Professional Documents
Culture Documents
[Vol. 56
282
Opening Report to the W.G. Hart Legal Workshop on Dispute Resolution: Civil Justice and its
Alternatives (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 7-9 July 1992).
O.W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation (1899) 6 Harvard L Rev 365; also in Collected
Legal Papers (New York: Peter Smith, 1952), at 203.
0 The Modem Law Review Limited 1993
May 19931
which, of course, is yet another kind of exaggeration, leading to what I have called
the philosophy of catastrophe.
The access-to-justice movement, as a theoretical approach, while certainly rooted
in the realistic criticism of formalism and legal dogmatics, tends toward a vision
more faithful to the complexity of human society. While the normative component
of the law is not denied, it is seen as one element, and quite often not even the
principal one of the law. The primary element is the people, with all their cultural,
economic and psychological features. Moreover, the institutions and processes are
prominent in this realistic vision. The result of the access-to-justice approach is
a contextual conception of the law. Thus, instead of a uni-dimensional conception,
whereby the law and legal scholarship are limited to the ascertainment of the norms,
a tri-dimensional conception is affirmed. A first dimension reflects the societal
problem, need or demand that prompts a legal intervention or the creation of a legal
institution; the second dimension reflects the legal response or solution and, indeed,
a response that includes in addition to the norms the institutions and processes which
are intended to deal with that societal need, problem or demand; and finally, a third
dimension faces the results, or impact, of such a legal response on the societal need,
problem or demand. The role of legal scholarship, and indeed the role of lawyers
generally, thus becomes much more complex, but also much more fascinating and
realistic. To exemplify, it does not limit itself to describing the rules, forms and
procedures applying to the acts of initiating a judicial proceeding or an appeal; it
must also consider the costs to be borne, the time required, the dificulties (including
psychological ones) to overcome, the bene$ts to be obtained, etc.
Let me now come to the access-to-justice movement as a reform movement. The
tri-dimensional approach requires, first, that we become aware of the basic societal
needs, problems and expectations to which a legal institution is intended to give
an answer. Since we are concerned here with civil procedure, the question is what
are the basic societal needs, problems, aspirations in respect of civil litigation?
A first answer reflects the very raison d gtre of the access-to-justice movement.
The idea of access is the historic response to criticism of liberalism and the rule
oflaw. Such criticism, in its extreme expressions, maintains that the traditional civil
and political liberties are a futile promise, indeed a deception for those who, because
of economic, social and cultural reasons defacto, have no capacity to accede to
and to benefit from those liberties. The access movement then undertakes to analyse
and to search for the ways to overcome the dificulties or obstacles which make
civil and political liberties non-accessible to so many people. With specific regard
to civil procedure, there are three basic obstacles to overcome.
First is the economic obstacle, that is, the poverty of many people who, for
economic reasons, have no or little access either to information or to adequate
representation. Here the access movement, in its first wave, has become the
proponent of, and has focused its research interests on, such devices as legal aid
and advice, a topic which is not part of our work~hop,~
but indeed one in which
this country, since at least 1949, has been a leader.4 In addition to legal aid and
advice, an alternative has been emerging, legal expenses insurance, the growth
of which in Europe has been documented for a number of years by a bilingual
3 This statement proved to be wrong - one session of the workshop was dedicated to legal aid.
See eg M. Cappelletti, J. Gordley and E. Johnson Jr, Toward Equal Justice: A Comparative Study
of Legal Aid in Modern Societies (New York: Milan & Dobbs Ferry, 1981).
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[Vol. 56
The periodical is now in its twentieth year and is published every four months in Brussels. See also
Erhard Blankenburg and Jean Fiedler, Die Rechtsschutzversicherungund der steigende GeschciftsnfaCC
der Gerichte (Tubingen: Mohr, 1981).
6 See the Brown Report, infra n 43, at pp 36-37.
7 [I9771 3 WLR 300; see the comment by I.H.Jacob, Access to Justice in England in M. Cappelletti
and B. Garth (eds), Access to Justice, vol 1 , book 1 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff, 1978) p 417ff,
at p 473.
