1

[G.R. No. 48100. June 20, 1941.] FLORENCIO PELOBELLO, petitioner-appellant, vs. GREGORIO PALATINO, respondent-appellee.
DECISION
LAUREL, J p:
The petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against the
respondent-appellee, Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. The proceedings were had
pursuant to the provisions of section 167, in relation with section 94 (a), of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357). It was alleged that
the respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atentado cointra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to
imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the
contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by plenary pardon.
The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the election and consequent proclamation of the respondent-appellee for the office
of municipal mayor. It is also admitted that the respondent-appellee was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915;
and it has been proven (Vide Exhibit 1, admitted by the lower court, rec. of ap., p. 20) that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, granted the respondent- appellee absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political
rights.
The question presented is whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction
under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for
assuming office (sec. 4, Election Code). Without the necessity of inquiring into the historical background of the benign prerogative of mercy,
we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only
blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment
has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. While there may be force in the argument which finds
support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the
better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive
who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the
party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. In the case at bar, it is admitted that the
respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had already merited conditional pardon from the GovernorGeneral in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to
1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the
municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him
absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date
mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this
wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive.
We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant. So ordered.
In re MARCELINO LONTOK.
Ramon Diokno for respondent.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the removal of Marcelino Lontok from his office of lawyer in the Philippines Islands, because
of having been convicted of the crime of bigamy. The respondent lawyer, in answer, prays that the charges be dismissed, and bases his plea
principally on a pardon issued to him by former Governor General Harrison.
Marcelino Lontok was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales of the crime of bigamy. This judgment was affirmed on appeal to
the Supreme Court, while a further attempt to get the case before the United States Supreme Court was unsuccessful. On February 9, 1921, a
pardon was issued by the Governor-General of the following tenor:
"By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Philippine Organic Act of August 29, 1916, the sentence in the case of Marcelino Lontok,
convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales of bigamy and sentenced on February 27, 1918, to imprisonment for eight years, to suffer
the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of the proceedings, which sentence was, on September 8, 1919, confirmed by
the Supreme Court, is hereby remitted, on condition that he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct."
The particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which the Attorney-General relies in asking for the disbarment of Attorney Lontok,
provides that a member of lawyer by the Supreme Court "by reason of his conviction of the crime involving moral turpitude." (Sec. 21.) That
conviction of the crime of bigamy involves moral turpitude, within the meaning of the law, cannot be doubted. The debatable question relates
to the effect of the pardon by the Governor-General. On the one hand, it is contended by Government that while the pardon removes the legal
infamy of the crime, it cannot wash out the moral stain; on the other hand, it is contended by the respondent that the pardon reaches and
offense for which he was convicted and blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.
The cases are not altogether clear as to just what effect a pardon has on the right of a court to disbar an attorney for conviction of a felony. On
close examination, however, it will be found that the apparent conflict in the decisions is more apparent than real and arises from differences
in the nature of the charges on which the proceedings to disbar are based. Where proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls are
founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon
operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted. (In re
Emmons [1915], 29 cal. App., 121; Scott vs. State [1894], 6 Tex. Civ. App., 343.) But where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on
the professional misconduct involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while the effect of
the pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as the
criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to
retain his license to practice law. (People vs. Burton [1907], 39 Colo., 164; People vs. George [1900], 186 Ill., 122; Nelson vs. Com. [1098], 128
Ky., 779; Case of In re [1881], 86 N.Y., 563.)

2
The celebrated case of Ex parte Garland [1866], 4 Wall., 380 is directly in point. The petitioner in this case applied for a license to practice law
in the United States courts, without first taking an oath to the effect that he had never voluntarily given aid to any government hostile to the
United States, as required by statute. The petitioner, it seems, had been a member of the Confederate Congress, during the secession of the
South, but had been pardoned by the President of the United States. It was held, by a divided court, that to exclude the petitioner from the
practice of law for the offense named would be to enforce a punishment for the offense, notwithstanding the pardon, which the court had no
right to do; and the petition was granted. Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, in part, said:
"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the of fender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted
after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him a new credit and capacity.
"There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in others in consequence of
the conviction and judgment."
Although much which is contained in the opinion of the four dissenting justices, in the Garland case, appeals powerfully to the minds of the
court, we feel ourselves under obligation to follow the rule laid down by the majority decision of the higher court. We do this with the more
grace when we recall that according to article 130 of the Penal Code, one of the different ways by which criminal liability is extinguished is by
pardon. We must also remember that the motion for disbarment is based solely on the judgment of conviction for a crime of which the
respondent has been pardoned, and that the language of the pardon is not such as to amount to a conditional pardon similar in nature to a
parole. It may be mentioned, however, in this connection, that if Marcelino Lontok should again be guilty of any misconduct, the condition of
his pardon would be violated, and he would then become subject to disbarment.
It results, therefore, that the petition of the Attorney General cannot be granted, and that the proceedings must be dismissed. Costs shall be
taxed as provided by section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So ordered.
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP
questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to
provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly
argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in
violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

ANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085February 3, 2004
Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted menof the AFP,
acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders haveseized the
Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP anddeclared their
withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President,Secretary of
Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of theRevised Penal Code,

