G.R. No. L-52364 March 25, 1983 RICARDO VALLADOLID, petitioner, vs.HON. AMADO G.

INCIONG, Deputy Minister of Labor, and

COPACABANA APARTMENT-HOTEL, respondents. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The Order dated December 26, 1979 of the Deputy Minister of Labor affirming the Order of May 2, 1979 for reinstatement without backwages
issued by Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella in Case No. R4-STF-2-1316-79 entitled, "Ricardo C. Valladolid, Jr. vs. Copacabana ApartmentHotel," is being assailed by the parties in these petitions.
J. R. M. & Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as JRM), as petitioner in G.R. No. 53349, is also the respondent in G.R. No. 52364 named therein as
Copacabana Apartment-Hotel. JRM originally owned and operated not only Copacabana but also Tropicana Apartment-Hotel. The principal
stockholders of JRM were the brothers Joseph, Manuel, Vicente and Roman, all surnamed Yu. Upon the death of Joseph on October 12, 1975,
although both Copacabana and Tropicana continued technically as owned by JRM, the controlling (70%) interest in Copacabana was lodged in
the surviving heirs of Joseph, with brothers Manuel and Roman having a 15% interest each. JRM was placed under the management of the
heirs of Joseph. The brothers Manuel, Roman and Vicente were allowed 100% equity interest in Tropicana, which was operated separately from
JRM. Eventually, Tropicana and Copacabana became competing businesses.
Ricardo Valladolid, petitioner in G.R. No. 52364 and respondent in G.R. No. 53349, after the death of Joseph, was employed by JRM in 1977 as a
telephone switchboard operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of clerk-collector by Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM.
According to the affidavit of Daniel T. Yu, Executive Vice-President, attached to the position paper submitted by JRM before the Regional
Director, the transfer was motivated by the fact:
xxx xxx xxx
That as such switchboard operator numerous telephone conversations and communications relating to business and confidential matters were
intercepted and relayed to Tropicana Apartment-Hotel, a competitor;
That to confirm suspicion on Ricardo Valladolid as the person responsible for said interception and relay, Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM &
Co., Inc. sent him on an errand to Manila Hotel to bring flowers on the occasion of Wedding Anniversary of Mr. & Mrs. Yu Hong Ty. Matters which
Mrs. Lourdes Yu told him in confidence and admonitions not to tell anyone, reached Tropicana people;
xxx xxx xxx

The affidavit further disclosed:

xxx xxx xxx
That while serving in his capacity as clerk/collector, copies of Accounts Receivables, reach Tropicana Management although said copies were
not referred to them;
That conferred (sic) on numerous confidential matters taken in the office of Copacabana Apartment-Hotel reached Tropicana Apartment-Hotel;
That to finally and fully confirmed suspicions that Ricardo Valladolid was the person responsible for the aforementioned disclosures, a plan for
the entrapment was conceived by the management of Copacabana Apartment- Hotel;
That on November 9, 1979, pursuance of said plan, a cash voucher for P500,000.00 supposedly in payment for representation expenses to
myself with the corresponding check were prepared and issued respectively by Juan V. Bermudo, Apartment-Hotel Manager, who thereafter
called Ricardo Valladolid and asked the latter to bring the said cash voucher and check to my room which he did; few minutes later I came
down to the office and asked Mr. Ricardo Valladolid to prepare the corresponding deposit slip to Pacific Banking Corporation for said check;
That thereafter, the aforementioned cash voucher, corresponding check and deposit slip were kept in the hotel vault with no other person
other than myself, Juan Bermudo and Ricardo Valladolid having any knowledge of preparation and existence thereof;
That unknown to Ricardo Villadolid, the aforementioned check, cash voucher and deposit slip were cancelled;
That on December 4, 1978, Mr. Manuel Yu Chua, came to Copacabana Apartment-Hotel as minority stockholder of the latter, vehemently
demanding for an accounting of Copacabana books;
That he strongly charged that information reached him that I received a disbursement of P500,000.00 from Copacabana Apartment-Hotel as
representation expenses in my capacity as Executive Vice-President thereof;
That at this juncture, I brought out the cancelled cash voucher, check and deposit slip with mouth agape Manuel Yu Chua, could do nothing
else but admit that in fact, his informer within Copacabana Apartment-Hotel was no other than Mr. Ricardo C. Villadolid;

That I then informed Manuel Yu Chua, that under the circumstances, I could no longer repose any trust whatsoever on Ricardo Valladolid and
requested him to take the latter to Tropicana Apartment-Hotel and just swap him with someone else; Mr. Manuel Yu Chua directed me to tell
Valladolid to see him;
That after few days, Ricardo Valladolid came back and told me that Manuel Yu Chua has no place for him at Tropicana Apartment-Hotel; in this
conversation, Ricardo Valladolid apologized for having betrayed the trust that we had reposed on him, especially after Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu had
told him to stay impartial; that he then having done this for Manuel Yu Chua, the latter could not even accept him in Tropicana ApartmentHotel;
xxx xxx xxx

The entrapment scheme was corroborated by the affidavits of Sofia Mo. Gianan, External Auditor of J.R.M. & Co., Inc., and Juan V. Bermudo,
Copacabana Apartment-Hotel Manager, which affidavits formed part of JRM's position paper filed before the agency below. 3 The cancelled
Cash Voucher, the uncashed check, and the unused deposit slip, all in the respective amounts of P500,000.00 were also attached to the same
position paper as Exhibits "4", "5" and "6".
On December 29, 1978, or after the entrapment scheme had been effected, Valladolid filed a written request for a five (5) day vacation leave
starting December 30, 1978 with the Manager of Copacabana, stating therein that he would report for work on January 5, 1979. 4 He did not
report for work on January 5 but sent a telegram from Bicol on January 8, 1979 requesting for 15 days sick leave as he was confined for flu at
the Dr. Estrellado Clinic. 5 On January 23, 1979, Valladolid's wife allegedly called up JRM informing the company through its accountant, Eddie
Escueta, that her husband was still sick and requested for 30 days sick leave, which was allegedly granted. This was denied by JRM.
Valladolid reported for work on February 16, 1979. The Executive Vice- President, Mr. Daniel Yu, allegedly refused to admit him and instead
asked him to resign. JRM maintains that Valladolid left the office that same day and never returned, because he was reprimanded for his
unauthorized absences.
On February 22, 1979, Valladolid filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with vacation and sick leave pay.

On February 24, 1979, JRM sent a letter to Valladolid signed by Daniel T. Yu, advising him of his preventive suspension effective February 26,
1979 preparatory to the termination of his services 10 days from receipt of a copy of the application for clearance to dismiss him. The grounds
given were: (1) Willful Breach of Trust for having divulged, in various instances, confidential business matters to competitors of the company;
and (2) Gross Neglect of Duty for having been absent without leave or notice for more than 25 days, to the detriment of the company. 7
On February 28, 1979, JRM filed said application for clearance with the Ministry of Labor. 8 The application for clearance and Valladolid's
complaint for Illegal Dismissal were consolidated and docketed as R4-STF-2-1316-79. The parties submitted their respective position papers
and documentary evidence. On May 2, 1979, the Regional Director issued the following challenged Order:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for clearance with preventive suspension is hereby denied. Respondent is hereby ordered
to reinstate complainant to his former position without backwages and without loss of seniority rights. Let the time this case was pending be
considered as complainant's suspension for his absences.
The claim for vacation sick leave pay is dismissed for failure to substantiate the same.
Valladolid appealed the foregoing order to the Minister of Labor seeking modification of the same, praying for the award of backwages from
the time he was illegally dismissed on February 16, 1979 to the date of his actual reinstatement. JRM also appealed the said Order.
On December 26, 1979, the Deputy Minister of Labor, in a succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding "no sufficient justification or
valid reason to alter, modify, much less reverse the Order appealed from."
On January 21, 1980, Valladolid filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 52364, praying for a modification of the
Order of December 26, 1979 of the Deputy Minister of Labor so as to grant him backwages. This Court resolved. on February 4, 1980, to give
due course to the petition, and required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda.
On March 12, 1980, JRM also filed a petition for certiorari with this Court assailing that same Order. This Court gave due course to the petition
and consolidated the same with G.R. No. 52364. Thereafter, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
The non-award of backwages is the only issue being raised by Valladolid claiming that the Orders in question are contrary to law and evidence,
and were issued arbitrarily and capriciously with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
JRM, on the other hand, assails the said Orders on the following grounds:
I

That respondent Deputy Minister of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion when in his questioned order in effect sustained the finding of
respondent Regional Director that there is no evidence to support the dismissal of private respondent.
II
That respondent Deputy Minister Amado Inciong and Regional Director Francisco Estrella committed grave abuse of discretion when they
arbitrarily failed to consider in their respective orders under review, established jurisprudence.
III
That respondent Regional Director committed grave abuse of discretion when he held that preventive suspension is equivalent to dismissal.
IV
That the order of respondent Hon. Amado Inciong was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment when it failed to state the facts and
conclusion of law upon which it is based.
V
That respondent Regional Director Francisco Estrella acted in excess of his jurisdiction when, without any statutory authority or transcending
beyond his jurisdiction, he absolutely disregarded procedural requirement in the hearing of the present controversy, thus depriving petitioner
of its right to due process.
Valladolid, in his affidavit dated March 29, 1979, denied having committed any breach of trust. 9 In corroboration, he presented the affidavits of
Mr. Manuel Yu dated March 20, 1979 and March 29, 1979, wherein the latter stated that Valladolid was "one of Copacabana's most hardworking and efficient employees;" that Valladolid's work is "mere routinary collection and clerical in nature which do not involve trust (or)
confidential business or trade secrets which he may 'divulge' to other companies." 10
On this issue, the Regional Director ruled that "there is no evidence on record that Valladolid furnished copies of receivables or divulged
confidential business matters to Mr. Manuel Yu and the 'Tropicana People' including the P500,000.00 'entrapment scheme.'"
That finding is not supported by the records. The affidavits attached to petitioner's position paper adequately show that JRM did not act on
mere suspicion but on the contrary, acted prudently when it first transferred Valladolid from switchboard operator where he could eavesdrop
on telephone conversations, to a less crucial position of clerk-collector. But even in the latter capacity, JRM's fears were confirmed as shown by
the entrapment scheme. Manuel Yu's certification as to Valladolid's trustworthiness cannot be given much weight not only because it was
disproved by the entrapment contrived but more so because even Manuel Yu himself refused to employ him at Tropicana when Daniel Yu had
suggested that Tropicana absorb Valladolid because JRM had lost confidence in the latter. And although Manuel Yu, who owns 15% of the equity
holding of Copacabana, and being a member of the Board of Directors of JRM had a right to know the business standing of said establishment,
there is basis to believe that he would not have been able to pinpoint the particular "disbursement" of P500,000.00, if the same had not been
leaked out to him.
Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct is not required,
it being sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his
position. 11 However, as this was Valladolid's first offense, as found by the Regional Director, dismissal from the service is too harsh a
punishment, considering that he had not been previously admonished, warned or suspended for any misdemeanor. Besides as clerk-collector,
he need not be given access to facts relative to the business of Copacabana, which, if divulged to Tropicana would be to the former's prejudice.
Moreover, we find basis for the finding of the Regional Director that Valladolid was terminated without prior clearance. J.R.M. sent a
memorandum to Valladolid on February 24, 1979 advising him of his preventive suspension effective February 26, 1979 pending approval of
the application for clearance to dismiss him. The clearance application was filed on February 28, 1979. However, even prior to that date, or on
February 22, 1979, Valladolid had already filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal. This shows that Valladolid was indeed refused admittance on
February 16, 1979 when he reported back to work, so that he was practically dismissed before he was formally notified of his suspension
leading to his dismissal, in violation of the requirement of Section 3, Rule XIV, Book V, Rules & Regulation Implementing the Labor Code. 12 And
as provided in Section 2 of the same Rule, any dismissal without prior clearance shall be "conclusively presumed to be termination of
employment without a just cause."
JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process considering that applications for clearance have to be summarily investigated and a
decision required to be rendered within ten (10) days from the filing of the opposition 13 As this Court had occasion to hold there is no violation
of due process where the Regional Director merely required the submission of position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter. 14
Nor is the questioned Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor violative of Section 9, Article X of the Constitution, which requires a statement of
the facts and the conclusions of law upon which it is based. That prescription applies to decisions of Courts of record. The Ministry of Labor is
an administrative body with quasi-judicial functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V, Ibid, states that proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-litigious
and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law. As the Deputy Minister was in full accord with the

findings of fact and the conclusions of law drawn from those facts by the Regional Director, there was no necessity of discussing anew the
issues raised therein.
JRM admits that Valladolid requested for leave for 5 days from December 30, 1978, and thereafter for 15 days, but denies that he notified the
company of his absences subsequent to this. The Regional Director ruled that the absences of Valladolid were unauthorized but did not
amount to gross neglect of duty or abandonment of work which requires deliberate refusal to resume employment or a clear showing in terms
of specific circumstances that the worker does not intend to report for work. We agree. But as Valladolid had been AWOL, no error was
committed by respondent Regional Director in ordering his reinstatement without backwages. 16
WHEREFORE, both Petitions for certiorari are hereby denied. No costs