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There are many more, for instance, again in Sweden, the ombudsman to protect
against sexual discrimination in labour relations. Here, the advantage is that the
agency has special expertise in the area involved and can represent the entire interest,
not only a fragment of it. The shortcoming of this solution, however, is that it tends
to burden the state with more bureaucratic machinery and regulations. Also, as best
illustrated on occasions, certainly under the Reagan presidency by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in the USA, there might be a decline of the agencys zeal
and activism; and the agency might tend to be captured by the very interests it
was expected to control. Moreover, we should keep in mind that the interests involved
are primarily private, not public in nature, even though they belong to groups or
classes of people. Governmental agencies are not always sensitive to such collective,
yet private interests. Thus different devices have been developed, which better reflect
the hybrid but essentially private nature of the diffuse rights. These devices include
the class action, which is especially important in the United States but also elsewhere
in the Common Law world. This device is rarely adopted in the Civil Law countries
(a recent exception is the class action possibility envisaged by the new code for
the protection of consumers in Brazils). As is well known, typical of the class
action is that one or a few member(s) of the class - a class that might extend to
thousands, even millions of persons - has standing to represent the entire class,
if the court recognises him or her (or them) as an adequate representative of the
entire class. This is all so well known that one might wonder why I have felt it
worthy to be mentioned here. My reason for doing so is to highlight the very radical
characteristics of the class action solution, the very characteristics that make its
introduction into other countries so difficult, notwithstandingthe remarkable efforts
of such scholars as Per Henrik Lindblom in S ~ e d e n . ~
The class action device admittedly breaks away from some of the traditional and,
indeed, millennia-old principles of civil litigation: those principles that, significantly,
are called rules of natural justice. First, the traditional principle is that standing
to sue belongs only to the person or persons who are, or affirm to be, the owner@)
of the right vindicated in court; in the case of a class action, on the contrary, standing
is granted to the owner of a merefragment of the right. Second, the rules of natural
justice imply that all the persons for or against whom the decision will have res
judicata effects shall be heard, which includes inter alia duly notifying every person.
However, this is simply impossible in class actions; consider, for instance, the famous
case Eisen v Carlisle & JacquelZinO in which notification, even limited to those
absent parties whose address was relatively easy to be found, would have cost
US$225,000, and this for postage alone: an impossible cost to bear for any plaintiff.
Thus, even the very traditional idea of res judicata, which as the ancients said,
tertiis nequeprodest neque nocet, had to be moulded to the exigencies of these new
rights. Of course, traditionalists have raised their voice against such developments,
8
The text of the Brazilian law can be seen in Diario Oficial Republica Federativa do Brasil, 12 September
1990, supplement to No 176. For some comments, see Ada Pellegrini Grinover, 0 novo process0
do consumidor (1991) 16 Revista de Processo, p 141% also M. Cappelletti, 0acesso dos consumidores
a Justica, ibid p 205ff.
9 See the remarkable book Grupptalan det Anglo Amerihnsh class actioninstitutetur Svenskt Perspektiv
(Stockholm: Norstedts, 1989), especially ch 15 where sixteen mythsare discussed, that is, the reasons
usually presented as contrary to the adoption of class action in Sweden and more generally in Civil
Law countries. Efforts to introduce class actions in other countries have been made, for instance,
in Japan under the leadership of Professor Takeshi Kojima and others; in Sweden, Dean Lindblom
is presently the chairperson of a governmental committee to study the possibility of introducing the
class action in that country.
10
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invoking due process values. However, I certainly agree with my Stanford colleague
Kenneth Scott, that it is a landmark in judicial sophistry to use the due process
concept in the name of protecting the interests of class members, to reject the only
litigation procedure capable of doing S O . I1 Another basic rule of millenary tradition which also had to be set aside by the class action device is no less important:
the traditional concept of damages implies that only damages suffered by the plaintiff
can be restored; here, however, once again the only way to make the vindication
of diffuse rights effective is to consider the entire damage caused by the masswrongdoer, and to find imaginative ways for the distribution of damages among
the members of the entire class, including members not present in the case.
Another solution, which prevails in Continental European countries, is the action
collective (in France and Belgium) or Verbandsklage in Germany and Austria.
