MWSS vs.

CA and the City of Dagupan

FACTS:
The City of Dagupan (CITY) filed a complaint against the former National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA), now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), for recovery of
the ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA interposed as one of its
special defenses R.A. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership, possession and control of all waterworks
systems throughout the Philippines and as one of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it
had incurred for necessary and useful improvements amounting to P255,000.00. Judgment was rendered
by the trial court in favor of the CITY on the basis of a stipulation of facts. The trial court found NAWASA
to be a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MWSS has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by NAWASA to the
Dagupan Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA was found to be a possessor in
bad faith?
HELD:
Pertinent portion related to our topic.
The CITY in its brief questions the raising of the issue of the removal of useful improvements for the first
time in this Court, inasmuch as it was not raised in the trial court, much less assigned as an error before
the then Court of Appeals. The CITY further argues that petitioner, as a possessor in bad faith, has
absolutely no right to the useful improvements; that the rulings in the cases cited by petitioner are not
applicable to the case at bar; that even assuming that petitioner has the right to remove the useful
improvements, such improvements were not actually identified, and hence a rehearing would be required
which is improper at this stage of the proceedings; and finally, that such improvements, even if they could
be identified, could not be separated without causing substantial injury or damage to the Dagupan
Waterworks System.
The procedural objection of the CITY is technically correct. NAWASA should have alleged its additional
counterclaim in the alternative-for the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and
useful improvements or for the removal of all the useful improvements it had introduced.
Petitioner, however, argues that although such issue of removal was never pleaded as a counterclaim
nevertheless it was joined with the implied consent of the CITY, because the latter never filed a countermanifestation or objection to petitioner's manifestation wherein it stated that the improvements were
separable from the system, and quotes the first part of Sec. 5 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court to support
its contention. Said provision reads as follows:
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.-When issues
not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues. ...
This argument is untenable because the above-quoted provision is premised on the fact that evidence
had been introduced on an issue not raised by the pleadings without any objection thereto being raised
by the adverse party. In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever had been introduced by petitioner on
the issue of removability of the improvements and the case was decided on a stipulation of facts.
Consequently, the pleadings could not be deemed amended to conform to the evidence.

Solar Team Entertainment v. Ricafort

293 SCRA 661 | Andres
FACTS:
Petitioner, as plaintiff, filed before the RTC in Paranaque a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages with prayer for a writ of replevin against herein private respondents. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 97-0304 and was assigned to public respondent Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort. Private
respondents, as defendants, filed their Answer (with Counterclaims). A copy thereof was furnished
counsel for petitioner by registered mail; however, the pleading did not contain any written explanation as
to why service was not made personally upon petitioner-plaintiff. Petitioner filed a motion to expunge the
Answer (with Counterclaims) and to declare herein private respondents in default, alleging therein that the
latter did not observe the mandate of the aforementioned Section 11, especially since the office of
defendants counsel is just a stone throw away from the office of petitioners counsel, with an estimate
distance of about 200 meters more or less. Petitioner further alleged that the post office was about ten
(10) times farther from the office of defendents counsel. Public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort
issued an order denying, for lack of merit, petitioners motion to expunge the Answer (with Counterclaims)
and to declare private respondents in default.
ISSUE:
W/N Judge Bautista-Ricafort committed GAD when she admitted private respondents' "Answer (with
Counterclaims)" notwithstanding violation of Section 11, Rule 13.
HELD:
No. Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable,
be done personally; and if made through other modes, the party concerned must provide a written
explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally.
Personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of
time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not
practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation
as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an
explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues
involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section
11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by the
1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.
Here, the proximity between the offices of opposing counsel was established; moreover, that the office of
private respondents counsel was ten times farther from the post office than the distance separating the
offices of opposing counsel. Of course, proximity would seem to make personal service most practicable,
but exceptions may nonetheless apply. For instance, where the adverse party or opposing counsel to be
served with a pleading seldom reports to office and no employee is regularly present to receive pleadings,
or where service is done on the last day of the reglementary period and the office of the adverse party or
opposing counsel to be served is closed, for whatever reason.
Returning, however, to the merits of this case, in view of the proximity between the offices of opposing
counsel and the absence of any attendant explanation as to why personal service of the answer was not
effected, indubitably, private respondents counsel violated Section 11 of Rule 13 and the motion to
expunge was prima facie meritorious. However, the grant or denial of said motion nevertheless remained
within the sound exercise of the trial courts discretion. Thus, as guided by Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which ordains that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding, as
well as by the dictum laid down in Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 [1910], the trial court opted to exercise
its discretion in favor of admitting the Answer (with Counterclaims), instead of expunging it from the
record.
To our mind, if motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 were to be
indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of Rule 1 or Alonzo v. Villamor and other analogous cases, then
Section 11 would become meaningless and its sound purpose negated. Nevertheless, we sustain the
challenged ruling of the trial court, but for reasons other than those provided for in the challenged order
(The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1 July 1997, while the questioned Answer (with
Counterclaims) was filed only.

