Case 2:15-cv-00201-JP Document 1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 1 of 12

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN HARGRAVE

: CIVIL ACTION

vs.

: No.

CHARLES RAMSEY AND

THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

: JURY TRIAL DEMAND

COMPLAINT

I.

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a section 1983 action, which Plaintiff brings to address defendants under color of
state authority conduct, viz intentional and in different treatment, because of Plaintiffs race and
prior First Amendment activities.
2. Plaintiff contends he was subject to illegal Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
clause race discrimination.
3. Plaintiff contends that the Defendant City and Ramsey used a disciplinary system in a
way that disparately impacts minorities, that Ramseys decisions against the Plaintiff and
Ramseys use or application of the disciplinary policys process, is retaliation for Plaintiffs prior
free speech and expression clause First Amendment activity; which activity, Ramsey was aware
of before and when Ramsey made the decision to not terminate the plaintiff and not reinstate the
Plaintiff to employment, following the Plaintiffs acquittal of the criminal charge, which charge
Ramsey relied on as a pretext to terminate the Plaintiff.
4. Plaintiff contends the Defendants acted under color of state law when they used the
Citys disciplinary system, then terminated the plaintiff, and declined to reinstate Plaintiff after
being acquitted of the offense for which Ramsey terminated the Plaintiff.
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5. Plaintiff suffered economic damages in excess of $100,000 from the defendants acts,
which acts are more fully describe below.
6. Plaintiff suffered personal injuries, which injuries as more fully described in the below
paragraphs, and the proximately cause of the injuries is the acts of defendant Ramsey, which acts
are more fully described below. The injuries too are from the Citys disciplinary policy, or use of
the policy, to discriminate, and the Citys policy to terminate an employee upon a mere
allegation, viz criminal allegation, and/or because of the employees first amendment or
otherwise protected activity; such activity is, but not limited to, the right to sue in court the City
and its employees for depriving under color of law an employees civil rights.
II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. This Court derives jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff claims under 42 USC 1983, et. seq., 28
USC 1331 (federal Question), and 1340 (civil rights). Venue is proper in this Court because the
defendants reside in this venue and Plaintiffs claims accrued in this venue.
III.

PARTIES

8. John Hargrave, plaintiff hereafter, is a natural person. Plaintiff is a Person as such term
is used or intended under 42 USC 1983, et seq.
9. Charles Ramsey, hereafter Ramsey or defendant Ramsey is a natural person. Ramsey
resides in the County and City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Ramsey is now and was for all
times related to the Plaintiffs claim the Police Commissioner.
10. Ramsey as the Police Commissioner for the City of Philadelphia. Ramsey as the Police
Commissioner is the highest-ranking decision making official in the police department, and
Ramsey is the policy-maker for discipline rules and how the disciplinary process will operate
within the police department.

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11. Ramsey is a state actor as such term is intended under 42 USC 1083 et seq.
12. Ramsey is sued in his individual capacity and not in his official capacity. Ramsey is sued
for a deprivation under color of state law of Plaintiffs federal rights.
13. The City of Philadelphia, here after Defendant City, is a municipal entity and it is located
in the County of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The City is public employer and it is a Person as
such term is intended under 42 USC 1983. The City operates solely under the authority
conferred to it by state law and through its official, employees, agents, and representatives,
which Ramsey is one.
IV.

MATERIAL FACTS

14. On or about November 6, 2012, Plaintiff was terminated from employment as a police
officer for the City of Philadelphia.
15. Defendant Ramsey is the person that terminated the Plaintiff from employment as a
police officer.
16. Defendant Ramsey is a person as such term is intended under 42 USC 1983 et seq.
17. Plaintiff has a recognized property interest in continuing wage earnings from the
employment, and for the benefits that are attended to the employment.
18. Plaintiffs termination deprived the Plaintiff of the aforementioned property.
19. Plaintiff based on his race belongs to a class of person, which class is African American.
20. Plaintiff as a civil service employee and member of a collective barging agreement
belongs to a class of city employee, whereas, he like the other class members can only be
terminated from employment when the City had good cause to terminate, and then only after
valid due process is first provided to the employee.