Here, standing to sue is entrusted to associations (generally private associations,
such as consumer or environmental associations, but also a range of other associations
such as leagues for the protection of family interests, leagues against racial abuse,
leagues against alcoholism, leagues for the furtherance of the rights of women, of
children, of veterans, of the handicapped, etc). The advantages of this solution vish-vis the isolated litigator are clear: on the one hand, they are specialised in the
area they represent. However, unlike the specialised governmental agencies, they
are better suited to preserve the zeal of the private persons involved, while at the
same time representing the entire interest and not merely a fragment of it. They
can also multiply the resources of isolated individuals. The shortcoming of this
solution, vis-h-vis the class action solution, is that usually only associations duly
registered (certifibes)and, quite frequently, only associations in existence for one
or more years are entitled to bring actions as the representatives of the entire group
or category. Furthermore, a statute is also usually necessary to define the requirements
for such power of representation; of course, it will then be for the courts to verify
the existence of such requirements in the case at hand. Obviously, this means that
there is a certain degree of rigidity in this solution, unlike the class action where
any member of the class can, in a sense, appoint him or herself as the champion
for the entire class (subject to the verification by the court that the class suitor is
an adequate class champion).
A further but quite rarely adopted solution is the citizen action. Unlike the class
action, where standing to sue can be granted only to a member of the class, here
anybody (quisquis de populo) can claim standing. I give two illustrations: one is
the Clean Air Act in the United States which, both in its original version (1977)
and in its new version (1990), gives standing to everybody (as well as to the
Administrator of the Act) to go to court against any violation of the law (a similar
provision is in the Clean Water Act).l3 A second illustration, which I find very
interesting indeed, is provided by the Land of Bavaria, which established a
Popularkluge in case of violation of the fundamental rights proclaimed by the Land
Constitution; here the idea is that a violation of the Grundrechte by Land organs
is, in some indirect way, a violation of every citizens basic rights and expectations;
hence, everybody is entitled to vindicate such rights against state organs.
11
K. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process in J.H. Merryman (ed),Stanford Legal Essays (Stanford,
CA, 1975) p 413ff, at p 420.
12 See eg N.A. Schoibl, Die Verbandsklage als Instrument zur Wahrung offentlicher oder iiberindividueller Interessen, im osterreichschen Zivilverfahrenrecht in (1990) Ditschrif! fiir
Rechtsvergleichung: Internationales Privatrecht und Euraparecht 2 1 .
13 See J. Onarles and W.H. Levis Jr, The New Clean Air Act and the Clean Air Programme as Amended
in 1990 (Morgan, Lewis and Bockius, 1990) p 54.
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May 19931
Some scholars have seen in the citizen action the most perfect solution of the
problem of vindicating diffuse rights.14 I have always been and remain a little
sceptical about this solution, except perhaps when the most basic rights are concerned.
It involves risks of abuse which might not be outbalanced by its advantages. To
put it in blunt terms, it is my impression that an army of busybodies is less effective
than a limited number of adequately representative persons or associations motivated
by a personal or organisational interest. Consider also the guiding behaviour effect
of judicial decisions; the risk with citizen actions is to reach decisions which, because
of the inadequacy of the popular suitor, are misleading and might be more damaging
than of advantage to the interest involved.
So much for the obstacle to access which is what we have called organisational
poverty. There is, however, a further obstacle which I have proposed to call
procedural. By procedural obstacle I mean the fact that, in certain areas or kinds
of controversies, the normal solution - the traditional contentious litigation in court
- might not be the best possible way to provide effective vindication of rights.
Here the search must be for real (stricto sensu) alternatives to the ordinary courts
and the usual litigation procedures.
This idea is not new of course: conciliation, arbitration, mediation have always
been important elements of the means of dispute settlement. However, there is a
new element in that modern societies have developed new reasons to prefer such
alternatives. It is important to stress the fact that such new reasons include the very
essence of the access movement, that is the fact that the judicial process now is,
or should be, open to larger and larger segments of the population, indeed in theory
at least to the entire population. This is, of course, the cost of access to justice,
which is the cost of democracy itself; a cost that advanced societies must be ready
and happy to bear.