G.R. No. 78648 January 24, 1989

RAFAEL N. NUNAL, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND MUNICIPALITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN, respondents. MELENCIOHERRERA, J.:
For resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Minute Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 dismissing the Petition
for certiorari "for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the public respondent had committed grave abuse of discretion in holding,
among others, that the compromise agreement of the parties is not enforceable against the Municipality of Isabela, the latter not having been
impleaded as an indispensable party in the case.
In the present Motion, petitioner contends:
1. The decision does not clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which it is based;
2. The Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, is bound by the compromise agreement; and
3. Public respondent "Commission on Audit (COA, for short) gravely abused its discretion in denying the lawful claim for separation pay by your
petitioner." (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p. 67)
The facts disclose that on 24 February 1986 petitioner was appointed as Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan. On 1 February 1980 he
was administratively charged and dismissed from the service for dishonesty, misconduct and for lack of confidence. On appeal, the Merit
Systems Board exonerated petitioner and reinstated him to his position as Municipal Administrator on 8 May 1980.
On 29 January 1981 petitioner was again dismissed for lack of confidence by then Municipal Mayor Alvin Dans under Administrative Order No.
54, Series of 1981. Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed Case No. 43, a suit for mandamus and Damages with
Preliminary Injunction against the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Treasurer, and the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, before the then
Court of First Instance in Basilan Province, Branch 1, praying for reinstatement "with full backwages and other rights inherent in the position."
He also filed Case No. 45 with the same Court seeking that he and his wife be paid their back salaries from 1 February 1980 to 31 May 1980
pursuant to the Decision of the Merit Systems Board on 16 February 1981.
On 20 February 1984, during the pendency of the said case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, abolished the subject position in its
Resolution No. 902, Series of 1984, and Ordinance No. 336, pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code.
On 5 December 1984, petitioner and his wife, on the one hand, and on the other, Mayor Dans in his capacity both as Municipal Mayor and as
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, the Municipal Treasurer and the Provincial Fiscal (p. 4, Reply To Comment of
COA), entered into a Compromise Agreement stipulating, among others, that:
l. The respondents shall pay petitioner Rafael Nunal all back salaries and other emoluments due him by reason of his employment as Municipal
Administrator of Isabela, Basilan, covering the period from January 1, 1980 to August 15, 1984, together with accumulated vacation/sick
leaves, mid-year and Christmas bonuses in 1982 and 1983, and separation pay under the Local Government Code, which are reflected in the
computation hereto attached and made an integral part hereof... (p. 13, Rollo)
Under the same Compromise Agreement, petitioner was also considered as "retired" upon receipt of the monetary considerations mentioned
therein.
On 12 December 1984, the Court approved the Compromise Agreement.
On 1 April 1985, petitioner collected his retirement benefits although, concededly, no provision for the same had been included in the
Compromise Agreement (Petition, p. 6; Rollo, P. 9).

On 17 September 1985, petitioner filed his claim for separation pay in the amount of P54,092.50 to which he is allegedly entitled due to the
abolition of the position of Municipal Administrator, which separation pay is provided for by the Local Government Code (B.P. 337, Section 76).
On 6 January 1986 the Municipal treasurer forwarded petitioner's claim to the Provincial Auditor of Basilan. On 11 January, 1986, in a First
Indorsement, the Provincial Auditor opined that the claim was legal and proper but payment thereof was made subject to availability of funds
and the ruling of the Regional Office of the Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City.
On 12 February 1986, in a 2nd Indorsement, the Regional Director of the Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City, reversed the
Provincial Auditor of Basilan and denied petitioner's claim for separation pay. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was forwarded to the
Commission on Audit (COA), Central Office, Quezon City.
On 13 October 1986 the COA Central Office, in its Decision No. 388, not only denied petitioner's claim for separation pay but also disallowed
the other payments made to petitioner. It held:.
Premises considered, and it appearing that Mr. Nunal has been paid back salaries and other emoluments in the total amount of P90,362.96
pursuant to the Compromise Agreement, supra, this Commission hereby directs that any and all payments made to Mr. Nunal corresponding to
the period when he was no longer in the government service should be disallowed in audit without prejudice to his right of recourse against
the officials personally liable for his unlawful dismissal. (pp. 15-16, Rollo)
Thus, this recourse by petitioner alleging grave abuse of discretion by COA, which Petition we had previously dismissed in our Resolution of 11
May 1988 as heretofore adverted to.
It appearing, however, that the Compromise agreement was duly signed by Mayor Alvin Dans as Mayor and as Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Bayan, by the Municipal Treasurer, and by the Provincial Fiscal as their lawyer (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3); that the case
was one for reinstatement and backwages; and following the ruling of this Court in Gementiza vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-41717-33, 113
SCRA 477, April 12, 1982), the Municipality of Isabela should be deemed as impleaded in this case, it being apparent that the officials
concerned had been sued in their official capacity.
It should be noted that before the Court below, respondents sued petitioner Mayor alone. However, respondents, too, prayed for a Writ of
mandamus to compel petitioner Mayor to reinstate them with back salaries and damages. Respondents, therefore, actually intended to sue
petitioner in his official capacity. Failure to implead the Municipality and other municipal authorities should not deter this Court, in the interests
of justice and equity, from including them herein as respondents. (at p. 488)
The Compromise Agreement, therefore, must be held binding on the Municipality of Isabela, which was not, in any way, deprived of its day in
Court (Gabutas vs. Castellanes, L- 17323, 14 SCRA 376, June 23, 1965). Thus, the payments to petitioner of the sums of P68,389.25 as back
salaries, P21,387.71 as total accumulated vacation/sick leaves, P772.75 as Christmas bonus, and the back salaries of Mrs. Nanie B. Nunal in
the sum of P3,096.00, have to be upheld. It likewise appears that retirement benefits bad also been collected by petitioner on 1 April 1985.
In respect, however, of the separation pay claimed by petitioner, we uphold the ruling of the COA reading in part:
Anent the second issue, this Commission believes and so holds that the instant claim for separation pay in addition to the retirement benefits
earlier received by claimant is bereft of any legal basis. Culled from the records is the fact that Mr. Nunal was dismissed from the service on
January 29, 1981 and has not been reinstated to the service until his position of Municipal Administrator of Isabela was abolished. In other
words, he was no longer in, or had already been separated from, the service when the said position was abolished. Evidently then, his
separation from the service was not attributable to the abolition of the position but was due to his dismissal and, therefore, Section 76 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 which provides
'Section 76.-Abolition of Position. When the position of an official or employee under the civil service is abolished by law or ordinance, the
official or employee so affected shall be reinstated in another vacant position without diminution of salary. Should such position not be
available, the official or employee affected shall be granted a separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service over and
above the monetary privileges granted to officials and employees under existing law.'
cannot be validly invoked as legal basis for the claim for separation pay. Moreover, the fact remains that as earlier seen Mr. Nunal has already
been paid his retirement benefits under the existing retirement law. His entitlement, therefore, to separation pay under Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 is offensive to the general policy of the government prohibiting payment of double retirement benefits to an employee. (p. 4, COA
Decision No. 388; p. 15, Rollo)
To grant double gratuity is unwarranted (See Cajiuat, et al. vs. Mathay, Sr., G.R. No. L-39743, 124 SCRA 710, September 24, 1983).
It may be that the matter of separation pay was included in the Compromise Agreement. Nonetheless, it could not be granted outright but still
had to be claimed and passed in audit, and has been aptly denied by COA. And although petitioner did file suit against the Municipality for
reinstatement, it does not follow that he was not effectively dismissed such that he could still be considered an incumbent whose position had
been abolished. A dismissed employee can be considered as not having left his office only upon reinstatement and should be given a
comparable position and compensation at the time of reinstatement (Cristobal vs. Melchor, No. L-43203, 101 SCRA 857, December 29, 1980).

Finally, a word on petitioner's contention that the Resolution of this Court under date of 11 May 1988 is not in accordance with Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
basis therefor.
In the first place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision" within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is
applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as
the case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second place, the assailed
Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision. (Tayamura, et al., vs.
IAC, et al., G.R. No. 76355, May 21, 1987 [en banc]; see also Que vs. People, G.R. Nos. L-75217-18, 154 SCRA 160, September 21, 1987).
It may be added that the Writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative Writ, never demandable as a matter of
right, "never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3d Rev. [8th ed.]; Francisco, The Revised Rules,
1972 ed., Vol. IV- B, pp. 4546, citing 14 C.J.S., 121-122).
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 is hereby PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED in that the disallowance by respondent
Commission on Audit of the amounts ordered paid by the Court of First Instance of Basilan, Branch 1, in its Decision dated 12 December 1984,
is hereby SET ASIDE, but its disallowance of petitioner's claim for separation pay of P54,092.50, is hereby SUSTAINED. No costs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintif-appellee, vs. MARCELINO A. BUGARIN, accused-appellant. MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision, [1] dated February 11, 1993, which the Regional Trial Court, Branch 97 of Quezon City rendered in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28785 to 86 and Q-92-31157 to 31160, finding accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin guilty of four counts of
consummated rape and one count of attempted rape and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged of multiple (3 Counts) rape and one count of attempted
rape, and in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code sentences him to prison terms as follows:
1) For each of the four counts of the above rape, reclusion perpetua.
2) For the attempted rape, two (2) years and four (4) months in the minimum penalty to four (4) years in the maximum period and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 to deter sexual
crimes of the sort committed by accused.
SO ORDERED.
The complainant, Maryjane Bugarin, is the daughter of accused-appellant. On February 22, 1992, accompanied by her mother, Regina
Bugarin, and her maternal aunt, Nena Padecio, she complained to the Central Police District Command that she had been repeatedly raped by
accused-appellant. In her sworn statement she related how, on nine different occasions between November 1989 and January 17, 1992, her
father entered the common sleeping area of their house in Payatas, Quezon City and, after holding her knees and spreading her legs,
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina and kissed her breasts. She claimed that, on January 17, 1992, her father molested her by
kissing her vagina and that only by repeatedly kicking him did he desist from molesting her any further.
Complainant was examined on the same date by Emmanuel I. Aranas, PNP Medico-Legal Officer, who found that she was in non-virgin
state physically.[2] On February 25, 1992, she returned to the police station to file formal charges against her father. The case was referred to
the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor which found probable cause and accordingly filed charges for consummated rape and attempted rape
by means of force and intimidation committed on December 23, 1991 and January 17, 1992 against accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin. No
bail was recommended considering that the evidence of guilt of the respondent is strong. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-92-28785 and Q-92-28786 and raffled to Branch 88 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.
On May 7, 1992, four more charges for rape by means of force and intimidation committed on November 1989, May 1990, June 1990,
and March 14, 1991 were filed against accused-appellant. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to 31160, the additional cases were
raffled to Branch 97 of the same court. These cases were eventually consolidated and assigned to Branch 88.
The informations in the six cases alleged as follows:
Crim. Case No. 92-31157

That on or about the month of June 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there,
wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARY JANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her
consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-31158
That on or about the month of November, 1989 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned MARY JANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION without her consent and against
her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-31159
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1991 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without
her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-31160
That on or about the month of May 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without
her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-28785
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1992, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commence the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the
undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN Y ASUNCION, a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her will, however, the said accused did not
perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, undersigned complainant push him away, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned in such amount as may be
awarded to her under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
Crim. Case No. 92-28786
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1991, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN Y ASUNCION, a minor, without her consent and against her will, to her
damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty in each case, after which trial ensued. Under questioning by the prosecutor,
Maryjane Bugarin narrated how her father sexually assaulted her in their familys common sleeping area while no one was at home and
threatened her if she told anyone about what happened.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed to be God fearing and morally upright and that his wife, Regina Bugarin,
must have induced their daughter to file the complaints against him because his wife blamed him for financially neglecting their family since
1989.
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented Regina Bugarin who testified that a good mother would not expose her child to humiliation just to
get back at her husband. She further claimed that her daughter, who had been raised properly and taught to be honest, could not have
fabricated the charges against the accused-appellant.
In a two-page decision, promulgated on February 11, 1993, the trial court, after giving a summary of the testimonies of the complainant
and accused-appellant, laconically ruled:

The issue is simple. Is the private complainant credible in her story of how she was raped? The answer of this Court is an undoubtful and a
definite yes.
Accused-appellant questions the trial courts decision on the ground that: (1) the testimony of Maryjane Bugarin is not credible; (2) the
elements of force and intimidation had not been proved; and (3) the decision of the trial court does not state the facts and law upon which it
was based.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General, representing the prosecution, contends that complainant, who was only 15 years old when she
reported the crime, was not likely to concoct charges against her father and that the moral ascendancy of the father over her took the place of
force and intimidation in rape.
We take up first accused-appellants charge that the decision of the trial court does not state the grounds therefor. Indeed, the
Constitution provides in part in Art. VIII, 14 that No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. This requirement is reiterated and implemented by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides in Rule 120, 2:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge
and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which
the judgment is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d)
the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.
In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make
a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.
The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in at least three respects. First, it does not contain an evaluation of the
evidence of the parties and a discussion of the legal questions involved. It does not explain why the trial court considered the complainants
testimony credible despite the fact that, as accused-appellant points out, complainant could not remember the time of the day when she was
allegedly raped. It does not explain why accused-appellants licking of complainants genital constituted attempted rape and not another
crime. Second, the complainant testified that she had been raped five times, to wit, in November 1989, on December 24, 1989, in June 1990,
on March 14, 1991, and on December 23, 1991, and that once, on January 17, 1992, she was molested by her father who licked her private
part, for which reason six informations were filed against him, but the decision found the accused-appellant guilty of only four counts of rape
(which the trial court erroneously said three counts) and one count of attempted rape, without explaining whether accused-appellant was
being acquitted of one charge of rape. Third, the decision is so carelessly prepared that it finds the accused-appellant guilty of three counts of
consummated rape but sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the four counts of . . . rape.
Maryjane claimed she had been raped on December 24, 1989, but the information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160 is for rape allegedly
committed in May 1990. It must be for this reason that the trial court convicted accused-appellant of only four counts of rape, instead of
five. But the trial court should have explained so, if this was really the reason, and expressly acquitted the accused-appellant of the charge
under this information.
The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the
decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the findings of facts or the rulings on points of law with which
he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse
dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing
judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public
confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision of the trial court in this case disrespects the judicial function.
We would normally remand this case to the trial court for compliance with the constitutional requirement for decisions. But this case has
been pending for sometime and further delay can be avoided if the Court simply reviews the whole evidence. After all, the records of the trial
court contain the transcript of stenographic notes, the complainants sworn statement dated February 22, 1992, the resolution of the
prosecutor, and the statement of the arresting officer, on the basis of which the Court may properly decide the case. [3] For this reason the
Court has decided to review this case despite the failure of the trial court to make detailed findings of facts and a statement of the reasons
underlying its decision.
Now it is settled that when the complainant in a rape case, more so if she is a minor, [4] testifies that she has been raped, she says, in
effect, all that is necessary to prove the commission of the crime. [5] Care must be taken, however, that her testimony is credible for a
conviction to be justified based on her testimony alone. [6] In this case, Maryjane Bugarin testified on November 25, 1992 [7]

The accused-appellant claims that Maryjanes testimony contains inconsistencies which indicate that the charges against him were
fabricated. He points to the failure of complainant on cross-examination to state in some instances the exact date and time she was allegedly
raped, and to the fact that it took complainant two years before reporting the incidents and that the prosecution did not present the medicolegal officer who examined the complainant. Accused-appellant also claims that no evidence was adduced to prove that the rape was
committed by force and intimidation.
The failure of the complainant to state in some cases the exact date and time of the commission of rape is a minor matter and can be
expected when a witness is recounting the details of a humiliating experience which are painful and difficult to recall in open court and in the
presence of other people.[8] Indeed, this Court has ruled that complainants failure to recall some details of the crime, instead of suggesting
prevarication, precisely indicates spontaneity and is to be expected from a witness who is of tender age and unaccustomed to court
proceedings.
Besides, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. [9] The precise time of the crime has no
substantial bearing on its commission, [10] especially since in this case the date and time of the commission of the crime is not material to the
accused-appellants defense. Indeed, accused-appellants contention is only that he could not have raped his daughter in the common
bedroom at nighttime because the place where they sleep is shut off from the rest of their house by a curtain.
Suffice it to state that lust is no respecter of time and place. [11] Our cases record instances of rape committed inside family dwellings
when other occupants are asleep. [12] In the case at bar, Maryjane testified that the accused-appellant was able to rape her by sending out her
siblings to play with their neighbors children, and while her mother was at work from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. Complainant explained her apparent
inability to recall the exact dates of the assaults upon her, thus:
Q- Madam witness, you mentioned that you were raped sometime November 1989, June 1990, December 24, 1989, March 14, 1991,
December 23, 1991, how come that you knew very well the date as December 24, March 14, December 23; or rather, how come that your
complaint is only sometime in the early part of 1991?
A-

I remember because that was closed to the birthday of my brother.

Q-

How about March 14, how come you knew very well that you were molested by your father?

A-

Because at that time, our class will almost end and we were given clearances.

Q-

What day is your last school day?

A-

I cannot remember, sir.

Q-

Is it usual that you knew very well March 14, and you do not know very well your last day of your school day?

A-

Because March 14 is our clearance.

Neither does the delay in making a criminal accusation impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained.
In People v. Coloma,[14] where the complainant was also only 13 years old when first molested by her father, the Court adverted to the
fathers moral and physical control over the young complainant in explaining the delay of eight years before the complaint against her father
was made. In this case, Maryjane must have been overwhelmed by fear and confusion, and shocked that her own father had defiled her. After
all, she had been very close to him. She also testified that she was afraid to tell her mother because the latter might be angered, so that she
finally confided to her aunt. Indeed, a survey conducted by the University of the Philippines Center for Womens Studies showed that victims
of rape committed by their fathers took much longer in reporting the incidents to the authorities than did other victims. Many factors account
for this difference: the fact that the father lives with the victim and constantly exerts moral authority over her, the threat he might make
against her, the victims fear of her mother and other relatives.
[13]

Nor is it entirely true that no evidence of force and intimidation had been adduced during the trial. Maryjane testified that she tried to
resist her fathers advances but, on several occasions, she was overpowered by him. She was embraced and thus prevented from escaping.
[15]
At other times she was intimidated by menacing looks cast on her [16] and by threats of harm. [17] Indeed, even if there was no violence or
force employed against her, the moral influence of accused-appellant over the complainant sufficed to make the crime rape. [18]
Nor is a medical examination an indispensable element in prosecutions for rape. [19] That the prosecution did not present the medico-legal
officer is, therefore, not an obstacle to a finding of guilt in this case.
We think the evidence in this case proves beyond all reasonable doubt that Maryjane had been raped on four occasions by accusedappellant: November 1989, June 1990, March 14, 1991, and December 23, 1991. Complainant has no motive to incriminate her father. To
the contrary, she testified that she was close to him. The absence of a motive lends greater credence to her testimony. [20] Neither does her
mother have any reason to falsely accuse Marcelino Bugarin. Regina Bugarin suspected her husband of having an affair with her sister in 1980
and confronted him, but she continued to live with him. This fact makes it unlikely that she would use her daughter to destroy her husband
more than ten years later. A mother would not expose her child to public trial, if the charges she makes are not true. [21]

We find no evidence, however, to find accused-appellant guilty of the charge in Criminal Case No. Q -92-31160 for alleged rape
committed in May 1990. There is no evidence to prove that accused-appellant raped complainant on that date. Her testimony is to the effect
that she was raped on another date, December 24, 1989. But accused-appellant cannot be convicted for this as no complaint was formally
filed regarding it. Accused-appellant must accordingly be acquitted of the charge in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160.
Nor do we think that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape committed on January 17, 1992 as the trial court held. Maryjane
testified:
Q-

Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you were?

A-

I was also in our house.

Q-

Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this day?

A-

He licked my sex organ.

Q-

After that, what did he do next?

A-

He was threatening me.

Q-

What did you do when he threatened you?

A-

I was so afraid. (witness is crying)

Q-

What did the accused to after threatening you?

A-

He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.

Q-

What happened after you saw him walking just beside you on that date?

A-

None, sir. I was just crying.

The intent to commit rape is not apparent from the act described. It cannot be inferred from this act (licking complainants genital) alone
that his intention was to have sexual intercourse with her because it has not been shown that he had at least placed himself on top of the
complainant.[22] The act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse. [23] Accused-appellant is instead guilty of
acts of lasciviousness. It can at least be inferred from his act of kissing the genital of the complainant that he was moved by lewd designs. [24]
Although relationship, as an aggravating circumstance, is alleged only in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to 31160, this circumstance
was nonetheless proved during the trial in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785 and, therefore, should also be appreciated in that case to justify the
imposition of the penalty in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 11, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is SET ASIDE and another one is
RENDERED finding accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin GUILTY of four counts of consummated rape in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28786, Q92-31157, Q-92-31158, and Q-92-31159 and SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua and ORDERED to INDEMNIFY the complainant Maryjane
Bugarin in the amount of P30,000.00 in damages for each count of rape committed; and of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. Q-9228785, for which he is SENTENCED to suffer imprisonment from 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six 6 years of prision correccional,
as maximum.
G.R. No. 104874 December 14, 1993 DANILO HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in
CA-G.R. CR No. 05877, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, FINDING the decision appealed from to be in accordance with law and evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED except as to
Criminal Case No. 21-87 where, for reasons above discussed, the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED (Rollo, p. 33).
CA-G.R. CR No. 05877 was an appeal by petitioner from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cavite City in Criminal Cases Nos.
21-87 to 29-87, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds Danilo Hernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the following cases: Crim. Case No.
21-87, for Estafa and he is hereby ordered sentenced to an indeterminate prison term from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion

temporal, as minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the
amount of P150,000.00 corresponding to the value of jewelries embezzled and unreturned and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 22-87, for
Estafa, he is hereby ordered sentenced for an indeterminate prison term of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of
P100,000.00 for the value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 23-87, Violation of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to
eight (8) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 25-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P250,000.00 for the value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay
the costs; Crim. Case No. 26-87, for Viol. of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs;
Crim. Case No. 27-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day
ofreclusion temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in
the amount of P280,000.00 for the value of jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 28-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced
to an indeterminate prison term of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P100,000.00 value of the jewelries embezzled and
to pay the costs; Crim. case No. 29-87, for Viol. of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision correccional, and to pay the
costs (Rollo, pp. 49-50).
It appears that sometime in August 1986, petitioner was introduced to Remedios de Leon by his aunt, as one engaged in the business of
buying and selling jewelry (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 18, 20).
In their first transaction, petitioner paid in cash the several pieces of jewelry which he bought from de Leon. In their subsequent dealings,
petitioner either paid in cash or by way of postdated checks (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 22-23). On one occasion, petitioner issued post-dated
checks with the aggregate amount of P275,000.00. These checks bounced. However, upon notice of dishonor by the drawee banks concerned,
petitioner paid de Leon cash in exchange for the dishonored checks. Some checks were likewise exchanged with cash even prior to their due
date (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 33, 37).
Several days before October 20, 1986, petitioner told de Leon that he was interested in buying some more pieces of jewelry (TSN, March 17,
1987, p. 60). On that date, at around 10:00 A.M., petitioner, together with his common-law wife, Rosemarie Rodriguez, and two other
companions, went to the house of de Leon in Cavite City (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 70). Petitioner selected a pair of 2-carat diamond earrings
worth P150,000.00 for which he issued BPI Check No. 798246 payable to "cash" in the said amount and post-dated it to October 26, 1986. The
amount of the check was filled in by Rosemarie Rodriguez and petitioner affixed his signature as drawer (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 69).
Petitioner and Rodriguez returned to de Leon's house at about 7:00 P.M. and bought one choker with 20 diamond stones and one bracelet with
16 diamond stones, for which he issued BPI Check No. 798247 payable to "cash" in the amount of P250,000.00 and postdated it to October 27,
1986. Petitioner specifically instructed de Leon to give him one week to confer with his buyer before de Leon negotiates the check. The check
was also prepared by Rodriguez and signed by petitioner (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 73-79).
In the evening of October 22, 1986, petitioner again went to the house of de Leon and bought one heart-shaped diamond set. In payment
thereof, he issued BPI Check No. 798248 payable to "cash" in the amount of P280,000.00 and post-dated it to November 9, 1986 (TSN, March
17, 1987, pp. 84-89).
On October 23, 1986, petitioner made a long-distance call to de Leon and inquired whether she still had jewelry for sale. When she said that
she did, petitioner made an appointment with her. Petitioner arrived at de Leon's house at around 2:30 P.M. The two went to a restaurant,
where petitioner selected a set of earrings and a ring, each piece with a 1-carat diamond (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 15-16). In payment for the
set, petitioner issued to de Leon BPI Check No. 798250 payable to "cash" in the amount of P100,000.00 and dated that same day (October 23,
1992). Petitioner told de Leon that the check was funded and that she could even withdraw the amount on that day. De Leon did not encash
the check for the bank was closed (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 16, 19).
In the evening of October 24, 1986, petitioner with Rodriguez went to de Leon's house and bought a 5-carat diamond piece. In payment
thereof, petitioner indorsed to de Leon ASB Check No. 245964 in the amount of P150,000.00 post-dated to November 10, 1986 and issued by
one Enrique Araneta (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 21-26).
BPI Checks Nos. 798246, 798247 and 798250 were drawn against insufficient funds, while BPI Check no. 798248 and ASB Check No. 245964
were drawn against a closed account.
Petitioner was charged in nine informations with estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
After a joint trial, petitioner was convicted of the nine charges in a joint decision.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the conviction of petitioner was affirmed as to Criminal Cases nos. 22-87, 23-87, 24-87, 25-87, 26-87, 2787, 28-87 and 29-87, and reversed as to Criminal Case No. 21-87.

In this petition, petitioner claims that his conviction of nine distinct offenses subject of nine separate informations in a single judgment is
reversible error, This contention is untenable.
The case of United States v. Tanjuatco, 1 Phil. 116, relied upon by petitioner, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Tanjuatco, we held
that the trial court improperly rendered a single judgment for two offenses in one of the two criminal cases, in the absence of a consolidation
of the two cases. In the case at bench, the trial court rendered a judgment for each of the nine separate informations, albeit in the same
decision.
We further stated in Tanjuatco that the trial court violated "an essential right of the accused, inasmuch as he is entitled, although accused of
two offenses, to a trial in each of the two cases upon the proofs adduced in each individual case, and upon the allegations set forth in each
information. It is not permissible to take into account or consider in one case the facts proved in the other, and vice versa" (at pp. 117-118).
The trial of the nine criminal cases was conducted jointly without any objection from petitioner. Even had he signified his opposition to the joint
trail, such opposition would have been unavailing. A consolidation of trails, at the court's discretion, is allowed in "charges for offenses founded
on the same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character" (1985 Rules on Criminal procedure, Rule 119, Sec. 14).
Petitioner also complains that while he assigned eight errors, the Court of Appeals did not make a complete findings of fact as to the last two
assigned errors (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
In the last two assigned errors, petitioner claims that the trial court erred:
VII
IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 21-87 TO 29-87 NOTWITHSTANDING ABSENCE OF
INCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND PRESENCE OF NUMEROUS PROOFS NEGATING THE SOUNDNESS OF SUCH VERDICT.
VIII
IN PRONOUNCING THE ACCUSED, THROUGH A SINGLE JUDGMENT, GUILTY OF ALL THE NINE DISTINCT OFFENSES COVERED BY THE NINE
SEPARATE INFORMATIONS SUBJECT MATTER OF CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 21-87 TO 29-87, INCLUSIVE (Rollo, p. 56).
Obviously, the Court of Appeals did not deem it necessary to make a separate findings of fact for said assigned errors, because they were just
the necessary consequences of the previous, assigned errors.
Petitioner next questions: (i) as violative of the constitutional mandate that decisions shall contain the facts and the law on which they are
based (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, sec. 14, par. 1), the decision of the Court of Appeals which merely adopted the statement of facts of the
Solicitor general in the appellee's brief, and (ii) as violative of the constitutional mandate requiring that any denial of a motion for
reconsideration must state the legal basis thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2), the denial of his motion of reconsideration on
the basis of a comparison of said motion with the "comment thereon" (Rollo, pp. 10-12).
In its decision the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts of the case as summarized in the Appellee's Brief are as follows: " and the quoted
in full the statement of facts of the Solicitor General (Rollo, p. 20). According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not make its own
"independent judicial opinion" by such act of adopting the statement of facts made by the advance party (Rollo, p. 11).
What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it found the facts as presented by the Solicitor General as supported by the evidence. The
constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no proscription made in the briefs or
memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the same in its own words.
Precisely briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the courts in the writing of decisions.
We note that aside from adopting the statement of facts of the Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals also made findings of facts in the course
of its discussion of the assignment of errors.
As to the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals stated in its Resolution dated March 30, 1992:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused-appellant of the decision dated December 13, 1991 and the comment thereon of
the Solicitor General, the Court finds no cogent reason that could justify a modification or reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered.
Accordingly, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 35).
The denial, therefore, was based on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not find any "cogent reason that could justify a modification or
reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered."

Petitioner claims that the decision of the trial court is not supported by the evidence, which is contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals
that said decision is "in accordance with law and the evidence" (Rollo, p. 12). He points out that the appellate court should not have believed
the trial court's conclusion that "the sole testimony of the offended party would have sufficed to sustain her assertions (Rollo, p. 47). He claims
that self-serving declarations of a party favorable to himself are not admissible and that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions were
presented.
The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct because almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is
"hearsay" (Wenke, Making and Meeting Objections, 69).
Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are
those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a party's testimony as a witness in court (National
Development Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]).
Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission
would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party's testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the
part of the opposing party for cross-examination.
It is not true that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions was presented in court (Rollo, p. 13). Yolanda Dela Rosa, an eye-witness to
some of the transactions, testified for the prosecution. Assuming that Dela Rosa was not presented as a witness, the testimony of de Leon
sufficed to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The conviction of an accused may be on the basis of the testimony of a single witness (People v.
Rumeral, 200 SCRA 194 [1991]). In determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not counted (People v.
Villalobos, 209 SCRA 304 [1992] ).
Petitioner also contends that while he was condemned by the trial court to pay civil indemnity, no evidence was actually presented in court to
prove the existence, ownership and worth of the pieces of jewelry other than the checks (Rollo, p. 14).
The existence of the jewelry was established by de Leon herself, who testified that petitioner even selected the pieces of jewelry before buying
them.
As to the ownership of the jewelry, we held in People v. Dy, 109 SCRA 400 [1981] that:
Ownership is not a necessary element of the crime of estafa, . . . In estafa, the person prejudiced or then immediate victim of the fraud need
not be the owner of the goods. This, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "Any person who shall defraud another (it does say
'owner') by any means mentioned herein below shall be punished . . . ." All that is necessary is that the loss should have fallen on someone
other than the perpetrators of the crime. . . ." (at p. 408).
The trial court based the civil indemnity on the actual price of the jewelry as agreed upon by petitioner and de Leon at the time of the
transactions and this is reflected by the face value of the checks.
Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the checks in evidence without the prosecution first proving that his signature
on the checks were authentic (Rollo, pp. 13-14). If petitioner claims that his signatures on the checks were forged, the burden is on him to
prove such fact. He who alleges must prove his allegations.
In the trial court, petitioner presented a certification issued by the San Juan Police Station to the effect that he reported as lost several blank
checks, to wit: BPI Checks Nos. 798246, 798247, 798248, 798249, and 798250, and AB Check No. 245964. We agree with the trial court when
it gave little weight to the certification. Like the trial court, we wonder why petitioner never filed a criminal case against de Leon, if said checks
were really stolen.
Lastly, petitioner contends that because "the amounts covered by the checks were deposited by the offended party in her savings account
with the Prudential Bank, it becomes the liability of the bank by its acceptance to pay for the amounts of the checks" (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
The case of Banco de Oro v. Equitable Banking Corporation, 157 SCRA 188 (1988) cited by petitioner as authority, dealt with the negligence of
a collecting bank which facilitated the payment by the drawee bank of the value of a check with a forged endorsement and signature of the
payee. No such issue is involved in the case at bench.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.

G.R. No. 132428

October 24, 2000 GEORGE YAO, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, George Yao (hereafter YAO) assails the 25 April 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
16893 which dismissed his appeal and ordered the remand of the records of the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Caloocan *
City (hereafter MeTC) for execution. YAO was convicted by said MeTC for unfair competition.
YAO's legal dilemma commenced in June 1990 when the Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company (hereafter PEMCO) noticed the
proliferation locally of General Electric (GE) lamp starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA, PEMCO knew that it was a highly unlikely
market situation considering that no GE starter was locally manufactured or imported since 1983. PEMCO commissioned Gardsmarks, Inc. to
conduct a market survey. Gardsmarks, Inc., thru its trademark specialist, Martin Remandaman, discovered that thirty (30) commercial
establishments sold GE starters. All these establishments pointed to Tradeway Commercial Corporation (hereafter TCC) as their source.
Remandaman was able to purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with the GE logo and design. Assessing that these
products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied for the issuance of a search warrant. This was issued by the MeTC, Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight
boxes, each containing 15,630 starters, were thereafter seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City.
Indicted before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code were YAO, who was
TCC's President and General Manager, and Alfredo Roxas, a member of TCC's Board of Directors. The indictment 1 charged YAO and Roxas of
having mutually and in conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which have the General Electric (GE) logo, design and containers, making
them appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and inducing the public to believe them as such, when they were in fact counterfeit.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-155713.
Both accused pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to establish the foregoing narration of facts. Further,
the State presented witnesses Atty. Hofilena of the Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon Law Offices who underwent a familiarization seminar
from PEMCO in 1990 on how to distinguish a genuine GE starter from a counterfeit, and Allan de la Cruz, PEMCO's marketing manager. Both
described a genuine GE starter as having "a stenciled silk-screen printing which includes the GE logo . . . back to back around the starter, a
drumlike glowbulb and a condenser/capacitor shaped like an M&M candy with the numbers .006." They then compared and examined random
samples of the seized starters with the genuine GE products. They concluded that the seized starters did not possess the full design
complement of a GE original. They also observed that some of the seized starters did not have capacitors or if they possessed capacitors,
these were not shaped like M&M. Still others merely had sticker jackets with prints of the GE logo. Mr. de la Cruz added that only Hankuk Stars
of Korea manufactured GE starters and if these were imported by PEMCO, they would cost P7.00 each locally. As TCC's starters cost P1.60
each, the witnesses agreed that the glaring differences in the packaging, design and costs indisputably proved that TCC's GE starters were
counterfeit.
The defense presented YAO as its lone witness. YAO admitted that as general manager, he has overall supervision of the daily operation of the
company. As such, he has the final word on the particular brands of products that TCC would purchase and in turn sold. He also admitted that
TCC is not an accredited distributor of GE starters. However, he disclaimed liability for the crime charged since (1) he had no knowledge or
information that the GE starters supplied to TCC were fake; (2) he had not attended any seminar that helped him determine which TCC
products were counterfeit; (3) he had no participation in the manufacture, branding, stenciling of the GE names or logo in the starters; (4)
TCC's suppliers of the starters delivered the same already branded and boxed; and (5) he only discussed with the suppliers matters regarding
pricing and peak-volume items.
In its 13-page 20 October 1993 decision,2 the MeTC acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the trial court declared that the
prosecution failed to prove that he was still one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods were seized. It anchored its conviction of YAO
on the following: (1) YAO's admission that he knew that the starters were not part of GE's line products when he applied with PEMCO for TCC's
accreditation as distributor; (2) the prosecution's evidence (Exhibit G-7), a delivery receipt dated 25 May 1989 issued by Country Supplier
Center, on which a TCC personnel noted that the 2000 starters delivered were GE starters despite the statement therein that they were China
starters; this fact gave rise to a presumption that the TCC personnel knew of the anomaly and that YAO as general manager and overall
supervisor knew and perpetrated the deception of the public; (3) the fact that no genuine GE starter could be sold from 1986 whether locally
manufactured or imported or at the very least in such large commercial quantity as those seized from TCC; and (4) presence of the elements
of unfair competition.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
For the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, Alfredo Roxas, of Unfair Competition under Article 189 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code . . . i.e., to prove that he was Chairman of the Board of the Tradeway Commercial Corporation on October 10, 1990, as well as to
have him identified in open court during the trial, he is acquitted of the same.
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused, George Yao, beyond reasonable doubt as principal under the said Article
189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven,
and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and twenty-one (21)days
of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision correccional.
This case was prosecuted by the law offices of Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon for . . . PEMCO . . . Considering that no document was
submitted by the private complainant to show how the claim of 300,000 for consequential damages was reached and/or computed, the court
is not in a position to make a pronouncement on the whole amount. However, the offender, George Yao, is directed to pay PEMCO the amount
of P20,000 by way of consequential damages under Article 2202 of the New Civil Code, and to pay the law offices of Castillo, Laman Tan and
Pantaleon the amount of another P20,000.00 as PEMCO's attorney's fees under Article 2208 (11) of the same.