3
and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, thePhilippines was declared under the
State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers wentback to their barracks in the evening of
the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamationand General Orders were lifted, and
Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.In the interim,
however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NGMANGGAGAWA VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not
require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and thatthere is no factual basis for
such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. ExecutiveSecretary, et al, petitioners contending
that the proclamation is a circumvention of the reportrequirement under the same Section 18, Article
VII, commanding the President to submit a report toCongress within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law. Finally, they contend that thepresidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress hasnot delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et
al. v. President Macapagal- Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there
was usurpation of thepower of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4)
Pimentel v. Romulo,et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to
theunconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?Whether or Not the
petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
Held:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 areconstitutional.
Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. ThePresident in addition
to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executivepowers. It is not disputed
that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forcesand to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examinewhether the power was
exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuseof discretion, none of the
petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that thePresident acted without factual
basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit asthere was no indication that military
tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities

OLAGUER
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They
were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to
assassinatecabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and
Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and
(7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for
prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already
released from military confinement. When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition
for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention
centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic. But the military court
created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian
defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.

DAVID v ARROYO
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president,
then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No.
5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally
which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles
and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was
also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters
cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen
averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed
in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in
the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting
of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care
power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there
are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP
1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in
the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of
the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.

Petitioners

5
presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

However, the exercise of such power or duty

must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7
consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to
speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the
overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive
control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful
and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA
has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the presidentdeclared
PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President.
Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted
former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from
Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also
includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers
does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the
following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the
president by the president.

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa
City) REYNALDO DE VILLA,petitioner, JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator, vs. THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID
PRISONS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

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This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa,
joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the
basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial.[1] These reliefs
are sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on
samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child born to the victim of the rape.
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo de Villa,[2] we found petitioner guilty of the
rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusin perpetua; and ordered him to
pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the
putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
As summarized in our Decision dated February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza charged petitioner Reynaldo de Villa with rape in an
information dated January 9, 1995, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. When arraigned on January 26, 1995,
petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.[3]
During the trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week of April 1994, at about 10:00 in the morning,
Aileen Mendoza woke up in her familys rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner on top of her. Aileen was
then aged 12 years and ten months. She was unable to shout for help because petitioner covered her mouth with a pillow and
threatened to kill her. Aileen could not do anything but cry. Petitioner succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. After
making thrusting motions with his body, petitioner ejaculated. This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileens pregnancy, which
was noticed by her mother, Leonila Mendoza, sometime in November 1994. When confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed
that petitioner raped her. Aileens parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they lodged a criminal complaint
against petitioner.[4]
Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight months pregnant and found in her hymen healed
lacerations at the 5:00 and 8:00 positions. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to a baby girl whom she named Leahlyn
Mendoza.[5]
In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had
rendered him incapable of having an erection. He further averred that Aileens family had been holding a grudge against him,
which accounted for the criminal charges. Finally, he interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that at the time of the incident,
he was in his hometown of San Luis, Batangas. [6]
The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support the child, Leahlyn Mendoza. [7]
On automatic review,[8] we found that the date of birth of Aileens child was medically consistent with the time of the rape.
Since it was never alleged that Aileen gave birth to a full-term nine-month old baby, we gave credence to the prosecutions
contention that she prematurely gave birth to an eight-month old baby by normal delivery. [9] Thus, we affirmed petitioners
conviction for rape, in a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusin perpetua and ordered to
pay the offended party P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; costs of the suit and to provide support
for the child Leahlyn Corales Mendoza.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced with the question of Reynaldo de Villas guilt or
innocence.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware
that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victims child, Leahlyn.
Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioners case that DNA testing could
resolve the issue of paternity. [11] This information was apparently furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) AntiDeath Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner.
Thus, petitioners brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to determine the
paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape. [12] This relief was implicitly denied in our Decision of February
21, 2001.
On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed
that DNA tests be conducted. [13] The Motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated November 20, 2001. [14] Hence, the
Decision became final and executory on January 16, 2002. [15]
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be
extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn
Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. [16] Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home
and gave it to the petitioner-relator, who immediately labeled the cup as Container A.

7
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. These samples were placed in separate
containers with distinguishing labels and temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory
at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI). [17] During transport, the containers containing the saliva samples were kept
on ice.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the
grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors of the samples,
save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory. [18]
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could
not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic
markers in petitioners sample and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyns. [19]
Hence, in the instant petition for habeas corpus, petitioner argues as follows:
DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT PETITIONER DE VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN MENDOZA;
HIS CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED RAPE, CANNOT
STAND AND MUST BE SET ASIDE.[20]
xxx