Alternative dispute process is an area in which the Ford Foundation developed
a pioneer programme as early as 1978, which launched a broad search for what
was called new approaches to conflict re~olution,~~
dealing particularly with
complexpublic policy disputes, regulatory disputes, disputes arising out of social
welfare programmes, all of which were intended to find ways to handle disputes
outside the formal system.
What has emerged in this search are especially conciliatory,non-contentious forms
of alternatives, as well as special courts, often staffed with layjudges. In the Florence
Access-to-Justice Project, one volume (vol 2 in two books) was entirely dedicated
to such a search. Illustrationsare innumerable and of very diverse kinds. Conciliation
is pre-eminent. What must first be said is that, whereas - in the last two centuries
or so - Western civilizations have glorified the ideal of fighting for ones rights
(Jehrings famous Kampf urns Recht), we should recognise that in certain areas
a different approach - one that I used to call co-existentialjustice - might be
preferable and better able to assure access to justice. We should be humble enough
to recognise that we might have a lot to learn from African and Asian traditions.
Quite interesting is a recent book by our Japanese colleague Takeshi Kojima of Chuo
University in Tokyo, entitled Perspectives on Civil Justice and Alternative Dispute
14 See eg H. Kotz, Public Interest Litigation: A Comparative Survey in M. Cappelletti (ed), Access
to Justice and the Werfare State (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff, 1981) p 85ff, at p 110.
15 New Approaches to ConjlictResolution: A Ford Foundation Report (New York, May 1978). The Report
was based, in part, on the first findings of the Florence Access to Justice Project, the first three volumes
of which were published in 1978-79; the Florence Project was sponsored and partly funded by the
Ford Foundation.
0 The Modern Law Review Limited 1993
287
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Resolution: Japan and the USA.l6 This is an interesting book not only because of
its subject matter, but also because it puts in bold relief the contrast between a typically
litigious (Western) approach and one which is geared more towards achieving
consensus than to a rigidly conceived idea of right or wrong. A recent statute in
Italy, to be implemented by 1 January 1993, seems to move somewhat in that
direction; it provides for the establishment of over 4,000 justices of the peace,
endowing them with a limited, but nonetheless substantial power to decide cases
on the basis of equity rather than strict law. Of course, this is but a limited
development if one considers that, in this country, the bulk of the administration
of justice is left to more than 25,00017lay magistrates administering, in addition
to criminal cases, cases in civil, including family, matters.
As mentioned earlier, the search for alternatives has represented what Professor
Bryant Garth and I happened to call the third wave in the access-to-justice
movement.18Needless to say, there are here many hard questions and difficulties
- perhaps contradictions, as was emphasised by Professor Abel in a well-known
and often cited article ten years ag0.I9Among the hard questions to be faced, two
stand out. First, what are the best kinds of institutions to be promoted? Possibilities
include arbitration, mediation, conciliation and, of course, an array of simplified
procedures as well as small claims courts. Second, which are the best kinds of persons
to staff such institutions? These may include lay persons and, quite often (as in the
traditional commercial courts where merchants have been the adjudicators, as is
still the case in the French tribunaux de commerce), persons involved with and
personally aware of the same kinds of interests and problems as the parties in the
case. This is typical, for instance, in labour and agricultural matters, as illustrated
by the Conseils de Prud hommes in France and, again in France, by the Tribunaux
paritaires des baux ruraux.*O In both of these French institutions, conciliation
procedures are prominent.* Another hard question concerns the minimum
standards and guarantees to be maintained even in these alternative kinds of
adjudicatory organs and procedures. The risk, of course, is that the alternative will
provide only a second classjustice because, almost inevitably, the adjudicators in
these alternative courts and procedures would lack, in part at least, those safeguards
of independence and training that are present in respect of ordinary judges. And
the procedures themselves might often lack, in part at least, those formal guarantees
of procedural fairness which are typical of ordinary litigation. An important
16 Tokyo, The Institute of Comparative Law in Japan, 1990.
17 To this number, a number of lay judges in administrative tribunals has to be added.
18 See M. Cappelletti and B. Garth, Access to Justice: The Worldwide Movement to Make Rights
Effective. A General Report in Access to Justice, vol 1, book 1, p lff, at pp 49ff, 54ff.