BPI v. Santiago Digest

G.R. No. 169116 March 28, 2007
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.:
Service of Summons
Facts:
1. Centrogen, a domestic corporation engaged in pharmaceutical business obtained several loans from
Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), which was secured by a real estate mortage over a parcel
of land by Irene Santiago. Subsequently, FEBTC merged with BPI. Due to failure of Centrogen to pay its
loans,
BPI filed a case for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property before
the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Thereafter, a Notice of Sale was issued by the Provincial Sheriff on 21
January 2003. On the same day, the Spouses Santiago were served with the copy of the Notice of
Sale.Upon receipt the spouses and Centrogen filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a TRO and
Preliminary and Final Injunction and in the alternative, for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with
BPI.
2. The complaint alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of P490,000.00, including interest
thereon has been fully paid. Such payment notwithstanding, the amount was still included in the amount
of computation of the arrears as shown by the document of Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage filed by the latter. Moreover, the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen contended that the original
loan agreement was for the amount of 5 Million but only 2 Million was released by petitioner and as a
result, the squalene project failed and the company groped for funds to pay its loan obligations.
3. On 27 February 2003, BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer and on the same day,
summons was served on the Branch Manager of BPI . Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and other procedural
infirmities attendant to the filing of the complaint. BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz,
Laguna Branch, was not one of those authorized by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court to
receive summons on behalf of the corporation. The summons served upon its Branch Manager, therefore,
did not bind the corporation. Also alleged lack of authorityof the person who signed. RTC denied the MD
and issued new summons.
4. The RTC granted the TRO to prevent foreclosure sale. BPI file MR but was denied hence this petition
with BPI alleging that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over its person and consequently, the
Order issued by the RTC, permanently enjoining the foreclosure sale, was therefore void and does not
bind BPI.
Issue: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over BPI
YES. The Court acquired jurisdiction over BPI. The defect of the service of the original summons was
cured by the issuance of the new summons which was not questioned by BPI.
1. There was substantial compliance. Although it may be true that the service of summons was made on
a person not authorized to receive the same in behalf of the petitioner. Since it appears that the summons
and complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there
was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons.
2. The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of summons is whether the same and the
attachments thereto where ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances that no

undue prejudice is sustained by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full opportunity to present
its responsive pleadings. This is but in accord with the entrenched rule that the ends of substantial justice
should not be subordinated to technicalities and, for which purpose, each case should be examined within
the factual milieu peculiar to it.
3. The Court also emphasized that there is no hard and fast rule pertaining to the manner of service of
summons. Rather, substantial justice demands that every case should be viewed in light of the peculiar
circumstances attendant to each.