This decision should have been promulgated in open court on July 28, 1993 but the promulgation was reset for August 31, 1993 in view of the
absence of parties; it was again re-set for today.
Promulgated this 20th day of October, 1993 in Kalookan City, Philippines. 3
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied in its order 4 of 7 March 1994.
YAO appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC). The appeal was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-47255(94) and was assigned
to Branch 121 of the court.
On 24 May 1994, Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of Branch 121 issued an order 5 directing the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On 4 July 1994 YAO filed his Appeal Memorandum.6
Without waiting for the Memorandum on Appeal of the prosecution, which was filed only on 20 August 1994,7Judge Adoracion Angeles
rendered on 27 July 1994 a one-page Decision8 which affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. In so doing, she merely quoted the dispositive portion
of the MeTC and stated that "[a]fter going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
Metropolitan Trial Court."
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration9 and assailed the decision as violative of Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. 10 In its order11 of 28
September 1994, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration as devoid of merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons.
On 4 October 1994, YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal. 12
The appealed case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 16893. In its Resolution 13 of 28 February 1995, the Court of Appeals granted YAO an
extension of twenty (20) days from 10 February or until 12 March 1995 within which to file the Appellant's Brief. However, on 25 April 1995 the
Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution14 declaring that "[t]he decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121,
has long become final and executory" and ordering the records of the case remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment. The
pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
In Our resolution, dated February 28, 1995, accused-appellant was granted an extension of twenty (20) days from February 10, 1995, or until
March 12, 1995 within which to file appellant's brief.
To date, no appellant's brief has been filed.
From the Manifestation, filed on March 24, 1995, by City Prosecutor Gabriel N. dela Cruz, Kalookan City, it would appear that:
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. George Yao received a copy of the RTC's decision on August 16, 1994, and filed a motion for reconsideration on August 30, 1994. On
October 3, 1994, George Yao received a copy of the RTC's order, dated September 28, 1994, denying his motion for reconsideration.
3. On October 4, 1994, George Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered mail.
We will assume from the said Manifestation that the decision of the RTC and the order denying YAO's motion for reconsideration were sent to
and received by YAO's counsel.
Proceeding from said assumption, Yao had fifteen (15) days from August 16, 1994 to elevate his case to this Court. On August 30, 1994, or
fourteen (14) days thereafter, Yao filed a motion for reconsideration. When he received the Order denying his aforesaid motion on October 3,
1994, he had one more day left to elevate his case to this Court by the proper mode of appeal, which is by petition for review. Yao, however,
on October 4, 1994, filed a notice of appeal by registered mail informing the RTC that he is appealing his conviction to the Court of Appeals. By
then, the fifteen (15) day period had already elapsed.
That notwithstanding, the Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 121, transmitted to this Court the entire records of the case, thru a transmittal
letter, dated October 13, 1994, and received by the Criminal Section of this Court on October 28, 1994. YAO's counsel, on February 20, 1995,
filed with this Court, a motion for extension of period to file brief for accused-appellant which was granted in Our resolution mentioned in the
opening paragraph of this resolution.
Petitions for review shall be filed within the period to appeal. This period has already elapsed even when Yao filed a notice of appeal by
registered mail, with the RTC of Kalookan City. Worse, the notice of appeal is procedurally infirm.

YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment contending that the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically dismiss the appeal,
for which reason, there was no Judgment on which an entry of judgment could be issued. He also argued that the attendant procedural
infirmities in the appeal, if any, were cured with the issuance of the 28 February 1995 resolution granting him twenty (20) days from 10
February 1995 or until 12 March 1995 within which to file an appellant's brief and in compliance thereto, consequently filed his appellant's
brief on 2 March 1995.15
In its Resolution16 of 26 January 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment for lack of merit. It
considered the 25 April 1995 resolution as having "in effect dismissed the appeal, [hence] the Entry of Judgment issued on May 26, 1995. . .
was proper."
In this petition for review on certiorari, YAO reiterates the arguments he raised in his Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment of the
Court of Appeals, thus: (1) that the entry of judgment was improvidently issued in the absence of a final resolution specifically dismissing the
appeal; (2) the procedural infirmity in the appeal, if any, has been cured; and (3) the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying him (YAO) due process of law.
In support of his first argument, YAO cites Section 1, Rule 11 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, thus:
SECTION 1. Entry of Judgment Unless a motion for reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court, judgments and final
resolutions of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to parties.
YAO claims that the 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals was not a judgment on his appeal nor was it "a final resolution"
contemplated in the Internal Rules since it did not specifically dismiss his appeal. A fortiori, the entry of judgment was improvidently issued for
lack of legal basis.
YAO also repeats his argument that any procedural infirmity in the appeal was cured when the RTC gave due course to the appeal, elevated
the records to the Court of Appeals which in turn issued on 13 December 1994 a notice to file his Appellant's Brief and granted him until 12
March 1995 within which to file the appellant's brief.
Finally, YAO asserts that he was denied due process considering that (1) none of the elements of unfair competition are present in this case;
(2) he filed his appeal to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period; and (3) notwithstanding his filing of a notice of appeal (instead
of a petition for review), it was a mere procedural lapse, a technicality which should not bar the determination of the case based on intrinsic
merits. YAO then invokes the plethora of jurisprudence wherein the Supreme Court "in the exercise of equity jurisdiction decided to disregard
technicalities"; "decided [the case] on merits and not on technicalities"; "found manifest in the petition strong considerations of substantial
justice necessitating the relaxing of the stringent application of technical rules," or "heeded petitioner's cry for justice because the basic
merits of the case warrant so, as where the petition embodies justifying circumstances"; discerned "not to sacrifice justice to technicality";
discovered that the application of "res judicata" and estoppel by judgment amount to a denial of justice and/or a bar to a vindication of a
legitimate grievance."17
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. It maintains that although the
25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically state that the appeal was being dismissed, the intent and import are clear and unequivocable. It
asserts that the appeal was obviously dismissed because the RTC decision has long become final and executory. YAO failed to challenge the
RTC decision, within the reglementary period, by filing a petition for review of the same with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
42 of the Rules of Court. Instead, he filed an ordinary appeal by way of a notice of appeal. Hence, the period to file the correct procedural
remedy had lapsed.
There is no dispute that YAO availed of the wrong procedural remedy in assailing the RTC decision. It is clear from the records that YAO
received a copy of the adverse RTC judgment on 16 August 1994. He has fifteen (15) days or until 31 August 1994 within which to file either a
motion for reconsideration or a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Fourteen (14) days thereafter or on 30 August 1994, YAO opted to
file a motion for reconsideration the pendency of which tolled the running of the period. He received a copy of the RTC's order denying the
motion for reconsideration on 3 October 1994. He had therefore, only one day left, 4 October 1994 as the last day, within which to file with the
Court of Appeals a petition for review.18 However, on said date, YAO filed a notice of appeal. He palpably availed of the wrong mode of appeal.
And since he never instituted the correct one, he lost it.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if
granted or provided by statute.19 Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 20Corollarily, its requirements must be strictly complied with.
That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within the period fixed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. 21 Non-compliance
with such legal requirements is fatal,22 for it renders the decision sought to be appealed final and executory, 23 with the end result that no court
can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision.24
In the light of these procedural precepts, YAO's petition appears to be patently without merit and does not deserve a second look. Hence, the
reasons he enumerated to persuade this Court to grant his petition and reinstate his appeal are obviously frivolous if not downright trivial.
They need not even be discussed here.

In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss the petition outright, if not for an important detail which augurs well for YAO and
would grant him a reprieve in his legal battle. The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.
xxx

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xxx

Let us quote in full the RTC judgment:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Kalookan City, in Crim. Case No. C-155713, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused, George Yao, beyond reasonable doubt as principal under the said Article
189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven,
and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days
of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision correccional.
xxx

xxx

xxx

After going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
WHEREFORE, this Court affirms in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated October 20, 1993.
SO ORDERED.
That is all there is to it.
We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction notwithstanding
the laconic and terse manner in which they were written and even if "there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence
and comprehensibility" provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, 25 as when they stated the legal
qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty
imposed and the civil liability;26 or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and
accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; 27 or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution's memorandum but
made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecution's evaluation of the case. 28
We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions,29 a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with
the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129 30 on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. We have
also declared that memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional mandate. 31
In Francisco v. Permskul,32 however, we laid down the conditions for the of validity of memorandum decisions, thus:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote
reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum
decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must
be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg.
129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable
part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was
merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement
should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to
begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for
judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the
main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an
extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection
cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.
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Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both as to the form prescribed and the occasions
when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down
the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.
Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the
constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It
achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for
itself.
We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity laid
down in Francisco vs. Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one
resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless. 33
We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 34 in that while we conceded that brevity in the writing
of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot be substituted for substance; and again in Francisco v. Permskul, 35 where we
cautioned that expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the constitutional requirements.
This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but never at the expense of scholarly analysis, and more
significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears expressed by Justice Feria as the ponente in Romero v. Court of Appeals 36 come true, i.e., if
an appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due process since he
was not accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases,
as in this case, where not only property rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human being.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and
fair play.37 It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. 38 The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A
decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal.39 More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of
legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the
sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or
property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his
decision.40
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the
constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty
to the Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a decision, resolution or order which:
contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a
summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties; 41 convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal authority or principle
to support conclusions that the letter in question was libelous 42 ; consisted merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations
and failed to support its conclusion of parricide 43 ; consisted of five (5) pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from the labor arbiter's
decision including the dispositive portion and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of its own discussion or
reasonings44 ; was merely based on the findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic notes; 45 or failed to explain the factual and
legal bases for the award of moral damages. 46
In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC decision in question.
In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process but not on the grounds he ardently invoked but on the reasons already extensively
discussed above. While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an essential part of the
judicial system that courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead afford every party-litigant
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his case, freed from the constraints of technicalities. 47
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be relaxed. 48 In other
words, if strict adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice 49 or where the merit of a party's cause is
apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements, 50 procedural rules should definitely be liberally
construed. A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose
life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities. 51 We therefore withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable
failure to comply with the constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day in court. We also remind all magistrates to heed
the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to uphold the Constitution and the principles
enshrined therein, lest they be lost in the nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial work.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in this case is GRANTED. The questioned 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of
AppeaLs in CA-G.R. No. 16893 is hereby SET ASIDE and the 27 July 1994 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Kalookan City
rendered in its appellate jurisdiction is NULLIFIED. The records are hereby remanded to said Regional Trial Court for further proceedings and
for the rendition of judgment in accordance with the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.