xxx

xxx

A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IS PROPER AND MAY BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT IN VIEW OF THE
RESULTS OF THE DNA TESTS CONDUCTED.[21]
Considering that the issues are inter-twined, they shall be discussed together.
In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the trial in order to re-litigate the factual issue of the
paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial, considering that his conviction in 2001 was
based on the factual finding that he sired the said child. Since this paternity is now conclusively disproved, he argues that the
2001 conviction must be overturned.
In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The ancillary
remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be newly-discovered
evidence. This Court is thus tasked to determine, first, the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an
individual already convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory judgment; and second, the propriety of
granting a new trial under the same factual scenario.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for those seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial
of freedom of movement. Very broadly, the writ applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person has
been deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person has been withheld from the person entitled
thereto.[22] Issuance of the writ necessitates that a person be illegally deprived of his liberty. In the celebrated case
of Villavicencio v. Lukban,[23] we stated that [a]ny restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. [24]
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of
his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrained via
some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be
used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not
deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as
a post-conviction remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals,[25] we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is
allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such as when, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess. [26]
In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of conviction, without, however,
providing a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a constitutional
right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of findings of fact long passed upon with
finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpusproceedings. In the early case of Abriol v. Homeres,[27] for
example, this Court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used.
The writ of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral challenge of the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal issuing the
process or judgment by which an individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere
errors of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction. [28] The reason for this is explained very simply in the case
of Velasco v. Court of Appeals:[29] a habeas corpus petition reaches the body, but not the record of the case. [30] A record must
be allowed to remain extant, and cannot be revised, modified, altered or amended by the simple expedient of resort to habeas
corpus proceedings.

8
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and
the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus; if at all, these errors
must be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by law. [31] In the past, this Court has
disallowed the review of a courts appreciation of the evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as this
is not the function of said writ. [32] A survey of our decisions inhabeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in general, the writ
of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary remedy; it may thus be invoked only under
extraordinary circumstances.[33] We have been categorical in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be
used as a substitute for another, more proper remedy. Resort to the writ of habeas corpus is available only in the limited
instances when a judgment is rendered by a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for instance, it can be demonstrated
that there was a deprivation of a constitutional right, the writ can be granted even after an individual has been meted a
sentence by final judgment.
Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[34] the writ of habeas corpus was held to be available where an accused was
deprived of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. A defect so pronounced as the denial of an accuseds
constitutional rights results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction, and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent
conviction of the accused. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the
function of habeas corpus.[35] Later, in Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,[36] this Court ruled that, once a deprivation
of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas
corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. [37] Although in Feria v. Court of Appeals[38] this Court
was inclined to allow the presentation of new evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, this was an
exceptional situation. In that case, we laid down the general rule, which states that the burden of proving illegal restraint by
the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. Where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where
it sets forth a process which, on its face, shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to
allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. [39]
In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of Appeals,[40] we summarized the scope of review allowable in a petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus. We ruled that the writ ofhabeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the orderly
administration of justice, can be invoked by the attendance of a special circumstance that requires immediate action. In such
situations, the inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus would be addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction,
but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under which a person has been restrained is a complete nullity.
The probe may thus proceed to check on the power and authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the
judge to render the order that so serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention. [41] It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of
conviction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through the filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v. de Villa, we find that the remedy of the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailing.
First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner. As such, this Court is hard-pressed to find legal
basis on which to anchor the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as this Court sympathizes with petitioners plea, a careful
scrutiny of the records does not reveal any constitutional right of which the petitioner was unduly deprived.
We are aware that other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ of habeas corpus in order to test claims that a defendant
was denied effective aid of counsel. [42] In this instance, we note that the record is replete with errors committed by counsel,
and it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at trial, denied the effective aid of counsel. The United States Supreme Court
requires a defendant alleging incompetent counsel to show that the attorneys performance was deficient under a reasonable
standard, and additionally to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different with competent counsel. [43] The
purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. [44]
The U.S. Supreme Court asserts that in judging any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, one must examine whether
counsels conduct undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process to such an extent that the trial did not
produce a fair and just result. [45] The proper measure of attorney performance is reasonable under the prevailing professional
norms, and the defendant must show that the representation received fell below the objective standard of reasonableness.
[46]
For the petition to succeed, the strong presumption that the counsels conduct falls within the wide range or reasonable
professional assistance must be overcome. [47]
In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the petitioners counsel of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G.
Salvador, suddenly and inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel, giving the sole explanation that he was leaving for
the United States for an indefinite period of time by virtue of a petition filed in his favor. [48] In the face of this abandonment,
petitioner made an impassioned plea that his lawyer be prevented from this withdrawal in a handwritten Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Opposition of Counsels Withdrawal of Appearance with Leave of Court received by this Court on
September 14, 1999.[49] Petitioner alleged that his counsels withdrawal is an untimely and heartbreaking event, considering
that he had placed all [his] trust and confidence on [his counsels] unquestionable integrity and dignity. [50]
While we are sympathetic to petitioners plight, we do not, however, find that there was such negligence committed by his
earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a constitutional right. There is likewise no showing that the proceedings were
tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.
In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a re-examination of the
records of People v. de Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents and purposes, petitioner seeks a