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21. Plaintiffs termination or loss of property is from a policy, practice, or custom of the City
of Philadelphia.
22. Defendant Ramsey, using policy- making authority as Police Commissioner, created and
used a policy to terminate the Plaintiff and other minority employees; whereas, the policy is to
terminate an employee that is merely arrested and where the punishment provides for
incarceration of one year or more, if the employee is convicted.
23. The aforementioned policy to terminate an employee, including the plaintiff, is to
terminate the employee on the mere arrest. Further, the policy is not uniformly applied against
non-class member as the plaintiff. The policy also, and the difference provides that s to reinstated
to employee if exonerated or found not guilty of the criminal allegation.
24. Ramsey has not applied the policy uniformly in regards to restoring an employee to
employment. In that Ramsey applies more favorably the policy towards non-minority police
employees and those officer that have not filed a lawsuit against the City by reinstating the nonclass employees to employment and by not requiring the non-class and/or white officers to seek
reinstatement through the collective bargaining arbitration process.
25. Ramsey required the Plaintiff, and other minority officers, such as Jessy Jones, to pursue
reinstatement to employment though the collective bargaining arbitration process.
26. In April, 2014, Plaintiff learned from other City police officers and/or FOP (Union)
official whom Plaintiff spoke with to obtain reinstatement of employment, that a white police
officer, who was terminated by Ramsey under the aforementioned policy, was reinstated by
Ramsey.
27. The white officer was reinstated by Ramsey after the officer was exonerated of the
criminal charge and without the need for the white officer to use the arbitration process.

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28. Plaintiff on or about July 2014 was found not guilty of the criminal charges.
29. In July 2014, Plaintiff requested Ramsey reinstate Plaintiff to police employment with the
City of Philadelphia.
30. On or about July 2014, Ramsey would not and refused to reinstate the Plaintiff to police
employment with the City of Philadelphia; Ramsey required the Plaintiff to obtain reinstatement
through the collective bargaining arbitration process.
31. On or about October 2014, Plaintiff in the pursuit for reinstatement, to his police
employment with the City of Philadelphia, was provided a hearing through the collective barging
arbitration hearing process.
32. Defendant Ramsey participated in Plaintiffs collective bargaining arbitration hearing
process, and Ramsey participated as a witness and the chief disciplinary policy maker for the
City of Philadelphia Police Department.
33. Defendant Ramsey, during the Plaintiffs collective bargaining arbitration process,
enforced the policy to terminate an employee, such as the plaintiff, because of a mere arrest on a
criminal charge, where the penalty for the charge is incarceration of a year or more.
34. Plaintiff believes, thus avers, that the policy to terminate because of a mere arrest, and to
treat more favorably non-class employees, is unconstitutional on its face, as is applied, and
arbitrarily treats unequally persons because of race and/or prior first amendment activity.
35. Plaintiff believes and thus avers that but for Plaintiffs race and a prior lawsuit filed
against the City, for race discrimination and malicious prosecution of a theft allegation, for
which Plaintiff was exonerated, that Plaintiff would have been returned to employment by
Ramsey without the need to go through the arbitration process.

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36. As a direct result of the policy, the disparate use of the policy, and defendant Ramseys
animus for the Plaintiff, and/or Plaintiffs his class or prior protected in court activity to
challenge and oppose race discrimination and the misuse of the criminal system, the Plaintiff
suffered both economic damages and personal injury.
37. Ramsey was aware of and on notice of Plaintiffs race and protected activity when
Ramsey made a decision to not reinstate the plaintiff to police employment.
38. Plaintiff sustained actual economic damages in excess of $100,000.00, and suffered
personal injury; such injury as, but not limited to, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment
and extreme emotion distress.
39. Defendant Ramsey acts, including the use of the aforementioned policy, was intentional,
malicious, done in reckless disregard of or deliberate indifference of the Plaintiffs rights, as such
rights are secured by federal law, rule, and the U.S. Constitutions First and Fourteenth
Amendments.