ENGINEER FERNANDO S. DIZON, complainant, vs. JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay
City, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, with violation of the Constitution,
serious misconduct, inefficiency, and falsification in connection with her decision in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Engineer Fernando S. Dizon.
It appears that on April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered, convicting complainant of falsification of private document. The promulgation
of the judgment consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy of the
decision on him. The accused and his counsel were told to return in a few days for their copy of the decision, but although petitioner and his
father by turns went to the court to obtain a copy of the decision they were not able to do so. To protect his right, complainant filed a partial
motion for reconsideration on May 5, 1993, expressly reserving his right to submit a more elaborate one upon receipt of the decision. The
hearing of the motion for reconsideration was scheduled on May 12, 1993, but the case was not called as complainants counsel was told that
the decision had not yet been finished. On November 29, 1994, complainant filed an Omnibus Motion to Annul Promulgation of Sentence and
to Dismiss the case. On December 16, 1994, the date set for hearing the motion, complainant was served a copy of the decision, dated April
22, 1993, the dispositive portion of which states:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Fernando Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Private
Document as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2 in relation to Art. 171 par. 2 and 4 thereof and hereby sentences him to
imprisonment of Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years and a fine of P5,000.00.
Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one year and eight months
after the promulgation of its dispositive portion on April 22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, 14 of the Constitution which prohibits
courts from rendering decisions without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based and 15 of the
same Art. VIII, which provides that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions within three months from the date of their
submission. He alleges further that he was denied the right to a speedy trial in violation of Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution and that Judge
Lopez falsified her decision by antedating it and including therein, as additional penalty, a fine of P5,000.00.
On December 26, 1994, complainant filed another motion for reconsideration after receiving a copy of the full decision of the court. On
January 3, 1995, he moved to disqualify respondent from hearing the motions for reconsideration which he had filed. Respondent judge
responded by voluntarily inhibiting herself from further consideration of the case and ordered it forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court
for re-raffle. The case was eventually assigned to Judge Manuel F. Dumatol of Branch 113 of the Pasay City RTC.
Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was promulgated with the reading of the dispositive portion, her decision
was already prepared, although to prevent leakage in the process of preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until the day of its
promulgation. Respondent judge states that after the dispositive portion had been read to complainant, respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde
Paulo (Social Worker II, presently OIC of Branch 109) for typing and incorporation into the text of the decision. The court found complainant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of private document under Art. 172, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that
the delay in furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision was unintentional.
Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing her decision and to a series of personal problems which contributed to this
delay in the release of her decision, to wit: she has only two (2) stenographers to attend to daily trials in her court, making it necessary for her
to make use of the Social Worker assigned to her to type her decisions. During the period January to December 1993 she had to dispose of
285 cases, apart from the fact that there was an unusually big number of criminal, civil, and land registration cases as well as special
proceedings filed in her court which required the holding of hearings in the mornings and in the afternoons. During the same period, she went
through some personal tragedies. She lost her niece, Gloria Lopez Roque, whom she had raised from childhood, due to a hospital
accident. This was followed by the death on March 1, 1992 of her mother, Margarita Lopez, who had been under respondents care for the
past eight years after suffering a stroke. On September 17, 1993, respondents father died of diabetes, renal failure, pneumonia, and cardiac
arrest. Respondent was the one who single-handedly brought them in and out of the hospital because all her able-bodied relatives are
abroad. Respondent herself was found to be suffering from diabetes and hypertension, necessitating her treatment and leave of absence from

September 27, 1994 to December 12, 1994, in addition to her other leaves of absence. Aside from these, respondents family suffered
financial reverses because of estafa committed against them.
On February 19, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis submitted a memorandum, finding the charge of violation of the
Constitution to be without merit. He called attention to the written decision of respondent judge, which, albeit delivered to complainant late,
nonetheless states the facts and law on which it is based. He likewise finds the charge of serious misconduct and falsification to be without
basis in view of the absence of malice. However, he finds the charge of inefficiency to be well founded on the basis of respondents failure to
furnish complainant or his counsel a copy of the decision within a reasonable time after its promulgation. Hence, the Deputy Court
Administrator believes that Judge Lopez should be given admonition for her negligence, but recommends that the other charges against her
for violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution which provides:
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of
submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months
for all other lower courts.
Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three months of the submission of the case for decision, the fact is that only
the dispositive portion was read at such promulgation. She claims that on April 22, 1993 the text of her decision, containing her findings and
discussion of complainants liability, had already been prepared although it had to be put in final form by incorporating the dispositive
portion. However, the fact is that it took a year and eight months more before this was done and a copy of the complete decision furnished
the complainant on December 16, 1994. Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
1. Judgment defined. - The term judgment as used in this Rule means the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is not guilty
of the offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by law on the accused.
2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the
judgment is based.
6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court
in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read
to him, stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is based. Since this was done only on December 16, 1994 when a copy of the
complete decision was served on complainant, it is obvious that the respondent failed to render her decision within three months as required
by Art. VIII, 15 of the Constitution.
If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had been read in open court on April 22, 1993 was to incorporate it in the
text of the decision allegedly then already prepared, it is difficult to see why it took respondent judge one year and eight more months before
she was able to do so. Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out her decision by a series of personal and other problems
which leads the Court to believe that when she promulgated her sentence she had not finished the preparation of the entire decision. At all
events, she could have applied for extension of time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of judgment until she had finished it.
What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a sin perjuicio judgment, which is a judgment without a statement of
the facts in support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the final judgment. [1] That is why, in answer to complainants charge that the
dispositive portion of the judgment read to him did not impose a fine, respondent contends that the addition of the fine of P5,000.00 was
within her power to do even if no such fine had been included in the oral sentence given on April 22, 1993. As respondent judge states,
because the decision was not complete it could be modified and cites in support of her contention the case of Abay, Sr. v. Garcia.
[2]
Respondent only succeeds in showing that the judgment promulgated on April 22, 1993 was a sin perjuicio judgment which was
incomplete and needed a statement of the facts and law upon which the judgment was based. As early as 1923, this Court already expressed
its disapproval of the practice of rendering sin perjuicio judgments, what with all the uncertainties entailed because of the implied
reservation that it is subject to modification when the decision is finally rendered. [3] This Court has expressed approval of the practice of some
judges of withholding the dispositive portion from their opinions until the very last moment of promulgation of their judgment in order to
prevent leakage,[4] but that refers to the preparation of their decision, not its promulgation. What must be promulgated must be the complete
decision. There would be no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret at the stage of promulgation of judgment.
However, the Court finds the other charges against respondent to be without merit.
First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial by reason of respondents failure to furnish him with a copy of
the decision until after one year and eight months is without basis. It appears that despite the destruction of records by fire in the Pasay City
Hall on January 18, 1992 the parties were required to submit simultaneously their memoranda on August 18, 1992. The delay, if any, was not
such vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay [5] as to justify finding a denial of the right to a speedy trial. The fact is that the reading of
the sentence on April 22, 1993, albeit not in compliance with the requirement for promulgation of judgments, nonetheless put an end to trial.

Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the complete decision did not prejudice his right to appeal or file a motion for
reconsideration. It is true that an accused must be given a copy of the decision in order to apprise him of the basis of such decision so that he
can intelligently prepare his appeal or motion for reconsideration. However, in accordance with the ruling in Director of Lands v. Sanz,
[6]
complainants period to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration did not begin to run until after he actually received a copy of the
judgment on December 16, 1994. He therefore suffered no prejudice. If at all, complainant suffered from the anxiety to refute a conviction
which he could not do for lack of a statement of the basis of the conviction.
Nonetheless, certain factors mitigate respondent judges culpability. Except for this incident, respondents record of public service as
legal officer and agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, as State Prosecutor, and later Senior State Prosecutor, of the Department of
Justice for 17 years and as Regional Trial Judge for more than 13 years now is unmarred by malfeasance, misfeasance or wrongdoing. This is
the first time she is required to answer an administrative complaint against her. Her failure to decide the case of complainant was brought
about by factors not within her control, to wit, lack of stenographers and unusually big number of cases; and her personal loss as a result of
the death of her niece and both her parents, financial reverses of the family, and poor health as a result of diabetes and hypertension.
In Mangulabnan v. Tecson,[7] a joint decision in two criminal cases was rendered by respondent judge on February 24, 1978, six months
and eight days from submission of the case, and a copy was delivered to complainant on September 28, 1979, over 19 months after rendition
of the decision. Two complaints were filed for violation of the constitutional provision requiring submitted cases to be decided by lower courts
within three months and for violation of complainants right to a speedy trial. Respondent judge blamed the delay in deciding the cases on the
fact that his clerks had misfiled the records. As to the delay in furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision, the judge attributed this to
the mistake of his clerk who did not think complainant was entitled to receive the same. The judge was reprimanded. The reason for the
delay in that case was even less excusable than the difficulties experienced by respondent Judge Lopez, i.e., deaths in respondents family,
her own poor state of health, financial reverses suffered by her family, and the volume of work done within the period in question, which
somewhat mitigate her liability. The Court believes that a similar penalty would be appropriate.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that repetition of the same acts complained of will be
dealt with more severely.

In Re: Derogatory news Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a
Suspected Drug Queen:
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Men and Women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice
must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their influence in
society must be consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of preserving
the independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court or administrative agency."[1] The slightest form of interference cannot be countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence
to derail or interfere in the regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the parties therein, public confidence
in the judicial system is diminished, if not totally eroded.
Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper accounts which appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues of The Manila Standard,
The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily Inquirer andToday. The national dailies collectively reported that Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of
prison to play in a Manila casino.[2]
That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., issued a Memorandum to Justice Demetria directing him to comment on
the derogatory allegations in the news items. [3] On 24 July 2000, Justice Demetria submitted his Compliance. Subsequently, Chief State
Prosecutor (CSP) Jovencito R. Zuo, who disclosed to the media the name of Justice Demetria, and State Prosecutor (SP) Pablo C. Formaran III,
a member of the Task Force on Anti-Narcotics Cases of the Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese drug
queen, filed their respective Comments on theCompliance of Justice Demetria.[4]
On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation and designated Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino as Investigator and
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo as Prosecutor. An investigation then commenced on 22 August 2000 and continued until 16 November
2000.
The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP Zuo, SP Formaran III, Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP Formaran, III, and Jose
H. Afalla, an employee from the Office of Asst. CSP (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr. The defense on the other hand presented ten (10) witnesses:
respondent Justice Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Severino Gana, Jr., Senior State Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo Daosos, Go Teng
Kok, Yu Yuk Lai, MTC Judge Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok, Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng
Kok, and Luisito Artiaga, official of the Philippine Amateur Track and Field Association (PATAFA).
The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the prosecution are quite clear. In an Information dated 9 December 1998, SP
Formaran III charged Yu Yuk Lai, together with her supposed nephew, a certain Kenneth Monceda y Sy alias William Sy, before the RTC of
Manila, Br. 18,[5] with violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended, for "conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
deliberate intent and without authority of law x x x (to) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3)
kilograms, more or less, of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated drug." [6] Accused of non-bailable offense, both Yu

Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda were held at the detention cell of the PNP Narcotics Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 25 June 1999,
accused Yu Yuk Lai filed a Petition for Bail on the ground that the evidence of her guilt was not strong.
On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the accused, especially Yu Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly playing in the casinos
of Heritage Hotel and the Holiday Inn Pavilion, SP Formaran III filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Transfer the Detention of the Accused to the
City Jail.[7] On the same day, Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the motion and ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2) accused to
the Manila City Jail.[8]
On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the evidence standing alone and unrebutted, is strong and sufficient to warrant
conviction of the two accused for the crime charged" and denied the petition for bail of accused Yu Yuk Lai for lack of merit. [9] Consequently,
both accused filed a Joint Motion for Inhibition arguing that the trial court's actuations "do not inspire the belief that its decision would be just
and impartial."[10] On 28 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., believing that the joint motion was utterly without merit but considering the gravity of
the offense and for the peace of mind of the accused, inhibited himself. [11]
The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge Angel V. Colet. Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to Order the Confinement
of the Accused in a Hospital. Before Judge Colet could resolve the motion, the case was handled by the Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.
On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's motion and allowed her to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for a
period not exceeding seven (7) days, [12] contrary to the recommendation of Dr. Jose Estrada Rosal, Chief of the Health Services of the Manila
City Jail, that Yu Yuk Lai be confined at the Philippine General Hospital. [13]
On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent Motion for Extension of Medical Confinement "for a period of one (1) month, or
until such time that she is fit to be discharged from the said hospital." [14] On 7 July 2000 Judge Muro also granted Yu Yuk Lai's Motion for Leave
of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence. [15] Soon, rumors circulated in the Manila City Hall that Judge
Muro was partial towards accused Yu Yuk Lai.
The rumors did not end there, On 6 July 2000 unidentified employees of the RTC Manila calling themselves "CONCERNED COURT
EMPLOYEES" wrote the Secretary of Justice, copy furnished the Chief State Prosecutor, the Ombudsman, and Judge Muro. The letter alleged
that Judge Muro ordered the hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she (was) not sick and there (was) already a rumor circulating around the City
Hall, that the notorious Judge had given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to file the Motion to Quash, which (would) be granted for a
consideration of millions of pesos and the contact person (was) allegedly the daughter of the Judge, who is an employee in the said branch." [16]
Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion for Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit himself "from further handling
this case and/or from resolving the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused Yu Yuk Lai as well as any other pending incidents therein." [17]
On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while she was supposed to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, accused
Yu Yuk Lai was arrested inside the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn Pavilion, Manila, while playing baccarat, She was
unescorted at the time of her arrest.
On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro was heard and submitted for resolution. Later, at
around 11:30 o'clock, when SP Formaran III arrived in his office from the hearing, he was informed by his secretary, Agnes Tuason, that the
staff of Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio Demetria had called earlier and said that the Justice wanted to speak with him. The caller requested
for a return call. As requested, SP Formaran III immediately returned the call of Justice Demetria but the Justice had already gone out for
lunch.
Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice Demetria, PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of
Go Teng Kok and a close friend of Justice Demetria, went to the office of SP Formaran III in the DOJ which SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert
Fonacier. Apparently, Justice Demetria was not familiar with SP Formaran III as he greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka, Prosecutor Formaran?"[18]
Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately pleaded with SP Formaran III to withdraw his motion to inhibit Judge Muro as this
would purportedly delay the resolution of the case. Go Teng Kok also expressed his apprehension that if Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge
might convict his friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then already receiving bad publicity.
Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP Formaran III informed the Justice that a motion for inhibition has been
submitted for resolution, one basis of which was the unsigned letter of the concerned court employees. Justice Demetria opined that it was a
bit dangerous to anchor the inhibition of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous letter. The Justice then advised Go Teng Kok who was becoming
persistent to "keep his cool" and asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help Go Teng Kok. Apparently, prior to 18 July 2000, Go
Teng Kok had already been asking SP Formaran III to go slow in prosecuting accused Yu Yuk Lai. [19] SP Formaran III at first politely declined the
request. But later, "just to put an end to (the) conversation," [20] he told them that he would bring the matter to CSP Zuo. "Iyon pala," Justice
Demetria replied. The Justice then stood up, bade good bye and left. Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok followed closely behind.[21]
Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuo and informed the latter of what had transpired. CSP Zuo replied, "No way!" SP
Formaran III also told ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who gave the same reply. [22]
At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuo received a call from Justice Demetria who requested him to instruct SP Formaran III
to withdraw the motion for inhibition of Judge Muro so that the Judge could already issue an order. "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor
Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro," Justice Demetria was quoted as
saying.[23] Politely, CSP Zuo said that he would see what he could do. Tingnan ko po kung ano ang magagawa ko."[24]
On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a "Supreme Court Justice x x x and an outspoken sports person and
leader"[25] had been exerting "undue pressure" on the DOJ to go slow in prosecuting re-arrested drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. That same afternoon,
the names of Justice Demetria and Mr. Go Teng Kok were disclosed to the media to clear the name of the Supreme Court justices who might
have been affected by the erroneous news report. The following day, 21 July 2000, several newspapers named Justice Demetria and Go Teng
Kok as "drug lawyers."
Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a Copy of an Order dated 19 July 200 of Judge Muro inhibiting himself from further hearing the case
of Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda.[26]
Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied having interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he indeed visited
the DOJ on 18 July 2000, he went there to "visit old friends" and his meeting Go Teng Kok whom he did not know until that time was purely
accidental. Expectedly, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok corroborated the claim of respondent Justice.
Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP Formaran III "to do something to help Go Teng Kok about the case" without ever
specifying the kind of "help" that he requested. He averred that it was purely on the basis of erroneous impression and conjecture on the part

of SP Formaran III that he impliedly asked him to withdraw the motion "because that is what Mr. Go Teng Kok was appealing and
requesting."[27] Respondent claimed that the "help" he was requesting could well be "within legal bounds or line of duty."
Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III, such was not
a form of intervention. He only admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the discussion between the prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became
heated. While he asked about the status of the case this, he said, demonstrated his lack of knowledge about the case and bolstered his claim
that he could not have possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.
Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his identification by CSP Zuo as the Justice exerting undue pressure on the DOJ
were all hearsay. Respondent submited that CSP Zuo based his identification from a newspaper account, from the statement of his secretary
that it was he (Justice Demetria) who was on the other end of the telephone and from SP Formaran III when the latter consulted the Chief State
Prosecutor about the visit of the Justice and Go Teng Kok impliedly asking him to withdraw the motion.
In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was actually he, not Justice Demetria, who later called up CSP Zuo to inquire
about the latter's decision regarding the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit since SP Formaran III had earlier told Go Teng Kok that the matter
would be taken up with his superiors.
In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for him to ask SP Formaran III whom he just met for the first time to
do something for Go Teng Kok whom he claims he just likewise met for the first time. Neither did he know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself
corroborated. It would be unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of someone he did not know. Indeed respondent Justice asserted that his
meeting Go Teng Kok on 18 July 2000 at the DOJ was purely coincidence, if not accidental.
So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai?
Investigating Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino believes so. In her Report dated 5 January 2001, she found respondent Justice Demetria
"guilty of violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct" and recommended that "appropriate disciplinary action be taken against him
by this Honorable Court."[28]
Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and damning. Thus, even the Senate Committee on Justice and Human
Rights, after a hearing, found that "there was a conspiracy to commit the following offenses on the part of CA Associate Justice Demetrio
Demetria and PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice punishable under PD No.1829 and Article 3(a) of RA
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." [29]
While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the criminal case, his denial cannot stand against the positive assertions of
CSP Zuo and SP Formaran III, [30] which are consistent with natural human experience. To accept the testimony of the defense witnesses that
it was Atty. Paas who telephoned CSP Zuo, and not Justice Demetria, and that the "help" the respondent Justice was requesting SP Formaran
III was something "within legal bounds or line of duty" other than the withdrawal of the motion is to strain too far one's imagination.
The testimony of CSP Zuo is plainly unambiguous and indubitably consistent with the other facts and circumstances surrounding the
case CSP Zuo: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria said, "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang
Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro." [31]
In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP Formaran III said that he would consult his superiors regarding the proposal to
withdraw the motion. The timely telephone call to CSP Zuo was thus a logical follow-up. And no one could have made the call except
respondent Justice since it is not uncommon for anyone to believe that CSP Zuo would recognize the voice of respondent Justice who was CSP
Zuo's former superior in the DOJ. Thus, the confident utterance "[p]akisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong
kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro" could not have come from anyone else but from respondent Justice
who had moral ascendancy over CSP Zuo, he being a Justice of the Court of Appeals and a former Undersecretary and at one time Acting
Secretary of the DOJ.
Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent Justice claims he did not know and met only that time, could not have
meant any other assistance but the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro. True, Justice Demetria never categorically asked SP
Formaran III to withdraw his Motion. But when respondent Justice Demetria asked the state prosecutor at that particular time "to do
something x x x to help Mr. Go Teng Kok," the latter was pleading for the withdrawal of the motion, and nothing else. That was the only form
of "help" that Go Teng Kok wanted. The subtle pressure exerted simply pointed to one particular act. Thus, subsequently respondent Justice
called CSP Zuo to ask for just that - the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.
Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty. Paas, went to the DOJ, first, to see Secretary Artemio Tuquero and seek
assistance in the appointment of Atty. Paas to the Court of Appeals, and second, to "visit old friends," [32] and that the meeting with Go Teng Kok
was purely accidental. But respondent Justice never mentioned in his earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that his
primary purpose in going to the DOJ was to see Sec. Tuquero, and since Sec. Tuquero was not in, he instead decided to see some
officials/prosecutors whom he had not visited for a long time.
We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very own witnesses belied his alibi. ACSP Gaa, Jr. testified and confirmed that
Justice Demetria only said "hi." [33] SSP Daosos, denied seeing him and claimed that it was only Atty. Paas who peeped into his room.
[34]
Suspiciously, it was really in the office of SP Formaran III, whom respondent Justice Demetria did not know, where Justice Demetria, Atty.
Paas and Go Teng Kok decided to "stay a while." [35]
Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, the Investigating Justice, Justice Demetria and company could not have been
there to exchange pleasantries with SPs Formaran III and Fonacier since they were not acquainted with each other. Prior to this incident, Justice
Demetria did not personally know either SP Formaran III or SP Fonacier, a fact corroborated by respondent himself. [36]
All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that
"[b]ecause Prosecutor Formaran is also a friend, we decided to drop by his office x x x (and) I stayed a while." [37]
As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice was there "to join forces with Go Teng Kok in arguing for the withdrawal of
Formaran's Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro, which was the real purpose of their visit to SP Formaran and to the DOJ. The uncanny
coincidence in the timing of Justice Demetria's visit to SP Formaran's office, and that of Go Teng Kok, could not have been 'accidental' but prearranged."[38] And, "visiting old friends" only came as an afterthought. The circumstances simply show that Justice Demetria and Atty. Paas,
together with Go Teng Kok, did not go to the DOJ to see Sec. Tuquero, but to visit, if not "pressure," CSP Zuo and SP Formaran III.

Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him to help Yu Yuk Lai and Go Teng Kok, both of whom he did not personally
know, and more unthinkable that he would be asking help from SP Formaran III whom he had just met for the first time.
The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that respondent is a very close friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok. And, it is
not necessary that respondent Justice Demetria be acquainted with Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai or SP Formaran III for him to intercede in behalf of
the accused. It is enough that he is a close friend of the lawyer of Go Teng Kok, who has been helping the accused, and that he wields
influence as a former DOJ Undersecretary and later, Acting Secretary, and now, a Justice of the Court of Appeals.
In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convincing and trustworthy, as compared to those of the defense which do
not only defy natural human experience but are also riddled with major inconsistencies which create well-founded and overriding doubts.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety and must be above suspicion. [39] His must be free of even a whiff
of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private
individual.
Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed to live up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did
not only make a mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the
national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and interfering with her prosecution, seriously undermined the integrity
of the entire Judiciary.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. [40] High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the
people in the Judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society cannot be preserved. [41] There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who
cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. [42]
WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating Justice and hold Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or
reappointment to any government office, agency or instrumentality, including any government owned or controlled corporation or institution.

G.R. No. L-35377-78 July 31, 1975 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO,
ISIDRO PUGAL and ERNING ABANO, defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer to the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame,
Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole defendant, is
charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial
because there are many political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity; some of the adherents of the Crisologos had in fact been
murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his father, Congressman Floro Crisologo, was shot to death while hearing mass at the Vigan cathedral.
Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting duck for a gunwielder or grenade-thrower who wants to assassinate him. He
could even be lynched or shot to death on the specious pretext that he was trying to escape.
Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur signified his conformity to the transfer of the venue of the trial to the New
Bilibid Prisons.
Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court to "order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice". Here, what is involved is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant Crisologo, the accused. It would be
absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperilled.
Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a justification for transfer of venue (See State vs. Siers, 136 S. E. 503,
103, W. Va. 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).1wph1.t