9
reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We are being asked to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA evidence that the petitioner seeks to present to this
Court. This relief is outside the scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.
Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner seeks a new trial to re-litigate the issue of the
paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza.
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendozas paternity is not central to the issue of petitioners guilt or innocence.
The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of
her child. Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio,[51] we ruled that the fact or not of the victims pregnancy and resultant
childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of
rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no
moment in determining an individuals guilt.
In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our Decision was
based, at least in small measure, on the victims claim that the petitioner fathered her child. This claim was given credence by
the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by this Court on automatic review.
The fact of the childs paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil award of child support. It is only tangentially
related to the issue of petitioners guilt. However, if it can be conclusively determined that the petitioner did not sire Leahlyn
Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow the acquittal of the petitioner on this basis.
Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more relies upon erroneous legal grounds in resorting to the remedy of a
motion for new trial. A motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is available only for a limited
period of time, and for very limited grounds. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, amotion
for new trial may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its
promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy.
Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds for a new trial:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a)
That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the
trial;
(b)
That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly newly-discovered evidence, i.e., the DNA test
subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has long attained finality, and
entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the evidence presented by
the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within the statutory or jurisprudential definition of newly- discovered
evidence.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the
evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that
the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. [52] It is essential that the offering
party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.
[53]

In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we nonetheless find that it does not
meet the criteria for newly-discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have
been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Petitioner-relators claim that he was unaware of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight
with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on
the part of petitioners counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner. It is a settled rule that
a party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect. [54] A client is bound by the acts of his
counsel, including the latters mistakes and negligence. [55] It is likewise settled that relief will not be granted to a party who
seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to
a mistaken mode of procedure.[56]
Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not
convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is
conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with
Aileen Mendozas testimony and positive identification as its bases. [57] The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that
the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. [58] Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to

10
conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was
based solely on a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear and
convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for habeas corpus and new trial is DISMISSED for lack of merit
CONSTANTIONPLE V QUICON
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the countrys external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts.
Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion programs).
Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes
are onerous and they do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution . And assuming that the President has
such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the
person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must
exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the
submission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to
the scheme.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.
HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the
president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to
execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep
within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and
meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to
pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and
choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the
concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to
sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders
thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government. The act of the respondents are not unconstitutional.
Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional
powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the
exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at
least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special
class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing
that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
NICOLAS V ROMULO
Herein respondent, Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape
committed against a Filipina, Suzette S. Nicolas.
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, the United States, at its
request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.
During the trial, the US Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his
presence was required.
Eventually, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty. He shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall
be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States pursuant to the VFA. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused is hereby
temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.
However, defendant was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, and brought to a facility for
detention under the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the United

11
States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement. This agreement provides that in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed,
Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to United States military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because if they would allow such transfer of custody of an accused to a
foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused. The equal protection clause of the Constitution is also violated.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not there is a violation of the equal protection clause.
HELD:
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military
armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused.
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the
extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions,
according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can
exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather
one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply
except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as
visiting foreign armed forces.
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after conviction, because they
provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be
carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities." Therefore, the
Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States
Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities."
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the United States towards an agreement on
detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.
The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the
Romulo-Kenney Agreements are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.
MAMA V v ROMULO
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of
providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in
filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the
comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and
Japan.

12
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and
(b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of
1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare
support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms
of reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to
espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations of
our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate
treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but
to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true
in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and
could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive
Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to
make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between
the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of
espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that
basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has
been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to
ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it
thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their
rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available,
with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the
position internationally.

13
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes
committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States
towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international
community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they
are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and
custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified
only by general international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, petitioners,
vs.
EASTERN SEA TRADING, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Valentin Gutierrez for respondent.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petition for review of a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals reversing a decision of the Commissioner ofCustoms.
Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion and garlic which arrived at the Port of Manila from August 25
to September 7, 1954. Some shipments came from Japan and others from Hong Kong. In as much as none of the shipments had the certificate
required by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized and subjected to forfeiture
proceedings for alleged violations of section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation to the aforementioned circulars of the
Central Bank. In due course, the Collector of Customs of Manila rendered a decision on September 4, 1956, declaring said goods forfeited to
the Government and the goods having been, in the meantime, released to the consignees on surety bonds, filed by the same, as principal,
and the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., as surety, in compliance with orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Cases Nos. 23942
and 23852 thereof directing that the amounts of said bonds be paid, by said principal and surety, jointly and severally, to the Bureau of
Customs, within thirty (30) days from notice.
On appeal taken by the consignee, said decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs on December 27, 1956. Subsequently, the
consignee sought a review of the decision of said two (2) officers by the Court of Tax Appeals, which reversed the decision of
the Commissioner of Customs and ordered that the aforementioned bonds be cancelled and withdrawn. Hence, the present petition of
the Commissioner of Customs for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
The latter is based upon the following premises, namely: that the Central Bank has no authority to regulate transactions not involving foreign
exchange; that the shipments in question are in the nature of no-dollar imports; that, as such, the aforementioned shipments do not involve
foreign exchange; that, insofar as a Central Bank license and a certificate authorizing the importation or release of the goods under
consideration are required by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45, the latter are null and void; and that the seizure and forfeiture of the
goods imported from Japan cannot be justified under Executive Order No. 328, 1 not only because the same seeks to implement an executive
agreement2 extending the effectivity of our3 Trades and Financial Agreements 4 with Japan which (executive agreement), it believed, is of
dubious validity, but, also, because there is no governmental agency authorized to issue the import license required by the aforementioned
executive order.
The authority of the Central Bank to regulate no-dollar imports and the validity of the aforementioned Circulars Nos. 44, and 45 have already
been passed upon and repeatedly upheld by this Court (Pascual vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-10979 [June 30, 1959];Acting Commissioner
of Customs vs. Leuterio, L-9142 [October 17, 1959] Commissioner of Customs vs. Pascual, L-9836 [November 18, 1959]; Commissioner
of Customs vs. Serree Investment Co., L-12007 [May 16, 1960]; Commissioner of Customs vs. Serree Investment Co., L-14274 [November 29,
1960]), for the reason that the broad powers of the Central Bank, under its charter, to maintain our monetary stability and to preserve the
international value of our currency, under section 2 of Republic Act No. 265, in relation to section 14 of said Act authorizing the bank to
issue such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and the exercise of the powers
assigned to the Monetary Board and to the Central Bank connote the authority to regulate no-dollar imports, owing to the influence and
effect that the same may and do have upon the stability of our peso and its international value.