AZAJAR VS CA
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks reversal of the Resolution of the respondent CA setting aside the judgment by default
rendered against private respondent by the CFI, and directing that said respondent be allowed to file its
answer to the complaint and after joinder of issues, trial be had and judgment rendered on the merits.
This case originated from a complaint filed by petitioner Azajar against respondent Cham Samco and
Sons, Inc. in the CFI of Camarines Sur. Azajars claim, briefly, is that he had purchased from Samco, thru
the latters agent, 100 Kegs of nails of various sizes, specified in one of Samcos printed order forms, and
had given to the agent P18,000.00 in fun payment thereof; but in breach of contract, Samco had offered
to deliver only a part of the quantity ordered.
Samco filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action-the
complaints language indicating not a perfected sale but merely an offer to buy by plaintiff that was partly
accepted by defendant, and failing to show that as explicitly required by the order form prices had been
confirmed by Samcos Manila Office, and (2) that venue was improperly laid- Samcos invariable
conditions in transactions of this nature, as Azajar well knew from many such transactions in the past,
being that any legal action thereon must be instituted in the City of Manila.
It is this notice that has given rise to the controversy at bar.
Contending that such a notice was fatally defective and rendered the Motion to Dismiss incapable of to
the period to answer, Azajar filed a to declare Samco in default, which the Court granted. The Court
pronounced Samco in default and allowed Azajar to present evidence ex parte. The Court justified the
order of default in the wise:
On February 4, 1974, defendant thru counsel instead of an answer to the complaint, filed a Motion to
Dismiss which, in legal contemplation, is not a motion at an because the .notice therein is directed to
the Clerk of Court instead of to the party concerned (as required by Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court) and is without the requisite notice of time and place of hearing; that a motion with a notice of
hearing (a) directed to the Clerk of Court not to the parties; and (b) merely stating that the same be
submitted for resolution of the Honorable Court upon receipt thereof, copy of which motion was duly
furnished to and received by the adverse counsel is fatally defective and did not toll the running of the
period to appeal. Consequently, inasmuch as the motion to dismiss in this case is a mere scrap of paper
because it is without the requisite notice of time and place of hearing, the filing thereof did not suspend
the running of the period to file the required responsive pleading. That from February 4, 1974 to
February 21, 1974, seventeen (17) days had lapsed and defendant failed to file any responsive pleading

Then on March 30, 1974, the Trial Court rendered judgment by default against defendant Samco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the non-compliance to the notice of hearing requirement is defective warranting a
denial of Motion to Dismiss.

HELD:
The Court concluded its opinion with the observation that the ends of justice would be better served in
this case if we brush aside technicality and afford the petitioner its day in court.
It was wrong, of course, for Samco to have failed to set its motion to dismiss for hearing on a specified
date and time. The law explicitly requires that notice of a motion shall be served by the appellant to all
parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion,
and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it; and that the notice shag be directed to the parties
concerned, stating the time and place for the hearing of the motion. The uniform holding of this Court has
been that a failure to comply with the requirement is a fatal flaw. Such notice is required to avoid
surprises upon the opposite party and give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion,
as well as to determine or make determinable the time of submission of the motion for resolution.
Samcos belief that it was not necessary that its motion to dismiss be set for hearing was avowedly
engendered by two factors, namely: 1) the fact that while the Rules of Court specify the motions which
can be heard only with prior service upon adverse parties, said Rules do not point out which written
motions may be ex parte, preferring, it appears, to leave to the court, in motions other than those
specified, the discretion either to ex parte resolve or to call the parties to a hearing ; and 2) the
further fact that its motion to dismiss was based on two grounds on which a hearing was superfluous, the
first, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, being determinable exclusively from the
allegations of the complaint and no evidence being allowable thereon; and the second, that venue is
improperly laid, being resolvable exclusively on the basis of documents annexed to the motion.
These considerations, to be sure, did not erase movants duty to give notice to the adverse party of the
date and time of the hearing on its motion, the purpose of said notice being, as already stressed, not only
to give the latter time to oppose the motion if so minded, but also to determine the time of its submission
for resolution. Without such notice, the occasion would not arise to determine with reasonable certitude
whether and within what time the adverse party would respond to the motion, and when the motion might
already be resolved by the Court. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant, not on the Court.
Withal the reasons for Cham Samcos erroneous notion of the dispensability of a hearing on its motion to
dismiss are not utterly without plausibility. This circumstance, taken together with the fact, found by the
Intermediate Appellate Court and not disputed by petitioner Azajar, that Cham Samco has meritorious
defenses which if proven would defeat Azajars claim against it, and the eminent desirability more than
once stressed by this Court that cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all
parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
18
imperfections, all conduce to concurrence with the Court of Appeals that the ends of justice would be
better served in this case if we brush aside technicality and afford the petitioner its day in court.