COUNT I
42 USC 1983 et se,
Fourteenth Amendment-Equal Protection of the Law
Invidious Race Discrimination
40. Plaintiff by incorporation incorporates all preceding paragraphs here and as though
repeated verbatim.
41. Defendant Ramsey, using under color of state law authority, which authority is conferred
on Ramesh as police commissioner under law or city authority, deprived the Plaintiff of federal
rights that are secured under federal law, rule, and constitution.
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42. Defendant Ramsey would not and did not return the Plaintiff to city police employment
because of the Plaintiff race.
43. Defendant Ramsey applied a policy to terminate an employee because of an arrest on a c
criminal charge, and did not, would not return the Plaintiff to city police employment, after
plaintiff was acquitted or found not guilty of the criminal charge, because of the Plaintiff race.
44. Defendant City and Ramsey failed to hire the plaintiff and/or failed to renew plaintiffs
employment.
45. Plaintiffs protected status was a motivating factor and/or the determinative factor in
defendant Ramseys decision to not rehire or reinstate the plaintiff.
46. Defendant Ramsey acted with the intent to discriminate against the plaintiff, because of
Plaintiffs race, or said differently because of the plaintiff's protected status (race and/or class
membership), which was a motivating factor for defendant Ramseys action.
47. Defendant Ramseys decision under the policy, as the decisions applied to the Plaintiff,
viz, to treat Plaintiff unequally than how a white officer is treated under a substantially similar
situation.
48. But for and as a direct result of the acts of defendant Ramsey, such as not to reinstate the
plaintiff, or to disparately use of the disciplinary policy and work rules, and/or because of
defendant Ramseys animus for the Plaintiffs race and/or Plaintiffs prior protected in court
activity, which activity was to challenge and oppose race discrimination and the misuse of the
criminal system, which opposition was made in court by a discrimination lawsuit, which lawsuit
Ramsey was aware of and on notice of when Ramsey acted, the Plaintiff sustained actual
economic damages in excess of $100,000.00, and Plaintiff suffered personal injury, such injury
as, but not limited to, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment and extreme emotion distress.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the Court enter judgment for the Plaintiff and against the
defendants, and to award plaintiff all legal and equitable relief the law allows, including
reinstatement, to declare the policy unconstitutional, enjoin further use of the policy, and to
award back and front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees and
litigation costs.
COUNT II42 USC 1983
First Amendment - Retaliation
49. Plaintiff by incorporation incorporates all preceding paragraphs here and as though
repeated verbatim.
50. Defendant Ramsey, acting under color of state law authority, and using such authority
under statutory law or city authority that is conferred on Ramsey as police commissioner,
Ramsey deprived the Plaintiff of federal rights that are secured under federal law, rule and
constitution.
51. Defendant Ramsey would not and did not return the Plaintiff to city police employment
because of the Plaintiffs prior first amendment activities to speak out and express in a prior
lawsuit an opposition to race discrimination and/or misuse of the criminal and disciplinary
system.
52. Defendant Ramsey applied against the Plaintiff a City policy, which policy is to terminate
an employee because of an arrest on a criminal charge, which charge might provide for
incarceration of a year or more.
53. Ramsey, because of the aforementioned policy, and other pre-textual or illegal reasons
did not and would not return the Plaintiff to City police employment after plaintiff engaged in

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first amendment activity to clear his name, such as to speech of his innocence in court, which is
protected free speech and expression activity.
54. Ramsey intentionally refused to reinstate Plaintiff after Plaintiff was acquitted and/or
found not guilty of the criminal charge that Ramsey relied on to terminate the Plaintiff.
55. Defendant Ramseys decisions under the City disciplinary policy, practice or custom, and
as Ramsey applied the policy to the Plaintiff, was motivated because of Plaintiffs race and/or
prior protected activity.
56. Ramseys acts is retaliation for plaintiff prior free speech, expression, and written petition
to oppose the Citys misuse of the criminal process and/or unequally use the disciplinary process,
which different treatment disparately impacts on minorities.
57. But for Plaintiff's first amendment activities, Defendant Ramsey would not have required
the Plaintiff to exhaust a collective barging arbitration process to obtain reinstatement of
Plaintiffs city police employment.
58. As a direct result of the of defendant Ramseys decisions to retaliate for Plaintiffs prior
protected in court activity, which was to challenge and oppose race discrimination and/or the
misuse of the criminal system, which opposition and lawsuit Ramsey was aware of and on notice
of at the time of Ramseys decision to not reinstate the plaintiff, the Plaintiff sustained actual
economic damages in excess of $100,000.00, and suffered personal injury; such injury as, but not
limited to, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment and extreme emotion distress.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the Court enter judgment for the Plaintiff and against the
defendants, and to award plaintiff all legal and equitable relief the law allows, including
reinstatement, to declare the policy unconstitutional, enjoin further use of the policy, and to