14
The Court of Tax Appeals entertained doubts on the legality of the executive agreement sought to be implemented by Executive Order No.
328, owing to the fact that our Senate had not concurred in the making of said executive agreement. The concurrence of said House of
Congress is required by our fundamental law in the making of treaties (Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]), which are,
however, distinct and different from executive agreements, which may be validly entered into without such concurrence.
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding
through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has
been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as
commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Agreements with respect to the registration of trade-marks have been concluded by the Executive with various countries under the Act of
Congress of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat. 502). Postal conventions regulating the reciprocal treatment of mail matters, money orders, parcel post,
etc., have been concluded by the Postmaster General with various countries under authorization by Congress beginning with the Act of
February 20, 1792 (1 Stat. 232, 239). Ten executive agreements were concluded by the President pursuant to the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890
(26 Stat. 567, 612), and nine such agreements were entered into under the Dingley Tariff Act 1897 (30 Stat. 151, 203, 214). A very much
larger number of agreements, along the lines of the one with Rumania previously referred to, providing for most-favored-nation treatment in
customs and related matters have been entered into since the passage of the Tariff Act of 1922, not by direction of the Act but in harmony
with it.
xxx

xxx

xxx

International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a
permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out wellestablished national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of
executive agreements.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity and constitutionality of executive agreements entered
into without Senate approval. (39 Columbia Law Review, pp. 753-754) (See, also, U.S. vs. Curtis-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L.
ed. 255; U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.S. vs. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S., 188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 15, pp. 1905-1906; California Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675;Hyde on International Law [Revised Edition], Vol. 2, pp. 1405,
1416-1418; Willoughby on the U.S. Constitutional Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218;
Hackworth, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390-407). (Emphasis supplied.)
In this connection, Francis B. Sayre, former U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, said in his work on The Constitutionality of Trade
Agreement Acts:
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less
common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of
exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements time or protocols. The point where
ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or
exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here
the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered
into under the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that
the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs
matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and copyrights, etcetera.
Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with
respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect of the settlement of claims against
foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation. (39Columbia Law Review, pp. 651, 755.)
The validity of the executive agreement in question is thus patent. In fact, the so-called Parity Rights provided for in the Ordinance Appended
to our Constitution were, prior thereto, the subject of an executive agreement, made without the concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of the Senate
of the United States.

15
Lastly, the lower court held that it would be unreasonable to require from respondent-appellee an import license when the Import Control
Commission was no longer in existence and, hence, there was, said court believed, no agency authorized to issue the aforementioned license.
This conclusion is untenable, for the authority to issue the aforementioned licenses was not vested exclusively upon the Import Control
Commission or Administration. Executive Order No. 328 provided for export or import licenses from the Central Bank of the Philippines or the
Import Control Administration or Commission. Indeed, the latter was created only to perform the task of implementing certain objectives of
the Monetary Board and the Central Bank, which otherwise had to be undertaken by these two (2) agencies. Upon the abolition of said
Commission, the duty to provide means and ways for the accomplishment of said objectives had merely to be discharged directly by the
Monetary Board and the Central Bank, even if the aforementioned Executive Order had been silent thereon.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another one shall be entered affirming that of the Commissioner of
Customs, with cost against respondents