19 Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice in R.L. Abel (ed), The Politics of Informal
Justice, vol 1 (New York: Academic Press, 1982) p 287ff. What follows in the text might indicate
that I tend to disagree with the very sharp and certainly most stimulating criticism by Professor Abel.
The Politics of Znfonnal Justice (at least its main philosophy as put forward by its Editor) was a strong
and uncompromising indictment of the kind of developments which in the Access to Justice Project
were described as the third wave in the movement. This was considered a radical attack in so far
as it challenged developments which were described as providing poor justice to the poor. I have
for many years disagreed with this radical approach, which in fact seems to me quite the opposite
from radical; indeed, extremely conservative. There are two ways to refuse change: one is simply
to say no to reforms; the other, and perhaps a less overt one, is to pretend perfection (the all-ornothing approach). However, if we want to apply ordinary procedures even to the most insignificant
controversies (what the Germans call Bagatell-Sachen), then we might find that to be fully unrealistic
and, indeed, unreasonable.
20 See H. Solus and R. Perrot, Droit Judiciuire Privk, tome 3 (Paris: Sirey, 1991) pp 478ff, 518ff.
21 See id, op et loc ult cit.
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22
289
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See the article by Yyuan Zhou, Arbitration Courts have hands full this year, in China Daily, 5 April
1992. According to this author China has established the second largest international trade arbitration
agency in the world.
26 T. Fisher (ed), Family Conciliation within the UK: Policy and Practice (Bristol: Family Law, 2nd
ed, 1992).
27 C. Menkel-Meadow, Review Essay in (1986) 69 Judicature 302. See also Grillo, Mediation: Process
Dangers for Women (1991) Yale L.J. 1545.
28 A collection of studies on small claims courts in a number of countries from the USA to Europe and
Japan provides ample information; see C.J.Whelan (ed), Small Claims Courts: A Comparative Study
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
29 For an illustration, see my study The Future of Legal Education: A Comparative Perspective in
(1992) South African Journal of Human Rights, pp 15-16.
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30
31
32
29 1
[Vol. 56
Green and Sander.33It deals with negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and hybrid
processes, especially in family disputes, neighbourhood justice centres, intrainstitutional disputes, consumer disputes, environmental disputes, intergovernmental
disputes and even international disputes. An array of possibilities are mentioned,
including private judging (rent-a-judge). A large part of the book is dedicated
to the impediments to and problems in the use of ADR processes, and how to
overcome such impediments and problems. One alternative device often used in
the USA is the so-called mini trial, in which the parties present their case to a neutral
advisor or even to a mock jury (so-called summary jury trials).
To be especially noted is that in a number of states in the United States almost
every court has the arbitration possibility. Parties referred by the court to the
arbitrator must do so; thus the assignment is compulsory, but the arbitration decision
might be contested, thus this device has not been held unconstitutional; sanctions,
however, eg the imposition of costs, are provided against the party who seeks a
rehearing by the court and does not obtain a better result than by the a r b i t r a t ~ r . ~ ~
It should also be noted that, in the United States, the American Bar Association
and at least 120 state and local bar associations now have special ADR sections
and committees.36
France is another country where interesting developments have occurred over
the last fifteen years or so. First the conciliateurs: after an experiment in four
departments (Alpes Maritimes, Gironde, Haute Marne and Loire Atlantique) in
1978,37conciliuteurs were introduced in the entire country. From 1981 to 1987
there was a period of relaxation, with the suspension of the recruitment of conciliateurs, due to the scepticism (hard to explain!) of the ruling socialist party vis-a-vis
that institution. However, after 1987 there has been a revival and further development
of this institution.38 The conciliuteurs are not magistrates but private persons,
appointed by the President of the Court of Appeal, for a period of one year renewable
for two more years. They are responsible for meeting the parties and trying to find
out whether there is the possibility of arriving at a conciliation agreement (the
conciliateur is allowed to hear testimonial evidence). As a leading French authority
(Professor Roger Perrot) says:
This institution deserves confidence and any mefiance corporatiste (especially from the
judiciary, a distrust that contributed to the relaxation of this institution from 1981 to 1987)