We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves not merely the change of the place of hearing but also the transfer
of the expediente of Criminal Case No. 3949 to another court. According to Crisologo's motion, the alleged evidence against him is in the
custody of the authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The transfer of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City and the
holding of the trial at Camp Crame appear to be the most convenient arrangement.
WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City where it
should be re-docketed and raffled to any Judge thereof. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and security measures
should be adopted in bringing defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on the occasion of the hearing.
G.R. No. L-41313 November 6, 1975
ALIPIO MONDIGUING and ANDRES DUNUAN, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Ifugao; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; MARIANO PACTIW, alias Bugbug; DULMOG ABLUYEN and ANGELINA
ABLUYEN, respondents..
AQUINO, J.:
Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the ten defendants accused of double murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder in
Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao Province (People vs. George Bayucca et al.). That case was filed in connection
with an ambuscade which was perpetuated on July 23, 1970 at Baag, Banaue, Ifugao. As a result of that incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig
of Ifugao was wounded and his executive assistant and his driver were killed. Up to this time the accused in that case have not been
arraigned. .
On September 4, 1975 Mondiguing and Dunuan filed in this Court a petition to transfer the venue of the case to Baguio City or Quezon City.
They claimed that they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of First
Instance of that province is a protege' of Governor Lumauig and his brother, former Congressman Romulo Lumauig, and because their
witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear of harassment and reprisals. The petitioners further claimed that, as may be inferred from previous
incidents recounted in the petition, their lives and the lives of their witnesses and lawyers would be in grave danger in Ifugao because of the
tensions and antagonisms spawned by the case and the political rivalry between the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. (The accused, George
Bayucca was killed on October 28, 1970 and Alipio Mondiguing resigned as mayor of Banaue and took refuge in Baguio City). .
The Acting Solicitor General interposed no objection to the change of venue but he invited the Court's attention to the suggestion of Governor
Lumauig that the case may be transferred to the proper court in Isabela in view of its proximity to Ifugao. .
Respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad in his comment disputed the correctness or truth of the grounds relied upon for the change of venue
and prayed that the petition be dismissed. He said that, if there would be bias on his part, he would be biased in favor of the People of the
Philippines. He said that the crime charged was not "committed personally against" Governor Lumauig. That statement is not correct since the
governor is one of the victims mentioned in the information. .
Judge Abad revealed that petitioner Dunuan sent to the court a letter dated August 30, 1975 wherein he declined the services of Atty. Jose W.
Diokno (who filed the instant petition for transfer of venue). In view of that disclosure, the petition herein should be regarded as having been
filed only by Alipio Mondiguing. .
The fact is that this Court in Paredes vs. Abad, L-36927-28, April 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 522, 534, disqualified Judge Abad from trying the electoral
protests filed by Crescencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against Gualberto Lumauig and John Langbayan. In that case it was alleged that Judge
Abad was a political leader of Governor Lumauig and was recommended to his present position by the Lumauig brothers. .
The issue is whether Mondiguing's plea for a change of venue is justified. A change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted
for whimsical or flimsy reasons. "The interests of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is
necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime" (Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, 562). .
This Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of
the Constitution). It "possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First
Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and
there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair
and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice" (People vs. Gutierrez, L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172, 185). .
A change of venue was ordered by this Court in a case where it was shown that the accused might be liquidated by his enemies in the place
where the trial was originally scheduled to be held (People vs. Pilotin Vincent Crisologo, movant, L-3537778, July 31, 1975).
After a careful consideration of the circumstances recited in Mondiguing's petition to support his request for a change of the place of trial, we
have reached the conclusion that his petition is meritorious. .

In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice and considering that his life would be in danger if he were to be
tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of Baguio. .
The other relief sought by Mondiguing, which is that he be transferred from the Philippine Constabulary headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao to
Camp Crame should be submitted for the consideration of the Circuit Criminal Court. .
WHEREFORE, the petition of Alipio Mondiguing for the transfer of the venue of Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao is
granted. The said case should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District so that it may be heard in Baguio City.

G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO (ECOT) GARCIA,
RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER, OSCAR, OMAR,
JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed DOES respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure
ordained in the implementation of the right to bail 2 are involved in this petition which, even if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a
certiorari. It must have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the conviction that there
was no time to lose, that must have led them to devote less than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals. They ignored the
principle that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is with the public officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the
questions raised, the need for a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that further action be taken. Accordingly,
in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of the petition, the Court required the comment of the Solicitor General as well
as of the private respondents, 4 the accused in six pending criminal cases before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 5 It opened with this preliminary statement: "The
present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines can,
under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting the action
'subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal
point but instead adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of
Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition
for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander
at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased
bodies of seven persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * *
* On September 16, 1980 armed with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola.
Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez,
Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander
of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose
Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129,
4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's
witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the accused. It thus issued an order for their a. rest.
However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them
the right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of
this right and have since been released from detention. In a parallel development. the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution
of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their
safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on
bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the
families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation of the
bail bonds.
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the
Solicitor General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the
setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et
al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue
of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge
Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan
has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that
the said Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail,
without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the
prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become moot and academic. The comments respectively submitted by respondent

Florendo Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt
solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed
submitted for decision.
The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents, there being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the
prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in favor of
petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So we
rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The
Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The
Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes
as ponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality
where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose
for which courts have been established." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor General.
Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are
fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of qqqts
fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their lives. 13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such transfer,
but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question of the
cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no objection to the transfer. 15 It may be added that there may
be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it
has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should
be resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea
could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that
along with the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought.
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court
without hearing the prosecution That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice
Capistrano, speaking for the Court: "The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process.
The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a
capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in
the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation
of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground." 17 These words of Justice
Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure
are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be
acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating
proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
filament. We are to keep the balance true." 18 This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that
the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the
questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a
jurisdictional character. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be
without force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been
transferred by virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents,
with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision
is immediately executory. No costs.

G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO (ECOT) GARCIA,
RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER, OSCAR, OMAR,
JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed DOES respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure
ordained in the implementation of the right to bail 2 are involved in this petition which, even if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a
certiorari. It must have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the conviction that there
was no time to lose, that must have led them to devote less than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals. They ignored the
principle that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is with the public officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the
questions raised, the need for a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that further action be taken. Accordingly,

in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of the petition, the Court required the comment of the Solicitor General as well
as of the private respondents, 4 the accused in six pending criminal cases before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 5 It opened with this preliminary statement: "The
present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines can,
under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting the action
'subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal
point but instead adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of
Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition
for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander
at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased
bodies of seven persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * *
* On September 16, 1980 armed with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola.
Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez,
Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander
of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose
Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129,
4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's
witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the accused. It thus issued an order for their a. rest.
However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them
the right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of
this right and have since been released from detention. In a parallel development. the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution
of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their
safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on
bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the
families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation of the
bail bonds.
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the
Solicitor General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the
setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et
al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue
of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge
Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan
has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that
the said Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail,
without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the
prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become moot and academic. The comments respectively submitted by respondent
Florendo Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt
solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed
submitted for decision.
The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents, there being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the
prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in favor of
petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So we
rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The
Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The
Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes
as ponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality
where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose
for which courts have been established." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor General.
Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are
fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of qqqts
fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their lives. 13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such transfer,
but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question of the
cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no objection to the transfer. 15 It may be added that there may
be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it
has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should
be resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea
could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that
along with the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought.

2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court
without hearing the prosecution That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice
Capistrano, speaking for the Court: "The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process.
The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a
capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in
the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation
of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground." 17 These words of Justice
Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure
are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be
acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating
proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
filament. We are to keep the balance true." 18 This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that
the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the
questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a
jurisdictional character. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be
without force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been
transferred by virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents,
with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision
is immediately executory. No costs.
Zaldivar v Gonzales
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme
Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and
filing informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper
interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation
theta the rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his
petition to be given due course.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated
that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings
of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six
justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of
the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements
constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and,
through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the
Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly
the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

In re : Edillon, 84 SCRA 554 (1978)

Fast facts
Marcial Edillon is subject to an action for his name to be removed from the Roll of Attorneys.
Contentions c/o IBP
Edillon should be disbarred and whose name should be stricken out of the Roll because of stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the
IBP.
Section 24, Article 3 IBP By-laws
Provides, among others, that continued delinquency in payment of the fees shall authorize the IBP to resort to all appropriate actions,
including a recommendation to the SC for the removal of the delinquent members name from the Roll.
Section 10 Court Rule
Provides, among others, that the effect of the nonpayment of dues shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP and continued default
for one year shall be a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent from the Roll.
Contention c/o Edillon
The abovementioned provisions in the IBP by-laws and Court Rule are null and void as they are violative of his right to freedom of association.
He is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed
to him by the Constitution.

In re: Petition for the IBP, Roman Ozaeta

The integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable.
Integrated Bar and Integration of the bar
Integration of the bar is a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of
the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. An integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar. Created by the SC, as the
regulator of the practice of law.
Integration provides an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is
already a member.
Reason for the collection of fees
In order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services.
Held & Ratio On Edillons name and the Roll. Edillon is barred and his name is removed from the Roll. Integration of the Bar in the Philippines
is valid as there is a power expressly vested in the SC by the Constitution. The SC has the plenary power over all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law. All legislation directing the integration of the Bar has been uniformly and universally
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the
holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. On Edillons
constitutional right of freedom to association. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not violative his constitutional right to
associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member.

In re : IBP Elections Bar Matter No. 491 (October 6, 1989)

Fast facts There were 3 candidates for the position of IBP President in 1989: Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta Drilon. Drilon
won the elections. However, there were allegations that the candidates resorted to unorthodox campaigning practices that further
investigation was conducted. The IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of
members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter.
Resolution Elections of 1989 are null and void. All the practices, those which pertain to the campaign of the 3 candidates proving to be overly
extravagant and unreasonable, made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole elections process. In addition the Court
amended the by-laws of the IBP. The changes included, among others, the shift of the voter participation in the elections from all the delegates

of the IBP per region to simply the members of the Board of Governors. The Court has power to amend the by-laws as part of their power to
promulgate rules under Article 8, Section 5(5).
De La Llana vs. Alba, 122 SCRA 291 (1983)
Fast facts De La Llana was a Judge and was allegedly affected by BP 129. He, together with other colleagues, filed an action to enjoin the
enactment of BP 129.
BP 129 An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other Purposes". BP 129 mandates that Justices and Judges of
inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the Judiciary. The purpose of this act is to
promote expediency in decisions and avoid accumulation of pending cases.
Issue (WON) BP 129 is constitutional. Held & Ratio The abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good
faith suffers from no infirmity. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the SC
and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitation new appointments and commissions. The Constitution vests
in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in
the case of the SC. There is no undue delegation of legislative power if the law is complete and provides for a standard.

DELA LLANA V ALBA

In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was
passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be
removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides
the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President
who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict
law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished,
the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance
with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and
that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle
that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have
its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization.
That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of
judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the
exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to
those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
G.R. No. 202242

April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs.JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR.,Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed 2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez (petitioner).

By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29,
2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether
the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if
the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111, 3 112,4 113,5 and
114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012. 7 On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the
arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012
Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution 8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice. Until further orders, the
Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Courts July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This
disposition is immediately executory."9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda. 10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has
always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins,
both the Malolos Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12 vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of
aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body. 13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one body, the appointment of judges and
justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the
condition that the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities, 15 the
members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the
President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio
members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to
the JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1wphi1 An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. 17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. 18 It has
been the situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the following grounds: 1] that
allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the
Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two

representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the
rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself
unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the
conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and
defined and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the
body politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the
framework upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly
relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which
must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance
and bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in the July
17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers
intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism.
One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."20 Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be
confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately." 21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately,
by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." 22 In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form
of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very
clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise
of its primary function to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely
assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the
existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions
which particular House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether in the
exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of appropriation, 24 the declaration of an existence of a
state of war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President, 26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must
be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all these instances, each House is constitutionally
granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in
consonance with the principle of checks and balances, as to the other branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required
between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC,
the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of
government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the
Executive Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so
providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence
to it as a major branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered
position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1)
of the 1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oftrepeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them."

Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the
three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of single representation of Congress in the JBC in
order to respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC
Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of politics in
Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of
two votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the
appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock
by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7) representatives coming from different sectors.
From the enumeration it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the
bicameral nature of our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific
that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC
members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth
reiterating.31 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the Commissions desire "to have in
the Council a representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives
from the three main branches of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The
unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx
Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial
nominees.
xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under
Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of
government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the
exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in
furtherance of Congress role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two
Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of
government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same weight to considerations that any of its
representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives
act as such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly
bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the
JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively
disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned
practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and
reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into
two or more is clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution
envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC simply because all of the regular
members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular
members of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of members of
Congress.

Respondents contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply because it was only questioned for the
first time through the present action, deserves scant consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no
matter how frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once an act is
considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under
the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is
essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation: 32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was
applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts
done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality
in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot
correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the
Constitution, read into the law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived inadvertence.
To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held as
intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the omission even though the omission
may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated." 36 "The Court cannot supply what it
thinks the legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation." 37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains
steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial
exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an
insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to
the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft
and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may
sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.