GO TEK petitioner-appelle, vs.DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:
This is a deportation case. On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go Tek a Chinaman residing at Ilagan, Isabela
and 1208-B, Misericordia Street, Sta. Cruz Manila.
It was alleged in the complaint that in December, 1963 certain agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) searched an office located at 1439 O'Donnel
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila believed to be the headquarters of a guerilla unit of the "Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States" and that among
those arrested thereat was Go Tek an alleged sector commander and intelligence and record officer of that guerilla unit.
It was further alleged that fake dollar checks were found in Go Tek's possession and that, therefore, he had violated article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and
rendered himself an undesirable alien.
The prosecutor prayed that after trial the Board should recommend to the President of the Philippines the . immediate deportation of Go Tek as an undesirable
alien, "his presence in this country having been, and will always be and a menace to the peace , welfare, and security of the community". Case No. R1116).
Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature bemuse them was a pending case against him in the city fiscal's office of Manila
for violation of article 168 (IS 64-7267). He contended that the board had no jurisdiction to try the case in view of the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan vs.
Deportation Board, 118 Phil. 868, 875, that the t may deport aliens only on the grounds specified in the law.
The Board, composed of Manuel A. Concordia, Arturo A. Alafriz and Manuel V. Reyes, in its resolution of April 21, 1964 denied Go Teks motion. The Board
reasoned out that a conviction is not a prerequisite before the State my exercise its rights to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding
body whose function is to make a report and recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien or a deportation
proceeding.
In view of the denial of his motion to quash, Go Tek on June 10, 1964 filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a prohibition action against the Board. On July 8,
1964 the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the board from hearing Go Tek's case.
After hearing, the trial court (Judge Federico C. Alikpala presiding) in its decision of 31, 1964 granted the writ prohibition and the Board to desist from taking
cognizance of the Go Tek.
The court, citing the said obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case, held that mere ion of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration
Law; that under section 37(3) of the law before an alien may be deported for having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more
for a crime involving moral turpitude a conviction is and that since Go Tek had not been convicted of the offense punished in article 168, the deportation was
premature.
The Board appealed to this Court on the ground that the decision is contrary to law. The Solicitor General contends that the trial court erred in assuming that the
President may deport undesirable aliens only to grounds enumerated by law; in holding that mere possession of forged dollar checks is not a ground for
deportation and that a criminal conviction is necessary, and in not finding that the Board has jurisdiction over Go Tek's case.
The parties stipulated that the Deportation Board is an of the President of the Philippines charged with the investigation of undesirable aliens and to report and
recommend proper action on the basis of its findings therein."
The issue is whether the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground which is not specified in section 37 of the Immigration Law
and although the aliens has not yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him.
We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for illegal possession of fake dollar checks (as well as his alleged "guerilla" activities) in spite of the
fact that he has not yet been convicted of illegal possession thereof under article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and notwithstanding that act is not the grounds
for the deportation of undesirable aliens as enumerated in section 37 of the Immigration Law. The charge against Go Tek before- the Board was not premature.

16
The aforementioned obiter dictum the Qua Chee Gan case invoked by Go Tek and relied upon by the trial court, is not of this case. In the Qua Chee Gan case the
aliens were with economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under Republic Act No. 503.
The ratio decidendi of the Qua Chee Gan case is that the provision of Executive Order No. 398, of 1951, the Deportation Board to issue a warrant of arrest upon
the filing of formal charges against an alien, is "illegal" or unconstitutional because it is contrary to the provinsion in section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution
that warrants shall issue upon to be de by the judge after e under oath the t and the witness he may produce. (Note that under section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution cause may be determined "by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law". See Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration
L-25694, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 96, per Fernando, J.)
A thorough comprehension of the President's power to deport aliens may show the baselessness of the instant prohibition action of Go Tek The President's power
to deport aliens and the investigation of aliens subject to deportation are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative Code:
SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippine Islands shall not be deported expelled, or excluded from
said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General except upon prior investigator, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the
ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall he informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be
allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own
behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.
On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law Provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant - "after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien." Thirteen classes of aliens who may be deported by the Commissioner are specified in
section 37 (See Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, L-24792, February 14, 1975, 62 SCRA 363, 368).
So, under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the
immigration Law (Qua Chee Gan vs- Deportation Board, supra).
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be
exercise by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation Justice Johnson's is that there the
Chief Executive rinds that there are aliens whose continued in the country is injurious to the public interest he may, even in the absence of express law, deport
them (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In reMcCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is rental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam
vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956).
The Deportation Board is composed of the Undersecretary of Justice as chairman , the solicitor General, and a representative of the Secretary of National Defense
(Executive Order No. 455 dated June 25, 1951, 47 O.G. 28M).
SECTION 69 and Executive Order No. 398, the Deportation Board, do not specify the grounds for deportation Paragraph l(a) of Executive Order No. 398 merely
provides that "the Deportation Board, motu proprio or upon complaint of any person is authorized to conduct investigations in the manner prescribed in section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code to determine whether a subject of a foreign power in the Philippines is an undesirable alien or not, and thereafter to
recommend to the President of the Philippines the deportation of such alien."
As observed by Justice Labrador, there is no legal nor constitutes provision defining the power to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the
Chief Executive "full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security welfare or interest of the
state. The adjudication of facts upon which deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory." (Tan Tong vs.
Deportation Board 96 Phil. 934, 936; Tan Sin vs. Deportation Board, 104 PhiL 868, 872).
It has been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an
investigation conducted in accordance with 69. No other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.
(Martin vs. Mott 12 Wheat., 19, 31, cited in In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 62).
In the Dick case it was noted "that every alien forfeits his right to asylum in the country in which he resides, in the absence of treaty provisions to the contrary when
his conduct or his mode of life renders his prance there inimical to the public interests". "The reasons may be summed up and co in a single word: the public
interest of the State ." (38 Phil. 41, 47, 100).
"It is fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a case" (Ang Bong vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 100
Phil. 801, 803). Thus, it was held that the fact that an alien has been acquitted in a of the charge does not prevent the deportation of such alien based on the same
charge. Such acquittal does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings. Conviction of a crime is not n to warrant deportation. (3 C.J.S. 743, note 40,
citing Lewis vs. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 58 L. Ed. 967 and U.S. ex.. Mastoras vs. McCandless 61 F. 2nd 366; Tama Miyake vs. U.S. 257 F. 732).
And in the Tan Tong case, supra, it was ruled that the Deportation Board could take cognizance of the charge of illegal importation against an alien as a ground for
deportation, even if he of the Deportation Board is merely recommendatory. The Chief Executive has to approve the board's recommendatory Abuses or rents
committed by the prosecutor or by the Board should first be brought to his attention.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. The writ of preliminary injunction is dissolved. The case is to the Deportation Board for further
proceedings. Costs against the petitioner-appellee.
G.R. No. L-37878