is unjustified. It is sure that for many persons justice is psychologically remote: in our rural
areas, the presence of a conciliateur close to the interested persons is an interesting idea which
deserves to be pursued.39
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May 19931
mediation role. This practice is not limited to France and can be found, for instance,
in Germany and Italy, where the judges at the beginning of a case are expected
to try to reach a Vergleich, that is, a compromise between the parties. The French
proposal has been widely criticised by many judges as a form of excessive privatisation of the judicial function; and, as a matter of fact, the bill has not or not yet
become a law. Professor Perrot, however, once again expresses his opinion in favour
of this institution and his conviction that the risks inherent in such an innovation
could be easily prevented, by means of technical safeguards of easy implementation,
for example, by forbidding the mkdiuteur in case of failure of the mediation efforts
to inform the judge ot the evidence collected. With such simple provisions, this
practice of using the services of a mkdiuteur has, in Professor Perrots opinion, the
potential for being extremely
Another authoritative opinion is expressed
by Professor Vincent and others, who note that the mkdiuteur is already used, with
good results in certain criminal cases, eg cases involving minors.41
This country also presents most interesting developments in the area of alternative
dispute processes beyond the family sphere. These developments are presumably
well known to this audience, but I must mention two recent reports, one prepared
by Henry Brown for the Courts and Legal Services Committee of the Law Society,
the other by a Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Justice Beldam for the
General Council of the Bar. Apart from some brief references to other countries,
the Brown Report focuses on developments in England and Wales, and includes
adjudicatory ADR processes (arbitration and expert determination), nonadjudicatory and hybrid processes (including mediation, mini trials, court annexed
arbitration, neutral fact-finding experts and med-arb, that is, the amalgam of
mediation and arbitration), plus other hybrid forms (such as the moderated settlement conference). The report also includes a valuable discussion of the ethical
implications of ADR.43 The Brown Report is concluded by a five-year action
plan which foresees a further and pervasive growth. The prospect for special teaching
and training in ADR is also mentioned and forcefully recommended.@
The Beldam Report begins with a rapid survey of some contemporary ADR
initiatives in Britain and overseas, and a commentary on submissions received from
official bodies. It then concludes that court-based alternative dispute resolution
would be of value across a wide field of civil disputes. It approves mediated
negotiations as the most appropriate form for ADR to take, proposes lawyers as
the mediators and visualises the process located firmly within the courts system.
The Report concludes with a proposal for pilot schemes in some county courts and
at least one division of the High Court.
It is noteworthy that in this country a number of organisations are involved with
ADR processes: they are listed in Schedule 2 of the Brown Report. These organisations are: the Centre for Dispute Resolution (CEDR); the British Academy of Experts;
R. Perrot, op cit, supra n 39, paras 491-492.
Jean Vincent et al, La Justice et ses Institutions (Paris: Dalloz, 3rd ed, 1991) p 505.
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Report prepared by Henry Brown for the Courts and Legal Services
Committee, July 1991, The Law Society, Legal Practice Directorate, 1991; Report ofthe Committee
on Alternative Dispute Resolution, General Council of the Bar, October 1991.
43 In this connection, it might be worth noting that both the National Family Conciliation and the Family
Mediators Association have already Codes of Practice, and that the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators
has its Guidelines of Good Practice for Arbitrators. Confidentiality, of course, is an important element
of the ethics of mediators and other neutrals.See the Brown Report, supra n 43, p 31; to the Report
is attached in Schedule 4 a Specimen of a Code Practice for mediators.
44 See the Report at pp 29-30.
40
41
42
293
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46
47
294
See the Brown Report, supra n 43, p 17. Also, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators offers a similar
possibility, called SupervisedSettlement Procedure. Similar possibilities are offered by the American
Arbitration Association, the Australian Commercial Dispute Centre and the Chamber of Commerce
of Zurich; ibidem.
I am grateful to my former colleague Monica Seecombe for drawing my attention to these.
P.H. Lindblom, Allmandomstol som alternativt tvistlosningsorganin Fesfskriji fill Per Olof Bolding
(Stockholm: Juristforlaget, 1992) pp 261-288.
