs. Castillo, Adm. Case No. 6501, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 309.

[14]

Canon 8, Code of Professional Responsibility.

[15]

Gamilla v. Marino, Jr., Adm.Case No. 4763, March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 308.