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award back and front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees and
litigation costs.
COUNT III
-42 USC 1983 et seq.
Monell
59. Plaintiff by incorporation incorporates all preceding paragraphs here and as though
repeated verbatim.
60. But for the policy, past custom and practice of the City was to reinstate police employees
terminated for a mere arrest on a criminal charge.
61. The aforementioned policy that Ramsey created, applied against the Plaintiff, and
enforced was "the 'moving force' be hide the Plaintiffs deprivation of federal rights, such rights
as the Fourteenth Amendment loss of property because of different treatment in substantial
similar situation, viz race discrimination, and Ramseys disparate use of the policy and/or
Ramseys retaliatory conduct for Plaintiff First Amendment free speech and expression petition
clause conduct.
62. The City acted though Ramsey and Ramsey acted with deliberate indifference for the
Plaintiff equal rights, property rights, and right to be free from retaliation for first amendment
activities.
63. The City of Philadelphia failed to adequately train and/or supervisor Ramsey. In that they
provided Ramsey with no training in federal rights and the City with knowledge of Ramsey
having no training in civil or federal right did not supervise Ramsey to insure his decision would
not likely deprive employees or persons of federal rights.
64. The Citys failure to train or supervise Ramsey, when the City knew or was on notice that
Ramsey was making disciplinary decision and/or creating disciplinary policy concerning

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reinstatement of police employees under the policy to terminate a police employee for an arrest
under a criminal law, is deliberate indifference for a persons federal rights.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the Court enter judgment for the Plaintiff and against the
defendants, and to award plaintiff all legal and equitable relief the law allows, including
reinstatement, to declare the policy unconstitutional, enjoin further use of the policy, and to
award back and front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees and
litigation costs.
COUNT IV
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Art 1 Section
Equal Rights Race
65. Plaintiff by incorporation incorporates all preceding paragraphs here and as though
repeated verbatim.
66. Defendant Ramsey, using under color of state law authority, which authority is conferred
on Ramsey, as the police commissioner, is under law or the City's authority, deprived the
Plaintiff of federal rights that are secured under federal law, rule, and constitution.
67. Defendant Ramsey would not and did not return the Plaintiff to city police employment
because of the Plaintiff race.
68. Defendant Ramsey applied a policy to terminate an employee because of an arrest on a c
criminal charge, and did not, would not return the Plaintiff to city police employment, after
plaintiff was acquitted or found not guilty of the criminal charge, because of the Plaintiff race.
69. Defendant Ramseys decision under the policy, as the decisions applied to the Plaintiff
treated Plaintiff unequally than how a white officer is treated under a substantially similar
situation.

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70. But for and as a direct result of the acts of defendant Ramsey, the disparate use of the
termination policy, and defendant Ramsey animus for the Plaintiff and/or Plaintiffs race, and
Plaintiffs prior protected in court activity to challenge and oppose race discrimination and
misuse of the criminal system, which opposition and lawsuit Ramsey was aware of and on notice
of for Ramseys decision to not reinstate the plaintiff, the Plaintiff sustained actual economic
damages in excess of $100,000.00, and suffered personal injury; such injury as, but not limited
to, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment and extreme emotion distress.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the Court enter judgment for the Plaintiff and against the
defendants, and to award plaintiff all legal and equitable relief the law allows, including
reinstatement, to declare the policy unconstitutional, enjoin further use of the policy, and to
award back and front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees and
litigation costs.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/
Brian M. Puricelli, Esquire
Attorney for the Plaintiff

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