0 The Modern Law Review Limited 1993
May 19931
19th and 20th centuries was that the equality thus achieved was often more a fasade
than a reality, it was a mockery for those to whom the caustic motto could apply
that they were all free to sleep under the bridges. From a real equality before
the law all those were defucto excluded who had no economic and/or cultural capacity
to have real access to those rights which, in theory, were supposed to be equal for
all. It was precisely the highest court of this country which, in the 1930s, stated
that poverty is a misfortune for which the law cannot take any responsibility at
The answer to such a criticism has been, at times, that of a total denial of
the Rule of Law ideal and of the liberties (derogatorily called traditional) of the
Rechtsstuut. Such a denial brought about tragic results, namely the totalitarian regimes
in many countries, including Germany, Italy and Spain. Also it brought about those
further, and alas still painful, disasters: the regimes of the so-called real socialism,
in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, based on the idea that individual liberties were
valueless, while only social rights were to be pursued; with the consequence of
concentrating all power, including economic power, in the hands of the political
branches or even a political party. This inevitably brought about economic bankruptcy
(in an economic system where politicians acted as uncontrolled entrepreneurs and
any competition, the basic engine for economic as well as political progress, was
wholly neglected).
Another answer, however, has also emerged to the criticism of the liberal
revolution. This consists not in the repudiation of the traditional liberties, but
rather in supplementing them with the new social rights, which have precisely
the basic aim of making those freedoms accessibleto all, thus making poverty relevant
indeed for the law. The access-to-justice philosophy reflects this very answer, ie
the attempt to add a social dimension to the Rule of Law state, that is, the passage
from the Rechtstuut to the soziuler Rechtstuut as proclaimed in the most advanced
Constitutions of Europe, including the French,49the GermanMand, more recently,
the Spanishs; indeed as it is proclaimed also in such transnational bills of rights
as the European Convention of Human Rights as interpreted by the European Court
at Strasbourg. Thus, the access-to-justice movement and its third wave, which
emphasises the importance of alternative dispute processes, reflects the very rationale
of this political philosophy. The philosophy for which even the poor are entitled
to representation and information, even the unorganised groups, classes and
categories, should have access to effective remedies and, finally, a philosophy which
accepts alternative remedies and processes, in so far as such alternatives can help
to make justice fair and more accessible. Our conclusion is that the very subject
to be discussed in this workshop is most central to the social and political ideals
of our epoch.
Let me add a word about our responsibility as lawyers, whether in the Academy
or in practice. The most important intellectual battle of many jurists through our
See the reference in M. Storme, Rechtspraak in opspraak (Antwerpen: Kluwer, 1980) p 138. Anatole
Frances caustic derision might also be mentioned, that justice is made to give everyone his due:
to the rich his richness, to the poor his poverty.
49 See the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, which is incorporated in the Constitution of 1958.
50 See Arts 3 and 20 of the German Constitution.
5 1 See Art 1 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978.
52 In the field of legal aid, for instance, even though the Convention expressly established that legal
aid has to be provided in criminal cases (Art 5 ) , the Court has interpreted the general fair hearing
requirement as implying that legal aid shall be assured in civil litigation as well. S e e eg Airey v Ireland,
a decision by the European Court of Human Rights of 9 October 1979 in Publications ofrhe European
Court of Human Righrs, Series A, vol XXXII.
48
295
[701.
56
century, from the American and the Scandinavian realists to the programmes for
a libre recherche scientifique in France to the school of Interessenjurisprudenz
in Germany, has been against those abstract, dogmatic conceptions of the lawyers
role that would restrict our responsibility to a mere ascertainment and mechanical
application of the law. This conception is in conflict with a modern approach to
law and legal interpretation, indeed with a modem theory of hermeneutics gtlnerally:
interpretation always leaves some space for choices, hence for responsibility; indeed,
for what Karl Popper called the cross of being human - a cross indeec , and at
times a very heavy one, but that very cross which also has the beauty of res onsible
freedom. We have to be aware of our responsibility; our duty is to cont ibute to
making law and legal remedies reflect the actual needs, problems and as1,irations
of civil society. Among these needs are surely those of developing altern<?tivesto
the traditional processes and remedies any time such remedies are too expensive,
slow and inaccessible to the people; hence, the duty to find alternatives capable
of better accommodating the urgent demands of a time of societal transfor mations
at an unprecedently accelerated pace.
296