November 25, 1932

17
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs.PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric Company, requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the
compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal
right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a
franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power
system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any
franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the
terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or
corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in this court, it was ordered that the petitioner be required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and
the transportation companies affected by the petition. Thereafter, the Attorney-General disclaimed any interest in the proceedings, and opposition was entered to
the petition by a number of public utility operators. On the submission of memoranda after an oral hearing, the petition was made ready for resolution.
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power is attempted to be granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a
board of arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as an entity. It is next seen that the decision of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court is made final. And it
is finally observed that the franchise granted the Manila Electric Company by the Government of the Philippine Islands, although only a contract between the
parties to it, is now made to effect the rights of persons not signatories to the covenant.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement
may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil
Code. Citation of authority is hardly necessary, except that it should be recalled that in the Philippines, and in the United States for that matter, it has been held that
a clause in a contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and
cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction (Wahl and Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims & Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301; Puentebella vs. Negros Coal Co. [1927], 50 Phil., 69;
Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co. [1924], 51 Phil., 908; District of Columbia vs. Bailey [1897], 171 U. S., 161.)
We would not be understood as extending the principles governing arbitration and award too far. Unless the arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close
the doors of the courts against the parties, the courts should look with favor upon such amicable arrangements. We can also perceive a distinction between a
private contract for submission to arbitration and agreements to arbitrate falling within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others than the
parties to a particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it remains true that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final,
which if literally enforced would leave a public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts for a judicial
determination of the question in dispute.
Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioner's Court [1908], 158 Ala., 263. It was there held that an Act of a
state legislature authorizing the commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners of a bridge is not
unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the courts. But that is not the question before us. Here the question is not one of whether or not there has been
a delegation of legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction
granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction
would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the
Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions performed by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of duties which the members
of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find
the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all.lawphil.net
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of
the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The
Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administering of judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only
mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board
of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the
Supreme Court.lawph!l.net
In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney, it was said:
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties
being defined in the organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction
or power, or perform any other duty. . . . The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is

18
no judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without
a remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at
some future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial power confided to this court, in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the whole power that the court is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress. . . . And while it executes firmly all the judicial
powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully abstain from exercising any power that is not strictly judicial in its character, and which is not clearly confided to it by
the Constitution. . . . (Gordon vs. United States [1864], 2 Wall., 561; 117 U. S., 697 Appendix.)
Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation
of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court
decline to proceed further in the matter.
GARCIA V MACARAIG
Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created
CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge
due to the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up and running.
When Macaraig realized that it would be some time before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had
worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had
earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to assist the
Secretary, without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that
Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has
not been performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department of the executive oi
charge of prosecution of cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge.
HELD: No. Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Macaraig was, like
every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a judge without a sala, but
forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in
the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a
judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always
be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be
gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts
on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental
conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest
court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and
prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may
be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.
Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch
VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for alleged dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge gross incompetence, violation
of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof, committed (allegedly) as follows:
2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, as such incumbent Judge, respondent herein, has not submitted his monthly reports containing
the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or resolved, the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to over three months, together
with the title, number, number of hours of court session held a day, etc., as evidenced by the certificate issued by Hon. Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent,
Dept. of Justice, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex A, Item No. 1, in violation of Circular No. 10 of the Dept. of Justice dated February 6, 1952, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex B;
3. That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966) from July to December, 1970 and from January to February, 1971
inclusive as evidenced by the certificate issued by Judge Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex A, Item No. 2 thereof;
4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo and knowing fully well that he has never performed his official duties or
discharged the duties appertaining to his office, he has collected and was paid his salaries from July to December, 1970 and from January to February 1971 as
evidenced by the certificate issued by the cashier Mrs. Santos of the Department of Justice hereto attached as Annex C and the certificate of Mr. Pichay Annex
A, last paragraph thereof, aggravated by his repeated failure to submit the certificate of service in flagrant violation of action 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended which provides as follows:

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District judges, judges of City Courts, and municipal Judges shall certify on their application for leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by them for
payment, or upon the payrolls upon which their salaries are paid, that all special proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases which
have been under submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making
the certificate and no salary shall be paid without such certificate (Emphasis supplied).
5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports from July to December, 1970 and from January, 1971 to February, 1971 stating therein the number of
hours of session that the Court holds daily, the accomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended.
6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office as a District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo, Branch VI he has manifested
such moral bankruptcy as to deny his fitness to perform or discharge official duties in the administration of justice.
7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote to the Honorable Secretary of Justice informing him that he was entering upon the performance of his duties,
which letter of his reads in full:
I have the honor to inform you that I am entering upon the performance of the duties of the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo
City (Branch VI) today, June 29, 1970.
That such actuation of deliberately telling a deliberate falsehood aggravates his moral bankruptcy incompatible to the requirements of the highest degree of
honesty, integrity and good moral character appertaining to holding the position of Judge in the administration of justice.
Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an answer alleging pertinently that:
THE FACTS
Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City with station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of
the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. After consultations with the officials of the province of Laguna, the municipality of Calamba
and the Department of Justice, respondent decided to accept the offer of the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of
the court; to utilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials; and to rely on
the national government for the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, all these items must be furnished by the
provincial government. The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so).
As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured the respondent that the court could be accommodated in the west wing of the
Calamba municipal building as soon as the office of the municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another location. When the projected transfer of
the municipal treasurers office was about to be effected, the treasurer and several municipal councilors objected. The municipal mayor then requested the
respondent to look over some of the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with the commitment that the municipal government will shoulder the payment of the
rentals. Respondents first choice was the second floor of the Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when the owner of the building refused
to reduce the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable space selected by respondent was the second floor of the Laguna Development Bank. After a months
negotiations, the municipality finally signed a lease agreement with the owner on October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the municipal government could
release the amount necessary for the improvements to convert the space that was rented, which was a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom and offices for
the personnel of the court and for the assistant provincial fiscal. Thereafter, upon respondents representations, the provincial government appropriated the amount
of P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies and materials needed by the court. Early in December, 1970 respondent also placed his order for the necessary
equipment with the Property Officer of the Department of Justice but, unfortunately, the appropriation for the equipment of courts of first instance was released only
on December 23, 1970 and the procurement of the equipment chargeable against this allotment is still under way (please see enclosed certification of the
Financial Officer of the Department of Justice marked Annex A).
When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had
worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he
had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to
assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
Charges Have No Basis .
Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty, violation of his oath of office, grave incompetence and violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary
Act.
It is respectfully submitted that .
A. Respondents inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was like every
lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a judge without a sala, but forces and
circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
B. Respondents collection of salaries as judge does not constitute dishonesty because aside from the time, effort and money he spent in organizing the CFI at
Calamba, he worked in the Department of Justice (please see enclosed certification of Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo S. Santos marked Annex B). Indeed,
even if respondent did no more than exert efforts to organize his court, he could, as other judges have done, have collected his salaries as judge without being
guilty of dishonesty.

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Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI judge which position then carried a salary of P19,000 per annum, he automatically ceased to be Chief of the
Technical Staff of the Department of Justice and Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, positions from which he was receiving P16,200 and P8,000 per
annum, respectively. Also, in anticipation of the judicial duties which he was about to assume, respondent took a leave of absence from his professorial lecturers
duties in the U.P. College of Law where he was receiving approximately P600 a month.
C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually
discharging his judicial duties.
The Department of Justice has never required judges who have not actually started, to perform their judicial duties to comply with the abovementioned statutoryprovisions and circular (please see enclosed certification of Judge Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, marked Annex C).
Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular makes evident the folly of requiring a judge who has not entered into the Performance of his judicial duties to
comply with them. Taking Section 5, how could a judge who has not started to discharge his judicial duties certify that all special proceedings, applications,
petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases, which have been under submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more have been
determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate. And how could such a judge hold court in his place of permanent station as required by
Section 55; observe the hours of daily sessions of the court as prescribed by Section 58; and render the reports required by Circular No. 10 when his court is not
yet in physical existence Clearly, therefore, Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 cannot apply to such a judge. .
In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and respondent in their respective complaint and answer and considering, in the light thereof, that the
material facts are more or less undisputed, the Court feels that this case can be disposed of without any further proceeding.
After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the complaint must be dismissed. To begin with, We cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the
actuations for the respondent complained of. As We see it, the situation is not exactly as complainant has attempted to portray it. Complainants theory is that
respondent collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since the date he took his oath up to the filing of the complaint. In the
sense that respondent has not yet performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties of judge. What is lost
sight of, however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the
extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any good reason, take a leave, as in
fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever way
possible which would not, it must be presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as in this case, the government officials or officers in duty
bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without any fault on
his part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time,
made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from
being dishonesty, to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving
salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on, his part. As to whether or not in doing so he, placed in jeopardy the
independence of the judiciary and failed to act according to the correct norm of conduct which a judge should observe vis-a-vis service to the other departments of
the government will be discussed a non. At this juncture, the only point We settle is that complainants theory of dishonesty cannot hold water.
Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges
under existing laws as well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice. The reason is simple. He has not yet started performing any judicial
functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and
others. On the other hand, respondent Could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he
simply made himself available for the purpose for which he was appointed. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed was not of
his making. The other officials in charge of providing him therewith seem to have been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to have it read.
Conceivably, under the law, with the permission of this Court, respondent could have been assigned to another court pending all these preparations, but that is
something within the initiative control of the Secretary of Justice and nor of the respondent.
Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the
Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line
between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the
government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the
people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental
advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts a check and
balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences
or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge or even the lowest court in this
Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval
and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless
to say, this Court feels very strongly that, it is best that this practice is discontinued.
WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Secretary of Justice.